DOCSLIB.ORG

The Battle of Britain: Misperceptions That Led to Victory

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Battle of Britain: Misperceptions That Led to Victory The Battle of Britain: Misperceptions that Led to Victory by Douglas M. Armour Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours in History Acadia University April, 2011 ©Copyright by Douglas M. Armour, 2011 This thesis by Douglas M. Armour Is accepted in its present form by the Department of History & Classics As satisfying thesis requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours Approved by the Thesis Supervisor ________________________________ ______________________________ Dr. Paul Doerr Date Approved by the Head of the Department ________________________________ ______________________________ Dr. Paul Doerr Date Approved by the Honours Committee ________________________________ ______________________________ Dr. Sonia Hewitt Date i I, Douglas M. Armour, grant permission to the University Librarian at Acadia University to reproduce, loan or distribute copies of my thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats on a non-profit basis. I however, retain the copyright in my thesis. ________________________________ Signature of Author ______________________________ Date ii Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Paul Doerr, for all the support he has given me while writing my thesis. He has guided me through this long process and put up with my terrible spelling. Also, I especially thank him for getting some primary sources from Britain, (you know your thesis advisor is awesome when he crosses an ocean to get sources for you). Thanks again Paul for all your efforts! To my parents, thanks for all the loving support and motivation you have given me while writing my thesis. You have made this thesis possible by first making the writer of it (me) possible and for raising me to be the person I am. Mom and Dad I love you. To the rest of my family and loved ones I love you very much. To Dr. David Duke, thanks for all the guidance you have given me over the years. When I first came to Acadia you were assigned to be my mentor. The advice you have given me then and over the years have been extremely valuable. You are now my second reader and still giving me valuable advice. Thank you for all your guidance; you are a great professor and person, never change unless it is for the better. To all the professors I have had while at Acadia, thank you for your hard work and for the knowledge you have given me over the years. Also, to all the staff that have helped me at Acadia, thank you. To God, thank you for literally everything. You have made this thesis possible by making reality itself. I love you God, you are awesome. For those of you reading who do not share my religious views, you at least now know I have a religious back ground. iii Table of Contents Title Page i Approval Page ii Permission for Duplication Page iii Acknowledgement Page iv Table of Contents v Abstract Page vi Chapter One: Historiography............................................................................................................1 Chapter One: Conclusion................................................................................................................31 Chapter Two: The Wrong Battle.....................................................................................................34 Chapter Two: Conclusion................................................................................................................60 Bibliography....................................................................................................................................62 iv Abstract This thesis examines British preparations for the future of aerial warfare in the 1930s and the subsequent Battle of Britain in 1940. It argues that British planners in the 1930s prepared for the wrong war that was going to be fought in 1939 and early 1940. It shows that this mistake in planning was mainly due to poor information and an institutional bias toward offensive bombers. The thesis then looks at the defensive preparations made by Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding. It argues that though Britain had prepared for the wrong offensive battle that was fought in 1939 and early 1940, the preparations it made for a defensive battle gave the RAF a distinct advantage over the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain which would follow. v vi Chapter 1: Historiography The Battle of Britain is remembered as one of the great battles of World War II. It is also notable for being the first battle in history fought almost exclusively in the air. The Battle of Britain is important for many reasons. It was a battle fought for Britain’s very survival, in which the RAF met the Luftwaffe over the skies of Britain. More importantly if the battle had been lost it is very imaginable that in all probability Nazi Germany would have won World War 2, making the world a very different place than it is now. Churchill captured the importance of the battle when he famously said, “Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves, that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, ‘This was their finest hour.’”1 The Battle of Britain, like most histories, is too complicated in its many parts and too large for any human to comprehend atits fullest. From the lowliest airmen to the highest ranking officers, none know the battle to its fullest. Historians and others, however, can comprehend some parts of the battle and from these parts are able to draw larger pictures. Looking at these accounts it is important that one remembers that historians and those who write the past have subjective limitations. They come from different backgrounds and different times. Also they have different perspectives, different biases and use different sources. Historians and others end up giving different accounts of the battle. The Battle of Britain is no exception to this and there are many varying accounts of the battle that have been written over the years. 