ARMOR July-August 2006

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-06-4

Editor in Chief Features LTC SHANE E. LEE 7 Gaining and Maintaining Visual Contact: Replacing the M1114 Managing Editor by Captain Jim Golby CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 11 Death Before Dismount: A Relic by Captain Irvin W. Oliver Jr. Commandant 15 FBCB2: Past, Present, and Future MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS by Captain Shane Robb 19 ARMOR 101 by Louis Gorenc and Laurie Austin ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- month ly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 22 The Modern Army Combatives Program: ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Benefi ts of Integration into Company Training Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. by Captain Brian W. Loyd Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- MOR represents the professional opinions of 24 Rifl e Marksmanship for Today’s Battlefi eld the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Captain Joe Morrison the official Army or TRADOC position, nor 26 The Stryker Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. by Captain Matthew L. Blome Official distribution is limited to one copy for 33 Armor Basic Offi cer Leaders Course III each armored brigade headquarters, armored by Captain Mark Belinsky and Lieutenant Colonel Steven Duke cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron 36 Leader Development at the Company Level head quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- by Captain C.J. Kirkpatrick quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of 41 Mortar Platoon Training Focus to Meet the Evolving Battlefi eld the United States Army. In addition, Army li- by Captain Stephen Ward braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and 43 Integrating Iraqi Forces into Company Team Combat Operations MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, by Captain Justin D. Harper organizations, and the training of personnel 46 Recognition of Combat Vehicles Training Saves Lives for such organizations may request two copies by Dr. William M. Rierson and David A. Ahrens by sending a request to the editor in chief. Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only 48 ARMOR’s Writing Guide those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor 53 Patton Museum Volunteers Restore the “Ontos” Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry Departments carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these 2 Contacts systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which 3 Letters armor and armored cavalry organizations use 4 Commander’s Hatch exclusively; training for all 19-series officers 5 Driver’s Seat and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; 6 From the Boresight Line and information concerning the training, logis- 51 Reviews tics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offi ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, where copyright is indicated. ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. July-August 2006, Vol. CXV, No. 4 USPS 467-970 “From My Position...”

In 1888, a group of cavalry officers decided to get together to ideas for everyone’s benefit. By all accounts, the discussions discuss their profession. The only obstacle preventing them from were focused, relevant, and highly useful to everyone in atten- doing so was the great distance separating them from each oth- dance. Although the live, resident portion of the symposium end- er. To overcome this obstacle, they began publishing The Jour- ed on 19 May, Mounted ManeuverNet will allow those discus- nal of the U.S. Cavalry Association, known today as ARMOR. sions to continue indefinitely. More recently, a group of former company commanders got together for similar reasons and harnessed the potential of the in- The quality of the discussions that take place on this latest pro- ternet, creating a website called CompanyComand.com. fessional forum are highly dependent on the willingness of the forum’s members to contribute. This site is very new, and the Although separated by history and technology, these two seem- content you may find today will improve over time and eventual- ingly dissimilar discussion groups share two similar traits — both ly take on a life of its own. The best thing you can do to make the are a means to share professional knowledge. More important- forum as useful as possible is to join today. Simply go to https:// ly, however, they have both earned outstanding reputations for leadernetwork.bcks.army.mil, click on Mounted ManeuverNet, their candor, insight, and most of all, their independence. and then click on “Become a Member” under the participate section. If you already have Army Knowledge Online access and The latest forum for sharing professional knowledge is Mounted submit your completed application form, you’ll gain access with- ManeuverNet, which combines the best characteristics of AR- in about 24 hours. MOR and CompanyCommand.com to allow its members to quickly learn yesterday’s lessons, dominate today’s enemies, and One of the great things about ARMOR is that it is portable. After win tomorrow’s peace. you read this issue of the magazine, you’ll probably find more than one article worth taking with you. This edition touches on a Unlike ARMOR, Mounted ManeuverNet is not limited to 52 pag- variety of issues the force deals with every day. The contributing es of text. Additionally, authors who contribute lessons learned authors for this issue discuss recommendations for equipping or other pieces of hard-earned knowledge will not need to wait our formations with alternatives to the M1114, organizational two months for feedback from other members. Finally, members change to improve tactical reconnaissance, Army combatives, can use this free forum from wherever they are located, as long and the future of Force XXI battle command, brigade and below as internet access is available. (FBCB2). This edition will also serve to educate our readers on After reading about all of the advantages of a web-based profes- basic armor theory and improvements to rifle marksmanship sional forum, you may conclude that ARMOR ’s days are num- training. Once again, this month’s magazine has a little bit of ev- bered. Nothing could be farther from the truth; in fact, the oppo- erything. site is true. The discussions that take place on Mounted Maneu- In closing, several of our readers have commented that they verNet can easily develop into cutting-edge articles, which will would like to see some humor reintroduced into our pages. The serve to improve the magazine’s already outstanding reputa- magazine’s staff is certainly not opposed to doing so, provided tion. Similarly, articles found in the magazine can serve as the we have some humor to include. A little good-natured humor nev- catalyst for further comment and development on the web. To- er hurt anyone and current events certainly cry out for a break gether, these two professional forums will complement each oth- in routine. If you have a humorous anecdote, cartoon, or article, er while serving to improve courses taught in the training base, by all means send it in. Humorous submissions really only have preparing Soldiers and units for deployment, and better assist- two requirements: they must be in good taste; and most impor- ing soldiers already in theater. One way to look at the potential tantly, they must be funny! Until next issue, take care and Forge of this forum is to compare it to our recent Armored Warfighting the Thunderbolt! Symposium. The symposium brought together some of the armor force’s foremost experts on the current war to exchange S.E. LEE

