Examining the Relationship Between Social Welfare Nonprofitization and Service Expansiveness in Canada and the United Kingdom

The Nonprofitized Welfare State: Examining the Relationship between Social Welfare Nonprofitization and Service Expansiveness in Canada and the United Kingdom

Kristen Pue

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Department of Political Science University of Toronto

Ó Copyright by Kristen Pue 2021

The Nonprofitized Welfare State: Examining the Relationship between Social Welfare Nonprofitization and Service Expansiveness in Canada and the United Kingdom

Kristen Pue

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Department of Political Science University of Toronto

2021

Abstract

When governments reach out to nonprofit organizations to provide social welfare services, a common argument posits, service expansiveness is weakened: either contracting out is an explicit abdication of public duty or it creates incentives that undermine service expansiveness over time. And yet the evidence does not seem to support this simple explanation of welfare state nonprofitization. This dissertation presents a comparison of nonprofitized welfare in two countries – Canada and the United Kingdom – and two policy areas – homelessness and emergency management. It argues, first, that there is no necessary relationship between the level of nonprofitization and social welfare expansiveness. Nonprofitization occurs within a context where the public duty is being continuously renegotiated, meaning that the boundaries of the welfare state are always in flux. Two pathways to nonprofitization result from the different directions of these fluctuations: cost-cutting and co-optation. While the cost-cutting pathway is linked to service contraction, co-optation is linked to the expansion of public duty. Thus, there is no single overarching relationship between welfare nonprofitization and service expansiveness: nonprofitization operates in both directions. However, this dissertation also argues that the choices that governments make about how to institutionalize nonprofit social welfare can

ii influence whether welfare expansiveness erodes over time or, indeed, actually increases. Service expansiveness is undermined when institutions of acquisition embed values of free-market competition, rather than collaboration or service stability. Service expansiveness is facilitated where the policy structure offers opportunities for nonprofit voice through advocacy, shaping the service, and piloting.

iii Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without support and guidance from many individuals over many years. It is extremely gratifying to be able to articulate my appreciation here.

First and foremost, I would like to extend my sincerest thank you to Dan Breznitz, who has always been an excellent mentor. I want to thank you in particular for the encouragement as I muddled through the most difficult stages of this harrowing process. Thanks also to Amos

Zehavi, Rod Haddow, Joe Wong, Jane Gingrich, and David Rueda, all of whom have provided helpful feedback throughout this journey.

Thanks to everyone who helped me in gathering data for this project. Most importantly, thank you to the 104 individuals that were generous with their time and willing to be interviewed.

Some of you sat down with me for upwards of two hours! Thanks also to the Canada Revenue

Agency’s Charities Directorate for providing information from the charities list from 1990-2015.

I have been consistently impressed with the professionalism and speed of the Charities

Directorate in responding to requests. A special shout out to Karim Hussain, archivist at the

British Red Cross. Thank you, Karim, for your helpful advice and for the engaging conversations during my visits. Thanks also to the staff at the Bishopsgate Institute research library, for their assistance in my accessing the Shelter Archives.

I also wish to thank my undergraduate supervisor, Greg Anderson. I have been bad about keeping in touch, but you were an excellent advisor. We all looked up to you.

Thanks to Steven Bernstein for supervising my Master’s research paper and for encouraging me to accept my offer for the PhD program. Thanks to Teresa Kramarz for the support during my capstone project, and for bringing me on as a Teaching Assistant afterwards. Thanks to Matt

Hoffmann for helping me through the beginning of the PhD. Thanks, Stefan Renckens, Michael

Trebilcock, and Mariana Mota Prado, for offering me so many opportunities to grow as a researcher. Thank you to Richard Sandbrook for helping me develop a deep understanding of

Karl Polanyi’s work. Dan, thanks for giving me such interesting work and for the space to write in the later years.

But, of course, the most wasted of all days is one without laughter. Therefore, I wish to express gratitude for my wonderful friends in Canada and around the world. Your generosity, love, whimsy, patience, gamesmanship, and wisdom made this marathon possible. Above all, thanks to Kathleen Elhatton-Lake for being a vociferously steadfast friend. Thanks, Bianca Vong, for sharing your effervescence. To Mary Milner, Stu MacLaren, Ian Literovich, Sarah Mistak, Scott

Latham, Rory and Justice Johnston, Penny Angelopoulos, Elizabeth Shelley, and Faye

Simmonds, for making an expensive Master’s degree worth every cent. To Kirstie Sutcliffe, for being basically family. To Catherine Fan, Ian Burch, Iain Ireland, Zoë Francis, Nisha Patel, Mary

McPhail, Robbie Lees-Miller, Ashvin Singh and the rest of the UADS diaspora. To the Canadian

Red Cross’ emergency management staff and volunteers, in the GTA and around the country. To the pub trivia regulars, to the worst floor hockey team in history, to the Rock Oasis crew, to

Orange Krush, to fellow food ethics enthusiasts, to thoroughly inartistic art therapy sessions.

Thank you for getting me through the difficult days, and for reveling in the triumphs.

A special thanks to Kyla Hewson for being a timeless friend. You and Fariya Mohiuddin gave me the perfect induction to London. (And here’s to our farcical, but still thoroughly enjoyable,

Maltese adventure). Merci aussi à Stacey Boknek de m’avait montrée les joyaux de Paris.

And, of course, my family deserves immeasurable accolades for, among other things, listening to six years of esoteric rants about how my dissertation is going. Thanks to Lauren Pue, Richard

Pue, Taryn Pue, Sherry Bohn, Brenda Kropp, Karen and Rodger Grover, Michelle Grover, Jon

Pue, and Nancy Haynes for the love and support. And in the same breath, thanks to Diane and

Gary Hnatko.

Thanks also to my doctoral colleagues and friends in the University of Toronto’s Department of

Political Science. A special thanks to Nicholas Conserva, Scott McKnight, Brianna Botchwey,

Elena Goracinova, Alix Jansen, and Reut Marciano, each of whom suffered through my writing at some point during the process. Thanks also to Jason Vandenbeukel and Meghan Snider for the excellent introduction to Canadian politics. Shout out to the Political Animals, computer lab gabbers, strike captains, enviro-gals, study groups, and prairie illuminati. Thanks for the collegiality, whether it was Friday or not.

vi Table of Contents Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgements ...... iv List of Tables ...... xi List of Figures ...... xiv List of Appendices ...... xv Chapter 1. Welfare State Nonprofitization and Service Expansiveness: When Does Nonprofitization Undermine Social Rights, and When Can it Advance them? ...... 1 1.1 Introduction ...... 1 1.2 Bringing Nonprofit Welfare to the Welfare State Literature ...... 2 1.2.1 The Nonprofitization of the Welfare State ...... 4 1.2.2 The Political Consequences of Nonprofit Social Welfare Provision ...... 6 1.3 The Nonprofit Studies Literature on Government Contracting ...... 9 1.4 Nonprofitization and Service Expansiveness: Error Causality Not Found ...... 13 1.4.1 Moving Beyond State Abdication Narratives ...... 13 1.4.2 Practicing Publicness ...... 17 1.4.3 If Not Cost-Cutting, Then What? ...... 19 1.5 Two Pathways to Nonprofitization ...... 20 1.5.1 Co-optation as an Alternate Pathway to Nonprofitization ...... 20 1.5.2 Why Co-opt Nonprofit Services into the WS ...... 23 1.6 Service Expansiveness and the Institutions of Nonprofitized Welfare ...... 25 1.6.1 Policy Structure and Nonprofit Voice ...... 26 1.6.2 Institutions of Acquisition: Marketization Creates Incentives that Undermine Service Expansiveness ...... 29 1.7 Theoretical Contributions ...... 29 1.8 Research Design ...... 32 1.8.1 Country Selection ...... 32 1.8.2 Policy Selection ...... 33 1.8.3 Data Sources and Case Development ...... 34 1.9 Chapter Overview ...... 37 Chapter 2. Co-optation or Cost-Cutting? Comparing Pathways to Nonprofitization in Canadian and British Homelessness ...... 39 2.1 Introduction ...... 39 2.2 British Homelessness ...... 39 2.2.1 The Policy Context ...... 40 2.2.2 Nonprofit Welfare Provision in British Homelessness ...... 41 2.2.3 Drivers of Nonprofitization in British Homelessness ...... 43

vii 2.3 Canadian Homelessness ...... 46 2.3.1 The Policy Context ...... 46 2.3.2 Nonprofit Welfare Provision in Canadian Homelessness ...... 48 2.3.3 Drivers of Nonprofitization in Canadian Homelessness ...... 54 2.4 Conclusions ...... 59 Chapter 3. Co-optation or Cost-Cutting? Pathways to Nonprofitization in Canadian and British Emergency Management ...... 61 3.1 Introduction ...... 61 3.2 The Emergency Management Policy Context ...... 62 3.3 Nonprofit Welfare Provision in Emergency Management ...... 64 3.4 Drivers of Nonprofitization ...... 72 3.5 The Nonprofitization of Canadian Emergency Management in the Climate Change Era .. 77 3.5.1 Climate Change and EM in the UK and Canada ...... 78 3.5.2 Canadian Emergency Management Nonprofitization in 2013-2019 ...... 84 3.6 Conclusions ...... 96 Chapter 4. Comparing Institutions of Government Social Welfare Service Acquisition: Marketization and Bases for Competition in Canadian and British Homelessness ...... 99 4.1 Introduction ...... 99 4.2 Literature Review ...... 101 4.3 Characterizing Nonprofit Service Markets ...... 103 4.5 Case Studies ...... 106 4.5.1 Procuring Homelessness Services in the UK: The UK Social Care Commissioning System ...... 106 4.5.2 Paying for Homelessness Services in Canada: A Fragmented System of Grants and Service Agreements ...... 115 4.5.3 Reimbursements, Contributions, and Spot Purchases: Acquiring Emergency Management Services in the UK and Canada ...... 119 4.6 Discussion: Competition and Bases for Competition ...... 128 Chapter 5. Let Nonprofits Be Nonprofits: Policy Structure, Nonprofit Voice, and Service Expansiveness in Nonprofitized Welfare States ...... 134 5.1 Introduction ...... 134 5.2 Research Puzzle: Greater Constraints on Service Expansiveness in a System Based on Social Rights ...... 135 5.3 The Policy Context ...... 136 5.3.1 Canada ...... 137 5.3.2 The United Kingdom ...... 138 5.4 Nonprofitized Social Welfare ...... 140 5.4.1 Canada ...... 141

viii 5.4.2 The United Kingdom ...... 142 5.5 Nonprofit Voice and Welfare State Boundaries ...... 144 5.5.1 Canada ...... 144 5.5.2 The United Kingdom ...... 150 5.6 Discussion ...... 154 Chapter 6. Conclusions ...... 161 6.1 Introduction ...... 161 6.2 Summary of the Research ...... 161 6.2.1 Findings ...... 162 6.2.2 Contributions ...... 165 6.2.3 Limitations ...... 167 6.2.4 Implications ...... 168 6.3 Future Research ...... 171 6.3.1 Causes of Variation ...... 172 6.3.2 Nonprofitized Welfare and Civil Society ...... 172 6.3.3 Nonprofitized Welfare and Power ...... 173 6.3.4 Philanthropy and Public Duty ...... 174 6.3.5 State Capacity ...... 176 Bibliography ...... 179 Appendices ...... 224 Appendix 1. Interview List ...... 224 1.1 Canada Interviews ...... 224 1.2 United Kingdom Interviews ...... 225 1.3 France Interviews ...... 226 Appendix 2. United Kingdom Housing Assistance Applications ...... 227 Appendix 3. United Kingdom Homelessness Contracts and Nonprofit Organizations ...... 229 3.1 Contracts Finder Data ...... 229 3.2 CCEW Homelessness Charities ...... 239 Appendix 4. The Canadian Nonprofit Service Providers List ...... 244 4.1 The NSPL ...... 244 4.2 NSPL Organizations Dataset ...... 246 4.3 Shelter-Administering Charities’ Revenue Sources ...... 248 4.4 Data on Shelter-Administering Organization Funders ...... 250 4.5 Ontario Funders’ Dataset ...... 253 Appendix 5. Eligible and Ineligible Expenses ...... 260 5.1 (In)eligible Expenses in Canadian Homelessness ...... 260 5.2 (In)eligible Expenses in Canadian Emergency Management ...... 281 5.3 (In)eligible Expenses in UK Emergency Management ...... 308 Appendix 6. Emergency Management Policy and Disaster Risk in Canada and the United Kingdom ...... 313

ix 6.1 Canada ...... 313 6.1.1 The History and Legislative Context of Emergency Management ...... 316 6.1.2 Public Emergency Management Policies ...... 320 6.1.3 Disaster Assistance Programs ...... 324 6.1.4 Coordinating Emergency Response ...... 332 6.2 The United Kingdom ...... 336 6.2.1 The History and Legislative Context of Emergency Management ...... 339 6.2.2 Public Emergency Management Policies and Duties ...... 341 6.2.3 Disaster Assistance Programs ...... 343 6.2.4 Coordinating Emergency Response ...... 344 Appendix 7. The Four Civil Society Functions ...... 347 Appendix 8. Comparison of Philanthropy and the Welfare State ...... 352

x List of Tables

Table 1. United Kingdom Voluntary Sector Organization Capacity, Welfare Services

Table 2. Immediate Financial Assistance, Major Canadian Disasters 2016-2019

Table 3. Government Social Welfare Service Acquisition Regimes

Table 4. Government Social Welfare Service Acquisition Regime Effects

Table 5. Applications for Housing Assistance, Accepted and Refused (2014-2017)

Table 6. England Public Contracts for Homelessness Services, Frequency by Service Type

Table 7. England Public Contracts for Homelessness Services, by Supplier Type

Table 8. Charitable Purposes, Frequency

Table 9. Assisted Groups, Frequency

Table 10. Charitable Activities, Frequency

Table 11. Financial Data, Charities with Homelessness Contracts

Table 12. Personnel, Charities with Homelessness Contracts

Table 13. Geographic Spread, Charities with Homelessness Contracts

Table 14. Charitable Purposes, Frequency

Table 15. Assisted Groups, Frequency

Table 16. Charitable Activities, Frequency

Table 17. Financial Data, Charities with Homelessness Contracts

Table 18. Personnel, Random Sample of Charities

Table 19. Geographic Spread, Random Sample of Charities

Table 20. Data Dictionary: Nonprofit Service Provider List

Table 21. Homeless Shelter Administering Organization

Table 22. Shelter Administering Organization (SAO), by Province

xi Table 23. Revenue Mix of Shelter Administering Charities

Table 24. SAO Funders Data Dictionary

Table 25. Ontario Funders Data Dictionary

Table 26. Ontario SAO Funding Sources, by Sector

Table 27. Top Ontario SAO Funders

Table 28. Homelessness Partnering Strategy (HPS)-Eligible Activities

Table 29. HPS-Ineligible Activities

Table 30. Home for Good (HFG) Initiative Requirements

Table 31. HFG Ineligible Capital Projects

Table 32. Examples of Eligible Health and Social Services Organizations

Table 33. Eligible and Ineligible Public Sector Costs

Table 34. Eligible Private Sector Costs

Table 35. Ineligible Public Sector Expenditures

Table 36. Eligible Public Sector Expenditures

Table 37. Eligible Expenditures for Individuals, Small Businesses, and Nonprofits

Table 38. Ineligible Expenditures for Individuals, Small Businesses, and Nonprofits

Table 39. Disaster Recovery Assistance for Ontarians (DRAO) Sample Assistance Calculation

Table 40. DRAO-Eligible Items, Individuals

Table 41. DRAO-Eligible Items, Small Businesses

Table 42. DRAO-Eligible Items, Nonprofits

Table 43. DRAO-Eligible Items, Small Farms

Table 44. DRAO-Ineligible Items

xii Table 45. Provincial and Municipal Cost-Sharing, Municipal Disaster Recovery Assistance

(MDRA)

Table 46. Provincial and Municipal Cost-Sharing, MDRA, Example

Table 47. MDRA-Eligible and -Ineligible Costs

Table 48. Examples of Bellwin Scheme-Eligible Expenditures

Table 49. Examples of Bellwin Scheme-Ineligible Expenditures

Table 50. Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) Cost-sharing Formula,

Calculated for Ontario 2017

Table 51. Provincial and Municipal Cost-Sharing, MDRA, Example

Table 52. Membership of Provincial Emergency Management Nonprofit (EMNPO) Coordinating

Bodies

Table 53. Comparison of Philanthropic Donations and Government Taxation

xiii List of Figures

Figure 1. Emergency Response Man-hours, Staff and Volunteers, for a Local Nonprofit Branch

Figure 2. Annual Fatalities, Injuries, and Evacuees in Canadian Disasters, 1990-2016

Figure 3. Canadian Red Cross Domestic Disaster Appeals 2013-2019

Figure 4. United Kingdom (UK) Homelessness Contracts 2015-2017, Competition Type

Figure 5. Rough Sleeping in England, 2010-2016

Figure 6. England Public Contracts for Homelessness Services, by Service Type

Figure 7. Annual Fatalities, Injuries, and Evacuees in Canadian Disasters, 1997-2016

Figure 8. Toronto Fire Services 2017 Incident Response Summary

Figure 9. Emergency Management Spending by Departments with Core Responsibility for

Emergency Management

Figure 10. INFORM Index, Hazard and Exposure Ratings

Figure 11. Incidents Attended by Fire and Rescue Services, England

Figure 12. Central Government Engagement Model

xiv List of Appendices

Appendix 1. Interview List

Appendix 2. United Kingdom Housing Assistance Applications

Appendix 3. United Kingdom Homelessness Contracts and Nonprofit Organizations

Appendix 4. The Canadian Nonprofit Service Providers List

Appendix 5. Eligible and Ineligible Expenses

Appendix 6. Emergency Management Policy and Disaster Risk in Canada and the United

Kingdom

Appendix 7. The Four Civil Society Functions

Appendix 8. Comparison of Philanthropy and the Welfare State

Chapter 1. Welfare State Nonprofitization and Service Expansiveness: When Does Nonprofitization Undermine Social Rights, and When Can it Advance them?

1.1 Introduction

This chapter makes the case that welfare state researchers ought to care about nonprofit social welfare, due to its prevalence and political consequences, including the stakes for democracy. It then reviews the literature on nonprofit social welfare provision, identifying three weaknesses: it has taken the boundaries of the welfare state (WS) as given; it has yet to address the different ways in which governments structure social welfare provision; and the linkages between nonprofit contracting and nonprofit influence in the policy process are underdeveloped.

Together, these three weaknesses have served as obstacles to developing a full account of the relationship between welfare state nonprofitization and service expansiveness. This chapter then introduces the theoretical framework that is used throughout the rest of the dissertation. First, it identifies the research puzzle: that the relationship between WS nonprofitization and service

1 expansiveness appears to be more complicated than existing theory suggests. Addressing this puzzle requires an approach to the WS where the public duty is viewed as being reconstituted through everyday practice.

Next, this chapter introduces the dissertation’s two main arguments. First, nonprofitization occurs within a context where the public duty is being continuously renegotiated, meaning that the boundaries of the WS are always in flux. Two pathways to nonprofitization result from the different directions of these fluctuations: cost-cutting and co- optation. While the cost-cutting pathway is linked to service contraction, co-optation is linked to the expansion of public duty. Thus, there is no single overarching relationship between welfare nonprofitization and service expansiveness: nonprofitization operates in both directions. Second, the institutions of nonprofitized welfare can create causal mechanisms which either advance or undermine service expansiveness. Service expansiveness is facilitated where the policy structure offers opportunities for nonprofit voice through advocacy, shaping the service, and piloting.

Service expansiveness is undermined when institutions of acquisition embed values of free- market competition, rather than collaboration or service stability.

After establishing the importance of the topic, reviewing the literature, and introducing the central arguments, a brief section explores the theoretical contributions of this dissertation.

Next, this chapter explains the methodological approach and research design of the dissertation.

Finally, it concludes with an overview of upcoming chapters.

1.2 Bringing Nonprofit Welfare to the Welfare State Literature

The creation of the WS is viewed as one of the most significant evolutions in the political economy of advanced industrial democracies. Since its inception a sizable portion of political

2 economy research has been devoted to understanding the WS’ origins, variations, and trend-lines over time (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990; Lewis and Surender 2004; van Kersbergen and Vis

2014). Confronted with these and other changes over the past half-century, scholars have asked whether the WS is regressing, expanding, or reforming but neither expanding nor regressing

(e.g., Cerny 1990; Pierson 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Palme and Korpi 2003; Hacker

2004; Vis et al. 2011; Bonoli and Natali 2012; Morgan 2013; van Kersbergen and Vis 2014).

This has, in turn, raised questions as to whether the three WS regimes posited by Esping-

Andersen (1990) still hold true today and, if so, how, why, and to what effect there have been changes in the implementation of welfare (e.g., Allan and Scruggs 2004; Rueda 2005, 2015;

Hemerijck 2013; Thelen 2014).

As research has progressed, the boundaries of the WS have shifted. First, the range of social policies was widened through research on the ‘hidden’ WS (Howard 1999). Then, proceeding debates about privatization and the WS (e.g., Kamerman and Kahn 1989; Stoesz

1987), Hacker identified the private WS (2002). This strand of research drew attention to welfare policies that are met indirectly, through government interventions such as tax concessions, regulations, and subsidies (Hacker 2002). Unfortunately, the WS literature to-date has devoted relatively little attention to one of the major actors in its development and implementation: nonprofits. For the purposes of this dissertation, nonprofits are defined as organizations which are institutionally separate from government, non-profit-distributing, and self-governing, with some degree of voluntary participation (Salamon and Anheier 1997).1

1 However, it is worth noting that there is ongoing debate about the proper terminology for the sector. The following are the most common terms: the social economy (Quarter, Mook and Ryan 2010; Neamtan and Downing 2005; Bouchard 2012, 2013); the third sector (Alcock and Kendall 2011); civil society (Deakin 2001; Wang 2006) ; the civic sector; the voluntary sector (Brown et al. 2015; Clifford 2012; Fyfe and Milligan 2003, 2004; NCVO 2008); the nonprofit sector (Salamon and Anheier 1997); the charitable sector (Emmett and Emmett 2015); the independent sector (Payton et al. 1988); the dependent sector (Roelofs 2005); the plural sector (Mintzenberg 2015) and philanthropy. Tellingly, one of the more common names for these organizations, the “third sector” (Anheier and

3 Of course, this is not to say that the WS literature ignores nonprofits completely. There have been some articles on the privatization of the WS – also called ‘welfare pluralism’ – which discuss contracting to nonprofit as well as for-profit service providers.2 Salamon and Anheier

(1998) used Esping-Andersen’s (1990) WS regimes in developing their social origins theory of civil society. But nonprofit welfare research has thus far failed to penetrate the mainstream WS literature – as a result, there is currently a one-way relationship in which research on nonprofit welfare acts as a recipient of postulates from WS research, without shaping the literature. It is for this reason that authors have continually pointed to a lack of understanding of nonprofit welfare

(e.g., Milbourne 2013; Chaney and Wincott 2014). Cammett and MacLean offer a strong starting point for research on non-state social welfare provision and its political consequences (2014), but much more work remains to truly bring nonprofit welfare into the WS literature.

1.2.1 The Nonprofitization of the Welfare State

From hospitals to elder care facilities, schools, refugee resettlement, and disaster relief, government-funded nonprofits are key actors in implementing social rights (Marwell and

Calabrese 2015; Marwell 2004). Research on the ‘contracting out’ of the WS has drawn attention to the role of nonprofit organizations as implementers of core social policies (e.g., Sanger 2003;

Seibel 1990; Casey 2004; Gidron et al. 1992; Lewis 2004; Kendall and Anheier 2001), frames the sector as a residual, suggesting that it is defined by what it is not (public or private, the state or the market) rather than shared characteristics. We still lack a satisfying understanding of how to name or define the amalgam of nonprofits, let alone to fully understand its position in society, sources of power, and relationship to the WS. This is, in part, because nonprofit sector functions, origins, and behavior reflect specific legal definitions, cultural inheritances, and state policies in different national societies (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990). For this dissertation, the author refers to nonprofits and philanthropy as distinct entities, although of course philanthropic funders can be institutionalized as nonprofits. 2 E.g.: Lipsky and Smith (1990), Smith and Lipsky (1993), Handler (1996), Nathan (1996), Milward and Provan (2000), Smith (2002), Vallaincourt Rosenau and Linder (2003), Wong and Tang (2006), Zehavi (2008, 2013), Wright and colleagues (2011), Evers and Svetlik (1993), and Trætteberg (2015).

4 Kramer 1994). As the prominence of government-nonprofit service contracting has risen, authors have labelled this trend the “nonprofitization of the welfare state” (Salamon 2015).

The nonprofitization of the WS refers to the increased use of nonprofit third-party actors to deliver government-funded social welfare services. This is not a phenomenon that is limited to liberal WS regimes – although it has been most closely studied there (e.g., Smith and Lipsky

1993; Wright et al. 2011; Alcock et al. 2012; Milbourne 2013; Jones et al. 2016) and there is an argument to be made that the scope of nonprofitized welfare may be greatest in liberal WS regimes. But nonprofits are involved in social welfare service provision across all WS regimes.3

Indeed, the nonprofit WS is a global phenomenon touching all six populated continents.4

While government-nonprofit service contracting may be growing, the broader relationship is not new: nonprofits have for centuries worked with governments at a variety of levels, especially in the provision of social welfare services (Dillon 2011; Elson 2013; Ranci

2015; Maurutto 2004; Dobkin Hall 2006). In many areas, social welfare by philanthropists and religious charities preceded state welfare programs (Van Bavel and Rijpma 2016; Dobkin Hall

2006). Despite the important and longstanding role of nonprofits in the provision of social welfare, the contribution of nonprofits has been underrepresented in WS theory (Chaney and

Wincott 2014).

The WS literature could benefit from sustained attention to the nonprofit provision of social welfare, in both its government-funded and philanthropic forms – and, as is often the case, when a mix of both funding types are at-work. The purpose of this dissertation is to build a

3 E.g.: Archambault (2015), Besley and Ghatak (2008), Brandsen and Pape (2015), Ranci (2015), Salamon and Toepler (2015), Seibel (1990), Trætteberg (2015). 4 Given the bias of welfare state research toward wealthy countries (Cammett and MacLean 2011, 2014; Rudra 2007), this is an important point to establish. For research on nonprofitized welfare outside of Europe and North America’s wealthiest countries, see, e.g.: Salamon (2015), Shapovalova (2015), Nałęcz, Leś, and Pieliński (2015), and Cook (2015).

5 theoretical foundation from which to understand nonprofitized welfare, its institutional variations, and its political consequences – specifically, its relationship to the expansiveness of social welfare.

1.2.2 The Political Consequences of Nonprofit Social Welfare Provision

It is important to study nonprofit social welfare provision not only because of its prevalence as an arrangement of the WS, but also because nonprofit provision has potentially distinct political consequences. The most comprehensive contribution in this area, by Cammett and MacLean (2014), sets a framework for studying the political consequences of non-state social welfare for the sustainability of care, equality of access to care, accountability to citizens, and state capacity.5 Cammett and MacLean (2014), as well as contributors to the volume, are primarily addressing non-state social welfare in contexts where the state is absent or where provision is distinct. In contrast, nonprofit welfare in high-income states is much more tightly entangled with the WS itself. This entanglement does not render the political consequences of non-state social welfare any less important. But it does require a recalibration of the causal mechanisms that we are interested in, since government welfare institutions set the context for nonprofit welfare provision. Bearing in mind those differences, one can easily see how each of these political consequences is relevant to WS research touching on a range of topics, from distributive justice to social rights and democratization.

The sustainability of care refers to the extent to which non-state welfare provision can be stably funded over time. Related research has pointed to mechanisms in nonprofit contracting

5 While non-state social welfare encompasses a wider array of activities than nonprofit social welfare, the political consequences that the authors identify are all relevant to understanding nonprofit social welfare provision.

6 that undermine the long-run financial health of nonprofits, thereby putting the future quality of services at risk (Marwell and Calabrese 2015). The use of nonprofit contracting to replace unionized government labour with cheaper, non-unionized, or temporary labour can also in some sense be categorized under service sustainability (Chaney and Wincott 2014; Cordelli 2012). In the nonprofit welfare context, the effects of nonprofit welfare on state capacity may also influence the long-run sustainability of care. Cammett and MacLean (2014) posit that the effect on state capacity is related to whether the state had higher or lower levels of regulatory capacity at time-zero.6 However, it is worth exploring whether there are mechanisms through which nonprofit welfare erodes existing state capacity even for strong states. If in the long run nonprofitized welfare undermines state capacity, this would weigh heavily in normative evaluation of nonprofit social welfare.

Next, the equality of access to care refers to whether non-state provision makes it more likely that certain categories of individuals may face barriers in seeking out and receiving social welfare services. Although we know little about how nonprofit social welfare influences equality of access to care, we can easily imagine how institutional incentives can lead to the use of, for instance, restrictive eligibility criteria (Cammett and MacLean 2014). Unequal effects of non- state welfare provision may be more acute for for-profit provision than nonprofit provision, given different organizational motivations (Cammett and MacLean 2014). Accountability effects could also contribute to our understanding of equal access. For instance, to the extent that nonprofit welfare is fragmented and complex, it can make it difficult for citizens to access services and thereby lower issue visibility – in turn, creating a barrier to preference-based voting

6 Their logic is more complex than this, but one supposition has to do with pre-existing state capacity.

7 that might undermine the long run political viability of equitable social welfare services

(Gingrich 2014).

There are, thus, numerous reasons that researchers should be interested in the effects of nonprofit welfare provision for the sustainability of care and equality of access to care. But sustainability of care and equality of access to care only partially address a question that has

(implicitly or explicitly) interested many in the field of nonprofit welfare: namely, does welfare nonprofitization advance or undermine social rights, and under what conditions? Social rights, broadly speaking, are rights pertaining to assuring an adequate standard of living for individuals in a society – such as food, clothing, health, and housing (Kohn 2018). To understand the effects of nonprofit welfare for social rights, equality of access is of course a relevant variable. Yet even minimal services can be provided equally.

This project thus utilises a somewhat wider variable: service expansiveness. The expansiveness of social welfare refers to the breadth (coverage) and depth (content of care) of provision, with greater coverage and content of care denoting more expansive provision.7 Social policy areas measure coverage and content of care differently, but in general these are the two metrics for assessing the level of services provided across areas. For instance, in basic education experts frequently discuss the proportion of children in a polity that have access to education, as well as the quality of education that they receive (e.g., Tomaseski 2004; Pritchett 2013). Because the supposition is that contracting affects the overall environment of social welfare, expansiveness includes social service provision outside of government-nonprofit contracting – for instance, services provided by the government directly or through government-for-profit contracts.

7 This is similar to Thelen’s (2014) use of bargaining coverage and union density as a measure for the liberalization of industrial relations policy.

8 This study asks: is there a relationship between nonprofitized service provision and the expansiveness of social welfare? If so, what is it?

1.3 The Nonprofit Studies Literature on Government Contracting

There are substantial political stakes in nonprofit social welfare provision, including for the advancement of social rights. This section reviews the literature on government contracting to nonprofits. It identifies the major conclusions of the literature and highlights three important weaknesses that this dissertation seeks to address.

The nonprofit provision of social welfare has been an area of focus for researchers for a half-century. Public services have played a key role in explanations of the nonprofit sector, from government failure theory (Weisbrod 1977, 1986; Matsunaga et al. 2010; Carroll and Calabrese

2017) to market failure theory (Preston 1988) and social origins theory (Salamon and Anheier

1998). Near the end of the 20th century, research on the contracting out of the WS to nonprofits began to take off.

A seminal book in this field, Nonprofits for Hire (Smith and Lipsky 1993), depicts a contracting revolution that is transforming nonprofit organizations into essentially businesslike agencies, delivering low cost services to conform to the government’s desire to spend less on its social services. The authors point to certain characteristics that are inherent to service contracting

– such as its effects on the organization of nonprofits – and others that are specific to particular government-nonprofit contracting relations – such as power imbalance, emphasis on cost reduction, the opening of these contracts to competition with for-profits, and the uncertainty imposed on nonprofits – to make the argument that the contracting revolution will exert downward pressure on social welfare provision.

9 This basic logic has been echoed by other research on nonprofits in the context of contracting out.8 A strand of this research focuses on nonprofit advocacy and its relationship to government contracting; while no consensus has been achieved (Nicholson-Crotty 2009), many authors suggest, as Smith and Lipsky (1993) do, that increased dependence on government contracts decrease the extent to which nonprofits are willing to express policy voice, other characteristics being held constant.

Furthermore, researchers have argued that government-nonprofit contracting generates organizational pressures for nonprofits (Salamon 2012). Specifically, government contracting is associated with a turn toward the commercialization/marketization (Adams and Perlmutter 1991;

Eikenberry and Kluver 2004; McBrearty 2007) and professionalization (Onyx et al. 2010;

Choudry and Kapoor 2013; Kohl-Arenas 2016) of nonprofit organizations. The principles of commercialism and professionalism potentially intersect with nonprofit imperatives of voluntarism and civic activism to affect the role, strategy, style, principal reference group, organizational structure, management style, and resource base of nonprofits (Salamon 2012).

This line of reasoning fits well with critical research arguing that ‘NGOization’ – the shift from member- to chequebook-based nonprofits – undermines the capacity of nonprofits to act as sites of citizen mobilization (e.g. Choudry and Kapoor 2013). The authors writing on this stream stress how organizational changes shift not only the level of advocacy but also the type of advocacy that is undertaken. The implication is that increased use of government-nonprofit social welfare contracting puts downward pressure on the expansiveness of the WS, both in terms of its direct effect on service provision and the indirect effect of reduced or unrepresentative nonprofit advocacy.9

8 E.g., Smith (2002b), Boris and Maronick (2014), Pettijohn (May 2013), Morgan and Campbell (2011). 9 Although, as Mosley (2012) notes, this has been underexplored empirically.

10 Existing research thus points to two ways that government-nonprofit contracting exerts downward pressure on the expansiveness of service provision: directly, through the fact of competitive contracting and indirectly, through the effects that this relationship has on nonprofit voice. That is, the literature predicts that increases in the level of government-nonprofit contracting for services (LGNC) results in less expansive social welfare policies (DV1)10 and decreased nonprofit voice (DV2).

LGNC à DV1 LGNC à DV2

Furthermore, the existing literature expects that decreased nonprofit voice (DV2), due to a shift in emphasis from an expressive to a service function amongst nonprofit organizations, might further constrict the expansiveness of social welfare (DV1).

LGNC à DV2 à DV1

Finally, the literature might also expect increased government-nonprofit contracting to affect nonprofit voice (DV2) through the effect that decreased expansiveness of social welfare (DV1) has on the availability of resources to advocate.

LGNC à DV1 à DV2

The literature on government-nonprofit contracting has contributed greatly to identifying the ways in which government contracting potentially influences nonprofit social welfare providers. However, three weaknesses prevent it from offering a full account of nonprofitized welfare.

10 There are, of course, all kinds of other factors that affect the expansiveness of social welfare provision. However, at the level of individual policy environments and organizations this literature would expect us to observe a narrowing of social welfare provision arising as a result of the power asymmetry introduced as contracting becomes the norm of provision.

11 First, this literature has taken the boundaries of the WS as given, even as the research implies that nonprofit contracting should accompany receding boundaries of the WS. While the nonprofit contracting literature offers evidence that contracting affects nonprofits, there is no a priori reason to believe that contracting to nonprofit organizations implies an abdication of state responsibility (Metzger 2003; DiIulio 2003).11 As such, it is necessary to examine this question more fully from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Through the use of a practice approach to the study of public duty, this dissertation seeks to provide a foundation for understanding the interplay of philanthropy and government in social welfare, especially as boundary changes are implemented through nonprofit organizations. Indeed, one of the two pathways to nonprofitization that this dissertation identifies – co-optation – is fundamentally linked to positive boundary shifting, where governments adopts a new area of responsibility.

Second, research on nonprofit contracting has yet to address the different ways in which governments structure social welfare provision. Contracting to nonprofits through a competitive bidding process is just one way in which governments acquire services from nonprofits. Some arrangements resemble ‘markets’ more than others. Just as the structure of service markets differentially affects for-profit providers (Gingrich 2011), there is every reason to expect that the choices governments make about how to purchase nonprofit services should exert differential effects on nonprofit organizations. Indeed, this dissertation finds that marketized government- nonprofit social welfare acquisition regimes create incentives for price-based competition that are not as prevalent in non-marketized regimes.

11 Indeed, Hirst (1994) presents “associationalism” as an alternative to liberal individualism and socialist collectivism, stressing its root with socialist thinkers like Robert Owen, George Jacob Holyoake, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. “Associationalism does not aim to reduce either social provision or economic governance, but to change their form of organization. It devolves the performance and administration of public functions to voluntary bodies that are accountable to their members and to the public power. What would conventionally be regarded as ‘private’ agencies undertake public functions, but, unlike the agencies created by economic liberal reforms, they are accountable to those for whom the service or activity is provided.” (Hirst 1994: 22)

12 Third, the linkages between nonprofit contracting and nonprofit influence in the policy process is underexplored. Some nonprofit contracting research has included advocacy as a dependent variable (e.g., Nicholson-Crotty 2007, 2009; Lu 2018). However, there has been relatively little work looking at how contracting regimes elicit different effects for nonprofit voice. This dissertation finds that social welfare institutions which allow greater space for nonprofit voice may embed more opportunities to ratchet up service expansiveness.

1.4 Nonprofitization and Service Expansiveness: Error Causality Not Found

The two available narratives for explaining nonprofit welfare provision both assume a negative relationship between service expansiveness and nonprofit welfare provision. And yet, the trend of WS nonprofitization that we are observing does not seem to uniformly support this assumption. How can we account for this puzzle? This dissertation suggests starting from a practice perspective on the WS, where the public duty is constantly being reproduced and transformed – meaning that the boundaries of the WS are perpetually fluctuating. Applying this lens can help researchers move beyond cost-cutting in their analysis of why WS nonprofitization occurs.

1.4.1 Moving Beyond State Abdication Narratives

In studying nonprofit social welfare one question of implicit interest concerns the scope of public responsibility. This is at the heart of the contracting out literature. Thus far, the literature has posited two common propositions about the relationship between nonprofit social welfare provision and state capacity. Both suggest a negative relationship between nonprofit provision and WS service expansiveness. The first is a state expansion narrative, which posits

13 that nonprofit welfare provision was overtaken by government provision as WS institutions were created, primarily in the post-war context. The second is a state abdication narrative, which posits that we ought to interpret the contracted implementation of services to nonprofits as a winnowing of previously public duties (e.g., Smith and Lipsky 1993; Beresford and Croft 1983).

These narratives both express elements of reality, yet they offer an incomplete and therefore unsatisfactory account of nonprofit social welfare.

Although nonprofit contracting research quite often implies that the use of nonprofits is emblematic of state abdication – cost-cutting – the relationship between nonprofit welfare and service expansiveness does not appear so straightforward. Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development statistics on social spending as a percentage of gross domestic product, for instance, show that between 1995 and 2011 social spending in Sweden has remained almost identical (OECD 2016), despite increased use of nonprofit contracting since the early

2000s (Johansson and Johansson 2015). Social spending in the US increased over that same period (OECD 2016). Although this is obviously a cursory glance at a very complicated issue, it corroborates the argument of WS researchers, who have pointed to the endurance of Esping-

Andersen’s (1990) three “worlds of welfare” (Van Kersebergen and Hemerjick 2012) despite the nonprofitization of the WS across much of the world (Salamon 2015).

There is no necessary association between the extent to which nonprofit organizations are prevalent as social welfare service providers and the scope of the WS. This point is most obvious for countries like Germany, which have drawn on nonprofit implementation throughout the expansion of the WS (Strachwitz and Zimmer 2010). It is also a notable feature of the Canadian

WS. As governments in Canada began taking on a greater role in social service provision, the involvement of nonprofits also increased. As Maurutto has noted, “new public relief programs,

14 far from displacing the work of charities, intensified cooperative ventures, or “partnerships,” between voluntary institutions and municipal departments” (2004: 164). Indeed:

Charities were not casualties of state expansion. As governments stepped up their responsibility in social welfare, voluntary organizations were restructured and transformed, but they were not displaced. In fact, as public provisions expanded during the forties and fifties, voluntary agencies likewise benefited from substantial public support. (Maurutto 2004: 165)

Wolfe and Jay (1990) tell a similar story in their chapter on homeless-serving nonprofits in Canada: church and other voluntary agencies provided shelter and other services before the government accepted responsibility for the public wellbeing of these individuals, and these same nonprofits were incorporated into the WS as a result. Thus, while displacement of nonprofit welfare occurred in some instances of state expansion, we can also point to cases where states decided to retain or even expand nonprofit provision as an element of the WS. Likewise, nonprofit provision of previously government-provided services is not necessarily evidence that the state is abdicating responsibility for a policy area.

One example is the transfer to nonprofit-provided community living services in Canada, which took place during the program of deinstitutionalization which began in the mid-1980s.12

Today, Ontario’s Ministry of Community and Social Services funds approximately 370 community living organizations to provide residential and other support programs for individuals with developmental disabilities.13 Rather than reflecting an abdication of responsibility by the state, the structure of this service reflected an acknowledgement by the state that a public duty it had already accepted should be undertaken through a different approach, drawing upon improved practices of care. Those nonprofits that had led the drive for this new approach were brought into the government system through service contracts and corresponding financial transfers. This

12 Heintz v. Christian Horizons. 13 Heintz v. Christian Horizons at para 53.

15 suggests a need to think beyond state expansion and state abdication in our understanding of nonprofit social welfare.

Authors have attempted to add nuance to the state abdication narrative through new conceptual tools. One example is government deficit theory, which analyses the revenue mix of nonprofits involved in providing social rights (Marwell and Calabrese 2015). While this measure adds to our understanding, it too is unsatisfactory because it glosses over the internal divisions of nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit organizations provide an array of programs, some of which may be ‘core’ social welfare services while others may not. For instance, the same nonprofit may operate a government-funded emergency youth shelter while also offering programs supported by donation – for instance, religious summer camps or art classes. Analysis of the ratio of government funding to total funding cannot account for these nuances. A nonprofit which provides only an emergency shelter may have a funding mix comprised of 90 percent government funding, reflecting a ten percent philanthropic cross-subsidization of a supposedly government program. On the other hand, an agency with many program areas could receive government funding for 60 percent of total revenue or even less – and yet their emergency shelter may be completely government-funded. Given that it can be the norm for social service nonprofits to deliver upwards of five or six programs (Grenier et al. 2013), the overall revenue mix may obscure the confluence of these services.

Our current conceptual tools are inadequate to address the relationship between nonprofit welfare provision and service expansiveness. The literature on nonprofit social welfare has taken the boundaries of the WS as a given. However, this obscures the ways in which WS boundaries are constantly in flux. A solution to this weakness of the literature is to view the public duty as contested and practice-based. That is, rather than approaching the public as a static ‘domain’, we

16 should see the public duty as a contested set of practices, the scope and nature of which are constantly changing. Doing so can help to elucidate different pathways of nonprofitization, which are often connected with WS boundary shifts. Government may choose to displace nonprofit provision, or it can fund existing nonprofits, or it might open up a market, mixed-form or nonprofit-only. But preceding the choice amongst these formats is a decision about the

‘publicness’ of a service in the first place. Namely, governments need to decide that it is appropriate to intervene, and if so to define the appropriate boundaries of their duty on a certain issue. This is an ongoing matter of contestation, and it occurs through publicness claims submitted both inside and outside the state.

1.4.2 Practicing Publicness

This dissertation proposes to study social welfare through a conception of public duty as consisting of contested practices constituting the collective responsibility for private wellbeing.

That is the approach taken by Best and Gheciu (2014) in their edited volume, the Return of the

Public in Global Governance. The authors begin from the supposition that the ontological separation of public and private realms cannot explain the reconstitution of the public in global governance (Best and Gheciu 2014a). Instead, Best and Gheciu (2014a) suggest viewing publicness through public-making practices. In particular, they posit that conceptualizing the public as a set of practices emphasizes “the contested and historically contingent character of what we call public” (Best and Gheciu 2014c: 5). This, in turn, makes it possible to consider the politics of defining a good, procedure, or actor as public – as well as the power relations involved in defining the public (Best and Gheciu 2014b). Their argument is at home as part of a

17 broader “practice turn” in social science.14 Notably, this approach is also in essence the one endorsed by Evers (1993) when he suggests a sociological approach to understanding welfare pluralism. The main building blocks of a practice approach are, of course, practices. Practices are defined as “knowledge-constructed, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity that structure experience and enable agents [individuals and communities] to reproduce or transform their world.” (Best and Gheciu 2014b: 26-7) They are “patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6).

A public practice is “an action that involves an understanding that someone counts as a member of the public, something is of common concern, or that some process is public.” (Best and Gheciu 2014b: 33) At the base of this definition is the notion that something is of common concern, which the authors argue is a core assumption underpinning the general use of the term public (Best and Gheciu 2014b). This project focuses specifically on public-defining practices as they pertain to social welfare. That is, it examines practices defining whether something is a collective duty or not, as well as who is responsible for actualizing that public duty.

In the area of global policy, Best and Gheciu (2014) explore how issues come to be seen as public or not. The public that they articulate is fluid and dynamic; it is “a construction involving certain actors or processes at certain moments, and not at others” (Best and Gheciu

2014: 33-4). Viewed as a set of practices, publicness emerges at a given moment as the culmination of ideational claims as well as material practices. Public practices “are partial, incomplete, and contested, [meaning that] efforts to define an actor, problem, or process as public tend to include some things or people while excluding others” (Best and Gheciu 2014:

14 This ‘turn’ has been more prominent in some areas than others, notably sociology and international relations. See, e.g.: Adler and Pouliot (2011), Schatzki and colleagues (2001), and Spaargaren and colleagues (2016). Best and Gheciu’s (2014) description of practices draws closely from Adler and Pouliot (2011).

18 35). Through performative public-defining acts, the boundaries of publicness are continually redrawn. Best and Gheciu (2014) focus on public legitimation claims in transnational private governance, but this same perspective can be applied to domestic policy as well.

This dissertation conceptualizes public duty as a set of practices constituting the collective responsibility for private wellbeing. Public duty is thus defined here in terms that are specific to social welfare.15 Importantly, we are here able to see the overall scope of public duty as determined by public-defining acts, rather than a single domain. Taking a practice approach – in which we assume that the public duty is contested and being constantly redefined – enables us to turn our attention to how pathways of nonprofitization intersect with the expansion and contraction of the boundaries of the WS.

1.4.3 If Not Cost-Cutting, Then What?

We can observe nonprofitized welfare across many places and policy areas. There does not seem to be a clear unidirectional relationship between the extent of nonprofitization and the scope of social welfare. This suggests that cost-cutting cannot, by itself, explain the use of nonprofit organizations to deliver WS services. How, then, can we account for the relationship between nonprofit welfare provision and WS service expansiveness? That is the question that this dissertation sets out to answer, in two parts. In the first part, the focus is on general pathways of nonprofitization. Then, the second part turns its attention to how nonprofit welfare provision is

15 According to Cammett and MacLean, social welfare is “the direct delivery or indirect facilitation of services and programs that promote well-being and social security. Essentially, this includes health, education, and support for vulnerable populations such as the elderly, disabled, and the poor” (2014: 6). Stated another way, social welfare comprises those areas where societies have established collective practices in order to safeguard the wellbeing of individuals – it is the contours of public duty for the wellbeing of individuals in a society.

19 institutionalized, linking institutional characteristics to mechanisms for growing or shrinking service expansiveness.

1.5 Two Pathways to Nonprofitization

The previous section established that cost-cutting cannot explain the nonprofitization of

WS services that we have seen in recent decades, at least not by itself. What, then, explains nonprofitization? Understanding the use of nonprofit welfare services requires attention to changes in government acceptance of public duties – in other words, WS boundary changes. This dissertation finds that many instances of nonprofitization occur when government adopts a new public duty as part of the WS. When nonprofitization accompanies new WS duties, it reflects a government’s decision to co-opt existing services, rather than to promote or replace them. Co- optation offers an explanation for nonprofitization which is associated with greater service expansiveness. Six characteristics identified in the dissertation may induce governments to co- opt nonprofit services: ease, service stability, unique constituencies, service-related expertise, surge manpower, and preference for supporting civil society.

1.5.1 Co-optation as an Alternate Pathway to Nonprofitization

When government wants to take on a new social program, it is seldom the case that that program is totally novel. Virtually always, that service exists in some form for some segment of the population. Maybe it is available to those who can afford to pay a fee. Maybe it is available for free in some places for people who meet criteria of some kind. When governments move into a new are of public duty, they have to make choices about how they will address existing providers. Adapting a framework used in the literature on public-private governance

20 interactions,16 there are three possible strategies governments can take when they enter a new area of public duty: promote, replace, and co-opt.

First, governments can use tools to promote existing services. This is what is sometimes referred to as the “private” WS. Examples of promoting existing services include offering incentives like tax credits that encourage people to use fee-based services or mandating that people must purchase the privately provided service, as in the case of certain types of insurance.

Promoting non-governmental social services is a strategy that is primarily directed at fee-based

16 The public-private governance interactions literature examines the different ways in which governments can intervene (or not) in private regulatory governance, as well as how public and private authority intersect. Although the public-private governance interactions literature may at first seem distant from the subject of domestic WS nonprofitization, this author would submit that it is an appropriate and useful choice because that literature has the “most encompassing” focus on public-private governance dynamics (Tosun et al. 2016: 3). Rooted primarily in the international relations literature – and especially the subfield of global governance – the public-private governance interactions literature examines how private governance initiatives engage with one another, as well as with state and supranational institutions. Research seeks to understand why non-state actors get involved with governance, as well as why the state is willing to delegate to private actors (Tosun et al. 2016). Contributors to this literature also want to identify the patterns and mechanisms of interaction, as well as their causes and implications for state capacity and policy outcomes (Eberlein et al. 2014; Green and Auld 2017; Levin et al. 2009; Renckens forthcoming; Cashore et al. forthcoming; Wood et al. 2016). A government’s decision to adopt a new area of public duty has to contend with activities that are “private”, as the literature conceives it (meaning provided by actors in for-profit and nonprofit domains). The public-private governance interactions literature brings into focus how governments may support or clash with those actors when moving into a new area – whereas the WS literature has tended to avoid this question, treating WS expansion as terra nullius. Because the public-private governance interactions literature is focused on dynamics precisely at the intersection of “public” and “private” domains, it is inherently focused on the changing boundary lines between public authority (sovereignty) and private authority. As such, adapting this approach to a domestic social welfare context can help to reveal the changing dynamics of the public duty over time, since government is constantly interacting with nonprofits in the realm of public duty. Government is also constantly interacting with private providers of fee-based services that lie outside of public duty. These dynamic interactions are what constitutes – and either reifies or transforms – the public duty over time. But of course, the public-private governance interactions literature focuses on regulatory governance. While some aspects of WS nonprofitization are regulatory, social welfare services are primarily about service design and delivery. Thus, the conceptual tools from the public-private governance interactions literature cannot be simply transplanted to analysis of social welfare services; they must be adapted. The four categories outlined below draw roughly from Cashore and colleagues (forthcoming) and Renckens (forthcoming). Cashore and colleagues (forthcoming) argue that public-private governance interactions can be complementary or competitive (with co- existence being a middle case). Within these larger categories they present the subcategories of collaboration, coordination, isomorphism, collusion, substitution, and co-optation. Renckens (forthcoming) builds upon this framework to look at the features of private (regulatory) governance in which governments can intervene. In private regulatory governance, Renckens argues that governments can react to private standards by ignoring them (declining to intervene), deferring to or recognizing them, or developing a governmental standard (which itself involves a range of choices).

21 services, and so will usually pertain to the private sector, but it can be relevant to nonprofits in some instances.

Second, government can choose to replace existing services with a government-run public service. In this case, government might create a department, or expand an existing one, to carry out new services using government employees. Government might also take over an existing service agency, formally bringing it in as a state entity.

Finally, governments can choose to co-opt existing services. Perhaps the most common pathway of nonprofitization is through co-optation. Co-optation occurs when governments adopt responsibility for a new area of social policy by funding the nonprofits that are already operating in that policy space – whether this is government’s entry into a totally new area or, more frequently, the subtle and ongoing reconstitution of the boundaries of the WS over time.

Sometimes governments fund nonprofits that already provide a similar, previously philanthropic, service. In other instances, nonprofits are engaged to provide services that they were not previously providing. A third variant of co-optation observed in this dissertation consists of grant-based capacity supports for nonprofits that are primarily philanthropic but offer social welfare services that are proximate to government social welfare services.

Co-optation and cost-cutting are thus the two main pathways to nonprofitization in the

WS (and likely in other policy areas as well). By its nature, co-optation follows an increase of government responsibility, whether this is incremental or more radical. On the other hand, cost- cutting usually implies an offloading of government responsibility in some respect.17 While research has often focused on cost-cutting as the rationale for WS, co-optation is a very common pathway as well. Co-optation and cost-cutting can coincide within a social welfare policy area.

17 Although when cost-cutting pertains to lower labor costs (e.g., through the nonprofit sector’s use of non-unionized workers) or “innovation” (efficiencies induced through competitive contracting), this is somewhat more ambiguous.

1.5.2 Why Co-opt Nonprofit Services into the WS

What factors might induce governments to co-opt nonprofit social welfare provision, rather than opting for other strategies? This dissertation identifies six characteristics that make it attractive for governments to co-opt nonprofit services: ease, service stability, unique constituencies, service-related expertise, surge manpower, and a preference for supporting civil society.

First, and somewhat obviously, it is easier to pay for an existing service than to re-invent the program. Replacing nonprofit provision requires significantly greater resource investment, as well as political risks (if the nonprofit, say, opposes the government’s initiative). While funding nonprofit services can decrease a government’s level of control over the service, governments often view this as a reasonable trade-off. (And through funding rules governments can exert control anyhow). A slightly different framing of this argument would see co-optation as resulting from lower state capacity in a particular area (Tosun et al. 2016).

Second, governments sometimes prefer to co-opt nonprofit services because they value service stability. Especially when a service is targeted toward individuals with multiple vulnerabilities, destabilizing service provision can do irreparable harm. These kinds of problems can generate bad press, which injects political risk for officials.

Third, nonprofits have unique constituencies that governments may find helpful to draw upon in providing social welfare. Longstanding local groups can have deep, lasting community ties that make it easier to reach these communities. That is especially the case in areas where distrust of government is high – e.g., undocumented migrant communities. Even newer nonprofit organizations can be valued for their access to and trust within specific communities. For instance, the Indigenous-run community safety group Bear Clan Patrol received $100,000 in

23 funding in 2017-2018 to support the organization’s capacity. Bear Clan is a Winnipeg-based volunteer group that is increasingly playing an important support role in First Nations emergency response.18 The organization is able to promote safety because it has a trusting relationship with

Indigenous people, in contrast to police services.

Fourth, nonprofits often have service-related expertise that is unmatched within government. Where government is expanding into a totally new social policy area, co-opting nonprofit service providers can be especially attractive: the civil service will inevitably have less expertise in implementing a new service than a nonprofit that has been providing the service for years. Depending on the nature of the service, nonprofit expertise can exceed government expertise even when government has accepted responsibility in that policy area for some time.

One example is emergency management, where emergencies happen infrequently in local areas.

National nonprofits are able to develop more expertise than small municipalities, both because they have larger staff complements and because they respond to a broad array of disasters from different geographic contexts.

Fifth, governments may co-opt nonprofits into the WS because of volunteer personnel.

When this occurs in a regularized service context, it is fair to consider this rationale a cost- cutting measure – as volunteers effectively displace paid labour. However, in policy contexts where unspecialized surge manpower is needed periodically, volunteers can improve community

18 Manitoba First Nations communities frequently evacuate to Winnipeg when weather events on-reserve affect infrastructure and/or threaten the safety of residents. Although Bear Clan is in essence a community-led inner-city patrol, its members have stepped forward to support evacuees and ensure safety in congregate shelters. In addition to being useful for governments from a surge capacity perspective, Bear Clan Patrol’s contribution is indispensable in preventing and de-escalating incidents when evacuees come into contact with police. There is considerable distrust of the police, for reasons to do with the historical and ongoing colonization of Indigenous communities. While non- Indigenous humanitarian nonprofits have a better relationship with Indigenous communities, it is still better when Bear Clan Patrol provides security – especially since in practice humanitarian nonprofits would usually hire private security for a task like this. Bear Clan Patrol has been so successful in Manitoba that it is expanding to other areas of Canada.

24 resilience.19 For instance, in emergency management local governments face high personnel needs during a disaster, for specialized tasks (e.g., staffing a reception centre) as well as unspecialized tasks (e.g. sandbagging). Community members often want to help with local disaster response efforts. But doing so in an uncoordinated way can pose risks. Governments thus draw on nonprofits to manage spontaneous volunteers. The alternative is either taking on this role themselves – which some municipalities do – or excluding spontaneous volunteers.

Governments that do not use spontaneous volunteers for surge manpower must then find staff capacity internally – which can be impossible in some contexts, and in the best-case scenario undermines business continuity – or ask for support from an outside government agency, like the military – which is expensive.20

Finally, governments may co-opt nonprofits into the WS as an instrument for encouraging the voluntary sector, as well as connecting objectives like social capital and resilience. Governments do sometimes see civil society, the voluntary sector, or community- based organizations – the terminology differs, and each is imbued with slightly different meanings – as inherently worth supporting. Most often grant funding is the avenue that governments choose for supporting the voluntary sector, but in some cases this perspective can be a factor underpinning the choice to co-opt nonprofits into the WS.21

1.6 Service Expansiveness and the Institutions of Nonprofitized Welfare

19 Although the situation of long-term care homes during the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted that in some policy contexts having staff capacity to handle surge times may be a requirement of good care. 20 It also is not ideal from a military perspective, since this is a bit outside their ordinary mandate. But there is a conversation ongoing in the military about whether it is good for the military to carry out disaster assistance. 21 Conversely, governments may feel that nonprofits are easier to control when funded by government. This was not an argument that I directly encountered in my research, but nonprofits did express that in some cases they felt unable to criticize government – so we cannot dismiss the possibility.

25 There are at least two pathways to WS nonprofitization: cost-cutting and co-optation.

While the cost-cutting pathway is linked to mechanisms of declining service expansiveness, the co-optation pathway is not; it accompanies an expansion in the boundaries of the WS. But what about once social welfare is nonprofitized? Under what conditions does nonprofitized welfare provision expand or contract the expansiveness of social welfare?

Although there is no necessary relationship between the level of nonprofitization and social welfare expansiveness, the choices that governments make about how to institutionalize nonprofit social welfare can influence whether welfare expansiveness erodes over time or, indeed, actually increases. This author advances two causal arguments in support of the claim that the institutions of nonprofitized welfare can differentially impact service expansiveness. The first argument focuses on where the power to shape the boundaries of the WS resides, while the second argument deals with the values embedded in institutions of acquiring nonprofit social welfare provision.

1.6.1 Policy Structure and Nonprofit Voice

Policy structure can influence the extent to which nonprofits are able to influence the boundaries of the welfare state. Where the division of public duty is institutionalized on the ground there are more opportunities to expand the WS, compared with boundaries that are solely and rigidly dictated by legislation. This dissertation finds that nonprofit welfare providers have three avenues for ratcheting up the welfare state: advocacy, shaping the service, and piloting.

While advocacy is possible in all policy contexts, the policy structure can determine whether the points at which nonprofits access the state are also those with the power to make decisions about service expansiveness. The remaining two avenues of influence are best facilitated in policy structures where there is freedom for bureaucrats and nonprofits to institutionalize on the ground.

26 Systems where the boundaries of the welfare state are less rigid provide greater space for nonprofit welfare providers to directly shape the services they are contracted to provide.

Institutionalizing on the ground also offers a meaningful pathway for successful philanthropic pilot projects to become part of the welfare state. This implies that when the line between government and philanthropy is messy, it can actually create more favourable conditions for service expansion. That is because, in contrast to policy contexts where social rights act as a ceiling as well as a floor, institutionalizing on the ground allows bureaucrats and nonprofits the space to negotiate the division of public duty over time.

