rn Popular Culture between History and at Ethnology u pe Peter Burke by Burke, Peter 1984: Popular Culture between History and Ethnology. Ethnologia nd Europaea XIV: 5-13. cil After discussing problems inherent in concepts such as "culture", "popular", "tradition" and "hegemony" the author attempts to describe and explain the main changes in European popular culture from the fourteenth to the twentieth century. He presents a "model" in the sense of a simplified general picture of European developments as a yardstick against which the characteristics of par ticular regions may be defined. Four main periods are distinguished: the late Middle Ages, 1350-1500; the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, 1500-1650; the commercialisation of popular culture, 1650-1800; and the industrialisation of popular culture, since 1800.
Dr. Peter Burke, Emmanuel College, Cambridge, CB2 3AP, U.K.
include such cultural constructs as the catego 1. Problems of Conceptualisation ries of sickness, or dirt, or kinship, or politics, The aim of this paper is a deliberately rash one. and extending 'performance' to cover such It is to attempt a synthesis of the work of both culturally stereotyped, ritualised forms of be historians and ethnologists on European popu haviour as feasting and violence. It should also lar culture, and in particular to describe and to be stressed that 'values' need not be conscious; analyse change over the long term, from the the most important values are so much part of fourteenth century to the present. This aim is what some ethnologists call the 'deep struc rash for more than one reason. In the first ture' of a culture that the actors are unlikely to place, because it is undertaken by a historian - be aware of them (Frykman and Lofgren for historians (as distinct from antiquarians) 1979). 'Culture' is coming to be less and less have discovered popular culture only recently, distinguishable from 'society' as 'society' is while ethnologists have been studying it for a seen more and more as a cultural construct. long time. In the second place, because the Of course, most of what we know about past concepts employed, notably 'culture' and 'popu cultures does derive from artifacts and perfor lar' are themselves culture-bound and time mances in a more precise and conventional bound. sense. Much of our information about popular In a general book on popular culture (Burke culture before the systematic investigations of 1978), I defined culture as 'a system of shared the nineteenth century is necessarily derived meanings, attitudes and values, and the sym from such performances as songs, stories, plays bolic forms (performances, artifacts) in which and rituals. The vivid picture of medieval Mon they are expressed or embodied'. This defini taillou painted by Le Roy Ladurie is essentially tion is rather too narrow, not fully emanci based, as one reviewer remarked, on a series of pated from a 'high' conception of culture in performances by the villagers which happened terms of art, literature and music, a kind of to be recorded by the Inquisition (Davis 1979). superstructure erected on a social base. 'Ar To supplement this information our main re tifacts' and 'Performances' need to be under source is the study of physical artifacts, such as stood in a wide sense, extending 'artifact' to houses and furniture, or the descriptions of
5 such artifacts in inventories; historians and category) formed a culturally homogeneous ethnologists have recently converged on this group. The rural world of nineteenth-century approach (compare Wiegelmann 1980 with Hungary, for example, seems to have consisted van der Woude and Scbuurman 1980). How of a number of cultural strata. To make mat ever, it is worth reminding ourselves that ters still more complex, upperclass women and these sources offer us no more than the tip of children often participated in performances the iceberg. which their husbands and fathers rejected as Like 'culture', the term 'popular' is proble popular. If we can trust Dostoyevsky, nine matic . The phrase 'popular culture' was coined teenth-century Russian noblewomen still par in Germany in the late 18th century and it was ticipated in the cult of icons and the devotion to intended to refer to what was not 'learned' cul holy fools. ture. This sense of contrast between two cul Students of religion have been particularly tures had previously been expressed by the unhappy with what they sometimes call the learned in references to popular culture as a 'two-tier model', the division of religion into collection of 'superstitions' or 'old wives' tales' 'elite' and 'popular'. Among the alternatives (fabulae aniles), or, to quote a phrase used by recently proposed have been 'practical religion' the Bollandists in 1757 but almost identical to (Leach 1968), 'unofficial religion' (Yoder 197 4), one coined by the anthropologist Robert Red religione delle classi popolari (Ginzburg 1979), field some hundred years later, 'little traditions and 'local religion' (Christian 1981). However, of the people' (populares traditiunculae). it seems to me that each of these concepts But who are the people? It is a term with a removes some difficulties only at the prise