A FREGEAN SOLUTION TO THE PARADOX OF ANALYSIS

Dale JACQUETTE The Pennsylvania State University

I. Moore's Paradox

The paradox of analysis is not a logical antinomy implying outright contradiction, but a metaphilosophical dilemma with im• portant negative methodological consequences for the conduct of conceptual inquiry. In philosophical analysis, the analysandum is either the same in meaning as the analysans or not. If the analys• andum and analysans are the same in meaning, then the analysis is uninformative. But if the analysandum and analysans are not the same in meaning, then the analysis is unsound or incorrect. l There have been several attempts to avoid the paradox, which are not critically evaluated here.2 Instead an alternative solution is presented that is comparatively simpler, .more straightforward and intuitively satisfying than previous efforts. The method is to intro• duce an informal semantic distinction between intentional concep• tual identity, or fully generalized predicate-unrestricted version of

1. C.H. Langford, "Moore's Notion of Analysis", in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, third edition, edited by Paul A. Schilpp (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), Vol. I, p. 323. G. E. Moore, "AReply to My Critics", Schilpp, Vol. 11, pp. 660-667. 2. Roderick M. Chisholm and Richard Potter, "The Paradox of Analysis: A Solution", Metaphilosophy Vol. XII, 1981; rpt., Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 100-106. George Bealer, Quality and Concept (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 75-77. Terence Parsons, "Frege's Hierarchies of Indirect Senses and the Paradox of Analysis", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, VI, The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 37-57. 60 Leibniz's Law, and referential identity or codesignation. Conceptual nonidentity of analysans and analysandum guarantees the possibil• ity of informativeness, and referential codesignation guarantees the possibility of soundness for correct analyses. These definitions in turn require preliminary articulation of the concept of converse intentional properties, and a property reduction function that re• duces any concept to an un ordered set of its constitutive properties.

11. Identity and Codesignation

Conceptual identity, or exact identity of concepts in thought, is first defined. (Dl) For any objects x and y, x is conceptually identical to y (x =c y) =d[for all properties P, x has P if and only if y has P. ("ifx)("ify)[(x =c y) == ("ifP)(Px == Py)] This principle is sometimes known as Leibniz's Law, or the unrestricted identity of indiscemibles and indiscemibility of ident• icals. If x =c y, then x and y have all properties in common, including so called converse intentional properties.3 An informal understanding of converse intentional properties may help to explain the limitations and narrow application of predicate-unrestricted conceptual identity. Converse intentional properties are the properties an object acquires when an intelligence takes an intentional attitude toward it. When I love Berlin, I have the intentional property of loving Berlin, and Berlin has superadded to it the converse intentional property of being loved by me. When like Descartes I doubt the existence of my body, but do not doubt the existence of my mind, then my body acquires the converse intentional property of having its existence doubted by me, and my mind the complementary converse intentional property of not hav• ing its existence doubted by me.4

3. See Chisholm, "Converse Intentional Properties", The Journal of PhiLos• ophy, Vo!. LXXIX, 1982, pp. 537-545. The tenn 'converse intentional property' and infonnal characterization but not the fonnal definition in (D2) are Chisholm 'so 4. Rene Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, The Philosophical Works