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW PETER J. SCHOOMAKER Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff 0612906 DSN preﬁ x – 464- Points of Contact Commercial preﬁ x– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Ofﬁ ces U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) LTC Shane E. Lee 4087 MG Robert M. Williams 2121 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Christy Bourgeois 4582 BG Michael S. Tucker 7555 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Vivian Oertle 2610 COL Russell Cloy 1101 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Art Director Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 CSM Otis Smith 4952 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editorial Assistant Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM) Kathy A. Johnson 2249 CSM Joseph P. Zettlemoyer 7091 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Marlin Levendoski 1315 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit- E-mail: [email protected] ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, Rich Text Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development Format, or ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or COL Richard G. Piscal (ATZK-TD) cover letter). Tape captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Ad- E-mail: [email protected] 8247 ditionally, we accept articles as e-mail or attachments at: TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) [email protected] COL John M. Shay 7955 When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing ad- E-mail: [email protected] dress and daytime phone number. Experimentation and Analysis Directorate (ATZK-UAE) COL Douglas L. Fletcher 7809 SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, E-mail: douglas.fl [email protected] we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle article to only one Army professional bulletin at a time. Command/Combat Identifi cation (ATZK-PBC-CID) COL Alan Mosher 4009 GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, but E-mail: [email protected] will accept electronic graphic and photo fi les in no less than 300 dpi format. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) Offi ce, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) If you use PowerPoint for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of ex- Aubrey Henley 5155 cessive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning elec- E-mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 tronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (ATZK-UA) Joe Hughes 5050 ADDRESS CHANGES, PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS, AND ST. GEORGE- E-mail: [email protected] ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription ser vice, address chang- Assistant TRADOC System Manager es, and delivery problems, or for awards in formation, contact Con- Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) nie Stiggers or Connie McMillen, United States Armor Association, MAJ Bryan Salyers 3519 P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; E-mail: [email protected]; E-mail: [email protected] phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the Association through their web site at www.usarmor-assn.org. UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery prob- U.S. Army Armor School lems or changes of unit address, e-mail us at [email protected]. mil; phone DSN 464-2249, com mercial (502) 624-2249; or FAX DSN Director of the Armor School (ATZK-DAS) 464-5039, commercial (502) 624-5039. Requests to be added to the of- COL Robert Valdivia 1050 fi cial distribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Ed- E-mail: [email protected] itor in Chief. 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, COL Peter D. Utley 8736 Bldg 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. E-mail: [email protected] ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine web site 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ) at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. COL Robert R. Naething 7848

ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- NCO Academy (ATZK-NC) hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, CSM Samuel Wilson 5150 training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]