of long history in western culture - a history creating others. The problem is that (like the which bas not been written, unfortunately, but boundary between 'high' and 'low'), the fron would reveal that the term has generally been tiers between 'central' and 'local', between used in different ways by different kinds of 'clerical' and 'lay', between 'official' and 'unoffi speaker. For the clergy, the people are the cial' must be seen not as fixed but as fluid. It laity ; for the no'bility, the commoners; for the may be useful to regard a culture as a system, rich, ihe poor; and for those of us who have but only as a loosely bounded or 'open' one. been to university , it is obvious that the people The least unsatisfactory solution is probably are those who lack degrees . The people have to stay with the two-tier model, while recognis often been seen , explicitly or implicitly, as ing its defects. In saying this I do not mean to Them as opposed to Us, particularly in Eng suggest that a ternary model (say) would not land France and other western countries . ht also have its uses, particularly in some regions this respect there are both national and disci and periods . Still less do I want to imply that plinary variations. Ethnologists have tradi we should see European culture as neatly di tionally been closer to ibe people than histo vided into two layers. Actually, one of the ad rians and Central Europeans have been closer vantages of the division of culture into 'high' than intellectuals fw-ther west. We really need and 'low' is that we can introduce as many a history of the idea of the people, which there intermediate positions as local circumstances is no space to summarise here (cf. Burke 1978, dictate. Another advantage is that it provides ch. 1). a language for describing cultural change in 'We' (historians or ethnologists) can if we terms of 'sinking' and 'rising'. The sinking the wish define the people more precisely, as the ory of culture is the classic theory of the Ger 'subordinate classes' or as 'craftsmen and man specialists in Volkskunde at the end of the peasants', but these choices do not dissolve the last century, who emphasised the downward problem, which is the fact that the poor, power diffusion of many cultural items, from furni less, 'uneducated' and so on are groups which ture (e.g. wardrobes) to literature (e.g. ro do not coincide (thought they may well over mances of chivalry). The opposite, 'rising' the lap). In any case we cannot assume that ory of cultural change was taken less seriously craftsmen and 'peasants' (a notoriously vague by scholars until a few years ago - no doubt for
6 lS social and political reasons - but it has been ted' and 'genuine' tradition. Where does 'adap stressed in some important studies of indivi tation' end and 'invention' begin? Is a genuine dual writers and artists, such as Bakhtin tradition any more than one whose invention (1965) on Rabelais, and Paulson (1971) on has been forgotten? Hogarth. The term 'invention' should not lead us to ~s · 'Sinking' and 'rising' are vivid images but assume that elites have the power to mould the iS they are misleadingly mechanical - they are culture of the subordinate classes as they wish. e too hydraulic. They thus give two false impres The history of European popular culture shows r sions. The first is that artifacts and perfor that it is extremely resilient, that ordinary to mances move up and down the social scale un people have often been able to resist attempts changed, whereas they are usually adapted to to reform them. In order to reduce such resis ly suit their new situation. The second false im tance, it has been traditional for missionaries le pression is that the movement is automatic, as to 'accomodate' their ideas to their audience - a to if people played no part in the process. The process which sometimes leaves one wondering es traditional metaphor of 'borrowing' and the who was converting whom. n' currently fashionable one of 'appropriation' are An alternative way of describing both the n, more useful because they remind us of the role imitation of the elite and that elite's attempt to )), of individuals and groups and of their aims and reform popular culture is to use Gramsci's con strategies in the process of cultural change. cept of cultural 'hegemony'. This is a concept ,ts Individuals may imitate higher groups because which I deliberately refrained from using in of they want to rise socially; a form of 'anticipa my own study of early modern Europe, while, Ile tory socialisation', as some sociologists call it, on the other hand, it is central to a study of n- which the sumptuary laws oflate medieval and early modern France which happened to ap ~n early modern Europe were expressly designed pear at the same time (Muchembled 1978). fi to prevent. Groups lower in the social scale Muchembled argues that in 17th-century It may imitate higher groups because they want France, the ruling class tightened their control m, to reduce the distance between them, or in the over the people to such an extent that it is hope of increasing the social and cultural dis possible to speak of the 'conquest' of popular 1ly tance between themselves and still