Otherwise, the only direction in which service expansiveness can go is down – at least, until laws change. Nonprofits in highly legislated policy contexts can always cross-subsidize contracted services with philanthropy, running them at a government-deficit. Indeed, they may even have competitive incentives to do so, as we will see. But where legislation dictates the boundaries of the WS, nonprofits are not able to directly ratchet up services in response to need.

Nor can they easily change the service approach.

Changing the legislated boundaries of the WS is challenging not only for reasons that are well-known to political scientists (e.g., veto players). Additionally, in nonprofitized welfare it is challenging because the requirements for advocating legislative change is misaligned with the points at which nonprofits access the state. Nonprofit service providers have dense interactions with frontline, midlevel, and even high-level municipal civil servants. They have some interactions with civil servants in subnational governments. But their access to higher levels of government, and especially lawmakers, is limited. To influence laws, service provider nonprofits must join advocacy coalitions or work with nationally influential advocacy organizations on specific campaigns. This can be helpful to an extent, and it is certainly something that nonprofit

27 service providers do, but the capacity of such organizations to do this often and effectively is limited.

When the division of public duty is institutionalized on the ground, nonprofits and bureaucrats can tweak the boundaries of the WS over time, in response to changing needs and best practices. Such systems increase the agency of nonprofits, since they offer better tools for using philanthropy to ratchet up services, to better react to problems, and to incorporate evolving social needs. For instance, nonprofits can use philanthropy to fund new elements of an existing service or to demonstrate evidence justifying a new program or approach. Where the boundaries of the WS are institutionalized on the ground, it is easier for these initiatives to become part of the WS. In other words, such systems can better facilitate a government co-optation of previously philanthropic services. Although governments should not rely on philanthropy to carry out public duty, there are complementarities between philanthropy and the WS. Where nonprofits have the capacity and flexibility to use both – and to see one as a path to the other – they can be more effective.

One interesting implication of this for the WS literature is that it requires a practice-based approach to studying nonprofitized welfare. Studying systems that are institutionalized on the ground is only possible by examining practices as they unfold. In cases like these, examining formal policies – especially policies at the national or regional level – does little to shed light on the boundary lines between government and philanthropic public duty. WS boundaries are only elucidated through an examination of how nonprofit social welfare is practiced through everyday policymaking – the decisions of frontline bureaucrats, the specifics in service contracts and memoranda of understanding, and the budget and programmatic choices of service provider nonprofits.

1.6.2 Institutions of Acquisition: Marketization Creates Incentives that Undermine Service Expansiveness

The relationship between nonprofitized welfare and service expansiveness is also shaped by the institutions for acquiring nonprofit social welfare services. The values embedded in regimes for acquiring social welfare can undermine, stabilize, or even advance social rights over time. Marketized regimes create incentives that undermine the long-run expansiveness of care, while regimes that embed other values, like service stability or collaboration, do not.

This dissertation finds that marketized nonprofit social welfare provision introduces incentives which erode the expansiveness of social care over time. Marketized regimes create incentives for the nonprofits that participate to act more like businesses, just as the contracting out literature implies. In particular, price-based competition is more prevalent under such regimes. Marketized regimes also create segmentation within the nonprofit sector. But governments can choose acquisition regimes that prioritize other values – such as collaboration or service stability. Under these systems, nonprofit social welfare need not erode the expansiveness of the WS. Indeed, these systems can actually enable nonprofits to use philanthropy as a tool for expanding the WS over time, under certain conditions.

1.7 Theoretical Contributions

There is no necessary relationship between the level of nonprofitization and social welfare expansiveness. Nonprofitization that is led by cost-cutting, as authors have previously pointed out, can undermine WS expansiveness over time. However, a second pathway to nonprofitization does not have this same drawback. Co-optation occurs when government expands the boundaries of the WS through incorporating nonprofit services, rather than

29 promoting non-governmental services through incentives or replacing them with services directly provided by government. There are at least six reasons that co-opting nonprofit services may be attractive to governments.

Once nonprofitized, the choices that governments make about how to institutionalize nonprofit social welfare can influence whether welfare expansiveness erodes over time, stays the same or increases. Ratcheting up service expansiveness is easier where the policy structure enables nonprofit voice to influence the boundaries of the WS through piloting, shaping the service, and advocacy. In the case of homelessness, this has created a somewhat counterintuitive situation where the United Kingdom’s centrally legislated right to housing provides fewer levers for service expansiveness than the Canadian context, where homelessness policy is institutionalized on the ground. The relationship between service expansiveness and nonprofit welfare provision is also influenced by the values embedded in institutions for acquiring nonprofit social welfare services. That is because marketized regimes – which emphasize free- market competition – create incentives for nonprofits to compete on the basis of price, while undermining collaboration.

The arguments presented in this dissertation contribute to the debate on whether one form of privatization (nonprofitization) represents a retraction of the WS. While existing narratives of nonprofitization – state abdication and state expansion – suggest a negative relationship between nonprofit welfare provision and service expansiveness, this dissertation argues that the relationship is more complicated. Indeed, viewing the WS as an ongoing practice of constituting the public duty, we can see a pathway to nonprofitization that coincides with an expansion of the public duty. Governments that wish to take on a new public duty can choose to co-opt, promote, or replace existing non-governmental provision. And there are many reasons that co-opting

30 nonprofit welfare services may be an attractive option for governments. This is not to negate the existence of nonprofitization through the cost-cutting pathway – where governments contract out existing services to nonprofits (or other private actors). Cost-cutting also occurs. But the case studies in this dissertation illustrate that co-optation explains at least some instances of nonprofitization, thus resolving the gap between theory and evidence introduced above.

Building upon the first contribution, this dissertation advances our understanding by linking the institutions of nonprofitized welfare provision to their effects on service expansiveness. Dynamics in both directions – erosion through “cost efficiencies” and ratcheting up – are potentially at play in nonprofitized welfare, depending on the policy context. The first argument on institutional variation, which focuses on the institutions of nonprofit social welfare acquisition, again finds levers for both expanding or contracting social welfare. The overall effect of nonprofitized welfare on service expansiveness also depends on the values that institutions of acquisition privilege. Consistent with the contracting out literature, this argument finds that contracting based on market-based competition can create incentives that erode the WS over time, through its effects on nonprofit behaviour. However, other institutions of acquisition do not have this same effect. WS researchers interested in contracted social care should, thus, widen their research attention beyond competitive contracting: institutions such as cost-recovery and usage-based grant funding introduce different behavioural incentives for nonprofits.

With regard to policy structure, the dissertation offers the counterintuitive finding that legislating social rights may not always be the best way to advance social rights. This is not to say that legislating social rights is a bad thing. But in the context of housing rights in the United

Kingdom, the combination of competitive contracting and centrally legislated duties provide few avenues for nonprofits to influence the boundaries of the welfare state. In contrast, the case of

31 Canadian homelessness demonstrates how institutionalizing on the ground can enable nonprofits to use their philanthropic and commercial funding to ratchet up service expansiveness. This argument implies that nonprofit use of philanthropic and commercial funding is highly relevant to where the WS may go in the future. Accordingly, research on WS change should include an analysis of philanthropy.

1.8 Research Design

This dissertation uses cross-case as well as within-case analysis to gain analytical purchase on the nature of nonprofitized welfare in two liberal welfare states (Canada and the

United Kingdom), across two policy areas (homelessness and emergency management). Cases were selected using a congruence method (George and Bennett 2005). Chapter two is a comparison of the pathways to nonprofitization in homelessness in Canada and the United

Kingdom (UK). In chapter three, the broadly similar cases of emergency management in Canada and the UK are presented as exemplars of nonprofitization through co-optation. Chapter four compares all four cases, but in this chapter the focus is on the institutions of service acquisition specifically. Chapter five compares Canadian and British homelessness in terms of how the boundaries of the welfare state are institutionalized and altered over time. The comparative case studies in these two chapters seek to link variation in nonprofit welfare to causal mechanisms that influence social welfare service expansiveness, in either direction.

1.8.1 Country Selection

To limit external variation, this dissertation focuses on Anglophone, or liberal, welfare regimes in its exploration of nonprofit welfare. Specifically, it uses the policy areas of

32 homelessness and emergency management in the UK and Canada.22 The purpose of selecting two liberal welfare regimes – rather than, say, one of each regime type – is to allow for in-depth elucidation of how nonprofit social welfare works, in systems where we can otherwise think about the WS as roughly similar. These cases are also good ones because they share broadly similar ways of defining and subsidizing the nonprofit sector. However, as we will see, there are differences in how the division of public duty is defined and in the rules around government acquisition of welfare. Although the analysis is limited to liberal welfare states, the concepts included are meant to be applicable across all welfare regime types.

1.8.2 Policy Selection

This project conceptualizes homelessness and emergency management as social welfare policies of last resort. Homelessness is a welfare policy of last resort since it entails the provision of support to individuals whose housing needs are not addressed under ordinary welfare state policies.23 Emergency response and recovery are welfare policies of last resort because they entail the provision of support to individuals affected by a disaster when first-resort policies such as prevention (e.g., floodplain zoning, private insurance) fail. Both entail the assumption of public responsibility for private individuals.

Policy area case selection was based, first, on their structural similarity as an element of social welfare – since both emergency management and homelessness are social welfare policies of last resort, they can be reasonably viewed as similar policy areas. This provides an a priori

22 Canada is arguably ten different welfare states, since provinces largely set social policy (Haddow 2015), which complicates the case. The approach taken by this researcher was to discuss federal involvement and to focus on three provinces: Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. These provinces represent 73% of country’s population and 74% of its gross domestic product (Statistics Canada 2018, 2019a). 23 Such as private housing finance (e.g., Reisenbichler forthcoming) and affordable and social housing (e.g., Musterd 2014; Zdencanovic 2017). While the author understands that homelessness policy is deeply interconnected with housing policy more broadly, this dissertation deals chiefly with social policies targeted at homelessness.

33 expectation that they should face similar political dynamics. Both emergency management and homelessness occasionally reach high levels of political salience, but in both cases public attention to the issue tends to be episodic and short-lived.

Second, homelessness and emergency management reflect the two core service functions of charity, in public conception: emergency relief and care for the very vulnerable (Mohan and

Breeze 2016). A predicate of this dissertation is that nonprofits play some role in the policy environment, so this is an important criterion. But also, selecting two functions that the public generally associates with charity will allow us to apply scrutiny to popular myths about charity – as Mohan and Breeze (2016) do at a macroscopic level – thus contributing to a more realistic conceptualization of the sector’s role. The third reason was practical: as relatively small policy areas – in contrast to, say, health care – the number of nonprofit players is more manageable.

This will allow for greater analytical depth while still retaining geographical coverage for the two case countries. Finally, despite their small budget lines both homelessness and emergency management have critically important substantive impacts on service beneficiaries.

1.8.3 Data Sources and Case Development

Data for the case studies was gathered through a combination of interviews and document analysis. In total, 104 interviews were conducted between April 2017 and April 2019.24 A list of participating organizations is included as Appendix 1. Interviews were semi-structured and were conducted through a combination of in-person meetings and phone conversations. Interview selection was based on a variety of methods. Contacts were established based on groups identified in background research (consisting of a literature review, as well as a Google Alert-

24 This includes 8 interviews conducted for the French shadow case, which is discussed only in the concluding chapter of the dissertation.

34 based news review and selection from applicable membership lists). This was combined with a snowball method whereby participants suggested other helpful contacts.

For each interview, the author created an interview report, which served as the primary reference for future interview analysis. Interview reports were paragraph-form documents, usually between 1,000 and 2,000 words, arranged into core interview themes. They identified key messages, including some notable direct quotes and anecdotes. At the end of each interview report, this researcher listed the government agencies and nonprofits mentioned in the interview.

Sixty-five interviews were recorded, and these recordings were revisited as needed for clarification, or whenever the interview report suggested that a quote might be worthwhile.

Where a recorded interview was not available for review, direct quotes were taken as recorded in the interview report.

Of course, interview research has its limitations – memories can fade, actors may omit details or attempt to deceive the interviewer, and the interviewer bring their own biases into the interpretation of interview data (Mosley 2013). Furthermore, selection bias is a potential challenge for interview research, as with other research methods (Mosley 2013). Given the mixture of snowball and other selection techniques described above, one cannot dismiss the possibility that selection effects have influenced the data collected from interviews in this dissertation. To mitigate these limitations, this author attempted to triangulate data from the interviews through the use of, among other things, document analysis. The author began by reviewing background scholarly literature on homelessness and emergency management, both internationally and in the two case areas. This background research provided a foundation on which to identify relevant legislation, agencies, and policy documents. On this basis, the author

35 proceeded with the interview research. Key policy documents, reports, and datasets were identified throughout and used in developing the case study chapters.

This dissertation uses a combination of cross-case and within-case analysis to explore different elements of the relationship between nonprofit social welfare provision and service expansiveness. Case study research is a particularly useful method for theory development

(George and Bennett 2005), which is the objective of this dissertation. That is because case study research has a comparative advantage in four aspects of research that are crucial to theory development: achieving high levels of conceptual validity; identifying new hypotheses; exploring new causal mechanisms; and accommodating complex causal relations (George and

Bennett 2005).

Cross-case analysis is used to demonstrate variation in social welfare nonprofitization and nonprofitization pathways, as well as to demonstrate the effect of variation on welfare- providing nonprofits and the policy area as a whole. Comparison was used to develop typological theories linking the independent variable in this study (the nature of nonprofit welfare) to the dependent variable (service expansiveness), as is appropriate for this method

(George and Bennett 2005). In chapters two and three case comparison is used primarily to explore the pathways of nonprofitization taken in each case, using post hoc justifications of nonprofit provision. In chapters four and five, the cases approach the independent variable with regard to variation in the institutions of nonprofit social welfare, identifying linkages to the dependent variable, including through the intermediary variable of nonprofit voice. Within-case analysis was used in chapter three to trace the process of nonprofitization through co-optation as it is unfolding in Canadian emergency management.

36 1.9 Chapter Overview

This dissertation seeks to understand the relationship between nonprofitization and social welfare service expansiveness. The chapters that follow each contribute to that overarching purpose. The first research question asks: what is the relationship between nonprofitization and welfare service expansiveness? While cost-cutting is one pathway to nonprofitization – and it is associated with weakened service expansiveness – it is not the only pathway. This chapter introduced co-optation as an alternate pathway to welfare nonprofitization. Co-optation is associated with greater service expansiveness, since it occurs as a result of government adopting a new public duty. Chapters two and three provide empirical studies of these two pathways to nonprofitization. While the nonprofitization of British homelessness is primarily driven by cost- cutting, chapter two shows that Canadian homelessness is primarily driven by co-optation. In chapter three, we see evidence of co-optation in emergency management nonprofitization in

Canada and the UK, including as Canadian emergency management has been transformed by recent climate-linked disasters.

The second research question asks: under what conditions does nonprofitization expand or contract the expansiveness of social welfare? While the first research question examines general pathways of nonprofitization, the second research question is focused on how specific institutions of nonprofit welfare advance or undermine social rights. This dissertation finds that, although there is no necessary relationship between the level of nonprofitization and social welfare expansiveness, the choices that governments make about how to institutionalize nonprofit social welfare can influence whether welfare expansiveness erodes over time or, indeed, actually increases. This chapter introduced two explanations for this finding, which are then empirically presented in chapters four and five.

37 First, the values embedded in regimes for acquiring social welfare can undermine, stabilize, or even advance social rights over time. Marketized regimes create incentives that undermine the long-run expansiveness of care, while regimes that embed other values, like service stability or collaboration, do not. Chapter four contrasts the regimes of government social welfare service acquisition in British and Canadian homelessness and emergency management.

British homelessness is a case of highly marketized government-nonprofit social welfare service acquisition, while non-market values are more prominent in the case of Canadian homelessness, as well as emergency management in both countries. As the case study shows, the British system has certain advantages – greater accountability, for instance – but it also creates incentives that undermine service expansiveness.

Second, policy structure determines the extent to which nonprofits are able to ratchet up the welfare state through advocacy, shaping the service, and piloting. Chapter five presents empirical evidence for this finding through a comparative analysis of nonprofitized social welfare in homelessness. It contrasts a policy context defined through legislated rights (Britain) to one where there is more ambiguity (Canada). Somewhat counterintuitively, this chapter finds that where the division of public duty is institutionalized on the ground there are more opportunities to expand the welfare state, compared with boundaries that are legislated. This chapter finds that the policy structure provides more space for Canadian nonprofits to exert influence, whereas in the British case the boundaries of the welfare state are rigid.

Finally, chapter six summarizes the dissertation’s main conclusions. It also discusses the applicability of the research other areas of interest and suggests avenues for future work.

38 Chapter 2. Co-optation or Cost-Cutting? Comparing Pathways to Nonprofitization in Canadian and British Homelessness

2.1 Introduction

There are some instances of nonprofitization prompted by cost-cutting. But this is not the only pathway to nonprofitization. When nonprofitization accompanies new welfare state duties, it reflects a government’s decision to co-opt existing services, rather than to promote or replace them. Co-optation offers an explanation for nonprofitization which is associated with greater service expansiveness. Building on these two pathways to nonprofitization, this chapter introduces evidence of co-optation and cost-cutting. Comparative case analysis contrasts a case in which nonprofitization has been primarily driven by cost-cutting with a case where co- optation is the dominant pathway. Through the case studies, this chapter finds that the co- optation pathway is driven by a mix of ease, service stability, access to unique constituencies, service-related expertise, and preference for supporting civil society. British homelessness nonprofitization is primarily driven by cost-cutting; however, expertise, and access to unique constituencies were also present. Canadian homelessness nonprofitization is a case of co-optation where ease, expertise, service stability, and voluntary sector promotion were dominant justifications.

2.2 British Homelessness

The nonprofitization of British homelessness seems to be clearly linked to cost-cutting – although constituencies and voluntary sector promotion have also been important. Housing is a legislated right in the United Kingdom, as a result of which homelessness policy focuses on local authorities’ statutory obligations to assist and rehouse residents. Nonprofits are contracted to

39 provide homelessness services; they also assist ineligible citizens and provide supports beyond government responsibility. Cost-cutting is the primary driver of nonprofitization in British homelessness policy, although expertise and access to unique constituencies was also perceived as valuable.

2.2.1 The Policy Context

Homelessness policy refers, broadly, to interventions aimed at preventing and addressing homelessness in its various forms. However, the meaning of homelessness and the types of action used to address it vary from place to place.25 The United Kingdom (UK) is somewhat unique for having a legally enforceable right to housing. This right is matched with corresponding statutory obligations held by local authorities (local government). As a result of these statutory obligations, government homelessness policy in the UK places more emphasis on permanent rehousing, relative to the Canadian case – where government duties centre on emergency shelter. In addition to the main duty to rehouse, UK local authorities also have a duty to prevent homelessness, to provide housing advice, and to provide temporary relief from homelessness.

Despite the rights approach, British governmental homelessness policy retains certain elements of the Victorian poor laws: in particular, homelessness legislation has replicated the binary of the deserving and undeserving poor. Local authorities have a duty to rehouse the statutorily homeless – people who meet the criteria set out by various laws on homelessness.

Individuals must demonstrate that they are not ‘intentionally homeless’, their ‘local connection’

25 Homelessness is a contested concept. The definition of homelessness may be confined to chronic rough sleeping (primary homelessness), or it might include “hidden homelessness” (secondary homelessness) – a category that includes insecure accommodation, substandard housing, and “houselessness” (living in institutions or shelters) (Tipple and Speak 2005; UNDESA 2008). Worldwide, definitions of homelessness vary; in general, though, government attention is focused on extreme forms of primary homelessness (Fitzpatrick and Stephens 2007).

40 to the housing authority, “that they have not left any accommodation that they could reasonably be expected to occupy”, and that they are in a situation of ‘priority need’ (Burrows, Pleace, and

Quilgars 1997: 3; MHCLG 15 April 2019). Priority need categories include individuals who are pregnant, with dependent children, elderly, having a mental illness, or escaping domestic abuse.

Because there is space for local authorities to interpret these criteria, definitions of statutory homelessness differ from place to place (Burrows, Pleace, and Quilgars 1997).

Statutory homelessness duties are structured as an entitlement. Individuals seek assistance by approaching their local council. The council then determines whether an individual is eligible for homelessness assistance, based on the criteria discussed above. On average one half of housing assistance applications are accepted, while the other half are refused (see

Appendix 2). Individuals can also be connected with the local authority through homelessness outreach services or by referral from other public services.

There are also transactional elements in British homelessness policy. For instance, hostels and other accommodation typically charge a user fee. For individuals with no source of income, these user fees are commonly paid through government rental benefits. But those who are ineligible or who have a source of employment may pay out of pocket. This occurs for philanthropic services as well as services within government responsibility. For instance, local

Emmaus charities require residents to work in their social enterprise in exchange for accommodation (author’s interviews).

2.2.2 Nonprofit Welfare Provision in British Homelessness

The central government establishes the framework for government homelessness policy.

It also provides short-term program funding, especially for pilot projects. Local governments sometimes directly provide services associated with their statutory obligations. Quite often,

41 though, local authorities will contract services through a competitive tendering process.

Decisions on the content of the service are made by local authority staff, based on “intelligence” about effectiveness, trends, and service gaps, as well as legislative, funding, or other external drivers (author’s interview DV01TR, EX01CS).

Local authorities are permitted to contract out most elements of their statutory obligations on homelessness (MHCLG 15 April 2019). These functions include: making advice and information about homelessness and the prevention of homelessness freely available; making inquiries about and deciding a person’s eligibility for assistance; making inquiries about and deciding whether and which duties are owed to a person; assessing eligible applicants’ cases and agreeing a personalised housing plan; undertaking prevention and relief duties; making referrals to another housing authority; carrying out decision reviews; and securing accommodation

(MHCLG 15 April 2019).26

A wide variety of homelessness services in England are contracted to external providers

(see Appendix 3 for more detail). These include support services of different kinds as well as emergency accommodation and homelessness prevention services. Contracted tasks include the provision of core services like supported accommodation, as well as ancillary interventions like security or concierge services, service infrastructure such as information technology, and service research, planning and evaluation (Appendix 3). Procedurally, a competitive procurement process was used to award most homelessness services contracts (Appendix 3). Homelessness contracts hardly ever draw more than a few bidders because they are not commercially appealing

26 There are a small number of homelessness functions that cannot be contracted out, as specified in the 1996 Order (e.g., designing advisory services to meet the needs of persons in the authority’s district). Furthermore, local authorities cannot contract out functions relating to homelessness strategies and reviews (MHCLG 15 April 2019). However, homelessness reviews and strategies can be informed by research commissioned from outside agencies (MHCLG 15 April 2019). A local authority remains statutorily responsible for homelessness functions, even if they are contracted out (MHCLG 15 April 2019).

42 (author’s interviews). Although the bidding process is open to for-profit organizations, nonprofits most commonly won homelessness contracts. Nonprofit organizations are selected as suppliers for three-quarters of homelessness contracts by frequency, and just under half by value

(Appendix 3). Nonprofits are typically awarded contracts for “core” homelessness services, as compared with ancillary and infrastructure services or strategic and planning services (Appendix

3).

Services beyond statutory obligations are provided by nonprofits as charity. Activity outside of the statutory duties is generally considered a philanthropic responsibility, although governments do sometimes provide grant support. Nonprofits provide philanthropically funded assistance to individuals that are ineligible for government homelessness assistance, such as single homeless men and those without a local connection to the place in which they reside. They also provide support to individuals who for various reasons might not seek council support.

Philanthropy also covers assistance that goes beyond statutory duties, especially supports connected with the complex causes of homelessness.

2.2.3 Drivers of Nonprofitization in British Homelessness

There is considerable evidence that nonprofitization in the British homelessness case is driven primarily by cost-cutting. However, expertise and access to unique constituencies were also relevant to a local government’s decision to contract for homelessness services.

Contracting for most homelessness services was made possible through legislative changes occurring in the mid-1990s.27 Recall from above that most homelessness contracts are awarded to nonprofits, so nonprofitization and the use of contracting are in this case tightly

27 Specifically, the Local Authorities (Contracting Out of Allocation of Housing and Homelessness Functions) Order 1996, which was made under section 70 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 (Government of the United Kingdom 15 April 2019).

43 linked. In recent decades, and especially since 2008, contracts have increasingly been decided through competitive procurement processes (author’s interviews). Indeed, this is now required in many cases and practiced even when it is not required (see chapter four for more on the acquisition regime). The use of competitive procurement processes, which emphasize price- based bidding, is suggestive of cost-cutting.28

Furthermore, when considering whether to contract out a service, rather than provide it internally, local authority staff frequently mentioned cost considerations as a “large factor”

(author’s interviews). Contracting is typically cheaper, as it means that the Council does not take on employee responsibilities, such as pension requirements (author’s interviews). Contracted homelessness services typically rely on paid staff. However, in some instances, volunteers may also be involved. For instance, one housing services manager pointed to an agency that is contracted to provide food vouchers and uses volunteers (author’s interview DV01TR).

The cost-cutting justification does appear to provide some mechanisms for undermining the expansiveness of services over time. In principle, contracted statutory obligations on homelessness are fully funded by government. In practice, however, there is a tendency for contract values to shrink over time – reflecting an expectation of finding “efficiencies” (author’s interviews). Moreover, nonprofits do operate certain contracts at a loss, whether for mission- related reasons or in order to gain market share (author’s interviews). For instance, nonprofits may need to win a contract because they must operate at a certain scale in order to remain solvent (author’s interview UK03IB). If an organization can take on a deficit by cross- subsidizing with philanthropic revenue, it is more likely to succeed in bidding for a contract

(author’s interview UK03IB). Especially when budgets are tighter, there is an emphasis on value

28 Although this author has also observed that it may have more to do with procurement officers’ belief that EU procurement rules apply to social services (author’s interviews), which this author is not sure is actually the case.

44 for money, meaning keeping costs low (author’s interviews). The level of cross-subsidization can differ, but ten percent is “at the lower end” of the spectrum; at the high end, one nonprofit executive said that one of their contracts was subsidized with philanthropy for about thirty percent of costs (author’s interview UK03IB).

The impetus to cut service costs has altered an already uneven balance in favor of large organizations. Local authorities will often look for prospective providers to have knowledge and linkages in the local context, but national agencies bring expertise that is also valued (author’s interviews). It is easier for large organizations to meet the procedural demands of the procurement process (author’s interviews). Local charities have in some cases disappeared and in other cases adapted by joining consortia to bid for large contracts (author’s interviews).

Although cost-cutting was a prominent justification for homelessness nonprofitization in the UK, it was not the only justification. Interview participants also cited two non-cost rationales for nonprofitization: expertise and access to unique constituencies.

First, participants noted that the national experience of large nonprofits can bring useful expertise, on matters such as process and implementing new best practices. For instance, one housing services manager pointed to a staff debrief process that a new supplier had brought to the local authority (author’s interview DV01TR).

Service users may, secondly, be more comfortable going to nonprofits that are already embedded in the community (author’s interviews). Thus, nonprofits have access to constituencies that governments find it difficult to reach. One housing service manager for a local authority said clients that may be unhappy with the council might prefer accessing services through a nonprofit. They mentioned that in a rough sleeper encampment there had been rumblings about how little the Council was doing: “They don’t realize the advocate is in the

45 Council and they don’t recognize the external agency as Council-funded” (author’s interview

DV01TR). One might suggest that this could undermine long-term political support for social welfare services, since service recipients often see nonprofit service provision as philanthropic, which reduces the visibility of government assistance. Nevertheless, in the short-term, commissioning services to nonprofit providers can increase comfort amongst those accessing the service.

2.3 Canadian Homelessness

The Canadian homelessness case is one in which nonprofits were co-opted into the welfare state gradually over time, based on administrative rationales of ease, service stability, constituencies, and civil society promotion. Cost is not a primary justification for nonprofitized welfare in Canadian homelessness. Canada’s homelessness policy is primarily structured around the provision of emergency sheltering, although the country is unevenly transitioning toward a housing first approach. Government homelessness service provision is highly nonprofitized, with direct service provision primarily from nonprofits. The direct costs of providing core services are typically covered, while certain non-core services and capital expenditures receive government grant support.

2.3.1 The Policy Context

In Canada, government responsibility for addressing homelessness is structured around the emergency sheltering system – although this is changing as the ‘housing first’ approach diffuses (Anderson-Baron and Collins 2018).29 As the term implies, a housing first approach puts

29 There is no official federal definition of homelessness in Canada. Across subnational jurisdictions, definitions vary from very narrow – including only shelter users and those street-sleeping – to more expansive. One such example is the endorsement by several subnational jurisdictions of the Canadian Observatory on Homelessness’

46 housing first: it is “a strategic response to homelessness that prioritises permanent and stable housing for people experiencing homelessness” (AHURI 2018: n.p.). “Wraparound” services are then provided to assist the newly-housed individual (Smith 2016).30 For instance, approximately half of the Government of Alberta’s spending on homelessness is devoted to housing first interventions (AMCSS 2018). The new housing first focus has brought with it an emphasis from governments on chronic homelessness. Other services – such as drop-in programs, pre- employment supports, street outreach, and housing follow-up – may also be included as an element of the policy. Notably, homelessness policy in Quebec is more tightly interlinked with other social insertion policies than is the case in Alberta or Ontario. The line between government and philanthropic duties are messy in a Canadian context. But generally, nonprofits use philanthropic funding to provide interventions that go beyond shelter, especially when the organization is dealing with a subset of the homeless population (e.g., individuals with

HIV/AIDS).31

definition: “the situation of an individual or family without stable, permanent, appropriate housing, or the immediate prospect, means and ability of acquiring it” (Gaetz et al. 2018). 30 Housing first can be contrasted with “treatment first”, “staircase model” or “linear residential treatment” approaches, which require individuals to become “ready” before receiving housing, for example by treating an addiction (Smith 2016; Evans et al. 2016). There are debates on how new the HF model really is (e.g., Knutagård and Kristiansen 2013; Padgett et al. 2015), but certainly it represents a paradigm shift in the Canadian policy context (Anderson-Baron and Collins 2018). 31 Wolfe and Jay (1990), for instance, include all of the following in their study of homeless-serving nonprofits: soup kitchens, food banks, emergency shelters, hostels, ‘halfway’ or transitional housing, special care residences, and cooperative affordable housing. Adding to these, several modern cornerstones of homelessness services include housing advice, eviction prevention, and outreach services. But the category homelessness services might also include the range of services to address its multitudinous causes: services for teen parents, family counseling, LGBTQ+ services, refugee settlement services, addictions treatment, trauma services, identification card assistance, employment training and counselling, mental health treatment, and so on. Or they might include the provision of ‘wraparound’ services which strengthen the wellbeing, resilience, and/or dignity of those experiencing homelessness – such as tax advice, day care, dental care, medical check-ups, and recreational, cultural or educational programming. Many of the homeless-serving nonprofits studied in this case address at least one of these non- housing services in their work.

47 Unlike the United Kingdom, there is no enforceable right to housing in Canada

(UNSRAH 2009).32 As such, although government does accept responsibility for some homelessness services, these are not provided as social rights. Government policy documents tend not to use terms like “duty” or “responsibility” (e.g., ESDC 2017). Even the recent inclusion of rights language in the National Housing Strategy was couched – declaring a “rights-based approach”, rather than a “right to housing” (Government of Canada 2017). Users have a very limited ability to appeal decisions of service providers.33

2.3.2 Nonprofit Welfare Provision in Canadian Homelessness

Although there is local variation, in general the delivery of homelessness policy is highly nonprofitized in Canada. Governments do directly provide some homelessness programs, but they more commonly participate as funders, regulators, and overseers. Interestingly, the role of systems planning is in some cases a local government responsibility while in other cases it is held by nonprofits.

All three levels of government contribute to funding the homelessness policy system. The federal government provides a matched funding called the Homelessness Partnering Strategy

(HPS).34 Provincially, all three jurisdictions studies for this case provided funding to nonprofit homeless service providers. The Government of Alberta’s homelessness services are primarily operated through “community-based organizations” (CBOs), which are generally nonprofits.

Through its Homeless and Outreach Support Services program area, the Government of Alberta

32 Although Canada’s international legal commitments arguably create a right to housing (Canada Without Poverty 2019; Farha et al. 2018), there are no legal mechanisms giving force to the right to housing. The federal government recently adopted a “rights-based approach” to homelessness (Government of Canada 2017), but with no corresponding duties. 33 In some cases, individuals turned away from shelters can make an appeal to the municipal government. 34 This was the program’s name at the time of research. The program is now called Reaching Home. It was previously called the National Homelessness Initiative.

48 funds CBO-provided Housing First programs, adult homeless shelters, women’s shelters, and supportive housing. The vast majority of government-funded shelters in Alberta, sixty-one out of sixty-six, are nonprofit-operated (see an Appendix 4). This pattern is similar across the country, although there are some areas with a relatively higher share of directly provided government shelters. For instance, the City of Toronto operates fifteen government shelters, while a further fifty-two are nonprofit-operated (Ibid). Only one of the Quebec’s 160 homeless shelters is government-operated (Ibid). The Government of Ontario’s main homelessness funding program, the Community Homelessness Prevention Initiative, provides disbursements to local governments, which can be spent in four different categories of service: emergency shelters, supported housing, homelessness prevention, and other services. In Quebec, temporary housing nonprofits are funded through a program called PSOC (la programme de soutien aux organismes communautaires).

Government also regulates homelessness policy at different levels. The federal government requires communities to produce five-year homelessness plans in order to receive funding. Provincial governments in Alberta and Quebec are most involved in homelessness policy. But even the Ontario government regulates homelessness policy by requiring its municipal “Service Managers” (local governments) to create a plan for addressing homelessness, to enumerate homelessness, and to deliver social and affordable housing and homelessness prevention services (MOH 2016). Municipally, government regulates the service in homeless shelters through “shelter standards” documents. These standards specify elements of the service such as principles of service delivery; client rights and responsibilities; complaints processes; rules for access requests; service requirements; health and safety standards; and administrative requirements (TSSHA 2015).

49 Finally, government oversees nonprofit-provided homelessness services. This role entails some combination of periodic shelter audits; receipt and analysis of data and reports from nonprofit service providers; and addressing service complaints.

Nonprofits play an important role as direct service providers in Canadian homelessness policy. The vast majority of homelessness services are provided by “community agencies” – nonprofit organizations, usually registered charities – that are to some degree funded and regulated by governments, with municipalities generally taking on the largest share of responsibility. This is especially the case for emergency shelters – while a few government-run shelters exist, the vast majority (98%) are government-funded nonprofit shelters.35 But nonprofits were also funded to provide outreach programs, temporary winter shelters, support services, and supportive housing. In some cases, municipal governments appeared to accept responsibility for covering the full cost of such government-supported projects. In other instances, the level of responsibility was less clear, with government referring to their support as a “subsidy”. Client responsibility for rent was also an element of certain housing programs in some instances.

Over time, Canadian municipalities and homeless-serving nonprofits (HSNPOs) have come to understandings of their shared and individual responsibilities. In the case of homelessness programs viewed by government as “core” services – emergency homeless shelters, plus some other services (e.g., outreach and support services) depending on the jurisdiction – governments typically provide support that is intended to cover the full cost of service delivery.36 Generally, interview participants expressed that government funding is adequate to provide the core operating costs of running an emergency shelter – in other words,

35 Specifically, 629 are nonprofit shelters, of which 615 are run by registered charities. See Appendix 4. 36 Although this is not universally true. The City of Ottawa, for instance, describes its funding to nonprofit shelters as “subsidized” rather than fully funded (City of Ottawa 2019).

50 government funding “keeps the lights on” (author’s interviews). These core operating costs entail elements such as utilities, some staffing, equipment, and food, with the idea that block or per diem rates are sufficient to provide a base level of shelter without the need for HSNPOs to supplement with fundraising (author’s interviews). However, some governments fell short of this aim (e.g., City of Ottawa 2005; Suttor 2012; City of Toronto 8 May 2012). Moreover, these

“core” costs present a constrained vision of homelessness services consisting chiefly of basic physical necessities: shelter, heating, electricity, food, and a small staff contingent to oversee the shelter. Participants commonly expressed the sentiment that government shelter funding “is adequate to meet basic needs”, but that it is inadequate in a wider sense, “especially if we want to do anything forward thinking” (author’s interview OT03MW).

Furthermore, emphasis in government homelessness funding is placed on direct services: participants or staff working with participants. This means that indirect costs, such as supervisors, utilities, and capital upgrades, can be more difficult to fund (author’s interviews).

HSNPOs use philanthropic funding sources (or cross-subsidization of earned income) to pay for services beyond the basic necessities of operating a shelter (author’s interviews). Furthermore, funding adequacy tends to erode over time due to inflation (author’s interviews). Tight government shelter funding is reflected in poor living conditions in many shelters – especially emergency shelters for single men. Youth, women’s, and family shelters can be much nicer, with private spaces for tenants, the ability to store personal items, daytime programs, and unrestricted lengths of stay. These latter shelters tend to more successfully draw on philanthropic donations owing to their relatively more sympathetic clients (author’s interviews).

There is another subset of programs that governments view as non-core services. These may receive some “support” from government, especially in the form of grants. But there is an

51 expectation that the provider will draw from other funding sources to make up a deficit in these funding areas. Project-based grant funding is viewed as less secure, but can be enabling for a nonprofit that wants to establish a project outside of the main government programs (author’s interviews). The nonprofits that participated in this study quite frequently had a combination of long-term government funding for a “core” homelessness service, typically via contracts, as well as a number of short-term grants from a handful of government agencies. Homeless-serving nonprofits situated at the intersection of another policy area might have two or three core government funders, at different levels of government. Beyond government funding, the local community foundation and United Way/Centraide often provided enduring support to homeless- serving nonprofits.

Generally speaking, capital projects are also treated by government as separate from operating costs. While some homelessness programs provide funding for capital expenditures, especially repairs, oftentimes they do not (see Appendix 5). In these cases, when a nonprofit believes that repairs or a new facility are required, they will establish a capital campaign to fundraise for it. Government funding is often available to support these kinds of campaigns, but it is frequently through different ministries and rarely covers the full amount of a capital project.

The model of funding new capital projects through philanthropic fundraising campaigns was a common one, according to interview participants. In this sense, new buildings – whether as a replacement for ageing infrastructure or nonprofit expansion – are something that is quite often viewed as a philanthropic task, rather than a government duty. However, it would be an overstatement to suggest that capital projects are outside of government’s sphere of duty entirely.

Governments do quite often support capital projects. For example, a recent capital campaign by

52 YMCA Calgary received $15 million in government funding for a $60 million project (YWCA

Calgary 2019).

Beyond service provision, another role that some nonprofits play is that of systems planning. Depending on the local area, nonprofits and/or local government agencies are empowered as system planners: bodies responsible for channeling homelessness funding to implementing agencies. In fulfilling this role, system planners implicitly make decisions about the number, scale, and characteristics of service providers. The extent to which system planners have power to make decisions of this nature depends on the extent to which resources are channeled centrally, through a single system planner. A strong system planner may direct nearly all governmental funding; or, funding may be distributed through multiple channels across levels of government and government agencies.

Nonprofit organizations sometimes function as system planners in Canadian homelessness policy. Nonprofit systems planners tend to be locally-based institutional funders – e.g., community foundations and United Ways. These organizations often carry out similar functions as their government counterparts. However, they have potentially more power. The presence of philanthropic funds in an area of public responsibility decentralizes resources, thus weakening the role of systems planners. However, in the Canadian context some philanthropic funding has been channeled through nonprofit system planners. Thus, nonprofit system planners may actually be stronger than government system planners, depending on the extent to which philanthropic funding channels through the system planner as well.

Alberta’s two major cities both have nonprofit system planners. In Edmonton, Homeward

Trust acts as the system planner, while in Calgary the Calgary Homeless Foundation undertakes that role (author’s interviews). Outside of Edmonton and Calgary, all but one of Alberta’s

53 systems planners are municipal governments. In Ontario, systems planners are primarily municipal. However, in five out of twenty-two “designated communities”,37 nonprofits are the coordinating entities for matched federal funding. As such, in these communities the role of systems planning is split between local government and nonprofit organizations. In Quebec, the provincial health ministry (MSSS) plays the largest role in channeling homelessness resources.

Quebec’s system planners are local affiliates of the MSSS.

2.3.3 Drivers of Nonprofitization in Canadian Homelessness

Canadian homelessness is a case of nonprofitization through co-optation, with very little evidence to suggest the relevance of a cost-cutting pathway. Early choices to co-opt existing nonprofit provision have resulted in the impression that there has “always been a mixed service delivery model” in Canadian homelessness (author’s interview TO09LR). The co-optation of

HSNPOs has been driven by ease, expertise, service stability, and preferences for promoting civil society.

From the 1960s until the 1980s, federal and provincial governments primarily approached access to housing through social housing (Bacher 1993; Smith 2016). In 1973 amendments to the

National Housing Act shifted to “emphasis on “third sector” delivery [of social housing] by municipalities, non-profit associations, and co-operatives, in contrast to provincial bureaucracies.” (Bacher 1993: 11) Nonprofit and cooperative housing was intended to overcome the stigma of government-managed housing (Wake Carroll 1989). It was supported through assisted rental programs and start-up funding for local groups (Walker 2008; Wolfe and Jay

1990). Social housing programs were substantially rolled back beginning in the late 1980s (Wake

37 Communities that receive funding through the federal HPS program.

54 Carroll 1989; Dalton 2009). When the federal government adopted responsibility for addressing homelessness in 1999, it did so through a program that matched funding for community initiatives, mostly disbursed to “community-based” nonprofits (Farthing-Nichol and Pries 2018).

Although its name has changed, the core structure of this program has remained more or less the same: the federal government provides funding in several streams, the largest of which is

“catalytic” funding to designated communities for addressing chronic homelessness (ESDC

2018d).38 Designated communities must contribute their own funds, usually through provincial and municipal governments, to match federal dollars. Although there are complex eligibility rules (see Appendix 5), this funding usually flows through to nonprofits.

When Canadian governments began to take targeted action addressing homelessness, charities were already active in the area. Bringing these nonprofits into the welfare state was easier than replacing the service. In Quebec, for instance, many HSNPOs were founded in the early 1980s, as homelessness was recognized as a social problem requiring a dedicated response

(Côté 2012). Some, of course – such as the Old Brewery Mission – were considerably older.

When the Quebec provincial government began to develop targeted policy responses in the

1990s (Côté 2012), they turned to nonprofits who were already implementing these services on a philanthropic basis. Interview participants recounted a similar pattern in the ongoing expansion of government homelessness services. As homelessness expands – and thus so too does the demand for emergency sheltering – the growth of services has occurred primarily through government-funded nonprofit provision (author’s interviews).

In the Canadian context, nonprofit service provision is easier not only from a service simplicity perspective. It can also be seen as a way to avoid Constitutional sensitivities. The

38 It was initially called the National Homelessness Initiative, then the Homelessness Partnering Strategy, and now it is Reaching Home.

55 federal government does not have primary responsibility for homelessness, so a decentralized funding program was the easier approach. In Calgary, for instance, the Calgary Homeless

Foundation acts as a system planner: it channels funding from federal and provincial governments to local HSNPOs. Calgary Homeless Foundation took on this role after the community and the City had identified the organization as the spokesperson for a plan to end homelessness that had been developed there (author’s interview CG07DK).

Second, especially as HSNPOs have professionalized, Canadian governments view them as a source of expertise. One HSNPO Executive Director remarked that she could be involved in a consultation every day of the week if she wanted (author’s interview ED05BS). HSNPOs are especially valued for their expertise when they have specialist knowledge of a particular community or underlying cause of homelessness (author’s interviews). There has been a

“coming of age” amongst Canadian HSNPOs in which governments increasingly seek the expertise of nonprofit service providers (author’s interviews).

I believe that the individuals that are working within government have also seen this […] I think there was a bit of a – some “we know best”. And maybe that was the case, that they did at one time, but I think now the people that are coming into both sectors are people that are well-versed; they believe in evidence-based practice; they believe in relationship-building and how important that is. So I think it’s almost like a coming of age, right? If I can define it that way. (author’s interview ED05BS)

Conversely, from a state capacity perspective, nonprofit co-optation can make it more difficult for the government to enter a social welfare service area as services become more complicated.

For this reason, one municipal official noted, some cities do operate at least a few homeless shelters directly. Operating shelters directly “gives us [the City] some experience in operating the shelter.” It also improves responsiveness, and gives the city a “backup” that it can go to. “It allows us to respond to emergencies,” the participant said (author’s interview TO09LR).

56 Third, service stability is an important driver of nonprofitization in Canadian homelessness.

There is a strong reluctance to de-fund service providers and transfer clients to a different agency

(author’s interviews). HSNPOs providing core services expressed an expectation of long-term funding continuity, even if funding increases may not keep pace with inflation (author’s interviews). Government and flow-through funders are reluctant to de-fund agencies, including for performance reasons, and will rarely do so (author’s interviews). Participants expressed a strong preference for undergoing a “remedial” or “capacity-based” approach when they experience challenges with HSNPO performance (author’s interviews). “I can’t think of an example where we have de-funded” an HSNPO, one civil servant said. They continued, saying that “in theory” agencies know funding could be discontinued, “but the reality is we wouldn’t de- fund an agency.” (author’s interview TO09LR)

Service stability is valued by governments in part because of the serious consequences for recipients when disruptions occur. For instance, when Second Base (the only youth homelessness shelter in Scarborough, Ontario) closed, it caused increased pressure on other agencies serving homeless youth for several years (Mondebraaten and Vendeville 7 September 2015). Although it occurred despite continued City funding, the closure of Second Base caused immense challenges for civil servants, who struggled to find an alternative shelter two years later (Adler 18 May

2017). Closures of this nature are very rare in the Canadian context, and civil servants will do their best to work with HSNPOs to prevent closures (author’s interviews). Existing HSNPOs are often viewed as a safe choice for governments, since these organizations have “proved themselves reliable, responsive, and accountable partners over many years” (City of Ottawa

2005a).

57 The emphasis on service stability may also be linked to a sense of shared identity that has developed between municipalities and HSNPOs. Municipalities and HSNPOs often expressed a view of being in “partnership” with one another (author’s interviews). This does not negate the existence of asymmetrical power relationships, of course. But it is the case that municipalities tend to be actively engaged in the same policy and advocacy networks. For instance, the cities of

Grande Prairie, Kamloops, and Vancouver are all members of an advocacy coalition called the

Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness.39 Both groups see one another as trusted allies in obtaining shared objectives – often, increased funding from higher levels of government

(author’s interviews).40 “They get it,” one HSNPO executive said, in reference to the municipal government’s understanding of homelessness needs (author’s interview ED03JB).

Finally, nonprofitization in Canadian homelessness in part reflects a preference for promoting civil society.41 Support for civil society was not a feature that participating bureaucrats and nonprofits cited in their interviews. However, it is built into the structure of Canada’s homelessness policy. In particular, the nonprofit sector has been viewed as an avenue for achieving effective, systemic solutions through collaboration (author’s interviews). One example is through the HPS requirement that designated communities submit a community plan. In most designated communities, community plans were developed through a process that brought together HSNPOs as well as other nonprofits, homelessness advocacy groups and various government agencies that interact with people who experience homelessness. Often, this process was led by a nonprofit. Participants expressed that this process was helpful and developed

39 As of 19 July 2017. 40 Notably, however, this appears to be unique to the municipal-nonprofit relationship. HSNPOs expressed in some cases significant distrust of higher levels of government – although, of course, not always (author’s interviews). 41 In the Canadian context, it is common to use the terminology of “community-based” organizations (author’s interviews).

58 linkages (author’s interviews). In multiple instances, the nonprofit that led community planning was asked to continue this linking role after the community plan was submitted (author’s interviews CG06DK, KW01LM).

There is little evidence that the cost-cutting pathway explains nonprofitization in Canadian homelessness. This is not to say that funding is plentiful in Canadian homelessness policy. It is not. But cost-cutting does not appear to figure into decisions about nonprofit service provision.

Rather, actors on both sides view costs as an external limitation on service possibilities. The participants in this study did not view nonprofit provision as an avenue to cheaper or more efficient service provision. That being said, nonprofits did in a few cases report that governments have pushed for cost reductions in ongoing service funding relationships (author’s interview

ED03JB). In other instances, core service funding arrangements have moved away from administrative costs, or funding levels have remained the same over many years, resulting in an overall erosion due to inflation (author’s interviews).

2.4 Conclusions

In both Canada and the United Kingdom, HSNPOs are important welfare state service providers. This chapter argues that while the British case of homelessness nonprofitization can be explained through cost-cutting, in Canada the co-optation pathway is a better fit. In the United

Kingdom, statutory obligations for addressing homelessness are contracted to nonprofits.

Contracting was allowed as part of broader welfare reforms in the mid-1990s, and has accelerated as homelessness contracts have been placed under procurement rules for free and fair market competition. Cost was a dominant observed characteristic, driving decisions to contract services. In contrast, while Canada’s homelessness system is far from perfect, there is little evidence to suggest that nonprofitization is driven by cost-cutting. Rather, nonprofits were co-

59 opted into the welfare state as governments took responsibility for addressing homelessness beginning in the 1980s and 1990s. Welfare state services have incrementally grown in the area of homelessness primarily through the expansion of nonprofit provision. While cost is of course a factor in the policy context, it is viewed as external to nonprofitization: funders and fundees see financial resources as a constraint on their ability to execute programs. In the Canadian context, evidence of justifications based on ease, expertise, service stability, and civil society promotion were observed.

60 Chapter 3. Co-optation or Cost-Cutting? Pathways to Nonprofitization in Canadian and British Emergency Management

3.1 Introduction

EM has undergone recent strain and transformation in response to climate change.

This chapter finds that EM nonprofitization in Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) is primarily driven by co-optation, although cost-savings were also present as a justification for government use of nonprofits. The co-optation pathway entails the adoption of new government responsibility for public duty. EM, in both Canada and the UK, demonstrates co-optation rooted in the justifications of ease, unique constituencies, service-related expertise, and surge manpower. As EM solidifies as a new component of the welfare state, government is entering into domains that have been primarily philanthropic in nature. As such, even though there is more philanthropy in emergency social services,42 relative to homelessness, this is not a result of cost-cutting; indeed, the opposite is happening. EM is a case where certain specialist nonprofits

42 Services are more likely to be administered at a government-deficit or funded entirely by philanthropy.

61 have an expertise advantage. This is a product of how EM is structured in both countries.

Primary government responsibility for EM is local, although disasters occur only sporadically in individual jurisdictions. When they do occur, disasters can overwhelm local capacity. EM is also a case where non-experts are used for surge manpower, and where ease and unique constituencies are viewed as important.

To provide deeper analysis of a process of nonprofitization, this chapter includes an examination of recent nonprofitization in Canadian EM, which has accelerated as a result of increased natural disasters in 2013-2019. A parallel British case is not available, since the role of nonprofits in EM has remained relatively stable in the recent decade.43 The case study focuses on the increased use of emergency management nonprofits (EMNPOs) as disasters have intensified, with a particular focus on one EMNPO that has become especially tightly enmeshed with the welfare state: the Canadian Red Cross (CRC). The case study demonstrates the important role of philanthropy as a catalyst for CRC’s growing involvement in EM. But it also highlights the combination of crisis decisions and post-disaster formalization that has led to the gradual nonprofitization of Canadian EM through co-optation. As with the justifications for nonprofit provision in general, the recent period of EM nonprofitization in Canada has drawn on justifications of ease, expertise, surge capacity, and access to unique constituencies.

3.2 The Emergency Management Policy Context

In Canada and the UK, EM policy is governed by a doctrine of tiered response, with all levels of government sharing responsibilities for planning, training, and coordinating, while local

43 The only substantial recent shifts in British EM nonprofitization include the creation of local resilience fora in the post-2004 context – which is discussed in this chapter – and the ancillary effects of increased EMNPO contracting in the area of healthcare – which is more about health policy than EM policy.

62 governments are the primary implementers (Henstra and McBean 2005; Henstra 2011, 2013;

CCO 17 January 2011; Stainsby 2012; Cabinet Office 2010; Kapucu 2014). In Canada, for instance, approximately 80 per cent of emergencies are handled solely at the local level, and municipalities are the first responders in 90 per cent of emergencies (Juillet and Koji 2013: 31,

39; FCM National Security Group 2006: 5).44 Within this framework of tiered response,

Canadian and British governments provide immediate disaster assistance, either directly or through nonprofits. This most often occurs in the response phase of an emergency, where the focus is on preserving life and property and meeting immediate needs of affected individuals. An obvious example is the provision of fire services to extinguish a fire. Local government agencies provide transportation to facilitate safe, speedy, and orderly evacuations. Temporary shelter – for example, mass shelters in a gymnasium or college dorms, or the provision of hotel rooms – is made available to residents evacuated due to a disaster. During a disaster, governments adopt significant responsibility to assure the basic needs of affected individuals. Yet they often provide assistance that is purposefully minimal, to encourage individuals to make use of personal, insurance, or social resources such as staying with friends and family (author’s interviews).

In addition to these forms of direct assistance, provincial and federal Canadian governments have established disaster financial assistance programs to support individuals, governments, small businesses, and nonprofits affected by major natural disasters. Disaster financial assistance programs aim to minimize the disruption from natural disasters. Where they apply to government actors, they also recognize the budgetary strain posed by extraordinary disaster events. The main federal financial assistance program in Canadian EM is the Disaster

Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) program, which is a cost-sharing program that funds

44 For more detailed information on EM policy in Canada and the UK, see Appendix 6.

63 provincial governments when very large disasters occur. DFAA was established in 1970 and, although it has no fixed budget, has disbursed in excess of $4.8 billion throughout its existence

(Public Safety Canada 15 May 2018; Henstra and McBean 2005). Provinces and territories commonly have financial assistance programs that overlap with DFAA. The content and structure of these programs vary; in general, though, provincial programs provide financial assistance to individuals, small businesses, and nonprofits to enable those affected to return to a new normal. Disaster financial assistance programs include an expectation that individuals will absorb some costs of disasters (author’s interviews; Public Safety Canada 2008). In place of financial assistance schemes for individuals and small businesses, the UK has “almost universal insurance availability against flood risk” (Ball et al. 2013: 266; Crichton 2008). The latest iteration of this program, Flood Re, continues to rely primarily on private market mechanisms

(Surminski 2018).

3.3 Nonprofit Welfare Provision in Emergency Management

Emergency management features nonprofit provision both within and outside of the remit of the welfare state. In Canada and the UK, EMNPOs are activated by governments to perform five different functions: protecting life and property, emergency social services, recovery assistance, donation management, and volunteer management. Because EM is governed by hierarchical command and control principles, all service providers must be activated to participate in a response. Activation does not always entail the adoption of responsibility for funding a service – it can be purely permissive – but in many cases governments engage

64 EMNPOs to provide welfare state services. The role of EMNPOs is typically smallest in protecting life and property,45 while EMNPOs play an extensive role in the other four functions.

First, EMNPOs are involved in protecting life and property when a disaster occurs. In some cases, nonprofits undertake tasks that are not technically complicated but require surge manpower – for instance, evacuation assistance and door-to-door wellness checks. Other

EMNPO roles under this function draw on specializations that are developed and used primarily in non-emergency situations. Examples include volunteer search and rescue, first aid, amateur radio, and emergency transportation by 4x4 clubs. A final role of EMNPOs in protecting life and property consists in registering individuals and assisting in family reunification.

The share of government activity is typically highest in protecting life and property, as compared with other functional areas. More than other areas, the EMNPOs that specialize in tasks pertaining to the protection of life and property discussed challenges in getting government to trust them and make use of their capacity (author’s interview NW04SW). This challenge was particularly acute in some contexts, while in others governments frequently drew on EMNPOs.

One interview participant pointed to “significant tension between the police force and the volunteer [search and rescue] cadre” in Quebec due to “protectionism” (author’s interview

NW04SW).46

Second, EMNPOs provide an array of emergency social services. These are typically connected to the immediate basic needs or psychosocial wellbeing of affected individuals, including first responders. Beyond the provision of shelter, food, clothing, and other necessities

45 For instance, a study of EMNPO capacity in Canada found that nonprofits were not involved in just two EM capabilities, both of which pertained to infrastructure: mitigation and critical infrastructure resilience and restoration (Mackwani 2016). 46 Protectionism here refers to union sensitivities around replacing paid labour with unpaid volunteer labour. As is mentioned in chapter one, this can sometimes be a difficult tension. The use of volunteers in extraordinary cases where surge manpower is needed would seem to be different than replacing ordinary paid labour with unpaid volunteer labour, but the boundaries between the two cases can be fuzzy.

65 of life, psychosocial supports, cultural services, recreation, and pet care are increasingly included under emergency social services.47 Governments often provide immediate disaster assistance.

The majority of nonprofit-delivered emergency social services are provided by a small cadre of specialist EMNPOs. For both countries, the Red Cross is the “primary voluntary sector responder” (author’s interview CL01SM). In Canada, two EMNPOs provide basic needs nationwide: the Canadian Red Cross (CRC) and the Salvation Army. Of these, the CRC has close to comprehensive coverage, while the Salvation Army is usually, but not always, present.

The Salvation Army tends to specialize in food provision, while the CRC offers an array of emergency social services. The British context is slightly less concentrated, yet a handful of

EMNPOs nevertheless provide most emergency social services. The table below is taken from a voluntary sector capacity report undertaken by the London Resilience Partnership (2017). It outlines the EMNPOs that may be able to offer support in an area of EM “welfare services”.

Table 1. United Kingdom Voluntary Sector Organization Capacity, Welfare Services

No. Service EMNPOs EMNPOs British Red Cross, Cruse Bereavement Care, faith Staffing and/or management 5 communities, Salvation Army, St. John of emergency centres Ambulance Feeding and refreshment British Red Cross, faith communities, Salvation 4 provision Army, St. John Ambulance Feeding and refreshment for 1 Salvation Army emergency responders Clothing 2 British Red Cross, Salvation Army

Financial and legal advice 2 British Red Cross, Salvation Army Resettlement of affected British Red Cross, faith communities, Salvation 4 populations such as evacuees Army, St. John Ambulance

47 These are all included as “critical services” provided by EMNPOs in the City of Calgary’s emergency response structure, for instance (City of Calgary 2017).

66 British Red Cross, Cruse Bereavement Care, faith Support and comforting 6 communities, Salvation Army, Samaritans, Victim Support British Red Cross, Cruse Bereavement Care, Information and advice 3 Salvation Army British Red Cross, Cruse Bereavement Care, Refugee services 3 Salvation Army Home care and support British Red Cross, faith communities, Salvation 3 services Army Bedding, blankets 1 British Red Cross

Care of children 2 Cruse Bereavement Care, Salvation Army British Red Cross, faith communities, Salvation Entertainment resources 3 Army British Red Cross, Cruse Bereavement Care, Support at transport hubs 4 Salvation Army, St. John Ambulance Support at hospitals 1 British Red Cross Source: London Resilience Partnership (2017: 21-22)

While governments and a handful of specialized EMNPOs are the dominant emergency social services providers, large-scale or highly publicized disasters can draw the participation of numerous local nonprofits. In many cases these will be social services charities, faith groups, community associations, nonprofit infrastructure organizations, or service clubs. One participant, speaking about 2013 floods in the Canadian prairie city of Calgary, recalled that the floods were a “galvanizing moment” for community associations. It was “a movement”, she said, a

“demonstration of how community associations could mobilize for each other” (author’s interview CG05LE).

Relationships between governments and non-EM specialist nonprofits often arise in reaction to specific needs during an incident, becoming more formalized over time. For instance, in the Canadian context food banks have been active in several disasters (Newton 1999).

Discussing how this relationship arose, the Executive Director of a food bank member association said that government “didn’t know who we were until the fire [refers to a wildfire

67 disaster].” However, food banks became an important element of that disaster response. Since the response concluded, there has been an effort to clarify the role of food banks in EM. Now, the Executive Director commented, “[Government emergency management agency name] knows they can call us instead of Costco”, (author’s interview AB03SR). A final group of nonprofits worth mentioning under emergency social services are mental health-specialist agencies.