2 — July-August 2006 Is the MGS a Very Expensive Soldiers do not need rules of engagement Forces) — must remove their safely holstered Up-gunned Recoilless Rifle? (ROE)/rules on the use of force (RUF) that are weapons from the holster, manipulate them in a constantly tinkered with by so-called operation- crowded area, and “clear” (unload) them with Dear ARMOR, al law attorneys. Instead, our forces need realis- barrels pointed into sand-filled clearing barrels. Major Jonathan B. Slater’s article, “Introduc- tic training on threat identification and response When a weapon does, on occasion, fire into a tion to the Stryker Mobile Gun System,” in the as set forth in Captain Netherland’s article de- clearing barrel (isn’t that why they have clearing May-June 2006 publication of ARMOR was well scribing the ROE/RUF tactical training seminar. barrels), the command generally crucifies the worth the wait. A few thoughts and questions Neither Captain Netherland nor I, as course di- “guilty” party by issuing career-ending nonjudi- that immediately come to mind are: rector for the Seminar, advocate training any- cial punishment. This panic is so bad that a thing outside the doctrinal standard concerning command sergeant major from a Special Forc- • Why three vehicles and not four in the MGS ROE or RUF. Rather, we strongly believe there es unit recently told me that some senior lead- platoon? They are supporting two leg platoons; is a disconnect between current training meth- ers “fake” charging their weapons when they go why does one only get one MGS and the other odologies and the tactical realities of use of force outside the wire so they can avoid the potential two? Does the concept of “overwatch” or fire and encounters across the mission spectrum. for an accidental discharge on their return to maneuver ring any bells? Or was this decision base. There have also been many reports of made and justified based on cost? Whose cost Despite a clear mandate set forth in the Chair- military members being forced to place strips of — the soldiers, mission, or the bean counters? man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Standing Rules colored tape over their magazine wells to visu- of Engagement, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of • 18 rounds of main gun ammo is not enough, ally demonstrate that their weapons are un- Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, para. 1b loaded. A group called the “armed forces” has especially if you have a basic load mix of HEP, (13June2005), “Unit commanders at all levels HEAT, SABOT, CANISTER, not to mention WIL- gradually and consistently developed a fear of shall ensure that individuals within their respec- weapons that rivals Disney. LIE-P. Please, do not try to make it a proverbial tive units understand and are trained on when “man for all seasons” (you know a jack-of-all- and how to use force in self-defense” most sol- These real-world examples are far more com- trades, but a master of none — always firing diers, sailors, airmen and Marines are not prop- pelling than anything one can glean from read- blanks) or give it more big bullets. erly trained on threat recognition and the ap- ing the New York Times from the comfort and • What is the thought process behind the ini- propriate immediate tactical response to a hos- safety of the schoolhouse. Attempts to put a tial issue of the MGS to an armored cavalry reg- tile act or demonstrated hostile intent. This cre- band-aid on a serious training deficiency by iment (ACR)? I thought the concept was to pro- ates both a heightened risk for friendly forces, writing more restrictive rules is typical of what vide support to infantry squads in the assault as well as a greater likelihood of a legally and one would expect from a corporate lawyer, but phase of an attack mission? At least that is tactically inappropriate use of force. Neither op- it is anathema to the warrior class. what the major said at the beginning of his arti- tion bodes well for mission success. Commanders and soldiers are always looking cle. I’m confused. Why not all to SBCTs? May- Many commands turn to legal advisors to draft for simple, direct, and easily applied ROE/RUF be even right into Iraq, now that’s a novel idea? and implement guidance concerning this area that answer their fundamental use of force ques- • What is this new “around corner” firing capa- of concern. Sadly, this often does not result in tion, “When can I pull the trigger?” While gener- bility? Trick question? If you mean firing from concise rules and better training, but rather in al guidelines for upper command levels can be your flank, say it. There is no line of sight “around a plethora of ever-tightening, ever-changing, and set forth in the ROE/RUF in an operations order corner” firing, yet; sounds a lot like military intel- tactically ridiculous ROE being forced down on (OPORD), and even more particularized guid- ligence to me. our forces. The resultant confusion and hesita- ance handed out on ROE cards, the answer to tion makes us a less effective force, as demon- such a question is almost always incident spe- Finally, after paying due homage (way over- strated by the following real-world examples: cific and must be based on the split second judg- due I think) to the altars of safety and earplugs ment of individual soldiers on the scene. Such in combat and graphics on maps, it seems to ECP Guards in the Green Zone. In January judgment-based training is the opposite of the me that Major Slater is telling us that we have 2004, I interviewed five young soldiers perform- usual rules-based training individuals receive ended up with a very expensive up-gunned re- ing entry control point (ECP) duty at the Coali- in this area. As a further benefit, this judgment- coilless rifle, at best. At worst, it will become a tion Provisional Authority Headquarters in the based training in no way degrades traditional replacement for tanks at the troop level in 3d green zone in Baghdad. Each soldier, after get- force-on-force combat skills, but rather enhanc- ACR squadrons (why the 2d is going away). ting “off duty,” was asked the question “when es them. Sort of like the Bradley. This is okay by me, as do you believe you can use deadly force?” I re- long as they do not screw around with tank com- ceived five different answers, but the overarch- In a world where technology allows four-star manders in those squadrons! ing theme of each young soldier was “I don’t commanders to make near real-time tactical de- know, sir, but I do know that I will be in trouble cisions from a headquarters thousands of miles Great article, Major Slater; mission accom- if I fire my weapon.” This seeking of affirmation away from the conflict, the temptation to substi- plished; it did exactly what an “introduction” is — in other words, is it okay to shoot — is not tute their judgment for the judgment of the sol- supposed to do, raise questions and comments. unusual. dier on the ground is very strong and prevalent. Unless, of course, the conclusion is a fait ac- Former U.S. Envoy to Iraq Paul Bremmer’s be- compli — it’s comforting to know that we never Marines at Fallujah. In Spring 2004, unclassi- moaning that his mission was constantly being do that in the Army, do we? fied portions of the ROE designated members tinkered with by Washington’s “ten-thousand of Iraqi insurgency groups as hostile forces that JOSEPH C. KOPACZ mile screwdriver” is a systemic problem. When could be engaged at will. Instead of taking ad- COL, U.S. Army, Retired that ten-thousand mile screwdriver attempts to vantage of this authority to kill bad guys, many restrict a soldier’s judgment and inherent right subordinate units, including Marines at Fallujah, of self-defense, however, it becomes a deadly ROE/RUF: Response to Netherland’s layered on overly restrictive ROE. Unbelievably, serious systemic problem. And the more that Article Misses Point Entirely at the tactical level, one Marine unit was ordered lawyers, unskilled and unaware of the tactical “not to fire unless fired on.” In addition to being dynamics of a deadly force encounter, attempt Dear ARMOR, unnecessarily dangerous and tactically foolish, to substitute their judgment for the soldiers’ via such guidance was contrary to the authority pro- I am responding to the letter that appeared in restrictive and tactically absurd ROE/RUF guid- vided by higher headquarters. Moreover, it was your magazine’s May-June 2006 edition, titled ance, the more deadly the problem becomes. in direct contravention to the Marines’ inherent “Distinction Must Be Made between the Nature right of self-defense. Captain Netherland should be applauded rath- and Purpose of ROE and RUF,” written by Da- er than chastised for his efforts as a war fighter vid Graham of the Judge Advocate General’s Clearing barrels and accidental discharge to spread the good and true word about a very Legal Center and School, in response to Cap- paranoia. Soldiers returning to most bases in successful, as well as legally and tactically tain Netherland’s article, “21st-Century Rules of theater — regardless of their age, rank, or level Engagement.” of experience (to include Special Operations Continued on Page 50