higher culture and of the 'acculturation' of the domi isc groups - the question of motivation is contro nated. to versial (cf. Christiansen 1979 and Ek 1980). I am afraid that in some respects this argu LOt Of course these appropriations and con ment only confirmed my suspicion of the con ns sequent adaptations are not the only causes of cept 'hegemony' as a tool for the analysis of 1at cultural change. On many occasions in Euro cultural change. Muchembled's model encour di pean history the elite, or a group within the ages us to see the ruling class as monolithic, Ld elite, have tried to 'reform' popular culture; in whereas in 17th-century France, the leaders of th' other words, first to suppress behaviour or Church and State were not always in agree ny ideas which they considered subversive, im ment. At times he gives the impression of hold :es moral or simply 'boorish' (that suggestive En ing a conspiracy theory of history. The sharp les glish term assimilating the peasants to the un contrast between a culture which came from in civilised), and secondly to replace all this with the people and a culture which the ruling class 1e an alternative culture, a new tradition. Some imposed on the people makes it difficult for him er British historians, led by Eric Hobsbawm, have to deal with the many intermediaries between ;he recently begun to speak of 'the invention of the two groups, such as the professional enter Lrd tradition' (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). This tainers (cf. Vovelle 1980). These intermediaries ni wilfully paradoxical phrase is a useful re do not fit the model and they are virtually ro minder that cultural change is not always absent from Muchembled's book. ~e gradual, or, for that matter, always disin At the same time, his book, together with sly terested. It should not, however, lead us to some recent work on nineteenth-century En for make too sharp a distinction between 'inven- glish popular culture and the theoretical de-
7 bates to which it has given rise (notably Hall dition was often an adaptation to quite recent and Jefferson 1975; Bailey 1978; Yeo and Yeo circumstances (cf. Weber-Kellermann 1965). It 1981; Storch 1982), has made me realise that is hard to think of a century since 1200, if not my own study was not political enough, and before, which did not see important modifica also that if the notion of cultural hegemony tions to European popular culture. could be made sufficiently subtle and flexible, Th second part of t.hjs paper therefore at it might become a valuable addition to the con tempts to describe and account for some of the ceptual armoury of ethnologists and historians major changes between 1350 and 1950. It pres as well as sociologists . Among the questions ents a 'model' in the ense of deliberately sim which might preoccupy us if we wished to re plified pictw·e. There will be little mom for formulate and operationalise this notion regional varation in this picture but hopefully (which Gramsci formulated in a rather differ it will provide a yardstick against which the ent context), I should like to distinguish three. characteristic of particular regions may be measured. I have divided this period of six hun i. Is cultural hegemony to be assumed to be a 8 t was static, let alone that it was a period of urban sub-culture which survived the plague t preparation for the next, a 'pre-Reformation', and the urban decline which in some places ,t as it has been called by some historians. All the followed the Black Death. It is easier to define same, it is useful to begin with a period in this sub-culture negatively (it was not peasant, which most Europeans were at least nominally noble or clerical), than positively (there are ;- Catholic (and the Catholics not so far from the obvious reasons for avoiding the vague label e Orthodox as they became during the Counter 'middle class'). New cults, whether orthodox or ,- Reformation). This was a period in which the heretical, seem to have sprung up and flouris 1- cultural distance between the parish priests hed more easily in the towns. Urban life, litera ,r (who were not yet trained in seminaries), and cy, and the new medium of print (which was y their flocks was not very great. If there was a already in use to produce cheap, simple devo 1e major division within Catholicism, it was not tional books from about 1470 on), all encour ,e between the upper classes and the people or aged a more private, interior religion. It was in 1- even between the clergy and the people, but the name of this interior religion that a group 1g between the scholastic theologians and every of educated clerics (Gerson, Hus, Savonarola, to one else, since the discourse of the theologians Erasmus, etc.), criticised the traditional popu in was a highly technical one which could only be lar religion of their day. Hus and Savonarola g learned by study at a university. But there is certainly appealed to ordinary people, and so, o, no evidence that Aquinas (say) rejected the lay in the next century, did Martin Luther. s or popular religion of his day, with its stress on In the second period, from the Reformation ly images, relics, local cults and patron saints. He on, we find much