Psychosocial wellness has become an increasingly important element of emergency response in recent decades. Depending on the local context, psychosocial services are provided by a combination of government, EMNPOs, and mental health specialist organizations.

Third, EMNPOs provide recovery assistance: assistance to support individuals in attaining a ‘new normal’ following a disaster. Recovery assistance is generally available to a smaller number of individuals over a longer period of time, and can be much more intensive in terms of the resources devoted to each household. It includes aid in cleaning, rebuilding, or removing debris from homes, as well as assistance in relocating or resuming employment.

Psychological supports can also be an element of recovery assistance. There are distinct, but overlapping, communities of EMNPOs in emergency response and recovery. Many recovery specialist EMNPOs are religiously affiliated groups connected to international networks, such as

Samaritan’s Purse and World Renew.

Fourth, EMNPOs may undertake donation management: accepting and distributing both financial and in-kind donations. In the case of financial donations, EMNPOs will typically set up a fund or ‘appeal’ that is specific to the disaster taking place. EMNPOs may also manage in-kind donations of items such as clothing and food. Financial donation management can be a significant opportunity for EMNPOs, with few drawbacks. Accordingly, this role is desirable and can sometimes become contentious. Often, numerous nonprofits will open financial appeals

68 during large-scale disasters, providing multiple channels for individuals to contribute resources to an ongoing response. In addition to major EMNPO actors, appeals in both countries are sometimes opened by local grant-making groups – such as community foundations and United

Ways. In some cases, different groups may collaborate to provide a single channel for donations.

This can be a reaction by local groups to negative experiences with national EMNPOs’ funding practices (author’s interviews). In other cases, it may reflect a desire not to duplicate services, as has been a lesson from the Grenfell Tower Fire (author’s interviews).

In-kind donations can be beneficial for EMNPOs, but generally pose greater burdens and risks. Donations must be sorted, stored, moved, and distributed. In-kind donations are often either of low quality or do not match the need, which can create problems for the nonprofits that manage them. For example, the British Red Cross came under scrutiny during the Grenfell

Tower Fire for the perception that in-kind donations were not getting to affected individuals, when really many of the donated goods did not match the local need (author’s interviews).48

Managing in-kind donations is often a formal role that EMNPOs will be directed by government to provide, especially because of the risks that unmanaged donations can pose. Simultaneously, local nonprofits and informal groups of community members may take it upon themselves to manage in-kind donations. The dynamic here can be difficult, especially when community members run afoul of public health regulations (author’s interviews). Despite the challenges, in- kind donation management can be vital to emergency response. For instance, food banks have played an unofficial role in this capacity. When grocery stores are closed, food banks are often the best available source of food in a community. At the same time, people often turn

48 British Red Cross (BRC) dealt with this challenge in a novel way, through the establishment of Shop for Grenfell. Shop for Grenfell essentially used BRC’s existing charity shop capacity such that ordinary people could purchase excess donated clothing with the proceeds going to victims of the fire (Oakley 28 June 2017).

69 instinctively to food banks with donations when they wish to support affected individuals. Local food banks can be overwhelmed in this context, and may not be able to help if they have been affected by the disaster. Food bank associations in a few Canadian provinces have been tasked with the role of coordinating food donations during disasters, after one provincial food bank association took on this role in an ad hoc capacity (author’s interview AB03SR).

Finally, volunteer management pertains to activities to oversee and coordinate spontaneous – also called ‘episodic’ or ‘emergent’ – volunteers. Spontaneous volunteers are

“people who, in the wake of a disaster, impulsively contribute to response and recovery efforts without affiliations to recognized volunteer organizations” (Mayorga et al. 2017: 1106). Such volunteers are an element of virtually every disaster. The volunteer labour offered by spontaneous volunteers can be of immense help in emergencies, but they can also create challenges (Mayorga et al. 2017; Waldman et al. 2018). Untrained and unsupervised volunteers pose liability risks; volunteers may self-deploy and thus be unaccounted for; and volunteers can do harm when operating unknown to authorities in areas where they may not be allowed to go.

These spontaneous volunteers may injure themselves or others, damage property or even violate individuals’ rights and dignity by taking well-intentioned but inappropriate actions. For instance, local government officials recounted instances where nonprofit faith groups had inappropriately attempted to use a disaster as an opportunity to proselytize (author’s interview CG01BW).

The risks posed by spontaneous volunteers make governments hesitant about them.

However, there is increasingly wide recognition that spontaneous volunteers can be an asset in

EM if handled properly.49 In light of these dual considerations, governments often turn to

49 See, e.g.: Voluntary Sector Agencies of Canada (2007), Cottrell (2010), Shaw and colleagues (2015), and American Red Cross (2006).

70 EMNPOs to manage spontaneous volunteers.50 This involves establishing a system for registering, preparing, and deploying unaffiliated volunteers. Volunteer management can occur during a disaster, or it can be something that EMNPOs plan for in advance. One prominent example of volunteer management planning is the British Red Cross’ community reserve volunteer program. In late 2017 the British Red Cross rolled out its community reserve volunteer program, which is essentially a platform on which citizens can register to help in the event that a large-scale disaster occurs in their local area. Community reserve volunteers “would assist regular British Red Cross volunteers with practical tasks relevant to the crisis, like preparing kit and equipment, filling sandbags, sorting supplies and making refreshments.” (BRC 2017) The program aims to recruit 10,000 reserve volunteers by the end of 2019 (UK Fundraising 30 April

2018).

Emergent groups can also result from disasters but are typically not included in volunteer management. Emergent groups result when “individual citizens com[e] together to deal collectively with disasters, forming new and informal groups to do so.” (Twigg and Mosel 2017:

445). They can be informal citizens’ groups formed to advocate for the interests of affected individuals. Or, they may be groups of concerned residents that create their own group to coordinate donations or offer assistance. Sometimes emergent groups form in reaction to perceived mishandling of a disaster by government and/or EMNPOs. For instance, town residents who were dissatisfied with the CRC’s assistance created a group called West Carleton

Disaster Relief (Burgess 29 October 2018). Emergent groups occasionally formalize and become part of the EMNPO landscape.

50 Although some local governments do seek to undertake this role themselves (e.g., Lincolnshire County Council 2016).

71 3.4 Drivers of Nonprofitization

In Canadian and British EM, four justifications for nonprofitization linked to co-optation were observed: ease, service-related expertise, surge manpower, and unique constituencies.

Although the use of nonprofit resources was also a factor, this is not primarily a case of cost- cutting as EMNPOs have been incorporated into the welfare state through the transition of traditionally philanthropic duties into government’s remit.

Nonprofitization in EM has, first, been justified on the basis of ease. This justification was only observed directly in the Canadian case, regarding the delicate nature of the

Constitutional division of powers. Although EM has frequently been the subject of

Constitutional wrangling in the past (Lindsay 2009, 2014; Juillet and Koji 2013), provincial governments seem to accept the legitimacy of federal government funding for the nonprofit provision of EM services.51 Nonprofitized service delivery is also easier in a second sense: it allows governments to simplify the process of interprovincial billing that occurs under Canadian financial assistance programs. As discussed later in this chapter, Canada’s recent experience with climate-linked disasters has resulted in a norm of government funding the CRC, through upfront contributions to disaster appeals as well as cost reimbursement. In a large disaster, it is easier for the Government of Canada to fund the CRC directly for costs that they know they will incur under DFAA anyway.52 Funds contributed to a disaster appeal do not need to undergo the laborious bureaucratic reimbursement telephone that is required through DFAA, thus increasing efficiency.

51 It is not clear why provinces have not, thus far, been sensitive about federal government funding of the CRC, since it does have implications for the Constitutional order. Federal government can exercise control over how CRC spends its contribution, which would seem to imply a loss of control for provincial governments. 52 It also makes for a nice press release.

72 Second, EMNPOs have expertise that local governments value. A 2016 review of

Canadian EMNPO capacity found that national EMNPOs have expertise in twenty-two out of twenty-five identified EM capabilities (Mackwani 2016). Interview participants in both case countries spoke about how few local governments will experience a catastrophic emergency within a lifetime; as such, the trans-jurisdictional operation of large EMNPOs can be a significant asset where local governments are responsible for disaster response and recovery

(author’s interviews). The expertise of EMNPOs can exceed, sometimes significantly, that of local government. For this reason, local governments often look to the small cadre of large

EMNPOs for advice on technical matters. Government staff cited the reliability of established

EMNPOs as a core advantage of working with them in EM (author’s interviews).

Third, EMNPOs offer surge capacity during emergencies, where more than ordinary levels of labor are needed. In the first instance this includes the provision of trained staff and volunteers from the major EMNPOs. Local governments often have few specialized EM staff – sometimes under a dozen – while EMNPOs can have a sizable cadre of local volunteers and often deploy volunteers from surrounding areas (author’s interviews). Government officials pointed to the advantage that EMNPO volunteers could spend time with affected residents to understand the needs, while in bureaucratic organizations there is “closer attention to the bottom line” (author’s interview CL01SM). The chart below provides information on the labour provided by the regional unit of an EMNPO during four months of an emergency response operation in that area. It provides data on the total hours per day devoted to a particular emergency response operation over the four-month period during which the response was active.

Information pertaining to the EMNPO is obscured in order to respect the confidentiality of the organization from which it was obtained, since it is from an internal document.

Figure 1. Emergency Response Man-hours, Staff and Volunteers, for a Local Nonprofit Branch

Staff Hours Volunteer Hours

200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Month Month Month Month 1 2 3 4

Source: internal nonprofit organization data

As the chart above shows, volunteer labour was a critical aspect of this organization’s nonprofit emergency response operation. In total, 20 staff members provided 754.1 hours of work on this response, while 138 volunteers contributed 7,998.4 – more than 10 times as many hours.53 While this data draws only from one response by one organization, it is broadly indicative of the role that EMNPOs play in providing volunteer surge-capacity in EM.

The surge capacity role extends beyond the provision of trained staff and volunteers by major EMNPOs. At the next level, local groups with specialized training – such as 4x4 clubs or amateur radio – can assist with specialized tasks. For instance, one interview participant spoke to an incident involving trapped miners where an EMNPO was drawn upon to support the fire service because the EMNPO had expertise in a specific terrain (author’s interview WA01WP).

Usually governments prefer to use their own internal capacity first, but they may turn to

EMNPOs for their specialized knowledge when large operations require it (author’s interviews).

53 This is response-specific; as such, it does not include staff hours devoted to the ordinary operation of nonprofit business, nor volunteer hours devoted to other programming.

74 Most governments “default to” an attitude that “they can handle it”, but when they experience a catastrophic disaster they realize that they cannot do so alone (author’s interview AB02BD).

There are also organized local groups which offer accounted-for, but adaptable or unspecialized, volunteers. Quite often, faith groups constitute this category. Governments value the adaptability of these nonprofits, especially volunteer search and rescue, which one interview participant described as the “duct tape of emergency management” (author’s interview

NW04SW). Lots of groups “will put their hands to anything”, another said (author’s interview

BS01MC). Governments recognize the utility of these volunteers, not only for their functional role, but also the contribution to community cohesiveness. One municipal emergency manager said: “Plus, it brings people together – everyone has fun.” (author’s interview BS01MC).

Fourth, governments saw the utility of drawing on EMNPOs’ separate reputations – and, thus, their access to unique constituencies. Nonprofits may draw on higher levels of trust in the community, especially amongst vulnerable populations. There is a public perception of the state that can be scary, especially when it comes to authority figures like police (who lead civil protection in the UK). Governments may draw on EMNPOs to offer a “softer uniform presence”

(author’s interview NH01GC). One participant spoke about recent EMNPO involvement in

British human-trafficking raids, where this consideration is particularly important. Victims of trafficking often do not trust the police, and may not speak English, but they do know the Red

Cross emblem (author’s interview WA02RD). Similarly, one Local Resilience Forum Manager,54 speaking to a flood response in his area, said that there was a “certain level distrust of the authorities”, but EMNPOs were able to reach affected individuals because they were “seen as more approachable” (author’s interview CL01SM). Governments may also turn to nonprofits to

54 In the UK, local units responsible for emergency management are required to have a Local Resilience Forum to coordinate disaster response amongst category one and two actors, as well as nonprofits.

75 protect their own reputation, when handling an issue could be politically tumultuous. For instance, governments may find it difficult to turn away in-kind donations offered by citizens which are not needed – as such, it is more convenient for a nonprofit, which may face less public scrutiny, to do so (author’s interview CL01SM).

There is some evidence that cost savings was a factor for governments seeking to activate

EMNPO services. Governments often pointed to the resources that EMNPOs can bring, financial and otherwise (author’s interviews). An obvious example here is the use of donation-matching to induce philanthropic contributions to the CRC in Alberta in 2016.55 EMNPOs and other local nonprofits also possess physical infrastructure that can be used in emergency response (e.g., community halls, food bank warehouses, emergency response vehicles, and shelter setup kits).

Under some circumstances, governments reimbursed nonprofits for the use of these resources, while in other circumstances this is considered part of the “ordinary” mission-based activities of the nonprofit (author’s interviews). The use of nonprofit resources was sometimes justified as additive of government provision, needed in extraordinary circumstances (author’s interviews).

While governments identified that EMNPO resources can reduce the cost of an emergency response, it would be too simple to label EM as a case of nonprofitization by cost- cutting, since government’s use of nonprofit service provision seems to have increased governmental compensation over time. This is because the starting point for nonprofit EM services has traditionally be an assumption of philanthropic responsibility. That is, nonprofits have typically provided philanthropic services separate from government services. A relatively clear division of responsibility has pervaded where governments assumed a duty for protecting lives, critical infrastructure, and, where possible, preventing the destruction of personal property.

55 See section 3.5 for more detail on this.

76 Governments also assumed responsibility for some emergency social services in an immediate response context – for instance, providing psychological care and, in some contexts, food or emergency lodging. Separately, EMNPOs provided emergency social services at all emergency scales. But these nonprofit-provided emergency social services were considered to be, and funded through, philanthropy.

The incorporation of EMNPOs into the welfare state is a newer phenomenon. Today, some EMNPOs receive government cost-recovery for providing these services (author’s interviews). It is common for EMNPOs to seek cost recovery for direct service delivery costs, while EMNPOs assume the cost of maintaining organizational capacity (London Resilience

Partnership 2017; BLEVEC 2016; author’s interviews). Occasionally, governments provide an annual contribution to support the EMNPO’s capacity (author’s interviews). Government-

EMNPO financial arrangements are increasing as emergency social services become well- established and as natural disaster incidences increase. As such, although cost-saving is a rationale that this author observed in EM, we ought to still see this case as an instance of nonprofitization through co-optation, since the primary shift has been toward governments taking on responsibilities previously conceived as philanthropic.

3.5 The Nonprofitization of Canadian Emergency Management in the Climate Change Era

In both case countries, EMNPOs are commonly involved in providing all five functions described above. The nonprofitization of EM in both Canada and the UK is based primarily on co-optation rationales – specifically, ease, expertise, surge manpower, and unique constituencies.

Thus far, this chapter has presented a relatively static overview of EM nonprofitization in

Canada and the UK, with an eye toward how and why nonprofit social welfare service co-

77 optation has been understood and justified by actors in the field. But as nonprofitization implies a process of change, it can be helpful to offer an example of policy change in motion. Fortunately,

Canadian EM offers an excellent example of change in the recent decade. While British EM has remained relatively static since 2004 (when the prevailing EM legislation was created),56

Canadian EM has experienced considerable change as the policy sphere has been strained by an influx of climate disasters, beginning in the late 1990s but accelerating especially in 2013-2019.

The increase in EM activity has, in turn, prompted further nonprofitization of EM policy in

Canada, especially through increased reliance on one nonprofit: the CRC.

This section begins with an explanation of climate change and EM in both case countries, demonstrating that Canada has experienced a significant acceleration of climate-linked natural disasters recently, while the UK has not experienced such dramatic change. It then provides an account of the accelerated nonprofitization of Canadian EM resulting from climate-linked disasters in 2013-2019.

3.5.1 Climate Change and EM in the UK and Canada

The UK is relatively safe from major natural hazards (INFORM 2018a), and this has remained true throughout the 2010s. Although some areas of the UK are at an elevated risk of flooding and heat waves from climate change, in general the country has not experienced a surge of climate-linked natural disasters.57 Indeed, none of the UK’s recent major disasters have been climate-linked: the largest recent disasters in the UK have included a pandemic, several mass

56 See Appendix 6 for more detail. 57 First responders responded to 125,512 flooding and water rescue incidents between 2010 and 2018. Based on the UK Home Office’s Flooding and Water Rescue Incidents Dataset, downloaded 9 April 2019 (UK Home Office 2019).

78 casualty terror incidents, and a multi-unit apartment fire (see Appendix 6 for further detail).58 As a result, UK EM in the period studied has largely remained static, albeit with some increased attention to terrorism and human trafficking.

Canada, in contrast, has experienced a deluge of climate-linked disasters over the last decade. EM in Canada has always primarily addressed natural disasters: the diversity of

Canada’s weather and physical geography generates an array of natural hazards to plan for and manage.59 According to the Canadian Disaster Database (CDD), which Public Safety Canada publishes, there have been 544 EM ‘disasters’ and ‘incidents’ in Canada between 1 January 1990 and 12 October 2017.60 In recent years, however, Canada has experienced a range of climate- linked disasters, leading to an overall increase in the need for EM policy responses. It is difficult to pinpoint the precise start of the climate change era, but Canada’s Senior Climatologist, David

Phillips, suggests that the first climate-linked disaster that he recalls observing is the 1996 flood in Saguenay, Quebec.61 While Canada experienced several major disasters in the late 1990s, natural disasters have become particularly challenging in the period of 2013-2019.

58 The COVID-19 pandemic, of course, occurred after fieldwork for this dissertation was completed. It is likely to have considerable ramifications for the EM system in all countries – but we cannot know yet what those ramifications will be. 59 For instance, Canada has fifteen distinct terrestrial ecozones (Lands Directorate 1986). Although human-made disasters – such as chemical spills, plane crashes, and terrorist incidents – certainly do occur, natural disasters are much more common. Of the 544 events in the Canadian Disaster Database for 1990 to 2017, 451 are natural while the rest are either classed as technological (87) or conflict (6). 60 Based on a downloaded search for disasters from 1990 to 2017 conducted on 13 October 2017 (Public Safety Canada n.d.). There are several criteria, any of which can result in the classification of an incident as a disaster. These are: ten or more fatalities; one hundred or more affected individuals; an appeal for national or international assistance; historical significance; and significant damage or interruption of normal processes such that a community cannot recover on its own (Public Safety Canada n.d.). Over the 544 disasters, there have been 1 749 fatalities. Eighty-three disasters have featured at least one fatality, while fatalities have exceeded 100 in just three cases. The only three disasters to exceed 100 recorded fatalities consist of: a 2009 heat wave in Vancouver and Fraser, BC, which killed 455; the 2009 H1NI (“Swine Flu”) pandemic, with 425 fatalities; and a 1998 airplane crash in Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia, which killed 229 people. 61 This is from a lecture delivered at the 2019 Canadian Red Cross Ontario Connects Conference (Phillips 17 November 2019). The broader observation that climate change is linked to more extreme urban flooding events due to rainfall (rather than snowmelt) has been corroborated by research (Kirchmeier-Young and Zhang 2020).

79 To offer some context as to scale and prevalence, the chart below provides a yearly summary of fatalities, injuries, and evacuees in Canadian disasters, drawn from the CDD. As it shows, fatalities and injuries are rare relative to evacuations – the median annual fatalities and injuries were, respectively, 24 and 20, compared with 13,605 evacuees.62 Unfortunately, the chart does not include data for 2017-2019, as CDD data was not yet available for these years at the time of writing.

Figure 2. Annual Fatalities, Injuries, and Evacuees in Canadian Disasters, 1990-2016

62 This is consistent with the global trend toward costlier disasters with fewer fatalities (Below and Wallemacq 2018). The vast majority (429 of 544) of disasters occurring during this period were “meteorological – hydrological” events: avalanches, cold events, droughts, floods, heat events, hurricanes/typhoons/tropical storms, unspecified and other storms, storm surge, storms and severe thunderstorms, tornados, wildfires, and winter storms. Average figures are higher in all categories – there were, on average, 65 fatalities, 505 injuries, and 23 207 evacuees annually – owing to very large disasters in certain years. The 2009 heat event and H1N1 outbreaks led to uncharacteristically high numbers of fatalities and injuries in that year, for instance.

80 100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fatalities Injured Evacuated

The chart above illustrates the rise of Canadian climate-linked disasters: as climate change unfolds, disasters are affecting more people. They are also taking a larger financial toll (Henstra and Thistlewaite 2017a). Two years in particular are important in the story of Canadian climate disasters.

The year of 2013 was marked by one of the costliest and most devastating disasters in

Canada.63 In June of that year, rivers in Alberta’s Southern Saskatchewan River Basin flooded,

63 Some observers may recall that there was a major ice storm in December 2013 which left 500,000 Ontarians without power (Canadian Press 22 December 2013). While this was indeed a substantial disaster – the event cost the City of Toronto, the largest municipality affected by the storm, an estimated $106 million (Toronto City Manager 8 January 2014) – the focus of this section is on the exceptional nature of the 2013 Southern Alberta floods. It should be noted that the City of Toronto has recognized that ice storms are one of three hazards that are likely to intensify

81 precipitating over 30 local states of emergency, four deaths, and the evacuation of 125,000 people (Mackwani 2015). Close to 15,000 homes were flooded, about a third of which sustained major damage (Mackwani 2015; KPMG LLP 2017). The financial impact of the disaster was without precedent in Canada: in total, the flooding caused $7 billion in losses, comprising $5 billion economic losses and $2 billion insured losses (Mackwani 2015). The impact of this disaster is still being felt: cleanup efforts are ongoing and are expected to continue until 2023

(Mackwani 2015).

After the 2013 Calgary floods, there were two years of relative quiet. Then, in the midst of a warm spring wildfires necessitated the evacuation of communities in the northern Albertan

Wood Buffalo Region on May 3-4, 2016 (KPMG LLP May 2017). In total, 88,000 residents of northern Alberta were evacuated, while both local and provincial states of emergency were declared (KPMG LLP May 2017). The Northern Alberta wildfires was unusual for requiring the evacuation of an entire city. Extractives operations were also temporarily shut down (KPMG

LLP May 2017). Many Canadians will remember images of cars fleeing walls of fire on

Highway 63, the only road out of Fort McMurray.64 The Northern Alberta Wildfires constituted the costliest natural disaster in Canadian history, with a total estimated economic impact of $8.9 billion.65

under climate change, along with flooding and heat waves (Toronto Environment Office 2012). So, the 2013 ice storm (and July 2013 Toronto floods) are part of the larger story on Canadian climate-linked disasters. The Lac Mégantic rail disaster also happened in 2013. 64 Luckily, the well-handled evacuation resulted in zero fatalities (KPMG LLP May 2017). However, two evacuees died in a traffic accident near the Edmonton area – the location to which many people evacuated, approximately a five-hour drive from Fort McMurray (Friscolanti 7 May 2016). 65 This figure is from KPMG’s post-incident assessment report (May 2017). The Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC) estimates that the Wildfire resulted in $3.6 billion in insured losses (IBC 7 July 2016). Although this author was unable to find the text of the original report finding the $8.9 billion cost estimate, it was a study undertaken by Rafat Alam and Shahidul Islam which was released in January 2017.

82 Left off of the above chart are 2017 and 2018, two record-setting wildfire seasons – and years with significant flooding across numerous provinces (Government of British Columbia 2019;

Public Safety Canada 12 May 2017).66 The 2018 British Columbian wildfires, which affected every region of the province, also caused record-breaking air pollution levels in Alberta (CBC

News 8 January 2019). Overall, Canada was the ninth most disaster-affected country in the world in 2018 (Eckstein et al. 2019).67

2019 was a repeat of the now-familiar pattern: “hundred-year” or otherwise major floods affected multiple provinces – this time Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick – and an “extreme” wildfire season occurred in the west – this time in Alberta (Flanagan 18 December 2019; NASA

30 May 2019; Omstead 29 July 2019; Tutton 26 April 2019).68 While it is too early to identify what the ‘new normal’ will look like for Canada in the climate change era, the cumulative effect of simultaneous disasters is a challenge to which experts are already pointing (Lemmen et al.

2016; author’s interviews). Climate disasters have intensified to such an extent that it is having a profound, destabilizing effect on the insurance industry (Coxon 25 April 2019; Kovacs 2019).

66 At the time of writing, CDD data was not yet available for these years. 67 It was somewhat anomalous for Canada to make the top ten of the Global Climate Risk Index, which is typically dominated by low-income countries. Readers may be surprised to see Canada rank so prominently in 2018, given that no Canadian disasters in 2018 reached the national and international profile of the 2016 Northern Alberta Wildfires. Instead, a series of concurrent disasters occurred throughout the year (including floods, extreme heat and cold weather events, wildfires and related air pollution, and a tornado). Germanwatch’s Global Climate Risk Index is based on absolute and relative impacts from climate-linked disasters, both in terms of fatalities and economic impact (Eckstein et al. 2019). Notably, Canada tends to have few fatalities but a lot of evacuees, so this index may actually undercount the impact of climate change on Canada from this perspective (although without knowing the evacuation figures for other countries, this is a speculative statement). At any rate, Canada was ranked 77, 43, and 42 for 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively (Kreft et al. 2016; Eckstein et al. 2017, 2018). Notably, however, Canada’s risk profile is relatively higher when the figures are focused on recent years, in contrast to ten-year figures. Canada ranked 107, 98, 100, and 95 for 1996-2015, 1997-2016, 1998-2017, and 1999-2018, respectively (Kreft et al. 2016; Eckstein et al. 2017, 2018, 2019). This suggests that very recent climate disasters have had a disproportionate impact on Canada. 68 2019 marked three consecutive years of flooding for most towns along the Saint John River, and the seventh since 2008 (Kennedy 6 June 2019). As with other years discussed here, the disasters mentioned are not the only disasters that occurred in Canada that year. For instance, in 2019 several hurricanes and tropical storms affected Canadians on the eastern half of the country: to give just one example, Hurricane Dorian left 500,000 Nova Scotians without power (Cecco 9 September 2019).

83 And as the number of Canadians affected by disasters increases, this has created strains for governments in implementing EM. The strain from accelerating natural disasters is evident in financial aid policies. Take, for instance, the DFAA: this program has become more expensive as the frequency and impact of disasters has increased. On average, payments made under DFAA have increased from an average of $10 million annually in 1970-95 to $110 million in 1996-2010 and $360 million in 2011-16 (Public Safety Canada 14 March 2017: 1). DFAA is projected to increase to an estimated annual cost of $902 million by 2021 (PBO 2016: 2) – nearly a hundred times costlier than when the program was established. Costs have increased despite changes to

DFAA which raise the threshold below which this program is not available (so disasters have to be larger to be eligible).

3.5.2 Canadian Emergency Management Nonprofitization in 2013-2019

Canada’s recent experience with climate-linked disasters has pushed the boundaries of the country’s traditional EM policy framework. One of the major implications of the increased demand for EM services has been social welfare nonprofitization – although nonprofits have a long history of involvement in EM, going back to civilian air patrols and other wartime efforts.

Over time, natural disasters have become the primary focus of Canadian EM policy (Henstra

2011), resulting in the growth of emergency social services. For instance, emergency social services divisions have become commonplace within emergency management organizations

(author’s interviews). Climate-linked disasters have expanded disaster assistance budgets, prompted policy reviews, and increased the role of EMNPOs. They have also led to the ad hoc creation of new forms of assistance: government donation-matching and its offshoots, as well as

84 the use of cash transfers during early disaster response. In turn, EMNPOs have become key actors in implementing social welfare services in Canadian EM.

EMNPOs have been instrumental in recent disasters, especially when disasters are very large. When major disasters occur, governments often call on EMNPOs to provide expertise, surge capacity, and to assist the state in reaching vulnerable communities. After the event has passed, this relationship is often formalized and even expanded through forward-looking agreements and institutions. In this way, EMNPOs are co-opted into the welfare state through a combination of crisis decisions and considered policy. For instance, this is the pattern that occurred in the 2013 Southern Alberta flood. During that event, ten EMNPOs deployed 15,000 volunteers to assist with response and recovery efforts (Mackwani 2015). In the years following, the Calgary Emergency Management Agency and Calgary Neighbourhoods, two City departments, worked together to create a framework for coordinating with EMNPOs. In doing so, they created an organization called the Critical Service Providers Group (CSPG). CSPG brings together EMNPOs with which the City has worked directly on emergency social services, as well as three local philanthropic funders (author’s interviews). The City also developed processes for activating and coordinating EMNPOs during disasters (author’s interviews). These systems were deployed successfully in 2016 when Calgary welcomed 2,400 evacuees from the

Northern Alberta Fires (author’s interviews).

Calgary’s experience after the flood is broadly reflective of how EMNPOs are co-opted into the welfare state in Canada. It is a general pattern that in the aftermath of major disasters, local governments seek to improve their coordination with EMNPOs. Sometimes this takes the form of a coordinating body like the CSPG. In other cases, agreements are created between local government and specialist EMNPOs that were involved in the most recent disaster – such as the

85 CRC, the Salvation Army, St. John Ambulance, volunteer search and rescue, and amateur radio groups (author’s interviews). Government-EMNPO agreements help to establish clear procedures and expectations, which both nonprofits and government value (author’s interviews).

“Provinces react a lot better after they’ve had a major, major event,” one nonprofit executive said

(author’s interview). After a major disaster, EMNPOs often seek to improve coordination amongst themselves as well (author’s interviews). Thus, a disaster event serves as a catalyst for

EMNPO co-optation, which is then carried forward in other events.

To provide a detailed look at a process of co-optation, this case study focuses on the transformation of one EMNPO in particular: the CRC, which is now ubiquitous in Canadian EM.

CRC has agreements with local, regional, provincial, and federal governments across the country

– over 800 at the local level alone (author’s interview). Today, it is involved in every major disaster in Canada (as well as most small- and medium-scale disasters), frequently taking on a lead role in supplying emergency social services – and usually with the understanding that government will reimburse direct costs (author’s interviews). This was not always the case: indeed, until recently EM was a small program area for the Society. Before 2013, CRC was primarily focused on international operations, water safety, and health programs (Glassford

2017). Although the period of 1996-2009 had seen some growth in CRC’s domestic EM activities (CRC 2009, n.d.), the EM program was still relatively small. From 2004-2015, EM comprised an average 11 per cent of the organization’s budget (Sauvé 2019). EM is today (2016-

2019) the single largest program area, making up 50 per cent of the budget (Sauvé 2019). As the

CRC looks ahead to its future, the society sees EM as a service with further growth potential:

“We are confronted by a growing reality and now we need to change to meet that scale” (Sauvé

2019).

86 Throughout the 2000s, CRC built experience with international disaster appeals, especially the 2004 Asian Tsunami and 2010 Haitian earthquake relief appeals.69 When the 2013

Southern Alberta floods occurred, CRC decided to open a domestic disaster appeal.70 The response was staggering: CRC raised $45 million (CRC 2016a). The funds enabled CRC to be involved for much longer than had previously been possible after a disaster, taking it from a response-oriented organization to one that also carries out disaster recovery (author’s interviews). CRC was able to support individuals in long-term recovery, aid community groups to return to operating capacity, and fund resilience-building projects (author’s interviews).71 The

Southern Alberta floods were also CRC’s first experience as a grant-maker – a transition that was not always smooth (author’s interviews). Although the philanthropic disaster appeal was an important enabling factor, CRC’s expertise made the transformational effect of 2013 possible. In addition to its direct experience with Canadian EM, CRC had expertise in the related fields of health, first aid, and international disaster assistance.

The 2016 Northern Alberta wildfires again stretched the bounds of CRC’s EM capacity, with once again unprecedented philanthropic and government resources at their disposal. The

2016 Alberta Fires appeal raised a total of $323 million from a combination of philanthropic and government sources (CRC 2017a). Both the Government of Alberta and Government of Canada pledged to match citizens’ donations to the CRC. Spending on donation-matching was not trivial:

69 The 2004 Asian Tsunami appeal raised $132 million and the 2010 Haitian earthquake relief appeal raised $227 million (CRC 2020, 2019a) 70 This was not the first domestic disaster appeal. The 1997 Manitoba Flood Appeal raised $17 million (CRC n.d.). It is the first mention of a CRC domestic disaster appeal that this author was able to find. The 2011 Northern Alberta Fires appeal raised $5.8 million (CRC 2013). This author was unable to find evidence of a disaster appeal for any of the other major domestic disasters between 2001 and 2009, including the: 2009 H1N1 outbreak, 2009 heatwave, 2009 Kelowna wildfires, 2008 Toronto propane explosion, 2004 Edmonton flood, 2003 SARS outbreak, and 2003 Kelowna wildfires. 71 Through its Community Grants Program, CRC funded 70 projects in affected communities – such as First Nations housing support and a project to rebuild the High River library (CRC n.d.).

87 the Government of Canada contributed $104 million in matched donations, while the

Government of Alberta contributed $30 million (CRC 2017). This was the first time that the

Canadian government had ever pledged to match donations for a domestic disaster appeal

(Rabson 31 July 2017).

Government donation-matching in 2016 had an effect beyond the funds directly disbursed. CRC, a nonprofit still adjusting to the rapid growth of its domestic EM program, found itself for a second time in the uncomfortable position of recovery grant-maker – and at a time when a massive media spotlight was trained on them (author’s interviews). “There was an incredible rush to tap into funding” during these two disasters (author’s interview). In 2013 and

2016, CRC was criticized by some within the nonprofit community for its grant-making. These nonprofits expressed frustration with CRC’s cumbersome and confusing grant processes. A familiar refrain was that while CRC is good at emergency response, it was not set up to excel at funding disaster recovery (author’s interviews). This situation accentuated already difficult power relations between CRC and the wider nonprofit community in affected areas (author’s interview). While nonprofits in affected communities said that they were thankful for the CRC funding, some criticized government donation-matching (author’s interviews). As one civil servant put it: “The government should stay in control of their money,” (author’s interview).

Perhaps as a result of this experience, matching philanthropic donations has not become a norm of Canadian EM. The federal government faced questions about whether it would match donations to CRC at the onset of the 2017 British Columbia wildfires, but ultimately it decided to contribute funds to CRC without the donation-matching component (Rabson 31 July 2017;

Russell 1 August 2017). Nonetheless, the 2016 Northern Alberta wildfire advanced an expected practice of funding CRC disaster response and recovery. Out of the nine events for which the

88 CRC has opened a domestic disaster appeal since 2016, Canadian governments have contributed funds to eight disaster appeals – with an average contribution of 53 per cent of the total disaster appeal.72 Governments also fund the CRC for smaller scale disasters, especially where such disasters frequently recur. For instance, the CRC has a contract with Indigenous Services Canada in Manitoba for the cost of carrying out EM for First Nations disasters in the province (author’s interviews).

The figure below provides data on Canadian domestic disaster appeals opened by the

CRC in 2013-2019. The 2016 Northern Alberta Wildfire appeal is noticeably larger than other disaster appeals, both in terms of philanthropic and government contributions. The 2017 British

Columbian wildfires appeal was about half as large – and primarily comprised of government funding. In 2018 and 2019 a series of concurrent disasters drew small disaster appeals. While there were fewer evacuees in the disasters of 2018 and 2019, their cumulative effect has been considerable.

Figure 3. Canadian Red Cross Domestic Disaster Appeals 2013-201973

72 This is for the nine disaster appeals for 2016-2019 for which full data on funding sources was available. 73 This figure excludes three domestic disaster appeals opened during the period of study: the Lac Mégantic Support Fund, which raised $14.9 million, the Syrian Refugee Arrival Appeal, which raised $4.1 million, and the 2017 Spring Floods Appeal, which raised $15.1 million (CRC 2018a, 2019b, 2016b). These appeals are excluded because the author was unable to find data on the source of the funds (philanthropic versus government contributions).

89 $350 Millions $300

$250

$200

Contributed from Provincial $150 Governments Contributed from Government of Canada $100 Philanthropic Contributions

$50

BC Fires 2017BC Fires 2018 BC Floods 2018 QuebecOntario Floods Floods2019 2019

Northern Alberta Fires 2016 Alberta Flood Response 2013 New Brunswick FloodsNew 2018 Brunswick Floods 2019 Ottawa-Gatineau Tornadoes 2018

Sources: CRC (2016a, 2017a, 2018b, 2018c, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e, 2019f, 2019g); Weld (26 June 2018); CBC News (16 May 2018)

CRC’s 2013-2019 disaster appeals illustrate the unreliability of philanthropy. That is particularly true in recent years, where fires and floods have occurred simultaneously, making it more difficult for individual events to capture public attention and sympathy. On a per evacuee basis, the 2016 Northern Alberta wildfires raised four times as much philanthropic funding as the

90 2019 Spring Floods in Quebec, Ontario, and New Brunswick: $2,148 was raised per evacuee in the former disaster, compared with $527 for the latter. 74 Since the 2016 Northern Alberta wildfire, eight disaster appeals have raised a combined total of $37 million in philanthropic contributions – $24 million of which was from the 2017 British Columbia wildfires.75

As philanthropy has dried up, the CRC has turned to governments to fund disaster response. Federal and provincial governments provided between 38 per cent and 88 per cent of

CRC disaster appeal funding in 2016-2019. In addition to provincial and federal government funding for CRC disaster appeals, CRC and other EMNPOs frequently receive reimbursement for providing direct disaster assistance to Canadians. Especially during large disasters, EMNPOs can typically recover costs (are reimbursed) for direct costs of service delivery (author’s interviews). The reason that cost recovery is more common in major disasters is that these open up disaster financial assistance programs at higher levels of government – so, municipalities bill the province, who then bills the federal government. In rarer cases, agreements with government agencies also include a financial contribution for capacity-building, although anecdotal evidence suggests this may be more common when governments and EMNPOs frequently interact on response (author’s interviews).

The nature of CRC’s work has changed from a periodic mobilization of resources on an as-needed basis to a practice of being permanently deployed. Both because disasters are more frequent and the society is involved for longer, CRC personnel are now constantly engaged in dozens of active incidents (author’s interviews).76 As resources become increasingly strained, the

74 The 2019 Spring Floods figure is based on $$4.8 million was raised philanthropic donations for 2019 flooding in Quebec, Ontario, and New Brunswick, divided by the 9,000 evacuees (CRC 2019; Eschner 30 April 2019). The 2016 Northern Alberta wildfires figure is based on $189 raised in philanthropic donations, divided by the 88,000 evacuees (CRC 2017; KPMG 2017). 75 Thus, the remaining seven appeals raised a total of $13 million together, amounting to an average of $1.9 million apiece. 76 At the time of writing there are 45 active CRC disaster operations, for instance.

91 CRC is reaching out to governments across the country for stable base funding for capacity, such as the cost of keeping equipment in warehouses (Sauvé 2019). “What we’re saying to the provinces is that we need to stop treating these events as exceptional.” (Sauvé 2019).

Also arising from the 2013 flood and 2016 wildfires, cash transfers are a common feature of Canadian EM in the 2013-2019 period. This case study focuses on cash transfers for immediate emergency assistance – funds provided to every eligible citizen to enable them to meet their basic needs when an event happens. Much larger sums are also commonly provided to a small number of individuals that have been most affected by disasters and have the least capacity to recover. But these are somewhat more difficult to capture empirically, owing to their discretional nature and the lack of research on EM policy in general.

The 2016 Northern Alberta wildfire created a norm of providing immediate financial assistance, usually administered by CRC either with or without government assistance. In 2016, the Government of Alberta provided immediate assistance in the amount of $1,250 per person and $500 per child – a funding level that was replicated in 2019 during the High Level wildfires response (CBC News 24 May 2019). Though one cannot know with certainty the motivation, it has been suggested to this author that the province may have felt obligated to offer the same level of immediate assistance because citizens expected it (author’s interview). CRC immediate financial assistance in the 2016 Northern Alberta wildfires was provided at a level of $600 per adult and $300 per child (CRC 2016b). In subsequent events, assistance levels have been smaller: typically, $600 per household. The table below summarizes cash transfers for immediate emergency assistance in major disasters from 2016-2019.

Table 2. Immediate Financial Assistance, Major Canadian Disasters 2016-2019

92 Immediate Financial Administered Disaster Name Funded By Assistance By Northern Alberta $1,850 per adult and $800 per Government and Government and Wildfires 2016 child Red Cross Red Cross Government and 2017 Spring Floods $600 per household Red Cross Red Cross

BC Fires 2017 $600 per household77 Red Cross Government

New Brunswick $300 per household Red Cross Red Cross Floods 2018

BC Floods 2018 $2,850 per household Red Cross Government

BC Fires 2018 N/A N/A N/A

Ottawa-Gatineau $600 per household78 Red Cross Government Tornadoes 2019 New Brunswick $600 per household Red Cross Government Floods 2019

Ontario Floods 2019 $600 per household Red Cross Government

High Level Alberta $1,250 per adult and $500 per Government Government Fires 2019 child

Quebec Floods 2019 $600 per household Red Cross Government

Sources: CRC (2016c, 4 October 2018, 18 May 2017); CBC News (24 May 2019); Ironworkers 720 (2016); Globe and Mail (25 April 2019); Emergency Management British Columbia (2018)

The practice of Canadian EM increasingly relies on upfront government funding to CRC, which provides direct assistance as well as cash transfers for evacuees. The details of assistance are determined by the relevant governments. The 2013 Southern Alberta floods and 2016

Northern Alberta wildfires were both transformative for the CRC’s role in disaster response, in large part due to the massive philanthropic resources at their disposal. In 2017 and onwards,

77 An additional $600 per household was available to those evacuated for longer than 14 days. 78 Only available for uninsured households; additional $200 available for households of four people or more.

93 philanthropy has been a smaller presence, but the CRC role has not diminished: instead, the

Society is deepening its integration in the WS. Whether this consists of administering government cash transfer programs for immediate emergency assistance or providing direct assistance in accordance with government guidelines and on the expectation of reimbursement,

CRC increasingly provides government social welfare services when disaster strikes.79

Canadian EM policy has strained to address the social risks posed by the acceleration of natural disasters linked to climate change. While these risks are not new – natural disasters have, of course, occurred throughout history – the frequency and scale of disasters has moved EM from the fringes to occupy a larger role. There is a growing sensibility in the EM profession that climate-linked disasters are not merely ‘natural’ events and are not randomly distributed; rather, climate change is putting certain communities at greater risk and these risks need to be addressed through social policy (author’s interviews). While the basic policy architecture of EM has, for the moment, remained – governments provide direct assistance and offer financial aid during very large events – natural disasters in 2016-2019 have strained these policy structures and prompted the use of additional interventions, especially cash transfers.

Canadian EM has also nonprofitized to a greater degree, with the CRC taking on an omnipresent role within the span of a decade. While philanthropic contributions drove the initial growth of CRC’s role, this dynamic is now primarily driven by government co-optation. The

CRC was co-opted into the WS gradually, primarily through ad hoc policies enacted on a one- time basis in reaction to specific disaster events. However, as the case study shows, these crisis decisions in turn generated expectations and habits that influenced how EM was carried out in

79 The new frontier of CRC’s involvement in EM is disaster prevention, which is now a primarily philanthropic priority for the organization.

94 future events. There are now well-understood expectations of what EMNPOs, including but not limited to CRC, will do and which activities will be reimbursed by governments.

Philanthropy had an important catalytic effect through the exceptionally high contributions to domestic disaster appeals for the 2013 Southern Alberta floods and 2016

Northern Alberta wildfires. The impressive scale of disaster appeals in these cases points to the important role that philanthropy can play in defining new social risks, and therefore shaping boundaries of the welfare state. Yet experiences in 2017-2019 have also illustrated the limitations of philanthropy. As concurrent disasters split the public’s attention – resulting in lackluster philanthropic support for disaster appeals – the CRC increasingly looked to government to provide stable, equitable disaster response and recovery funding.

Canada’s experience in 2013-2019 is revealing a typical pattern for that country’s disasters in the climate era: ice storms on the eastern half of the continent, coastal flooding, heatwaves, wildfires in western Canadian forests, and inland flooding, all happening concurrently. As natural disasters accelerate, there is still the possibility that governments will shift their approach. For the moment the dominant choice appears to be nonprofitization through the co-optation of EMNPOs, and in particular the CRC. Already it is clear that CRC sees itself, and is seen, as a member of a “club of governments” (author’s interviews). This privileged status has made power dynamics with other nonprofit sector actors difficult on occasion, as the case study shows. However, one must emphasize that the world is at the very beginning of the climate change era. As disasters become larger and more frequent – and as EM is therefore elevated in policy importance – it remains to be seen whether government will continue a policy of funding

CRC EM, rather than replacing CRC assistance with government programs or bringing the CRC

95 officially into government.80 Government could also take a step back from direct provision, choosing instead to promote private provision. One possibility is mandatory private insurance, as has been the British approach to floods. However, given the Constitutional sensitivities of a shared service responsibility like EM, the intergovernmental co-optation of a nonprofit may prove an enduring Canadian approach.

3.6 Conclusions

EMNPOs are increasingly embedded within the welfare state, especially as emergency social services providers. This chapter argues that in both Canada and the UK, the nonprofitization of EM should be viewed through the co-optation pathway, rather than as an instance of cost-cutting. As EM has evolved from a policy area focused on wartime preparations to an ongoing welfare program for responding to habitual social risks from natural (and man- made) disasters, EMNPOs are taking on a larger share of responsibility. Canada’s recent experience with climate-linked disasters provides a specific example of how this is unfolding. As the case study shows, philanthropy drove the initial growth of CRC’s role in EM; however, government co-optation soon became the primary force sustaining CRC’s involvement. Through a series of crisis-based choices, which were later formalized and expanded in forward-looking policy, the CRC has become institutionalized as a government social welfare service provider.

This is broadly reflective of how EMNPOs are brought into the welfare state in Canada.

EMNPOs are involved in protecting life and property, emergency social services, recovery assistance, donation management, and volunteer management. Increasingly, we can observe a norm of governments reimbursing EMNPOs for the direct costs of services that were previously

80 Which seems unlikely to occur formally, given the society’s fundamental principles. It is also difficult to imagine given the sensitivity of provinces and territories to federal takeover of shared responsibility.

96 considered philanthropic in nature. Justifications of ease, expertise, surge manpower, and access to unique constituencies were all at play in British and Canadian EM.

As EMNPOs are incorporated within the Canadian and British welfare states, this has generated new tensions with government. Where EMNPOs are embedded as government social welfare service providers, the content of the service in an operation is often negotiated through the role of government liaisons. Frontline personnel observe needs and pass those along to their supervisors, who then convey trends and unmet needs to government liaisons. Government liaisons will then advocate for meeting these needs with their government partners (author’s interviews). EMNPOs will bring their own values and principles to this liaising role, which can influence the type of needs that are advocated for.

This dynamic can sometimes create tensions as the EMNPO becomes increasingly subsumed under the government response structure. That is particularly the case because agencies are “activated” in an EM context (permitted to be involved in a response). Where an

EMNPO is funded to provide government services, the funding aspect can become intertwined with activation, resulting in instances where these two components can be conflated: in other words, a government’s ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on one aspect may be confused for a decision on both aspects (author’s interviews). This can make EMNPOs less willing to carry out services that the government sees as outside of its responsibility because a decision not to fund something can be taken as a decision not to activate the EMNPO to provide it (author’s interviews).81 That is just one example of how, as EMNPOs are co-opted into the welfare state, the boundaries between philanthropy and government can become difficult to navigate. Explanations of nonprofit welfare that frame nonprofitization as a zero-sum case of outsourcing do not allow us to see the ways in

81 If this explanation is confusing, that is because this aspect of EMNPO-government collaboration is confusing for those implementing it as well.

97 which philanthropy is entangled in the ongoing reconstitution of the public duty. Yet where the pathway to nonprofitization is co-optation, these dynamics are vitally important.

98 Chapter 4. Comparing Institutions of Government Social Welfare Service Acquisition: Marketization and Bases for Competition in Canadian and British Homelessness

4.1 Introduction

When governments acquire social welfare services (SWS), they create institutions of acquisition – or, as Gingrich (2011) describes it, they make markets. The rules and practices that governments adopt in acquiring SWS define who is able to participate, on what bases, and how prices will be determined. Research on the “contracting revolution” – in which governments contract nonprofits to provide SWS – has emphasized the transformative effect that such practices are having on nonprofits. A seminal text on the subject by Smith and Lipsky (1993), for instance, points to characteristics of service contracting to argue that the contracting revolution will exert downward pressure on social welfare provision. This basic logic has been echoed by further research on NPOs in the context of contracting out (e.g. Smith 2002; Boris and Maronick

2014; Pettijohn May 2013; Morgan and Campbell 2011; Curtis, n.d.). Government-funded, nonprofit-provided services are the norm in many social policy areas (Salamon 2015; Johansson and Johansson 2015; Archambault 2015; Marwell 2004). From hospitals to elder care facilities, schools, refugee resettlement, and disaster relief, government-funded nonprofits are key actors in implementing social rights (Marwell and Calabrese 2015; Marwell 2004). Given their pivotal role, political science should turn its attention to understanding the political consequences of nonprofit social welfare provision (Cammett and Maclean 2011, 2014).

This chapter compares the regimes for government acquisition of nonprofit-provided

SWS in Canada and the United Kingdom, focusing specifically on the provision of homelessness and emergency management services. It argues that government SWS regimes can be marketized

99 to a greater or lesser extent, and that this is influential through its effect on nonprofit competition. Depending on the institutions that they select, governments embed different values in their SWS acquisition regimes. Those regimes that emphasize free market values create incentives for nonprofits to compete on market values, especially through price-based competition. In contrast, regimes that embed non-market values such as collaboration and service stability are more likely to produce collaborative, trusting relationships where reciprocal exchange occurs. Of course, this does come at the expense of accountability. Overall, this chapter finds that marketized SWS acquisition regimes are more likely to erode service expansiveness in the long-run, because they create incentives for participants to reduce prices by loss-leading or ratcheting down service quality.

This chapter will draw on the concept of basis for competition as introduced by Tuckman

(1998). Basis for competition refers to “the way that competitors choose to compete to meet their customer/constituent needs” (Tuckman 1998: 176). It begins with a review of the literature on nonprofit competition, before introducing this chapter’s theoretical contribution on nonprofit service markets. Then, it applies the theory through the three case studies. The case studies demonstrate three distinct systems, with differing levels of marketization. The most marketized case is the UK’s competitive tendering process for acquiring homelessness services. Nonprofits participating in this service were most likely to compete on the basis of price and least likely to collaborate, suggesting that incentives reward market-like behavior under this system. Next,

Canada’s system of homelessness service agreements and grants emphasized provider stability, perhaps at the expense of accountability. Nonprofits in this system preferred to differentiate their services and were positively disposed to collaboration. Finally, long-term government-nonprofit relationships prevail in emergency management. In both countries, very little evidence of

100 competition existed, as the field of participants privileged existing providers. Rather than a market system, emergency management appears to reflect a distinct combination of hierarchical service activation and reciprocal resource-sharing.

4.2 Literature Review

In nonprofit studies research, competition is viewed as a driver of commercialization. It is also seen as a mechanism for decreased government spending in contracted social welfare. As such, competition is at the heart of the debate on nonprofitized welfare. Competition is defined as “the pursuit of the same objective by two or more firms” (Tuckman 1998: 176). Nonprofits are in competition with one another for revenue, personnel (board members, volunteers, and staff), beneficiaries, access, and authority (Tuckman 1998; Stroup and Wong 2017). To the extent that contracted SWS drive nonprofit competition, this raises concerns about how contracting could change the way that nonprofits operate – whether they might become more businesslike or lose their unique character.

Some of these questions have been explored by the literature on nonprofit competition.

There have been numerous studies on nonprofit competition. For the most part, this corpus focuses on attitudes toward competition (e.g. Sharp 2018), strategies of competition (e.g.

Chetkovich and Frumkin 2003), and the confluence of competition and collaboration amongst nonprofits (Bunger 2013; Lammers 1990).

There is a small body of research which specifically examines the effects of nonprofit competition, whether in nonprofit-only or mixed-mode contexts (e.g., Lammers 1990; Wolff and

Schlesinger 1998). These studies broadly point to a concern that nonprofit competition will erode the unique characteristics of the nonprofit sector. Eikenberry and Kluver (2004), for instance, argue that the marketization of nonprofits undermines the sector’s role in fostering civil society,

101 for example through building social capital or advocating on behalf of service beneficiaries.

Grogan and colleagues (2009) find that competition for government revenue can increase political activity to secure a favorable role under a new contracting regime; however, these efforts can undermine a nonprofit’s ability to represent poor beneficiaries.

Competition is conceived as one of the drivers behind a broader trend toward the

‘marketization’ or ‘commercialization’ of the sector (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004; Ochs 2012;

Weisbrod 1998; Tuckman 1998). However, Weisbrod (1998) notes that competition may in some circumstances strengthen the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit sectors, as well as strengthen nonprofit collaboration. Insofar as competition is expected to drive the adoption of market-based strategies, the effect is thought to be especially acute in mixed-form markets where nonprofits compete directly with for-profit organizations (Marwell and McInerny 2005).

Competition with for-profits is also argued to change the way in which nonprofits provide services – for instance, influencing the types of beneficiaries they serve (Wolff and Schleisinger

1998).

The literature has identified competition for government contracts in particular as a source of nonprofit marketization (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004; Alexander et al. 1999; Adams and Perlmutter 1991; Ryan 1999; Smith and Lipsky 1993). The supposition is that government contracting leads to a loss of the public character of nonprofits, as these organizations adapt to the business-oriented approach necessary to meet government requirements (Alexander et al.

1999). Moreover, contracting prompts large nonprofits to become more business-like, while smaller, community-based organizations experience financial difficulties under devolution

(Alexander 1999; Aiken and Harris 2017).

102 Although the shift from grants to contracts has been identified as a sort of bogeyman for the sector, the literature has devoted relatively little detailed attention to the characteristics of government service markets themselves. Tuckman (1998) acknowledges that public policy can influence whether for-profits and nonprofits compete directly, but this is a passing reference in an article about how nonprofits compete. This chapter seeks to add to our understanding of the link between the contracting revolution and nonprofit commercialization through an analysis of government regimes for acquiring nonprofit SWS. It asks: do governments take different approaches to acquiring nonprofit SWS and, if so, how does this affect competition (and nonprofit behavior more broadly)?

4.3 Characterizing Nonprofit Service Markets

When governments acquire SWS, they create institutions of acquisition. These institutions of acquisition have been referred to in other work as “markets” (Gingrich 2011), but this chapter uses the more neutral term of “regimes” to emphasize the differing extent to which free-market principles are reflected in these institutions. Government SWS acquisition regimes establish rules and practices which can emphasize different values, creating varying levels of competitiveness and different bases of competition. Based on government’s choices, these institutions can reflect “free market” principles to a greater or lesser degree. This chapter begins from the logical supposition that to the extent that an acquisition regime looks like a free market

(reflects capitalist values), nonprofits are more likely to face pressures to become more businesslike.

But governments can choose to emphasize other values in structuring their SWS acquisition regimes: they can protect nonprofits from direct competition with for-profits, create a presumption of service continuity except in extraordinary circumstances, encourage

103 collaboration, and promote environmental, social, and governance (ESG) values. Rules and practices such as these seek to place boundaries on competition or to shape the bases of competition away from a focus on price and service quality. In creating institutions such as these, governments shape the nature of the market, as well as the bases upon which nonprofits compete.

This section discusses key institutions of nonprofit service markets and introduces their connection to different bases of competition.

A first potential distinction in government-created nonprofit service markets consists of grant- versus contract-based service acquisition. Indeed, there is some evidence that service contracting has displaced grant funding for nonprofits.82 The distinction between granting and contracting is sometimes used as a signal for the extent to which a government-nonprofit funding relationship is marketized. For instance, in her analysis of political justice and private associations in light of “privatization” of public services Cordelli (2012) distinguishes between grants and contracts. For Cordelli, grants provide greater space for nonprofits to determine its own ends and programs. In contrast, contracting relations exert greater control over the fundee by allowing the funder to provide an organization with external ends, as well as to maintain direct involvement in supervising the work of the recipient. Cordelli’s analysis provides a reasonable ideal-type distinction between contracts and grants, and as such is a useful starting point for this research. However, it is worth noting that the boundaries between government granting and contracting has been blurred. Grant programs can be tied to service targets and in some cases do closely prescribe the nature of the service to be provided. Frequently, grants are

82 In the UK, revenue to the charitable sector has been slowly increasing in recent years across all funding sources, including governments. However, there has been a shift in the way that governments fund charities. Specifically, since 2004 there has been a simultaneous decline of voluntary contributions by governments (i.e. government grants) and an increase in earned income from governments (i.e. fee-for-service contracts). Earned income from government is now the single largest source of funds for the charitable sector. See NCVO (2016).

104 delivered through a contract. As such, while the grant-contract distinction can be salient, it is necessary to delve into the details of either sort of arrangement rather than to simply rely on the label ‘grant’ or ‘contract’.

Beyond the grant versus contract divide, there are at least three dimensions of government regimes for SWS acquisition that are potentially salient for the extent and nature of nonprofit competition: rules of entry, participation, and assessment. The first of these pertains to the rules of entry. Governments determine eligibility rules for potential service-providers. In doing so, they can “ring-fence” the process such that only nonprofits are able to compete. Or, they can allow for direct competition with for-profits. Rules of entry also include whether government invites a small pool of applicants, versus an open process that any organization can join. Next, the rules of participation set out how a nonprofit applies for funding. Procedurally, participation can entail written submissions or in-person interviews. The length of written submissions, as well as substantive requirements, can make applications more or less onerous for prospective participants. Finally, governments can establish assessment rules that prioritize different values. For instance, assessment criteria may turn on the lowest available cost or they could privilege values such as service stability, provider experience, partnership and collaboration, or ties to the local community. The inclusion of values outside of the cost- efficiency frame in assessment criteria suggest a less marketized acquisition regime. Assessment rules may also pertain to who is empowered to decide. In this case, the inclusion of certain actors, such as people with lived experience, may shape the way in which funding decisions are made. Additionally, modes of evaluation after a funding agreement is awarded, as well as the length of the agreement, rules of payment, and the procedures of defining the service potentially shape nonprofit competition in less direct ways.

105 The institutions of government SWS acquisition shape the manner by which nonprofits compete. In the first instance, rules of entry can constrain the extent to which there is competition – if, say, a government chooses to value stability by continuing to fund the same organization year-after-year. Rules of procedure, when they are onerous or complex, can limit competition by making it difficult for nonprofits to compete. But perhaps most significantly, different institutions of acquisition shape the bases for competition. As defined by Tuckman, basis for competition refers to “the way that competitors choose to compete to meet their customer/constituent needs” (1998: 176). Rules of entry can create direct competition with for- profit organizations, which might lead nonprofits to compete differently than if the pool was restricted to nonprofit organizations alone (Marwell and McInerny 2005). Bureaucratically onerous procedures for participation can privilege larger, professionalized nonprofits. And, of course, assessment criteria will dictate the characteristics of nonprofits that are likely to be successful, as well as the manner by which nonprofits tailor the service that they are offering.

4.5 Case Studies

4.5.1 Procuring Homelessness Services in the UK: The UK Social Care Commissioning System

In the UK, homelessness services are, by and large, acquired through a social care commissioning process – which is rooted in public procurement procedures – implemented by local authorities. This section begins by describing the service procurement process in the UK.

Public procurement rules in the UK are geared toward providing open, fair, and transparent competition. It then describes four considerations which temper this general policy aim: promoting the local care market, small providers, social value, and incumbents and service disruption.

106

4.5.1.1 The Service Procurement Process

Public procurement is a process of purchasing goods or services by government. In the UK, public procurement is subject to European Union (EU) rules covering, among other things, public contracts. These rules are designed to ensure the free movement of goods and services across the EU, including through establishing a level playing field for companies (Institute for

Government 2017; Maciejewski 2017). It is also guided by domestic legislation which implements these rules and creates internal guidelines. The main current domestic legislation on procurement is the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR). PCR defines how contracting authorities are to carry out tendering processes.

