Iraq's Political Transition After the Surge

IRAQ’S POLITICAL TRANSITION AFTER THE SURGE Five Enduring Tensions and Ten Key Challenges Brian Katulis, Marc Lynch, and Peter Juul Center for American Progress September 2008 www.americanprogress.org Center for American Progress Executive summary he 2007-2008 surge of U.S. troops achieved important gains in reducing violence in Iraq. But it has not delivered on its central objective: achieving a sus- T tainable power consolidation among Iraq’s different political forces. The surge has frozen into place the accelerated fragmentation that Iraq underwent in 2006 and 2007 and has created disincentives to bridge central divisions between Iraqi factions. The common refrain that the surge has produced military success that has not been matched by political progress fundamentally misrepresents the nature of Iraq’s political evolution. The increased security achieved over the last two years has been purchased through a number of choices that have worked against achieving meaningful political reconciliation. The reductions in violence in 2007 and 2008 have, in fact, made true political accommodation in Iraq more elusive, contrary to the central theory of the surge. Rather than advancing Iraq’s political transition and facilitating power-sharing deals among Iraq’s factions, the surge has produced an oil revenue-fueled, Shia-dominated national government with close ties to Iran. This national government shows few signs of seeking to compromise and share meaningful power with other frustrated political factions. The surge has set up a political house of cards. But this does not mean that the U.S. military must stay longer to avoid its collapse. Quite the contrary: Without a U.S. military drawdown, Iraq will not be able to achieve the true internal consolidation of power necessary to advance U.S. security interests in the Middle East. Now that the last surge brigades are gone, Iraq’s government is demanding a strict timeline for the departure of U.S. troops, and U.S. policy in Iraq is moving toward an inevitable transition, it is time to take stock of Iraq’s internal politics Iraq’s internal politics today are a complicated mosaic of competing interests and con- tradictory trends. Five enduring, unresolved tensions lie beneath the surface, each cap- turing a part but none the entirety of the political dynamics of post-surge Iraq. 1. Centralizers vs. de-centralizers. Some Iraqi factions want to see more power placed in the hands of the national government, while others continue to push for more power to be vested in local and provincial governments. 2. State power holders vs. popular challengers. Certain factions have dispropor- tionately benefited from the national government’s spoils, such as Dawa, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and the Kurdish factions who are part of national govern- 1 www.americanprogress.org SEPTEMBER 2008 ment. Some factions that have not benefited from the national government’s increased oil wealth and military power have stronger support in key areas of Iraq such as the Sons of Iraq in central and western Iraq and the Sadrists in central and southern Iraq. 3. Sunni vs. Shia. Sectarian conflicts are much reduced since high levels of violence in 2006, but the Sunni-Shia sectarian strain endures. 4. Arab vs. Kurds. The Arab-Kurd division is coming to a head in the unresolved crisis over the status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories. 5. Religious factions vs. secular factions. Latent tensions remain between Iraqis who are concerned by the religious nature of Iraqi politics versus those who see politics as one facet of advancing enduring religious principles of either Sunni or Shia Islam. Religious minorities such as Christians and Yazidis have suffered from perse- cution at the hands of other groups in Iraq since 2003. The five persistent fault lines are present in the three major alliances and political groups that continue to evolve in Iraq: the fragmenting Shia-Kurdish coalition that has ruled Iraq, the transformations in Sunni politics, and the still fledgling efforts of nation- alist and secular groups. Iraq will need to overcome numerous hurdles in its political transition before the end of 2009, including two elections and a long list of unresolved power-sharing questions. Not all of the 10 key challenges outlined in this report are of equal magnitude—failure to resolve some would likely lead to major, systemic crisis, while failure on others would simply be suboptimal. Yet all are interconnected, and none have been resolved by the security improvements of the last 18 months or will be meaningfully addressed simply by postpon- ing U.S. troop withdrawals. Ten key challenges ahead for Iraq’s political transition include: 1. The U.S.