more of a deliberate effort by and other theologians participated in popular European elites to change the attitudes and is religion. In a similar way the nobility had a values of ordinary people. Luther may have ;l culture of its own, the sub-culture of chivalry, begun with the idea of the priesthood of all :e with its own language and its own norms, but believers, but he soon came to support a at also participated in popular culture, from the learned clergy and the 'indoctrination' of the it cult of the saints to the celebration of Carnival. young (Strauss, 1978). A whole apparatus of re This 'culture of folk humour', as Bakhtin calls Lutheran superintendents, Calvinist synods, ce it, seems to have involved everyone, with the and so on came to be associated with the pro le most active parts played by young adult males ject of purifying popular religion. The Catholics nd organised in festive societies, whether compo learned from the methods of their opponents. on sed of nobles, students, apprentices or peas The parish clergy were trained in seminaries, ne ants. thus widening the cultural distance between ne This traditional culture, however stable it priest and people, while the young were taught ~n may appear in retrospect, was not static. It is the rudiments of their faith in a more uniform an useful to regard it, as Gurevich (1981, 1983) and thorough manner than before. By the lar suggests, as a 'dialectical system' in which con early 17th century, catechisms and Sunday ire flict, dialogue, and other forms of interaction schools were features of both Catholic and 1ge between learned and popular was important. Protestant Europe. e is Popular culture was also affected by the his It would be misleading to suggest that in this cal tory of events, notably the Black Death of long process of reform the elite were always del 1347-8, which is the real reason for beginning active and the people passive. In the early 16th 1an this survey in 1350. This traumatic event lies century, a small minority of zealots were ith behind the preoccupation with death and de trying to convert everyone, elite and people ain cline which Johan Huizinga identified as alike. By the later 16th century, many crafts as characteristic of the later Middle Ages. men, if not peasants, were studying their bi too Other changes were more gradual; urbanisa bles and were prepared to suffer, or, on occa tion is one of them. European cities had been sion, even to kill, for their reformed faith. tse growing steadily from the 11th century on, and However, the new religious ideas spread more iod this growth encouraged the development of an quickly among the literate, so that by the early 9 17th centw-y the image ofa reformed elite try nals), the practical (notably almanacs, which ing to convert an unreformed people was prob were a kind of mini-encyclopaedia, containing ably coming to correspond to reality more information on agriculture, astrology, medi clo ely than before. cine, markets, weights and measures and even Change in the second phase is a story of a on history), and the devotional. The new me highly self-conscious movement of 1:eform dium carried new messages, and it facilitated even ifit had unintended consequences. In the exchanges between learned and popular cul third phase (1650-1800 in north-west Europe), ture (cf. Burke 1981). change was more the result of market forces. The rise of the chap-book was part of a wider The resilience of trad.itionaJ populal' culture, process: the commercialisation of popular cul which had resisted so many reformers, was ture . Material culture was commercialised as undermined by technological and economic peasant families in western Europe became change. more closely involved with the marked, acquir One agent of cultural change, particularly ing new consumer goods such as wardrobes effective in northern Europe, was the printing and grandfather clocks. It may be an exag press. By the year 1800, it is likely that about geration to speak of 'mass-production' at this 80% of adults in Scotland and Prussia and as point, but increasing division of labour and the many as 901J' in Sweden could read and write, standardisation of products (Dutch tiles, for and in the exceptionally well-documented example), are already to be discerned. Conspi Swedish case we know that the breakthrough cuous consumption was becoming a means for to genera l literacy (more exactly to the gen craftsmen and peasants, as well as the upper era l ability to read) came in the late seven classes, to distinguish themselves from other teenth and early eighteenth centuries (Johans groups, a 'vehicle of plebeian self-conscious son 1973). ness' (Medick 1983, with reference to 18th Once they were literate however, ordinary century London). There was also a trend to people did not confine their reading to the wards the commercialisation ofleisure, at least .Bible. In Western Europe, the period 1650- in large towns such as Paris, London and Ma 1800 was the age of he chapbooks (the French drid. Popular entertainment was beginning to Bibliotheque Bleue, the Swedish skilling be dissociated from major festivals and orga trycker, etc .), small cheap books in paper covers nised on a more permanent