As provided by EU and UK legislation, local authorities must undertake public procurement processes where the value of a contract exceeds set thresholds: in 2018, £181,302 for ordinary procurement and £615,278 for social care and other “light touch” contracts (CCS 2017). Below these thresholds, local authorities establish their own procedures. It is usual for local authorities to have a competitive tendering process for contracts of a larger size but below the threshold, while smaller contracts might be achieved by inviting one or a few providers to submit a quote

(author’s interviews).

Procuring for social care entails a special process of “commissioning”. In public service commissioning, policy-specific commissioners work with more generalist procurement officers to define and procure a service (Geldards LLP 2013). The commissioning process generally begins with the development of the specification – a document defining the service to be provided – by the commissioner, sometimes with the assistance of a procurement team.

Specifications are based on a needs analysis undertaken by the commissioner, as well as an identification of statutory obligations and “nice to have” services (author’s interview LO01SP).

107 Once the specification is developed it is put into a package, called the invite to tender (ITT), which encompasses: the rules of engaging with the tender, the specification, the selection questionnaire, and the proposed contract. The selection questionnaire includes questions about the organization itself – such as financial viability, experience with contracts, and whether the organization or its personnel have been convicted of certain offences like fraud – as well as how the provider will achieve the service. Once the ITT is developed, a contract notice goes out.

Next, there is an opportunity for providers to raise questions; these questions are anonymously recorded, with providers and/or commissioners preparing responses. Once this clarification period is closed, there is a period of a few weeks before the deadline for tender submissions. At this deadline, the evaluation period commences.

Evaluation occurs at two stages. At the first stage, procurement officers undertake a pass/fail evaluation of the selection questionnaire. The second phase encompasses “quantitative and qualitative” submissions, referring to pricing and service quality, respectively (author’s interviews).83 Quality scores are determined through a panel, which is comprised of between three and ten individuals. The lead commissioner on the tender is on the panel, usually with at least one other commissioner. Other panel participants can be representatives from other service divisions, frontline workers, or service recipients. Panelists do independent evaluations to arrive at independent scores, based on the stated evaluation criteria, and then come together to arrive at a single consensus quality score. The overall aim of including both elements is to find the “most economically advantageous tenderer” (MEAT) – which can mean “best Value for Money” or the lowest price (See CCS 2016a). In general, local authorities achieve this by weighting quantitative and qualitative elements of the bid. Weightings are sometimes set by the Council, whereas in

83 This is the terminology that participants referred to in regard to the procurement process and for that reason it is being used.

108 other cases commissioners have discretion. A common ratio is 70:30, where price is 70% of the weighting (author’s interviews). “Commissioners want high quality and procurement wants a low price […] We try to get them [commissioners] to construct the ITT so you get innovation – so there’s something newer and better” (author’s interview LO01SP).

After an evaluation is complete, the procurement lead drafts a debrief letter for all applicants, providing the results and anonymized feedback on their quality of submissions, ranking, and score. Then there is a standstill period during which applicants can seek clarification or raise a legal challenge. Interview participants had never heard of a situation in which a legal challenge had been raised by a voluntary sector organization, which they speculated was due to the small size of the contracts as well as the cost of legal action (author’s interviews).

Data from a 9 October 2017 search of the Contracts Finder for “homelessness” contracts yielded information on 168 contracts published or awarded from 2015 onward. Contracts Finder is a government database covering public sector procurement in England (Northern Ireland,

Scotland, and Wales have separate datasets). Its purpose is to facilitate competition by increasing transparency in public sector procurement. The public sector is required to publish its contracts on Contracts Finder (Cabinet Office Efficiency and Reform Group and CCS 2015). The

Contracts Finder data shows a high level of nonprofit participation in homelessness contracting, with some for-profit participation as well. NPOs were selected as suppliers for the majority

(75%) of homelessness contracts, receiving the largest share of the total value of contracts (£242 million out of a total £500 million). For-profit organizations represented 17% of the total number of contracts and 6% of the total value (£28 million). The second largest category of contracts by

109 total value is a small number of hybrid contracts, encompassing nonprofit and for-profit provider

(£216 million). For more detail, see Appendix 3.

Figure 4. UK Homelessness Contracts 2015-2017, Competition Type Open Restricted Direct Award Negotiated Other

16% 2% 1%

51%

30%

Source: Contracts Finder database 2015-Oct 2017

The Contracts Finder data also suggests that most homelessness contracts are awarded through a competitive tendering process. The majority of the contracts in this dataset, 81%, were awarded through an open or restricted procedure – the two procedures that allow for the widest range of competition.84 In an open procedure, “any interested economic operator may submit a tender in response to a contract notice” (PCR 2015: 27). Restricted procedures are similar, but entail pre-qualifying bidders, for instance by financial standing, technical capacity or professional capability (Mills & Reeve 2015).

84 Specifically, 51% of contracts were awarded through an open procedure while 30% were awarded through a restricted procedure. The remaining contracts were awarded through negotiated procedures (1%), direct awards (1%) or other (16%).

110 4.5.1.2 Social Care Procurement Markets?

Generally, the framework for public procurement is meant to establish a market for social care contracting which adheres to three values: transparency, fairness, and equal access to opportunity. Where a contract is of sufficient size to go through procurement, commissioning operates through a competitive market process in which price is a prominent basis for determining the appropriate provider and where nonprofit organizations compete with for-profit agencies.85 According to Contract Finder data, most contracts are awarded through “open” or

“restricted” competitive procurement processes. In three-quarters of cases, homelessness contracts were awarded to NPOs. Thus, in the case of homelessness we can say that the government-nonprofit service regime is based on free market principles to a considerable degree.

However, there are certain other considerations that enter into the decision-making process which affect the nature of competition for homelessness and other service contracts. This section discusses four such considerations: promoting the local care market, small providers, social value, and incumbents and service disruption.

First, the Care Act 2014 requires local authorities to “promote the efficient and effective operation of a market in services for meeting care and support needs” (2014: s.5(1)).

Specifically, this entails the following steps: designing strategies to meet local needs; engaging with providers and local communities; understanding the market; facilitating the development of the market; integrating their approach with local partners; and securing supply in the market and assuring its quality through contracting (Department of Health and Social Care 2018).

Commissioners are expected to understand the local supplier base and to “facilitate markets that

85 Generally, commissioners cannot “ring-fence” a procurement process such that only nonprofits are considered. Authorities can reserve the award of certain services to mutuals and social enterprises (CCS 2016b). But none of the procurement officers or commissioners participating in this study mentioned having used the mutuals carve-out for homelessness contracting (author’s interviews).

111 offer a diverse range of high-quality and appropriate services” (Department of Health and Social

Care 2018).

The government staff that participated in this study all expressed an awareness of the market in the service areas in which they operated. For instance, one participant described using a conceptual tool called the “Kraljic Matrix”, which helps procurement officers to assess the risks associated with different provider markets from competitive to oligopolistic or monopolistic (author’s interview ES01RH). The Kraljic Matrix identifies different purchasing strategies depending on the importance of the purchase and the complexity of the supply market

(Kraljic 1983). More broadly, procurement officers were aware of social care market structures and their obligation to facilitate market development (author’s interview BH01EB).

Facilitating markets can entail encouraging new entrants as well as preserving existing participants. For the former, procurement officers and commissioners seek to ensure that providers have heard about opportunities and listening to agencies about barriers to applying for contracts (author’s interview). As to preserving participants, the market shaping imperative also tempers the drive for low-cost bids, where this is unsustainable. Procurement officers expressed an awareness that bidders sometimes “loss-lead” and explained that they look for financially sustainable bids. “We don’t want to be squeezing businesses so much that they go out of business,” one interview participant said (author’s interview LO01SP).

Second, social care procurement can take certain limited actions to encourage the participation of small providers. While procurement officers and commissioners stressed that for- profit and nonprofit providers are “all treated equally”, statements of this nature were often followed by a discussion of rules to facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In 2010, only 6.5 percent of central government procurement spending was

112 allocated to SMEs in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors (Young 2015). That year government set a target of supplying 25% of public procurement spending through SMEs by 2015.86 The

Public Contracts Regulations 2015 incorporated a number of recommendations put forward by

Lord David Young. Known as the “Young Reforms”, changes included: a requirement that all undisputed invoices be paid within thirty days of receipt; the abolishment of pre-qualification questionnaires for procurement below a given monetary threshold; and a new online “Contracts

Finder” tool on which all public authorities are required to add contracting opportunities (Fisher

Scoggins Waters 17 March 2015).

Procurement officers are encouraged to break larger services into “lots” (smaller, parceled out services) for which organizations can bid (CCS 2016b). The new regulations also place a cap on the turnover requirement, so that procurement officers cannot require that bidding companies have a turnover of more than twice the estimated contract value (Government of the

UK 2015: s.58.9). Service commissioners are also moving toward consortia-based service delivery (author’s interview LE01TP). For small charities, a consortium can sometimes be the only way to competitively vie for a service contract (author’s interview OX02EB).

Third, although local authorities cannot restrict procurement processes to nonprofit providers, the Public Services Act (Social Value) 2012 (SVA) requires that social value be considered in public service contracting (Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport 2012).

In some instances, SVA requires public sector agencies to consult on social value. Social value, defined as “enriched lives and social justice” (Cabinet Office August 2018: 19), refers to social, economic, and environmental criteria.

86 Defined as “an entity engaged in economic activity that: employs fewer than 250 people; and had an annual turnover less than or equal to 50 million euros (£39 million); or has a balance sheet total of less than or equal to 43 million euros (₤33 million).” (UKNAO March 2016: 6) The SME category includes most voluntary, community and social enterprise (VCSE) organizations.

113 Evidence of social value is usually expressed in the questionnaire and can include stakeholder engagement, certifications (e.g. International Organization for Standardization accreditation), or other criteria. For instance, in a social needs contract social value might include providers administering a workshop for parents. Participants said that there is usually a bit of direction provided by commissioners on social value. For instance, a questionnaire might ask,

“How would you decrease obesity?” (author’s interview LO01SP). There have been challenges in implementing SVA since its passage, which the central government is seeking to address

(Acclaro Advisory 2019; Cabinet Office August 2018).87 A Cabinet Office report found that “too often the [Social Value] Act is treated as an afterthought, and a ‘tick box exercise’ to be performed for compliance only” (August 2018: 115)

A final consideration concerns incumbent providers. Formally, procurement processes cannot favor incumbents. However, interview participants expressed that commissioners do commonly consider the effects of de-funding incumbents on service provision in making their decisions. For instance, one local government official described a situation in which an incumbent provider has two contracts with the local authority (author’s interview BH01EB). In that case, commissioners would consider whether losing one contract might affect their ability to carry out the other. Although the procurement officers and commissioners that participated in this study expressed that this would not occur in a way that breached procurement regulations, the inherent tension between these two ideals was palpable as they described the issue of incumbents (author’s interviews).

87 At the time of writing, the Cabinet Office is undertaking a consultation of how the central government should incorporate social value in its contracting (Cabinet Office 11 March 2019).

114 4.5.2 Paying for Homelessness Services in Canada: A Fragmented System of Grants and Service Agreements

Overall, government acquisition of homelessness services in Canada consists of a fragmented system of (1) short-term project or capital grants and (2) annually-renewed usage-based funding for core services. In most cases, nonprofits do not directly compete with for-profit organizations.

This section explains core homelessness programs in two provinces – Ontario and Alberta – as an entry point for examining the extent to which the government acquisition of homelessness services in Canada reflects free market principles.

The main federal homelessness program, HPS, provides matched-funding for a variety of interventions. Although there have been fluctuations, HPS funding is typically around $100 million in a given year.88 HPS-eligible activities include homelessness reduction activities, especially Housing First; homelessness prevention activities; data collection, analysis, and dissemination; “innovative solutions”; and activities to plan, coordinate, and integrate homelessness responses (ESDC 2018: s.4.0). Written into the HPS terms is a requirement that no less than half of funding for any given project emanate from another funder (ESDC 2018). This

“community contribution” can be from other levels of government, philanthropic funders,

88 Approximately 0.03% of the total federal government budget, based on the projected 2017-2018 total expenses of $329 billion (Government of Canada 2018: 319).

115 nonprofits, or for-profit organizations. In both large and small communities, provincial/territorial and city/municipal government funding comprises the vast majority of the community contribution (ESDC 2017b, 2017c). The matched funding requirement is complemented by a programmatic focus on “catalytic” funding to support local homelessness systems, focusing on extreme forms of homelessness.

HPS is an annual matched grant-funding program. To receive HPS funding, projects must assure housing choice; undertake resource coordination; be sustainable beyond the life of HPS; and serve official language minority communities. Organizations apply for HPS funding through a designated community entity – which is usually a local government but can be a nonprofit. In both of Alberta’s major cities, for instance, the community entities are nonprofits. Funding decisions are based on requests for proposals. Although funding is annual, community entities value stability and prefer to work with them to improve performance. As such, it is “not common” to de-fund an agency and transfer clients (author’s interview CG07DK).

The federal government contributes a relatively small proportion of overall government spending on homelessness – other levels of government, especially provincial and territorial governments, comprise a much greater share of government homelessness supports. Provincial approaches to addressing homelessness differ. To provide a snapshot, this chapter discusses government homelessness funding in two provinces: Ontario and Alberta. In Alberta, homelessness policy is set at the provincial level, with funding flowing from the province as well. Ontario has devolved homelessness policy implementation to municipal Service Managers

– though the province sets the framework for municipalities and provides some funding for homelessness. For both provinces, the vast majority of homelessness services are provided by nonprofits and supported by government funding.

116 Homelessness policy in Alberta is the responsibility of the Ministry of Community and

Social Services (AMCSS). AMCSS is the major social services ministry and is responsible for the province’s employment and income support, as well as disabilities supports transfers.

Through the Ministry’s Community Services and Supports Division, the Government of

Alberta’s homelessness services are primarily operated through “community-based organizations” (CBO), which are generally nonprofits. Through its Homeless and Outreach

Support Services program area, AMCSS funds CBO-provided Housing First programs, adult homeless shelters, and women’s shelters, and supportive housing.

First, AMCSS provides funding and oversight of Housing First programs and outreach in

Alberta’s seven major cities (AMCSS 2018). Funding for Housing First comprises just under half of AMCSS’ homelessness spending, 46% (AMCSS 2018: 37). Housing First, formerly called “outreach and support”, refers to provincial government funding under the HPS framework (Alberta Housing and Urban Affairs 2011). The other major homelessness spending area, comprising 52% of total spending, consists of funding for adult homeless shelters and women’s shelters. AMCSS funds twenty-eight emergency homeless adult homeless shelter operations (AMCSS 2018: 37). AMCSS also “supports” women’s shelters in providing emergency and second-stage shelters, as well as some supportive services such as child trauma counselling, outreach, and case management (AMCSS 2018: 10). The vast majority of shelters, sixty-one out of sixty-six, are nonprofit-operated.89

In Ontario, homelessness services are devolved to local governments. The 2011 Housing

Services Act established a provincial framework for homeless and housing services through municipal Service Managers, which are local government actors (York Region 2017). While

89 The remaining six are government-run (four municipal shelters and one provincial AMCSS shelter), according to the National Service Providers List.

117 municipalities have primary responsibility for homelessness in Ontario, three funding programs are worth mentioning: Community Homelessness Prevention Initiative (CHPI), Local Poverty

Reduction Fund (LPRF), and Home for Good (HFG).

CHPI disburses funds to communities through Service Managers (Farthing-Nichol and

Pries 2018). Service managers have flexibility to use funding toward any of the four service categories (MMAH 2015). CHPI funding is thus often put toward core municipal homelessness programs, such as shelter funding (Region of Waterloo 2017). Next, HFG made available $200 million in operating funding over a three-year period, 2017-2020 (Government of Ontario 9

March 2017). Funding included operating funding for housing assistance and support services, as well as capital funding for new supportive housing units (MOH 2017). Although some HFG funding remained within government, most was distributed either to nonprofit support service providers or to affordable and social housing providers (government, for-profit, and nonprofit) via a request for proposals process (e.g., TSSHA 2018).

Finally, LPRF was a grant fund administered by the Ontario Trillium Foundation, a government foundation (OTF 2018). The LPRF had five streams, one of which was ending homelessness. In 2016 $6.7 million in funding went to the homelessness stream (Government of

Ontario 2017). LPRF recipients must all be qualified donees, which in practice limits the pool of applicants to registered charities. LPRF funding applications consisted of a project overview, business case, and description of the evaluation approach to be applied (OTF April 2017).

Funding allocations were assessed based on eligibility, the three elements of the application, partnership/collaboration, and organizational capacity (OTF April 2017).

Municipalities in Ontario fund homelessness services through a combination of property taxes, as well as provincial and federal transfers. Provincial funds can comprise approximately a

118 quarter of a city’s homelessness budget, while federal funding through HPS is usually considerably less (City of Ottawa 2017a, TSSHA 2017). Municipal homelessness programs tend to be made up in large part by funding to nonprofit-operated homeless shelters, although support services and outreach are also typical.

The typical model for homeless shelter operators consists of a service agreement in which the government actor pays the operator, usually a nonprofit, based on nightly occupancy

(author’s interviews). Funding can usually only be used for direct costs of service provision, as a result of which homeless shelters often use philanthropy to subsidize other activities. Most governments have shelter operating standards, which establish expectations as to the quality of the service. While shelter operators felt that funding levels were inadequate, and often eroding due to inflation, they felt that funding was very secure – operators perceived little risk that funding would be withdrawn (author’s interviews).

Thus, there are in essence two distinct avenues through which the Government of Alberta acquires nonprofit homeless services: grant funding through the HPS system and funding to homeless shelter operators. Ontario’s homelessness funding is more disaggregated, with two provincial funding streams that flow through service managers – CHPI and HFG – as well as a direct granting program administered by OTF. Municipalities also contribute their own funds.

But the general the same model holds across both provinces: short-term grants are available for project or capital funding, while core services are provided through annually renewed, but predictable and long-term, funding arrangements.

4.5.3 Reimbursements, Contributions, and Spot Purchases: Acquiring Emergency Management Services in the UK and Canada

119 Emergency management services in Canada and the United Kingdom are often either government-funded and government-provided or philanthropically-funded and philanthropically- provided. However, in some cases nonprofit-provided emergency management services are funded by government. This section begins by describing arrangements for compensating nonprofit-provided emergency management services in Canada and the UK. As these arrangements are broadly similar across the two countries, emergency management is treated here as a single case. However, differences between the two countries are discussed briefly in this section. Emergency management services in Canada and the UK are commonly compensated through a combination of reimbursement and capacity-building contributions, the latter of which resembles the ideal-type of a grant. Long-term, trust relationships between government emergency management offices and nonprofit organizations are emphasized in these arrangements, with competition being largely absent. Moreover, the existence of non-exchange resource sharing suggests reciprocity rather than acquisition for some elements of this SWS relationship.

4.5.3.1 Cost-Recovery and Capacity Contributions

Governments in Canada and the UK deliver compensation for some nonprofit-provided emergency management services in some disaster contexts. Most commonly, this is structured as

“cost-recovery”, “bill-back” or “reimbursement” for eligible expenditures (author’s interviews).

Another financial arrangement consisted of a voluntary “contribution” or “donation” to the capacity of an emergency management nonprofit (EMNPO).

Cost-recovery and reimbursement refer to a payment to regain the value of an expense undertaken by an organization. During emergencies, governments look to nonprofit and for- profit organizations for certain goods and services that are specialized, require surge capacity, or

120 are otherwise inconvenient for government to provide itself. These services fall within five emergency functions - protecting life and property, emergency social services, recovery assistance, donation management, and volunteer management. EMNPOs are least involved in protecting life and property, while they have a sizable role in the other four functions.

Emergency management operations are organized in a hierarchical, command and control structure, in which emergency managers “activate” agencies (FEMA 2017). EMNPOs are activated by governments irrespective of whether the cost of a service will be reimbursed by government.

To ensure smooth operations, emergency management offices plan for the provision of key services in advance of disasters – although, certainly, unanticipated needs do arise during an event. In the planning process, governments assess likely operational needs and develop arrangements with organizations that have the capacity to meet those needs during a disaster

(VSCPF 2014). These arrangements can be formal or informal, and in the case of EMNPOs may not include cost-recovery.

During an emergency, local emergency managers select providers through pre- determined lists or, when a need arises that is not covered by the list, through spot purchases

(one-time purchases that go through an expedited process, used when an incumbent provider is not available). Provider lists include EMNPOs, as well as for-profit businesses such as caterers.

However, in most cases there is no direct competition for service provision: governments generally look to nonprofits to provide emergency care services, while for-profit businesses supply physical goods. There were a few instances of overlap – for instance where governments had switched from nonprofit to for-profit caterers. But in general, this was in reaction to a mutual agreement with the nonprofit that they were best suited to other aspects of the response (author’s

121 interviews). On the other hand, participants cited a situation in which a for-profit provider had been displaced by nonprofit food provision because the latter was cheaper (author’s interview

AB03SR). Nonprofit providers are typically not determined through direct competition with one another. This is for two reasons: first, there are usually only a few EMNPOs operating in an area.

The ecosystem of EMNPOs is highly concentrated in both Canada and the UK. Second,

EMNPOs tend to differentiate their services to avoid competing with one another. The author did not observe any instances of EMNPOs attempting to take over a service from another EMNPO.

Typically, EMNPOs are included in provider lists after having worked with a local government on disaster response. Alternately, local governments may identify gaps in their emergency response plans and seek out organizations to fill these needs. Once a nonprofit is identified as a provider, that relationship tends to continue unless a serious dispute arises concerning the EMNPO’s provision of a service. On the other hand, an EMNPO’s role may expand over time as they demonstrate capacity to government. This process is described in the quote below, where an emergency manager explains the increased role of a local EMNPO in their responses:

They became a professional organization – a professional amateur organization. With that is the credibility – once the City… once they started seeing how credible these individuals were, how professional they were, their role did change. … When we initially engaged them, it was just a force-multiplier: here’s a group of volunteers that can help. The first couple of uses was Public Health, it was door-to-door campaigns for boil water advisories… The first time Public Health used them – just amazed that they were quick, they were very quick in response. Public Health was over the top, just thinking, “Wow, this was a God-send, this force-multiplier.” They used them very quickly again for another boil water advisory across the City. Then word spread that this is a great resource. (author’s interview OT01KT and OT01JM).

122 Oftentimes, decisions about which nonprofit services will be reimbursed are made after-the-fact or as an informal understanding from an ongoing relationship between government and the

EMNPO.

Cost-recovery or reimbursement arrangements vary by local government, EMNPO, and situation. Local governments may prefer to establish formal agreements with nonprofits; in other cases, informal “verbal” or “handshake” agreements prevail (author’s interviews). Some local governments – especially large cities – have a standard approach to their relationship with

EMPNOs. In most cases, however, these arrangements differ dyadically for reasons to do with factors such as historical legacy, the strength of the relationship, and nonprofit preference. For instance, numerous local government staff offered that a national EMNPO prefers “formal agreements” as a reason for having a written arrangement with that organization (author’s interviews). On numerous occasions, emergency management officials in both government and the nonprofit sector spoke about wanting to move “beyond agreements” – meaning that the aim was to develop long-term, trusting relationships (author’s interview CG03BL).

In Canada, most EMNPO-government relationships are structured as memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with local government. These agreements are broad statements of mutual expectations, and only occasionally include arrangements for cost-reimbursement – and even more rarely, annual financial contributions (author’s interviews). MOUs were also common in the UK context. However, in the UK context MOUs were more likely to include financial arrangements for cost-recovery or partial cost-recovery (author’s interview WA02RD). In the

UK there are some contracts that EMNPOs have for ordinary supplemental service – e.g., ambulance provision – but when it comes to emergency accommodation the arrangements are typically even more informal than in Canada, where MOUs abound. In both countries, after-the-

123 fact cost recovery, sometimes including labour time and sometimes not, seems to be the usual arrangement.

Reimbursement during a response is often connected to the scale of a disaster, with increased support to a nonprofit occurring in larger disasters. For instance, a municipal emergency manager described their policy as occurring on a “sliding scale”, where in smaller disasters the municipality may reimburse for the cost of food, say, but not for staff time. In a larger emergency, staff time may also be reimbursed (author’s interview HR03CB). Although significant local variation exists, the distinction between direct and indirect costs – direct service delivery costs and indirect costs of maintaining organizational capacity – was common (author’s interviews; London Resilience Partnership 2017; BLEVEC 2016).

Another, less common form of support consists of a “contribution” to the nonprofit, made on either a one-time or an annualized basis (author’s interviews). Government donation- matching is a form of one-time contribution. For instance, this was the approach taken by federal and provincial governments in response to the Fort McMurray wildfire of 2016, which took place in the Canadian province of Alberta. Where they occur, annual contributions for nonprofit capacity are typically formalized in MOUs.

4.5.3.2 Comparing Canada and the United Kingdom

Although there was remarkable similarity in emergency management service acquisition practices across Canada and the UK, the two situations are of course not identical. One difference between the two case countries is worth highlighting. In Canada, local government remuneration to EMNPOs for services either were only applicable for major emergencies or increased for major emergencies. This is because cost-reimbursement may be made available for a wider set of EMNPO activities when federal and provincial disaster financial assistance

124 programs are opened (author’s interviews). Contrastingly, in the UK EMNPOs frequently received contributions from statutory authorities for habitual emergency response services, while arrangements were not made for major emergencies. There was generally an expectation that philanthropic donations would pay for the increased costs associated with major emergencies.

The divergence between the British and Canadian cases suggest different views about the role of EMNPOs in relation to the state. The fact that EMNPOs in Canada more commonly received funding for large-scale emergencies rather than mundane ones suggests a contradiction with the narrative of using nonprofits as additive of government responsibility. But it also makes a great deal of sense from the perspective of keeping EMNPOs in operation. Civil servants discussed an awareness that nonprofits are put under strain during large events, even the national ones but especially local nonprofits (author’s interviews). They also indicated a desire to see this strain ameliorated. At the same time, EMNPO staff recognized the habitual responses to mundane emergencies as beneficial in terms of preserving volunteers, retaining volunteer knowledge, and providing a compelling narrative to donors (author’s interviews).

It difficult to ascertain the cause of these differences in compensation between the British and Canadian case. And it should be stressed that there was a good deal of within-case difference as well, since local governments had an array of relationships with EMNPOs that were often locally dependent. However, it may be that large emergency response may be in a sense more regularized in Canada than the UK, given the country’s exposure to a variety of natural hazards.

Another reason may have to do with the preferences of individual EMNPOs. For instance, an

EMNPO in at least one instance asked that an agreement with local government not include compensation for aid delivery for small-scale emergencies, in order to retain a standardized

125 service across the country (author’s interviews). Given that there are relatively few specialized

EMNPOs, the choices of one EMNPO could potentially shape the context for other EMNPOs.

4.5.3.3 Reciprocity in Emergency Management

The framing of this chapter on the “acquisition” of SWS implies a transactional understanding of government-nonprofit service provision. While this general understanding pervaded all three cases, emergency management arrangements left space for reciprocal, non- exchange relationships. Reciprocity is, alongside the market and redistribution, one of three models of economic integration – of circulating economic goods and services – presented by

Karl Polanyi (1944) in the Great Transformation. These principles “can be understood as precepts, ideologies, or systems of justification underpinning the organization of human societies”90 (Servet 2007: 262). In Polanyi’s text, the principle of the market reduces humans to individual economic vectors, autonomous from one another (Servet 2007). Reciprocity, on the other hand, cannot be reduced to a practice of transactional giving and counter-giving (Servet

2007). Reciprocity is “facilitated by the institutional pattern of symmetry” (Polanyi 1944 [2001]:

51). In other words, it assumes that partners are in a relationship of complementarity and voluntary interdependence (Servet 2007). It is founded on a complementarity of distinct elements, which is “not substitutable as it is for the dominant economy of seller and buyer”

(Servet 2007: 264).91 Mutualism is key in distinguishing reciprocity from market exchange

(Servet 2007). Servet (2007) argues that reciprocity is present in the hybrid relationships found

90 Original text: “Ces principes peuvent être compris comme des préceptes, des idéaux ou des systems de justification permettant d’organiser les sociétés humaines”. 91 Original text: “Ceux-ci ne sont pas commutables comme le sont pour l’économie dominante le vendeur et l’acheteur”.

126 in today’s social economy.92 This study suggests that we can also find reciprocity in government- nonprofit SWS arrangements, particularly in the emergency management case.

Annual capacity contributions constitute the first area in which one can observe reciprocity in nonprofit-provided emergency management. These arrangements can alternately be described as an “honorarium” or “donation” to the EMNPO (author’s interviews). Certainly, involved parties often understand annual contributions as an exchange relationship. “It’s a contract, really,” one participant explained (author’s interview CD01NH). In other cases, however, annual contributions are viewed as reciprocal rather than transactional: they are described as a way of recognizing the service that the organization provides and ensuring that it has the capacity to continue (author’s interviews).

Further evidence of reciprocity in EMNPO-government relationships occurred where resources were shared without an eye to valuing these contributions in monetary terms or framing it as a trade. In the UK, for instance, an EMNPO provides support for families affected by house fires. Government does not pay for this service, but it does support the EMNPO by housing its vehicles, maintaining them, and providing fuel (author’s interview UK04SL).

Additionally, volunteers from the EMNPO deploy from the fire stations and are able to make use of the facilities as they please. Similar arrangements include storing emergency response kits at local police detachments, hosting EMNPO meetings at government-owned community centres, and allowing EMNPO volunteers access to government training programs. These are relationships that could be calculated as part of a transaction between government and nonprofit, where the value of each is assessed and a contract is achieved. But interview participants

92 Which in France is referred to as the social and solidarity economy, or simply the solidarity economy.

127 preferred to view these resource sharing arrangements as avenues to building better inter-agency relationships and, therefore, more effective responses (author’s interviews).

4.6 Discussion: Competition and Bases for Competition

This chapter has presented three examples of how government acquisition regimes for nonprofit social welfare can differ, even amongst liberal welfare states. In the UK, homelessness services are procured through a competitive tendering process that emphasizes transparency, fairness, and equal access. However, it is worth emphasizing that the most open procedures resulted in just a handful of bidders – with five or seven being the high end of participants’ estimates (author’s interview LE01TP, EX01CS). These bidders were “usually all” nonprofits

(author’s interview LE01TP) and usually all locally-based. The Canadian homelessness system is carried out through a combination of grants and service agreements at all three levels of government. In some cases, multiple departments fund nonprofit homeless service providers.

Generally speaking, grant processes feature more competition than service agreements, since in the latter case existing service providers tend to receive renewals on a more or less automatic basis. In both case countries, nonprofit emergency management services were reimbursed through cost-recovery, with some instances where nonprofits were provided with one-time or annual capacity contributions. Reimbursement was determined on the basis of eligible costs for nonprofits “activated” by local emergency managers. The table below summarizes the three regimes.

Table 3. Government Social Welfare Service Acquisition Regimes

UK Homelessness CA Homelessness Emergency Management • “Ring-fencing” seen • Constrains • Based on pre-existing service Rules of as inimical to participation to partnerships and ad hoc entry competition, nonprofits identification of unmet needs

128 therefore • RFPs for new illegitimate project funding, • Competitive typically not for tendering for 1-3- service agreement year contracts, renewals sometimes with renewal period • Onerous • Onerous • Largely restricted to a pool of procedures, but with procedures, but existing players, informal Rules of government with government procedures participation officials aiming to officials aiming to reduce barriers to reduce barriers to participation participation • Favor cost- • Values project • Activation by local efficiency impact, local government, with • Other connection, and reimbursement occurring on Assessment characteristics (e.g. partnership the basis of informal/formal rules social value) added • Expectation of agreement or eligible • Consortia create letters of support expenditure rules in disaster difficult power • Stability valued in financial assistance programs dynamics shelter agreements for government

With regard to rules of entry, the Canadian homelessness system tends to constrain participation to nonprofit organizations and government – sometimes explicitly and sometimes tacitly, depending on the policy. In contrast, “ring-fencing” the nonprofit sector was viewed by commissioners and procurement officers in the UK as an illegitimate practice. As a result, nonprofits compete directly with for-profits, while the use of procurement rules situates competition in a free-market frame of selecting the best “value for money” amongst businesses.

While Canadian grant programs often invited open competition through requests for proposals – similar to the UK system of posting contract notices online – there tended not to be a new competition to determine providers of core services like homeless shelters, once the provider was established. In the case of emergency management, entrants are not constrained by sector – but nor was the procedure open or competitive. Pre-existing relationships with local emergency managers largely dictate access. As to rules of participation, both homelessness processes included procedures which were onerous, especially reporting requirements. However, in both

129 cases government officials expressed an aim of reducing these kinds of barriers to participation.

In the case of emergency management, participation occurred on an ad hoc basis, reflecting a longer term service relationship.

Finally, assessment criteria for homelessness in the UK favored cost-efficiency, although steps had been taken to incorporate other characteristics – such as social value. As such, competition in the UK rewarded price-based competitive behaviors. In Canadian homelessness, grant programs tended to value project impact, local connection, and partnership. Participants described an expectation that grant applicants obtain letters of support from other local providers.

In UK homelessness, consortia bidding is a collaborative mode of including small providers, but it often created uneven power dynamics between small and large consortia members (author’s interview OX02EB). Service stability was clearly a core value in Canadian shelter service agreements. Without an ongoing competitive process, however, price was in most cases determined by government on the basis of a uniform price per head formula. This led to the erosion of payments through inertia. As such, in both homelessness systems one could identify driving factors that might create downward pressure on the funding provided by government.

Thus, we might identify a general tendency toward declining service expansiveness in both homelessness systems, unless strategies such as indexing funds to inflation were deployed.

However, the British homelessness system’s emphasis on competing for cost-efficiency introduced an additional mechanism for decreased service expansiveness that was not present for

Canadian homelessness. As for emergency management, selection of service providers was disconnected from the system of assessing whether compensation would occur. Assessment of service activation was informal and privileged past experience. Assessment of service compensation relied on a combination of informal practices, bilateral agreements, and the

130 availability of funding from higher orders of government. Although there may be other grounds on which to criticize the compensation system in emergency management, it did not appear to create downward pressure on service expansiveness in either country.

These different acquisition regimes influenced the bases on which providers competed for funding. The competitive contracting process adopted in UK homelessness was more likely to result in providers competing on the basis of price. In some cases, nonprofits took on loss- leading contracts in order to gain or retain market share (author’s interview UK03IB). Canadian homelessness providers were more likely to differentiate themselves from other providers by emphasizing their own unique contributions. There was very little evidence of competition in emergency management – but to the extent that multiple providers existed in a space, differentiation appeared to be the primary approach. The table below summarizes the differential effects of the government SWS acquisition regimes for competition, collaboration, accountability, and long-term investments.

Table 4. Government Social Welfare Service Acquisition Regime Effects

Competition Collaboration Accountability Long-term Investments

131 UK homelessness Competitive tendering UK’s competitive tendering Discouraged under system produced created a competitive process for homelessness all systems more competition attitude amongst provides an objective on price nonprofits process by which to de-fund Competitive agencies tendering in UK Canadian In the Canadian homelessness homelessness homelessness system, Canadian homelessness reduced the providers were perception that system allows failing incentive for long- more likely to use funders (government nonprofits to “limp along”, term investment, a strategy of and philanthropic) though this occurs more in since the service differentiation want collaboration some contexts than others could change hands

However, Main barrier to Especially in very Canadian Canadian collaboration in informalized contexts or homelessness homelessness Canadian contexts where service agreements system creates homelessness context reimbursement is paid don’t allow for downward pressure is capacity through a second level of long-term on prices in other government, few investment, so ways Operational mechanisms for nonprofits rely on collaboration on accountability in emergency philanthropy and General absence of emergency management. Contracts with short-term grants competition in management annual financial emergency response. But the contributions offered some Uncertainty and the management; bilateral, hierarchical mechanisms for predominance of prevalence of relationship to accountability after-the-fact partial ongoing government limited cost-recovery limits relationships with collaboration amongst the potential for local government nonprofits long-term investment in emergency management.

The competitive tendering process associated with the acquisition of homelessness services in the UK does seem to decrease collaboration. Consortia are sometimes encouraged through this model because it is a necessity for small providers to be competitive, but in general the open tendering process discourages providers from sharing information and connecting with one another. The transition from grants to competitive tendering in UK homelessness services resulted in organizations taking an increasingly competitive attitude toward one another. “People started to ask one another, ‘Are you going to bid for my service?’ People that had been working in close partnership became competitors,” (author’s interview OX02EB). Participants also

132 expressed a perception that the potential that a service would transition from one provider to another also resulted in lower staff loyalty and decreased the incentive for long-term investments

(author’s interviews). In contrast, Canadian homeless-serving nonprofits were more likely to view themselves as competitors in the context of philanthropic funding sources. Certainly, government funding was sometimes seen as a source of competition amongst nonprofits, especially under scarcity. But in general, nonprofits in Canadian homelessness saw advantages in collaborating, and saw collaboration as something government funders wanted.

On the other hand, the competitive tendering process allows an ostensibly objective process by which to de-fund agencies. In this sense, it is potentially more accountable. In the

Canadian context, failing homeless-serving nonprofits were likely to “limp along” (author’s interview ED14ML). Providers are constrained by standards regarding the substance and quality of service they provide. However, the underlying mechanism that a provider could lose its government funding was not a credible threat in the case of the “core” service of emergency shelter provision. Emergency management was characterized by an absence of both competition and collaboration, as a result of the bilateral and hierarchical command and control relationship with government. While EMNPOs interact with one another on response, at a local level most nonprofits engaged primarily with government, rather than with one another. The emergency management system’s opaqueness leaves little space for accountability.

133 Chapter 5. Let Nonprofits Be Nonprofits: Policy Structure, Nonprofit Voice, and Service Expansiveness in Nonprofitized Welfare States

5.1 Introduction

This chapter builds upon the more general finding of the dissertation that although there is no necessary relationship between the level of nonprofitization and social welfare expansiveness, the choices that governments make about how to institutionalize nonprofit social welfare can influence whether welfare expansiveness erodes over time or, indeed, actually increases. This chapter provides one explanation of how nonprofit social welfare can be institutionalized in different ways, producing distinct outcomes for service expansiveness through its effect on nonprofit policy influence. Specifically, it presents a comparative analysis of nonprofitized social welfare in homelessness, comparing a policy context defined through legislated rights (Britain) to one where there is more ambiguity (Canada).

This chapter finds that policy contexts can allow for greater or more constrained nonprofit voice with respect to three avenues of influence: advocacy; shaping the service; and piloting. As a result of how policy structure interacts with the institutions of nonprofit social welfare service acquisition, this chapter finds, somewhat counterintuitively, there are more opportunities to expand the welfare state in a case where social rights are not legislated (but, rather, policy is institutionalized on the ground). The focus of the comparison is on how the structure of the policies provide more space for Canadian nonprofits to be nonprofits and to be influential. The chapter begins by articulating the research puzzle. It then compares British and

Canadian homelessness policy contexts, nonprofitization, and nonprofit voice regarding welfare boundaries. Finally, the chapter discusses how the Canadian case allows homeless-serving

134 nonprofits (HSNPOs) greater space to ratchet up service expansiveness by institutionalizing on the ground, while this is more difficult in the UK.

5.2 Research Puzzle: Greater Constraints on Service Expansiveness in a System Based on Social Rights

While conducting field research on welfare nonprofitization in homelessness policy, this author encountered an empirical puzzle. Both Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) have nonprofitized homelessness policy to a considerable degree. The UK has done so while protecting social rights in law. Legal protections for social rights are assumed to facilitate service expansiveness. But when it comes to the actual situation of homelessness, if anything care is slightly more expansive in Canada (at least, at the time of writing).

Both Canada and the United Kingdom have significant homeless populations.

Differences in defining and measuring homelessness prevent direct comparisons of the relative scope of homelessness in the two countries. But there is a stark difference in the trajectories of homelessness: in Canada, fewer individuals are entering into homelessness every year, facilitated by a nascent and uneven shift to a housing first approach (ESDC 2014). Some jurisdictions are making considerable progress towards ending homelessness – although with the exception of the small city of Medicine Hat, Alberta, none have yet achieved this goal. In contrast, homelessness in the UK has increased consistently throughout the most recent decade (Butler 25 January

2018). While this is in no small part a result of austerity measures that have been implemented in other areas of the welfare state, there is evidence that homelessness services are contracting as local authorities seek to define their statutory obligations more narrowly (author’s interviews).

One particularly prominent strategy is defining individuals as ineligible for homelessness

135 services, something which is at odds with principles of universalism on which social rights are based.

To resolve this empirical puzzle, one must devote attention to how nonprofit welfare is implemented in Canadian and British homelessness policy. As the cases below demonstrate, a central difference between the two consists of who is empowered to modify the boundaries of the welfare state. Housing is a legislated, enforceable right in the UK. In Canada, it is not. This chapter argues that there were more opportunities for nonprofits to expand the welfare state in the Canadian case, a case in which the division of public duty is institutionalized on the ground.

The rigidity of Britain’s centrally legislated housing duties, in combination with competitive contracting and austerity, constrained nonprofit voice to ratchet up service expansiveness.

5.3 The Policy Context

This section summarizes the homelessness policy context in Canada and the UK.

Canadian homelessness policy is a patchwork of municipally directed services, supported through a combination of provincial and federal funding. While this creates diversity in the services that are provided, in general the Canadian approach is centred on emergency sheltering.

However, a housing first approach has recently gained prominence in the Canadian context.

Along with this shift in approach, there appears to be increased attention to homelessness in recent years, resulting in modest progress toward ending homelessness. There is a legally enforceable right to housing in the UK, with corresponding statutory obligations that local authorities must fulfil to address homelessness. Despite these legal protections, homelessness has grown in the UK throughout the most recent decade. As they undergo increasing budgetary strain, there are incentives for local authorities to interpret their statutory obligations narrowly.

The subsections that follow explain the two policy contexts in further detail.

136 5.3.1 Canada

Canadian homelessness policy is structured around the emergency sheltering system, although there has been a shift toward a ‘housing first’ approach that emphasizes permanent rehousing. Supportive services – such as drop-in programs, pre-employment supports, street outreach, and housing follow-up – are sometimes also included as an element of government’s homelessness policy. Municipalities may have lead responsibility for homelessness, or this can be undertaken by provincial agencies or even nonprofit system planners. Municipal, provincial, and federal resources contribute toward relatively stable funding for core services as well as less consistent grant funding for projects that are viewed as ancillary to core government responsibilities (See chapter two and chapter four for more detail).

Although there are no official national statistics on homelessness in Canada,93 it is estimated that more than 235,000 Canadians experience homelessness at some point every year, while 35,000 are homeless on any given night (Gaetz et al. 2016). An estimated 50,000 people in

Canada experience “hidden” homelessness annually – couch-surfing, sleeping in a car, or other precarious housing (Gaetz et al. 2013).

There have been some encouraging trends in curbing Canadian homelessness over the most recent decade. At the time of field research, there was a strong sense of optimism amongst participating civil servants and nonprofit staff, who often reported having an impression that governments at different levels are buying into the messages that they have been sending

(author’s interviews). To an extent, this optimism is reflected in the data. The number of

93 Some progress has been made toward developing national homelessness statistics. Specifically, a unified methodology has been developed for point-in-time homeless counts. However, not all Canadian communities currently participate in this system. National statistics are available on emergency shelter use (ESDC 2017a). However, these cannot truly be considered a count of the homeless population – there are just 15,000 emergency shelter beds in Canada’s 400 emergency shelters, in contrast to the 35,000 estimated homeless on any given night.

137 Canadians using emergency shelters has been declining since 2005 (ESDC 2014).94 And in recent years several cities have reported progress in reducing homelessness (see e.g., CBC News 14

November 2018; Polewski 2018; Turner Strategies 2018). For instance, the small Albertan city of Medicine Hat famously ended homelessness in 2015 and has maintained that status since

(Lawrynuik 2017). Recent progress in addressing homelessness, however, should be contextualized against the backdrop of an unprecedented emergence of chronic homelessness arising from the contraction of welfare state programs since the 1980s, and especially the decline of social housing policy.95 Moreover, while there has been a reduction in the total number of individuals using emergency shelters, shelter usage has risen because the length of stay has increased.96

5.3.2 The United Kingdom

The UK is somewhat unique for having a legally enforceable right to housing. The right to housing is matched with corresponding statutory obligations that are held by local authorities

(local government). These statutory obligations consist of a main duty to rehouse, as well as a duty to prevent homelessness, to offer housing advice, and to provide temporary relief from homelessness. However, these duties apply only to the statutorily homeless – people who meet the criteria set out by various laws on homelessness.97 As such, while there is a social right to

94 Specifically, the decrease has been from 156,000 in 2005 to 137,000 in 2014 (ESDC 2017a). 95 See, e.g.: Jebanesan and Tam (2016), Laird (2007), Fallis and Murray (1990), Mishra (1990), Smith (2016), Suttor (2016). Although some homelessness had existed previously – and, certainly, lack of adequate housing was a substantial challenge (Hulchanski 2009) – homelessness did not emerge on a “mass” scale in Canada until the 1980s, as the government disinvested from social housing (Hulchanski 2009; Gaetz et al. 2016; Padgett et al. 2015). 96 The 400 emergency shelters in Canada are at more than 90% capacity, an increase from 2005 when emergency shelters were at 80% of capacity (ESDC 2017a). This is despite a decrease in the total number of people using shelters: a smaller number of people are using shelters for a longer period, resulting in a total increase of 300,000 bed-nights from 2005 to 2014 (ESDC 2017a). 97 Meaning that individuals must demonstrate that they are not ‘intentionally homeless’, their ‘local connection’ to the housing authority, “that they have not left any accommodation that they could reasonably be expected to occupy”, and that they are in a situation of ‘priority need’ (Burrows, Pleace, and Quilgars 1997: 3; MHCLG 15

138 housing, British governmental homelessness policy retains certain elements of the Victorian poor laws: in particular, homelessness legislation has replicated the binary of the deserving and undeserving poor (Lowe 1997).

Approximately 320,000 Britons experienced homelessness in 2018 (Shelter 2018).98

Despite having a legislated right to housing, homelessness in the UK has been consistently growing (Butler 25 January 2018). Local authorities in England provide annual rough sleeper estimates to DCLG. These statistics are gathered through either estimates or street counts, and likely underestimate the number of rough sleepers.99 Nevertheless, the data show that rough sleeping has climbed every year since 2010, with an average annual increase of 16%. Overall, rough sleeping has risen 134%, from 1,768 in 2010 to 4,134 in 2016. The chart below shows the prevalence of rough sleeping, as measured by the number of rough sleepers estimated or identified by a single-night street count.

Figure 5. Rough Sleeping in England, 2010-2016

April 2019). Priority need categories include individuals who are pregnant, with dependent children, elderly, having a mental illness, or escaping domestic abuse. Because there is space for local authorities to interpret these criteria, definitions of statutory homelessness differ from place to place (Burrows, Pleace, and Quilgars 1997). Individuals seek assistance by approaching their local council. The council then determines whether an individual is eligible for homelessness assistance, based on the criteria discussed above. On average one half of housing assistance applications are accepted, while the other half are refused (see Appendix 2). Individuals can also be connected with the local authority through homelessness outreach services or by referral from other public services. 98 This number, reflecting 5 per 1000 population, is smaller than the proportion of the Canadian population experiencing homelessness (9 per 1000 population). Based on population estimates for 2018 (66 573 504 for the UK and 36 708 083 for Canada). However, the Canadian estimates use a wider definition of homelessness that includes hidden homelessness, where the UK figures, including the ones that form the basis of Shelter’s (2018) estimate above, do not. 99 Specifically, the methodology of the street counts or estimates are determined by local authorities. These are then reported by local authorities to the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Local authorities are “asked to conduct an annual street count” if they estimate more than ten rough sleepers in their area (DCLG 16 February 2018: 10).

139 4134 3569 3170 2744 2629 2414 2309 2181 2002 1871 1768 1752 1735 1353 964 940 742 557 543 446 415

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 England London Rest of England

Recent reforms to the British welfare system have “increased pressure on levels of homelessness” (HCCLGR 2016: 15) and constitute one of the factors accounting for increased homelessness. However, other important factors include housing affordability challenges, the lack of social housing, and the uneven role of local authorities (HCCLGR 2016: 15).

In the post-2008 austerity context, local authorities are experiencing constrained budgets, which has influenced homelessness services. To begin with, local authorities have cut back on

“nice to have” services, focusing only on “statutory obligations” (author’s interviews). Some local authorities have sought to reduce budgetary strain by interpreting their homelessness obligations more narrowly (author’s interviews). As one commissioner put it: “everyone has retreated behind closed doors”; for homeless people, this means that only those “banging at the doors” receive support (author’s interview EX01CS). And, of course, local authorities have sought “efficiencies” through competitive contracting to nonprofits (see chapter two and chapter four).

5.4 Nonprofitized Social Welfare

140 Government homelessness services in both Canada and the UK are nonprofitized to a considerable degree. In Canada, nonprofit homelessness services are acquired through a combination of stable core services funding, which privileges existing providers, and more unstable grant funding for specific projects. In the UK, nonprofit homelessness services are acquired through competitive service contracting, where agencies bid for a defined service. The subsections below explain the two systems of nonprofitization in further detail.

5.4.1 Canada

Canada’s governmental homelessness services are highly nonprofitized. Nonprofitization is primarily achieved in this context through stable per diem or block funding for core services, along with less stable grant-funding for a more variable mix of projects. As the policies underpinning this general approach are elaborated further in previous sections of this dissertation

(Chapter two and chapter four), this section will skip over the details in favour of a cursory overview.

In contrast to the UK, the acquisition of homelessness services by Canadian governments is highly decentralized and variable. It is primarily undertaken through short-term grants or annually renewed usage-based funding. The federal government provides some funding for homelessness through the Homelessness Partnering Strategy. However, this is a relatively small proportion of overall government funding for homelessness. In most cases, provinces or municipalities provide grants to homeless-serving nonprofits to provide specific services. In most cases, homeless shelters are the largest category of core services, while other services like outreach and supportive housing occupy a smaller role. Taking homeless shelters as an example, the typical model for funding these core services consists of a service agreement in which the government actor pays a service operator, usually a nonprofit, based on nightly occupancy

141 (author’s interviews). The vast majority of shelters, sixty-one out of sixty-six, are nonprofit- operated.100

Some programs beyond basic emergency shelter necessities are funded by government.

This is especially the case where a homeless-serving nonprofit caters to populations with special vulnerabilities, such as LGBTQ2S, refugee, or youth communities. Due to the shifting policy orientations of homelessness in Canada, government funding is commonly also available for nonprofits providing housing first programs. Governments may also provide grant funding for specific interventions, such as managed alcohol programs. In many cases these types of programs are supported through short-term project grants, while in other cases long-term program funding may exist.

The nonprofits that participated in this study quite frequently had a combination of long- term government funding for a “core” homelessness service, typically via contracts, as well as a number of short-term grants from a handful of government agencies. Homeless-serving nonprofits situated at the intersection of another policy area might have two or three core government funders, at different levels of government. “Anytime you see the word ‘initiative’ it generally means it’s annualized” (author’s interview TO01SD). Beyond government funding, the local community foundation and United Way/Centraide often provided enduring support to homeless-serving nonprofits. Project-based grant funding is viewed as less secure, but can be enabling for a nonprofit that wants to establish a project outside of the main government programs.

5.4.2 The United Kingdom

100 The remaining six are government-run (four municipal shelters and one provincial AMCSS shelter), according to the National Service Providers List. See Appendix 4.

142 Nonprofitization in British homelessness is organized through service contracting.

Contracting touches many aspects of homelessness service provision. Services are contracted primarily through competitive, market-based public procurement procedures in which nonprofits and for-profits can both participate. Both aspects of homelessness nonprofitization have been discussed in greater detail in previous sections of the dissertation (Chapter two and chapter four), so the author will not engage in a lengthy discussion here. Nevertheless, an overview is worthwhile.

Local authorities are permitted to contract out most elements of their statutory obligations. In practice, a wide variety of homelessness services are contracted to external providers, primarily nonprofits. Contracted services include core services like supported accommodation, support services, emergency accommodation, and homelessness prevention services. But ancillary interventions – like security, concierge services, service infrastructure, and research, planning, and evaluation – are contracted as well.

Procedurally, homelessness services are usually contracted using public procurement processes.101 Policy-specific commissioners work with more generalist procurement officers to define and procure a service (Geldards LLP 2013). More than three-quarters of homelessness service contracts studied by this author were awarded through the two most competitive tendering procedures.102 Although the bidding process is open to for-profit as well as nonprofit providers, nonprofits are selected as suppliers for three-quarters of homelessness contracts by frequency, and just under half by value (Appendix 3). Homelessness contracts hardly ever draw more than a few bidders because they are not commercially appealing (author’s interviews).

101 See Chapter 4 for more detail on this. 102 See Chapter 4 for more detail on this.

143 5.5 Nonprofit Voice and Welfare State Boundaries

This section seeks to link the institutions of nonprofitized welfare in Canadian and British homelessness to nonprofit influence, especially in regard to how the boundaries of the welfare state change. It finds that the Canadian system allows for more nonprofit influence on the boundaries of the welfare state, due to the combination of enduring funding relationships and ambiguously defined state responsibilities. These two factors create a facilitative environment in which nonprofits are more able to exercise voice – including through service innovation – and that voice can be converted into altered welfare state boundaries. Service expansiveness can move in both directions under this system, as scarcity creates downward pressure while nonprofit influence provides avenues for ratcheting up expansiveness. In contrast, the British system of competitive service contracting for duties defined by the central government and implemented locally creates very little opportunity for nonprofits to ratchet up service expansiveness.

5.5.1 Canada

Canada’s homelessness policy system is far from perfect. But it does have at least one advantage: it provides avenues for nonprofit service providers to ratchet up service expansiveness. The combination of enduring funding relationships and ambiguously defined state responsibilities create a context in which nonprofits are able to exercise voice and, crucially, that voice can be converted into altered welfare state boundaries. Service expansiveness can move in both directions under this system, as scarcity creates downward pressure but nonprofit influence provides avenues for expanding care.

Canadian homelessness is governed through complex federalism, in which the prevailing relationship tends to be the implementation of locally defined service priorities with funding from provincial and federal governments. There is considerable variability in these arrangements

144 across the country, especially from province to province. But in all cases, there is not a legally enforceable right to housing, nor corresponding legal obligations. As a result, the boundaries of the welfare state are malleable. This allows for institutionalization on the ground: for the ongoing recalibration of policy locally to react to best practices and arising needs. Local systems planners do have some top-down requirements – for instance, they are required to develop community plans for addressing homelessness – but these tend not to be prescriptive. A downside is that this produces variability. But this flexibility is also central to enabling new approaches, for instance the shift toward housing first.

Another feature of the Canadian homelessness system, working in tandem with service flexibility, is that the institutions of acquiring nonprofit social welfare services in Canadian homelessness privilege service stability, especially in core services. While there is some competition for project and capital grants, most core service providers see very little risk that they will be defunded. As a result, there are fewer external pressures on HSNPOs to make organizational changes. Moreover, HSNPOs in Canada see their relationship with one another as primarily collaborative, rather than competitive (author’s interviews). “There’s nothing we do alone” (author’s interview ED07KM).

In contrast to the British system of competitive commissioning, which advantages large, commercial providers, the Canadian system encourages local organizations with longstanding ties to the community. Of the 406 nonprofit shelter administering organizations in the National

Service Provider List (see Appendix 4), more than two-thirds (281) operate only one shelter, while just two operate more than five shelters.103 Every nonprofit shelter provider is community-

103 Specifically, these are the Lookout Housing and Health Society, based in Vancouver, and Montreal’s Mission Old Brewery/Old Brewery Mission. Notably, though, the same space can be counted several times if beds are offered in different categories (men’s, women’s, co-ed, youth, emergency, transitional). So, while both Lookout and Old Mission Brewery are here counted as having 13 shelters, they have fewer physical locations. Total bed numbers

145 based: there are none that are based in, say, Toronto, and operate a service in Ottawa.104

However, some belong to federated nonprofit movements, most notably YMCA, YWCA, John

Howard Society, and the Salvation Army.

Importantly, while funding relationships with government likely do influence the behaviour of these nonprofits – certainly, some HSNPO executives noted a reticence to be seen as “not playing nice in the sandbox” (author’s interview FM02AH) and a preference for avoiding

“unnecessary drama” (author’s interview OT02CC) – the effect is not nearly as profound as is the case in the UK. Service providing nonprofits did tend to advocate less (author’s interviews), as the literature predicts for various reasons.105 Social welfare service providing nonprofits also overwhelmingly favoured insider advocacy to more confrontational, public-facing tactics

(author’s interviews). “We do advocacy; we are not activists,” (author’s interview KW01LM).

But there was not the same disaggregation of the sector that was observed in the British case.

Generally, in the Canadian context service providers see advocacy as a regular and important part of their role.

Instead, high-level homelessness advocacy in Canada tends to occur through advocacy coalitions, most notably the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness (CAEH) and A Way

for these organizations was 462 and 558, respectively. Old Brewery Mission is firmly rooted in Montreal, while Lookout Housing Society has a somewhat wider geographic spread – covering different communities in lower mainland British Columbia (the area surrounding Vancouver). 104 With the possible exception of the Canadian Mental Health Association (CMHA), which has five branches that operate shelters. This author did not look into the internal structure of CMHA and so it would not be possible to assess how much autonomy the branches have. However, the small number of shelter-operating CMHA’s and their geographic dispersion suggests that this is not part of a calibrated strategy on the part of CMHA to become a shelter- providing organization. Interview research suggests that when a specialist nonprofit recognizes homelessness as a problem for the community they serve, and see that services are underprovided, they sometimes become housing providers (author’s interviews). It is possible that CMHA’s decision to move into housing reflects this rationale, whether at a branch level or centrally. 105 See, e.g.: Nicholson-Crotty (2007, 2009), Onyx and colleagues (2010), Almog-Bar and Schmid (2014), Child and Grønbjerg (2007), Lu (2018).

146 Home.106 Participating HSNPOs tended to prefer advocacy through coalitions because it is viewed as more effective to have a unified voice to government (author’s interviews). However,

HSNPOs will sometimes advocate on their own when they see a problem that is not being addressed through wider networks, such as the opiate crisis (author’s interview OT02CC).

Furthermore, the HSNPOs that are part of federated nonprofit movements often saw provincial and federal organizations as the advocacy arm of their activities. Federated models are useful, because it creates a voice that is separated from individual HSNPOs who receive service funding. There was significant variability in the extent to which HSNPOs feel free to criticize government – participants reported that bureaucratic culture and partisan affiliation were factors shaping the extent to which they felt muzzled. But every nonprofit reported self-editing their statements in order to be perceived as “not rude, but strong” (author’s interview ED07KC).

There was a consistent impression that nonprofits achieve “very little when we embarrass the government” and “a lot of success when we speak to government directly” (author’s interview

ED06RM). Provincial or federal associations and advocacy coalitions have greater space to take stronger stances, while still wielding the legitimacy of affiliated HSNPOs. They also have greater capacity to undertake research and campaigning (author’s interviews).

In some communities, philanthropic funders also fulfilled an important advocacy function. These were primarily community foundations, United Way/Centraides, and local family foundations.107 In some instances, these philanthropic funders have been directly integrated into the governance of welfare state homelessness policy, especially through the policy architecture of the HPS. A few philanthropic funders participate directly in homelessness

106 There are also local versions of CAEH – e.g., the Toronto Alliance to End Homelessness – and HSNPOs sometimes are a member of these exclusively, or a member of both. 107 Although one corporate foundation (the Home Depot Foundation) was mentioned in several interviews.

147 advocacy coalitions. Others advocate through public officials, especially within municipal government (author’s interviews). HSNPOs saw this role as broadly positive (author’s interviews). The involvement of philanthropic funders in homelessness advocacy was seen as useful particularly because funders “sit at different tables than we do” (author’s interview

NW07DF).

