Resilience Beyond Rebellion: How Wartime Organizational Structures Affect Rebel-To-Party Transformation
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Resilience Beyond Rebellion: How Wartime Organizational Structures Affect Rebel-to-Party Transformation By Sheryl Zaks A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor David Collier, Co-chair Professor Ron Hassner, Co-chair Professor Leonardo Arriola Professor Heather A. Haveman Summer 2017 Abstract Scholars have established that the best prospects for long-term stability and democra- tization in war-torn states occur when former rebels compete in post-conflict elections. However, only half of the insurgencies with political aspirations successfully reinvent themselves as lasting opposition parties. Why are some rebel groups able to seamlessly transition into political parties while others revert to violence or die trying? My disser- tation draws on insights from organizational sociology to model the process and risks of rebel-to-party transition. I identify three wartime domains that I call proto-party struc- tures: shadow governance, political messaging, and social service wings. Proto-party structures represent a surprising dimension of rebel organizational diversity. Crucially, however, not all insurgencies have them. I demonstrate that these structures|by mirror- ing the key components of political party organizations|provide insurgencies with two decisive advantages when attempting to transition into a party: (1) relevant experience that translates into the political arena, and (2) an easier path to transition by repurpos- ing existing structures rather than building a party from scratch. I use a mixed-method approach|combining statistical analyses on a novel dataset with process tracing in three cases|to test my organizational theory of transition. 1 Contents 1 The Puzzle of Rebel-to-Party Transformation 1 1.1 Motivating Puzzle . 1 1.2 Significance and Contribution . 2 1.3 An Organizational Approach . 4 1.4 Data, Methods, and Scope . 5 1.5 Resilience or Metamorphosis? . 6 1.6 Outline . 8 2 Conceptualizing Rebel-to-Party Transformation 12 2.1 What is rebel-to-party transformation? . 13 2.2 Rebel-to-Party Transition in Four Acts . 20 2.2.1 Tradeoffs . 23 2.3 What affects rebel-to-party transformation? . 24 2.3.1 What facilitates rebel-to-party transition? . 24 2.3.2 What does the transformation process entail? . 25 2.4 Discussion . 29 3 Organizational Theory of Insurgent Resilience 31 3.1 Organizational Resilience: New Analytic Insight into Rebel-to-Party Transition . 33 3.1.1 When Size Matters . 33 3.1.2 Prior Flexibility . 34 3.1.3 Diversification / Domains of Activity . 34 3.1.4 Directed Resilience as a Guiding Framework . 35 3.2 What Changes? Proto-party Structures and the Content of Transformation . 36 3.2.1 A Map of Party Organizations . 37 3.2.2 A Map of Rebel Organizations . 38 3.2.3 Proto-party Structures as the Locus of Change . 41 3.2.4 Organizational Detractors: The Resource Curse Redux . 43 3.2.5 Implications . 44 3.3 How does Change Happen? Reprioritization versus Rebuilding . 44 3.3.1 Organizational Assessment . 46 i 3.3.2 Organizational Change: Two Paths to Transformation . 47 3.4 What Conditions Affect Change? . 51 3.4.1 Weak Governance . 51 3.4.2 Post-Conflict Electoral Institutions . 52 3.5 Conclusion . 53 4 Modeling Rebel-to-Party Transformation 54 4.1 Evaluation of Existing Datasets . 55 4.1.1 Evaluating Rebel-to-Party Operationalization . 56 4.1.2 Evaluating Inclusion Criteria . 61 4.2 Insurgent Structures and Outcomes (ISO) Data (1975{2015) . 64 4.2.1 Inclusion Criteria . 64 4.2.2 Outcome Variable: Rebel-to-Party Transformations . 66 4.2.3 Coding Organization-Level Variables . 70 4.2.4 Additional Explanatory Variables and Controls . 73 4.3 Cross-National Analysis . 76 4.3.1 Predictors of Rebel-to-Party Transformations . 77 4.3.2 Empirical Results . 77 4.3.3 Alternative Coding of Rebel-to-Party Transitions . 80 4.4 Conclusion . 83 5 Mozambique: RENAMO's Journey from Puppet to Party 86 5.1 Historical Context . 88 5.1.1 The Liberation Struggle and the Rise of Frelimo . 88 5.1.2 Frelimo's Policies: Tilling the Soil for Rebellion . 90 5.1.3 Geopolitcal Context: Rhodesian Interests . 92 5.1.4 Implications of Frelimo's Reign . 94 5.2 RENAMO: The Journey from Puppet to Party . 94 5.2.1 A Puppet of Rhodesia: RENAMO's Birth . 95 5.2.2 A New Puppet-Master: The Hand-off to South Africa . 105 5.2.3 Cutting the Strings: RENAMO's Push for Autonomy . 110 5.2.4 Coming to Life: RENAMO's Transition to Political Party . 114 5.3 Evaluating Alternative Arguments . 