basis by entrepre which were sold not only in towns but also in neurs who invested considerable sums of the countryside, to which they were carried by money whether in boxing, bull-fights, the dis itinerant pedlars. In Russia there was the play of exotic animals or mechanical devices. lubok, in which pictures were more important, The politicisation of popular culture is and the text less. These texts were intended for another major trend noticeable in this third ordinary people but they were not produced by phase, which from this point of view might be ordinary people, as so much of traditional oral dated 1640-1789 (with special but not exclu culture was. Robert Muchembled sees them as sive reference to England and France). Popular 'tranquiJlisers', produced on the part of the revolts were nothing new, but they had nor ruling class to keep the subordinate classes in mally been reactions to local grievances. Now their phtce. the 'mob', as it was corning to be called (with a Personally, I doubt this. The production and mixture of scorn and fear) by the elite, was distribution of chap -books was not in the hands concerned with the day-to-day activities of the of the authorities in Church or State, but in government, a change in consciousness in those of private enterprise, of small printing which printed pamphlets and newspapers and firms. The most the authorities did was to cen political prints played an important part, sor what was published . The printer was con added to the experience of living in a large cerned to produce what would sell, and this capital city such as London, Paris , or Madrid. turned out to be a mixture of the escapist (ro Both the politicisation and the commer mances of chivalry or lives of notorious crirni- cialisation of popular culture are trends which 10 h seem to have reduced the gap between the elite in a few generations, a paradoxical con _g and the people. It is in some ways tempting to sequence. By the end of the 18th century, some i- talk of the rise of a third culture in this period, educated Europeans (in Eastern as well as ,n situated somewhere between the other two Western Europe), were discovering popular e and associated with the larger towns. If I do culture as something to be nostalgic for, a ,d not do this, it is for two reasons, one general world they had lost. This was the moment that 1- and one particular. In the first place, because a popular culture was named as such. culture is an open system, so that there were The traditional popular culture which ~r not two cultural blocks, learned and popular, Herder, Scott, Chateaubriand and other Euro Ll but a spectrum of gradations, so that 'high' and pean intellectuals had discovered with such en :LS 'low' are not places but directions and almost thusiasm, and believed to be authentically 'na 1e everyone is in the middle. In the second place, tural' and 'primitive', was in fact changing ,r because of another trend in this third phase, even more rapidly in the early 19th century es the withdrawal of the elites from their former than before, for a variety of reasons - tech g- participation in popular culture. I have already nological, economic, social and political. This 1is suggested that popular culture used to be fourth phase, the age of industrial capitalism, he everyone's culture, to which the various elites was necessarily the age of the 'making of the ·or added a second culture of their own. However, English working class' as E.P . Thompson has ?i from the Renaissance onwards, and more es called it, followed by the making of other work or pecially in the 17th and 18th centuries (so far ing classes in France, Germany and elsewhere. ,er as Western Europe is concerned), we see the The growth of factories and of industrial towns .er elites deliberately distancing themselves from created a new way of life in which many tradi lS popular culture, withdrawing from participa tional attitudes and values became irrelevant. ;h tion in Carnival and other festivals, giving up Traditional festivals did not fit in well with the to- the use of dialect, and so on. At a time when new industrial work rhythm and in England at 1st popular culture was, thanks to the chap-books, least, these festivals were attacked by the Ca borrowing more than usual from learned cul elites in the name of 'rational recreation' (Bai to ture, such a withdrawal was an obvious strate ley 1978; cf. Cunningham 1980, and Yeo and ~a gy for the preservation of cultural distance. Yeo 1981). re- However, this withdrawal is unlikely to have Of course the speed of the change must not of been completely conscious. The so-called be exaggerated. Even in Britain, 'the first in lis- 'Scientific Revolution' of the 17th century and dustrial nation', popular traditions retained ,s. the consequent 'mechanisation of the world enough resilience to modify the new culture, is picture' involved changes in the mentality of and Irish migrants to London were not simply ird the elite which made the culture of ordinary 'acculturated' by the city (Lees 1979). In be people increasingly alien to them. Until the France, the workers continued to express :lu- middle of the 17th century, western European themselves in the traditional 