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The London of TUESDAY, the 14^ of SEPTEMBER, 1948 by Registered As a Newspaper

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The London of TUESDAY, the 14^ of SEPTEMBER, 1948 by Registered As a Newspaper IRujnb. 38404 5015 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Of TUESDAY, the 14^ of SEPTEMBER, 1948 by Registered as a newspaper THURSDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER, 1948 AIR OPERATIONS BY FIGHTER COMMAND FROM 25th NOVEMBER 1940 TO 3ist DECEMBER 1941 The following report was submitted to the equivalent to about a half of one per cent, of Secretary of State for Air on zqth February, the number of night sorties that the Germans 1948, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir were believed to have flown in that time. Sholto Douglas, G.C.B., M.C., D.F.C. (now Obviously, losses of this order were not likely Lord Douglas of Kirtleside], former Air to act as a deterrent. Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Com- 3. The directive by which I found myself mand,* Royal Air Force bound when I assumed command on 25th November, 1940, required me to give priority PART I: OPERATIONS. • to the defence of the aircraft industry. No Night Operations. formal variation of this directive was needed (a) The Situation on ist November, 1940 to make it clear that the defeat of the night bomber must be one of my main tasks. 1. At the beginning of November, 1940, the most urgent problem confronting the air defences 4. It would be wrong to give the impression was that presented by the night bomber. For the that hitherto this problem had been ignored. first ten months of the war the Luftwaffe had On the contrary, it had long been foreseen that undertaken only minor operations against this if the enemy found day attacks too expensive, country; but in June, 1940, the enemy began he would probably turn-to night bombing on a a senes of small-scale night attacks on ports substantial scale. But with limited resources and industrial towns. During the next two it had' been necessary to place the emphasis months, while tihe daylight battle of Britain on high-performance, single-seater fighters was being fought, this night offensive gathered capable of defeating the enemy by day. Before momentum. On September 7th London be- the war, and in the early stages of the war came its main objective, and the scale of attack it was hoped that, with the help of searchlights, increased once more. By the end of October these aircraft would also be effective at night. the night offensive had become in many re- 5. This hope had proved vain. Except at the spects a bigger threat to the kingdom than the beginning of the night offensive, when the day offensive, which, for the moment at least, enemy flew at 12,000 feet or lower, the search- had been successfully beaten off. lights were incapable of doing what was re- quired of them This was partly because they 2. At that stage London had been raided on relied on sound locators, which were unsuited every night but one for the last eight weeks. to modern conditions, and partly because very On every night but four during those eight often cloud or moonlight prevented pilots from weeks at least a hundred tons of bombs had seeing the searchlight beams at the height at fallen on or around .the Capital; Coventry, which they had to fly. Birmingham and Liverpool had all suffered attacks of some weight. So far no intolerable 6 A method of night interception which did harm had been done to industry or the public not rely on searchlights had been under de- temper, although many people had been killed velopment (although not continuously) since and much material loss and hardship had been 1936. This method rested upon the installation caused. But there was every reason to ex- in twin-engined, multi-seater aircraft of the pect that the attack's would continue and per- radar equipment known as A I. haps grow heavier; for during the last two 7. On November ist, 1940, the Command had months the defences had claimed the destruc- possessed six squadrons of aircraft fitted with tion of only 79 night bombers—a number this equipment All were Blenheim Squadrons, •S3 657 50i6 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 SEPTEMBER, 1948 but as the Blenheim was too slow and too 13. In addition, three Hurricane Squadrons lightly armed to take full advantage of its op- had been turned over to night duty, in the portunities, Beaufighters were being substituted middle of October, 1940. for the Blenheims as fast as the Air Mimslry 14. Thus when I assumed Command, the and the Ministry of Aircraft Production could night-fighter force comprised the following make them available. squadrons:— 8. But at best the provision of A.I. solved only half the problem. This airborne Radar