HSNPOs advocate using primarily insider tactics, drawing on their dense interactions with local government. The HSNPOs studied in Canada had high levels of access to municipal bureaucrats and public officials (author’s interviews). “Our asks always go up,” (author’s interview TO01SD). While it is difficult to trace the extent to which this access has translated into nonprofit voice – the capacity and attempt to influence another108 – HSNPOs certainly seem to have the impression that municipal governments are listening. “They [municipal governments] get it,” (author’s interview ED03JB). They expressed an expectation that concerns brought through municipal public officials and bureaucrats were being carried forward by the municipality to provincial government (author’s interviews).

This highlights an interesting situation in the Canadian case. The government body controlling the contracts is usually not the end provider of funding (or at least not the largest funder), which creates a situation in which municipal governments are thought of more like allies or colleagues than funders. This equivalence between nonprofits and municipal government is a

108 The author is drawing loosely on Hirschman’s (1970) concept of voice. Voice is an attempt to influence another, in this case government policy. However, because it encapsulates both ability and action, it has a somewhat wider meaning than advocacy. Nonprofit voice, as I use it, is a function of autonomy, capacity and willingness to advocate, and representation. First, to express voice a nonprofit must be in some sense autonomous – that is, it must have an identity that is separate and independent from government. Second, voice consists of both the capacity and willingness to advocate. Willingness refers to the use of advocacy activities by nonprofits. Because voice is relational – it is targeted at a listener – capacity, which refers to the access and influence that is elicited when nonprofits do advocate, is also an important aspect of voice (Pekkanen and Smith 2014a; Almog-Bar 2014). Finally, voice serves a representative function. That is, when undertaken by an organization, voice is a collective act that represents a constituency of some kind. In this sense, another important characteristic of voice is the constituency that it represents.

148 thread running throughout the Canadian nonprofit sector – and in general the line between local government (and in some cases provincial departments) and nonprofit is very blurry indeed.

The Canadian system also provides avenues for HSNPOs to channel their philanthropic resources in ways that ratchet up the welfare state. In both the British and Canadian contexts cross-subsidization was often observed – using philanthropic resources or earned income to fill a gap between the cost of providing a service and government funding for the service. However, this practice was more common in the UK than in Canada. In the Canadian context, HSNPOs often used philanthropic resources for services that were not yet part of the welfare state, with a view to changing welfare state boundaries.

Canadian HSNPOs also exercise policy voice through institutionalizing on the ground, in at least two ways. First, they can shape the service itself by making decisions about how a service will be provided. For instance, an HSNPO can shift to a trauma-informed approach or can work with another agency to embed outreach services within, say, the health system.

Shaping the service usually requires some government-deficit funding, through the use of philanthropic or commercial revenue, at least at the outset. However, HSNPOs also reported tapping into project grants for new initiatives. Coupled with the use of insider advocacy to municipalities, the Canadian system can allow for service shaping at one service site to eventually culminate in a new approach across a community. One example is the requirement in

Toronto that homeless shelters use principles of harm reduction (TSSHA 2015).

Another strategy that HSNPOs used to change the boundaries of the welfare state is through piloting: operating a service that is not a part of the welfare state in order to demonstrate the utility of the intervention. These are sometimes “orphan programs” (programs that do not

149 have a dedicated core funder), or they may be supported through grant funding from an institutional funder (author’s interviews).

Canadian HSNPOs reported using this strategy for an array of interventions (author’s interviews). For instance, the All in 2020 campaign in the Ontario community of Kitchener-

Waterloo is raising philanthropic funds to pilot a repair fund for landlords who rent to vulnerable individuals, with the explicit aim of seeking government funding after evidence of program efficacy has been collected (author’s interview KW01LM). Philanthropic revenue is crucial to this strategy. But for piloting to work, the boundaries of the welfare state have to be malleable: there must be the possibility of governments changing their approach. The shift to a housing first approach, shows how this kind of a transition is possible in the Canadian context. Although the

At Home/Chez Soi national pilot (a pilot of housing first) did not have its funding renewed, the country’s homelessness system has been shifting toward housing first through a combination of municipal, provincial, and federal supports.

5.5.2 The United Kingdom

The competitive contracting model utilized in British homelessness, in combination with centrally legislated social rights implemented by local authorities, creates several constraints on nonprofit influence.

To begin with, the process of commissioning services is such that service design rests chiefly with local authorities. Commissioning is a service acquisition process where a provider is

“granted the power to undertake defined tasks or duties on behalf of a principal” (Sturgess 2018:

157). When homelessness services in the UK are contracted out, they undergo a commissioning process in tandem with the competitive tendering process led by a procurement team. In a competitive commissioning model, the government puts out a request that a certain service be

150 provided, which is then opened up to a procurement process in which nonprofits (and sometimes for-profits) compete to meet a pre-determined set of parameters (author’s interviews). The advantages of this system are accountability, transparency, and fair competition. But it also creates an asymmetric service environment in which nonprofits have strong incentives to be responsive to government specifications, even in cases where this is not ideal for the service recipient.

It would be a step too far to argue that nonprofits have no input under this system. Of course, the commissioning process allows for feedback from the nonprofit sector, but this process is largely guided by local government, who define the service based on their statutory obligations, a needs assessment, and available resources (author’s interviews). British homelessness contracting does have several avenues that allow nonprofits to exercise flexibility in the service, including outcomes-based contracts (which are sometimes used) and feedback that nonprofits can provide during and after a contract. But service contracts tend to be specific, in order to avoid legal challenges (author’s interviews). And nonprofits have incentives to adhere as closely as possible to those service requirements in their bids, as well as in actual implementation of the contract, to avoid losing the service in the future (author’s interviews). Moreover, local authorities are constrained by the services they are statutorily obligated to fulfil, with scarcely enough financial capacity to meet these requirements: going beyond the obligations is largely considered impossible (author’s interviews). Thus, the legalization of homelessness under austerity, and with competitive contracting, restrains policy experimentation by local civil servants and nonprofit service providers. When a new contract is designed some service tweaks do occur, but these must take place within the dual constraints of scarce resources and rigidly legislated duties.

151 Next, as described in chapter four, the particular values that are emphasized in UK homelessness contracting shape the behaviour of nonprofit service providers. Specifically, emphasis on finding the “most economically advantageous tenderer” creates incentives for price- based competition. Larger, more commercial nonprofits are advantaged under this system.

Larger organizations are often viewed as a “safer pair of hands” for awarding contracts (author’s interview CW01KC). Aside from a preference for large organizations, which are viewed as more stable choices (author’s interviews), aspects of the bidding process can advantage larger organizations. First, there are economies of scale for organizations that participate in service contracting across the country. Second, larger organizations may have an easier time meeting certain bid criteria, such as financial stability and ability to obtain environmental, social, and governance certifications (author’s interviews). Austerity has exacerbated this trend: “When we were awash with funding, we used to have a lot of providers,” but now there are just a handful of bidders (author’s interview EX01CS).

As a result, the nonprofits that contract for homelessness tend to be much larger than

HSNPOs in the voluntary sector more widely. The median total income of contracting HSNPOs was £4.3 million, 26 times greater than the £163,328 for the general population of homelessness charities (see Appendix 3). And while the median sampled homelessness charity had 0 employees and 6 volunteers, the median contracting homelessness charity employed 139 people and had 42 volunteers (see Appendix 3). Larger contracts tend to bring in bidders from outside the community (author’s interview). One commissioner spoke about a £375,000 contract that he had participated in – the largest in his career at that point – that drew two organizations that had never bid in his area of the country. “Only if there is big money do you get the national or international agencies” (author’s interview EX01CS). In particular, housing associations

152 (registered organizations that own and administer social housing) are frequently awarded government homelessness contracts. Housing associations are also becoming larger and more commercial, through mergers as well as contracting in communities across the country (author’s interviews). While in principle larger nonprofits could result in more advocacy capacity – and perhaps it does to some extent – housing associations tend to have a commercial focus and provide homelessness services as a small part of their overall mandate. As such, there is less attention to policy issues around homelessness in the advocacy that these large, commercial service providers undertake.

Under the UK system of competitive contracting for homelessness services, contracts turn over much more frequently than is common in the Canadian context. Competitive contracting can also create “challenging” relationships or “cause conflict” between local government and de-funded nonprofits (author’s interviews DV01TR, EX01CS). It “can be quite tense at times because a lot of voluntary agencies rely on public funding” (author’s interview

EX01CS). The practice of “TUPEing” employees – when a service transitions from organization to organization, employees move too109 – also undermines a sense of commitment to mission- linked values, which can be very important for nonprofits. Interview participants in Canada frequently spoke about nonprofit values, whereas this was seldom raised in the British homelessness context (author’s interviews).

The competitive contracting model also inhibits the use of philanthropic resources to change the boundaries of the WS. This is true in two ways. First, the contracting system creates disaggregation in the nonprofit sector – large service providers that get government contracts, then local charities that use philanthropy to provide services and campaigning charities. These

109 Refers to the use of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) regulations (TUPE regulations).

153 nonprofits do in some instances work together, but not as much as in the Canadian case. In both countries, participants noted that service provision helps nonprofits to be viewed as legitimate by governments (author’s interviews). However, in the UK there was a competing narrative constraining nonprofit advocacy. “There is a view that if bidding is competitive then voluntary sector organizations should be just doing the service”, rather than campaigning (author’s interview SC03RS).

Second, given the austerity context and the tight legislation of statutory obligations on housing, there is no easy mechanism for ratcheting up services. HSNPOs with government contracts reported having frequent interactions with local authority bureaucrats, much like the

Canadian case (author’s interviews). Similarly, local authority housing units see themselves as allies with nonprofit providers but expressed a view that they had little power over the content of the service (author’s interviews). Thus, in the British context there were few avenues for translating these dense interactions into influence on the boundaries of the welfare state. The policy structure is the primary reason for this. Although there are some central government homelessness innovation grants available, these tend to be viewed as ephemeral (author’s interviews). Meanwhile, local authorities have had to cut granting programs and focus on non- discretionary spending requirements. Together, then, the rigidity of statutory obligations, competitive contracting, and the scarcity created by austerity budgets has made it extremely difficult for local NSPOs to ratchet up service provision.

5.6 Discussion

Both the British and Canadian homelessness policy structures provide opportunities for

HSNPOs to influence the boundaries of the welfare state through advocacy, although the configuration of advocacy looks different in both contexts. In addition, the Canadian system

154 provides wider avenues for ratcheting up the welfare state through institutionalization on the ground. The first such channel is shaping the service itself. To an extent, this is possible in both contexts. Where governments work with nonprofits during a policy development or service commissioning process, nonprofits can seek to modify the service that they will provide. For instance, nonprofits have some space to make decisions about how a service will be provided when they submit their bids for government social care contracts in the United Kingdom.

However, competitive contracting creates incentives for HSNPOs in the UK to conform to government’s vision of social welfare. In Canada, the emphasis on service stability impresses a self-understanding of HSNPOs as indispensable service providers, thus creating greater freedom to shape the service (within the boundaries of funding rules).

Another channel for influencing the boundaries of the welfare state through institutionalizing on the ground consists of piloting. Nonprofits use philanthropic service provision with the aim of influencing government duties. Explicitly or implicitly, these are pilot initiatives where the nonprofit begins performing a service through philanthropic funding – but with the intention that in future government will fund the service. Piloting highlights how the boundaries of government versus philanthropic duties shift over time, and how project funding can be an indicator of an incipient boundary shift. The flexibility of Canadian homelessness policy, coupled with the weaker disaggregation of the sector into contracted welfare providers and philanthropic charities, makes it easier for piloting to effectively shape the welfare state. The

British system has dedicated piloting funds disbursed by the central government, but there is a disconnect between these short-term programs and the everyday practice of social welfare through local authorities’ implementation of statutory obligations.

155 The case studies above show that the British contracting system, coupled with its statutory approach to homelessness, leaves nonprofits little space to expand the welfare state. In contrast, the Canadian homelessness policy context is changing in large part due to the activities of nonprofit service providers. Somewhat counterintuitively, this implies that centrally legislated social rights may not always be the best way to advance social rights in cases of nonprofitized welfare. When the line between government and philanthropy is messy, that can actually create more favourable conditions for service expansion. Of course, this is not to argue against social rights in general: when viewed as a floor rather than a ceiling, legislated social rights can co- exist with opportunities for nonprofit voice through institutionalizing on the ground.

Without these channels to ratchet up the welfare state, the only direction in which service expansiveness can go is down – at least, until laws change. Nonprofits in highly legislated policy contexts can always cross-subsidize contracted services with philanthropy, running them at a government-deficit. Indeed, they may even have competitive incentives to do so. But where legislation dictates the boundaries of the welfare state, nonprofits are not able to directly ratchet up services in response to need. Nor can they easily change the service approach.

Changing the legislated boundaries of the welfare state is challenging not only for reasons that are well-known to political scientists (e.g., veto players). Additionally, in nonprofitized welfare it is challenging because the requirements for advocating legislative change are misaligned with the points at which nonprofits access the state. Nonprofit service providers have dense interactions with frontline, midlevel, and even high-level municipal civil servants. They have some interactions with civil servants at subnational governments. But their access to higher levels of government, and especially lawmakers, is limited. To influence laws, service provider nonprofits must join advocacy coalitions or work with nationally influential

156 advocacy organizations on specific campaigns. This can be helpful to an extent, and it is certainly something that nonprofit service providers do, but the capacity of such organizations to do this often and effectively is limited.

When the policy structure allows for institutionalization on the ground, nonprofits and bureaucrats can tweak the boundaries of the welfare state over time, in response to changing needs and best practices. A central justification for legislating social rights is that it can ensure a baseline of care for all eligible citizens. However, as was observed in the British case, this can also set a ceiling for government expectations in contexts where governments are contracting provision to nonprofits. Over time, the result may be an erosion of service expansiveness through increasingly narrow interpretations of corresponding duties. On the other hand, while on-the- ground institutionalization creates small, incremental changes, these can be meaningful improvements over time.

Systems that allow for institutionalizing on the ground – through shaping the service and piloting – increase the agency of nonprofits, since they offer better tools for using philanthropy to ratchet up services, better react to problems, and incorporate evolving social needs. For instance, nonprofits can use philanthropy to fund new elements of an existing service or to demonstrate evidence justifying a new program or approach. Where the boundaries of the welfare state are institutionalized on the ground, it is easier for these initiatives to become part of the welfare state. In other words, such systems can better facilitate government co-optation of previously philanthropic services. Although governments should not rely on philanthropy to carry out public duty, there are complementarities between philanthropy and the welfare state.

Where nonprofits have the capacity and flexibility to use both – and to see one as a path to the other – they can be more effective.

157 One interesting implication of this for the welfare state literature is that it requires a practice-based approach to studying nonprofitized welfare. You can only truly study systems that are institutionalized on the ground by examining practices as they unfold. In cases like these, examining formal policies – especially policies at the national or regional level – does little to shed light on the boundary lines between government and philanthropic public duty. This is only clear through an examination of how nonprofit social welfare is practiced through everyday policymaking – the decisions of frontline bureaucrats, the specifics in service contracts and memoranda of understanding, and the budget and programmatic choices of service provider nonprofits.

This argument contributes to the debate on whether one form of privatization

(nonprofitization) represents a retraction of the welfare state. The answer that it supplies is essentially that both dynamics – erosion through “cost efficiencies” and ratcheting up – are potentially at play, depending on the policy context. Other conditions being equal, this argument suggests that, the long-run expansiveness of social care may be better facilitated in nonprofitized policy contexts where the boundaries of the welfare state are institutionalized on the ground, rather than being entirely based on legislated duties – though the two can co-exist. Furthermore, the argument implies that nonprofit use of philanthropic and commercial funding is highly relevant to where the welfare state may go in the future.

For the reader that may wonder whether austerity might offer a simpler explanation for the differences in Canadian and British homelessness policy: austerity is certainly part of the consideration. Local authorities in the United Kingdom face sizable challenges in meeting their growing statutory obligations as their budgets consistently shrink. That is manifestly part of the explanation. However, this author posits that the confluence of competitive nonprofit contracting

158 and rigidly legislated service requirements, along with financial constraints, provide a fuller explanation of the problem. This is for at least three reasons.

First, many Canadian municipalities face similar budget constraints as a result of declining provincial transfers. These are not necessarily a result of the 2008 financial crisis, which was not as devastating for Canada. But the downloading of responsibilities to municipalities and the absence of corresponding funding is a documented reality in the Canadian context (e.g., Fanelli, 2014). While it is true that in 2016-2018 the federal government increased its financial support for homelessness somewhat, the majority of homelessness funding comes from local and provincial governments. There has not been an obvious abundance of homelessness funding in any of the three jurisdictions studied – Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec – in recent decades. All of which is to say that financial constraints very much affect Canadian homelessness as well. Second, with regard to homelessness the policy approach may be more of a barrier to successful outcomes than the level of funding: for example, there is documented evidence that ending homelessness is cheaper for governments overall, while there is mixed evidence on whether housing first interventions increase or decrease costs (Gaetz 2012; Ly and

Latimer 2015). Finally, austerity is a choice that governments make – especially for a policy area like homelessness, which is a tiny fraction of overall government spending (0.03 percent of the

Canadian federal government budget, for instance).110 This dissertation posits that austerity was not inevitable, at least not in the area of homelessness policy. If funding is viewed as a function of influence (among other factors), recent increases for homelessness spending in Canada can be viewed as further evidence that nonprofit influence is greater there. Certainly, adequate funding is an important determinant of policy outcomes, but it may be at least partially endogenous to the

110 Calculated from Government of Canada (2018: 319).

159 avenues for nonprofit influence. And a bad policy approach can still be well-funded and produce undesirable results.

160 Chapter 6. Conclusions

6.1 Introduction

This conclusory chapter will accomplish two functions. First, it brings together the dissertation by summarizing the research, including core findings, contributions, limitations, and implications. Second, it suggests avenues for future research on causes of variation, state capacity, nonprofitized welfare and civil society, nonprofitized welfare and power, and philanthropy and public duty.

6.2 Summary of the Research

From hospitals to elder care facilities, schools, refugee resettlement, and disaster relief, government-funded nonprofits are key actors in implementing social rights (Marwell 2004). This dissertation has contributed to our understanding nonprofit welfare, its institutional variations, and political consequences, through an examination of the relationship between nonprofit welfare and one political consequence in particular: social welfare service expansiveness.

Specifically, the study asks: is there a relationship between nonprofitized service provision and the expansiveness of social welfare? If so, what is it? Service expansiveness, as conceived in this study, denotes the breadth (coverage) and depth (content of care) of provision, with greater coverage and content of care indicating more expansive provision.

This study has used cross-case analysis to accomplish these research objectives.

Specifically, it compares nonprofitized welfare in two liberal welfare states – Canada and the

United Kingdom – across two social welfare policy areas – homelessness and emergency management. The comparative case studies link variation in nonprofit welfare to causal mechanisms that influence social welfare service expansiveness, in either direction. Data for the

161 case studies was gathered through a combination of semi-structured interviews and document analysis.

6.2.1 Findings

This dissertation finds that there is no necessary relationship between the level of nonprofitization and social welfare expansiveness. There are at least two possible pathways to nonprofitization, and each implies a different relationship with service expansiveness.

Nevertheless, the choices that governments make about how to institutionalize nonprofit social welfare can influence whether welfare expansiveness erodes over time or not. Service expansiveness is bolstered where institutions of nonprofit welfare provision support long-term service relationships, as well as where nonprofit voice is empowered.

Nonprofitization through cost-cutting is linked to declining service expansiveness. But this is not the only pathway of nonprofitization. This study identifies a second pathway: the co- optation pathway. Co-optation offers an explanation for nonprofitization which is associated with greater service expansiveness. When nonprofitization accompanies new WS duties, it reflects a government’s decision to co-opt existing services, rather than to promote or replace them.

Chapter two found that the nonprofitization of British homelessness is primarily driven by cost- cutting, while Canadian homelessness nonprofitization is a case of co-optation – where ease, expertise, service stability, and voluntary sector promotion were important factors. Chapter three found that emergency management nonprofitization in both Canada and the United Kingdom

(UK) is primarily driven by co-optation, although cost-savings were also present as a justification for government use of nonprofits

Co-optation is just one option for governments when they seek to widen the scope of public duty. They can also promote existing services through incentives like tax breaks or

162 replace existing services with a government-run public service. The case studies suggest at least six characteristics present when governments choose to co-opt nonprofit services: ease, service stability, unique constituencies, service-related expertise, surge manpower, and preference for supporting civil society.

Nonprofitization, then, can be associated with a contraction of service expansiveness, but it can also follow an expansion of the welfare state. The dissertation, next, turns to examining how nonprofit welfare provision affects service expansiveness once social welfare has been nonprofitized. It finds that the institutions of nonprofit social welfare make a great deal of difference. The dissertation addresses institutions of nonprofit welfare in two respects.

First, regimes of nonprofit social welfare service acquisition – the rules of entry, participation, and assessment when governments acquire externally-provided social welfare services – embed different values, which in turn create varied incentives for participating nonprofits. Marketized regimes create incentives that undermine the long-run expansiveness of care, while regimes that embed other values, like service stability or collaboration, do not. This is because marketized regimes create incentives for the nonprofits that participate to act more like businesses, especially through price-based competition.

Chapter four finds that the cases represent three distinct social welfare service acquisition regimes, with differing levels of marketization. The most marketized case is the UK’s competitive tendering process for acquiring homelessness services. Nonprofits participating in this service were most likely to compete on the basis of price and least likely to collaborate, suggesting that incentives reward market-like behavior under this system. Next, Canada’s system of homelessness service agreements and grants emphasized provider stability, perhaps at the expense of accountability. Nonprofits in this system preferred to differentiate their services and

163 were positively disposed to collaboration. Finally, long-term government-nonprofit relationships prevail in emergency management. In both Canada and the UK, very little evidence of competition existed, as the field of participants privileged existing providers. Rather than a market system, emergency management appears to reflect a distinct combination of hierarchical service activation and reciprocal resource-sharing.

Second, these institutions in combination with the policy structure can either empower or constrain nonprofit voice when it comes to ratcheting up service expansiveness. Specifically, the policy structure can impact whether nonprofit service providers are able to access opportunities for ratcheting up service expansiveness through advocacy, shaping the service, and piloting.

Chapter five finds that the policy structure of Canadian homelessness provides more space for nonprofits to ratchet up welfare state expansiveness through advocacy, shaping the service, and piloting. On the other hand, the rigidity of local authorities’ statutory obligations on homelessness in the United Kingdom, in combination with resource scarcity and the competitive contracting regime, constrain nonprofit voice.

The case study shows greater opportunities for voice in the Canadian homelessness case, a case where boundaries are institutionalized on the ground (where there is ongoing recalibration of policy locally to react to best practices and arising needs). Somewhat counterintuitively, the centrally legislated nature of social rights in British homelessness, in combination with the competitive contracting system, make it more difficult for nonprofits to use their voice to advance social rights. Without opportunities to ratchet up service expansiveness, the only direction in which service expansiveness can go is down – especially under austerity. Nonprofits in British homelessness can always cross-subsidize contracted services with philanthropy, running them at a government-deficit. Indeed, they may even have competitive incentives to do

164 so. But because legislation dictates the boundaries of homelessness services in the United

Kingdom, welfare-providing nonprofits are not able to directly ratchet up services in response to need. Nor can they easily change the service approach, especially because the requirements for advocating legislative change are misaligned with the points at which nonprofits access the state.

6.2.2 Contributions

Governments look to nonprofits to provide social welfare for all kinds of reasons. While cost-cutting is one rationale for service nonprofitization, it cannot explain all instances of nonprofitization. This dissertation contributes to the literature on nonprofit social welfare by introducing co-optation as a second pathway to nonprofitization. Co-optation can occur for a variety of reasons, from ease to certain strengths of nonprofit provision (like access to unique consistencies) and even an ideological preference for promoting civil society more broadly.

Importantly, co-optation reflects a choice by government to fund existing nonprofit service provision when it wishes to expand the boundaries of the welfare state. This choice is also a decision not to promote existing services through levers of the private welfare state (e.g., tax incentives) and not to replace existing services with a government-run service. Viewing the co- optation pathway in this light allows us to, first, understand that nonprofitization is often about adding to the state, not hollowing it out. This framework also clarifies the nature of decisions to nonprofitize as the welfare state evolves. For welfare state researchers, the co-optation pathway offers a reminder that welfare state expansion never occurs in a vacuum: almost always, some version of the service is being provided to some people, in some manner, before the state enters.

The welfare state literature has tended to ignore nonprofit service providers except insofar as they fit as a subcategory of welfare privatization. But as this dissertation highlights, that misses a range of ways in which service providing nonprofits are integral to understanding

165 welfare state change. Nonprofit social welfare providers are the sites through which public responsibility is implemented and evolves. Observing changes in how nonprofit social welfare service providers operate – including philanthropic-funded programs as well as government- funded ones – can often signal an incipient welfare state boundary shift. This is demonstrated most directly through the discussion of climate change and Canadian emergency management in chapter three. But nonprofit welfare providers are more than passive recipients of government service contracts. They are also agents of welfare state change. As chapter five demonstrates, there are at least three avenues through which nonprofit social welfare providers can influence the welfare state: advocacy, shaping service provision, and piloting. When a welfare state boundary shift results from nonprofit agency, governments may be more likely to co-opt rather than to promote or replace – but this would require further study.

At the same time, governments do shape the nonprofit sector. This dissertation also contributes by elucidating the links between institutions of nonprofit social welfare and service expansiveness. Chapter four, which discusses institutions of social welfare service acquisition, highlight how marketization generates incentives which strip nonprofits of their unique sectoral identity. British homeless-serving nonprofits have strong incentives to behave like for-profit businesses, whereas these incentives are much weaker for Canadian homelessness and emergency management in both countries. Likewise, chapter five sheds light on the channels through which nonprofits most effectively exercise voice. This chapter highlights how government can integrate nonprofit voice more or less effectively by calibrating policies to account for how nonprofits access the state, as well as how nonprofit services evolve.

Finally, this study provides empirical support for Best and Gheciu’s (2014) argument that publicness should be studied through the use of practice theory. A practice approach is key to

166 understand the relationship between service expansiveness and nonprofitized welfare. That is because practice theory helps us to see that the boundaries of the WS are perpetually fluctuating.

Recognizing that the public duty is constantly being reproduced and transformed provides the possibility of looking beyond the contracting out pathway to nonprofitization.

6.2.3 Limitations

Because country case selection sought to reduce variation in welfare regime type and nonprofit sector composition, this dissertation likely does not encapsulate the full range of pathways to nonprofitization nor institutions of nonprofit social welfare provision. Even within the category of Anglophone welfare states with comparable charitable sectors, there is further variation that could be explored through examining different policy areas. As a result, this study reflects a small subset of the many, many different government-nonprofit welfare partnerships occurring around the world. While this is a limitation, it also highlights the importance of the study.

This dissertation has sought to widen the interpretation of nonprofit social welfare beyond the restrictive dual narratives of state expansion through nonprofit takeover and state abdication of duty through nonprofitization. Indeed, this author has attempted to highlight the variation that occurs even within two very similar welfare states with very similar nonprofit sectors. The observed differences between emergency management and homelessness highlight how even within one country there may be a mosaic of nonprofit welfare provision, with diverse origins, justifications, institutions, and effects. One would certainly expect to find even more

167 variation when expanding the study to conservative or social democratic welfare regimes, as well as to states with different institutions regulating the nonprofit sector.111

6.2.4 Implications

The findings of this study present several implications for theory, as well as practice. This section will begin with a discussion of three theoretical implications: the need for the welfare state literature to contend with nonprofit political influence; the importance of welfare state institutions in shaping nonprofit voice; and the crucial role of federalism in shaping welfare state political dynamics. It will then highlight four implications of the study for practitioners: for governments, the need to carefully design institutions of nonprofitized social welfare; for service providers, that constraints and opportunities are contingent on the institutional context, but that there is space to develop greater freedom to advocate; for nonprofit support organizations, the need to resist competitive mixed-form service markets; and, for philanthropic funders, the importance of considering advocacy channels in advance of funding pilot programs.

Most directly, this dissertation has argued that the welfare state literature would benefit from contending with the nonprofit sector in a robust way. Currently, the welfare state literature does encapsulate nonprofit political influence as it pertains to the development of broad political coalitions. Yet this dissertation highlights the need to contend with nonprofit influence through everyday bureaucratic interactions, as well as voice through municipalities and through the strategic manipulation of service provision itself.

111 For instance, in France the history of state-nonprofit relations is more contentious than that in the UK and Canada. That is because the repression of the “associational sector” was severe in post-revolutionary France (Debbasch and Bourdon 1985). Following the historical animosity that associations experienced during the 18th through 20th centuries, France protects the right of association robustly today (Debbasch and Bourdon 1985). As a result, there is a strong sensibility against regulating the sector in a manner as is done in Canada and the UK through charitable status. Associations can be recognized as having public utility (Debbasch and Bourdon 1985), but in practice a very small number of organizations have this status.

168 Moreover, through its focus on how the institutions of the nonprofitized welfare state shape service providers, this dissertation suggests a need to consider how the character and strength of nonprofit voice is shaped by the institutions of the welfare state as well. There are constraints on service provider advocacy in any case – for instance, capacity to advocate is generally low. But, broadly speaking, this study implies that nonprofit service providers are more likely to advocate in support of service expansion where the system is most stable and least marketized. Moreover, the configuration of advocacy is likely to vary depending on how nonprofitized welfare is structured. All service provider advocacy is likely to draw primarily on

‘insider tactics’, but this may be slightly more likely in systems that incentivize small, local providers. In such systems, service expansiveness advocacy may occur most effectively through coalitions or voice delegated to national bodies for federated nonprofit movements. On the other hand, in competitive systems that incentivize large, professionalized providers a more disaggregated advocacy system is likely. There may be a few very large agencies with strong capacity to campaign as a result of these systems. In theory, these very large providers could become powerful advocates for service expansiveness. However, competitive dynamics may limit the potential for coalition advocacy. Meanwhile, organizations that specialize in service provision – that do not sink resources into campaigning – are likely to be more successful in winning contracts.

Finally, while it was not a central question of the dissertation, another theoretical implication of this study is the importance of federalism. Federalism appears to have a substantial impact on the influence possibility frontier for nonprofit service providers. Where welfare state institutions were such that the points of nonprofit access were aligned with the points of welfare reform, nonprofits had a greater potential to ratchet up the welfare state. This

169 implies that federalism influences the political dynamics of the welfare state, especially when it comes to the ongoing reconstitution and transformation of the public duty through practice.

The findings of this study offer several insights for practitioners on both sides of the nonprofitized welfare state – government and nonprofit service providers – as well as for the nonprofit sector support organizations and philanthropic funders.

For governments, this research illustrates the importance of designing nonprofitized welfare bearing in mind the long-run effects of institutions on the nonprofit sector itself. As this study has shown, the institutions of acquiring social welfare services can create variable incentives which in turn reward some kinds of nonprofits over others. A government that values a local, community-based sector may be led to choose different institutions than one that prefers larger, more standardized ones. This study also highlights possibilities for non-transactional relationships that can arise when long-standing, trusting service relationships form between governments and nonprofits. Especially where government expertise is low, this is an important factor that policy designers may wish to consider.

For nonprofit service providers, this study highlights the different opportunities and constraints that will be available depending on the institutions of social welfare that are in place.

Service providers will have the greatest scope for advocacy when they operate in the absence of direct competition, receive funding from different government agencies, and are relied upon for service stability and expertise. This implies that nonprofits can, to a degree, generate freedom to advocate through accumulating expertise, demonstrating indispensability, and seeking funds from diverse levels of government as well as different departments within government. This study also suggests that nonprofit service providers can creatively use their philanthropic resources to ratchet up the welfare state over time.

170 Beyond service providers, this dissertation suggests implications for nonprofit sector membership, infrastructure, and advocacy organizations (E.g., the National Council of Voluntary

Organizations, the Ontario Nonprofit Network, Imagine Canada, and YWCA Canada). In particular, the findings demonstrate how important it is for governments to get policy design right when they decide to nonprofitize an area of the welfare state. Nonprofit support organizations should resist attempts by government to implement competitive contracting, especially with mixed-form markets (markets in which nonprofits compete directly with for- profits), for two reasons. First, as this study shows such institutions erode social protections over time by creating direct incentives for less costly contracts. Second, competitive contracting systems make it more difficult to draw on service provider nonprofits to collaborate in support of mission-based advocacy.

Finally, this study offers lessons for philanthropic funders that might wish to see a more expansive welfare state. The findings suggest that piloting can be an effective way to influence welfare state expansiveness, but only if there is an avenue for the philanthropic program to be adopted within government. Thus, philanthropic funders should pay attention to this aspect of the equation when they fund ‘pilot’ research and should be attuned to how they can assist their fundee in making the case for the service to government.

6.3 Future Research

Nonprofitized welfare is an important area of research. While this study has offered important contributions on the institutions of nonprofitization and their effects, there is much still to discover about the role of nonprofits in the welfare state. To conclude the dissertation, this section suggests five areas for future research on nonprofitized social welfare: causes of

171 variation; state capacity; nonprofitized welfare and civil society; nonprofitized welfare and power; and philanthropy and public duty.

6.3.1 Causes of Variation

This dissertation has focused on how variation in nonprofitized social welfare influences one political consequence: service expansiveness. But it does not offer a contribution on the causes of variation in the institutions of nonprofitization. This is a topic that future research could fruitfully explore. Variables of potential interest include the jurisdictional makeup of the policy area; the nonprofitization pathway used; the presence or absence of ideologically-driven welfare state reform; party affiliation at the time of nonprofitization; the political visibility of the policy area; and support for the nonprofit sector (as measured through, for instance, donation behavior, volunteerism, or membership in associations).

6.3.2 Nonprofitized Welfare and Civil Society

Nonprofits are not for-profits. While this statement might seem obvious, untangling what it means can prove difficult. There is considerable ongoing contestation about what makes the nonprofit sector unique. This is probably inevitable, as it depends on the aspects of the sector that are of interest for the researcher. Nevertheless, nonprofit organizations are organizationally distinct from for-profit organizations. They are often founded with moral missions in mind, as well as founding narratives and uniting values. Each of these characteristics shape to some extent the way that nonprofit organizations behave.

To-date, research on nonprofit social service provision has focused on the quality of service provision and the nonprofit organization’s financial sustainability. However, this focus obscures the other functions of the nonprofit sector. Nonprofit organizations constitute an important part

172 of civil society, 112 which itself fulfils at least four politically relevant functions: the democracy function, the pluralism function, the service function, and the community function.113 Future research should turn its attention to understanding what nonprofitized welfare means for civil society. Research could fruitfully ask what the co-optation of nonprofits into the welfare state means for the non-service functions of nonprofits. Furthermore, future research on nonprofitized welfare should consider that nonprofit welfare providers have a political role through their democratic, pluralistic, and community functions as part of civil society.

6.3.3 Nonprofitized Welfare and Power

The nonprofitized welfare state is a disaggregated state in which frontline authority is delegated to professionalized nonprofits with distinct identities, values, constraints, and resources. But research has yet to explore how power is distributed in the nonprofitized welfare state. Future research could contribute to understanding the dispersal of power through research on nonprofit revenue that includes the philanthropic sector.

As applied to nonprofitized welfare, the focus has often been on how dependence on government revenue influences when, how, and toward purposes nonprofits advocate (e.g.,

Almog-Bar and Schmid 2014). The idea is that nonprofits that rely on government to finance their activities may be less likely to speak out against the government. While this argument makes intuitive sense, the empirical evidence has been mixed (Almog-Bar and Schmid 2014).

112 Although civil society and the nonprofit sector are not synonymous concepts, nonprofit associations are at the heart of most definitions of civil society. Civil society is an essentially contested concept (Hall and Trentmann 2005), but in general it refers to “uncoerced associational life distinct from the family and institutions of the state.” (Chambers and Kopstein 2006: 363). It is “the space of uncoerced human association and also of the set of relational networks – formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology – that fill this space” (Walzer 1992: 89) 113 Given the diversity of organizations within civil society, these functions are generalizations; nevertheless, they are generalizations that scholars have seen as having applicability across civil society as a whole. These four functions are the underpinnings of special protections for the nonprofit sector in legal and regulatory regimes, although specific rules vary from country to country. See Appendix 7 for a literature review explaining these four functions in further detail.

173 This dissertation has contributed to an understanding of how government-nonprofit relationships can be more or less equal depending on the institutions of social welfare service acquisition.

Furthermore, interview research has suggested that the internal disaggregation of government funding may influence the extent to which nonprofit service providers feel empowered to exercise voice. Interview participants stated that they felt having a diverse set of government funding sources increased their perceived freedom to advocate on sensitive topics. But another important aspect is philanthropic funding. Participants also spoke about the salutary effects of having local philanthropic funders engaged in the policy area. This suggests that digging into the structure of funding networks – governmental and philanthropic – can add to our understanding of nonprofit power.

6.3.4 Philanthropy and Public Duty

Future research should seek to improve our understanding of the role that philanthropy plays in the public duty, in particular the relationship between philanthropy and the welfare state.

Social rights evolve through a series of publicness claims occurring in public and policy venues.

Government – the welfare state – and philanthropy are two domains in which public-defining practices often occur. Philanthropy is the use of private means for public ends (Salamon 1992).

While the welfare state and philanthropy are separate and neither functionally nor morally equivalent, both distribute resources to address ‘public’ concerns.114 As such, research should seek to capture the size, content, and political consequences of philanthropy in social care.

114 Both philanthropy and government draw on the contributions of individuals to achieve public objectives. Whereas taxation is a mandatory payment extracted by governments, philanthropic donations are government- subsidized voluntary contributions (Reich 2018). Both types of contribution are put to ‘public’ purposes, as defined by the recipient – governments and charities, respectively. For a detailed comparison of philanthropy and the welfare state, see Appendix 8.

174 Philanthropy is a quotidian element of social welfare. While social services/human services is not the largest category of philanthropic giving,115 philanthropic support for social welfare is sizable. For instance, Mohan and Breeze (2016) found that “social services” charities in England and Wales received £1.4 billion in revenue from fundraising and a further £288 million from the

“voluntary sector”.116 And, as researchers have emphasized, the retraction of the welfare state can elevate the importance of philanthropy in the lives of vulnerable citizens (Edin and Lein

1998; Guo 2010).117

Research to-date has excluded philanthropy as an element of the public duty, and so has yet to explore crucial questions about philanthropy as an interstitial layer between the welfare state and the realm of private responsibility. We know little about how big this philanthropic layer is, as well as the logics under which divisions between government and philanthropic duties are defined. As well, we know little about the interactions between government and philanthropic public duty. Future research on philanthropy and the welfare state could seek to understand why governments sometimes draw on philanthropy in social policy and to what effects. For instance, the Canadian government uses philanthropy as additive to its government refugee assistance programs by allowing and regulating the private sponsorship of refugees by groups of individuals and community organizations. Inequality is a potentially crucial variable for studies on philanthropy and the welfare state, since philanthropy reflects existing inequalities in the political economy and as it has possible regressive effects (see Appendix 8).

115 At least, not in the United States (Reich 2018; Edin and Lein 1998), Canada (Lasby and Barr 2018) or the United Kingdom (Charities Aid Foundation 2017; Mohan and Breeze 2016). 116 However, government was the main source of revenue for these charities, contributing £3.7 billion of £6.3 billion in total revenue (Mohan and Breeze 2016: 26). 117 Although Guo’s (2010) study finds that government funding is still the primary source of assistance for low- income Americans.

175 6.3.5 State Capacity

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of state capacity for governments to adapt to extraordinary needs. This crisis has highlighted existing weaknesses with political science’s approaches to measuring and conceptualizing state capacity (E.g.,

Fukuyama 2014). Thus, thinking through the implications of nonprofitization for state capacity should be a priority for future research. A few questions in particular come to mind.

First, to what extent do the assets of co-opted nonprofits count toward state capacity?

During a crisis, governments look to repurpose existing infrastructure to suit extraordinary needs.

As we are seeing amid the COVID-19 pandemic, that infrastructure has included nonprofit service providers. This is clear in both homelessness and emergency management in the

Canadian context – and indeed these two policy areas are intersecting as governments look to avoid a public health catastrophe amongst those experiencing homelessness.118

One challenge during the COVID-19 pandemic has been ensuring that people experiencing homelessness are able to self-isolate, something which is extremely difficult given the high density of many emergency shelters (Elliott 24 March 2020). The City of Toronto has opened nine new shelters in response to this challenge, while also accelerating permanent rehousing efforts (City of Toronto 24 March 2020; Westoll 24 March 2020). These facilities are located in hotels and motels, as well as recreation and community centres and are operated by existing community partners.119 The Government of Ontario has taken a similar approach in its

400-person recovery facility for homeless people who test positive for COVID-19 (Vincent 24

March 2020). The facility is operated by the nonprofit Inner City Health Associates (Vincent 24

118 As the global pandemic occurred well after field research for this dissertation, the author is focusing on the Canadian context here for reasons of familiarity and convenience. 119 And, a point of interest: the cots that are being used are Red Cross cots. The Red Cross has also been engaged to feed the homeless in Montreal during COVID-19 (Mignacca 29 March 2020).

176 March 2020), an organization that is funded through the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long

Term Care (ICHA 2020).

Public health emergencies engage a somewhat different grouping of nonprofits than natural disasters. Furthermore, in a pandemic some nonprofit roles – especially surge manpower

– must be adapted or revised. Nevertheless, governments have called on some familiar EMNPOs to assist in the COVID-19 response. For instance, the Government of New Brunswick has engaged the Canadian Red Cross to distribute $900 in financial assistance to individuals who have had their incomes interrupted as a result of the pandemic (Government of New Brunswick

24 March 2020). Red Cross personnel are also staffing long-term care homes in Quebec; operating COVID-19 isolation centres for temporary foreign workers and people experiencing homelessness; and providing phone support to individuals who are self-isolating and having a difficult time, among other interventions. Psychosocial and food-providing nonprofits have been important actors in the response as well.

Second, and more broadly, to what extent should nonprofit philanthropic assets be counted toward state capacity? Nonprofit resources that are funded through philanthropy can still augment the capacity of the state, especially where nonprofits are connected to the welfare state.

For instance, the 211 service is operated and administered by United Ways in many communities. Yet this system serves an indispensable linking function for government as well as philanthropic service providers and their service recipients. On the other hand, these interconnections are underscored when charities experience capacity challenges. This point has been highlighted by interview participants who experienced major natural disasters. But a more recent example is the global COVID-19 pandemic. Health, social services, and psychosocial nonprofits are experiencing increased demand for their services while trying to navigate the

177 personnel impacts of social distancing and a decrease in philanthropic giving (Jackson 29 March

2020; Imagine Canada 11 March 2020).

Third, when nonprofits are co-opted into the welfare state, to what extent does that present opportunity costs for state capacity, relative to replacing or taking over nonprofit social welfare services? For instance, recent pandemic-related cases of neglect and capacity failure have placed a spotlight on the limitations of Canada’s disaggregated long-term care system – which includes nonprofit, for-profit, and government facilities (Lowrie 12 April 2020; Katawazi

12 April 2020).

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223 Appendices

Appendix 1. Interview List

This appendix provides information on the interviews conducted in support of this dissertation. Overall, 104 interviews were conducted between April 2017 and April 2019. To protect the confidentiality of my informants, names were excluded from the interview list. As well, where requested the names of organizations have been replaced with a generic description of the organization type.

1.1 Canada Interviews

1.1.1 Government

City of Calgary, Calgary Emergency Management Agency (2) City of Calgary, Calgary Neighbourhoods (2) City of Edmonton, Landlord and Tenant Advisory Board City of Edmonton, Office of Emergency Management City of Edmonton, Partnership Centre of Excellence City of Greater Sudbury, Housing Services Section City of Ottawa, Office of Emergency Management City of Toronto, Office of Emergency Management City of Toronto, Toronto Shelter, Support, and Housing Administration Government of Alberta, Ministry of Community Social Services Government of Canada, Public Safety Canada Government of Canada, Natural Resources Canada Town of High River, Emergency Management Town of High River, Community Support Services

1.1.2 Nonprofit Organization

A Way Home Alberta Non-Governmental Organization Council Alberta Street News ALIGN Association of Community Services Bent Arrow Traditional Healing Society Boyle Street Calgary Chamber of Voluntary Organizations Calgary Homeless Foundation Canadian Housing and Renewal Association Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre Canadian Red Cross (2) Carya Calgary Co-operative Housing Federation Canada E4C

224 Edmonton Chamber of Voluntary Organizations Edmonton Community Foundation Edmonton John Howard Society Edmonton Social Planning Council Federation of Calgary Communities Fife House Fire Smart Canada Food Banks Alberta Fuse Social Fort McMurray Centre of Hope Habitat for Humanity Southern Alberta Homes First Society Housing and Homelessness Umbrella Group Imagine Canada Lit for Life Foundation Mennonite Disaster Service Mouvement pour mettre la fin à l’itinérance à Montréal/Movement for Ending Homelessness in Montreal Non-affiliated individual* NGO Alliance of Ontario Raising the Roof/Chez Toit Samaritan’s Purse Canada Salvation Army, Ottawa Booth Centre Salvation Army, Toronto Housing and Homeless Supports Office Sauvetage Bénévole Outaouais/Ottawa Volunteer Search and Rescue Search and Rescue Volunteer Association of Canada Shepherds of Good Hope (2) St. John Ambulance Canada Terra Centre (2) United Way Toronto and York Region Wellesley Institute World Renew YMCA Greater Toronto Area (2) YMCA of Northern Alberta Youth Empowerment and Support Services Youth Without Shelter (2)

*This individual had a career of working in housing and homelessness advocacy. However, at the time the individual was working for a non-housing charity and requested that the organization not be connected to this study.

1.2 United Kingdom Interviews

1.2.1 Government

Bedfordshire Prepared

225 Brighton and Hove City Council, Procurement Cheshire West and Chester, Procurement Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit Devon and Cornwall Local Resilience Forum Essex County Council Exeter City Council Government of Scotland, North of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership (2) Hampshire County, Emergency Planning and Resilience Leeds City Council London Borough of Redbridge, Procurement North Devon District Council Northamptonshire Local Resilience Forum Wales Resilience Team

1.2.2 Nonprofit Organization

British Red Cross (4) Crisis Cyrenians Depaul International Emmaus Oxford National Council for Voluntary Organisations Oxfordshire Community Foundation Riverside Group Rural Housing Scotland Scottish Churches for Housing Action Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations St. Andrew’s First Aid (2) St. John Ambulance UK (2) Work Place Chaplaincy Scotland

1.3 France Interviews

Advocacy France, l’ Croix-Rouge Française, la Fédération des Acteurs de la Solidarité (FNARS), la Fédération Solidarité Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, la Fédération Solidarité Normandie, la Fédération Solidarité Paca Corse Dom, la Fédération SOLIHA, la Refuge, le

226 Appendix 2. United Kingdom Housing Assistance Applications

The table below draws on Department for Community and Local Government (DCLG) statistics on statutory homelessness and prevention and relief efforts.120 It provides information on the total number of applications for housing assistance is provided on a quarterly basis for

2014 through the first half of 2017. This data is also broken down into four different categories.

The first of these is accepted applications. The final three refer to refused applications, for three reasons: those determined by the local authority not to be homeless; those determined to be homeless but not in priority need; and those declared to be homeless and in priority need, but determined to be intentionally homeless.

Table 5. Applications for Housing Assistance, Accepted and Refused (2014-2017)

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0 2014 2014 2014 2014 2015 2015 2015 2015 2016 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Intentional 2177 2155 2237 2562 2211 2204 2324 2632 2329 2383 2646 2430 2360 2310 Not Priority 5442 4849 5035 5123 5251 4683 4939 4972 5242 5064 4998 4560 4930 4550 Not Homeless 7347 7005 6713 7115 6634 6888 6972 7313 6698 7150 7056 6550 6540 6220 Accepted 12516 13201 13985 13660 13544 13775 14525 14333 14851 15193 14994 14420 14600 14400

120 Data is from quarterly statistics reported to the DCLG (28 September 2017; 22 June 2017; 23 March 2017; 15 December 2016; 28 September 2016; 30 June 2016; 23 March 2016; 17 December 2015; 24 September 2015; 24 June 2015; 26 March 2015; 11 December 2014; 25 September 2014; 31 July 2014). For the data provided on and before 2016 Q3, only the total number of applications and the percentage from each category was provided. Therefore, the number for the subcategories may be slightly inaccurate.

227

As the chart above shows, on average one half (50%) of housing assistance applications are accepted, while the other half are refused – with a “not homeless” assessment being the most common reason for a refused application.121

121 On average, there were 6872 refusals for “non-homeless” compared with 4974 “not priority” and 2354 “intentional” each quarter. Acceptance rates have risen slightly over time, from a low of 45.5% in the first quarter of 2014 to a high of 52.4% in the second quarter of 2017.

228 Appendix 3. United Kingdom Homelessness Contracts and Nonprofit Organizations

This appendix provides information on homeless-serving nonprofits in the United

Kingdom, drawing on two datasets. The first of these covers organizations with homelessness contracts, from the UK Contracts Finder database. The second is drawn from a list of homelessness charities registered in the Charity Commission for England and Wales (CCEW) charity register.

3.1 Contracts Finder Data

3.1.1 Data Collection

Contracts Finder is a government database covering public sector procurement in England

(Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have separate datasets). Its purpose is to facilitate competition by increasing transparency in public sector procurement. The public sector is required to publish its contracts on Contracts Finder (Cabinet Office Efficiency and Reform

Group and CCS 2015). This section describes four datasets created based on the Contracts Finder data, as well as the methods used to collect that data.

On 9 October 2017, the researcher conducted a search of the Contracts Finder database for contracts on “homelessness”. The search yielded information on 168 homelessness contracts published or awarded from 2015 onward.122 Contracts varied from £10,702.40 to £120 million, with a mean of £3.2 million and a median of £587,120.123 The homelessness services included in

122 Contract information prior to 26 February 2015 appears in an older Contracts Finder database, and does not include supplier information. 123 This excludes 10 contracts for which no value was listed as awarded, as well as one instance in which the awarded value was just £26, despite a listed anticipate value range from £70 000 to £100 000. It also excludes one instance in which a £1 contract was awarded.

229 this dataset are varied and include support services of different kinds as well as emergency accommodation, and homelessness prevention services.

The Contracts Finder data includes the following information on these 168 homelessness contracts: the supplier name, notice ID, notice type, contracting body, status, published date

(between 2015 and October 2017), title, description, nationwide, postcode, region, start date, closing date, contract start date (between 2014 and 2017), contract end date (between 2016 and

2024), whether it is a sub-contract (and if so parent reference), suitable for VCO, OJEU contract type (services, not specified, not applicable), OJEU procedure type (open, restricted, negotiated, not specified, not applicable), value low, value high, and awarded value. To this base sheet, I added variables for the number of suppliers, the names of all suppliers, and information on the organization type of suppliers. I then separated the contracts according to the supplier organization (so that there was one supplier per line). The result was 309 entries.

A second sheet is similar, except it does not expand the number of entries to separate multiple supplier contracts. Instead, it uses the notice ID as the main unit of observation and adds information on the contracting body (“HO Cont – Contracts Sheet”). In this sheet, on 14

September 2018 I added sections for provider type (binary). I also coded the contracts into different service types, based on the contract description.

I then consolidated the suppliers so that duplicate organizations (organizations with multiple contracts) were brought together into a single row. I created a further sheet which included only

NPO suppliers (“HO Cont – NPO list”), including information on organization status (registered charity, homes and communities agency registered provider, mutual). Based on this work, contracts were awarded to 233 organizations, of which 131 are nonprofit organizations.

230 On 13 September 2019, a separate dataset was created for nonprofits registered as charities by the CCEW (“HO Cont – Charities list”).124 For these 81 charities, data was retained from the

NPO suppliers list. In addition, data from the CCEW charity register was added. This includes data on what the charity does, who the charity helps, and how the charity works, as specified in the CCEW charity register. It also includes data on the charity’s revenue, personnel, and areas of operation, as available for the most recent filing year.

3.1.2 Findings – Contracts

The table below provides information on the types of homelessness services that the contracts in this dataset addressed. As it shows, the tasks for which homelessness services procurement is undertaken varies considerably – including the provision of core services like supported accommodation, as well as ancillary interventions like security or concierge services, service infrastructure such as information technology, and service research, planning and evaluation.

Table 6. England Public Contracts for Homelessness Services, Frequency by Service Type

Service Type Frequency Support Services 46 Supported Accommodation 25 Emergency and Temporary Accommodation 21 Prevention Services 19 Multiple Services 11 Outreach Services 9 Research, Planning, and Evaluation 9 Health Services 6 Housing Advice Services 4 Maintenance and Cleaning 4 Concierge Services 2 Decorating and Furnishing 2

124 A separate spreadsheet was created which removes the two charities for which there is not financial information. This spreadsheet was used for the financial data.

231 Information Technology 2 Homeless Drop-in Services 2 Coordination 1 Home Care 1 Housing First Services 1 Security 1 Training 1 Transitional Housing 1

The table below provides information on the organization type of suppliers that were awarded contracts in the dataset. As it shows, nonprofit organizations were selected as suppliers for the majority (75%) of homelessness contracts. Nonprofit suppliers also received the largest share of the total value of contracts, £242 million out of a total £500 million. The next most prevalent supplier type constitutes for-profit organizations, who represented 17% of the total number of contracts and 6% of the total value (£28 million). Interestingly, the mean value of contracts awarded to nonprofit suppliers was higher than for for-profit suppliers: £1.4 million compared with £166 048. The third most prevalent supplier type, hybrid suppliers, represent contracts in which both nonprofit and for-profit organizations were awarded a contract. This can occur either when a group of providers applies as a consortium or when contracts are split into smaller lots. Contracts awarded to other governments or to individuals were rare but did occur.

Table 7. England Public Contracts for Homelessness Services, by Supplier Type

Nonprofit For-Profit Organization(s) Organization(s) Hybrid Government Individual Number of 127 29 9 2 1 Contracts Value of £242,304,548 £27,896,009 £216,015,596 £13,587,000 £26 Contracts

The data above demonstrates that nonprofit organizations constitute the predominant supplier type in homelessness service contracting in England. Furthermore, nonprofit providers are more likely to be awarded contracts for “core” homelessness services. Contracts were coded according

232 to one of three service types: core services, ancillary and infrastructure services, and strategic and planning services. Core services, such as emergency and temporary accommodation, refer to services that are central to homelessness and are homelessness-specific. Ancillary and infrastructure services refer to tasks that are supportive of core homelessness services, such as the provision of security services at a supported housing site or the creation of a software system for collecting intake forms. Strategic and planning services refer to research, planning, evaluation, and coordination tasks. As the chart below shows, almost all (97%) of nonprofit- supplied homelessness contracts were for core services. In contrast, for-profit contracts were much more evenly dispersed amongst the three service types.

Figure 5. England Public Contracts for Homelessness Services, by Service Type125

125 Or, in table form: Provider Type Core Services Ancillary/Infrastructure Services Strategic/Planning Services For-profit provider(s) 11 11 7 Nonprofit provider(s) 123 1 3

233 140

123 120

100

20 11 11 7 1 3 0 Core Services Ancillary/Infrastructure Strategic/Planning Services Services

Nonprofit Provider(s) For-Profit Provider(s)

This difference in service type is, in one sense, intuitive: since nonprofit organizations are usually mission-based organizations, it makes sense that the service contracts that nonprofits obtain are primarily for core services, rather than ancillary or infrastructure services. On the other hand, the low overall number of for-profit providers, as well as the fact that they were most commonly suppliers for non-core services, suggests the need to explore the extent to which nonprofits and for-profits are truly competing for core service contracts. Is it that for-profit organizations are not competing for homelessness contracts, or is it that nonprofit organizations have certain advantages which result in their being more successful? Interview research is suggestive of the former proposition. Participants reported that it is common for just a few – or even just one – nonprofit to bid for homelessness services. The consensus appears to be that homelessness services are not viewed as lucrative market opportunities. As one participant

234 explained, “Homelessness is such hard work; it’s hard and thankless.” (author’s interview

CW01KC).

Procedurally, however, a competitive procurement process was used to award most homelessness services contracts for 2015-2017. The procedure used to award public service contracts can vary, depending on the size of the contract as well as other factors. The open procedure, as the name suggests, allows for the widest range of competition. In an open procedure, “any interested economic operator may submit a tender in response to a contract notice” (PCR 2015: 27). Restricted procedures are similar, but entail pre-qualifying bidders, for instance by financial standing, technical capacity or professional capability (Mills & Reeve

2015). In a restricted procedure “any economic operator may submit a request to participate in response to a call for competition by providing the information for qualitative selection that is requested by the contracting authority” (PCR 2015: 27). The majority of the contracts in this dataset, 72%, were awarded through an open or restricted procedure. In a negotiated procedure, a public authority invites a number of agencies to participate.126 This occurred in two instances.

There were also two instances where contracts were determined by “direct award”, in which the local authority directly selects a provider from a “lot” defined via a previously agreed framework

(Insight Public Sector 2015). Finally, a number of procedures were listed as “other”, “not applicable”, or “not specified”. In these cases, we cannot know precisely how the contract was awarded. Nevertheless, as the chart below shows, the data suggests that open and restricted processes are the most common and occurred in more than two-thirds of the cases included in the dataset.

126 Negotiated procedures can be used when contracts are below the size threshold, although this was not the case for either negotiated procedure in the dataset. This procedure can also be used where only one supplier can meet contract requirements, or where a service requirement is urgent and unforeseeable, a negotiated procedure can be used (Mills & Reeve 2015).

235

Figure 6. England Public Contracts for Homelessness Services, by Procurement Procedure

Negotiated Procedure 1%

Direct Award Restricted 1% Procedure 16% Other 5%

Other 25% Not Specified 16% Open Procedure 57%

Not Applicable 4%

3.1.3 Findings – Charities with Homelessness Contracts

This section presents information on the 81 registered charities that were awarded homelessness contracts, as specified in Contracts Finder.

Charities with homelessness contracts fulfil a variety of charitable purposes127 – four, on average. The most common charitable purpose identified by charities in the register was, unsurprisingly, accommodation and housing (65). However, not all charities identified accommodation and housing as one of its purposes. Moreover, two other purposes were cited by more than half of included charities: education and training (56) and the prevention or relief of poverty (44). A full list of charitable purposes identified by included charities is included in the table below.

127 “what the charity does” on the CCEW charity register.

236 Table 8. Charitable Purposes, Frequency

What the Charity Does Frequency Accommodation and housing 65 Education and training 56 The prevention or relief of poverty 44 General charitable purposes 33 The advancement of health or saving of lives 31 Economic and community development and employment 28 Disability 24 Religious activities 9 Amateur sport 8 Recreation 6 Environment, conservation, and heritage 5 Arts, culture, heritage, and science 5 Human rights, religious or racial harmony, equality or diversity 2 Other charitable purposes 18

Next, included charities served a variety of different groups in their work.128 On average, included charities cited three different groups in the CCEW register. Of these, children and young people (57) were the most commonly mentioned, followed by people with disabilities

(52). A full list of assisted groups is included in the table below.

Table 9. Assisted Groups, Frequency

Assisted Groups Frequency Children, young people 57 People with disabilities 52 The general public, mankind 37 Other defined groups 37 Elderly, old people 36 Other charities or voluntary bodies 15 People of a particular ethnic or racial origin 12

By far the most common charitable activity cited by the included charities was, perhaps unsurprisingly, service provision.129 All but one included charity identified this as one of its

128 “who the charity helps” on the CCEW register. 129 “how the charity works” on the CCEW register.

237 charitable activities. On average, charities identified 3.6 charitable activities. The table below provides a list of the frequency with which included charities identified each charitable activity.

