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Timeline of U.N. Security Council Resolutions

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Timeline of U.N. Security Council Resolutions Timeline of U.N. Security Council Resolutions Jason Starr Security Council Resolution 1737, Vote: 15-0 (December 23, 2006) Ballistic Missiles: Requires[1] states to prevent the sale or transfer to Iran of items contributing to weapon delivery systems. Imposes asset freeze on eight individuals and companies for involvement in ballistic missile programs (see “Sanctioned” below). Nuclear: Requires states to prevent sale or transfer of items to Iran contributing to nuclear proliferation. Calls on states to prevent nuclear proliferation-related training to Iranian nationals. Imposes asset freezes on 15 individuals and companies for involvement in Iran’s nuclear programs (see “Sanctioned” below). Travel: Calls on states to exercise vigilance regarding entry to their territories of individuals affiliated with Iran’s nuclear program. Sanctioned: Companies and individuals involved in ballistic missile programs (Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, Fajr Industrial Group, Gen. Hosein Salimi, Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Bahmanyar Morteza Bahhmanyar, Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi); companies and individuals involved in nuclear program (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mesbah Energy Company, Kala-Electric, Pars Trash Company, Farayand Technique, Defence Industries Organization, 7th of Tir, Mohammad Qannadi, Behman Asgarpour, Dawood Agha-Jani, Ehsan Monajemi, Jafar Mohammadi, Ali Hajinia Leilabadi, Lt. Gen.Mahammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi) Security Council Resolution 1747, Vote: 15-0 (March 24, 2007) Arms: Requires that states prohibit the procurement of arms and related material from Iran. Calls on states to restrict supply of specified arms and combat equipment to Iran. Ballistic Missiles: Imposes asset freeze on individuals, companies, and banks involved in ballistic missile activities (see “Sanctioned” below). Calls on states to restrict such individuals from entry into their territories. Nuclear: Imposes asset freeze on individuals, companies, and banks involved in Iran’s nuclear activities (see “Sanctioned,” below). Calls on states to restrict such individuals from entry into their territories. 1 Banking and Finance: Imposes asset freeze on three companies and seven individuals affiliated with the IRGC. Calls on states to restrict travel of aforementioned individuals. IRGC/Military: Imposes asset freeze on three companies and seven individuals affiliated with the IRGC. Calls on states to restrict travel of aforementioned individuals. Travel: Requires states to notify the Security Council Committee of entry into or transit through their territory of any person named in Resolutions 1737 or 1747 for involvement in Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or affiliated with the IRGC. Sanctioned: Individuals and companies involved in nuclear or ballistic missile programs (Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group, Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre, Kavoshyar Company, Parchin Chemical Industries, Karaj Nuclear Research Centre, Novin Energy Company, Cruise Missile Industry Group, Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International, Sanam Industrial Group, Ya Mahdi Industries Group, Fereidoun Abbasi-Danavi, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, Seyed Jaber Safdari, Amir Rahimi, Mohsen Hojati, Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi, Naser Maleki, Ahmad Derakhshandeh); individuals and companies affiliated with the IRGC (Qods Aeronautics Industries, Pars Aviation Services Company, Sho'a’ Aviation, Brig. Gen. Morteza Rezaie, Vice Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Rear Adm. Morteza Safari, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hejazi, Brig. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, Gen. Zolqadr) Security Council Resolution 1803, Vote: 14-0-1 (March 3, 2008) Ballistic Missiles: Imposes an asset freeze on individuals and companies involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programs (see “Sanctioned” below). Calls on states to restrict travel of aforementioned individuals. Extends list of nuclear proliferation-related items banned from Iran. Nuclear: Imposes an asset freeze on individuals and companies involved in Iran’s nuclear programs (see “Sanctioned” below). Calls on states to restrict travel of aforementioned individuals. Imposes mandatory travel ban on five individuals involved in nuclear programs, named in Resolutions 1737 and 1747. Extends list of nuclear proliferation-related items barred from Iran. Banking and Finance: Calls on states to exercise vigilance in entering new public financial support commitments with Iran. Calls on states to exercise vigilance over Iranian bank transactions in their territories. 