Squadron Equipment Station had a restricted range which could not be No. 23 Blenheim Ford greater than the height of the aircraft, subject No. 25 Blenheim and Debden to a maximum of 3^ miles. Before the A.I. Beaufighter. could detect an enemy bomber in the darkness, No. 29 Blenheim Digby and the fighter had therefore to be brought to within Wittering. three miles of it at roughly the same height If No. 219 Blenheim and Redhill searchlights were ruled out, this could only be Beaufighter. done by means of directions given to the pilot by a Controller on the ground. It was vital No. 600 Blenheim Catterick and Drem that this controller should have accurate No. 604 Blenheim Middle Wallop knowledge of the bomber's position. Under No. 141 Defiant Gatwick my Command, I had No. 60 (Signals) Group, No. 264 Defiant Rochford which controlled a chain of some 80 Radar No. 73 Hurricane Castle Camps Stations round the coasts, used for giving early No. 85 Humcane Kirtbn-in-Lindsey warning to the controller of the approach of enemy aircraft across the sea. Over land, in- No. 151 Hurricane . Digby formation on the raider's position was given 15. In addition to these first-line units, the by the Observer Corps. Although these sources Fighter Interception Unit at Tangmere had the had proved sufficiently accurate for daylight task of developing methods of night intercep- interceptions, they were not precise enough for tion with twin-engined fighters; and sometimes successful night fighter operations. ' provided aircraft for active operations, No. 422 9. Only Radar could provide the answer— Flight had been formed recently at Gravesend special ground search radar stations for the to study the problem of night interception with direct control of A.I.-equipped night fighter smgle-engined fighters; while a new Defiant aircraft. Such stations, termed G C.I. (Ground Squadron, No 307 (Polish) Squadron, was Control of Interception), were under develop- forming at Kirton-in-Lindsey, No. 420"Flight ment when I assumed Command. Nevertheless, (later No. 93 Squadron) had just begun to form the tactics of their .employment in conjunction for the purpose of sowing and trailing mines in with A.I night fighters had yet to be evolved front of German bombers. Finally, the forma- from practical experience as and when the tion of No. 54 Operational Training Unit, to G.C I stations became available.) specialize in night training, had been ordered. 10 The Radar Stations used for detecting the 16. I also had operational control of the guns approach of enemy aircraft across the sea had and searchlights of Anti-Aircraft Command, only a limited application to this problem, but under Lt.-General Sir Frederick A. Pile, another kind of ground radar equipment, de- Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., and the signed for gun-laying and known as G.L , balloon barrages of Balloon Command under promised to give good results. Although other Air Vice-Marshal 0. T. Boyd, C.B., O.B.E., varieties of radar equipment were under de- M.C., A.F.C. (succeeded on ist December, velopment, the defects of both ground and air- 1940, by Air Marshal Sir E. L. Gossage, borne search radars were not the ' mos:' im- K.C.B., C.V.O., DS.O., M.C.). portant factors in the establishment of - an 17. In the early stages "of the attack, except efficient night fighter defence. Any success in conditions of good visibility, the A.A. guns A.I. was likely to achieve depended m'tially had to rely on one of three methods of direct- on the skill of the ground controller and then ing their fire. These were: illumination of the on the operational ability of the aircraft A.I. bomber by searchlights, which were controlled observer There was an acute shortage of per- by sound locators; a combination of rather rudi- sonnel for both of these highly specialised tasks. mentary radar and sound locator, or a system 11. It was clear that many problems of of prediction which depended entirely on method, maintenance and supply would have sound locators. The shortcomings of these to be solved before all this delicate equipment sound locators were a great handicap to A.A. could be expected to yield concrete results, and gunnery, and the gunners deserve great credit that their solution was likely to take some for their achievements at a time when night months. In the meantime, the Air Ministry fighters were almost powerless. By 25th were anxious that some immediate al tempt November, 1940, radar equipment for gun- should be made to improve the situation laying was beginning to arrive, and a variant 12. A step in this direction had already been intended for controlling searchlights (S.L.C. or taken in the late Summer, when it was d'ecided " Elsie ") was on the way. that the two Defiant Squadrons in the Com- 18.
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