1 “The Churchill Centre and Museum at the Churchill War Rooms, London,” http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-about-winston-churchill/his-speechs-how- churchill-did-it, (February 8, 2011). 1 This historiography will look at a number of authors who have written on the Battle of Britain over the years. It will proceed chronologically, starting with early accounts of the battle and progress to more recent authors. Finally, it will point out some of the recurring themes and changing views of the authors. Sir Arthur Harris was the Air Officer Commander-in-Chief of RAF Bomber Command in 1942. After the war, in 1947, he published the book Bomber Offensive. Arthur Harris was born April 13, 1892 in Cheltenham, England. His father wanted him to join the army, but he did not join the army right away, “He dearly wanted me to go into the army. I was dead set against it. And as it was either the army or the colonies, I plumped for darkest Africa.”2 Harris went to North Rhodesia (modern day Zambia) and fell in love with the country. During World War One, Harris was compelled to enlist and later in the war found himself joining the Royal Flying Corps (R.F.C.) This started his career in military aviation, “I certainly had no idea that air warfare would be my life's work.”3 Harris was promoted in 1942 to Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command. During the war Harris supported the bombing of German cities and worked to make bombing effective. After the war he was heavily criticized for the bombing of German cities and was given the nick name “Bomber Harris” by the media. Harris died April 5, 1984 at his house in Goring. The book, Bomber Offensive, is an autobiography of Harris’s experiences during World War II. In the first two chapters, Harris recalls his experiences before the war and the early years of the war. Harris explained in Chapter One how, during the interwar years, the three services had been allowed to degrade, so that when the threat of war returned the RAF found itself inadequately supplied. He points to the "Ten Year Rule" as being responsible for the 2 Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive, (New York : Macmillan Co., 1947), p 15. 3 Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive, p 16. 2 degeneration of the RAF during the inter war period. The "Ten Year Rule” was created, under the following circumstances: After the 1914-1918 war the Chiefs of Staff sought political guidance on which to base the establishments and plans of the three services. They were told to base their plans on the assumption that there would be "no major war for ten years." That was a simple and, at the time when it was made, justifiable ruling. But that rule remained in force year after year, and no one had observed the logical conclusion that the progressive plans should thereafter have been based on an amended ruling that there would be no major war within nine years, within eight years, and so on each year, to zero.4 In the first part of the chapter Harris describes how far behind Britain was compared to Germany, and the urgency that military planners faced preparing for war. While Germany was preparing for war, “everything we had—and that was little—was in the shopwindow, with nothing behind it.”5 As for Britain’s French allies, their air force was in even worse condition. “Their air force was hopelessly deficient in every way, a dire state for which their politicians were responsible.”6 It was only a few years before the war that preparations started in earnest. “For some time we could not get across to the people who mattered the urgency of making preparations for war, but eventually Eden and Simon, in 1935, went to Germany and came back sufficiently staggered by what they had seen to cause them to ring all the bells.”7 In this chapter Harris also talks about how he believed that the bomber was going to play a major role in winning the upcoming war, But I never had any fear that the enemy would succeed in getting across the Channel, with the equipment then available.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • FM 11-25 Signal Corps Field Manual Aircraft Warning Service
    MHI Copy 3 FM 11-25 WAR DEPARTMENT CPS F LD MANUAL AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE August 3, 1942 REFERENCE USE ONLY NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM LIBRARY REGRAOED UNCLASSIFIED ay AUTHo'YoF! DOD DIR. 5200. 1 R By A7 A5 on 2z. FM 11-25 C 1 SIGNAL CORPS FIELD MANUAL AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE CHANGES I WAR DEPARTMENT, No. 1 WASHINGTON. March 10, 1943. FM 11-25, August 3, 1942, is changed as follows: * 34: REPORTING PLATOON b. Operating detail and power-plant detail.-The reporting platoon * * * the powver-plant detail. The personnel of these two details are responsible for the actual installation and operation of the mobile radar equipment. They are also re- sponsible for accomplishing minor repairs, adjustments, and replacement; (maintenance in first echelon) and such more extensive repairs, adjustments, and replacements (mainte- nance in second echelon) as may be accomplished by use of hand tools and the mobile equipment issued to the unit. The operating detail * * * supply truck K-31. · . a . *, ·* [A. G. 062.11 (3-1-43).] (C 1, Mar. 10. 1943.) BY ORDER Of THE SECRETARY OF WAR: G. C. MARSHALL. Chief of Stafl. OFFICIAL: J. A. ULIO, Major General, The Adjutanl General. U.S. GOVERPaMEUTPRINITIN.. OFICEISO 1· FM 11-25 SIGNAL CORPS FIELD MANUAL AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1942 WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, August 3, 1942. FM 11-25, Signal Corps Field Manual, Aircraft Warning Service, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned. [A. G. 062.11 (6-11-42) .] BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: G.