July-August 2006 — 3 Major General Robert M. Williams Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Armor Warfighting Symposium: Looking Forward

As many of you know, the Armor Cen- methods of capturing lessons learned, an- (MTTs) to assist in that preparation. We ter recently held the 2006 Armor War- alyzing their implications, and dissemi- have already received requests for MTTs fighting Symposium, and what a great nating the results is too slow. The Armor for the Scout Leaders Course, the Master event it was. Our vision for the sympo- Center must do its part to streamline that Gunners Course, and the 19D and 19K sium was to create a forum for our mount- process. We have a number of programs Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course. ed warriors to share their knowledge and in place to achieve that end. For exam- Many of the leaders I talked with at the experience to the greater benefit of all. ple, one of these programs sends teams Symposium reiterated this need. The chal- After what I saw at the Symposium, I am to division and brigade post deployment lenge for us is to support these brigade completely confident that we achieved after-action reviews; and another embeds combat teams with a limited number of that vision. Armor School instructors, doctrine writ- instructors. What I can say is that we will ers, and combat developers in deployed analyze each request, and will support I was particularly pleased with the suc- units. each within our capabilities. cess of our focused discussion panels. I sat in on a number of these panels through- Our responsibilities do not end with sim- On a final note, the 2006 Armor War- out the week and was very impressed ply capturing lessons learned; as the in- fighting Symposium was a great success with both the quantity and quality of dia- tellectual hub of the branch, we must and we must make next year’s sympo- logue. I have repeatedly said that the Ar- also make the lessons available to the op- sium even better. To do so, everyone plays mor Branch’s strength is in the standard erational force. One important develop- a role; the Armor Center’s role is to es- of excellence of our Soldiers, which was ment in support of that responsibility is tablish an agenda of important and rele- very apparent during these panel discus- Mounted ManeuverNet, which is an on- vant topics and to invite premier speak- sions. line collaborative forum for mounted ers and panel members. For those of you leaders to share knowledge and experi- in the operational force, your role is to The Symposium also convinced me that ence, much like an internet version of the continue to send your best Soldiers to the Armor Center and School remain the Armor Warfighting Symposium. While serve as panel members and Symposium intellectual hub of the Armor and Caval- we at the Armor Center maintain the site, attendees. ry force and we at the Armor Center have the members of the Armor and Cavalry an obligation to maintain that distinction. force dictate its content. Mounted Ma- Our enemies will not allow themselves There are a number of ways to accom- neuverNet has enormous potential to en- to become complacent and neither can plish this, some of which have already able leaders to benefit from the experi- we. Activities, such as the Armor War- been implemented and some that will be ences of fellow tankers and cavalrymen. fighting Symposium, are in integral part implemented in the near future. I encourage everyone to make maximum of keeping our mounted force prepared use of this asset. for today’s operating environment. I am First and foremost, it is essential that we confident that through a combination of maintain our close relationship with the In our role as the home of the Armor Armor Center efforts and the work of the operational force. Current operations have School, we must also look at exporting talented Soldiers in the Armor and Cav- placed an unprecedented requirement on por tions of our training. Brigade combat alry force, we will continue to meet any the Army to continually adapt the way we teams face many competing priorities challenge presented, both now and into fight. Success in that environment relies as they prepare for upcoming missions. the future. on our ability to learn from past success- These teams have requested that the Ar- es and mistakes. However, the traditional mor Center send mobile training teams FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT!