Table 10. Charitable Activities, Frequency

Charitable Activity Frequency Provides services 80 Provides advocacy, advice, information 62 Provides buildings, facilities, open space 57 Provides human resources 32 Sponsors or undertakes research 16 Acts as an umbrella or resource body 7 Makes grants to organizations 4 Provides other finance 4 Makes grants to individuals 3 Other charitable activities 25

Turning to financial data, the included charities received, on average, £22.7 million in total income in their most recent filing year (usually 2018).130 Median total income was much lower, however, at £4.3 million. The table below provides data on mean and median total income, as well as percentage of total revenue from donations and legacies, as well as from charitable activities.

Table 11. Financial Data, Charities with Homelessness Contracts

Total Revenue from Donations Revenue from Charitable Activities Income (% of total) (% of total) Mean £22,683,348 13% 80% Median £4,300,000 2% 94%

As it shows, charities with homelessness contracts draw a large percentage of their total income from charitable activities – eighty percent, on average.

130 This is for the 79 charities for whom financial information was available.

238 Regarding personnel, included charities generally had more employees than volunteers.

As the table below shows, included charities employed a mean 680 people (median 139). In contrast, these organizations had just 364 volunteers on average (median 42).

Table 12. Personnel, Charities with Homelessness Contracts

Employees Volunteers Mean 680 364 Median 139 42

The CCEW data also includes information on the areas in which charities operate. This information was converted into a measure of geographic spread. For charities operating in only one community, the geographic spread was listed as “local”. Charities in two communities were considered “bi-local”, while charities in three or more communities were “multi-local”. Moving up the geographic scale, charities that said they operated in an entire region of the UK (England,

Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland)131 were coded as “regional”. Finally, “national” organizations were those operating across more than one region of the UK. As the table below shows, included charities primarily operated in locally – with local (23) and multi-local (25) being the most common geographic spread.

Table 13. Geographic Spread, Charities with Homelessness Contracts

Geographic Spread Frequency Local – one local area only 23 Bi-local – two local areas only 8 Multi-local – more than two local areas 25 Regional – one region of the United Kingdom (e.g., Wales) 11 National – more than one region of the United Kingdom 14

3.2 CCEW Homelessness Charities

131 But for practical purposes just England and Wales, since charities operating only in Northern Ireland or Scotland would be registered under those regional charity commissions.

239 Of course, not every homeless-serving charity receives government contracts to provide homelessness services – quite the contrary. Thus, to give a general idea of the wider community of homeless-serving charities, on 22 October 2017 I undertook a keyword search for

“homelessness” in the CCEW charities register. Keywords refer to the charity’s objects and activities, but not to the charity name.132 The search yielded 1,986 results. Just under half (39 out of 81) of the charities in the Contracts Finder dataset are represented in this dataset, reflecting the diversity of organizations receiving “homelessness” contracts from local government.

From the list of 1,986 homelessness charities, I selected a random sample of eighty charities. For this sample of organizations, I entered information on organizational and financial characteristics from the CCEW register. Through this process I found that six organizations have been removed from the CCEW register. Accordingly, the remaining sample consists of just 74 organizations.

3.2.1 Findings – Characteristics of Homelessness Charities

Homelessness charities fulfil a variety of charitable purposes133 – 3.8, on average. The most common charitable purpose identified by homelessness charities was the prevention or relief of poverty (55). More than half of sampled charities cited education and training (40) as a charitable purpose, while general charitable purposes (31) and accommodation and housing (29) were cited by more than a third of sampled organizations. A full list of charitable purposes identified by sampled charities is included in the table below.

Table 14. Charitable Purposes, Frequency

132 Which is appropriate, as the last is not a good indicator of what a charity does, in comparison to the former two indicators. I limited results to charities operating throughout England and Wales to filter out international aid charities. The search was for registered charities only. Otherwise, the results were not limited. 133 “what the charity does” on the CCEW charity register.

240 What the Charity Does Frequency The prevention or relief of poverty 55 Education and training 40 General charitable purposes 31 Accommodation and housing 29 Religious activities 23 The advancement of health or saving of lives 22 Economic, community development and employment 20 Disability 18 Overseas aid and famine relief 14 Arts, culture, heritage and science 6 Recreation 5 Amateur sport 4 Human rights, religious or racial harmony, equality or diversity 3 Animals 2 Environment, conservation, heritage 2 Other charitable purposes 10

Next, sampled charities served a variety of different groups in their work.134 On average, sampled charities cited 2.7 different groups in the CCEW register. Of these, the general public and mankind (46) was the most commonly mentioned, followed by children and young people

(40). A full list of assisted groups is included in the table below.

Table 15. Assisted Groups, Frequency

Assisted Groups Frequency The general public, mankind 46 Children, young people 40 Elderly, old people 29 People with disabilities 27 Other defined groups 24 Charities or voluntary bodies 24 People of a particular ethnic or racial origin 10

By far the most common charitable activity cited by the sampled charities was, as with contracted charities, the provision of services.135 However, in this case just 74% of sampled

134 “who the charity helps” on the CCEW register. 135 “how the charity works” on the CCEW register.

241 charities identified this as one of its charitable activities. On average, charities identified 2.7 charitable activities. The table below provides a list of the frequency with which included charities identified each charitable activity.

Table 16. Charitable Activities, Frequency

Charitable Activity Frequency Provides services 55 Provides advocacy, advice, information 35 Provides buildings, facilities, open space 29 Provides human resources 23 Sponsors or undertakes research 6 Acts as an umbrella or resource body 3 Makes grants to organizations 15 Provides other finance 4 Makes grants to individuals 14 Other charitable activities 13

Detailed financial data was available for just 48 out of the 74 sampled charities. Data for these organizations is included below. Sampled charities received, on average, £1.4 million in total income in their most recent filing year (usually 2018).136 Median total income was much lower, however, at £163 328. The table below provides data on mean and median total income, as well as percentage of total revenue from donations and legacies, as well as from charitable activities.

Table 17. Financial Data, Charities with Homelessness Contracts

Total Revenue from Donations Revenue from Charitable Activities Income (% of total) (% of total) Mean £1 422 383 51% 30% Median £163 328 50% 2%

136 This is for the 48 sampled charities for whom financial information was available.

242 As it shows, sampled homelessness charities draw a large percentage of their total income from donations and legacies – 51 percent, on average. In contrast, the mean share of revenue from charitable activities is just 30 percent, while the median revenue from charitable activities is a negligible two percent. This is reflective of the fact that half (24 out of 48) of sampled charities received no revenue from charitable activities.

In contrast to the contracted charities, sampled homelessness charities generally had more volunteers than employees. As the table below shows, sampled charities employed a mean 18 people (median 0). These organizations had 99 volunteers on average (median 6).

Table 18. Personnel, Random Sample of Charities

Employees Volunteers Mean 18 99 Median 0 6

The CCEW data also includes information on the areas in which charities operate. This information was converted into a measure of geographic spread, as explained above. A sixth geographic level was added for this sample, reflecting organizations who identified their geographic spread as international (which did not occur in the contract supplier data). As the table below shows, sampled charities primarily operated locally (29).

Table 19. Geographic Spread, Random Sample of Charities

Geographic Spread Frequency Local – one local area only 29 Bi-local – two local areas only 6 Multi-local – more than two local areas 15 Regional – one region of the United Kingdom (e.g., Wales) 3 National – more than one region of the United Kingdom 10 International 11

243 Appendix 4. The Canadian Nonprofit Service Providers List

This appendix provides information on the data developed from the Nonprofit Service

Providers List (NSPL), as used in chapters two and five of the dissertation.

4.1 The NSPL

The Community Development Homelessness Partnerships Directorate of Employment and

Social Development Canada (ESDC) publishes the NSPL, a “comprehensive” listing of homeless shelters in Canada,137 as part of the National Homelessness Information System (NHIS). The

NSPL is curated for the purpose of retaining national capacity statistics, and includes both emergency and transitional shelters. Importantly, although the dataset title refers to “nonprofit” providers, not all homeless shelters in the dataset are nonprofit shelters. On 18 June 2018 I downloaded the dataset for 2017.138 According to the NSPL, there were 687 homeless shelters in

Canada in 2017.

4.1.1 NSPL Data Dictionary

The following is a data dictionary that accompanies the NSPL, downloaded on 13

November 2018.

Table 20. Data Dictionary: Nonprofit Service Provider List

Variable Description Values and Value Labels Name Shelter Shelter facilities are Emergency: Emergency shelter facilities provide temporary, Type categorized by the type of short-term accommodation for homeless individuals and families. service provided to clients. Other services, such as food, clothing or counselling, may or may not be provided.

137 Government of Canada. (8 September 2017). National Service Provider List. Government of Canada Open Government webpage, https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/7e0189e3-8595-4e62-a4e9-4fed6f265e10. 138 The NSPL is available at this URL: https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/7e0189e3-8595-4e62-a4e9- 4fed6f265e10.

244 Transitional: Transitional housing provides temporary shelter, but is differentiated from emergency shelters by longer lengths of stay and greater intensity of support services offered to clients. Transitional housing is an intermediate step between emergency shelter and permanent housing. Province Canadian provincial code. AB - Alberta Code BC – British Columbia MB - Manitoba NB – New Brunswick NL – Newfoundland NS – Nova Scotia NT – Northwest Territories NU - Nunavut ON - Ontario PI – Prince Edward Island QC - Quebec SK - Saskatchewan YT – Yukon City Municipality or community. Text Target Emergency shelters and General: Provide services to adult males and/or females. Some Clientele transitional housing are further accept youth. categorized by the clients they Family: Provide services to families and adults with dependants. serve. Some also accept single adult women without dependents. Youth: Provide services to youth. Shelters have varying definitions of youth, which may include a range of ages between 12 and 29 years. Gender(s) General and youth shelters Males: Provide services to males. Served may or may not offer facilities Females: Provide services to females. for a specific gender. Both: Provide services to both genders. Shelter The registered shelter name in Text Name the National Service Provider List for emergency shelters and transitional housing. Number of The number of permanent beds Numeric Beds provided by each facility, which describes the shelter capacity. Updated: 21/06/2017

4.1.2 Additions to the NSPL Dataset

The NSPL identifies individual shelters as observations. In reality, a single organization may operate more than one shelter. Accordingly, I used web searches to identify the organizations that operate each shelter. For each shelter, I added values for the following:

• Organization: refers to the administering organization that operates the shelter

245 • Organization type: refers to whether the organization is a registered charity, non-charity

nonprofit, government (municipal, provincial, federal, First Nations), for-profit company,

cooperative, public-private partnership, or nonprofit partnership.

• Charity BN: where the administering organization was a registered charity, this was

recorded.

There were 16 shelters for which I could not identify the administering organization.

4.2 NSPL Organizations Dataset

I created a new worksheet with administering organizations as the unit of observation.

The table below provides data summarizing the organization type of Canadian homeless shelters.

As it shows, the vast majority of both shelters and shelter beds are operated by nonprofits, which were largely registered charities. Only a handful (13) of shelters were administered by nonprofits that were not registered charities, and these were smaller shelters – on average, 9.8 beds/shelter as compared with 46.6 beds/shelter for registered charities. There was also one shelter operated by a nonprofit partnership. Together, nonprofit-administered shelters accounted for 93.7% of the total number of shelters, and 83.2% of total shelter beds.

Table 21. Homeless Shelter Administering Organization

Organization Type No. Shelters No. Shelter Beds Government 33 3365 Government, First Nation 4 39 Government, municipal 20 2000 Government, provincial 4 157 Government-linked charity 1 18 Government-linked, municipal 3 1135 Government-linked, provincial 1 16 Hybrid 3 251

246 Public-private partnership 3 251 Nonprofit 629 18386 Nonprofit partnership 1 8 Nonprofit, not a registered charity 13 117 Registered charity 615 18261 Private 6 106 Cooperative 1 5 For-profit company 5 101 Total 671 22108

Government was the next largest administering organization category. Municipal governments comprised the majority of government-operated shelters, although provincial and

First Nations organizations. Government-linked agencies refer to agencies owned by government, such as the Calgary Municipal Land Corporation. Together, government administering organizations operated 4.9% of shelters and 15% of shelter beds. Government- operated shelters were larger, on average, than their nonprofit counterparts: the average number of beds/shelter was 224.3 for government-run shelters, compared with 45.4 for nonprofit-run shelters. Hybrid- and for-profit-operated shelters were rare, but did occur in a few instances.

Since the NSPL includes data on shelter locations, it is possible to disaggregate administering organization data by province. The table below includes this data for the three provinces covered in my dissertation: Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. As the table shows, in all three provinces nonprofits operate the majority of shelters – 92.4% in Alberta, 88.0% in Ontario, and 98.7% in Quebec.

Table 22. Shelter Administering Organization, by Province

Organization Type, by Province No. Shelters No. Shelter Beds Alberta 66 4365 Government 5 1330 Government, municipal 1 80 Government, provincial 1 115

247 Government-linked, municipal 3 1135 Nonprofit 61 3035 Nonprofit partnership 1 8 Registered charity 60 3027 Ontario 217 8751 Government 22 1958 Government, first nation 2 20 Government, municipal 19 1920 Government-linked charity 1 18 Hybrid 3 251 Public-private partnership 3 251 Nonprofit 191 6501 Nonprofit, not a registered charity 3 33 Registered charity 188 6468 Private 1 41 For-profit company 1 41 Quebec 160 3637 Nonprofit 158 3590 Nonprofit, not a registered charity 2 16 Registered charity 156 3574 Private 2 47 For-profit company 2 47 Total 671 22108

4.3 Shelter-Administering Charities’ Revenue Sources

For the subset of administering organizations that are registered charities, I created a new worksheet. This included all organizations classed as “registered charities” as well as the one organization classed as a “government-linked charity”. In this worksheet, I kept the values for

Organization, Organization Type, and Charity BN. Then, I added financial data for each organization.

On 27 and 28 September 2018, I gathered financial data for the 393 registered charities identified in the NSPL. I began by drawing from the 2015 T3010 filings, which yielded results for 352 of the organizations. For the remaining 41 organizations, I then searched for data from

248 the 2014 T3010 filings. For 39 out of the 41 organizations, 2014 data was available. The remaining three organizations – Outflow Ministry Inc., Mon Chez-Nous Incorporée, and Eagle’s

Next Youth Ranch Inc. – do not have financial data available and as such have blank entries.

The total aggregate revenue for all charities that administer homeless shelters in Canada, for which data is available, is $2.1 billion (not adjusted for inflation). However, it is important to emphasize that this is not indicative of total shelter funding, since (i) not all shelter operators are charities, nor are all charitable shelter operators reflected in the dataset and (ii) many organizations included in this figure have significant operations outside of operating a shelter.

Shelter-administering charities (SACs) had a mean total revenue of $5.5 million, while the median total revenue was lower, at $1.5 million. This suggests, as is commonly the case for charitable sector research, a larger population of smaller charities and a smaller population of very large charities. This might be useful to disaggregate further in future. But for now, I will simply report some descriptive statistics.

The table below provides data on the mean and median revenue mix of SACs, by dollar value as well as percentage of total revenue. The percentage figures do not sum to 100. This results from gaps between reported total revenue and reported revenue in different subcategories.

Generally, there are inconsistencies in how charities fill out the financial disclosure, and the systematic effect of this is unknown.

Table 23. Revenue Mix of Shelter Administering Charities

Gifts Charities Government Earned Other Mean value ($) $477 940 $468 790 $3 414 562 $515 697 $222 834 Mean % of total revenue 12% 9% 61% 8% 5% Median value ($) $58 658 $63 886 $884 397 $32 833 $19 648 Median % of total revenue 4% 3% 68% 2% 1%

249 As the table above shows, government funding is the largest single revenue source for charities, comprising 61% of total revenue, on average. Gifts, funding from other charities, and earned income all comprise around ten percent of total revenue, on average (12%, 9%, and 8%, respectively). This suggests that shelter operators are predominantly government-funded, but have diversified to find funding through both commercial and philanthropic means. At one extreme, 20 SACs reported receiving 0% of funding from government. On the other end of the spectrum, four SACs reported receiving over 99% of funding from government, while 53 reported receiving more than 90% of funding from government.

4.4 Data on Shelter-Administering Organization Funders

After identifying the 429 homeless shelter-administering organizations (SAOs), I have taken the subsets of these organizations situated in the provinces of Alberta and Ontario in order to identify funder networks.

Funders were found through own-tie reports, in which providers listed their funders.

Essentially, I have searched the websites of these organizations to identify their funders. There are three areas where this information is usually included: on a funders section of the webpage, in the annual report, and in the audited financial statements. Where more than one of these was available, I chose the most detailed option. When I drew my information from an annual report or financial statements, I chose the most recent available data (2015, 2016 or 2017). Where no website data was available, I attempted to contact the organization via email (for the Ontario dataset, not yet for the Alberta dataset). In one case, I follow up via phone as well.

The table below provides a summary of the coding undertaken for this dataset.

Table 24. SAO Funders Data Dictionary

250

Variable Name Dataset Description Value Name/Labels Drawn from the NSPL Organization Both Organizations dataset, the name of Name of organization the SAO • 1 = complete Entry Administrative cell to indicate Ontario • 0 = entry incomplete complete? whether data has been entered • 99 = awaiting data Administrative cell to indicate Follow up? Ontario what, if any, follow up action has N/A or activity entered been undertaken Contact email for the SAO – either Contact email Ontario general or for a particular staff Email address member Contact phone for the SAO – Contact phone Ontario either general or for a particular Phone number staff member • Registered charity • Nonprofit • Government, municipal • Government, provincial Drawn from the NSPL • Government, federal Organization Both Organizations dataset, the Type • Government, first nation organization type • For-profit company • Cooperative • Public-private partnership • Nonprofit partnership Drawn from the NSPL Charity BN in form Charity BN Both Organizations dataset, the charity xxxxxxxxxRRxxxx BN (where applicable) Drawn from the NSPL NSPL Shelter Both Organizations dataset, the number Numeric value No. of shelters operated by the SAO Drawn from the NSPL Number of Organizations dataset, the number Both Numeric value Beds of shelter beds administered by the SAO Drawn from the NSPL Province Both Organizations dataset, the province AB, ON of the SAO Drawn from the NSPL City/Ville Both Organizations dataset, the city in Various cities which the shelter is located

251 URL or written entry (source Administrative cell indicating the Source Both also explained via comment source of the funding data in the Organization cell) In each column lists a funder Columns (added in alphabetical order), with • 1 = funder (for rows listing funder Both an entry corresponding to the SAO pertaining to each SAO) names row to indicate whether it is a • 0 = not a funder funder or not

4.4.1 Alberta

There are 40 homeless SAOs in Alberta. In July and September 2018, I gathered data on the funders of Albertan SAOs in the NSPL, in “NSPL Org. – AB Test”. Funders were listed alphabetically in columns and coded with a 1 or 0, to indicate whether the charity listed the organization as a funder. Funding lists were drawn from the charity’s website or most recent annual report available. The organizations for which I was unable to find funder information are highlighted in dark yellow. This was the case for 13 (32.5%) SAOs.

4.4.2 Ontario

There are 122 SAOs in Ontario.139 Between 18 October and 9 November 2018, I gathered data on the funders of Ontarian SAOs in the NSPL, in “NSPL Org. – ON Test”. Funders were listed alphabetically in columns and coded with a 1 or 0, to indicate whether the charity listed the organization as a funder. Funding lists were drawn from the charity’s website or most recent annual report available. The organizations for which I was unable to find funder information are highlighted in dark yellow and coded as 99 in the “Entry Complete” column. This was the case for 44 of the 122 SAOs (33%).

139 One SAO, Salvation Army Kingston Harbour Light, was excluded from the list because I was informed by a staff member that the organization no longer operates a shelter (although it did previously).

252 4.5 Ontario Funders’ Dataset

The data collected on Ontario SAO funders was transposed in a new workbook on 14

November 2018. In total, 1998 funders were identified. Each funder was categorized according to organization type. The following table summarizes the data included in this dataset:

Table 25. Ontario Funders Data Dictionary

Variable Name Description Value Name/Labels Drawn from a transposed version of the NSPL Org. – ON Test Organization Funder organization name dataset, this lists the names of funders • 1 = Government • 2 = For-profit Fund Cat The funder organization type • 3 = Nonprofit • 4 = Labour, pensions, and mutual • 5 = Other • 1 = Government – Municipal/Regional • 2 = Government – Provincial/Territorial • 3 = Government – Federal • 4 = Government – First Nations/Indigenous • 5 = Government – Crown Corporation (Includes public sector pension funds) • 6 = Government – Public School This more specific category (Includes Catholic schools, includes Fund Type specifies the nature of the public school boards) organization • 7 = Government – University, College, Institute (Does not include students’ associations) • 8 = Government – Foundation • 9 = Government – Police Service/Association • 10 = Government – Hospital • 11 = Government – Other Government-linked Agency • 12 = Government – Foreign Government

253 • 13 = For-profit – Business • 14 = For-profit – Corporate Foundation • 15 = For-profit – Professional, Trade, or Industry Association (Includes chambers of commerce) • 16 = Nonprofit – Giving Circle • 17 = Nonprofit – Religious Worship (e.g. church, synagogue, mosque) • 18 = Nonprofit – Other Religious Organization • 19 = Nonprofit – Food Bank • 20 = Nonprofit – Clubs – Non- Professional Sports, Recreation, Arts, Music, and Other Activities • 21 = Nonprofit – Service Club (e.g. Lions, Kiwanis, Rotary, Junior League, Zonta Club) • 22 = Nonprofit – Community Association, Ethnic Association • 23 = Nonprofit – Nonprofit Association (General) • 24 = Nonprofit – Informal Association • 25 = Nonprofit – Philanthropic Foundation • 26 = Nonprofit – Community Foundation • 27 = Nonprofit – United Way/Centraide • 28 = Labour Union (Includes public sector unions) • 29 = Private School • 30 = Other/Unknown In each column lists an SAO, with • 1 = fundee (for rows pertaining to Columns listing an entry corresponding to the each funder) SAO names funder row to indicate whether it

is a fundee or not • 0 = not a fundee No. Orgs A sum of the organizations that Formula =SUM(A[row #]:DW[row #]) Funded the funder funded

Data collection necessitated several coding choices, of varying difficulties. It bears mentioning a few of these. First, in-kind contributions were included in this dataset. The

254 rationale for this choice was that some organizations do not clearly delineate in-kind and financial contributions, but do include in their donors’ lists organizations that provided in-kind contributions. It was deemed better to include all in-kind donors rather than to make decisions about in-kind versus financial contributions where this was not clear from the organization’s own list. The author is also of the view that, in principle, in-kind donations should also be included because it constitutes the contribution of a resource.

Second, individual donors were not included in this list. This was, first, for the practical reason that many individuals with similar names might donate and it would be very difficult to distinguish these. Moreover, individuals are not primarily of interest to this study and so they were excluded.

Third, fundraising was treated as a separate revenue source (as with fee-based funding), and as such organizations listed as holding a fundraiser were excluded from the list. Finally, it was sometimes difficult to decide whether to code agencies as separate or linked. In general, I coded business contributions by local affiliates of major companies as a single entry (e.g., a local

Starbucks would simply be coded with Starbucks). Coding was separate where the organization was viewed to have sufficient autonomy as to have distinct control and interests (e.g., Home

Depot and Home Depot Foundation).

It is worth noting several limitations of the data collected here. First, some organizations may be duplicated, since there are for instance a lot of churches with similar names. In general I coded the likely location in order to prevent this, but it is possible that an out-of-town church was mistakenly coded, resulting in a double entry. Second, it was sometimes difficult to discern whether lists referred to funders or other service agencies. Where the title of a list was

255 ambiguous I drew from my knowledge of nonprofits to ascertain the nature of the list. However, some errors may have been made.

Finally, a major limitation pertains to missing data and the considerable variation in the scope of donors’ lists. At one extreme were organizations that listed every contribution, no matter how small. At the other extreme were organizations that published no donor information.

In between, some organizations listed a few key funders or only funders that contributed above a certain threshold. Some organizations also listed only a particular type of funders – government funders or ‘sponsorships’ by private organizations like corporations and foundations.

Accordingly, this dataset would not be appropriate for analysis characterizing the network of homeless shelter funders in Ontario. Such an analysis would have significant missing data.

Nevertheless, this data is helpful for identifying significant homelessness funders.

4.5.1 Ontario SAO Funders

This table provides data on the sector and organization type of the SAO funders included in this dataset. The “No. Funders” column includes a count of the funders of that funder type, while the “No. Orgs Funded” includes a sum of the organizations that funders in each category funded.

Table 26. Ontario SAO Funding Sources, by Sector

Funder Type No. Funders No. Orgs Funded Government 152 325 Crown Corporation 11 22 Federal Government 11 33 First Nations/Indigenous Government 3 3 Foreign Government 2 2 Government Foundation 1 30 Hospital 3 3

256 Municipal/Regional Government 39 92 Other Government-linked Agency 5 5 Police Service/Association 5 5 Provincial/Territorial Government 25 82 Public School 33 33 University, College, Institute 14 15 For-profit 1 092 1 328 Business 1 031 1 198 Corporate Foundation 46 115 Professional, Trade or Industry Association 15 15 Nonprofit 720 858 Clubs (Sports, Recreation, Arts, Music, Etc.) 21 21 Community Association, Ethnic Associations 12 13 Community Foundation 19 29 Food Bank 15 20 General Nonprofit Organization 107 118 Giving Circle 4 7 Informal Nonprofit Association 5 5 Other Religious Nonprofit 45 47 Philanthropic Foundation 196 262 Religious Worship Nonprofit 217 221 Service Clubs 60 66 United Way/Centraide 19 49 Miscellaneous 34 41 Labour Union 17 24 Other/Unknown 13 13 Private School 4 4 Total 1 998 2 552

As the table above shows, the vast majority of SAO funders consist of for-profit organizations – specifically, businesses made up 1 031 of 1 998 total funders. However, most of these were one-off contributions: for-profit funders, on average, funded 1.22 SAOs (this figure is even lower for businesses, at 1.16). In contrast, the 152 government organizations funded, on average, 2.14 SAOs. Nonprofit organizations, which comprise the next largest category at 720 funders, were similarly largely one-off contributors (on average funding 1.19 SAOs). There is a

257 great variety of organizations in the nonprofit category. Of these, the most common funders were: religious worship nonprofits and philanthropic foundations.

The table above demonstrates a wide variety of SAO funders (though it offers no sense of the magnitude of funding), many of which provided funding to only one SAO. Another way to use the data is to identify the top funders. The following table lists organizations that funded at least ten SAOs. Where applicable, funders are grouped together into the level of government or controlling for-profit organization.

Table 27. Top Ontario SAO Funders

Organization Funder Type No. Orgs Funded Government of Ontario (all) Government 113 Ontario Trillium Foundation 30 Local Health Integration Networks 13 Ministry of Community and Social Services 11 Ministry of Children and Youth Services 10 Ministry of Health and Long-term Care 6 Ministry of the Attorney General 4 Ministry of Training, Colleges, and Universities 4 Ministry of Advanced Education and Skills Development 3 Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 3 Ministry of Health Promotion 3 Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 3 Employment Ontario 2 Infrastructure Ontario 2 Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs 2 Ministry of Education 2 Ontario Seniors’ Secretariat 2 Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration 1 Ministry of Tourism and Recreation 1 Ontario Arts Council 1 Ontario Women’s Directorate 1 Unspecified 8 Government of Canada (all) Government 39 Employment and Social Development Canada 13 Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation 6

258 Service Canada 4 Public Health Agency of Canada 3 Correctional Services Canada 2 Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2 Canadian Institutes of Health Research 1 Health Canada 1 Heritage Canada 1 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1 Unspecified 5 City of Toronto (all) Government 33 Shelter Support and Housing Administration 6 Toronto Arts Council 3 Employment and Social Services 2 Toronto Community Housing Corporation 2 Toronto Police Service 2 Children’s Services 1 Community Funding Programs Unit 1 Unspecified 16 Home Depot (all) For-profit 32 Home Depot Canada Foundation 22 Home Depot 10 Royal Bank of Canada (RBC, all) For-profit 16 RBC 8 RBC Foundation 8 United Way Greater Toronto and York Region Nonprofit 15 Canadian Tire (all) For-profit 14 Canadian Tire 7 Canadian Tire Jumpstart Foundation 7 Toronto Dominion (TD) Bank For-profit 11

As the table above shows, the Government of Ontario, Government of Canada, and City of Toronto funded the largest number of Ontario SAOs. However, the funding was distributed across an array of agencies. Beyond government funders, four prominent for-profit companies

(Home Depot, RBC, Canadian Tire, and TD Bank) and one nonprofit organization (United Way

Greater Toronto and York Region) also funded at least ten SAOs. Interestingly, three of the four for-profits supported SAOs both directly and through a corporate foundation.

259 Appendix 5. Eligible and Ineligible Expenses

This appendix provides information on funding eligibility rules in homelessness and emergency management programs for the two case countries, focusing on funding eligibility for programs that fund nonprofits.140 The first section of the appendix covers federal and provincial

(for Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec) homelessness policies in Canada. Next, section two outlines eligibility rules for federal and provision disaster assistance programs. The third section identifies eligibility rules for UK EM reimbursement funding under the Bellwin Scheme.

5.1 (In)eligible Expenses in Canadian Homelessness

This section provides information on rules pertaining to eligible and ineligible expenses for major governmental homelessness funding streams in Canada, at the federal level and in the provinces of Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. For simplicity, in the Ontario context where funding is devolved to municipalities the City of Toronto’s funding rules are examined. Although this, of course, describes only part of the Ontario context, it would not be practical for this dissertation to examine the full suite of eligibility rules in Ontario’s municipalities. In Alberta, a similar approach is taken for Edmonton and Calgary, with a focus on Homeward Trust and the Calgary

Homelessness Foundation. Finally, in Quebec a provincial program is discussed.

5.1.1 The Federal Government Homelessness Partnering Strategy

The federal government provides a relatively small proportion of overall funding for homelessness in Canada. Nevertheless, the Homelessness Partnering Strategy (HPS) is a significant stream of homelessness funding in Canada. For instance, ESDC, which implements

HPS, was the most frequently cited federal government funder in the Nonprofit Service

140 Although not necessarily those programs that fund nonprofits exclusively or even primarily.

260 Providers List funders’ dataset (see Appendix 4). This section provides information on HPS and its rules pertaining to eligible and ineligible activities.

The HPS directives describe the types of activities that can be supported through HPS funding, as well as principles that must be met for HPS funding. As to the kinds of activities,

HPS funds chronic and episodic homelessness; emergency housing funding; some interim and transitional housing; capital expenditures; basic needs services; prevention; data collection, sharing, and dissemination; and educational, employment, and training services. To receive HPS funding, projects must assure housing choice; undertake resource coordination; be sustainable beyond the life of HPS; and serving official language minority communities. The paragraphs that follow provide more detail on the activities and principles of HPS.

HPS defines its target population as individuals who are “chronically” or “episodically” homeless, meaning that they have been homeless for at least six months in the past year or who have experienced three or more episodes of homelessness in the past year (ESDC 2016:

Directive 1). Homelessness in this regard refers to living in a “shelter or place not fit for human habitation” (ESDC 2016: Directive 1), which as noted in Chapter 4 is a rather restrictive view of homelessness.141 The purpose of this approach is, according to ESDC, to “ensure that those most in need are given priority” (ESDC 2016: Directive 1).

HPS provides for emergency housing funding as a temporary bridge for HF clients waiting to access rent supplements from other levels of government (ESDC 2016: Directive 3). It does not, however, support “the provision of general clinical health, medical, mental health, or addictions support services […] as these are provincial and territorial areas of responsibility.

141 However, HPS does have a bit of flexibility here: “Once a community has housed 90% of its chronic and episodic homeless population, it may focus the Housing First interventions on the group with the next highest needs.” (ESDC 2016: Directive 1). It is worth noting that this restrictive definition does not appear to have been modified for the new instantiation of HPS, Reaching Home (ESDC 2018b).

261 Therefore, communities must ensure that HPS programs are not supporting these services.”

(ESDC 2016: Directive 4) However, HPS funding “can be used for case management and activities to link Housing First clients to these services”, except where this is Veterans Affairs

Canada’s responsibility (ESDC 2016: Directive 4). If a community intends to create an Assertive

Community Treatment (ACT) team, it “needs to leverage any medical services from the Province or Territory” (ESDC 2016: Directive 4). However, HPS funding can support some aspects of an

ACT team’s work, including peer support, employment counselling, and coordination with the province or territory (ESDC 2016: Directive 4). HPS also supports some transitional and interim housing, the latter of which under “exceptional circumstances” only (ESDC 2016: Directive 7).

HPS-funding can be used for some capital expenditures. For HF, this includes furnishing apartments and repairing apartment damage (ESDC 2016: Directive 9). For non-HF funding, this includes a wider array of activities such as: new construction, purchase, renovation of transitional or permanent supportive housing, repurposing facilities, renovation of emergency shelters, and purchase of furniture, equipment, and vehicles (ESDC 2016: Directive 9). In

Indigenous communities, HPS funding can be used to construct or purchase emergency shelters

(ESDC 2016: Directive 9). Where a community is investing in a capital project, the project sponsor must demonstrate that it has: linked with the province or territory; “encouraged leveraging”; and “ensured sustainability” (ESDC 2016: Directive 9). The sustainability plan must include: a description of partnerships, a confirmation of funding sources for ongoing operations, a report of whether the project will increase the level of services or if they will remain stable, and a timeline for completion (ESDC 2016: Directive 9).

HPS can fund basic needs services in some instances, as well as homelessness prevention. For HF funding, basic needs can be funded for the initial apartment set up only

262 (ESDC 2016: Directive 10). Non-HF funding can go to basic needs services that “support outcomes that contribute to a reduction in homelessness” (ESDC 2016: Directive 10).

Homelessness prevention is only supported under the non-HF funds and must be for those at imminent risk of homelessness (ESDC 2016: Directive 11).142

Data collection, sharing, and dissemination is supported through HPS, with the aim of

“enhanc[ing] the understanding of local homelessness issues and help support decision-making, longer-term planning and outcome measurement to prevent and reduce homelessness” (ESDC

2016: Directive 12). Data collection also occurs through other HPS-funded activities and contributes to national data systems including HIFIS and results reporting on-line. HPS sets out expectations around the kinds of data that will be collected, as well as how CEs support and use data (ESDC 2016: Directive 12. Relatedly, HPS funding can support the inclusion of persons with lived experience of homelessness in some activities, such as the CAB and as a peer support worker (ESDC 2016: Directive 13). HPS does not fund advocacy or public education and awareness (ESDC 2016: Directive 15).

Finally, where it is not duplicative of provincial and territorial programs, HPS in some cases funds educational, employment, and training services (ESDC 2016: Directive 14).

HPS, then, funds chronic and episodic homelessness; emergency housing funding; some interim and transitional housing; capital expenditures; basic needs services; prevention; data collection, sharing, and dissemination; andeducational, employment, and training services. The

142 Imminent risk of homelessness is defined as: “individuals or families whose current housing situation end in the near future (i.e. within two months) and for whom no subsequent residence has been identified. These individuals are unable to secure permanent housing because they do not have sufficient resources or support networks immediately available to prevent them from moving to an emergency shelter or a public or private place not meant for human habitation.” (ESDC 2016: Directive 11)

263 HPS directives outline principles to which funded projects are held: housing choice; resource coordination; sustainability; and serving official language minority communities.

Housing choice is a principle of HPS. Accordingly, Directive 2 states that: “Clients should have the choice of private market, social or permanent supportive housing. Acceptance of any services, including treatment, or sobriety is not a requirement for accessing or maintaining housing, but clients must be willing to accept regular visits, often weekly.” (ESDC 2016:

Directive 2).

Resource coordination amongst partners is viewed as “critical” under HPS – including coordinating with services that are ineligible for HPS funding (ESDC 2016: Directive 5).

Accordingly, HPS requires that Community Advisory Boards (CABs) and Community Entities

(CEs) understand the resources available in their community (ESDC 2016: Directive 5).

HPS looks for projects that are sustainable, which is to say that project activities will continue after the end of HPS funding (ESDC 2016: Directive 6). For HF, this can also mean that the client is moved into the “mainstream” housing system (ESDC 2016: Directive 6). HPS requires that communities “ensure that there will be no gaps in services” at the conclusion of

HPS (ESDC 2016: Directive 6). To achieve sustainability under HPS, communities are asked to: integrate sustainability into planning and sub-project agreement management; partner with relevant sectors; and plan for the transition of HF clients (ESDC 2016: Directive 6). They are also expected to develop and maintain partnerships at a community level.

Finally, HPS establishes requirements for serving official language minority communities

(ESDC 2016: Directive 16). CABs and CEs must identify such communities in their community plans and ensure that “appropriate services and supports are available in both official languages”

(ESDC 2016: Directive 16).

264 The HPS terms and conditions provide a general list of expenditures that are eligible for

HPS funding, in line with overall program objectives. Directives for HPS detail a set of eligible activities (as discussed above). Below, these are reproduced in a table. It bears noting that HPS includes administrative or “overhead” costs, as well as capital expenses, as eligible activities.

Table 28. Homelessness Partnering Strategy-Eligible Activities

Eligible Expenses: • Overhead costs, including costs related to central administrative functions (e.g. postage, telephones, IT maintenance, and head office support); • Costs of materials and supplies; • Wages and mandatory employment-related costs; • Staff training and professional development costs; • Honoraria; • Printing and communication costs; • Professional fees, such as consultants, audit, technical expertise, facilitation, legal, and construction contractors; • Participant costs; • Capital costs.

Housing First dedicated funding: • Client intake and assessment; • Data, tracking, and monitoring; • Connecting clients to permanent housing; • Support services to improve the self-sufficiency of chronically and episodically homeless individuals and families through individualized services; • Temporary emergency housing funding, which must not represent more than 50% of the HPS HF allocation, for HF clients who have expended their first and last months’ rent provision under the provincial, territorial, or municipal social assistance programs, including utility payments and emergency one-time rental deposits; • Connecting HF clients to clinical, health and treatment services through case management, including through an ICM team; • Hiring housing support or tenancy expertise, basic skills training, and education or employment specialists, including as part of an ICM team; • Peer support; • Partnership development, liaison and integration to bring together services to support the needs of HF clients or to establish case management teams where none exists; • Project coordination on an ACT team; • Linking HF clients to existing ACT teams;

265 • Access to short-term interim housing for HF clients until permanent housing is secured; • Support services and housing for homeless Veterans with a history of chronic or episodic homelessness; • Furnish housing units for HF clients in private market, social or permanent supportive housing; • Repairs of damages resulting from HF clients (only in private rental market housing); • Groceries, personal hygiene and other supplies as part of initial apartment set up for HF clients; and • Wages for a PWLE to be a peer support worker.

Non-Housing First dedicated funding: • Individualized support services to improve the self-sufficiency of homeless individuals and those at imminent risk of homelessness; • Connecting homeless individuals and families and those at imminent risk of homelessness to support services through case management; • Consultation, coordination, planning, and assessment (e.g. community planning); • Capital investments in transitional housing; • Support services to improve the self-sufficiency of individuals living in transitional housing through individualized services; • Support services to improve the self-sufficiency of homeless Veterans and those at imminent risk of homelessness through individualized services (these services must not overlap or duplicate those provided by VAC); • Renovation of emergency shelters, transitional housing, permanent supportive housing, or non-residential facilities; • New construction of transitional or permanent supportive housing, or non-residential facilities; • Purchase of transitional housing, permanent or permanent supportive housing, and non- residential facilities to create new space or units; • Purchase of furniture, equipment and/or vehicles; • Capital investments to build new emergency shelter facilities, only under the Aboriginal Homelessness funding stream; • Access to shower and laundry facilities; • Food services related to food banks, soup kitchens, collective/community kitchens; • Personal hygiene items; • Clothing, footwear and blankets; • Storage for belongings; • Basic first aid; • Access to technology in a community setting; • Bus or public transit tickets related to job search/interviews, appointments/reconnecting to family, for example; • Housing loss prevention supports to respond to emergency situations; • Support services for individuals whose discharge from health, child protection or criminal justice is imminent; and

266 • Activities to ensure the participation of a PWLE in the CAB or Regional Advisory Board.

Both Housing First and Non-Housing First dedicated funding: • Activities to ensure coordination of resources and leveraging of services and resources; • Collection of data to demonstrate accountability, support decision-making, and inform of the homeless situation; • Activities intended to build partnerships for data collection and analysis; • Gathering, sharing, and disseminating information with the CAB, CE, and other interested parties; • Technical support for data collection, analysis, and management; • Purchase of equipment to collect and compile data; • Hire a local Data Coordinator to perform analysis and report development only where there is not already a NHIS-funded Community Coordinator at the local or provincial level performing these duties; • Education and training services; • Employment services; and • Activities relating to the improvement, collection and use of data.

Sources: ESDC (2018: s.5.0; 2016: Directives 1-5, 7-15)

The HPS directives list activities that are ineligible for HPS funding (ESDC 2016). The table below provides a list of these ineligible activities, included in order from Directive 1 to 16.

Table 29. HPS-Ineligible Activities

Directive 1 • Software development or purchase of hardware for the collection or management homelessness data that results in inability to participate in HIFIS, or that duplicates HIFIS;

Directive 2 • Assist with regular cleaning and general maintenance;

Directive 3 • Emergency housing funding to individuals who are not HF clients; • Emergency housing funding while the HF client is effectively supported by provincial, territorial, or municipal welfare and rent supplement programs; • Permanent emergency housing funding;

Directive 4

267 • Providing general health and medical services, mental health or addictions support services; • Harm-reduction and related activities;

Directive 5 • Holding meetings solely to provide networking opportunities or in recognition of past efforts;

Directive 7 • Placement of HF clients in transitional housing for a medium to long-term period;

Directive 8 • Services that duplicate those provided by Veterans Affairs Canada;

Directive 9 • Purchase or construction of new emergency shelters (except under HPS Rural and Remote Homelessness stream); • Construction and renovation of housing units whose funding is covered by the bilateral Investments in Affordable Housing Initiative agreement with CMHC and provinces/territories; • Affordable or social housing;

Directive 10 • Delivery of basic needs services that may serve to maintain homeless people on the street rather than stabilize and improve their living conditions (e.g. distribution of food or hygiene kits without demonstrated outreach or intervention);

Directive 11 • Provision or payment for student housing; • Supports for low-income individuals or families who do not face an imminent risk of homelessness; • Repeated and regular direct funds or income supports to a client in order to maintain housing;

Directive 12 • Information gathered or refocused primarily for the purpose of advocacy, public education or awareness; • Development of shelter data collection systems other than HIFIS; • Hiring a consultant to compile data to complete Results Reporting On-line; • Local research other than the data collection activities described under “Eligible Activities”; • Developing software and/or the purchase of hardware for the collection and management of homelessness data that constitutes a redundant use of funds and duplicates activities already offered through the HIFIS software;

268 Directive 13 • Paying a salary to a person with lived experience of homelessness for their participation in the Community Advisory Board;

Directive 14 • Employment activities that are normally delivered by other federal, provincial or territorial labour market programs; • Job wages for HF clients, homeless individuals or those at risk of homelessness for participating in an education, training, or pre-employment program; • Salary for a full-time teacher to provide an alternative to provincial or territorial education; • Tuition; • Workplace skills development; • Apprenticeship grants; • Child care, bus passes, clothing or equipment in support of a training or educational program;

Directive 15 • Gathering or refocusing information primarily for the purpose of advocacy, public education or awareness; • Creating or distributing tools for advocacy or public awareness purposes; and • Advocacy activities including public education, awareness sessions, and workshops. Sources: ESDC (2016, emphasis added)

As the HPS directives explicitly state, some expenses are ineligible because they are considered an area of provincial/territorial jurisdiction, such as clinical services (ESDC 2016: Directive 5).

Others are ineligible because they are duplicative of services provided by other federal agencies, such as Veterans Affairs Canada (ESDC 2016: Directive 8). The federal government also steers data-related funding toward the HIFIS system that they administer (ESDC 2016).

HPS has defined maximum funding amounts: the maximum funding for “contributions” is $125 million over five years, while for “grants” the maximum is $250,000 per year (ESDC

2018c: 8.1-2). Grants refer to projects that focus on knowledge development and research and do not include capital costs (ESDC 2018c: 10.3). They must also be deemed low-risk (ESDC 2018c:

10.3). Contributions have higher reporting requirements (ESDC 2018c: 10.4).

269 Once allocated, funding is provided in installments either based on reimbursement of eligible expenditures or advance payments (ESDC 2018c: 9.0). This can be linked to certain pre- determined outputs, such as community plans or reporting (ESDC 2018c: 9.0). Allocated funding which is not spent by the expiry of the funding agreement must be returned (ESDC 2018c: 9.0).

The following factors are described as determining the funding amounts provided via

HPS:

• “Scope and duration of activities;

• Validation of reasonableness and fair market value of proposed expenditures;

• Importance of projected expenditures to success;

• Reasonableness of overall cost given projected outcome(s); and

• Other sources of funding.” (ESDC 2018c: s.7.0)

5.1.2 Alberta’s Family and Community Support Services Program

The Family and Community Support Services (FCSS) program, in place since 1966, is a matched funding program between the Government of Alberta and municipalities,143 where the province provides eighty percent of the funding (Alberta MCYS 2010; FCSSAA 2017). FCSS funds preventive services, with an emphasis on independence and responsibility.144 FCSS cannot be used for programs that “offer direct assistance to sustain an individual or family”

(Government of Alberta 2017: 3). While it is not a homelessness program – indeed, as we will see, it cannot fund housing or other direct supports – FCSS is a significant funding source for some homeless-serving nonprofits. Generally, FCSS is not a “core” funding source for these

143 And Métis settlements. 144 Specifically, the Regulation requires that services under FCC enhance the social wellbeing of individuals and families to develop “independence”, “an awareness of social needs”, “interpersonal and group skills”, or which helps people to and communities to “assume responsibility for decisions and actions which affects them” or sustains them “as active participants in the community” (Government of Alberta 2017b: 2-3).

270 organizations (author’s interviews). This section provides information on FCSS and its rules pertaining to eligible and ineligible expenses.

FCSS privileges nonprofits as funding recipients. The FCSS Regulation requires that municipalities “give priority to funding services under the program that are delivered by volunteer non-profit organizations” (Government of Alberta 2017b: 4). Indeed, promoting voluntarism is an explicit goal of the FCSS program (Alberta MCYS 2010).

Once a municipality decides to establish an FCSS program, it establishes an agreement with the Ministry of Community and Social Services,145 which is then signed and authorized by the local council (Government of Alberta 2017b; Alberta MCYS 2010).146 Municipalities must submit an annual FCSS program report which summarizes revenues, expenditures, and funded projects/services (Alberta MCYS 2010). The FCSS Director and Chief Administrative Officer then sign a certificate attesting that the municipality has contributed its share and that the projects meet program objectives (Alberta MCYS 2010). The FCSS funding has been “steady”: there was no funding increase for seven years, and then a small funding increase in 2015 when the New Democratic Party entered office, to address inflation (author’s interviews).

Participating municipalities are required to promote public participation in governing the

FCSS program, volunteer involvement, efficient use of resources, and “co-operation and coordination with allied service agencies operating in the municipality” (Government of Alberta

2017: 2).

FCSS requires that services provided under the program are “of a preventive nature that enhances the social well-being of individuals and families through promotion of intervention

145 Previously, the Ministry of Children and Youth Services. 146 Multi-municipality FCSS agreements are also possible.

271 strategies provided at the earliest opportunity” (Government of Alberta 2017: 2). Furthermore, services must fulfil at least one of five purposes:

• “help people to develop independence, strengthen coping skills and become more

resistant to crisis;

• help people to develop an awareness of social needs;

• help people to develop interpersonal and group skills which enhance constructive

relationships among people;

• help people and communities to assume responsibility for decisions and actions which

affect them;

• provide supports that help sustain people as active participants in the community.”

(Government of Alberta 2017: 2-3)

Programs that are recreational, rehabilitative, or provide direct living assistance (e.g., money, food, clothing, shelter) are not considered FCSS eligible (Government of Alberta 2017: 3).

FCSS-funded programs cannot be duplicative of government services (Government of Alberta

2017: 3).

The Regulation outlines the following enumerated eligible municipal costs: general administration and management, operation of a board or committee, planning and research, general consulting (to services in the program and to the community), monitoring and evaluation,

272 advertising and promotion, managing a service delivery mechanism, providing training for staff and volunteers, employing staff, and reimbursing volunteers (Government of Alberta 2017).147

Prohibited costs are also outlined in the Regulation. Specifically, FCSS-funded programs cannot include expenditures toward: purchasing land or buildings; building or renovating buildings; purchasing vehicles; municipal property taxes and levies; payments to a member of a board or committee;148 and “any costs required to sustain an organization that do not relate to direct service delivery under the program” (Government of Alberta 2017: 4). In other words, capital expenditures are generally not eligible for FCSS funding, nor administrative expenditures outside of the specific service.

Municipalities that receive FCSS funding must “give priority” to programs delivered by

“volunteer non-profit organizations” (Government of Alberta 2017: 4). The Regulations also outline that municipalities must contribute at least twenty percent of the total program budget, that this funding must come from the municipality’s operating budget, and that other contributions cannot count toward the municipality’s matching share (Government of Alberta

2017).149

5.1.3 Ontario’s Community Homelessness Prevention Initiative

The Community Homelessness Prevention Initiative (CHPI) was introduced in 2013, consolidating five previously separate programs. Its aim is to “prevent, address and reduce homelessness by improving access to adequate, suitable and affordable housing that is linked to

147 Specifically, “reimbursing volunteers for incidental expenses necessarily incurred in providing volunteer services to the program but not including loss of wages” (Government of Alberta 2017: 4). 148 Other than expense reimbursement. 149 Specifically, municipalities must “not apply contributions from agencies towards the program, or funds collected through fees charged to clients for services provided under the program, as part of its matching share” (Government of Alberta 2017: 4). Municipalities also cannot use FCSS payments for other municipal costs, nor can they apply operating costs to funded programs that are not also charged on other municipal projects (Government of Alberta 2017).

273 flexible support services based on peoples’ needs” (MMAH 2012: 1). CHPI has seven principles: housing first, people-centered, partnership based, locally driven, inclusive, fiscally responsible, and outcome-focused (MMAH 2012). CHPI provides funding to municipal Service Managers.

5.1.4 Ontario’s Home for Good Program

In 2017 the Government of Ontario launched the Home for Good (HFG) Program as part of its update of the Long-Term Affordable Housing Strategy (MMAH 11 September 2017). In total, HFG made available $200 million in operating funding.150HFG funding had three streams: a

Service Manager stream; an Indigenous stream; and a provincial stream, which targeted individuals leaving the correctional system (MOH 2017: 1). HFG funding supported the four provincial priority homelessness areas of chronic homelessness, youth homelessness, Indigenous homelessness, and homelessness upon exiting government institutions such as hospitals and prisons (MOH 2017: 1). Funding included operating funding for housing assistance and support services, as well as capital funding for new supportive housing units (MOH 2017: 2).

In the Service Manager stream, funding was allocated based on the outcome of an

Expression of Interest (EOI) process. Service Managers were to submit an EOI outlining their supportive housing needs, program responses, ability to deliver, and intended community partners (MOH 2017: 6). EOIs were evaluated by the Ministries of Housing, Ministry of

Community and Social Services (MCSS), Ministry of Health and Long-term Care (MOHLTC), and the Ministry of Children and Youth Services (MOH 2017).

150 Comprising $33.3 million in 2017-18, $66.6 million in 2018-19, and $100 million in 2019-20 (MOH 2017).

274 In the first two years of the program, HFG was to select a small number of Service

Managers to support demonstrable progress, while in 2019-2020 this was intended to be expanded.

Operational funding for HFG was paid on a quarterly basis, conditional on the receipt of agreements between Service Managers and support services providers as well as quarterly update reports (MOH 2017: 10). These funds were required to be fully spent within the fiscal year – and, if not spent, to be returned to the Ministry (MOH 2017: 10). Capital funding is paid quarterly or monthly (MOH 2017: 15).

Up to ten percent of operating funds can be allocated to administration costs (MOH

2017). An additional five percent of funds can be allocated to administration costs for capital projects (MOH 2017). Capital funding covers up to seventy-five percent of the total capital cost per unit or $150,000 per unit, whichever is less (MOH 2017: 15).

HFG encouraged Service Managers to work with the regional offices of provincial ministries, LHINs, and supportive housing and homelessness nonprofits (MOH 2017). Eligible initiatives were required to address provincial priority areas, collaborate, be consistent with provincial policies and laws, leverage outside funding sources, encourage locally relevant solutions, address changing needs, participate in evaluation, and carry out needs assessments

(MOH 2017: 8-10). The table below outlines each of these requirements as set out in the program guidelines.

Table 30. Home for Good (HFG) Initiative Requirements

Requirement Description Focus on assisting those across the four provincial homelessness priority Provincial areas who have had significant challenges – including complex priority areas service/health needs – accessing and maintaining housing

275 Support appropriate community-level collaboration and/or partnerships during the development of the program’s design, implementation and administration stages (e.g., connections to LHINs, MCSS/MCYS regional offices, mental health and substance use service providers, developmental service providers and other services as needed) Collaboration Service managers are encouraged to work with providers that have supportive housing experience and those who provide specialized services for individuals who fall within the provincial priority areas. This may include experience with the four provincial priority homelessness areas, administering rent subsidies and support services, and familiarity with the addiction and mental health system Consistent with Be consistent with the Supportive Housing Policy Framework and Best provincial Practice Guide policies and Adhere to applicable laws including the Accessibility for Ontarians with laws Disabilities Act, 2005 and the Ontario Human Rights Code Leverage Leverage other services/funding where possible/appropriate (e.g., other outside funding support services or municipal/private/charitable contributions) sources Encourage locally relevant solutions that better meet peoples’ needs in a Local relevance holistic manner Address needs that change over time (e.g., continuing to support at-risk Address youth once they leave transitional supportive housing, life transitions and changing needs aging) Participate in an evaluation component requirement of the program, including tracking success in housing people with diverse characteristics Evaluation (e.g., developmental disability, mental health and addictions, acquired brain injury, fetal alcohol spectrum disorders, etc.) Service managers are also encouraged to carry out a needs assessment with Needs prospective recipients prior to providing assistance, to ensure that the Assessment services to be offered meet recipients’ level and type of needs. Service managers should periodically reassess recipients’ needs. Source: MOH (2017: 8-10)

HFG provided for both operational and capital funding, though operational funding constituted the largest share of the program.151 Operational funds were “to be used to provide housing assistance and/or support services to help eligible recipients obtain and retain stable housing” (MOH 2017: 9). Housing assistance was specified to include rent supplements as well

151 For instance, the City of Toronto’s $90 million in HFG funding is split as $53 million for operating funding and $37 million for capital funding (TSSHA 25 September 2017).

276 as housing allowances.152 Service providers were “encouraged to ensure that housing assistance and support services continue as long as they are needed by recipients” (MOH 2017: 9). Funding could be used to expand existing subsidies and support services, but not in ordinary private rented units and only for individuals in the four provincial homelessness priority areas (MOH

2017: 10).

Capital funding was to be used to increase the supply of supportive housing, both transitional and long-term, as long as units are linked to housing assistance and support services

(MOH 2017: 11). If a capital project is funded, “operating funding must also be targeted to tenants in that specific project for the remainder of the two years of the program.” (MOH 2017:

11) Eligible capital projects included: “new construction, including additions and extensions”;

“acquisition and/or rehabilitation of existing residential buildings to maintain or increase the affordable rental housing stock”; or “conversion of non-residential buildings or units to purpose- built rental buildings/units” (MOH 2017: 11). The following table provides a list of ineligible capital projects.

Table 31. HFG Ineligible Capital Projects

Ineligible capital projects • Nursing homes, long-term care homes, and retirement homes; • Emergency shelter solutions (e.g., homeless and survivors of domestic abuse) and crisis care facilities; • Owner-occupied housing; and • Student residences.

Capital projects recommended for HFG funding must meet a long list of requirements, chiefly aimed at the readiness and viability of the project, such as council approval, consistency with

152 Defined as, respectively, rent subsidies tied to a rental unit and paid directly to landlords, on behalf of recipients, and rent subsidies paid directly to recipients (MOH 2017: 9).

277 provincial laws and policies, an occupancy plan, and financial viability (MOH 2017). These projects must also have rent below 80% of average market rent for a minimum of twenty years, identify the types of supports available to residents and address the provincial priority areas

(MOH 2017). HFG encouraged Service Managers to give priority to projects with contributions by others, including the Service Manager; sponsored by providers that project affordability beyond the twenty-year requirement; have energy efficient features; and are fully accessible

(MOH 2017). Projects were submitted through the Grants Ontario System. HFG capital funding can be “stacked” with funding from other programs, as long as new units are being added (MOH

2017).

5.1.5 Quebec’s Support Program for Community Organizations

PSOC (la programme de soutien aux organismes communautaires) was created in 1973 with the goal of responding to the growing demand of charities to receive aid, advice, information and financial support (MSSS 2014: 7). It is a program under the Quebec Ministry of Health and

Social Services (MSSS) which funds community nonprofits that work in the domain of health and social services. In contrast to the programs described above, PSOC supports advocacy activities in addition to service provision.153 To be eligible for PSOC, organizations must meet the following five criteria:

• They must be a recognized legal nonprofit in Quebec;

• Their affairs must be governed by an administrative counsel with a majority composition

of service users or potential service users;

• Their activities must be in the domain of health and social services;

153 Specifically, it also welcomes : les organismes “qui exerce […] des activités de promotion, de sensibilisation et de défense des droits et des intérêts des personnes utilisant ses services ou des personnes faisant usage de services de santé ou de services sociaux de la région” (MSSS 2014 : 11).

278 • They must act in line with rules approved by general assembly and revised according to

need; and

• They must undertake activities that fit within the structure of PSOC (MSSS 2014).

MSSS outlines six types of health and social services organizations that may be supported by the program: aid and self-help/solidarity; advocacy organizations, organizations for the promotion and defence of rights; lifestyle and community supports; temporary housing organizations; regional (representative) groups; and national (representative) groups (2014: 16-17). The table below presents examples of each organization type, as described by MSSS (2014: 31).

Table 32. Examples of Eligible Health and Social Services Organizations

Category Examples Organizations addressing alcoholism and drug addictions Big Brothers and Big Sisters Aid and self-help/solidarity Alzheimer’s disease societies Certain disabilities-serving organizations Benevolence centres Organizations for the defence of mental health rights, Organizations for the promotion even if this is not the principal mission and defence of rights Organizations for people with a mental or physical disability Youth houses Women’s centres Organizations for mental health Lifestyle and community Sexual assault centres supports Domestic violence organizations Certain organizations addressing alcoholism and drug addictions Suicide prevention organizations Shelters for women affected by domestic violence and in difficulty Temporary housing Youth shelters organizations Shelters for people with mental health problems

Regional groups No examples listed National groups No examples listed

279 The Ministry also outlines several factors that would exclude a nonprofit from PSOC funding. This is the case where the organization’s primary objectives or activities:

• Are relevant to another ministry, whether or not that ministry offers a program like

PSOC;

• Are relevant to another level of government; and

• Are for seminars and colloquia, such as the preparation of teaching or promotional

materials (MSSS 2014: 13).

Additionally, research organizations; grant-making foundations; religious organizations; political organizations; unions; and professional associations are excluded from PSOC (MSSS 2014: 13).

Nonprofits that receive PSOC funding can (and usually do) receive funding from other sources (MSSS 2014). In outlining the structure of PSOC, MSSS notes that increased funding is a function of available MSSS or agency funding; it is not determined “according to costs incurred” by the nonprofit.154

The Ministry introduced an accreditation system in 1995, which was modified in 1998

(MSSS 2014). Essentially, agencies maintain accreditation to assure ongoing PSOC support. The purpose of this system is to aid nonprofits in long-term planning, by providing funding stability

(MSSS 2014). To be eligible for accreditation, agencies must have received PSOC funding for at minimum the last three years (MSSS 2014L 22). Once accredited, agencies must submit annual reports on their activities, finances, and governance (MSSS 2014: 23).

154 Specifically: “Le montant du soutien financier est déterminé notamment en fonction des ressources financières à l’agence ou au MSSS qui, en aucune façon, ne s’engagent à soutenir les services et les activités des organismes selon les couts encourus.” (MSSS 2014: 15, emphasis added).

