Factsheet: the National Assembly of Bulgaria

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Directorate-General for the Presidency Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments Factsheet: The National Assembly of Bulgaria 1. At a glance The National Assembly of Bulgaria consists of 240 members elected by proportional representation in multi-seat constituencies. Political parties must gather a minimum of 4% of the national vote in order to enter the Assembly. Bulgaria has a multi-party system. The Assembly is responsible for enactment of laws, approval of the budget, scheduling of presidential elections, selection and dismissal of the Prime Minister and other ministers, declaration of war, concluding peace and deployment of troops outside of Bulgaria, and ratification of international treaties and agreements. It is headed and presided by the Chairperson of the National Assembly of Bulgaria. 2. Composition Results of the parliamentary elections on 26 March 2017 Party EP % Seats affiliation Citizens for European Development of 39.58% 95 Bulgaria (GERB) Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) 33.33% 80 United Patriots (UP) 11.25% 27 Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) 10.83% 26 Volya - 5% 12 240 seats 3. Officeholders President of the National Assembly of Chairperson of the Committee on Bulgaria European Affairs and Oversight of the European Funds Ms Tzveta Karayancheva (GERB) Mr Kristian Ivanov Vigenin, Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) 4. Relations with Members of the European Parliament Participation rights for Bulgarian MEPs in Attendance only plenary sittings Participation rights for Bulgarian MEPs in Only EU Affairs committee committee meetings Availability of videoconferencing system in Yes the National Assembly of Bulgaria 5. Information links Official website: http://www.parliament.bg/en List of committees Recent documents submitted by the National Assembly of Bulgaria to the Interparliamentary EU Information Exchange (IPEX) 6. Contacts Factsheet author and contact in the Brussels-based contact of the Bulgarian EP Directorate for Relations with National Parliament: Parliaments: Mrs Diana Ciuche Mr Hristo Kraevsi Office WIE 05U046, 1047 Brussels Office WIE 06U023, Phone +32 2 28341197 Phone +32 2 2848699 [email protected] [email protected] Last updated on 11//2017 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/relnatparl [email protected].

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