2 Sanctioned: Individuals and companies affiliated with nuclear and /or ballistic missile programs (Amir Moayyed Alai, Mohammad Fedai Ashiani, Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani, Haleh Bakhtiar, Morteza Behzad, Dr. Mohammad Eslami, Seyyed Hussein Hosseini, M. Javad Karimi Sabet, Hamid-Reza Mohajerani, Brig.-Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi, Houshang Nobari, Abbas Rashidi, Ghasem Soleymani, Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co., Barzahani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies, Electro Sanam Company, Ettehad Technical Group, Industrial Factories of Precision, Jabber Ibn Hayan, Joza Industrial Co., Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, Niru Battery Manufacturing Company, Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries, Safety Equipment Procurement, TAMAS Company) Security Council Resolution 1929, Vote: 12-2-1 (June 9, 2010) Arms: Requires states to prevent supply of specified arms and combat equipment to Iran. Ballistic Missiles: Prohibits Iran from developing ballistic missile capabilities. Requires states to prevent sale or transfer of missile systems. Imposes asset freeze and travel ban on persons, companies, and banks for involvement in ballistic missile programs (see “Sanctioned” below). Nuclear: Prohibits Iran from acquiring interest in commercial activity in other states involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and weapons-related technologies. Imposes an asset freeze and travel ban on persons, companies and banks for involvement in nuclear program (see “Sanctioned” below). IRGC/Military: Imposes an asset freeze on IRGC and 15 affiliated companies and organizations. Sanctioned: Individuals and companies involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities (Amin Industrial Complex, Armament Industries Group, Defense Technology and Science Research Center, Doostan International Company, Farasakht Industries, First East Export Bank, P.L.C., Kaveh Cutting Tools Co., M. Babaie Industries, Malek Ashtar University, Ministry of Defense Logistics Export, Mizan Machinery Manufacturing, Modern Industries Technique Co., Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine, Pejman Industrieal Services Corp., Sabalan Co., Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Co., Shahid Karrazi Industries, Special Industries Group, Tiz Pars, Yazd Metallurgy Industries, Javad Rahiqi); IRGC entities (Fater Institute, Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem, Ghorb Karbala, Ghorb Nooh, Hara Co., Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute, Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, Makin, Omran Sahel, Oriental Oil Kish, Rah Sahel, Rahab Engineering Institute, Sahel Consultant Engineers, Sepanir, Sepasad Engineering Co.); IRISL front companies (Irano Hind Shipping Co., IRISL Benelux NV, South Shipping Line Iran) 3 Security Council Resolution 2231, Vote: 15-0 (July 20, 2015) Final Nuclear Agreement: Endorses the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated by Iran and world’s six major powers —Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States. Calls upon all states to fulfill their obligations under the JCPOA. Monitoring: Requests the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA. Allows monitoring and containing of the production, assembly and storage of centrifuges for 20 years and monitoring of uranium mines and mills for 25 years. Reporting: Requests the Director General to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA. Requests the Director General to report if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern. Requests that the Director General submit a report once the IAEA confirms that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities. Ballistic Missiles: Calls on Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, until October 2023 or until the date on which the IAEA reaches the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. Nuclear: Terminates all U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed on Iran’s nuclear program since 2006 following IAEA verification of Iran’s compliance and the peaceful nature of its program. Arms: Bans conventional arms transfers to Iran for five years or until the IAEA verifies that all of Iran’s nuclear material remains in peaceful activities. Travel: Terminates all U.N. Security Council travel restrictions imposed on Iranian individuals since 2006 following IAEA verification of Iran’s compliance and the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. IRGC/Military: Lifts all U.N. Security Council asset freezes of IRGC and Iranian military officials imposed since 2006 following IAEA verification of Iran’s compliance and the peaceful nature
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