Human Rights Lost: the (Re)Making of an American Story Christopher N.J
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The Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations
The Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations Updated January 6, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44725 Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations Summary The position of Secretary of Defense is unique within the United States government; it is one of two civilian positions within the military chain of command, although unlike the President, the Secretary of Defense is not elected. Section 113 of the United States Code states that the Secretary of Defense is to be “appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The section goes on to elaborate a key mechanism by which civilian control of the armed forces is maintained: A person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within seven years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force. The proposed nomination of General (Ret.) Lloyd Austin, United States Army, who retired from the military in 2016, to be Secretary of Defense may lead both houses of Congress to consider whether and how to suspend, change, or remove that provision. This provision was originally contained in the 1947 National Security Act (P.L. 80-253), which mandated that 10 years pass between the time an officer is relieved from active duty and when he or she could be appointed to the office of the Secretary of Defense. In 2007, Section 903 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), Congress changed the period of time that must elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to the position of Secretary of Defense to seven years. -
Richard Russell, the Senate Armed Services Committee & Oversight of America’S Defense, 1955-1968
BALANCING CONSENSUS, CONSENT, AND COMPETENCE: RICHARD RUSSELL, THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE & OVERSIGHT OF AMERICA’S DEFENSE, 1955-1968 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Joshua E. Klimas, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2007 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor David Stebenne, Advisor Professor John Guilmartin Advisor Professor James Bartholomew History Graduate Program ABSTRACT This study examines Congress’s role in defense policy-making between 1955 and 1968, with particular focus on the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), its most prominent and influential members, and the evolving defense authorization process. The consensus view holds that, between World War II and the drawdown of the Vietnam War, the defense oversight committees showed acute deference to Defense Department legislative and budget requests. At the same time, they enforced closed oversight procedures that effectively blocked less “pro-defense” members from influencing the policy-making process. Although true at an aggregate level, this understanding is incomplete. It ignores the significant evolution to Armed Services Committee oversight practices that began in the latter half of 1950s, and it fails to adequately explore the motivations of the few members who decisively shaped the process. SASC chairman Richard Russell (D-GA) dominated Senate deliberations on defense policy. Relying only on input from a few key colleagues – particularly his protégé and eventual successor, John Stennis (D-MS) – Russell for the better part of two decades decided almost in isolation how the Senate would act to oversee the nation’s defense. -
Extensions of Remarks
April 26, 1990 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 8535 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS BENEFITS OF AUTOMATION First-class mail delivery performance was "The mail is not coming in here so we ELUDE POSTAL SERVICE at a five-year low last year, and complaints have to slow down," to avoid looking idle, about late mail rose last summer by 35 per said C. J. Roux, a postal clerk. "We don't cent, despite a sluggish 1 percent growth in want to work ourselves out of a job." HON. NEWT GINGRICH mall volume. The transfer infuriated some longtime OF GEORGIA Automation was to be the service's hope employees, who had thought that they IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES for a turnaround. But efforts to automate would be protected in desirable jobs because have been plagued by poor management and of their seniority. Thursday, April 26, 1990 planning, costly changes of direction, inter "They shuffled me away like an old piece Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, as we look at nal scandal and an inability to achieve the of furniture," said Alvin Coulon, a 27-year the Postal Service's proposals to raise rates paramount goal of moving the mall with veteran of the post office and one of those and cut services, I would encourage my col fewer people. transferred to the midnight shift in New Or With 822 new sorting machines like the leans. "No body knew nothing" about the leagues to read the attached article from the one in New Orleans installed across the Washington Post on the problems of innova change. "Nobody can do nothing about it," country in the last two years, the post of he said. -
Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies
University of Colorado Law School Colorado Law Scholarly Commons Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 2018 (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies Helen Norton University of Colorado Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Election Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Judges Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Citation Information Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 117 (2018), available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1182. Copyright Statement Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is required. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. (AT LEAST) THIRTEEN WAYS OF LOOKING AT ELECTION LIES* HELEN NORTON** Lies take many forms. Because lies vary so greatly in their motivations and consequences (among many other qualities), philosophers have long sought to catalog them to help make sense of their diversity and complexity. Augustine and Aquinas, for instance, separately proposed moral hierarchies of lies based on their differing assessments of certain lies’ relative harm and value.1 Legal scholars too have classified lies in various ways to explain why we punish some and protect others.2 * See WALLACE STEVENS, Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE STEVENS 99 (Vintage Int’l 2015) (1954). -