118 5.4 Discussion . 119 6 Diamonds in the RUF: Failed Transition in Sierra Leone 121 6.1 Historical Context . 123 6.1.1 Pre-1960: The Road to Independence . 124 6.1.2 Sierra Leone in the Wake of Independence (1961{1967) . 125 6.1.3 The Rise of Siaka Stevens, the Fall of Democracy, and Fertile Ground for Resistance . 126 6.1.4 Sierra Leone's Lumpen Youth Culture . 128 6.2 Evolution and Devolution of the RUF . 128 6.2.1 A Hopeful Emergence . 129 ii 6.2.2 First Phase (1991{1993) . 131 6.2.3 Second Phase (1994{1997) . 137 6.2.4 Third Phase (1997{2002) . 146 6.2.5 Failed Transition: The Revolutionary United Front Party . 150 6.3 The Kailahun Exception . 153 6.4 Discussion . 155 7 El Salvador and the FMLN: Building Civil Society from Civil War 156 7.1 Historical Context . 157 7.1.1 The Coffee Economy and the Visible Hand . 158 7.1.2 The Depression, The Uprising, and La Matanza . 160 7.2 Growing Unrest and the Emergence of the FMLN . 162 7.3 The Outbreak of War and the FMLN's Evolution . 170 7.3.1 Radio Venceremos! The Voice of the Resistance . 171 7.3.2 Organizational Learning and The \Final" Offensive (1980{1984) . 172 7.4 New Strategic Phase (1981{1984) . 176 7.4.1 One Organization, Many Structures . 177 7.4.2 Aerial View of the FMLN . 184 7.4.3 Two Shocks in the Wartime Environment . 186 7.5 The Shift to `A People's War' (1984{1989) . 188 7.5.1 Organizational Overhaul in 3D . 189 7.5.2 Implications for the FMLN . 192 7.6 Negotiations and Transition (1989{1994) . 193 7.6.1 1989: The Beginning of the End . 193 7.6.2 Transition: Prospects, Process, and Pitfalls . 195 7.6.3 FMLN Electoral Performance: 1994 and After . 197 7.7 Discussion . 199 8 Conclusion: The Analytic Purchase of Organizational Approaches 201 8.1 Summary of Research and Findings . 201 8.2 Scholarly Implications . 204 8.2.1 Understanding Rebel-to-Party Transition . 205 8.2.2 Getting Traction on Militant Organizations . 205 8.2.3 Political Party Formation . 207 8.3 Policy Implications . 208 8.4 Future Directions . 208 A Contested Rebel-to-Party Transformations 221 iii List of Tables 2.1 Summary of Existing Rebel-to-Party Datasets . 14 3.1 Goals and Corresponding Domains of Activity in Insurgent Organizations 38 4.1 Summary of Existing Rebel-to-Party Datasets . 55 4.2 Distribution of Cases over the Four Transition Categories . 69 4.3 Ordinal Models of Rebel-to-Party Transformation . 78 4.4 Predicted Probabilities of Transition over Number of Proto-Party Structures 80 4.5 Logit Models of Minimalist Participation . 81 4.6 Logit Models of Electoral Success . 83 4.7 Logit Models of Persistent Opposition Status . 84 6.1 Vote Share by Party in the 2002 Parliamentary Elections . 152 7.1 OP-Ms and Popular Organization Affiliations . 168 A.1 Positive Instances of Rebel-to-Party Transitions from Existing Data . 222 iv List of Figures 1.1 Civil War Terminations by Year (1970{2013) . 9 3.1 Mapping Insurgent Domains to Party Domains . 41 5.1 Strategic Location of Mozambique in Southern Africa . 93 5.2 Renamo's Two Bases: Odzi and Gorongosa . 101 5.3 Anti-Frelimo Propaganda Poster: Frelimo Lied! You guys suffer . 107 6.1 Districts of Sierra Leone . 132 7.1 Location of OP-Ms (1981{1984) . 177 7.2 Excerpt from an Educational Workbook: Lesson 29: Heroic Chalatenango! 183 v Acknowledgements Confronted with life's hardships, some people snap, and others snap back. {Diane Coutu (2002) I would first and foremost like to acknowledge the universe, whose sense of humor did not go unnoticed when it found someone writing a dissertation about resilience and decided to throw them a broken computer, a broken leg, a broken hand, a last-minute surgery, an ulcer, and a lingering summer cold just to top off this project as it neared completion. Well played. This is a book about change. As such, I would be remiss not to acknowledge my own changes, transformations, and evolutions|and the people who made them possible. The most notable|and far more difficult and frustrating than transforming any rebel group into a political party|is my academic transformation. This dissertation is dedicated in part to every teacher who had to write \does not work to potential," and to the dozens of times my parents had to read it while I was holed up playing video games. Twenty years ago, Rich Orgera didn't settle for writing a mediocre progress report; he pushed me to be better. I truly believe I would not be on this path were it not for him. To my committee... I am unsure I have the words to thank David Collier, which makes me think I should substitute a cake in lieu of a paragraph, but I am going to try anyway.