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Hange at the Top: the Reasons For, and Consequences Of, Chossein Salami’S Elevation to Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

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Hange at the Top: the Reasons For, and Consequences Of, Chossein Salami’S Elevation to Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps hange at the Top: The Reasons for, and Consequences of, CHossein Salami’s Elevation to Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Abstract/Executive Summary The Gradual Rise to the Top of an Unremarkable Khamenei Loyalist The Salami Discourse—Bombastic Anti-Americanism and Anti-Zionism Abroad, Guarded Conservatism at Home Salami’s In-Box—A Restructured and More Powerful IRGC The Short- to Mid-Term Challenges: External Confrontation, Internal Disquiet Ramadan 1440 41 May 2019 2 © KFCRIS, 2019 ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 41 - 15/5/2019 L.D. No: 1440/8472 Ramadan 1440 - May 2019 Ramadan 1440 - May 2019 3 Change at the Top: The Reasons for, and Consequences of, Hossein Salami’s Elevation to Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ramadan 1440 - May 2019 Ramadan 1440 - May 2019 4 Abstract/Executive Summary April 21, 2019, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced the replacement of the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Aziz Jafari, with his deputy, Hossein Salami. This move caps a process of regeneration within the top echelons of the IRGC that has been ongoing since early 2017. The decision to replace Jafari was due, but it was not entirely expected so soon after the White House designation of the IRGC as a terrorist group. Since 1997, Khamenei had placed an informal ten-year limit on the commandership of the IRGC. Aziz Jafari was therefore due to be replaced by 2017, but he had announced a three-year extension in the summer of that year. His replacement in April 2019 was therefore within this extension period. Khamenei is wary of overstepping the ten-year rule in many cases and prepares these kinds of replacements methodically, in order to bring into effect a seamless transition. This holds particularly for the head of the judiciary, who also serves for ten years. Sadegh Larijani was recently replaced by another close acolyte of Khamenei, Ebrahim Raisi. The choice of Hossein Salami was not, however, an automatic or obvious one. In choosing Salami over several more prominent officers, Khamenei has chosen to continue to enact the gradual and discreet generational change that has been in place across the Islamic Republic’s institutional framework in the past few months, which has resulted in figures who rose to prominence during his own leadership (following 1989) and who are distinguished by a rigid loyalty to Khameini himself, rather than a loyalty “transferred” from Khomeini, progressively taking over key posts. Salami is also likely to have been seen as a better fit vis-à-vis the short- and mid-term challenges that the IRGC is facing in the wake of the White House’s designation of the URGC as a terrorist organization, due to his, at times, rabid anti-Americanism and anti-Israeli public remarks, and his stated preference for an aggressive, rather than defensive, posture toward such opponents of the Islamic Republic. His selection is probably designed to send the message that, at least in the rhetorical realm, the IRGC and its mentor, Khamenei, are unfazed by the recent White House designation and will continue to pursue the IRGC’s general objectives within Iran and the Middle Eastern region. Ramadan 1440 - May 2019 Ramadan 1440 - May 2019 5 The Gradual Rise to the Top of an Unremarkable Khamenei Loyalist Aged 59 and hailing from the Esfahan of the IRGC’s Air Force between 2005 and province, Salami belongs to the second 2009. From 2009, he served for a full decade generation. militarily speaking. of IRGC as deputy to the commander in chief, Aziz commanders, who rose to the highest echelons Jafari, effectively focusing on the land unit. of the Corps following the end of the Iran-Iraq Despite these rises, Salami was not included War, rather than during it. It is important to in the select group of senior commanders note that this description is military, rather than who wrote a famous threatening letter to genealogical. Salami is only two years younger President Mohammad Khatami at the height than Aziz Jafari, who became IRGC commander of the student protests of summer 1999. While at the age of 50 in 2007. Soleimani, Qalibaf, Safavi, and others joined As opposed to his immediate predecessors, forces to warn Khatami that their “patience” Aziz Jafari, Yahya “Rahim” Safavi, and for his “democratic games” was wearing thin, Mohsen Rezai, Hossein Salami did not hold Salami was not featured among the signatories, high command posts during the war, despite ostensibly because he was not deemed to be of joining the IRGC in the early 1980s. During the same rank. Salami’s elevation to the coveted the conflict, he held, among other posts, the rank of Sarlashkar, or major general, to which all commandership of two moderately sized units, the other IRGC commanders have belonged, did the 14th Guard of Emam