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Agile Leadership and Management of Change Agile Leadership and Management of Change Project Lessons from Winston Churchill and Battle of Britain Presentation to CMIT September 25th, 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland “Lessons From the Past that Assist the Projects of Today to Shape the World of Tomorrow” www.lessons-from-history.com Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland About Lessons-from-History series . 1993 – Initial idea . 1994 – Idea matured . 1995 – White paper . 1996 – Book outline . 1998 – Manuscript . 2000 – Accepted by publisher . 2002 – First publication . 2003 – First speaking event . 2004 – Web site . 2005 – Second publication . 2006 – Third publication . 2007 – Fourth publication . 2009 – Fifth publication www.lessons-from-history.com 2 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland Why the Lessons-from-History series was created? . The books from the series . The series uses relevant have been written for historical case studies to organizations applying today's examine how historical business and technology projects and emerging techniques to common technologies of the past business problems. solved complex problems. Lessons from the past assist . It then draws comparisons to projects of today in shaping challenges encountered in the world of tomorrow. today's projects. 3 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland What is available from the Lessons-from-History series? . Speaking events – Presentation or workshop. – Trackrecord 160 presentations to 10,000 attendees. 4 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland This is the story of how one man inspired his nation to continue a fight thought lost. In May 1940, the United Kingdom (UK) was facing a dire situation, an imminent invasion. Churchill had to – mobilize quickly and act with agility to assemble a defense. – transform the UK, restructure his organization and its processes. – make right investments, apply resources, and deliver solution in short time. Churchill turned a disastrous situation into an unexpected victory. Example of an agile project in flight. Please prepare questions for the end of the presentation. 5 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland Agile Project Management is nothing new. To understand it we need to go back to May 1940 to a time of continuous change . UK faced a grim situation. UK unprepared for war Chamberlain stalling for peace. Chamberlain trying to manage his way out of a bad situation. Audacious attack on Denmark/Norway, led to Chamberlains demise. Campaign demonstrates changes in war - mechanization & communication. In unpredictable environment Chamberlain is forced to resign. 6 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland On May 10th 1940 Churchill became PM and within 2 weeks he was facing the biggest military catastrophe in British History . Day 1 – invasion in the West . Day 5 – Holland capitulates . Day 7 - Axis break through at Sedan . Day 10 - Axis reach English Channel . Day 15 - 2 armies surrounded in a pocket . Churchill faced with disaster asked Chiefs of Staff to report on problem of defense of UK . Report stressed overwhelming superiority of enemy on land and air. 7 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland At Dunkirk the Allies miraculously got large numbers away with nothing but the shirts on their backs . France was seeking peaceful solution . UK government reluctant to fight on. Evacuation a logistical nightmare – 900 vessels (naval, commercial and private). Initial predictions for 45,000 troops . Troops evacuated per day: – May 29th, 47,300 – May 30th, 53,823 – May 31st, 68,000 – June 1st, 64,429 – June 2nd, 26,200 . Astonishingly 338,226 troops evacuated – Total - 224,686 British, – 121,445 French and Belgian, – (plus German POWs) 8 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland The cost of Dunkirk was incredibly high in losses of ship and aircraft . In last 2 weeks of May 1940 the Royal Air Force (RAF) sustained massive losses of 500 fighters in air battle. In total RAF lost 1,029 aircraft and over 1,500 personnel. At Dunkirk lost 200 ships and 177 aircraft (109 fighters). The Axis lost 240 aircraft. 9 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland Although “spun” into a victory in reality Dunkirk was a mitigated disaster as the army lost 90% of its heavy equipment . More than 75,000 vehicles & trucks, & 400 tanks. 650,000 tons of arms, ammunition and supplies were left behind – 1,200 field guns, – 1,350 anti-aircraft & anti-tank guns, – 11,000 machine guns. All sorely needed to defend the UK. Undefended coast line, no defenses. 