    [Show full text]
  • Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 29
    ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 29 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. Copyright 2003: Royal Air Force Historical Society First published in the UK in 2003 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361-4231 Typeset by Creative Associates 115 Magdalen Road Oxford OX4 1RS Printed by Advance Book Printing Unit 9 Northmoor Park Church Road Northmoor OX29 5UH 3 CONTENTS BATTLE OF BRITAIN DAY. Address by Dr Alfred Price at the 5 AGM held on 12th June 2002 WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THE LUFTWAFFE’S ‘TIP 24 AND RUN’ BOMBING ATTACKS, MARCH 1942-JUNE 1943? A winning British Two Air Forces Award paper by Sqn Ldr Chris Goss SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE SIXTEENTH 52 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING HELD IN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE CLUB ON 12th JUNE 2002 ON THE GROUND BUT ON THE AIR by Charles Mitchell 55 ST-OMER APPEAL UPDATE by Air Cdre Peter Dye 59 LIFE IN THE SHADOWS by Sqn Ldr Stanley Booker 62 THE MUNICIPAL LIAISON SCHEME by Wg Cdr C G Jefford 76 BOOK REVIEWS. 80 4 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY President Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Michael Beetham GCB CBE DFC AFC Vice-President Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowrey KCB CBE AFC Committee Chairman Air Vice-Marshal
    [Show full text]
  • How the Luftwaffe Lost the Battle of Britain British Courage and Capability Might Not Have Been Enough to Win; German Mistakes Were Also Key
    How the Luftwaffe Lost the Battle of Britain British courage and capability might not have been enough to win; German mistakes were also key. By John T. Correll n July 1940, the situation looked “We shall fight on the beaches, we shall can do more than delay the result.” Gen. dire for Great Britain. It had taken fight on the landing grounds, we shall Maxime Weygand, commander in chief Germany less than two months to fight in the fields and in the streets, we of French military forces until France’s invade and conquer most of Western shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, predicted, “In three weeks, IEurope. The fast-moving German Army, surrender.” England will have her neck wrung like supported by panzers and Stuka dive Not everyone agreed with Churchill. a chicken.” bombers, overwhelmed the Netherlands Appeasement and defeatism were rife in Thus it was that the events of July 10 and Belgium in a matter of days. France, the British Foreign Office. The Foreign through Oct. 31—known to history as the which had 114 divisions and outnumbered Secretary, Lord Halifax, believed that Battle of Britain—came as a surprise to the Germany in tanks and artillery, held out a Britain had lost already. To Churchill’s prophets of doom. Britain won. The RAF little longer but surrendered on June 22. fury, the undersecretary of state for for- proved to be a better combat force than Britain was fortunate to have extracted its eign affairs, Richard A. “Rab” Butler, told the Luftwaffe in almost every respect.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 P247 Musketry Regulations, Part II RECORDS' IDENTITY STATEMENT Reference Number
    P247 Musketry Regulations, Part II RECORDS’ IDENTITY STATEMENT Reference number: GB1741/P247 Alternative reference number: Title: Musketry Regulations, Part II Dates of creation: 1910 Level of description: Fonds Extent: 1 volume Format: Paper RECORDS’ CONTEXT Name of creators: The War Office Administrative history: The War Office was a department of the British Government, responsible for the administration of the British Army between the 17th century and 1964, when its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Defence. The name "War Office" is also often given to the former home of the department, the Old War Office Building on Horse Guards Avenue, London. The War Office declined greatly in importance after the First World War, a fact illustrated by the drastic reductions in its staff numbers during the inter-war period. On 1 April 1920, it employed 7,434 civilian staff; this had shrunk to 3,872 by 1 April 1930. Its responsibilities and funding were also reduced. In 1936, the government of Stanley Baldwin appointed a Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, who worked outside of the War Office. When Winston Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940, he bypassed the War Office altogether and appointed himself Minister of Defence (though there was, curiously, no ministry of defence until 1947). Clement Attlee continued this arrangement when he came to power in 1945 but appointed a separate Minister of Defence for the first time in 1947. In 1964, the present form of the Ministry of Nucleus: The Nuclear and Caithness Archives 1 Defence was established, unifying the War Office, Admiralty, and Air Ministry.