Fallacies in the Case for the Bricker Amendment Brunson Macchesney
Notre Dame Law Review Volume 29 | Issue 4 Article 3 8-1-1954 Fallacies in the Case for the Bricker Amendment Brunson MacChesney Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Brunson MacChesney, Fallacies in the Case for the Bricker Amendment, 29 Notre Dame L. Rev. 551 (1954). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol29/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE BRICKER AMENDMENT THE FALLACIES IN THE CASE FOR THE BRICKER AMENDMENT Introduction The existing constitutional arrangements for the making and enforcing of treaties and the present constitutional powers of the President to make executive and other agree- ments with foreign countries have recently been under severe attack. Since these arrangements and powers have on the whole served us remarkably well under changing circum- stances for more than a century and a half, it is proposed to examine the development of this campaign and to analyze the arguments that have been used to support it. The principal goal of this forensic effort has been the adop- tion of the Bricker amendment as reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 4, 1953. The amendment did not of course emerge suddenly out of a vacuum. Advocacy of such a proposal was initiated chiefly by groups in the Ameri- can Bar Association,2 and by Senator Bricker and other Sen- ators associated with him. -
Bricker-Dirksen Amendment Kenneth C
Hastings Law Journal Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 1 1-1956 Bricker-Dirksen Amendment Kenneth C. Sears Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kenneth C. Sears, Bricker-Dirksen Amendment, 8 Hastings L.J. 1 (1956). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol8/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. BRICKER-DIRKSEN AMENDMENT By KENNETH C. SEARSt The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has recommended the adoption of a resolution to amend the Constitution of the United States. It concerns treaties and other international agreements; but it differs from other ver- sions of what is called the Bricker Amendment. Senator Dirksen of Illinois appears to have been the person who secured an agreement of a majority of the committee in submitting the present text as follows: "Section 1. A provision of a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect."' While there are two additional sections, as noted, Section 1 is the only section that is worthy of any appreciable debate. Before it is made a part of the Constitution of the United States there should be an announcement, as clear as it is humanly possible to state it, of the purposes that its advo- cates seek to accomplish. Since there have been decisions of the United States Supreme Court as to the validity of treaties and of legislation to enforce them, the .voters should be informed which of these decisions will be rendered ineffective as precedents upon the adoption of section 1, supra. -
Abstract the Movement for the Bricker Amendment: Its
ABSTRACT THE MOVEMENT FOR THE BRICKER AMENDMENT: ITS ORIGINS, GROWTH, AND FAILURE The purpose of the movement for the Bricker amendment was to amend the Constitution relative to the making of trea ties and executive agreements. This paper interprets the movement as part of a conservative reaction to the growth of internationalism and presidential power during and after World War II. Although this paper is concerned primarily with the politics of the movement, the legal aspects are described to the extent necessary to make the politics in volved comprehensible. The movement originated as a response to the fear that rights guaranteed in the Constitution could be forfeited by the government through the use of treaties and/or executive agreements. The Supreme Court allowed Congress to legislate in a formerly unconstitutional area in order to implement a treaty in the case of Missouri vs. Holland (1920). In the early 1950s, there were several UN proposals before the Sen ate concerning human rights. If they were adopted as trea ties, it appeared that Congress could legislate on these rights in any way desired. Implementing legislation might ii be acceptable to the Supreme Court, constitutional limitations notwithstanding. The importance of the American Bar Association (ABA) as a leading force in developing the movement into one of national significance is emphasized. The ABA's support of the movement added credence to the idea that the Constitution needed to be amended to safeguard the rights of American citizens. Despite the fact that Republican Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio introduced one of his proposals with more than two-thirds of the Senate as co-sponsors, it met with defeat in 1954. -
July 22, 1983, Dear Mr. Mcdaniel
- .. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON July 22, 1983, Dear Mr. McDaniel: I want to thank you for sending a copy of Building on Yesterday, Becoming To morrow: The Washington Hospital Center's First 25 Years to Mr. Deaver for his perusal. He is traveling out of the country at present, but I know that he will enjoy looking at it upon his return. Again, thank you for your thoughtfulness. Sincerely, Donna L. Blume Staff Assistant to Michael K. Deaver Mr. John McDaniel President The Washington Hospital Center 110 Irving Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20010 [ I THE WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER II II II II July 14, 1983 Michael K. Deaver Deputy Chief of Staff Asst. to President 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20500 Dear Mr. Deaver: Enclosed you will find a copy of Building on Yesterday, Becoming Tomorrow: The Washington Hospital Center's First 25 Years. The hospital's history is significant in its own right because it was a struggle to provide Washington with the hospital people had been clamoring for. It was a response to the concern reflected in a 1946 Washington Post story headline which said, "District's Hospital 'Worst' in U.S., Medical Board Finds". It also seems that The Washington Hospital Center's history mirrors the history of the period which brought dramatic changes in America's approach to patient care and hospital management. Now, health care providers and managers find themselves in a new era which demands innovative strategies and financial skills that would challenge the best of the Fortune 500 scientists and executives. -