4 — July-August 2006 CSM Otis Smith Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Excellence in Armor: Developing Future Leaders The Armor Force faces no greater chal- on performance, motivation, and leader- lenge today than developing leaders and ship. An OSUT soldier is not formally en- soldiers who can rethink traditional roles rolled in the program until he graduates. and adapt to new missions and organiza- Unit selection requires the company/ tions. As part of this challenge, we need troop commander’s recommendation. The to evaluate our efforts in terms of the three commander may recommend any soldier, pillars of training — unit, institution, and from private to sergeant, to be enrolled in units will be filled at 100 percent as- self-development. We have already estab- EIA. The battalion/squadron command- signed strength; however, grade struc- lished a strong foundation for unit and in- er must approve all selections. The rec- ture will be underfilled at approximately stitutional training. ommending or approving commander is 67 percent. The program will allow com- However, we must improve in the area not required to be an armor officer. manders to identify and fill grade struc- of self-development. It is not enough to ture shortages with EIA soldiers who are EIA is a win-win program with unlim- capable of performing at the next level. encourage soldiers to improve themselves ited potential. It benefits the total armor on their own initiative. We must produce force by recognizing superior perfor- Command support is the key to imple- and promote self-development programs mance and potential, increasing soldier menting and managing a successful EIA that “grow” Armor and Cavalry soldiers motivation, and identifying soldiers that program. Commanders should designate who can meet the demands of the chang- we need to retain. The EIA Program ben- one soldier (usually enrolled in EIA) to ing Armor Force. efits enrolled soldiers by giving them an monitor the unit’s EIA program. In many The EIA program identifies outstanding edge for early promotion, and early en- units, the program is monitored by the career management field (CMF) 19 sol- rollment career courses. battalion/squadron master gunner with diers whose performance demonstrates support from the company master gun- Soldiers enrolled in the EIA program can ners. In other units, the command ser- superb leadership potential, both in one also earn 50 additional promotion points station unit training (OSUT) conducted geant major monitors the program with by successfully passing the tank com- support from the first sergeants, and the by the 1st Armor Training Brigade, and mander or scout commander competen- in cavalry/brigade combat team units Ar- master gunners provide technical exper- cy test level II (TCCT-II/SCCT-II), with a tise on EIA training. mywide. EIA also applies to CMF 19 sol- minimum score of 70. To be eligible to diers serving in non-Armor units, both ac- take the test, soldiers must be assigned to All armor/cavalry units should have a tive and reserve. the recommending unit for at least six formal EIA training program. An EIA The goals of the EIA program are to months to allow for additional training. training program developed by battalion identify and develop intelligent, highly The program is designed to afford the and company master gunners that sup- motivated Armor and Cavalry soldiers best young leaders the training and expe- ports the unit mission essential task list whose performance is consistently out- rience necessary for future leadership po- is an excellent tool to further develop the standing; encourage and facilitate their sitions. Allowing soldiers to test without technical and leadership skills of future career progression and growth into non- additional training undermines the EIA leaders and improves unit readiness. commissioned officer leaders; and pro- program. With the SCCT-II, TCCT-II, and the EIA vide incentives, which will lead to reten- An EIA enrolled sergeant who has suc- program, the Armor Force has a strong tion of these high-quality soldiers. EIA cessfully completed the Basic Noncom- foundation for self-development. We need is both an Active and Reserve Component missioned Officer’s Course and has passed to continue to improve and promote these program. Soldiers can be nominated for the level II test is potentially qualified for programs, actively seeking out those with the EIA program during OSUT at Fort the Master Gunner Course. The Master the technical, tactical, and leadership po- Knox or while assigned to a unit. Gunner Course and the EIA program tential to lead the Army of tomorrow. To During OSUT, soldiers are selected for complement one another — both pro- learn more about these programs, con- EIA during week ten of training. Soldiers grams are designed for highly motivat- tact the Office, Chief of Armor, at DSN are recommended by their drill sergeants ed armor soldiers who strive to excel in 464-TANK. I challenge each one of you and selection is confirmed by a battalion- their profession. to play an active role in self-developing level board, which is chaired by the bat- The EIA program will be exceptionally your soldiers. talion/squadron command sergeant ma- beneficial to soldiers assigned to life cy- YOUR PRIDE IS SHOWING AND jor. The OSUT soldier’s selection is based cle managed brigade combat teams. These SOMEONE IS WATCHING.

July-August 2006 — 5 From the Boresight Line: Master Gunner SME Panel Highlights Challenges Facing Today’s Master Gunners

by First Sergeant Robert Hay

The 2006 Armor Warfighting Sympo- sium was a very successful event for the master gunner branch. During the Sym- posium, the master gunner branch conducted two events, which included a master gunner subject-matter expert (SME) panel and a branch update. More than 60 master gunners from around the force participated in each event. The SME panel’s primary goal was to share knowledge and information with other master gunners and share experiences in both training and current operations. The master gunner SME panel con- sisted of master gunners from the force who served as company master gunners during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The panel focused its discussion topics around Sustaining Gunnery Proficiency multiple weapons platforms and weapons four main areas: pre- and post-deploy- While Deployed systems ranging from MK19s to Bradley ment training, sustaining gunnery profi- Most master gunners on the panel agreed Fighting Vehicles. Although most have ciency in Iraq, the master gunner’s role in never received direct training on these counterinsurgency operations, and the that sustaining gunnery proficiency while deployed was one of the most difficult systems, the knowledge and skills they direction of the master gunner’s course to acquired from the Master Gunner Course stay current. The panel moderator posed tasks due to the lack of training devices in theater, which led them to develop enabled them to incorporate these weap- each panel member a series of questions ons systems into their unit’s training. in relation to the main topics. more unique training ideas. While most agreed that tank crews who conducted patrols and operated on their tanks main- Master Gunner Course Direction Pre- and Post-deployment Training tained some tank-specific proficiency, Finally, the panel discussed the direc- Panel members were asked to share their they were still required to develop and in- tion that the Master Gunner Course would experiences with pre-deployment and corporate other methods to maintain and take to keep pace with current and future post-deployment training. The common sustain proficiency. These methods in- operating environments. Most agreed the ground shared by all panel members was cluded tracking boards and manipulation Master Gunner Course is right on track the requirement to be inventive and think exercises, which are good tools for sus- with its current curriculum. The skills outside the box. Most were required to taining proficiency, training new gunners, gained from the Master Gunner Course tailor their training tasks to upcoming and cross-training crewmembers. The ba- gives master gunners the ability needed to missions. Some of the concerns arising sic group consensus was not to rely on adapt to current missions, be it home sta- from these panel discussions highlight simulators while deployed. Master gun- tion gunnery training, deployment prep- that current operational tempo (OPTEM- ners have to be inventive and think out- aration, or conducting counterinsurgency PO) training calendars are compressed, side the box to enhance and sustain pro- operations in Iraq. Everyone overwhelm- which results in the master gunner being ficiency within their training plans. ingly agreed to maintain the current course required to thoughtfully plan out a gun- standards and program of instruction. nery training plan and make sure it is Master Gunner Role in properly resourced to ensure training is Counterinsurgency Operations All in all, the master gunner panel was conducted safely and to standard. very beneficial. It allowed master gun- The panel agreed that the master gunner’s from the field to express concerns Current operations and limited range ner’s role at this point is that of an advi- and share information. It also highlight- time are also forcing master gunners to sor. The master gunner was required to ed the continued need for unit master gun- incorporate new and inventive training advise his commander on weapons safe ners. The participants’ operational expe- techniques, as well as develop gunnery firing zones for main gun ammunition, riences substantiated that the master gun- training that focuses on mission-depen- ammunition terminal velocity, and tank ner is unequivocally the “go-to guy” for dant scenarios. Tank crewman who de- weapons system capabilities. All the tank gunnery training. ploy on HMMWVs or are dismounted master gunners agreed the training they will also require creative training ideas. received from the Master Gunner Course Finally, I would like to thank everyone Speaking with Bradley master gunners was invaluable in their role of advising who participated on the master gunner or scout platoon sergeants can make this the commander. They also pointed out panel and attended the master gunner easier. that they are being required to work with branch update.