280 5.2 (In)eligible Expenses in Canadian Emergency Management

5.2.1 Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements

The federal government assists provinces and territories in responding to large-scale disasters through the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA). DFAA guidelines were last updated in 2008 (Public Safety Canada 2008). DFAA is intended to support provinces in assisting the necessities of life for individuals, as well as to support the restored functioning of small businesses and farms, public works and essential community services (Public Safety

Canada 2008). DFAA also funds limited mitigation measures to reduce future infrastructure vulnerability (Public Safety Canada 2008).155 DFAA does not apply to pandemics; human security incidents like terrorist acts and civil disorder; or forest fires, except where they pose a threat to human populations (Public Safety Canada 2008). Requests for funding must be made within six months of the end of the event, via a letter from the premier or responsible minister

(Public Safety Canada 2008: s.2.1). Provincial governments submitting DFAA requests must provide financial estimates and expenditures, including damage and costs estimates (Public

Safety Canada 2008).

Under DFAA, assistance is available when eligible expenses incurred by the province are above $1 per capita, based on the Statistics Canada population estimate for 1 July of the calendar year of the disaster (Public Safety Canada 2008). So, for a disaster occurring in 2017 in Ontario, only a disaster with eligible provincial government expenditures exceeding $14.2 million would be eligible.156

155 Where this occurs, the province will recommend proposed mitigation enhancement and each measure must be agreed to by Public Safety Canada (Public Safety Canada 2008). “The value of enhancements eligible for cost- sharing is limited to 15% of the estimated cost of repair to pre-disaster condition.” (Public Safety Canada 2008: 16) 156 Population as determined by Statistics Canada (2018). Additionally, “innovative recovery solutions” can be eligible for DFAA support. “Generally, if it is less costly to implement a solution that would prevent reoccurrence of similar damages, such a solution is eligible.” (Public Safety Canada 2008: 16)

281 DFAA covers “unrecovered eligible losses”, where “a province has demonstrated that it has exhausted all reasonable legal and practical means to recover costs from individuals or organizations found by the courts to be liable” (Public Safety Canada 2008: 14). Expenditures must have actually been paid out and are net costs after insurance payouts, legal recoveries, and financial assistance from other sources (Public Safety Canada 2008). For example:

Contributions from recognized non-governmental organizations or those resulting from a special disaster-related fund-raising drive can be used to support expenditures ineligible under DFAA. If such contributions are used to support DFAA-eligible expenditures, they will be subtracted from a province's total costs before eligible costs are determined. (Public Safety Canada 2008: 14)

DFAA will not cover:

• Expenditures “for which provision is made for full or partial reimbursement under other

federal programs”;

• The “costs of restoring or replacing items that were insured or insurable”, where this

means that insurance coverage “was available in the area at reasonable cost”, as

determined jointly by the province and Public Safety Canada;

• Loss of: income, wages, profits, revenue, production, productivity, opportunity,

inconvenience, asset, market value, market share, wages or yield;

• Damages that “are an ordinary or normal risk of a trade, calling or enterprise”;

• Provincial sales tax revenues;

• Costs “associated with the settlement of estates of people killed in the course of a

disaster”;

• Punitive damages;

• Assistances to “businesses other than small businesses”;

282 • Assistance to “individuals, households, small businesses, farms and public infrastructure

physically located outside of the affected area”; and

• Interest on loans or late payments made by the provinces (Public Safety Canada 2008:

14-15).

Additionally, DFAA covers, at maximum, replacement costs. Where a provincial government wishes to improve upon previously existing infrastructure, it can receive support for the cost of replacement (Public Safety Canada 2008). DFAA does not cover the cost of repairing structures that were built in a location that was designated as a flood risk area by government authorities at the time it was built (Public Safety Canada 2008).

DFAA is applicable to public sector expenses encompassing most conceivable government activities during the response phase, typically the period from the onset of the event to six months after its end (Public Safety Canada 2008). Most ineligible response expenditures are for costs that are either long-term or ordinary costs for governments. Some recovery expenses are also eligible, but the scope here is more limited. The table below reproduces the list of eligible and ineligible public sector expenditures.

Table 33. Eligible and Ineligible Public Sector Costs

Eligible Response Costs Ineligible Response Costs • Delivery of emergency services to the • Regular salaries in the public affected population, including temporary sector; relocation, shelter, food, clothing, rescue and • Normal operating expenses, transportation, and related social and inquiry including maintenance budgets services; of those involved in the • Incremental costs of providing emergency response, including municipal medical care, treatment and evacuation, and and provincial government return of casualties following a disaster; departments and agencies; • Incremental costs incurred to provide the • Emergency service costs essential services, equipment, material and related to routine incident

283 labour required to sustain the operability of management functions, as public infrastructure; opposed to incremental costs • Incremental costs to provide short-term of responding to broader security measures to the affected area; disaster consequences; • Short-term costs for setting up and operating • Medical services delivered emergency operations centres, including the through the normal health rental cost of temporary telecommunications infrastructure and resources equipment, facilities and services; (hospitals, clinics, ambulance • Expenses and stipend payments associated services and their regular staff with the use of volunteers registered with a complements); and recognized disaster response agency in the • Long-term (over six months) response and initial recovery phases; health protection and • Registration of displaced people (such as is treatment. done by recognized non-governmental organizations); • Provision of mental and physical health counselling services to those affected by the disaster or its response. Such services include post-disaster critical incident stress management, counselling and other immediate post-incident psychological and health interventions; • Provision of financial counselling services to those affected by the disaster or its response; and • Costs associated with making safe the public access and egress routes previously designated by the province or municipality. Eligible Recovery Costs Ineligible Recovery Costs • Repairs or replacement to pre-disaster • Costs associated with general condition of provincial and municipal post-event inquiries, infrastructure and related equipment; commissions or other studies; • Restoration, replacement of, or repairs to • Assistance to provincial infrastructure directly related to the provision, Crown corporations, other than distribution and treatment of potable water those providing water and and sanitary sewage disposal; sanitary sewage disposal; and • Clearance of debris, wreckage and major • Costs associated with silting caused by the disaster from channels of decorative landscaping. rivers and streams, intake and outlet points of sewer and storm drains, and water supply reservoirs where such blockages have the potential to significantly worsen the effects of the disaster. This does not include mitigative “scalping” of gravel beds unless it can be demonstrated that there has been an unusually heavy, disaster-related deposit. The eligible

284 amount is the net cost of removing only the disaster-related deposition as closely as can be estimated to allow a community to function or to preserve navigable channels; • Making safe (including removal of trees and tree limbs) any public infrastructure and public facilities, including beaches, zoos and parks, which constitute a threat to public safety; • Rental or rental equivalent cost of machinery and equipment required to deal with the immediate effects of a disaster, including leasing and operating costs, as well as repair and restoration expenses; • Reasonable expenses for the restoration (to as close as practicable to the original state or capability) of property damaged by those authorized to take necessary actions in the course of disaster response; and • Landscaping that is an essential element of the function of a facility such as a public recreation facility may be eligible. Source: Public Safety Canada (2008: 19-21)

In addition to these general categories, the DFAA Guidance outlines conditions under which the following expenses are eligible: road restoration; appraising and estimating damage; government personnel and equipment; and claims adjustment and program administration.

Generally speaking, these costs are eligible if (1) not under federal jurisdiction and (2) additional to regular government work (Public Safety Canada 2008). Notably, the costs incurred for deploying Canadian Forces personnel and equipment are eligible (Public Canada 2008).

The DFAA Guidance also outlines eligible and ineligible costs for private individuals, residences, small businesses, and nonprofits. The table below reproduces key points from this section of the document.

Table 34. Eligible Private Sector Costs

Eligible Response Costs

285 • Out-of-pocket costs for measures taken based on orders from the proper authorities to reduce the extent of possible damage. Such precautions include the removal of valuable chattels, assets and hazardous materials from the area of immediate risk, the provision of storage space, transportation and special protective measures; and • Incremental costs for shelter and feeding of affected livestock from eligible farms, including the provision of facilities for these purposes and transportation costs to bring livestock to market prematurely and/or to transport it for protection. Eligible Recovery Costs (Individuals/Families) • Compensation at minimum wage for property clean-up by owners or occupants, if substantiated by a damage appraisal report or provincial certificate of work necessity and completion; • Debris clean-up, removal of hazardous material and waste disposal for accessibility and safe occupancy of a residence; • Elimination of mould caused by the disaster through clean-up, repair or restoration; • Costs of restoration, repair or replacement for chattels, furnishings, appliances and clothing of an essential nature to individuals and families. Where provinces have established lists and unit price allowances for items considered essential, and where these are applied on a consistent basis as part of the provincial assistance program, such expenditures will be eligible; • Repair or replacement costs for lawnmowers, snow blowers and household personal computers; • Costs of replacing equipment required for a vocation or trade, such as reference books, tools and informatics devices; • Meal and accommodation expenses incurred in the immediate disaster/evacuation period; and • Reasonable temporary accommodation costs including those incurred when major repairs are underway for damage caused by the disaster. Eligible Recovery Costs (Residences) • Eligible expenses for assistance to repair or restore an owner’s principal residence and/or property will be based on a damage appraisal report; • Repair, restoration and replacement of condominium, 'strata' and cooperative apartment buildings, row-type housing and similar situations where there is individual ownership of units and group ownership of common elements is eligible if they are operated on a not-for-profit basis; • For-profit rental accommodation is only eligible where the criteria for small businesses are met; • Driveway repairs for access or safety are eligible as part of the claim of the property owner. Eligible Recovery Costs (Small Businesses)157

157 “For purposes of the DFAA, a small business is an enterprise with yearly gross revenues as reported for income tax purposes of at least $10,000 but not more than $2 million and employing not more than the equivalent of 20 full- time employees. It also must be other than a “hobby business” and be an owner-operated enterprise where the individual owner-operator is acting as a day-to-day manager and owns at least 50% of the business. Self-employed fishers, trappers, loggers and other harvesters of natural resources are included. One claim should be made per business. However, if a province has established a criterion for the eligibility of small businesses under an existing

286 • Reasonable fixed expenses incurred as a result of the disaster, including rental of office space and equipment, production equipment, rolling stock and facilities, are eligible for assistance for a reasonable period after the end of the disaster. • Reasonable compensation paid by a business to its employees or to a contractor to clean a place of business and prepare it to re-open, including debris clean-up, removal of hazardous material and waste disposal, is eligible. • Costs related to commercially operated apartment buildings and roads servicing them are eligible if they are part of an eligible business. • Landscaping may be eligible if it is an essential element of the function of a facility such as a recreation facility, a botanical garden or a golf course. • If insurance coverage on business buildings can only be purchased for up to a designated fraction of the appraised value of the building, some portion of the uninsured losses may be eligible. • For businesses that do not carry insurance, only those losses for which they could not have obtained insurance coverage at reasonable cost will be eligible, to ensure equal treatment with those who had insurance coverage. Standard insurance policy deductible amounts are not eligible. • Costs for repair or replacement of items not essential to the restoration of a business to a viable state (e.g., a company-owned recreational property, works of art and furnishings) are not eligible. Eligible Recovery Costs (Not-for-profit organizations, charities, service clubs) Repairs, restoration, rebuilding and/or replacement of damaged equipment and facilities owned by an organization such as a church, charity, community service club, or volunteer agency are eligible if: • the province considers that the organization contributes significantly to the fabric and sustainability of the community, and a basic or essential service in the interest of the community as a whole is provided in the facility of the organization; • the province has provided financial assistance under its own program; and • unrestricted public access to the facility is allowed for all members of the community. Eligible Recovery Costs (Not-for-profit business cooperatives) Repairs, restoration, rebuilding and/or replacement of damaged equipment and facilities owned by a not-for-profit business cooperative are eligible if: • the province considers that a business cooperative contributes significantly to the fabric and sustainability of the community, and a basic or essential service is provided in the facility of the cooperative; • the cooperative is not-for-profit; and • the cooperative is generally in accord with the definition in the Cooperative Credit Associations Act Source: Public Safety Canada (2008 24-30)

provincial disaster assistance program, that criterion can be used to replace the minimum gross revenue criterion for the DFAA. The maximum gross revenue criterion for small businesses will be used consistently in either case to determine eligibility under the DFAA.” (Public Safety Canada 2008: 27)

287 Where disagreements arise between the federal and provincial government, the Minister of

Public Safety is the final arbiter of the dispute – however, the Guidance states that “Every reasonable attempt will be made to negotiate disputes at the lowest possible level” (Public Safety

Canada 2008: 13).

5.2.2 Alberta’s Disaster Recovery Program

AEMA administers Alberta’s Disaster Recovery Program (DRP), which “provide[s] financial assistance to individuals, small businesses (including farming operations), not-for-profit organizations (including not-for-profit cooperatives), municipalities and government departments for uninsurable loss and damage caused by emergencies and disasters.” (AEMA 2013: 1) DRPs are intended to assist in maintaining or reinstating: “the basic essentials of life”, “the viability of small businesses and working farms”, “public works and [….] essential community services”

(AEMA 2013: 1). DRP assistance only applies where insurance coverage was not readily and reasonably available (AEMA 2013). DRPs only apply to natural disasters or non-natural emergencies not resulting from conflict (AEMA 2013).

A Disaster Recovery Committee (DRC) decides whether a DRP will be available on the basis of two criteria. A disaster has to have “caused widespread damage to property” and the cause of the disaster must have been “extraordinary” (AEMA 2013: 3). The threshold for an extraordinary event is as follows:

…if it meets or exceeds the equivalent of a 1 in 25 year precipitation level in an urban area; a 1 in 50 year precipitation level in a rural area; or a 1 in 100 year stream flow for watercourses. (AEMA 2013: 3)

Where these criteria are met, the DRC recommends to the Minister responsible for EM the approval of a DRP. In cases where a DRC is not struck, AEMA can make a recommendation. If

288 a DRP is approved, municipalities are notified and must submit an application to AEMA within

90 days of the event (AEMA 2013). Individuals and small businesses must also submit assistance applications within 90 days (AEMA 2013).

DRP assistance is only available for damages that could not have been reasonably prevented; where insurance was not reasonably or readily available before the disaster occurred; it is unlikely that costs could be recovered through legal action; and where the full amount is not covered by other government programs (AEMA 2013: s.2.2.4). The DRP guidelines do not allow for duplication of assistance where assistance is nonprofit-provided:

Contributions from recognized non-governmental organizations or those resulting from a special disaster-related fundraising drive can be used to support the cost of loss or damage that is ineligible under a DRP. If such contributions are used to support eligible expenditures, the contributions will be subtracted from the financial assistance for which the applicant would otherwise be eligible. (AEMA 2013: 7)

The tables below outline eligible and ineligible expenditures as specified in the Guidelines

(AEMA 2013). The first two tables address public sector expenditures, while the latter two address other actors.

Table 35. Ineligible Public Sector Expenditures

Ineligible Expenses (Public Sector) General a) Loss of income, wages, profits and/or revenue, loss of production or productivity, loss of opportunity, inconvenience, loss of asset or market value or market share and/or reduction of yield (e.g., crops, livestock or wood). b) Losses or damages that are an ordinary or normal risk of a trade, calling or enterprise. c) Legal and other costs associated with the settlements of estates of people killed in the course of a disaster. d) Punitive damage awards by courts or out-of-court settlements. e) Assistance to businesses other than small businesses as defined in these Guidelines. f) Financial assistance given to individuals, households, small businesses (including farming operations) and public infrastructure, physically located outside of the affected area. g) Interest on loans obtained for bridge financing or on late payments. (AEMA 2013: 7-8)

289

Response • Regular salaries and wages; • Normal operating expenses; • Emergency service costs related to routine incident management functions; • Medical services delivered through the normal health infrastructure and resources; • Long-term health protection and treatment (AEMA 2013: 9) Recovery • Costs associated with post-event inquiries, commissions, or other studies; • Costs associated with decorative or ornamental landscaping; • Regular salaries and wages; or • Normal operating expenses (AEMA 2013: 10).

Table 36. Eligible Public Sector Expenditures

Eligible Expenses (Public Sector) • Pre-emptive measures undertaken by public authorities (e.g., sand-bagging); • Recovery solutions that reduce or prevent future damages “up to an equivalent of the cost of repairing or replacing actual damaged facilities” (AEMA 2013: 8); • Repair and restoration costs; • Riverbank stabilization; • Response expenditures “from the onset of the event to six months after its end”, such as: o Delivery of emergency services “including temporary relocation, shelter, food, potable water, clothing, rescue and transportation, and related social and inquiry services”; o Incremental costs of providing emergency medical care, treatment, evacuation and return of casualties; to sustain the operability of public infrastructure; to provide short-term security measures in the affected area; and to assess the safety of structures (including houses); o Short-term costs for setting up and operating emergency operations centres; o “Expenses and stipend payments associated with the use of volunteers registered with a recognized response agency in the response and initial recovery phases”; o Registration of displaced people; o Providing mental and physical health counseling services; o Providing financial counseling services; and o Costs associated with making public access or exit routes safe (AEMA 2013: 9); • Recovery expenditures “from the onset of the event to the program closure”, such as: o Repairs or replacement of GoA and municipal infrastructure and related equipment; o Restoration, replacement, or repairs to infrastructure for water treatment and sewage;

290 o Costs of appraising and estimating damage if additional to work of regular employees; o Engagement of third parties for damage assessment and cost appraisal; o Clearing debris, wreckage, and silt from water bodies, where blockages have the potential to worsen the effects of the disaster; o Making safe any public infrastructure and public facilities; o Rental costs of machinery and equipment to deal with the immediate effects of a disaster; o Restoring property damaged by authorities in the course of disaster response; and o Landscaping that is an essential element of the function of a facility (AEMA 2013: 9-10); • Road restoration, where these roads are maintained by the provincial government, a municipality, or where roads are multi-use, privately constructed industrial roads used both by the industry and the general public (AEMA 2013: 10); • Costs associated with public equipment use (but not equipment that is purchased and retained, unless this is more cost-effective than a rental); • Public sector personnel costs, such as overtime pay, temporary hires, and the deployment of military personnel and equipment; • Program administration costs that are incremental to normal administration activities;

DRP provides for assistance to individuals, small businesses,158 and nonprofits for disaster recovery.

Table 37. Eligible Expenditures for Individuals, Small Businesses, and Nonprofits

Eligible Expenses (Private)

158 Defined as an enterprise with yearly gross revenues between $6 000 and $15 000 000 and employing 20 or fewer FTEs. It also must not be a hobby business and must be owner-operated (AEMA 2013: 14).

291 • Costs “taken based on direction from the proper authorities to reduce the extent of possible damage” (e.g., removal of hazardous materials from an area of immediate risk); • Incremental costs for shelter and feeding affected livestock (AEMA 2013: 12);

Residences • Repair and restoration of “condominium, strata, and cooperative apartment buildings, row- type housing and similar situations where there is individual ownership of units and group ownership of common elements” but only where they are operated on a not- for-profit basis and the majority of units are owner-occupied; • Nonprofit or for-profit rental properties, where small businesses conditions are met; • Driveway repairs for safety or access (AEMA 2013: 12-13);

Individuals/Families • Financial assistance at 120% of the minimum wage to a maximum of 200 hours for property clean-up of the principal residence; • Debris clean up, removal of waste for accessibility and safe occupancy; • Costs of restoring, repairing, or replacing “assets, furnishings, appliances and clothing of an essential nature to individuals and families”, up to established maximums; • Costs of replacing equipment required for a vocation or trade; • Meal and accommodation expenses incurred in the immediate post-disaster or evacuation period; • Reasonable temporary accommodation costs (AEMA 2013: 13-14);

Small Businesses • “Reasonable fixed expenses incurred as a result of the disaster, including rental of office space and equipment, production equipment, rolling stock and facilities”; • Reasonable compensation to employees or a contractor to clean a place of the business and repair it to re-open; • Costs related to commercially-owned apartment buildings and roads servicing them, if part of the small business; • Landscaping, if an essential element of the function of a facility (AEMA 2013: 14-15);

Farming Operations159 • Outlying farm buildings in use on a working farm, including farmhouses if a principal residence; • Residences that provide accommodation to non-family workers; • Farm-owned rental properties where rent is declared farm income; • Uninsurable fences; • A portion of uninsured losses on farm buildings, where insurance coverage can only be purchased for a designated fraction of the appraised value of the buildings;

159 A specific category of small business, including businesses carrying out: beekeeping, horse stabling or raising, cultivating crops, dairy farming, fruit growing, fur farming, harvesting managed woodlots, livestock raising or showing, market gardening, operating a feedlot, operating a nursery/greenhouse, operating a wild-game reserve, poultry-raising, raising fish and mollusks, tree farming, wool or fibre farming.

292 • “In cases of farmland gouging or serious riverbank erosion such as might result from a flood, eligible costs may include leveling the farmland to workable condition where practicable and cost-effective, except if the area of the farm that suffered damage was not in production”; • Destruction of already harvested and stored crops, losses of other business inventory held in storage;

Nonprofits • Repairs, restoration, rebuilding and/or replacement of damaged equipment and facilities, if: o “The organization contributes significantly to the fabric and sustainability of the community, and a basic or essential service in the interest of the community as a whole is provided in the facility of the organization”; o “In the case of church property, it must be shown that the property constitutes a facility essential to the secular needs of the community”; o “Public access to the facility is allowed for all members of the community. Limitations on assistance based on the proportion of public access may apply” (AEMA 2013: 17); o For nonprofit business cooperatives, if it “contributes significantly to the fabric and sustainability of the community, and a basic or essential service is provided in the facility of the cooperative” and it “is in accordance with the cooperative principles set out in section 2(1) of Alberta’s Cooperatives Act” (AEMA 2013: 17-18).

Table 38. Ineligible Expenditures for Individuals, Small Businesses, and Nonprofits

Ineligible Expenses (Private) Residences • Assistance provided to repair or replace secondary residences or recreational property; • Costs of repairing roads whose sole purpose is to provide access to or within private recreational areas (unless owned and operated as a small business); • Repairs to seasonal trails, informal dirt paths or tracks and trails (unless they are part of a small business property); • Costs related to unoccupied homes under construction (generally, because not principal residence); • Private landscaping, unless required by municipal bylaw; • Repairs to fences on private, non-farm property, except where required for safety or required by municipal bylaw, code, or standard; • Replacing canned goods and refrigerated foodstuffs; • Repairing or replacing personal vehicles (AEMA 2013: 13); • Costs associated with replacing non-basic or luxury items (e.g., beverages, cameras, books, fur coats, artwork, seasonal decorations) (AEMA 2013: 14)

293 Small • Uninsured losses, if insurance was available; Businesses • Deductibles, unless they are unusually high; • Repair or replacement of items not essential to the restoration of a small business to a viable state; (AEMA 2013: 15) • Repairs or replacement of farm machinery (because generally considered insurable); • Crops in the field that were insurable under the crop insurance program (AEMA 2013: 15-17);

Nonprofits • “Private not-for-profit organizations are generally not eligible for assistance unless they meet the small business eligibility criteria or allow for public access to facilities” (AEMA 2013: 17);

5.2.3 Disaster Recovery Assistance for Ontarians

Disaster Recovery assistance for Ontarians (DRAO) assists individuals (homeowners and tenants), small businesses,160 small farms,161 and nonprofits162 affected by a disaster (Government of Ontario 2019a). DRAO is activated by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing

(MMAH). While generally disasters covered under DRAO are “sudden, unexpected” causing

“costly and widespread” damage, there is a special provision for low-income households affected by sewage backup (Government of Ontario 2019b: 1).163 When DRAO is activated in an area, applicants must submit their applications for assistance within 120 calendar days (Government of

Ontario 2019b). Applicants can request a reconsideration of MMAH’s decision, either on program eligibility or assessed payment amounts (Government of Ontario 2019b).

160 To qualify for DRAO, a business must be a “small, owner-operated business”. Specifically, this means that the owner-operator owns at least 50% of the business and is involved in day-to-day management of the business. It also can’t be a hobby business. To be small enough to qualify, the business can employ no more than 20 FTE employees and must have between $10 000 and $2 000 000 in gross revenues (Government of Ontario 2019b: 10). 161 The requirements for small farms are the same as for small businesses (except obviously that it must be a farm business). 162 To be eligible for DRAO a nonprofit must “provide a service to the broader community and allow public access to its facilities” (Government of Ontario 2019b: 13), which is very similar to the Albertan DRP requirements. 163 The low-income threshold for DRAO is as follows: “The program’s low-income thresholds are established each year based on 50% of median after-tax household income, adjusted for the number of people living in the household, as reported by Statistics Canada” (Government of Ontario 2019b: 5).

294 DRAO offers funding only for “essential property” – a primary residence or the main premises and key equipment and inventory for a small business, farms, or nonprofit

(Government of Ontario 2019b). The program only covers uninsured costs. As such, individuals and organizations must submit an application to their insurer prior to applying for DRAO

(Government of Ontario 2019b). Only costs that an insurance provider will not cover are eligible for DRAO assistance (Government of Ontario 2019b). Insurance deductibles are ineligible for

DRAO assistance (Government of Ontario 2019b).

DRAO establishes three general categories of eligible expenses: emergency evacuation/relocation and living expenses; emergency measures, cleanup, disinfection and disposal expenses; and repair and replacement expenses (Government of Ontario 2019b). DRAO establishes caps “based on essential costs” on the eligible amount of assistance in these categories (Government of Ontario 2019b: 4). The maximum payment per application is $250

000 (Government of Ontario 2019b). There is a $500 deductible applied to DRAO funding, although this deductible can be waived for low-income households (Government of Ontario

2019b). The following example is included in the guidance document for DRAO:

Table 39. Disaster Recovery Assistance for Ontarians (DRAO) Sample Assistance Calculation

Example of Application Assistance Calculation An applicant’s home is seriously damaged in a tornado. The applicant is not able to receive reimbursement through insurance, because the insurance policy does not cover damage from tornadoes. The applicant submits total costs for emergency expenses and property repairs of $289,000. The adjuster determines that $266,000 of this amount is eligible under the program.

The payment the applicant will receive is calculated as follows: • eligible application amount as determined by the adjuster: $266,000 • final eligible amount after $500 deductible: $265,500 • application paid at 90% of the final eligible amount: $238,950

The applicant will receive a payment of $238,950 under the program.

295 Source: Government of Ontario (2019b: 4)

The following tables outline DRAO-eligible items for the four applicant categories. The final table lists ineligible expenses.

Table 40. DRAO-Eligible Items, Individuals

Category Eligible Items • Transportation costs to evacuate members of your household a reasonable distance out of the affected area, in the event it is unsafe to remain in your home. Attach receipts where available. If the evacuation is carried out using an owned vehicle, eligible costs will be based on a standard rate per kilometre (see program website for current rates). • Temporary living expenses for accommodations and meals, if evacuation is required. Eligibility is limited to the immediate emergency period only. Attach receipts. • Emergency clothing or personal care items, if evacuation is Emergency required. Attach receipts evacuation and • Boarding of pets at kennels, if evacuation is required. living expenses Eligibility is limited to the immediate emergency period only. Attach receipts. • Transportation and storage of essential property, if required to avoid damage. Attach receipts. • Purchase of drinking water if regular water source is unavailable or unsafe due to the disaster. Attach receipts. • Purchase of consumable heat, light and power supplies, such as fuel, candles and batteries, if power is unavailable due to the disaster. Attach receipts. • Rental of generator or heater, if power is unavailable due to the disaster. Attach receipts. • Emergency measures directly taken to prevent or limit damage to your primary residence. Eligible costs may include purchase of sandbags or rental of water pumps or generators. Costs associated with emergency measures taken to prevent or limit Emergency damage to non-essential elements of the property such as sheds measures, cleanup, or swimming pools may not be applied for. Attach receipts. disinfection and • Hours worked by you or members of your household doing disposal expenses your own cleanup and disinfection necessary to make your home or property safe and provide access. Reimbursement is limited to 40 hours of work at the Ontario minimum wage. Provide a record of hours spent and work completed. Hours must be reasonable based on the amount of damage to the

296 home. Work undertaken by neighbours or others on a volunteer basis should not be included. • Consumable cleaning and disinfection supplies. Attach receipts. • Rental of cleanup equipment such as dehumidifiers and wet/ dry vacuums. Attach receipts. • Cleanup and debris removal completed by a contractor that is necessary to make your property safe and provide access. Eligible costs include removal of excess water, removal and disposal of damaged items or building materials to prevent mould or other hazards, and removal of hazardous tree branches or other debris on the property to the extent necessary to provide safe access. Attach invoices and receipts, ensuring they include a description of the work completed. • Fees for reconnection of gas or electricity services disconnected due to the disaster. Attach bill from service provider or invoice/ receipt. • Landfill tipping fees for disposal of debris or damaged property arising from the disaster. Attach receipts. Structural expenses (only for homeowners) • Necessary repairs to a primary residence, including repairs to the foundation, structure (floors, ceilings and walls), roof, chimney, and plumbing, heating and electrical systems. Eligible costs will be based on standard construction costs. Costs for upgraded finishes are ineligible. Repairs to damage that predates the disaster are not eligible. Attach receipts for work already completed. For work not yet completed, provide estimates from qualified contractors. You will be asked to submit receipts when the work is completed. • Cleaning, flushing, repair or replacement of septic tanks and, and repair or replacement of leaching beds, due to damage Repair and caused by the disaster. Attach receipts and evidence of when replacement the septic system was installed or rebuilt. expenses • Note: eligible costs for replacement are calculated on a depreciated basis. • Repairs to driveways to the extent required for safety and access. Attach receipts.

Essential contents • essential appliances including furnace, hot water heater, refrigerator, freezer, stove/range, clothes washer and clothes dryer • basic furnishings including bedroom furnishings for each household member, dining table and chairs, and seating and other furnishings for the main gathering area

297 • essential equipment for infants and children such as crib, stroller, and car seat or booster seat • other essential household property including bed linens, kitchen items and window coverings • basic household electronics including one television, one telephone and one computer • essential personal items including clothes, towels and toiletries (Government of Ontario 2019b: 7-8)

Table 41. DRAO-Eligible Items, Small Businesses

Category Eligible Items • Evacuation of essential business assets, if necessary to avoid damage. Attach receipts where available. If the evacuation is carried out using an owned vehicle, eligible costs will be based on a standard rate per kilometre (see program website for current rates). • Storage of essential business assets, if necessary to avoid damage. Eligibility is limited to the immediate emergency period only. Attach receipts. • Rental of alternative office space and associated equipment, if Emergency the main businesses premises must be evacuated. Eligibility is evacuation and limited to the immediate emergency period only. Attach relocation expenses receipts. • Purchase of drinking water if regular water source is unavailable or unsafe due to the disaster. Attach receipts. • Purchase of consumable heat, light and power supplies, such as fuel, candles and batteries, if power is unavailable due to the disaster. Attach receipts. • Rental of generator or heater, if power is unavailable due to the disaster. Attach receipts.

• Immediate emergency measures taken directly to prevent or limit damage to essential business assets. Eligible costs may include purchase of sandbags or rental of water pumps or generators. Costs associated with emergency measures to Emergency prevent or limit damage to non-essential business assets (e.g., measures, cleanup, landscaping) may not be applied for. Attach receipts. disinfection and disposal expenses • Reasonable compensation paid by a business to its employees, over and above normal wages (e.g., overtime wages), for debris cleanup, removal of hazardous material and waste disposal necessary to allow the business to be operational. Attach timesheets, payroll information or other documentation.

298 • Amounts paid to a contractor for debris cleanup, removal of hazardous material and waste disposal necessary to allow the business to be operational. Attach receipts. • Consumable cleaning and disinfection supplies. Attach receipts. • Rental of cleanup equipment such as dehumidifiers and wet/ dry vacuums. Attach receipts. • Cleanup and repair of landscaping essential to the function of a business, such as in the case of an outdoor recreational facility. Attach receipts. • Fees for reconnection of gas or electricity services disconnected due to the disaster. Attach bill from service provider or invoice/ receipt. • Landfill tipping fees for disposal of debris or damaged property arising from the disaster. Attach receipts.

Structural expenses • Necessary repairs to an essential business premises, including repairs to the foundation, structure, roof, chimney and plumbing, heating and electrical systems. Eligible costs will be based on standard construction costs. Costs for upgraded finishes are ineligible. Repairs to damage that predates the disaster are not eligible. Attach receipts for work already completed. For work not yet completed, provide estimates from qualified contractors. You will be asked to submit receipt when the work is completed. • Cleaning, flushing, repair or replacement of septic tanks, and repair or replacement of leaching beds, due to damage caused by the disaster. Attach receipts and evidence of when the Repair and septic system was installed or rebuilt. replacement • Note: eligible costs for replacement are calculated on a expenses depreciated basis. • Repairs to driveways or parking areas to the extent necessary for the business to operate and required for safety or access. Attach receipts. • Repair or replacement of a dock if necessary to the operation of the business, e.g., a marina. Attach receipts and evidence of when the dock was installed or rebuilt. • Note: eligible costs are calculated on a depreciated basis.

Contents expenses • Replacement of inventory or stock actively used by the business. Maximum eligible amount is equal to actual replacement cost less salvage value of lost inventory. Depreciation may be applied depending on the age and nature

299 of items. Attach receipts (proof of purchase of lost and replacement inventory or stock). • Replacement or repair of damaged furnishings, equipment and tools essential to the function of the business. The nature of eligible items will vary according to the nature of the business. Eligible costs are calculated on a depreciated basis. Attach receipts (proof of purchase of lost and replacement items).

Table 42. DRAO-Eligible Items, Nonprofits

Category Eligible Items • Evacuation of moveable property essential to the function of the not-for-profit organization. Attach receipts where available. If the evacuation is carried out using an owned vehicle, eligible costs will be based on a standard rate per kilometre (see program website for current rates). • Storage of essential property, if necessary to avoid damage. Attach receipts. • Rental of alternative office space and associated equipment, if Emergency the organization’s main premises must be evacuated. evacuation and Eligibility is limited to the immediate emergency period only. relocation expenses Attach receipts. • Purchase of drinking water if regular water source is unavailable or unsafe due to the disaster. Attach receipts. • Purchase of consumable heat, light and power supplies, such as fuel, candles and batteries, if power is unavailable due to the disaster. Attach receipts. • Rental of generator or heater, if power is unavailable due to the disaster. Attach receipts.

• Immediate emergency measures taken directly to prevent or limit damage to essential property of the organization. Eligible costs may include purchase of sandbags or rental of water pumps or generators. • Costs associated with emergency measures to prevent or limit damage to non-essential property (e.g., landscaping) may not Emergency be applied for. Attach receipts. measures, cleanup, disinfection and • Reasonable compensation paid to employees, over and above disposal expenses normal wages (e.g., overtime wages), for debris cleanup, removal of hazardous material and waste disposal necessary to allow the organization to be operational. Attach timesheets, payroll information or other documentation. • Amounts paid to a contractor for debris cleanup, removal of hazardous material and waste disposal necessary to allow the organization to be operational. Attach receipts

300 • Consumable cleaning and disinfection supplies. Attach receipts. • Rental of cleanup equipment such as dehumidifiers and wet/ dry vacuums. Attach receipts. • Cleanup and repair of landscaping essential to the function of the organization, as in the case of an outdoor recreational facility. Attach receipts. • Fees for reconnection of gas or electricity services disconnected due to the disaster. Attach bill from service provider or invoice/ receipt. • Landfill tipping fees for disposal of debris or damaged property arising from the disaster. Attach receipts. Structural expenses • Necessary repairs to a facility essential to the function of the organization, including repairs to the foundation, structure, roof, chimney and plumbing, heating and electrical systems. Eligible costs will be based on standard construction costs. Costs for upgraded finishes are ineligible. Repairs to damage that predates the disaster are not eligible. Attach receipts for work already completed. For work not yet completed, provide estimates from qualified contractors. You will be asked to submit receipts when the work is completed. • Cleaning, flushing, repair or replacement of septic tanks, and Repair and repair or replacement of leaching beds, due to damage caused replacement by the disaster. Eligible costs for replacement are calculated on expenses a depreciated basis. Attach receipts and evidence of when the septic system was installed or rebuilt. • Repairs to driveways or parking areas to the extent necessary for the organization to function and required for safety or access. Attach receipts.

Contents expenses • Replacement or repair of damaged furnishings, equipment, tools and stock essential to the function of the organization. The nature of eligible items will vary according to the nature of the organization. Attach receipts (proof of purchase of lost and replacement items).

Table 43. DRAO-Eligible Items, Small Farms

Category Eligible Items • Evacuation of livestock and essential farm assets such as Emergency equipment and inventory, if necessary to avoid damage. Attach evacuation and receipts where available. If the evacuation is carried out using relocation expenses an owned vehicle, eligible costs will be based on a standard rate per kilometre (see program website for current rates).

301 • Storage of essential farm assets, such as equipment and inventory, if necessary to avoid damage. Attach receipts. • Alternative accommodation for livestock that must be evacuated. Eligibility is limited to the immediate emergency period only. Attach receipts. • Purchase of water supplies for livestock if regular water source is unavailable or unsafe due to the disaster. Attach receipts. • Purchase of consumable heat, light and power supplies, such as fuel, candles and batteries, if power is unavailable due to the disaster. Attach receipts. • Rental of generator or heater, if power is unavailable due to the disaster. Attach receipts.

• Immediate emergency measures taken directly to prevent or limit damage to essential farm assets, including essential buildings and equipment. Eligible costs may include purchase of sandbags or rental of water pumps or generators. Attach receipts. • Reasonable compensation paid to employees, over and above normal wages (e.g., overtime wages), for debris cleanup, removal of hazardous material, waste disposal or restoration of active fields to working condition (e.g., leveling, repairing ruts and sinkholes), as necessary to allow the farm to be operational. Attach timesheets, payroll information or other documentation. Emergency • Amounts paid to a contractor for debris cleanup, removal of measures, cleanup, hazardous material, waste disposal or restoration of active disinfection and fields to working condition (e.g., leveling, repairing ruts and disposal expenses sinkholes), as necessary to allow the farm to be operational. Attach receipts. • Disposal of dead livestock lost due to the disaster. Attach receipts. • Purchase of consumable cleaning and disinfection supplies, rental of cleanup equipment, and rental of equipment/fuel costs to restore active fields to working condition. Attach receipts. • Fees for reconnection of gas or electricity services disconnected due to the disaster. Attach bill from service provider or invoice/ receipt. • Landfill tipping fees for disposal of debris or damaged property arising from the disaster. Attach receipts.

Structural expenses Repair and • Structural repair of essential farm buildings. Depending on the replacement nature of the farm, this may include barns, equipment storage expenses buildings, silos or other grain and feed storage, greenhouses, retail space, or tasting areas. Rental properties on the portion of

302 the farmland used for the farming operation may be eligible if the rent is declared as farm income. Attach receipts for work already completed. For work not yet completed, provide estimates from qualified contractors. You will be asked to submit receipts when the work is completed. • Repairs to driveways or parking areas only to the extent necessary for the farm to operate and required for safety or access. Attach receipts. • Repair or replacement of livestock fencing essential to the farm operation. Decorative or non-essential boundary fencing is not eligible to be applied for. Attach receipts.

Contents expenses • Repair or replacement of essential farming machinery and equipment. Essential machinery and equipment will depend on the nature of the farm operation. Attach invoices/receipts (proof of purchase for both lost and replacement items). • Note: Maximum eligible costs for replacement will be calculated on a depreciated basis • Loss of farm inventory held in storage at the value immediately before the disaster, including crops already harvested and in storage (such as hay/ feed), seed and fertilizer. Attach receipts or evidence of loss. • Loss of livestock as a direct result of the disaster, if the livestock could not be insured. Attach receipts or evidence of loss. • Veterinary or other costs to treat livestock injured as a direct result of the disaster. Attach receipts. • Land repair and preparation, and replacement of lost trees with seedlings, where damage has occurred to a managed woodlot, including nurseries, orchards and tree farms. A managed woodlot must be operated with a reasonable expectation of profit, show signs of significant active management, or be the subject of an approved Managed Forest Plan. Attach receipts and, if applicable, evidence of active management in the form of a business or forest operational plan, demonstration of significant investment or revenue, or participation in the Ontario Managed Forest Tax Incentive Program.

Table 44. DRAO-Ineligible Items

Category Ineligible Items • any expenses incurred as the result of a sewer backup unless you qualify for the special provisions for low-income households Individuals • replacement of items not considered essential property under the program. These include luxury items such as jewelry or cosmetics,

303 personal electronics such as cell phones (other than the single allowable telephone per household) and cameras, recreational property such as sports equipment, and collectibles and antiques restoration of landscaping, fencing, or retaining walls • driveway repairs other than those required for safety or access • replacement of finishes such as drywall and flooring in non- essential and recreational basement areas. Eligible costs for basements include the replacement of finishes for essential living spaces only, such as a primary bedroom for a member of the household or a main living room. For recreation rooms and other non-essential basement areas, only the replacement of damaged insulation and vapour barriers is eligible repair of structural damage to a secondary residence such as a cottage or other recreational property. A secondary residence is any residence in which you do not ordinarily reside improvements to the property or repairs above a basic level. Eligible amounts for repairs will be based on standard building costs • insurance deductibles (Government of Ontario 2019b: 8-9)

• evacuation of property not essential to the function of the business (e.g., art or personal property). • landscaping costs not essential to the function of the business. • costs associated with the disinfection or cleanup of items that are not essential to the function of the business (e.g., non-essential furnishings, recreational property, or art). Small • loss of revenue, wages, or business opportunity. Businesses • Business loan costs. • costs associated with personal injuries. • normal operating costs. • insurance deductibles; however, in an exceptional circumstance where a small business purchased insurance coverage with an unusually high deductible, the ineligible amount of the deductible may be adjusted. • evacuation of property not essential to the function of the not-for- profit organization • costs associated with the disposal, repair, cleanup, or replacement of items not essential to the function of the not-for-profit organization Nonprofit • loan costs Organizations • loss of revenue • costs associated with personal injuries • normal operating costs • insurance deductibles; however, in an exceptional circumstance where a not-for-profit organization purchased insurance coverage

304 with an unusually high deductible, the ineligible amount of the deductible may be adjusted • evacuation or relocation of property not essential to the function of the farm costs associated with the cleanup, disposal, disinfection, repair, or replacement of items not essential to the function of the farm (e.g., recreational property or vehicles, recreational roads or recreational trails, or decorative fences) • losses to crops in the field Small Farms • losses to livestock for which insurance is available • loss of revenue, wages, or business opportunity • farm loan costs • costs associated with personal injuries • normal operating costs • losses of sowed: seed, fertilizer, topsoil, or soil fertility • application of weed control measures

5.2.4 Ontario’s Municipal Disaster Recovery Assistance

The Municipal Disaster Recovery Assistance (MDRA) program “helps municipalities recover from extraordinary costs after a natural disaster” (Government of Ontario 2019c: 1). It is administered by MMAH. MDRA is activated when a disaster meets the criteria set out in the program guidelines: specifically, if it is “a sudden, unexpected, extraordinary, natural event that results in eligible municipal costs at least equal to three per cent of a municipality’s own purpose taxation levy” (Government of Ontario 2019c: 2). If MDRA is activated, the province and municipality “enter into a grant agreement”, where payments are based on “eligible costs incurred by the municipality as a result of the natural disaster” (Government of Ontario 2019c:

1). As with the federal and Quebecois financial programs, assistance is provided on a sliding cost-share scale, as follows:

Table 45. Provincial and Municipal Cost-Sharing, Municipal Disaster Recovery Assistance (MDRA)

Cost-sharing formula applied if eligible costs meet Provincial Municipal or exceed 3% OPT levy and the program is contribution contribution activated

305 Eligible costs up to 3% of own purpose taxation levy 75% 25% Eligible costs exceeding 3% of own purpose taxation 95% 5% levy Source: Government of Ontario (2019c: 5)

Table 46. Provincial and Municipal Cost-Sharing, MDRA, Example

Eligible municipal costs Provincial contribution Municipal contribution Up to 3% of OPT levy: $30 000 $22 500 (75%) $7 500 (25%) Exceeding 3% of OPT levy: $170 000 $161 500 (95%) $8 500 (5%) Total: $200 000 $184 000 $16 000 Source: Government of Ontario (2019c: 5)

Notably, the provincial share of costs is much higher under MDRA than under the Quebecois equivalent.

Eligible costs under MDRA are separated into two categories: operating costs and capital costs (Government of Ontario 2019c). Operating costs “refer to the delivery of services and response activities during, and the weeks immediately following, a natural disaster”

(Government of Ontario 2019c: 8). Capital costs “refer to expenditures incurred to restore essential municipal assets such as infrastructure and public facilities” (Government of Ontario

2019c: 8). For both operating and capital costs, only incremental costs are eligible.

Table 47. MDRA-Eligible and -Ineligible Costs

Eligible Costs Ineligible Costs • providing essential services and • normal operating expenses a ensuring the operability of public municipality would have infrastructure during and in the incurred without the immediate aftermath of a disaster occurrence of the natural • rescue and transportation for evacuated disaster persons • emergency services costs Operating related to routine incident Costs • incremental costs of immediate actions to ensure safe passage on frequently management functions (e.g., travelled roads and emergency routes responding to a medical • regular municipal staff overtime and emergency) volunteer expenses incurred to deliver • regular salaries and benefits emergency goods and services during of municipal employees, the disaster (e.g., staffing emergency even if the employee has

306 shelters, delivering goods to vulnerable been diverted to disaster persons) related work • measures taken to reduce the extent of • costs incurred by local damage or danger to the community electricity distribution (e.g., removing hazardous debris such companies as tree limbs, rocks, ice) • decorative landscaping or • rental costs for emergency equipment or corrective pruning special facilities (e.g., debris removal • grinding of tree stumps vehicles, generators, operating an emergency inquiry line) • hiring temporary employees for disaster-related activities • purchase of materials and procurement • tree replacement or tree of external service providers for capital canopy restoration projects • all costs covered by • repair or restoration of municipal insurance, or any other property and infrastructure (e.g., program, and insurance municipal roads, buildings, sidewalks) deductibles to pre-disaster condition Capital • damage to property or Costs • engineering appraisals and recovery infrastructure not related to cost estimates for municipal property the natural disaster for and infrastructure which the program has been • incremental labour costs and activated incremental costs for the use of the • damage to private property claimant’s own equipment for repairing • improvements to property or restoring essential infrastructure and and infrastructure facilities

5.2.5 Quebec’s Programme d’Aide Financière Aux Sinistrés

Quebec’s disaster financial assistance program [Programme d’aide financière lors de sinistres réels ou imminents] applies to individuals, businesses, EMNPOs, government agencies responsible for civil security, and local and regional governments that have been affected by a disaster or deployed temporary preventive disaster measures (SPQ 12 February 2015).

Assistance is available for a year, counting from the date that a program was opened in a territorial area (SPQ 12 February 2015).

Individuals can receive financial assistance for repairs or replacement of essential facets of a principal residence (up to 80% of eligible losses in some cases, 100% after a $500

307 deductible in other cases); temporary preventive measures (up to $3 000); temporary costs for necessities of life such as clothing, lodging, and food ($20/person/day, plus $50/person or

$150/person for clothing replacement, depending on the season); furniture replacement and removal; (SPQ 12 February 2015).

5.3 (In)eligible Expenses in UK Emergency Management

5.3.1 Bellwin Scheme

The Bellwin Scheme is a central government disaster financial assistance scheme managed by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). The Minister for

Housing, Communities and Local Government has discretion to activate the program for qualifying emergencies. Qualifying incidents “should be exceptional” and are typically natural disasters (DCLG October 2017: 4).

When the Bellwin Scheme has been activated, local authorities are able to make a claim.

This includes the following enumerated organization types:

a. a county council;

b. a district council;

c. the Greater London Authority;

d. a London borough council;

e. the Common Council of the City of London;

f. the Council of the Isles of Scilly;

g. a police authority (including Police and Crime Commissioners);

h. a joint authority established by Part IV of the Local Government Act 1985, other than a

metropolitan county passenger transport authority;

308 i. a Combined Fire Authority;

j. a National Park Authority or the Broads Authority. (DCLG October 2017: 5)

The DCLG will reimburse one-hundred percent of eligible expenditures after a “threshold” of

0.2% of the individual authority’s calculated annual budget (DCLG October 2017: 5). For instance, eligible costs above ₤914 130 would be reimbursable for Manchester (DCLG 2017).

The Bellwin Scheme is “intended to reimburse the cost of local authority actions taken in the immediate phase of an emergency, not those taken as part of the recovery phase. The scheme is not intended to fund longer term repairs or costs.” (DCLG October 2017: 4) Reflecting this requirement, eligible spending must take place within “one month from the date when a qualifying incident comes to an end” (DCLG October 2017: 4). To be eligible, an expenditure must therefore meet two conditions: it must have been taken by a local authority in connection with taking “immediate action to safeguard life or property or to prevent suffering or severe inconvenience” and it must have taken that action “as a result of the incident(s) specified in the scheme” (DCLG October 2017: 6). The table below, which is reproduced from Annex A of the

Bellwin Scheme Guidance (DCLG October 2017: 9-10), provides some examples of expenditures that would be expected to qualify for assistance.

Table 48. Examples of Bellwin Scheme-Eligible Expenditures

Category Examples of Eligible Expenditures

a) where repair is insufficient, the removal and replacement of street lighting, street signs, bus shelters and other street furniture, fences, railings damaged Street by the incident, where in its damaged state it presents a danger to public clearance safety or security;

b) works to clear debris – fallen trees and other objects causing obstruction or damage to highways, pavements and footpaths;

309

c) hire of additional vehicles, plant and machinery that are not those already in use by the authority, and incidental expenses to carry out such works.

d) additional temporary employees or contractors, to work on the emergency or replace permanent employees diverted from normal work;

Staff costs e) special overtime for employees, either during the emergency for overtime worked on the emergency itself, or afterwards to catch up on work from which they were diverted by the incident.

Drainage f) the costs of initial land drainage works to clear debris and unblock works watercourses which are or may be the cause of danger to the public.

g) costs of evacuating people from dangerous structures, and temporary rehousing (bed and breakfast);

h) costs of providing emergency supplies of food and other emergency provisions, and key services to affected communities during the period of the emergency;

Community i) costs of maintaining key communications and providing emergency support information to affected communities;

j) costs of temporary mortuaries;

k) In relation to non-administration purposes, the costs of setting up temporary premises including costs of removal, increased costs due to rent, rates, taxes, lighting, heating, cleaning and insurance.

l) In certain circumstances, marginal costs associated with military assistance Military may be eligible for reimbursement through the scheme. Examples include assistance additional travel, accommodation and other subsistence costs for military personnel that have been deployed as part of the emergency response.

m) The immediate nature of emergency expenditure means that capital expenditure is unlikely to qualify for grant, but there may be limited Capital circumstances where it could apply or a contribution could be made. The authority must demonstrate that this secures better value for money than current expenditure and is connected to immediate action to safeguard life or

310 property or to prevent severe inconvenience. Specifically, it must demonstrate:

i) given the existence of wider capital budgets, why additional (as opposed to simply reprofiled) capital expenditure was necessary to safeguard life and property; and ii) that this capital expenditure offered better value for money than the alternative of current expenditure. The Department should be consulted before including any capital expenditure in a claim; and iii) it otherwise meets the criteria of the scheme – including that such works are carried out within the eligible spending period and are immediate.

Examples of eligible capital costs may include some permanent repairs to structures rather than “patching up” repairs where there is a good value for money reasons for doing so and the repairs are carried out straightaway.

n) emergency works required to safeguard dangerous structures, including making them secure (where not insurable); Other

o) Initial repairs to flood defences damaged as a result of the incident.

Source: DCLG (October 2017: 9-10, Appendix A)

Expenditures that do not meet the two criteria described above are ineligible for cost recovery under the Bellwin Scheme. Recoverable costs must be additional to what a local authority would normally expect to incur. Insurable expenditures are non-recoverable. Capital expenditures are usually not recoverable – that is, unless the local authority can demonstrate “why capital expenditure on immediate action to safeguard life and property or to avoid severe inconvenience would represent better value for money than current expenditure” (DCLG October 2017: 7). The following table, reproduced from Annex B of the Bellwin Scheme Guidance (DCLG Otober

2017: 9-10), provides some examples of expenditures that would usually not qualify for assistance.

Table 49. Examples of Bellwin Scheme-Ineligible Expenditures

Category Examples of Ineligible Expenditures

311

a) costs which are normally insurable, whether by the authority or any other party (e.g. under household insurance policies); Insurable

costs and tax b) we would not expect to reimburse taxation costs through the scheme, including Landfill Tax.

c) loss of income (e.g. from facilities closed as a result of the emergency, Loss of income including Council Tax discounts), as this falls outside the scope of section 155 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989.

d) costs associated with road resurfacing will not be eligible for Bellwin Scheme funding and will be excluded from any submitted claim. The Road repairs Department for Transport recommends local highway authorities continue to retain a contingency from the funding it receives from central Government to help repair roads that may have been damaged through weather incidents.

Longer term e) longer term works of repair and restoration (i.e. not immediate actions). works

f) the normal wages and salaries of the authority's regular employees, Salary costs whether diverted from their normal work or otherwise, and the standing costs of the authority's plant and equipment.

g) expenditure eligible for any other specific grants, e.g. police grant; Other funding

and h) betterment, e.g. repairs to a significantly higher standard than their betterment condition on the day before the incident.

312 Appendix 6. Emergency Management Policy and Disaster Risk in Canada and the United Kingdom

This appendix provides an overview of emergency management policy structure and disaster risk for Canada and the United Kingdom. In both countries, as in much of the world, EM policy grew out of civil defense in the First and Second World Wars. Policies for air raid precautions and protecting critical infrastructure were later adapted or transformed to meet a wider array of emergency and disaster contexts (McConnell 1998; Lindsay 2009; Boyle and

Speed 2018). Over time, natural disasters have become increasingly important in EM policy, in both countries but especially in Canada. This has precipitated a rise of social services in EM policy. While the UK relies to a considerable degree on private insurance to address the risk of natural disasters, Canadian policy includes a mix of insurance and government disaster financial assistance programs. Finally, EM is addressed through tiered responsibility in both countries, where local governments are the primary responders and higher levels of government become involved only where local capacity is exceeded.

6.1 Canada

EM in Canada has primarily addressed natural disasters. Although human-made disasters

– such as chemical spills, plane crashes, and terrorist incidents – certainly do occur, natural disasters are much more common.164 The diversity of Canada’s weather and physical geography generates an array of natural hazards to plan for and manage.165 According to the Canadian

Disaster Database (CDD), which Public Safety Canada publishes, there have been 544 EM

164 Of the 544 events in the Canadian Disaster Database for 1990 to 2017, 451 are natural while the rest are either classed as technological (87) or conflict (6). 165 For instance, Canada has fifteen distinct terrestrial ecozones (Lands Directorate 1986).

313 “disasters” and “incidents” in Canada between 1 January 1990 and 12 October 2017.166 There are several criteria, any of which can result in the classification of an incident as a disaster.167

To offer some context as to scale and prevalence, the chart below provides a yearly summary of fatalities, injuries, and evacuees in Canadian disasters, drawn from the CDD. As it shows, fatalities and injuries are rare relative to evacuations – the median annual fatalities and injuries were, respectively, 24 and 20, compared with 13 605 evacuees.168 This is consistent with the global trend toward costlier disasters with fewer fatalities (Below and Wallemacq 2018). The vast majority (429 of 544) of disasters occurring during this period were “meteorological – hydrological” events: avalanches, cold events, droughts, floods, heat events, hurricanes/typhoons/tropical storms, unspecified and other storms, storm surge, storms and severe thunderstorms, tornados, wildfires, and winter storms.

Figure 7. Annual Fatalities, Injuries, and Evacuees in Canadian Disasters, 1997-2016

166 Based on a downloaded search for disasters from 1990 to 2017 conducted on 13 October 2017 (Public Safety Canada n.d.). 167 These are: ten or more fatalities; one hundred or more affected individuals; an appeal for national or international assistance; historical significance; and significant damage or interruption of normal processes such that a community cannot recover on its own (Public Safety Canada n.d.). Over the 544 disasters, there have been 1 749 fatalities. Eighty-three disasters have featured at least one fatality, while fatalities have exceeded 100 in just three cases. The only three disasters to exceed 100 fatalities consist of: a 2009 heat event in Vancouver and Fraser, BC, which killed 455; the 2009 H1NI (“Swine Flu”) pandemic, with 425 fatalities; and a 1998 airplane crash in Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia, which killed 229 people. 168 Average figures are higher in all categories – there were, on average, 65 fatalities, 505 injuries, and 23 207 evacuees annually – owing to very large disasters in certain years. The 2009 heat event and H1N1 outbreaks led to uncharacteristically high numbers of fatalities and injuries in that year, for instance.

314 100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fatalities Injured Evacuated

It is worth noting, however, that EM refers not only to events that the CDD describes as

“disasters”. As elsewhere, Canadian EM responds on a habitual basis to small-scale incidents

315 like chemical spills and house fires. A pilot study of the National Fire Information Database

(NFID) covering three-quarters of the Canadian population found that between 36 000 and 49

000 fire incidents occurred annually between 2005 and 2014, resulting in 439 256 total fire incidents (Statistics Canada 2017).169 To contextualize these figures a bit, the Toronto Fire

Services – which covers the 2.8 million residents of the City of Toronto – responded to 121 131 emergency response incidents in 2017 (Toronto Fire Services 2018).

Figure 8. Toronto Fire Services 2017 Incident Response Summary

Vehicle Incident Technical Rescue Other Emergency Incidents Non-Emergency Medical Emergencies Fires CBRNE & Hazardous Materials Carbon Monoxide

0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000

Source: Toronto Fire Services 2018

These small-scale incidents occur with much greater frequency and constitute part of the ordinary capacity of response agencies such as fire, police, and ambulance. EM also includes wilderness emergency response, for example to avalanches, maritime incidents, and landslides.170

6.1.1 The History and Legislative Context of Emergency Management

169 These figures are not inclusive of forest fires, since those fall under a different policy regime, as we will see. 170 Avalanches kill on average 8.5 annually (Stethem et al. 2003). The Coast Guard coordinates responses to approximately 7 000 maritime incidents annually (CCG 2009). There are often thousands of small landslides in Canada in a year (Guthrie 2013).

316 Canada has, of course, been affected by disasters throughout its history. In particular, numerous great fires affected Canadian cities in the 1800s and early 1900s (Lindsay 2009). Other major early disasters include the 1912 Regina tornado, the 1914 sinking of a passenger ship called the Empress of Ireland, the 1917 Halifax explosion, the 1918 influenza pandemic, the

1929 Newfoundland tsunami, and the 1929-1937 drought on the prairies (Lindsay 2009).

However, formal government EM systems are primarily a postwar phenomenon (Lindsay 2009).

This section discusses the history and legislative context of EM in Canada.

Emergency powers legislation in Canada has generally imbued governments with five groupings of powers: to authorize necessary action; to control location of people; to use property and control resources; to require service; and to search, arrest, and fine (Lindsay 2014). The first emergency powers legislation in Canada, the War Measures Act (WMA) – which was based on the Defence of the Realm Act in Britain – was enacted in response to the outbreak of World War

One (Niemczak 2001). WMA was used in the World Wars and during the 1970 FLQ Crisis.171 In late 1970, the WMA was replaced by the Public Order (Temporary Measures) Act, which was substantially similar in content (Niemczak 2001). In the 1980s this was replaced by the

Emergencies Act and the Emergency Preparedness Act, the latter of which describes the federal government’s EM roles and responsibilities (Lindsay 2014; FCM National Security Group

2006). The Emergency Preparedness Act was replaced in 2007 by the Emergency Management

Act, which serves as the current federal EM legislation.

There has been a general trend toward the demilitarization of federal EM policy (Juillet and Koji 2013), although this process has not been linear. Civil defence policy – as developed

171 A notable non-war use of the WMA occurred in 1917 in response to the Halifax disaster: WMA was used to provide relief to the affected neighbourhood and individuals (Oberlander and Fallick 1992). Indeed, the reconstruction of Richmond following this disaster “gave rise to Ottawa’s first intervention in the housing field” (Oberlander and Fallick 1992: 5).