    [Show full text]
  • Inscribed 6 (2).Pdf
    Inscribed6 CONTENTS 1 1. AVIATION 33 2. MILITARY 59 3. NAVAL 67 4. ROYALTY, POLITICIANS, AND OTHER PUBLIC FIGURES 180 5. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 195 6. HIGH LATITUDES, INCLUDING THE POLES 206 7. MOUNTAINEERING 211 8. SPACE EXPLORATION 214 9. GENERAL TRAVEL SECTION 1. AVIATION including books from the libraries of Douglas Bader and “Laddie” Lucas. 1. [AITKEN (Group Captain Sir Max)]. LARIOS (Captain José, Duke of Lerma). Combat over Spain. Memoirs of a Nationalist Fighter Pilot 1936–1939. Portrait frontispiece, illustrations. First edition. 8vo., cloth, pictorial dust jacket. London, Neville Spearman. nd (1966). £80 A presentation copy, inscribed on the half title page ‘To Group Captain Sir Max AitkenDFC. DSO. Let us pray that the high ideals we fought for, with such fervent enthusiasm and sacrifice, may never be allowed to perish or be forgotten. With my warmest regards. Pepito Lerma. May 1968’. From the dust jacket: ‘“Combat over Spain” is one of the few first-hand accounts of the Spanish Civil War, and is the only one published in England to be written from the Nationalist point of view’. Lerma was a bomber and fighter pilot for the duration of the war, flying 278 missions. Aitken, the son of Lord Beaverbrook, joined the RAFVR in 1935, and flew Blenheims and Hurricanes, shooting down 14 enemy aircraft. Dust jacket just creased at the head and tail of the spine. A formidable Vic formation – Bader, Deere, Malan. 2. [BADER (Group Captain Douglas)]. DEERE (Group Captain Alan C.) DOWDING Air Chief Marshal, Lord), foreword. Nine Lives. Portrait frontispiece, illustrations. First edition.
    [Show full text]
  • Freeman's Folly
    Chapter 9 Freeman’s Folly: The Debate over the Development of the “Unarmed Bomber” and the Genesis of the de Havilland Mosquito, 1935–1940 Sebastian Cox The de Havilland Mosquito is, justifiably, considered one of the most famous and effective military aircraft of the Second World War. The Mosquito’s devel- opment is usually portrayed as being a story of a determined and independent aircraft company producing a revolutionary design with very little input com- ing from the official Royal Air Force design and development process, which normally involved extensive consultation between the Air Ministry’s technical staff and the aircraft’s manufacturer, culminating in an official specification being issued and a prototype built. Instead, so the story goes, de Havilland’s design team thought up the concept of the “unarmed speed bomber” all by themselves and, despite facing determined opposition from the Air Ministry and the raf, got it adopted by persuading one important and influential senior officer, Wilfrid Freeman, to put it into production (Illustration 9.1).1 Thus, before it proved itself in actuality a world-beating design, it was known in the Ministry as “Freeman’s Folly”. Significantly, even the UK Official History on the “Design and Development of Weapons”, published in 1964, perpetuated this explanation, stating that: When … [de Havilland] found itself at the beginning of the war short of orders and anxious to contribute to the war effort they proceeded to design an aeroplane without any official prompting from the Air Minis- try. They had to think out for themselves the whole tactical and strategic purpose of the aircraft, and thus made a number of strategic and tactical assumptions which were not those of the Air Staff.