6 — July-August 2006 Gaining and Maintaining Visual Contact: Replacing the M1114 by Captain Jim Golby

“Red 1, this is Red 2. Checkpoint C311 cleared; executing the emies requires soldiers who are outfitted with the proper equip- Ad Dawr bypass.” ment and are rigorously trained based on sound doctrine. “This is Red 1, roger. Blue last cleared the bypass two hours Doctrinal Background ago. Maintain 360-degree security and continue mission.” U.S. Army doctrine clearly emphasizes the importance of sur- “Red 1, Red 2, roger.” prise and initiative at the tactical level. Surprise is included as “Red 1, Red 3. I recommend we deliberately clear checkpoint both a principle of war and as a characteristic of offensive oper- C309 to C308 with dis… Contact IED! Small arms west, out.” ations; initiative is classified as one of the tenets of Army operations.1 Nonetheless, insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan fre- An explosion erupts between my vehicle and the trail vehicle of quently manage to gain the initiative and achieve tactical sur- the patrol as AK-47 rounds fly errantly overhead. The gunners prise through crafty use of patience and concealment. Insur- of the two lead vehicles stand up and scan across the open field gents consistently use the confusion and hesitation created by an to the eastern side of Ad Dawr, attempting to acquire a target. improvised explosive device (IED) or a rocket-propelled gre- The vehicle commanders twist their heads, straining to identify nade (RPG) detonation to drop their weapons, cell phones, or insurgents through the small, square windows of their HMMWVs. detonation devices and slip unnoticed into a nearby neighbor- A burst of .50-caliber rounds from the trail HMMWV pierces the hood or a crowd of civilians, only to return to attack convoys air as the driver accelerates through the dust and debris creat- again another day. ed from the blast. Although the line between security and offensive operations “Red 3, Red 1, SITREP.” becomes increasingly blurred when fighting an insurgency, “Red 1, Red 3 …no casualties, no significant damage to the most route clearance missions or convoy security patrols can be vehicle, break. I thought I had observation of two men with an classified primarily as area security operations. Thus, units ex- RPG headed west into the city, but I’ve lost observation.” ecuting such operations should consider and apply the fundamentals of security operations, which is to provide early and ac- Most soldiers and leaders who have recently served in Iraq un- curate warning, provide reaction time and maneuver space, ori- derstand the frustration of similar engagements all too well. In- ent on the force to be secured, perform continuous reconnais- surgents wearing civilian clothes operating in complex urban sance, and maintain enemy contact.2 However, friendly convoys terrain have enormous tactical advantages. Destroying these en- in Iraq rarely have any warning until they are already in direct na National Guard made headlines for re- fusing to go on a mission until they had better armor protection. Congress immediately took action to increase funding for up-armored HMMWVs, attempting to rec- tify the problem as quickly as possible. Between October 2004 and October 2005, the number of U.S. armored vehicles in Iraq rose to almost 39,600 from 16,548.7 However, from 1 January to 7 October 2005, IEDs killed 302 soldiers, as compared with 165 during the same period in 2004, according to Iraq Coalition Casual- ty Count, an internet site with statistics based on official U.S. casualty reports.8 Some of the increase is probably due to larger, more sophisticated IEDs. Regard- less, the increase in armor has not translated to a decrease in casualties. “The M1114 was designed primarily for an environment where it would be expected to operate on roads due to a far-reaching land mine threat; therefore, the vehicle is inadequate as an off- The M1114 up-armored HMMWV has road vehicle. It loses its ability to move rapidly off-road and must travel extremely slowly on re- served the U.S. Army well for many years. strictive terrain.” It has the ability to move very quickly on roads, limited maintenance/logistics requirements, and decent protection for the crew against most threats in a peacekeep- fire contact, they usually have limited reaction time and maneu- ing environment. The up-armored HMMWV program initially ver space, and often lose contact with the enemy. Is this what began as a result of increased peacekeeping efforts throughout Army leaders had in mind when they developed the vision that various parts of the world, particularly in the Balkans.9 The the modular Army would be able to “see first, understand first, Army identified a need for an armored mobile vehicle that pro- act first, and finish decisively?”3 Certainly not. vided a high level of ballistic protection against sniper fire and The Army has always emphasized the importance of “winning mine blasts. The M1114 filled that role and served well in Bos- visual contact.” Recent technological developments have al- nia and Kosovo. lowed Army leaders to envision a “completely new paradigm of The M1114 was designed primarily for an environment where how tactical units will fight and win.”4 This new type of combat it would be expected to operate on roads due to a far-reaching will be successful because of the “synergy of maneuver, fire- land mine threat; therefore, the vehicle is inadequate as an off- power, protection, and leadership, empowered by dominant sit- road vehicle.10 It loses its ability to move rapidly off-road and uational understanding resident in a vibrant information net- must travel extremely slowly on restrictive terrain. Despite this, work.”5 Unfortunately, doctrine based on a vibrant information the M1114 can still continue to serve combat service support network that allows for maneuver out of contact is extremely units in the future; however, the armor branch needs to acquire difficult to implement when fighting against a non-uniformed a more suitable reconnaissance vehicle that is better-prepared to insurgency that cannot always be detected by a small number of conduct reconnaissance operations in the current operating en- unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and other surveillance equip- vironment, as well as into the future. The Army should consider ment. As a result, insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan have adapt- both the German Fennek light reconnaissance vehicle and the ed their methods to negate our ability to win visual contact. M1117 Guardian armored security vehicle. The only way to gain information necessary to “win visual con- Fennek Capabilities tact” is through the observation of disciplined soldiers who can recognize when something looks suspicious or out of place. In The Fennek armed reconnaissance vehicle is the best light re- an environment where soldiers cannot identify an insurgent un- connaissance vehicle (LRV) on the market. Designed primarily til he makes himself known or raises his weapon, even the most for the German and Dutch armies, the Fennek provides an ex- disciplined soldiers cannot always expect to win visual contact. cellent combination of mobility and observation with adequate However, they can maintain constant observation and 360-de- protection and firepower for operations across the full spectrum gree security, decreasing their reaction time and possibly pre- of operations. venting an engagement altogether. The Fennek’s observation system consists of a thermal imager, According to Army doctrine, “defeating an enemy requires in- a day vision camera, and a laser rangefinder that can observe creasing the disparity between friendly and enemy forces by re- out to 8 kilometers while on the move. All three components are ducing enemy combat power.”6 Enemies of the United States mounted in a sensor head on an extendable mast that adjusts az- will attempt to exploit any perceived weaknesses in our maneu- imuth and elevation, reaching to nearly 4.5 feet above the vehi- ver, firepower, leadership, protection, and information. cle’s roof. The sensor head can also be removed from the vehicle and can be tripod mounted for remote operation up to 40 HMMWV Limitations meters away from the vehicle. The crew can operate the sensor head using a control unit either inside or outside the vehicle if In the fall of 2004, public outcries to equip soldiers with better the system is dismounted.11 The position of the driver’s seat al- body armor and up-armored HMMWVs began when soldiers lows the driver to see greater than 180 degrees through the front from the 343d Quartermaster Company from the South Caroli- windshield and side windows. Additionally, the vehicle has a