Hossein from Esfahan occur, in similar fashion to his predecessor, Aziz and the 25th Karbala Unit of Mazandaran. His Jafari, upon accession to the commandership highest-rank duty during the conflict consisted position on April 22. of the commandership of the Nuh naval base. The putative shortlist for the succession to His roles were therefore considerably less Jafari did not include only Salami, nor was he important than those of other longtime IRGC to be considered at the top of it. It also consisted leading figures, such as Mohsen Rezai, “Rahim” of other seasoned first-generation commanders Safavi, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, or Qasem of the IRGC, such as Major General Gholam- Soleimani, all of whom rose to more senior Ali Rashid, the current head of the Khatam al- leadership positions during the 1980s. Anbiya engineering wing of the IRGC; Major Salami’s rise through the ranks occurred at General Mostafa Izadi, the head of the cyber a gradual but unrelenting pace after 1989. He warfare unit of Khatam; and Major General became the head of the commandership training Mohammad Bagheri, who is currently serving unit between 1992 and 1997 and was mostly as chief of staff of the Army while retaining involved in cadet and officer training during that his position as ranking IRGC officer; as well time. He then transitioned to being deputy head as Ghasem Soleimani. But there were reasons of the IRGC Joint Command between 1997 and behind the missed appointment. Rashid belongs 2005, before moving on to the commandership to a group of senior commanders informally Ramadan 1440 - May 2019 Ramadan 1440 - May 2019 6 known as the “Khuzestanis”:– early members of Soleimani and, as will be recounted, Bagheri are the IRGC hailing from the southern Khuzestan involved in delicate, unique tasks that require region, and hence associated with Mohsen the continuation of their current appointments. Rezai. Upon his departure from the position of The reason behind the choice of Salami is likely commander in chief in 1997, Rezai sought to to be a combination of Khamenei’s unwillingness place another Khuzistani at the helm, but this was to dislodge the others from their current positions discreetly but firmly rejected by Khamenei, who and his preference for someone who would be chose Rahim Safavi instead. The reason behind malleable and easier to control, such as Salami this is thought to be Rezai and the Khuzistanis’ who was focused on the external rather than pressure on Khomeini to prevent the dismissal internal dimension of the operations of the IRGC. of Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a long- Salami therefore fit the bill in this regard— – his standing opponent of then-President Khamenei, previous position was not a unique one, imbued on several occasions during the 1980s, including with specific tasks for which he was most suited, shortly after Khamenei’s reelection in 1985. like Bagheri or Soleimani. All this makes Salami This would explain why Khamenei appears to an unremarkable, run-of-the-mill senior IRGC have kept the Khuzistanis at arm’s length after commander, whose rise to the top is due to 1997, when he felt capable of controlling their Khamenei’s patronage and the number of years influence through awarding them senior posts he has clocked as an undisputed loyalist, rather that could be kept in check by other loyalists. than any distinguishing outstanding performance. The Salami Discourse—Bombastic Anti-Americanism and Anti-Zionism Abroad, Guarded Conservatism at Home Salami’s worldview, as espoused in a long in mid-March 2019, for example, he welcomed string of public speeches, televised interviews, welcome the possibility of a conflict with the and other filmed matter, is strongly geared toward United States and stated that the IRGC was ready an intense version of Khamenei’s long-standing for a long fight against America. He has expressed opposition to the United States, Israel, the West, willingness on several occasions to attack US Saudi Arabia, and other current opponents of the aircraft carriers in the Gulf. In December 2017, Islamic Republic. While Aziz Jafari, Soleimani, he pronounced an oft-repeated threat to Europe, and other senior IRGC commanders have often following a habitual condemnation of Iran’s applied a degree of circumspection to their missile tests: the IRGC was ready to favor the pronouncements, Salami’s remarks are, by development of missiles with a firing range of contrast, often brash, bombastic, and indicative over 2,000 km, in contravention of the 2015 of someone on the offensive. During a recent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). appearance on Iranian domestic state television A strong critic of the principle of negotiation Ramadan 1440 - May 2019 Ramadan 1440 - May 2019 7 with the West, Salami appears in favor of Iran’s fitnah more challenging than the Iran-Iraq War, exit from the JCPOA and is a strong proponent of and a transfer of conflict from the rural trenches a continued IRGC presence in Syria as a means of the war to the streets of the major Iranian to retain strong bonds with both the Lebanese cities.
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