-Iraq security agreement 2. Provincial powers and elections 3. Refugees and internally displaced persons 4. Disbanding and integrating militias and other armed groups 5. Constitutional review 6. Kirkuk and other disputed territories and Article 140 7. De-Baathification reform implementation 8. Amnesty implementation 9. Oil and revenue sharing laws 10. State capacity, governance, and anti-corruption These are all issues that Iraq’s leaders must address on their own terms, and at their own pace. The United States cannot impose a military solution to the power-sharing disputes among Iraq’s leaders, and expending significant resources in an effort to do so is unwise while other pressing national security challenges loom in Afghanistan, Paki- stan, and Iran. True progress in Iraq requires the United States to acknowledge the increasing moves by Iraqis to assert sovereignty and control over their own affairs. 2 www.americanprogress.org SEPTEMBER 2008 Most analyses tend to assume that the United States is the principal driver of events in Iraq. From this perspective, Iraqi political progress will only be achieved under constant U.S. pressure, which would make withdrawing troops and reducing U.S. power on the ground a self-defeating proposition. But this perspective is dangerously backward, since the primary drivers of Iraqi politics are Iraqis, and a stable political order must rest on the alignment of their interests and not the exercise of U.S. willpower or tinkering The U.S. military presence in Iraq is not politically neutral. It creates a distinct set of incentives for political actors that directly work against the reconciliation that U.S. diplomats try to promote. U.S. military dominance and support absolves the major political actors from having to make the tough decisions necessary to achieve a power-sharing equilibrium. In the months ahead in Iraq, the United States will have to distinguish between those outcomes that are truly catastrophic and those that are simply suboptimal given the limits on U.S. leverage over Iraqi actors—leverage that declines each day as the Iraqi government becomes financially self-sufficient and more assertive. Iraq’s leaders over the next year will increasingly demand greater control over their own affairs. The United States needs to rebalance its overall national security approach by stepping outside of the trenches of intra-Iraqi disputes over power and putting the focus back on its core national security interests. 3 www.americanprogress.org SEPTEMBER 2008 Introduction hen President George W. Bush announced the surge in January 2007, its stated objective was to improve security in order to provide the space for Wmeaningful political reconciliation. The underlying theory was that violence impeded Iraq’s political transition and national reconciliation. But Iraq’s brutal violence is better understood as politics by other means rather than as an alternative to politics. Key factions in Iraq used violence to reshape Iraq’s internal balance of power and altered the demographic composition of important areas of Iraq such as Baghdad. U.S. policy in Iraq has too often failed to understand the relationship between the military and political dynamics in Iraq, and it has rarely dealt with these dual challenges in an integrated fashion. Since the ouster of Saddam Hussein, the United States has defined its goals in terms of forming political institutions that would form the founda- tion for a stable, unified, and democratic Iraq. Yet its choices along the way have too often worked to undermine its stated ambitions: exacerbating rather than checking sec- tarianism, undermining rather than building state institutions, and devolving military power away from the state rather than building effective state sovereignty. These self-defeating choices have often been driven by immediate demands rather than a systematic strategy. The Bush administration’s determination to demonstrate progress led it to rush into drafting a Transition Administrative Law in 2004 and problematic constitution in 2005, and to hold premature and ill-designed elections in 2005. Its need to demonstrate progress in building the Iraqi Security Forces led it to encourage an overly rapid expansion of the Army and Police, which was exploited by sectarian militias. Its reliance on the Sunni Awakening Councils in 2007 and 2008 against Al Qaeda in Iraq built up independent military power outside the Iraqi state, compromising state sovereignty and essentially handing power over to local warlords. In short, the surge, like several previous U.S. initiatives, has frozen Iraq’s fragmentation into place, leaving a less violent, but still bitterly divided country.1 One of the failures of the 2007-2008 surge of U.S. military forces is that the declines in violence from record levels that it accomplished did not fundamentally alter the strate- gic calculations of Iraq’s leading factions in ways that advance political accommodation and progress toward power-sharing deals. The threats posed by terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq are much diminished, and militias such as the Mahdi Army, though not defeated by any means, operate less freely.

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