Richard Russell, Jr
77//33//1133 RRiicchhaarrdRR uusssseellll,JJ rr.- WW iikkiippeeddiiaa,tt hheff rreeeee nnccyyccllooppeeddiiaa Richard Russell, Jr. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Richard Brevard Russsseell, Jr. (November 2, 1897 – January 21, 1971) was an American politician from Georgia. Richard Brevard Russell, Jr. A member of the Democratic Party, he briefly served as speaker of the Georgia house, and as Governor of Georgia (1931–33) before serving in the United States Senate for almost 40 years, from 1933 until his death in 1971. As a Senator, he was a candidate for President of the United States in the 1948 Democratic National Convention, and the 1952 Democratic National Convnvention. Russell was a founder and leader of the conservative coaoalilition that dominated Congress from 1937 to 1963, and at his death was the most senior member of the Senate. He was for decades a leader of Southern opposition to the civil rights movement. PrPresesidident prpro tempore of the UUnited States Senate In office Contents January 3, 1969 – January 21, 1971 Leader Mike Mansfield 1 Early life Carl Hayden 2 2 Governor of Georgigiaa Preceded by 3 Senate career Succeeded by Allen J. Ellender 4 Personal life Chairman of the Senate Committee on 5 Legacy Appropriations 6 References InIn office 7 Further sources January 3, 1969 – January 21, 1971 7.1 Primary sources 7.2 Scholarly secondary sources Leader Mike Mansfield 8 External links Preceded by Carl Hayden Succeeded by Allen Ellender Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Early life Services In office January 3, 1955 – January 3, 1969 Leader Lyndon B. Johnson Mike Mansfield Preceded by Leverett Saltonstall Succeeded by John C. -
Laws As Treaties?: the Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH
Michigan Law Review Volume 99 Issue 4 2001 Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional- Executive Agreements John C. Yoo University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall) Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, International Law Commons, Legal History Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol99/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LAWS AS TREATIES?: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS John C. Yoo* TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 758 I. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONALIST VISION .......................... ....................................... 764 A. The Current Importance of Congressional-Executive Agreements ................................................................ ....................... 764 1. The Explosion of Congressional-Executive -
The Master of the Senate and the Presidential Hidden Hand: Eisenhower, Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 1950S by Samuel J
Volume 10 Article 6 2011 The aM ster of the Senate and the Presidential Hidden Hand: Eisenhower, Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 1950s Samuel J. Cooper-Wall Gettysburg College Class of 2012 Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/ghj Part of the Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Share feedback about the accessibility of this item. Cooper-Wall, Samuel J. (2011) "The asM ter of the Senate and the Presidential Hidden Hand: Eisenhower, Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 1950s," The Gettysburg Historical Journal: Vol. 10 , Article 6. Available at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/ghj/vol10/iss1/6 This open access article is brought to you by The uC pola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The uC pola. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The aM ster of the Senate and the Presidential Hidden Hand: Eisenhower, Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 1950s Abstract In March of 2010, renowned architect Frank Gehry unveiled his design for a memorial to Dwight D. Eisenhower in Washington, D.C. Centered around an elaborate layout of stone blocks running along a city- block of Maryland Avenue is the featured aspect of Gehry‘s design: a narrative tapestry of scenes from Eisenhower‘s life. Over seven stories tall, the tapestry will impede the view of the building located directly behind it. That building is the Department of Education, named for Lyndon Johnson.1 Decades after two of the greatest political titans of the twentieth century had passed away, their legacies were still in competition. -
The Unintended Consequences of Congressional Reform: the Clark and Tunney Amendments and U.S
diph_3 1/8/03 3:50 PM Page 215 robert david johnson The Unintended Consequences of Congressional Reform: The Clark and Tunney Amendments and U.S. Policy toward Angola On 20 December 1975, the U.S. Senate passed an amendment to the Depart- ment of Defense appropriations bill introduced by John Tunney (D-CA) ter- minating covert assistance to anti-Communist forces in Angola. Later that 1 winter, an amendment to the foreign aid bill, sponsored by Dick Clark (D-IA), extended the ban. The two amendments represented the high point of a congressional revolt against the anti-Communist ethos of the Cold War and executive authority in foreign policy. Although the two amendments are usually paired together, they expanded Congress’s foreign-policy presence in quite different ways.1 On the one hand, the Clark amendment relied on a traditional gambit—a rider to the foreign aid bill—to unequivocally establish the principle that Congress possessed the right to oversee covert intelligence operations. The Tunney amendment, on the other hand, used the appropriations power in a different way, in a policy rider to the Pentagon budget, to suggest that defense spending matters were fair game for congressional attempts to legislate foreign policy. Both tactics were so contro- versial that, before the debate over Angolan policy, no clear-cut congressional implementation of either approach had occurred during the Cold War. Once enacted, though, the amendments produced a host of unintended con- sequences. Their passage helped further erode the Cold War institutional struc- ture of Congress, in which that body had sacrificed potent foreign-policy tools in deference to executive authority.