10 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland Spin on Dunkirk was almost too successful, set off wave of public euphoria were gallant loser escapes at last moment . Ministry of Information (MOI), prepared public for bad news. MOI changed news stories of Anglo- French successes May 10-14th, . Churchill and MOI not sure of outcome adopted different positions. Implemented news management. – Controlled source, issued communiqués to newspapers – Editors interpreted, gave appearance of diversity. Growth of radio over news paper . Dunkirk propaganda victory role of "little boats" . Saved Churchill’s position. 11 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland The problems had to be prioritized, short and long term, and then addressed. Churchill is determined to fight on. "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.” May 13 . Small army with little . 675 RAF fighters, equipment. 50% below strength, . Undefended coast line, faced estimated no defenses. 3,500 aircraft (1100 . Economy on civilian, fighters). not war footing. Fighter production . UK over populated vastly industrialized. very low (290 vs 500 Luftwaffe per . All raw materials imported (except coal). month), 6 months behind schedule. 67% of food imported. Pilot shortage, 60% below operational strength. Lessons for Agile PM – clearly state organizational challenges. 12 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland Churchill’s architects recognize invasion only possible with victory in air. RAF Fighter Command is critical organization. Royal navy could only prevent sea invasion with massive air cover. Override Air Ministry pressure to invest in bombers. RAF to defend a very long coast line. Raids into British air space in 10 minutes, over London in another 10 minutes. Lessons for Agile PM – determine which organizations play a lead role and what has the greatest value. 13 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland Churchill defines vision, and short and long term objectives that looked beyond the imminent air battle. Short term (2 months): – Convince cabinet, government, people to fight on. – Win the air battle and stall invasion till spring 1941. – Restore nation’s confidence in his government. Long term (5-7 years): – Move economy to war footing to sustain total economic warfare. – Expand war through an alliance with U.S. – Responsibilities to free world and occupied Europe Lessons for Agile PM – Create guiding vision, clearly state short and long term organizational objectives. 14 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland Churchill is presented rough “technology diamonds” to incorporate in project, and integrate into solution in short term. A modern and technically outstanding fighter in the Spitfire, but in small numbers (33%). RAF Fighter Command - geographically distributed and networked installations (5 yrs old). Bletchley Park shows great promise in breaking Enigma with machines. Radar testing proves success of the technology. A secure, blast proof, underground facility near Downing Street with good communications. Lessons for Agile PM – assess all emerging technology options. 15 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland Major problems faced by Churchill in May 1940 were complexity & rate of change, confidence and overall priorities. Lack of confidence around him . “He delegated freely but also in government circles probed and interfered . No clear priorities where to continuously, regarding focus the fight nothing as too large or too small for his attention.” . No single minister for prosecuting war – 2005 Encyclopædia Britannica . Public unprepared for war . Focus primarily on military (not economy) . The fight was in one theatre Lessons for Agile PM – master the problem(s) before designing the solution, and prepare for lots of change and volatility. 16 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland Churchill’s background and experience proves invaluable, and he brought it forward as PM. 1901- Member of Parliament . 1905 – Cabinet Member . 1910-1911 – Home Secretary . 1911-1915 – First Lord of the Admiralty . 1915 – Member of the War Council . 1916 – Commanded 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers . 1917 – Minister of Munitions . 1919-1921 – Secretary of state for war and air . 1924-1929 – Chancellor of the Exchequer . 1929-1939 – Out of office Lessons for Agile PM – bring appropriate lessons learned forward from your career. 17 Churchill the Agile PM www.lessons-from-history.com 9/25/2009 © 2009 Mark Kozak-Holland Churchill learnt many lessons from the First World War which guides his priorities in May 1940. The lack of central policy undermined resource coordination, and prolonged UKs response. The lack of good intelligence at Gallipoli crucified his career. The horror of a static war as he fought in the trenches. As Minister of Munitions responsible for tank production – lack of cooperation - military and industry.
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