8 — July-August 2006 rearview camera mounted at the back of the vehicle and a mon- cle with a turret originally designed to meet the security mis- itor integrated in the driver’s instrument panel to allow the driv- sion requirements of the U.S. Military Police Corps. However, er to move backward without direction, which also simplifies in- the M1117 offers excellent protection and mobility, combined ternal crew communication.12 The Fennek also has a built-in glob- with good firepower and adequate surveillance capabilities, al positioning system (GPS) that can identify eight-digit grids which allow it to conduct reconnaissance operations in the con- to the vehicle, direction of movement, and grid locations to tar- temporary operating environment. The armor branch should gets when combined with the laser rangefinder.13 The Fennek’s equip all armor and reconnaissance units currently deployed to observation and surveillance capabilities set it apart from virtu- Iraq with M1117 Guardian ASVs instead of M1114 up-armored ally all other light reconnaissance vehicles in production today. HMMWVs. Subsequently, the armor branch should replace the M1025/1026 HMMWV in heavy brigade combat team recon- The Fennek runs on a diesel engine that operates for a range of naissance squadrons with M1117s. almost 500 miles and a maximum speed of up to 70 miles per hour. The automatic transmission and transfer unit provide se- The M1117 Guardian provides better protection against cur- lectable four-wheel drive and can negotiate a 60-degree forward rent threats than either the Fennek LRV or the M1114 HMMWV. slope and 35-degree side slopes, easily outmaneuvering the The Guardian also offers increased protection against RPG M1114 HMMWV. The turning radius is 6.3 meters and the threats. Although the M1117 is not designed to prevent RPG pen- fording depth is one meter. The system also has a central tire in- etration, its angled armor decreases RPG effectiveness.16 Simi- flation system that enables the driver to adjust tire pressure lar to the Fennek, the system also has a central tire inflation sys- while moving, based on terrain conditions.14 The Fennek pro- tem that enables the driver to adjust tire pressure while moving. vides excellent overall mobility both on and off road, enabling The increased protection of the M1117, combined with a fully it to be used in various environments. enclosed turret and 360-degree observation from inside the ve- The Fennek offers an adequate combination of protection and hicle, greatly increases the crew’s ability to rapidly and effec- firepower. With its add-on armor, the Fennek offers all-round tively engage targets. The Guardian is equipped with the de- protection against 7.62mm armor-piercing rounds and protects pendable firepower provided by the Cadillac Gage™ up-gunned the crew against anti-personnel mines. The crew compartment weapons station, consisting of an MK-19 40mm grenade launch- is also protected against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) er and .50-caliber machine gun. The turret’s protected feed chute warfare through an integrated NBC protection and air-condi- provides the gunner with the ability to reload and clear stoppag- tioning system. Additionally, a special exhaust system minimiz- es under armor protection for both weapons systems. Although es the vehicle’s infrared signature. the gun systems are not stabilized, the M-36 day/night gunner’s sight still offers the ability to return rapid, effective fire against an The Fennek has the capability to mount the equivalent of ei- enemy while conducting reconnaissance operations.17 ther a .50-caliber machine gun or an MK-19 40mm automatic grenade launcher while maintaining a low profile. Some Dutch The M1117 offers adequate mobility through various types of versions of the Fennek are also fitted with the Rafael Spike anti- terrain. Rugged 14.00 R20XZL tires allow the Guardian to op- tank missile. The gun mount is controlled electrically and has a erate effectively on or off road. The special-run flat tires, with a periscope sighting system that can be upgraded with an image central tire inflation system, offer the crew added mobility un- intensifier. Most importantly, the Fennek allows the entire crew der fire. Its ability to reach maximum speeds in excess of 63 to operate entirely inside the vehicle with 360-degree observa- miles per hour will allow the Guardian to keep up with virtually tion.15 The Fennek does have several significant faults. First, it carries only a three-man crew and does not offer a dismount capability. The Fennek largely relies on its excellent observation systems to allow the crew to conduct most of its reconnaissance from inside the vehicle. Therefore, the Fennek would probably need to operate in conjunction with other reconnaissance systems that are capable of employing dismounted scouts or support vehicles with detainee or enemy prisoner of war (EPW) transport capabilities. Finally, the Fennek is a German and Dutch vehicle that is not currently in the U.S. inventory. Thus, it would most likely take a significant amount of time to get through the acquisitions process. Never- theless, the armor branch should look to the Fennek as a model when developing future light reconnaissance systems or