317 ahead of and implemented during World War Two – was organized federally within the

Department of National Defence, although many responsibilities were decentralized to provinces and municipalities (McConnell 1998). Following the end of the war, many of those same duties that had been organized during the war were seen as transferable to natural disasters – such as

“early warning, internal security, industrial dispersion, and evacuation” (McConnell 1998: b.2,

2). Accordingly, in 1951 the responsibility for civil defence was transferred to the Ministry of

National Health and Welfare and its new Civil Defence Division (McConnell 1998).172

In the 1950s, civil defence policy began to take on the tiered, multi-level approach that is in place today. The federal government took on coordination, research, training, equipment provision, and financial aid roles. Meanwhile, provincial governments agreed to set up civil defence organizations and “to ensure that the municipalities in the urban target areas put in place local organizations” (McConnell 1998: b.2, 5). By 1951 each province had created a civil defence organization (McConnell 1998). Municipally, all communities with populations greater than 50 000 people had established civil defence organizations by 1952 (McConnell 1998).173 To support the development of the civil defence system, a cost-sharing Civil Defence Financial

Assistance Program was created in 1952 to aid provinces in developing their civil defence plans

– initially for war efforts only, but this was expanded to include projects with a peacetime use in

1957 (McConnell 1998).174 By the 1960s, policy was increasingly extended to include

172 The inclusion of natural disasters in civil defence occurred “apparently at provincial insistence” (McConnell 1998: b.2, 5) 173 With the exception of Ottawa, which had a federal agency undertaking civil defence (McConnell 1998). By 1955, 554 municipalities had a civil defence organization and 128 of these were fully developed (including a director, services, and training facilities) (McConnell 1998). 174 From 1952 to 1959, the federal government contributed $4.5 million to the program (an average annual expenditure of $638 087). Figure is not adjusted for inflation and is drawn from the McConnell study (1998: b.2, 15).

318 “peacetime” emergencies such as natural disasters, resulting in changes to the policy nomenclature, as well as substance (Henstra 2011).

Organization of federal EM policy continued to be the subject of internecine conflict throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. The responsible agency moved from department to department from the 1950s onward (McConnell 1998; Boyle and Speed 2018), oscillating between civilian agencies, like the Department of Health and Welfare, and the

Department of National Defence. Ultimately, the question of where EM policy should be situated was settled in 2003 when Public Safety Canada was created through the amalgamation of three agencies.175

This is not the end of the story, however. Although best practice generally supports taking an all-hazards approach to EM (Public Safety Canada 2019), it is important to emphasize the diversity of authority structures which exist for disasters of different kinds. Two other federal agencies are noteworthy. First, the Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response (CEPR) within the Public Health Agency of Canada is responsible for coordinating EM regarding public health emergencies like epidemics and addressing health concerns during non-health emergencies.176 This includes human security threats like bioterrorism. Second, Natural

Resources Canada and its agencies monitor natural hazards such as earthquakes, space weather, volcanoes, floods, landslides, and wildfires. Natural Resources Canada focuses exclusively on monitoring an array of natural hazards, while CEPR has a role in emergency response for the subset of health emergencies.

175 They were the Department of the Solicitor General, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (in the Department of National Defence) and the National Crime Prevention Centre (in Justice Canada) (Public Safety Canada 2015). 176 The Public Health Agency of Canada is an agency of the Ministry of Health.

319 6.1.2 Public Emergency Management Policies

Because the British North America Act 1867 had not contemplated the need for civil defence or its application to non-conflict emergencies, Canada confronted a Constitutional question in establishing its EM system (Lindsay 2009, 2014; Juillet and Koji 2013). As a result,

EM policy is decentralized with governments sharing responsibilities for planning, training, and coordinating, while local governments are the primary implementers (Lindsay 2009; Henstra and

McBean 2005; Henstra 2011; Public Safety Canada 2009). The current Emergency Management

Framework for Canada chiefly addresses federal-provincial coordination (Juillet and Koji 2013).

In practice, however, much of the responsibility for EM has been devolved to municipalities

(Raikes and McBean 2016). Approximately 80% of emergencies are handled solely at the local level, and municipalities are the first responders in 90% of emergencies (Juillet and Koji 2013:

31, 39; FCM National Security Group 2006: 5). This reflects the doctrine of tiered response in

Canadian EM, “which holds that municipal governments respond first to emergencies, with support from higher-level governments when necessary” (Henstra 2013: 4).

EM, then, is a responsibility shared across all levels of government in Canada. The balance of responsibility differs depending on the nature, location, and scale of the emergency, as well as the type of EM service being provided. Although most emergency response occurs at the community or provincial/territorial level, the federal government plays a role in monitoring and risk assessment activities; in setting the national EM framework; and occasionally in response to major disasters that exceed municipal and provincial capacity. The federal government may also be involved when disasters occur in areas of federal responsibility, such as on First Nations land.

320 At the federal level, the Ministry of Public Safety is primarily responsible for EM. Public

Safety Canada undertakes the following EM functions: operations; situational awareness; risk assessment; planning; logistics; and finance and administration (Public Safety Canada 2011).

The Government Operations Centre (GOC), which is housed within Public Safety Canada, provides nationwide monitoring, assessment, planning, and response management. During a response it coordinates resources and capabilities from federal, provincial, and territorial (FPT) governments, industry, crown corporations, and nonprofits. For instance, in May 2017 the

Province of British Columbia requested GOC support to identify options for procuring sandbags

(Public Safety Canada 2011).

The FPT governments of Canada created an Emergency Management Framework for

Canada in 2007, which was updated in 2011 and 2017 (EMPD 2011; EMPOD 2017). The purpose of this framework is to establish a common approach for FPT EM, to enable collaboration and ensure coherence across initiatives. The framework defines four interdependent components of EM: prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (EMPD 2011; EMPOD 2017). It also identifies ten principles intended to reflect the underlying goals of EM in Canada (EMPD 2011; EMPOD 2017). Finally, the framework establishes a governance structure for EM at all levels of governance and defines coordination mechanisms (EMPD 2011; EMPOD 2017).

Most provincial and territorial governments in Canada serve a primarily regulatory function in Canadian EM. They set out and oversee requirements for municipalities in their EM programs, but are less involved in carrying out EM functions directly. As Deguefe notes,

“provincial governments will usually only respond to a municipal emergency once the municipality’s capacity is overwhelmed or if the municipality requires specialized resources or

321 expertise.” (2018: 12) Almost all provinces and territories require local authorities or municipal governments to develop an EM program and plan.177

Ontario, Alberta, and Quebec are among the provinces that require local EM programs and plans, although this is somewhat different in Quebec due to the regional structure of EM policy. The Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act (EMCPA) is the current EM legislation in Ontario, having replaced the Emergency Plans Act. EMCPA requires municipalities to create an EM program (MCSCS 2016). EM programs are to consist of an EM plan, as well as training programs and exercises for EM personnel, and public education on emergency preparedness (Raikes and McBean 2016). Regulation 380/04 implements EMCPA

(MCSCS 2016). Alberta’s Emergency Management Act similarly requires municipalities to establish and maintain an emergency plan. Municipalities must also appoint an EM Committee, approve a Municipal Emergency Bylaw, maintain an EM Agency, and appoint a Director of EM

(Schreiber 2018; Government of Alberta 27 November 2018). Finally, Quebec’s Civil Protection

Act “is the most explicit in standardizing EM policy in a provincial statute in Canada” (Raikes and McBean 2016: 14).178 It requires a supra-local authority referred to as regional county municipalities (MRC, municipalité régionale de comté) to work with municipal governments to establish a civil protection plan (SCQ n.d.).

The Quebec provincial government plays a larger role in EM than is the case for other provinces and territories. Provincial government responsibilities are outlined in the National

Civil Security Plan, with several ministries and agencies taking responsibility for different aspects of EM (SCQ n.d.). For instance, Safety Quebec (Sûreté du Québec) is responsible for evacuations, while the the Quebec Housing Society (SHQ, la Société d’habitation du Québec) is

177 All but one, according to Raikes and McBean (2016). 178 La Loi sur la sécurité civile (L.R.Q. c.S-2.3)

322 responsible for emergency lodging, and the Ministry of Public Security (la Ministère de la

Sécurité publique) undertakes financial aid (SPQ 2019). The Civil Security Organization of

Quebec (OSCQ, l’organisation de la sécurité civile du Québec) plans and coordinates EM measures at the provincial level (SCQ n.d.).

In Alberta and Ontario, like elsewhere in Canada, provincial agencies lead the coordination of EM, while responsibilities for implementing EM are generally undertaken at the municipal level – except in situations where local capacity is exceeded. Ontario’s Office of the

Fire Marshall and Emergency Management (OFMEM) undertakes this role in Ontario, while the parallel agency in Alberta is the Alberta Emergency Management Agency (AEMA). OFMEM is a branch of the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services. For its part, AEMA is situated in the Ministry of Municipal Affairs.

Canadian governments provide immediate disaster assistance, either directly or through nonprofit organizations. This most often occurs in the response phase of an emergency, where the focus is on preserving life and property, as well as meeting immediate needs of affected individuals. An obvious example is the provision of fire services to extinguish a fire. Local government agencies will typically provide transportation to facilitate safe, speedy, and orderly evacuations. For instance, the City of Toronto has an arrangement with its public transport agency to provide buses in the event that an evacuation is needed (author’s interviews).

Governments will also typically make shelter available to residents evacuated due to a disaster.

Lodging arrangements can vary, from mass shelters consisting of large numbers of cots in a gymnasium to the use of college dorms or the acquisition of hotel rooms. Generally speaking, during a disaster governments adopt significant responsibility to assure the basic needs of affected individuals. However, governments often provide immediate assistance that is

323 purposefully minimal, to encourage individuals to make use of personal, insurance, or social resources such as staying with friends and family (author’s interviews). Psychological support is another common element of government-provided immediate assistance.

6.1.3 Disaster Assistance Programs

All three levels of Canadian government – but especially provincial/territorial and federal governments – have established disaster financial assistance programs to support individuals, governments, small businesses, and nonprofits affected by major natural disasters. Disaster financial assistance programs aim to minimize the disruption to societies from natural disasters.

Where they apply to government actors, they also recognize the budgetary strain posed by extraordinary disaster events. It is worth noting that disaster financial assistance programs have been criticized for offering minimal relief, being inconsistently comprehensive, entailing delays, and weakening individual incentives to reduce risk (see, e.g., Henstra and Thistlewaite 2017a;

Burgess 2012; Shughart 2011). Nevertheless, these policies are used across many Canadian jurisdictions and comprise a large institution of Canadian EM policy. This section reviews the major disaster financial assistance programs federally, as well as in the three case provinces

(Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec).

The federal government provides transfer payments to provincial and territorial governments that experience large-scale disasters through Disaster Financial Assistance

Arrangements (DFAA).179 DFAA was established in 1970 and, although it has no fixed budget, has disbursed in excess of $4.8 billion throughout its existence (Public Safety Canada 15 May

2018; Henstra and McBean 2005). DFAA has become more expensive over time as the

179 There are a few other federal government disaster assistance programs focused on specialized areas, but DFAA is the main program. For a full inventory see Public Safety Canada (2017).

324 frequency and costliness of disasters has increased. On average, payments made under DFAA have increased from an average of $10 million annually in 1970-95 to $110 million in 1996-2010 and $360 million in 2011-16 (Public Safety Canada 14 March 2017: 1).180 Projected DFAA costs are expected to increase, at an estimated annual cost of $902 million by 2021 (PBO 2016: 2).

The table below provides data on EM spending by departments with core responsibility for EM in the three case provinces as well as the federal government. The high level of spending from

Public Safety Canada reflects the growth of DFAA payments over time.

Figure 9. Emergency Management Spending by Departments with Core Responsibility for Emergency Management181

Public Safety Canada Alberta Ministry of Municipal Affairs Ministère de la Sécurité Publique de Québec Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200

EM EM Spending ($ millions) 100 0 2015 2016 2017 2018

180 The PBO (2016) arrives at slightly different figures, but the overall trend of rising annual average payments is consistent. 181 Sources: Public Safety Canada (2018), AMMA (2016, 2017, 2018), MSPQ (2016, 2017, 2018), and OMSG (2017, 2018). The Alberta Ministry of Municipal Affairs includes AEMA’s budget on a different line from disaster- specific assistance programs (i.e., 2013 Alberta Floods, 2016 Wood Buffalo Wildfires). The figure above reflects these programs as well. For Quebec, the budget line “Sécurité civile et sécurité incendie” from the Ministry of Public Security was used.

325 DFAA is intended to support provinces in assisting the necessities of life for individuals, as well as to support the restored functioning of small businesses and farms, public works and essential community services (Public Safety Canada 2008). DFAA also funds limited mitigation measures to reduce future infrastructure vulnerability (Public Safety Canada 2008). Provinces and territories can receive DFAA assistance when their eligible expenditures exceed $3.03 per capita, with the amount of assistance increasing as costs rise.182 A wide array of response and recovery costs are eligible, including public sector costs as well as private costs covered by provincial and territorial governments.183 The escalating cost-share formula is depicted in the table below, with the example of Ontario’s 2017 population as a point of reference.

Table 50. DFAA Cost-sharing Formula, Calculated for Ontario 2017

Eligible provincial Eligible expense threshold, applied to Government of expense thresholds Ontario’s 2017 population Canada share (per capita of population) (14.2 million people)184 (percentage) First $3.03 $0-$43 million No assistance

Next $6.07 $43 million - $129.2 million 50%

Next $6.07 $129.2 million – $215.4 million 75%

Remainder Beyond $215.4 million 90%

DFAA is not the only disaster assistance program. Other programs aim to support specific communities or to address certain elements of EM. Disasters affecting First Nations reserve lands are the responsibility of Indigenous Services Canada (ISC). The Emergency

182 This threshold was revised in 2016. Previously, assistance was offered after costs of $1 per capita, with the escalating scales occurring at the next $2 per capita and the $2 per capita after that. Disasters must now be much more expensive in order to be eligible for DFAA funding, and especially for higher rates of cost-sharing. 183 But for more specifics, see Appendix 5. 184 Population as determined by Statistics Canada (2018).

326 Management Assistance Program, which was established in 2005, provides funding to First

Nations community for EM mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (ISC 2018;

Government of Canada 19 November 2013). Other federal disaster assistance programs include the Disaster Mitigation and Adaptation Fund and Agriculture and Agri-food Canada’s

AgriRecovery program.

Provinces and territories commonly have financial assistance programs that overlap with

DFAA. The content and structure of these programs vary, and it is outside the scope of this dissertation to undertake a comprehensive review. Unfortunately, the author was unable to find any secondary literature reviewing disaster financial assistance across Canadian provinces and territories. Therefore, to provide an overview of the structure of these arrangements the paragraphs below review provincial financial assistance programs in this dissertation’s three case provinces (Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec). All three provinces have programs established for time-limited periods following disasters that assist affected individuals, small businesses, and nonprofits. Specific rules on eligibility, as well as the inclusion and coverage of costs differ. For example, Ontario and Quebec’s programs include provisions for tenants to replace personal items; Alberta’s program does not.185 However, the focus in all three cases is on enabling affected individuals and organizations to return to a new normal. In addition to these supports, all three provinces provide financial aid to municipal governments to offset some of the costs associated with disaster response. Aid programs for municipal governments in all three cases also assisted with disaster recovery – for example, repairing damage to public infrastructure.

AEMA administers Alberta’s Disaster Recovery Program (DRP). In “extraordinary” disaster events, DRP offers assistance to individuals, small businesses (including farms), nonprofits,

185 See Appendix 5 for more detail on eligible and ineligible expenses in each of the programs.

327 municipal governments, and provincial government agencies (AEMA 2013).186 Financial assistance is geared toward “uninsurable loss and damage caused by emergencies and disasters.”

(AEMA 2013: 1). The DRP guidelines are very detailed, but assistance is generally available for individuals to cover costs associated with safely returning to their homes, including repair or replacement up to previous functioning. Assistance to small businesses and nonprofits is geared toward business continuity – that is, the guidelines cover costs associated with getting these organizations in a position to operate normally.187 Public sector assistance also has a business continuity element, but covers a wider range of activities, such as disaster response and recovering programming. One such cost is expenses and stipends for affiliated volunteers

(AEMA 2013: 9).

Because DRP mainly applies to flooding,188 the Government of Alberta has a second disaster assistance program, the Municipal Wildfire Assistance Program (MWAP), implemented through AEMA. MWAP provides financial assistance to municipalities that have incurred

“extraordinary” fire-suppression costs for wildfires outside of Alberta’s Forest Protection Area.

As with DRP, public sector disaster response, recovery, and repair and restoration costs are eligible for MWAP assistance (AEMA 2011). Unlike DRP, MWAP only has a municipal cost recovery component – individuals, small businesses, and nonprofits are not eligible for assistance.

186 Further details on the definition of an extraordinary disaster, as well as eligible and ineligible expenses, see Appendix 5. 187 Nonprofits are covered under the DRP only if the organization “contributes significantly to the fabric and sustainability of the community” and provides a “basic or essential service in the interest of the community as a whole” in its facility, in addition to which it must provide public access to the facility “for all members of the community” (AEMA 2013: 17). Nonprofit business cooperatives are also included with these requirements (AEMA 2013: 17-8). 188 This is because DRP “only covers disasters that are considered uninsurable” (Government of Alberta 2019). Although flood insurance has recently become more widely available and affordable, there remain significant limitations to the insurability of assets against flooding from extreme weather events. Insurance is more widely available for fires.

328 Quebec’s disaster financial assistance program [Programme d’aide financière lors de sinistres réels ou imminents], similar to DRP, assists individuals, small businesses, nonprofits, and municipal governments (SPQ 2016, 1 March 2018). Like DFAA, Quebec’s support to municipalities is on a scaled cost-sharing basis, where the first three dollars of eligible costs per inhabitants is solely borne by the municipality, after which provincial support is available.189

Whereas EMNPO services during a disaster are addressed through municipal expenditures in other programs, Quebec has a funding stream specifically for organizations having provided disaster assistance (SPQ 2014).

Disaster Recovery for Ontarians (DRAO) and Municipal Disaster Recovery Assistance

(MDRA) are the Government of Ontario’s current financial assistance programs. DRAO assists individuals, small businesses, and nonprofits affected by a disaster (Government of Ontario

2019a, 2019b), while MDRA support is for municipal governments (Government of Ontario

2019c). Three general categories of expenses are available for DRAO support: emergency evacuation, relocation and living expenses; emergency measures, cleanup, disinfection, and disposal expenses; and repair and replacement expenses (Government of Ontario 2019b). All

DRAO support is capped at $250 000 and includes a $500 deductible (Government of Ontario

2019b).

For its part, MDRA is a support program for municipalities affected by major natural disasters. Like DFAA and the Quebecois financial assistance program, it is based on a sliding cost-sharing scale. MDRA can be activated when a natural disaster results in eligible municipal costs exceeding three percent of the municipality’s own purpose taxation (OPT) levy

189 The full scale is as follows: no provincial funding for the first three dollars per inhabitant, 25% cost-sharing for the fourth and fifth dollars per inhabitant, 50% cost-sharing for the sixth and seventh dollars, and 75% provincial coverage for additional costs (SPQ 2016).

329 (Government of Ontario 2019c; MMAH 2019). When it is activated, the province covers seventy-five percent of eligible costs up to three-percent of the municipality’s OPT levy, and ninety-five percent for costs exceeding that amount (Government of Ontario 2019c). The table below provides an example of this arrangement.

Table 51. Provincial and Municipal Cost-Sharing, MDRA, Example

Eligible municipal costs Provincial contribution Municipal contribution

Up to 3% of OPT levy: $30 000 $22 500 (75%) $7 500 (25%)

Exceeding 3% of OPT levy: $170 000 $161 500 (95%) $8 500 (5%)

Total: $200 000 $184 000 $16 000 Source: Government of Ontario (2019c: 5)

MDRA-eligible costs are split into two categories: operating costs and capital costs. Operating costs pertain to service delivery and other response activities during and immediately following a disaster (Government of Ontario 2019c). Capital costs are expenditures to “restore essential municipal assets such as infrastructure and public facilities” (Government of Ontario 2019c: 8).

In addition to these permanent disaster assistance programs, provincial governments have occasionally made financial assistance available through one-time programs in reaction to specific major disasters. The Government of Ontario, for instance, created a one-time program

“to help those municipalities and conservation authorities that were severely impacted by the

December 21-22, 2013 ice storm” (MMAH 2015: 1), one of the province’s worst such storms. In

330 Alberta, the Government of Alberta offered all individuals affected by the 2016 Fort McMurray

Wildfires $1,250 in emergency assistance (CBC News 3 October 2016).190

Finally, some municipal governments also offer disaster financial assistance – but this is uncommon and generally narrower in scope (Henstra and Thistlewaite 2017a). Examples include

Hamilton’s Residential Municipal Disaster Relief Assistance Program and the City of Ottawa

Residential Compassionate Grant Policy (City of Hamilton 27 April 2017; City of Ottawa 2009).

Disaster financial assistance policies exist at all three levels of government in Canada – although chiefly at the federal and provincial level. However, built into Canadian EM policy is the expectation that individuals will absorb some costs of disasters. The share of individual responsibility is influenced by several factors, including: the circumstances of the disaster, nature of costs, and capacity of individuals to pay. Private insurance is the “most significant risk- sharing mechanism” in an EM context (Henstra and Thistlewaite 2017b: 3), although it is less prevalent in Canada than the UK. Private insurance coverage is available for most natural hazards in Canada (Sandink et al. 2016). However, affordability and the scope of coverage varies. In particular, coastal and river flooding is rarely available (Sandink et al. 2016). Both government and nonprofit disaster assistance is typically restricted to uninsured or underinsured individuals (author’s interviews; Public Safety Canada 2008). However, this is not always the case: all evacuees were eligible for provincial government and Red Cross financial assistance provided immediately following the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire. Government disaster assistance programs usually also restrict eligibility to costs that are uninsurable, not available at a reasonable cost, or where available insurance would not have provided adequate coverage (see

190 During that same disaster, the Canadian Red Cross also provided a cash transfer of $600 per adult and $300 per child to evacuated households (Bellefontaine 11 May 2016). In total, Canadian Red Cross disbursed $91.7 million in direct cash transfers during this response (CRC September 2016).

331 Appendix IV). Nonprofit financial assistance tends to have more relaxed criteria in this regard

(author’s interviews). While government disaster financial assistance in Canada rarely activates for small- or medium-sized emergencies, the Canadian Red Cross’ personal disaster assistance program exists across the country.

6.1.4 Coordinating Emergency Response

As mentioned above, Canada positions the bulk of EM responsibility on local governments, under a doctrine of tiered response (Henstra 2013). Within this general federal arrangement, however, numerous agencies coordinate during and between emergencies. As such, coordination is an important, ongoing element of EM policy. This section discusses EM coordination in Canada, with an emphasis on the bodies that coordinate between government agencies and EMNPOs.

During a disaster response, all three levels of government may – depending on the severity of an incident – establish an emergency operations centre (EOC). EOCs are executive decision-making and coordination bodies. Depending on the nature of the disaster and the legacy of relationships, different actors may sit on the EOC. Typically, key government ministries – such as public health, natural resources, environment and social services – will be present. First responders (e.g., fire, police, emergency medical services) are usually represented on EOCs, as are agencies responsible for critical infrastructure and utilities. Key EMNPOs may be represented on an EOC individually, there may be a single nonprofit sector liaison, or a government agency may act as the nonprofit sector representative (author’s interviews). For instance, a governmental “Nonprofit Organization (NPO) Liaison” has a dedicated seat at the

EOC in Calgary. The City’s EM agency and social services department jointly created the NPO

332 Liaison position to address weaknesses with a flood response in 2013 (Calgary Neighbourhoods

23 March 2017).

EOC representation reflects existing relationships with the lead agency, as well as need in a disaster. Accordingly, EOC representation at a local level can be quite variable. The most common arrangement observed by this author consisted in EMNPO representation through the emergency social services representative. The Canadian Red Cross and Salvation Army often have their own independent representation at the EOC, but it is rare for other EMNPOs to sit in an EOC directly.

Local governments coordinate amongst one another through mutual aid agreements, which are usually struck between geographically contiguous responder agencies, such as fire departments or ambulances. While mutual aid agreements are commonplace in coordinating inter-jurisdictional first responder resource-sharing, wildland firefighting is coordinated through a different mechanism in Canada. An EMNPO called the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire

Centre (CIFFC) coordinates wildland firefighting resources in Canada. CIFFC acts as a

“brokerage” for fire response in Canada (author’s interview NW10DT). It is a member agency with representation from provincial, territorial, and federal governments. CIFFC manages offers of and requests for support with respect to wildfires through a members’ committee.

Agreements between EMNPOs and governments are common for a small subset of specialist EMNPOs – the Canadian Red Cross, but also Salvation Army, St. John Ambulance, and amateur radio groups. Occasionally other EMNPOs, such as search and rescue clubs, will have memoranda of understanding with local government as well. The Canadian Red Cross has by far the most wide-ranging set of agreements, a reflection of its ubiquity in Canadian EM. The organization has eight hundred agreements at the municipal level alone (author’s interview

333 NW09ML). As of September 2017, the Canadian Red Cross had agreements with eight provinces – and was in the process of arranging a ninth in Alberta – as well as several federal agreements (author’s interview NW09ML). Government-EMNPO agreements help to establish clear procedures and expectations, which both nonprofits and government officials value

(author’s interview). As will be discussed below, they sometimes include a financial contribution but are not fee-for-service contracts. These agreements tend to be reactive – resulting after an

EMNPO has already supported at least one response.

Government and nonprofit participants frequently underlined the importance of maintaining relationships with one another in “peacetime” – in order to build trust, as well as to establish a shared understanding of processes and expectations (author’s interviews). Permanent bodies for government-EMNPO coordination exist at all three levels of government in Canada, although their structure and level of activity differ.

At the federal level, the Voluntary Sector Working Group (VSWG) holds quarterly phone calls and functions primarily in a policy advisory capacity (author’s interview AB02BD).

EMNPOs use VSWG to raise their profile with government members, such as Senior Officials

Responsible for Emergency Management (author’s interview AB02BD). VSWG is a working group within Canada’s Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, a multi-stakeholder group administered by Public Safety Canada.

Provincially, EMNPO coordinating bodies exist in four provinces/territories, including two of the three case provinces: Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Ontario. The Alberta

NGO Council is the most active of these, while the Ontario NGO Alliance is a newer entity. The

334 following table provides information on membership of three out of four EMNPO coordinating bodies. 191

Table 52. Membership of Provincial EMNPO Coordinating Bodies

Manitoba Partners in NGO Alliance of Alberta NGO Council Disaster Ontario • Adventist Development and • CRC • Adventist Relief Agency (ADRA) Canada • Christian Reformed Community Services • Canadian Global Response World Relief Committee • ADRA Canada • Canadian Red Cross (CRC) • MDS • CRC • Mennonite Disaster Service • Salvation Army • MDS (MDS) • St. John Ambulance • Ontario SPCA and • Salvation Army Humane Society • Samaritan’s Purse Canada • Salvation Army • St. John Ambulance • Samaritan’s Purse • World Renew Canada • (Affiliate member) AEMA • St. John Ambulance • (Affiliate member) Alberta • Team Rubicon Human Services • World Renew Sources: NGO Council of Alberta (2014), Government of Manitoba (n.d.), OAEM (2019)

Following a tornado in 2000, EMNPOs in Alberta realised that just a few organizations commonly responded to disasters. They formed the Alberta NGO Council to coordinate, as well as increase the nonprofit sector’s credibility with government. “The biggest reason we

[EMNPOs] don’t get the call is because people don’t know us”, an EMNPO staff connected to the Council said (author’s interview AB02BD). The Alberta NGO council has a common code of conduct outlining shared principles. It is integrated within provincial EM structures, such as provincial EOCs (author’s interview AB02BD). The NGO Alliance of Ontario is a newer organization. In its early stages, the chair visits municipal and provincial government

191 This author was unable to find a membership list for the Integrated Disaster Council of BC, but interview research suggests that this agency is a government-EMNPO body similar to the Alberta NGO Council.

335 representatives to make a value case for the NGO Alliance itself and its members (author’s interview).

Coordination with the nonprofit sector is not required under EM legislation in any of the three provinces studied in this dissertation. As such, the arrangements by which municipalities coordinate with EMNPOs differs substantially. Nevertheless, many municipalities have standing forums through which coordination with EMNPOs occurs. Calgary’s Critical Service Providers

Group is among the most formalized of these, with significant government buy-in. However, informal groups exist elsewhere. In many municipalities, these kinds of groups may not exist; instead, bilateral relationships between emergency managers and EMNPO staff may persist. In these cases, government may have a strong working relationship with EMNPOs that respond regularly to small-scale emergencies. However, in absence of a coordinating body government may not be very familiar with the wider subset of EMNPOs, unless that community has recently experienced a large disaster.

6.2 The United Kingdom

Both the UK and Canada are safe from major disaster risks, relative to elsewhere in the world. According to the INFORM 2018 Risk Index, Canada’s overall risk rating is 2.5 while the

UK’s is 1.9. Both of these are well below the global median risk level (3.6). While both countries have a low disaster risk level, Canada is more exposed to hazards – especially natural ones. The chart below provides data from the INFORM Index on Hazard and Exposure.192 Data for Canada and the UK, as well as the United States are reproduced below. The United States is included

192 Other categories not reproduced here include Vulnerability (covers socio-economic factors, such as level of development, deprivation, and aid dependence) and Lack of Coping Capacity (covers measures for institutions, governance, communications, infrastructure, and access to healthcare). See de Groeve and colleagues (2016).

336 here for context, since Canada and the UK’s risk exposure levels are low and very low, while the

Index rates the United States as having a medium level of risk (INFORM 2018a).193

Figure 10. INFORM Index, Hazard and Exposure Ratings194

Natural (Overall)

Droughts

Tsunamis

Earthquakes

Cyclones

Floods

Human (Overall)

Conflict Risk

Current Conflicts

0 2 4 6 8 10 United Kingdom Canada United States

Sources: INFORM (2018b,c,d)

As the chart above shows, the UK is relatively safe from major natural hazards, although flooding and tsunamis are the largest natural threats. The UK’s level of human risk is also low, though it is higher than Canada’s (INFORM 2018a).

The UK confronts an array of natural and human-made hazards to which it is vulnerable.

The two World Wars continue to have a lasting influence on EM, given the immense impact that it had on civilians. Other noteworthy twentieth century disasters include the Spanish flu pandemic; the sinking of the Titanic and the Empress of Ireland; the December 1952 Great Smog

193 According to overall risk level, which is as follows: the United Kingdom (1.9), Canada (2.5), and United States (3.6). INFORM (2018b,c,d). 194 The ratings here are based on measures of the exposure to the different hazards historically. Measures are slightly different for each indicator, but measures include: annual exposed people; annual average exposed people; affected people by frequency of event; exposed cropland; conflict intensity; and probability for highly violent conflicts (De Groeve et al. 2016). INFORM uses different data sources, including EM-DAT’s International Disaster Database.

337 of London, which may have killed as many as 12 000 people (Polivka 2018); the North Sea flood of 1953; and the Tainted Blood Scandal of the 1970s and 1980s.

Since the new millennium, the UK has experienced at least two major natural disasters.

First, a record-breaking European heatwave in 2003, while less damaging in the UK than on continental Europe, resulted in an estimated 2 000 heat-related deaths (Batty 10 July 2010).

Then, flooding in the summer 2007 damaged or destroyed an estimated 55 000 homes across the country (BBC News 25 June 2008; Pitt 2008). Thirteen people died during the 2007 floods

(Kapucu 2014). More recently, a string of mass casualty events in 2017 drew attention to terrorism: the Westminster attack, Manchester Arena bombing, London Bridge attack, and

Finsbury Park attack. Also in that year, the Grenfell Tower Fire in London killed 72 people and displaced 203 families (de Freytas-Tamura 13 June 2018).

Given the high level of rainfall the country experiences, as well as the risks of sea level rise, flooding is a particular challenge in the UK. More than five million people live in flood risk areas in England and Wales (Kapucu 2014). Storms, extreme temperature events, earthquakes, transportation accidents, and civil security incidents constitute other major sources of disaster events in the UK (Kapucu 2014; Prevention Web 2018). International Disaster Database data suggests that the UK faced, on average, three disaster events annually between 2005 and 2014

(Prevention Web 2018; EM-DAT February 2015). The disasters during this period resulted in an average of eighty-four deaths and $1.54 billion USD in economic losses (Prevention Web 2018;

EM-DAT February 2015).

Although these and other medium- and large-scale incidents receive the most public attention, small-scale emergencies comprise an important facet of the EM system. The fire and rescue services in England attended 582,551 incidents in 2018 (UK Home Office 2018). As the

338 chart below shows, about 30% were fires, while 41% were false alarms and 29% were non-fire incidents, like animal assistance, bariatric assistance, and flood and water assistance.

Figure 11. Incidents Attended by Fire and Rescue Services, England

600

500 Thousands 400 Non-Fire Incidents 300 Fire False Alarms 200 Fires

100

0 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15

Source: UK Home Office (2018)

As mentioned above, flooding is a major hazard in the UK emergency management context. The

Home Office data suggests that responding to flood events is a frequent task of first responders.

First responders responded to 125,512 flooding and water rescue incidents between 2010 and

2018.195

6.2.1 The History and Legislative Context of Emergency Management

EM policy in the UK – alternately referred to as civil protection policy – has continued to evolve since the Second World War. In the immediate postwar context, civil defense was the predominant lens for viewing EM policy. The UK Parliament passed the Civil Defense Act of

1948 in response to the growing risk of nuclear attack as Cold War tensions rose (Kapucu 2014;

Smith 2010).

195 Based on the UK Home Office’s Flooding and Water Rescue Incidents Dataset, downloaded 9 April 2019 (UK Home Office 2019).

339 In the postwar context up to the 1980s, the central government largely left emergency activities to local organizations, though local authorities were able to draw on regional and national resources (O’Brien and Read 2005). In the late 1980s a series of civilian disasters led to heightened interest in reforming EM legislation, which at the time was still based on the 1948

Civil Defence Act (Henstra and McBean 2005). Ensuing policy reviews led to minor alterations, until Y2K, a fuel crisis, flooding, and the September 11 attacks catalysed a more comprehensive review (Henstra and McBean 2005; Stainsby 2005). The result of this review was the 2004 Civil

Contingencies Act (CCA), which established the current EM framework in the UK.

CCA has two main parts: part one discusses local arrangements for civil protection, while part two provides for emergency powers. The CCA identifies responsibilities for “Category 1” and “Category 2” responders. Category 1 responders are core emergency response actors, required to undertake duties such as risk assessment, having an emergency plan, and advising the public in an emergency (Stainsby 2012). For England, these consist of: local authorities (county and district councils); emergency services (police, fire and rescue); the National Health Service

(NHS) body (commissioning board, trust, or foundation trust) responsible for ambulance services and hospital accommodation; and some central government bodies. Category 2 responders are

“co-operating bodies” that are involved in emergencies and have coordination and information sharing duties (Stainsby 2012). These include utilities, transport agencies, strategic health authorities, and the Health and Safety Executive (Stainsby 2012). The CCA also requires the creation of local resilience forums (LRFs) to coordinate EM (discussed further below).

Although the CCA envisions a primary role for Category 1 and Category 2 Responders, it provides for a structure when “Central Government co-ordination or support becomes necessary”

(CCO 17 January 2011: 4). In this case, a Lead Government Department (LGD) is responsible

340 for managing the central government response (CCO 17 January 2011). Part of this role entails assessing and strengthening the capabilities of local responders (CCO 17 January 2011).

6.2.2 Public Emergency Management Policies and Duties

Like Canada, EM in the UK is decentralized. Local agencies are the “basic building block” of EM (Cabinet Office 2010: 4). They are always the first responders and handle most emergencies without Central Government involvement (Kapucu 2014). However, the Central

Government may provide support or coordination during large or complex disasters, through an

LGD (Kapucu 2014). The following figure depicts this model:

Figure 12. Central Government Engagement Model

Source: Kapucu (2014: 12)

341 In local multi-agency responses coordination is undertaken by a Strategic Coordinating Group

(SCG) located in the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC). SCG is the British equivalent of an

EOC.

The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), which operates within the Cabinet Office, was established in 2001 (Kapucu 2014; Sahin et al. 2008). It is the core emergency management agency within the UK Central Government. In non-terrorism emergencies, it operates under the

Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) – which is made up of related ministries in the Central

Government and supported by CCS (Sahin et al. 2008) – to coordinate emergency response

(Kapucu 2014).196 CCS works with lead agencies to assess needs; plan; inform other interested departments; establish structures, routines and data flows for managing the response; connect the lead department with specialist agencies that can provide advice and information; and decide whether a meeting of the CCC should be convened (Kapucu 2014). In serious or catastrophic emergencies the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR or COBRA) will activate to coordinate the Government’s response (Cabinet Office 2013). Between emergencies, CCS trains volunteers and officials through the Emergency Planning College (Sahin et al. 2008).

As discussed above, the CCA sets out the duties of different Category 1 and Category 2

Responders. Category 1 Responders, who have the greatest share of responsibility, are typically local statutory bodies such as police services, fire departments, ambulance services, and local authorities. In most responses, the police service acts as the lead co-ordinating agency in an emergency response (CCO 28 October 2013). Local authorities have primary responsibility for emergency social services – e.g., meeting the immediate sheltering needs of affected individuals and assuring the medium to long-term welfare of survivors – in most contexts, although the

196 In terrorism incidents the Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit undertakes this role (Kapucu 2014).

342 legislation states that they will “work with partners” to achieve these roles (CCO 28 October

2013). Local authorities are also responsible for coordinating the activities of nonprofits and spontaneous volunteers (CCO 28 October 2013). Between emergencies, CCA requires Category

1 responders to undertake risk assessment, emergency planning, and government business continuity planning (Cabinet Office October 2013). Local authorities have a duty under CCA to

“warn and inform the public in the event of an emergency” (CCO 28 October 2013: 8).

6.2.3 Disaster Assistance Programs

The Bellwin Scheme, introduced in 1983, is the Central Government’s disaster financial assistance program (Sandford 2015). When activated by the Minister of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Bellwin Scheme provides financial assistance to local statutory authorities for “actions taken in the immediate phase of an emergency, not those taken as part of the recovery phase” (DCLG October 2017: 4). The Bellwin Scheme was most recently activated for the Grenfell Tower Fire in 2017 (MHCLG 15 June 2017). Local councils, police, fire and rescue, and national park authorities are statutory authorities eligible for the Bellwin Scheme

(MHCLG 15 June 2017). When the scheme has been activated, local authorities can apply for full reimbursement of eligible expenditures above the “threshold” of 0.2% of their calculated annual revenue budgets (MHCLG 15 June 2017). Eligible expenditures are limited to actions taken in the immediate phase of a disaster to protect life or property (DCLG October 2017).197

The Bellwin Scheme applies only to local government agencies, in contrast to the disaster financial assistance schemes in Canada. In lieu of financial assistance schemes for individuals and small businesses (Crichton 2008), the UK has “almost universal insurance availability

197 For more on eligibility requirements see Appendix 5.

343 against flood risk” (Ball et al. 2013: 266). The latest iteration of this program, Flood Re,198 continues to rely primarily on private market mechanisms (Surminski 2018).199

At the European level, the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) is a disaster assistance program established in reaction to flooding in Central Europe in 2002 (European Commission

2019). Like the Bellwin Scheme, EUSF provides supports to governments. “Payments from the

EUSF are limited to finance operations undertaken by the public authorities alleviating non- insurable damages.” (Hochrainer et al. 2010) EUSF has been utilized twice for British disasters – for flooding in 2007 and 2015 (European Commission 10 October 2018). In total, €222.6 million in funding was disbursed through EUSF for these two disasters (European Commission 10

October 2018).200

6.2.4 Coordinating Emergency Response

Government-EMNPO emergency response coordination occurs both at the national level and locally. Nationally, there are two coordinating bodies: the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection

Forum (VSCPF), which is a “peacetime” body that coordinates between responses, and the

National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee (NVASEC), which is activated only during major emergencies.201 Locally, emergency response is coordinated through local resilience forums (LRFs).

198 Flood Re is a not-for-profit flood reinsurance pool owned and operated by the insurance industry (Surminski 2018). The aim is to ensure affordability of flood insurance. 199 A discussion of disaster insurance as an instance of private welfare is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, for articles touching on this issue see Crichton (2008) and, for the US case, Elliott (2017). 200 Comprised of €162.3 million for the 2007 floods and €60.3 million for the 2015 floods. Obviously, when the UK leaves the EU it will not longer be able to make use of EUSF funds. 201 CCS also coordinates volunteer groups through the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC). DEC is comprised of international nonprofits such as ActionAid, British Red Cross, Care International Islamic Relief, Oxfam, and World Vision (Sahin et al. 2008). However, DEC is largely focused on international disaster relief. As such, it will not be discussed further in this dissertation.

344 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat established the VSCPF with the British Red Cross

(BRC) and the in the Cabinet Office in 2003 (VCPF WP 2014; VCSP 2014). It is comprised of

“representatives from the voluntary sector, central and local government, devolved administrations, statutory authorities and professional organisations.” (Government of the UK n.d.) Its strategic aim is “to identify and maximise the voluntary sector contribution to UK civil protection arrangements” (VCSPF WP 2014). VSCPF is supported through a Working Party comprised of 11 members, seven EMNPOs, two government agencies, and two statutory associations.202 The Working Party implements an annual work plan, improves links between voluntary sector and government responders, promotes the role of voluntary organizations in civil protection, provides spokespeople to represent voluntary organizations on national groups, increases awareness of the benefits of voluntary sector and “statutory section” cooperation, and identify and shares good practices.

The National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee (NVASEC) is a grouping of the British Red Cross, St. John Ambulance, and St. Andrew’s Ambulance (ICRC 2003).203

NVASEC is to be convened by the BRC in extreme circumstances at the request of the Ministry of Defence, Department for Health, and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCO 28 October

2013).

The 2004 Civil Contingencies Act requires every policing area to have an LRF.204

Accordingly, there are 43 LRFs across England and Wales, with a further three Regional

202 Specifically: British Red Cross, Association of Chief Police Officers, Cruse Bereavement Care, Cabinet Office, Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Local Government Association, Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network, Royal Voluntary Service, St. John Ambulance, Salvation Army, and Victim Support Service. 203 St. Andrew’s Ambulance is a nonprofit that was historically the ambulance service in Scotland. Now it provides training and first aid. It is similar to St. John Ambulance. 204 Policing areas refer to the area covered by a single police service. In England and Wales have numerous territorial police services, while in Northern Ireland and Scotland a single police service covers the entire region. Policing areas are used because police are the lead responders to most incidents.

345 Resilience Partnerships in Scotland and one Emergency Preparedness Group in Northern

Ireland.205 Since these groups fulfil similar functions despite differences in naming, this section refers to all of the above coordinating groups as LRFs, for simplicity.

LRFs are multi-agency partnerships to coordinate emergency responses and avoid duplication and gaps (Cabinet Office 8 September 2017). They are locally-run and bring together the

Category 1 and Category 2 responders in a given policing area (Cabinet Office 8 September

2017). These groups undertake planning, response, and recovery coordination. The organizational capacity and activeness of LRFs varies; however, a typical LRF employs one coordinator (or half-time for a person with another role to coordinate the LRF). LRFs meet on a monthly, quarterly, or semi-annual basis.

Although the legislation does not require LRFs to include EMNPOs, they commonly do.

Nonprofits sometimes participate in LRFs through a dedicated working group, or they might be involved in groups according to their functions – e.g., the “feeding group” or “care group”.

205 As far as the author was able to tell, there is only one emergency preparedness group in Northern Ireland (in Belfast).

346 Appendix 7. The Four Civil Society Functions

As elements of civil society, the nonprofit sector potentially fulfils four major functions which underpin its importance: the democracy function, the pluralism function, the service function, and the community function. Given the diversity of organizations in civil society, these functions are generalizations; nevertheless, they are generalizations that scholars have seen as having applicability across civil society as a whole. These four functions are the underpinnings of special protections for the nonprofit sector in legal and regulatory regimes, although specific rules vary from country to country.206 This appendix provides a literature review explicating the four civil society functions.

Nonprofits, first, have a democratic function. Indeed, a strong and independent civil society is often considered to be essential for a robust democracy.207 Associations are seen as playing a role in dispersing power, and thereby acting as a check on the state (Chambers and

Kopstein 2006). Associations serve as “effective vehicles for the representation and formulation of the interests of citizens” (Wright 1995: 2). They also augment participation in political processes, especially amongst those most likely to be excluded (Cohen and Rogers 1994; Hirst

1994).208 Finally, associations socialize the citizenry, offering a “school for democratic values” of sorts.209

206 For instance, there are ‘special interest organization’ exemptions in the human rights codes of most Canadian provinces (Debbasch and Bourdon 2006). 207 E.g. Warren (2000), Walzer (1992), Cohen and Rogers (1994), Cohen and Arato (1992). On the other hand, however, is the problem of factions in democratic theory, which articulates the potential of CSOs to “deploy their powers in ways that undermine the conditions of well-ordered democracy.” (Cohen and Rogers 1994: 7) 208 However, inequalities are also reflected in civic voluntarism participation rates (Verba et al. 1995; Schlozman and Brady 1995). 209 E.g., Tocqueville (1945[1840]); Levy (1999); Salamon (1992); Putnam (2000); Cohen and Rogers (1994); Brown, Kenny and Spratt (2000); and Sandel (1998).

347 In Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen (1999) presents a “capabilities” approach to understanding freedom and poverty. He argues for the pre-eminence of democratic rights and political liberties for their direct importance, as well as “instrumental” and “constructive” roles

(Sen 1999). Instrumentally, political rights are used to express claims for political attention to specific needs. These rights also play a role in constructing social needs, conceptualizing what social needs are and how to address them. That is, political rights are not only inherently important, but also facilitate democratic outcomes. Nonprofits facilitate participation in democratic processes by developing individual as well as political autonomy (Warren 2001).

They also develop feelings of citizen efficacy; collect, organize, and convey information; and inculcate political skills (Warren 2001). In some cases the role of these organizations is publicly oriented, while others focus on a specific identity category. For instance, the Canadian-Muslim

Vote aims to increase democratic participation amongst the identity category of Canadian

Muslims, a group which historically has voted in lower proportions than the wider population.210

Second, and connected to the democratic function of civil society, associations are pluralistic organizations. That is, “in civil society individuals come together to pursue particularist ends and group‐specific goods some of which may very well also be public goods”

(Chambers and Kopstein 2006: 365). Associations, ideally, introduce a diversity of viewpoints that compete for legitimacy in the public discourse (Habermas 1996, 1993; Chambers and

Kopstein 2006). Civil society can also improve the quality of deliberation in public discourse through, for instance, the proliferation of political forums that reduce plebiscitary (side-taking) rhetoric (Chambers 2009). Put differently, the pluralistic function recognizes that “associational

210 Voter turnout amongst Canadian Muslims was 79% in the 2015 federal election, an unprecedentedly high turnout rate for this group. Voter turnout amongst Canadian Muslims was just 47% in the 2011 federal election, as compared with 61% turnout amongst the general population (Mainstreet Research 2015; Elections Canada January 2017).

348 life forms the social infrastructure of public spheres” (Warren 2001: 34). In this regard, political theorists have recognized that individual freedom of speech and association is insufficient:

basic constitutional guarantees alone cannot preserve the public sphere and civil society from deformations. The communicative structures of the public sphere must rather be kept intact by an energetic civil society. (Habermas 1996: 369, cited in Chambers and Kopstein 2006: 370)

Furthermore, civil society requires organizations in order to fulfil this role effectively.

Associations provide a space for the expression of viewpoints, thereby giving effect to an individual’s free expression (Salamon 1992). They seek to influence legislation and shape public opinion (Chambers and Kopstein 2006). The large and growing body of nonprofit advocacy research attests to this role.211 The pluralistic role of associations also pertains to the “pursuit of plural ends in association and cooperation with others” (Chambers and Kopstein 2006: 372).

That is, associations contribute to pluralism through their diverse activities and the values, ideas, and identities underpinning those activities. In this sense, apolitical associations like local soccer clubs, community associations, and cultural organizations contribute to advancing pluralism.

Third, nonprofits provide social goods, whether these are governmental or private/philanthropic. This point of view has been articulated in the “government failure” and

“market failure” explanations of civil society.212 Associations are posited as serving a gap-filling function; they also provide services that are more flexible and heterogeneous.213 In other words,

“Associations […] empower those for whom services are provided in diverse ways” (Hirst 1994:

6). Some also argue that associations should fulfil a redistributive function.214

211 E.g., Almog-Bar and Schmid (2014), Nicholson-Crotty (2007, 2009), Pekkanen and colleagues (2014), Child and Grønbjerg (2007), Guo and Saxton (2010), Keck and Sikkink (1998). 212 For a good summary of these, see Salamon and Anheier (1998). 213 However, this is contested. See, e.g., McQuarrie (2013). 214 See, e.g., Anheier and Daly (2007), Mohan and Breeze (2016). However, there is little evidence suggesting that the philanthropic sector actually reduces inequality (Pue 2018; Hay and Muller 2014; Reich 2018).

349 It is also important to mention that associations sometimes act not in contention or dialogue with, but indeed in support of, the state. Specifically, associations assist the state in delivering public goods and act as mediators between the state and citizenry (Chambers and

Kopstein 2006). The active role of nonprofits as implementers of social welfare services exemplifies the extent of this function. However, when associations partner with the state in this way, there is a risk that “civil society may begin to act and look like the state” (Chambers and

Kopstein 2006: 375). The implication of this concern is that the unique nature of civil society may be lost as it partners with the state – whether in terms of its values, characteristics, or independence.

Fourth, associations fulfil psychological and moral needs through their community function. They offer sites for people to come together and pursue mutual ends (Chambers and

Kopstein 2006; Warren 2001). Psychologically, they offer an important space for meeting an individual’s needs, thereby helping to produce well-adjusted citizens (Rosenblum 2000).

…the good life can only be lived in civil society, the realm of fragmentation and struggle but also of concrete and authentic solidarities, where we […] become sociable or communal men and women. (Walzer 1992: 97)

In this sense, associations create communities to the immense benefit of individuals, no matter the content of participation. Beyond this, however, the community function of associations aids in the development and expression of self-identity, especially where these identities are marginalized. For example, there is evidence that gay-straight alliances (school clubs where

LGBTQA2S youth can feel safe in discussing their sexual orientation or gender identity) have positive effects for LGBTQA2S students.215 Communities constitute persons (Soifer 1995), and associations are conduits for community.

215 See, e.g., Heck and colleagues (2011), Walls and colleagues (2010), and Poteat and colleagues (2016).

350 Associations provide “the spaces, venues, and opportunities for social collaboration and collective action” (Warren 2001: 18), and in doing so contribute to the advancement of cultural life. Some scholars have also pointed to the role of civil society in promoting certain values. In this view, associations can “instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public- spiritedness” (Putnam 1993: 89-90). Finally, associations build social capital: in other words, they increase the density of social ties.216 In strengthening social capital, civil society can also strengthen trust and reciprocity, which is indispensable to political as well as economic functions in society (Putnam 1993, 1993b).217

Theories of civil society have elucidated four important functions of nonprofit associations: democratic, pluralistic, service, and community. Each of these functions is of inherent importance to wellbeing in a democratic society. Research on nonprofit social welfare provision has to-date focused only on the service function. This focus on the service function is understandable, as the service function is the proximate role on display in nonprofit-provided social welfare. However, it is important to understand how the nonprofitization of the welfare state is influencing the democratic, pluralistic, and community functions of nonprofits. While not every nonprofit organization undertakes all four of these functions, many nonprofits are engaged in multiple functions at different times.

216 E.g., Levy (1999), Salamon (1992), Salamon and Anheier (1998) and Boris and Mosher-Williams (1998). 217 But it is important to also acknowledge the existence of “bad civil society”, which promotes “particularistic civility” (Chambers and Kopstein 2001).

351 Appendix 8. Comparison of Philanthropy and the Welfare State

This appendix provides a brief comparison of philanthropy and the welfare state, as they connect to the public duty. Both philanthropy and government draw on the contributions of individuals to achieve public objectives. Whereas taxation is a mandatory payment extracted by governments, philanthropic donations are government-subsidized voluntary contributions (Reich

2018). Both types of contribution are put to ‘public’ purposes, as defined by the recipient – governments and charities, respectively.218

Philanthropy consists of individual donations, as well as giving by institutional funders like philanthropic foundations and corporations.219 It is a universal practice that has occurred throughout human history (Reich 2018). Yet it is also an artifact of the state: it is an institutionalized practice that is embedded in laws and public policies (Reich 2018). Philanthropy is, furthermore, a practice which is actively supported by governments. Governments in many countries subsidize philanthropy through generalized tax deduction for charitable donations

(Reich 2018). These subsidies are no trivial matter – in the United States, for instance, the charitable donation subsidy cost government $50 billion in 2017 (Reich 2018). A Canadian study using 2011 data estimated foregone federal government revenue at $2.9 billion (Imagine Canada

2013).220 At least part of the policy rationale for subsidizing philanthropic giving is connected to the service-providing function of nonprofits (Reich 2018).221

218 Although the nonprofit sector is defined and regulated in vastly different ways worldwide, most liberal welfare states have a category for ‘charitable’ organizations. Charitable organizations are typically required to serve a public purpose and to file annual disclosures with the government; in return, they benefit from tax concessions, including the charitable tax deduction for donors. 219 Volunteerism is sometimes also included under this label (e.g., Payton et al. 1988). 220 However, this figure is incomplete as provinces also apply charitable tax deductions. The author was not able to find an estimate of foregone government revenue for the United Kingdom. 221 Although community, democratic, and pluralistic benefits are also relevant.

352 Although philanthropy and taxation both contribute to ‘public’ objectives, broadly defined, there are essential differences owing to the nature of the contributions. Thus, while we should analyse both government and philanthropic contributions as a part of the public duty, these two elements ought not to be treated as functionally or morally equivalent.

The differences between philanthropy and government stem from how each system funds its activities, as well as differences in decision-making and accountability. These differences are summarized in the table below.

Table 53. Comparison of Philanthropic Donations and Government Taxation

Donations Taxation Pluralism Equality Independence Democratic accountability Heterogeneous needs Fair and equal treatment

Whereas taxation is often conceived as redistributive, research increasingly suggests that philanthropy is regressive.222 Anyone can practice philanthropy, but mega-donors dominate: in

Canada, for instance, the ten percent of people who made the largest donations contributed sixty- three percent of all donations (Turcotte 2015).223 A broadly similar pattern pervades elsewhere

(OFF and CERPhi 2015; Reich 2018).224 While it is true that top earners also contribute to a large share of tax revenue – in this sense, both reflect the political economy of the day – democratic accountability presents an important difference in the power implications of this basic fact. Decisions on tax revenue are made by politicians, who are democratically

222 See: Dasgupta and Kanbur (2011), Reich (2018), Duquette (2018), Anderson and colleagues (2018), and Beaton and Hwang (2018). 223 And this gap has been growing since the mid-1990s (Lasby and Barr 2018: 18). 224 And the “top-heavy” nature of philanthropy is increasing as global inequality rises (Collins et al. 2018).

353 accountable. In contrast, mega-philanthropists decide which causes to support and can shape the agenda of the organizations to which they are donors (McGoey 2015).225

Depending on how it is used, philanthropy can be a tool for levelling inequality or increasing it. Philanthropy can be regressive when it funds quasi-public goods that primarily benefit well-off communities, rather than those that benefit the poor. For example, funding for an art gallery that is patronized principally by the middle- and upper-class could have regressive effects (even if it still might be a worthy thing to fund). In contrast, redistributive philanthropy might fund, say, art programming in a homeless drop-in centre. As yet, there is unfortunately a paucity of data on whether philanthropy is progressive or regressive.226 However, there are three reasons to expect that the dominance of mega-donors should result in regressive philanthropy.

First, proximity is often an important element of philanthropy (Hay and Mueller 2014).

People give to causes to which they feel close: perhaps to research an illness that afflicted a family member, to support a school their child attends, or to support an activity they enjoyed whilst growing up. To the extent that our life experiences are shaped by class/socio-economic status, the proximity of philanthropy is likely to result in the under-provision of support for causes that primarily affect middle and lower income individuals – in contrast to the popular myth of philanthropy as an element that supports ‘the needy’. Indeed, evidence suggests that most donations do not go to causes supporting the most economically disadvantaged (Mohan and

Breeze 2016; Reich 2018).

Second, it has been argued that philanthropic foundations, a core tool through which mega-donors contribute, are unable or unwilling or unable to address the causes of inequality

225 Of course, research has found that political systems are also more responsive to high-income voter preferences (Bartels 2008). 226 Although Reich (2018), Duquette (2018), and Anderson and colleagues (2018) offer strong contributions, their research each addresses only a part of the broader question.

354 (Kohl-Arenas 2016; Fisher 2017). Instead, the focus is on alleviating the symptoms of social problems, as in the case of self-help philanthropy in the United States (Kohl-Arenas 2016). The logic of this argument is essentially that mega-philanthropists benefit from the existing economic order and will therefore be unwilling to dismantle those systems that produce inequality.227

Finally, to the extent that mega-philanthropists are able to translate their donations into political influence, philanthropy can exacerbate existing inequalities in political institutions. Where this occurs, philanthropy can erode democracy (Pevnick 2013). Philanthropy can allow the wealthy to translate economic influence into political influence in at least three ways. Philanthropy can influence agenda setting; steer, co-opt, or “colonize” the organizations and programs that it funds as well as the social movements with which these organizations are linked; and act to reinforce hegemony by diverting protest and reconfiguring the dominant ideology.

Three recent books discuss the political power that philanthropists wield through their philanthropy. Jane Mayer’s book (2016) Dark Money provides a look that is rich in detail on how the Koch brothers, and other extreme-right mega-donors, have shaped Republican politics.

But philanthropic influence is not a tool of the right alone: David Callahan’s book (2017), The

Givers, pulls back the curtain on power and America’s “new philanthropists”, many of whom consider themselves liberals or progressives. Another excellent read in this area is Linsey

McGoey’s (2015) No Such Thing as a Free Gift, which is on the Gates Foundation. Philanthropy, then, can undermine democracy where it allows the wealthy to use their economic power to access political power that is unavailable to ordinary citizens (Pevnick 2013). On the other hand, philanthropic organizations fund nonprofits, who play an important role in levelling the democratic playing field.

227 A stronger version of this argument presents philanthropy as an act aimed at rehabilitating the image of billionaires; a fig-leaf propping up the existing economic order (e.g., Liu and Baker 2016; Hay and Mueller 2014).

355 A general difference, then, is that taxation is buoyed by democratic accountability, whereas philanthropy is not. Although the independence of philanthropy can be viewed as a drawback, for reasons discussed above, it is also sometimes posited as beneficial (e.g., Anheier and Daly 2007). The lack of external accountability, and therefore independent nature of philanthropic foundations, arguably enables them to innovate and act on longer time horizons

(Anheier and Daly 2007; Fleishman 2007; Hammack and Anheier 2013; Reich 2018).

Finally, taxation and philanthropy differ in their approach to service provision.

Government services tend to be implemented through policies which emphasize the equal treatment of citizens. Although this egalitarian feature assures that individuals are treated fairly, it can sometimes pose a challenge where heterogenous needs exist. Philanthropy is seen as an avenue for meeting these heterogeneous needs. This is, first, because philanthropic resources are pluralistic in nature – at least, relative to government. At a second level, the dispersal of philanthropic resources to a diverse pool of nonprofits is thought to allow for service provision that is more flexible and tailored to local needs (Levy 1999; Anheier and Daly 2007). However, a corollary of this is that the recipients of charity cannot hold providers accountable,228 nor can there be any assurance that beneficiaries are treated of equal concern (Cordelli 2012).

228 At least, not through voice; where there are multiple providers, beneficiaries can – in theory – exit.

356