    [Show full text]
  • The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force in Anti-Submarine Warfare Policy, 1918-1945
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Birmingham Research Archive, E-theses Repository THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE POLICY, 1918-1945. By JAMES NEATE A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham September 2012 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the roles played by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force in the formulation of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) policy from 1918 to 1945. Its focus is on policy relating to the use of air power, specifically fixed-wing shore-based aircraft, against submarines. After a period of neglect between the Wars, airborne ASW would be pragmatically prioritised during the Second World War, only to return to a lower priority as the debates which had stymied its earlier development continued. Although the intense rivalry between the RAF and RN was the principal influence on ASW policy, other factors besides Service culture also had significant impacts.
    [Show full text]
  • Great Western Society TAUNTON GROUP
    Great Western Society TAUNTON GROUP JOURNAL 2020 Edition Acting Editor: David Hartland [email protected] 07711 229071 Cherry Hill, 21 Pyles Thorne Road, Wellington TA21 8DX Any views expressed herein are solely those of the contributors and they are not to be considered in any way to be those of the Great Western Society Limited or the Taunton Group Committee. Photographs remain the copyright of the Author. GROUP COMMITTEE FOR 2020 as elected at the GROUP ANNUAL MEETING Stuart Trott Chairman Francis Lewis Vice-Chairman and Scribe David Hartland Secretary David Brabner Treasurer and Spendthrift Peter Triggs Welfare Officer and Programme Philip Izzard Audio Visual Aids & Catering Richard Studley Our Man in Wellington Roger Hagley Publicity Stand and Membership Chris Penney Publicity Coordinator Carl Honnor Senior Committee Member Data Protection Act The Group maintains a postal list on computer file of names and addresses of members and certain other persons who have in the past requested communications from the Group or to whom the Group needs, from time to time, to send details of working days and who are not contained within the Group List in the Society’s computer file. This is used solely for the purpose of producing labels for addressing these communications when applicable. If any such person does not wish his/her details to be included will they please advise the Group Membership Secretary in writing so that their name can be removed. This applies to some members and other persons domiciled outside the Group’s geographical
    [Show full text]
  • PRISM Vol 5, No.1
    PRISM VOL. 5, NO. 1 2014 A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS PRISM About VOL. 5, NO. 1 2014 PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners on complex EDITOR and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; relevant policy Michael Miklaucic and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS Ross Clark Ben Graves Caliegh Hernandez Communications Daniel Moore Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct communications to: COPY EDITORS Dale Erickson Editor, PRISM Rebecca Harper 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Christoff Luehrs Fort Lesley J. McNair Sara Thannhauser Washington, DC 20319 Nathan White Telephone: (202) 685-3442 DESIGN DIRecTOR FAX: Carib Mendez (202) 685-3581 Email: [email protected] ADVISORY BOARD Dr. Gordon Adams Dr. Pauline H. Baker Ambassador Rick Barton Contributions Professor Alain Bauer PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and Ambassador James F. Dobbins abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to [email protected] Ambassador John E. Herbst (ex officio) with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. Dr. David Kilcullen Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein Dr. Roger B. Myerson This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Dr. Moisés Naím Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted MG William L.