'corporate idiom' 1ar elites had understood witchcraft all too well; till 1848 if not beyond (Sewell 1980). In East or they had collaborated with ordinary people in ern Europe, it was not industrialisation but the ow the persecution of witches, or even taken the commercialisation of agriculture which created ha initiative. Now, in the late 17th century, they social change, together with the emancipation vas dismissed witchcraft as irrational and absurd. of the serfs, leading to what might be termed a the In Poland, on the other hand, the execution of golden age of peasant culture (Hofer 1973). in witches reached a peak in the early 18th cen However, even rural Europe could not escape ind tury, but here too reaction set in . Meanwhile, change in the age of steam - the steam press, art, ordinary people continued to believe in which reduced the price of newspapers, as well xge witches. In this and other ways, elite and popu as the railways. Improved communications rid. lar culture were becoming increasingly dif eroded the local base of traditional popular cul 1er- ferentiated (Frijhoff 1979). ture, which was first supplemented and then 1ich This withdrawal from popular culture had, replaced by such highly capitalised forms of 11 entertainment as the railway excursion live in a 'phantom world' of 'pseudo-events'? (Schivelbusch 1980), the music hall, the Sun (Anders 1957, Boorstin 1962). Has a public cul day newspaper and organised sport. In Britain ture become privatised? A specialist on the the News of the World (which has become a 16th and 17th centuries has no excuse for pon symbol of working-class leisure), was founded tificating on this subject, but from his special in 1843, while admission charges to football point of view, three final comments seem ap matches, making them a spectator sport, be propriate. The first is that in our time the dis gan in 1870. covery of popular culture has itself become The state also contributed to the transforma popularised. Even farmers find traditional tion of popular culture, notably by the estab peasant culture exotic. The second is that sub lishment of universal compulsory elementary cultures have proliferated - we are all mem education. In England, the 1870 Education Act bers of some minority, perhaps of several followed the extension of the vote to artisans in cultural minorities. The third point is that 1867 ('We must educate our masters', as the thanks to television, the withdrawal of the minister responsible remarked with some cyni elites from popular culture has been reversed, cism). In France, Germany, Italy and else and we have returned to the bicultural situa where, the essential aim of the new educa tion of the Middle Ages. Intellectuals may have tional system was rather to create national a second culture, but almost everyone shares loyalty, to turn 'peasants into Frenchmen' (We the common culture of television. ber 1976), Germans, and so on. Military servi ce reinforced the political lesson of the schools, as did the whole new apparatus of national flags and anthems. The 19th century may References therefore be seen as, among other things, a Anders, Gunther, 1957: 'The Phantom World of TV'. 'reform of popular culture' unparallelled in in In: Mass Culture, ed. B. Rosenberg and D.M. White, Glencoe, pp. 358----67. tensity and efficiency, a reform which inter Bailey, Peter, Hl78: Leisure and Class in Victorian acted with the industrialisation of popular cul England. London. ture, which was a process pursued by indivi Bakhtin, Mikhail, 1968: Rabelais and his World. dual entrepreneurs unaware of the general English trans. Cambridge, Mass. trend towards which they were contributing. Boorstin , Daniel, 1962: The Image . Harmondsworth. Briggs , Asa, 1960: Mass Entertainment: the Origins In the fifth and last phase, our own century, of a Modem Indu stry. Adelaide . the history of popular culture is dominated by Burke, Peter, 1978: Popular Culture in Early Mo the second industrial revolution. The late 19th dern Europe. London. century inventions of the telephone, the 'pho Burke, Peter, 1981: The Bibliotheque Bleue in Com nograph' and the 'kinetoscope' were exploited parative Perspective. In: Quaderni sel Seicento Francese, 4, 59-66. commercially by the early 20th century, giving Burke, Peter, 1982: A Question of Acculturation? In: us a radio, cinema and gramophone culture Scienze, Credenze Occulte, Livelli di Cultura, ed. P. which was of increasing importance until its Zambelli, Florence. pp. 197-204. replacement, from the 1950s on, by television Christian, William, 1981: Local Religion in 16th Century Spain. Princeton . (Briggs 1960). Early 20th-century rulers as di Christiansen, Palle 0., 1979: Peasant Adaptation to verse as Churchill and Hitler, Roosevelt and Bourgeois Culture? In: Ethnologia Scandinavica: Mussolini all showed themselves well aware of 98-151. the political uses of some at least of the new Cunningham, Hugh, 1980: Leisure in the Industrial Revolution. London. media. Davis, Natalie Z., 1979: Les conteurs de Montaillou. Historians of popular culture in the 20th In: Annales E.S.C. 34, 61-73. century will have some very large problems to Ek. 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