    [Show full text]
  • The London Gazette of Tuesday, the Loth of September, 1946 by Registered As a Newspaper
    IRumb, 37719 4543 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of Tuesday, the loth of September, 1946 by Registered as a newspaper WEDNESDAY, n SEPTEMBER, 1946 The Air Ministry, September, 1946. THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN. The following despatch was submitted to the Experiences in Holland and Belgium had Secretary of State for Air on August 20th, shown what they could do with armoured 1941, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh C. T. forces operating in conjunction with an Air Dowding, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., C.M.G., Arm which had substantially achieved the- com- A.D.Cs, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chiej, mand of the Air. Fighter Command, Royal Air Force. 5. This air supremacy was doubly necessary to them in attacking England ibecause the bulk PREAMBLE. of their troops and war material must neces- 1. I have been instructed by the Air Council sarily 'be conveyed by sea, and, in order to to write a Despatch on the Air Fighting of achieve success, they must be capable of giving last Autumn, which has become known as the' air protection to the passage and the landing " Battle of Britain." JThe conditions are a of troops and material. little unusual -because, firstly, the Battle ended 6. The destruction or paralysis of the Fighter many months ago, secondly, a popular account Command was therefore an essential pre- of the fighting has already been written and requisite to the invasion of these Islands. published, and, thirdly, recommendations for Mention in Despatches have already been 7. Their immediate objectives might be Con- submitted.
    [Show full text]
  • Ops Block Battle of Britain: Ops Block
    Large print guide BATTLE OF BRITAIN Ops Block Battle of Britain: Ops Block This Operations Block (Ops Block) was the most important building on the airfield during the Battle of Britain in 1940. From here, Duxford’s fighter squadrons were directed into battle against the Luftwaffe. Inside, you will meet the people who worked in these rooms and helped to win the battle. Begin your visit in the cinema. Step into the cinema to watch a short film about the Battle of Britain. Duration: approximately 4 minutes DUXFORD ROOM Duxford’s Role The Battle of Britain was the first time that the Second World War was experienced by the British population. During the battle, Duxford supported the defence of London. Several squadrons flew out of this airfield. They were part of Fighter Command, which was responsible for defending Britain from the air. To coordinate defence, the Royal Air Force (RAF) divided Britain into geographical ‘groups’, subdivided into ‘sectors.’ Each sector had an airfield known as a ‘sector station’ with an Operations Room (Ops Room) that controlled its aircraft. Information about the location and number of enemy aircraft was communicated directly to each Ops Room. This innovative system became known as the Dowding System, named after its creator, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, the head of Fighter Command. The Dowding System’s success was vital to winning the Battle of Britain. Fighter Command Group Layout August 1940 Duxford was located within ‘G’ sector, which was part of 12 Group. This group was primarily responsible for defending the industrial Midlands and the north of England, but also assisted with the defence of the southeast as required.
    [Show full text]
  • 571 Write Up.Pdf
    This paper comprises a brief history of the origins and early development of radar meteorology. Therefore, it will cover the time period from a few years before World War II through about the 1970s. The earliest developments of radar meteorology occurred in England, the United States, and Canada. Among these three nations, however, most of the first discoveries and developments were made in England. With the exception of a few minor details, it is there where the story begins. Even as early as 1900, Nicola Tesla wrote of the potential for using waves of a frequency from the radio part of the electromagnetic spectrum to detect distant objects. Then, on 11 December 1924, E. V. Appleton and M.A.F. Barnett, two Englishmen, used a radio technique to determine the height of the ionosphere using continuous wave (CW) radio energy. This was the first recorded measurement of the height of the ionosphere using such a method, and it got Appleton a Nobel Prize. However, it was Merle A. Tuve and Gregory Breit (the former of Johns Hopkins University, the latter of the Carnegie Institution), both Americans, who six months later – in July 1925 – did the same thing using pulsed radio energy. This was a simpler and more direct way of doing it. As the 1930s rolled on, the British sensed that the next world war was coming. They also knew they would be forced to defend themselves against the German onslaught. Knowing they would be outmanned and outgunned, they began to search for solutions of a technological variety. This is where Robert Alexander Watson Watt – a Scottish physicist and then superintendent of the Radio Department at the National Physical Laboratory in England – came into the story.
    [Show full text]