when modifying existing platforms. Photo courtesy Dutch Defence Press/Gerard van Oosbree Guardian Capabilities “The Fennek armed reconnaissance vehicle is the best light reconnaissance vehicle (LRV) on the market. Designed primarily for the German and Dutch armies, the Fennek provides an excellent The M1117 Guardian armored security combination of mobility and observation with adequate protection and firepower for operations vehicle (ASV) is a four-wheel drive vehi- across the full spectrum of operations.”

July-August 2006 — 9 any convoy. Its width of less than eight feet and turning radius first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively,” we cannot of 8.3 meters allow it to effectively operate in urban terrain allow the limitations of our equipment to drive our doctrine while its ability to climb a 60-degree gradient or 30-degree side when better equipment is available. Although the M1117 Guard- slopes make it an effective vehicle maneuvering in restrictive ian has several weaknesses, it is currently the best wheeled ar- terrain.18 The M1117 Guardian offers sufficient mobility to con- mored vehicle available to replace the M1114 up-armored duct full-spectrum reconnaissance and security operations. HMMWV. The M1117 Guardian provides adequate protection and surveillance to allow reconnaissance units to win visual Although the M1117 Guardian would be beneficial as a recon- contact and quickly respond to insurgent attacks with rapid, ef- naissance platform, there are several disadvantages. First, the fective fire. Guardian is larger than either the Fennek or the M1114, with a height of 8.5 feet and a length of approximately 19 feet.19 Addi- Armor branch must continue to aggressively push to develop a tionally, the Guardian has several observation limitations; it reconnaissance vehicle that will allow it to successfully conduct does not have a rear camera for the driver or any long-range sur- full-spectrum reconnaissance operations. With no peer compet- veillance (LRS)-equipped systems. These modifications should itor, the U.S. Army should expect to be involved in more low- be relatively easy to make and should be considered as part of an intensity conflicts over the next 15 to 20 years. Thus, there will upgrade process prior to fielding. continue to be a need for cavalry soldiers who can conduct reconnaissance and security operations in complex urban envi- Finally, the Guardian only carries one dismount per vehicle ronments while still retaining the capability to fight effectively with a total crew of four personnel. Dismounting the vehicle is in high-intensity operations. Armor branch should immediately also slower than on the M1114. Nevertheless, the Guardian is begin to develop a light reconnaissance vehicle similar to the an excellent armored vehicle already in the Army’s inventory German Fennek, but with an increased dismount capability. In that provides better protection and surveillance than the M1114 the interim, the Armor branch needs to equip its reconnaissance HMMWV. Thus, the armor branch should begin to acquire units with M1117 Guardian ASVs instead of M1114 HMMWVs. M1117 Guardians instead of M1114 up-armored HMMWVs. Soldiers’ lives depend on it. The M1114 up-armored HMMWV is no longer an adequate platform from which to conduct reconnaissance operations. Al- though it was a wonderful stop-gap measure to meet the needs Notes of the Army during the initial phases of deployments to the Bal- 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), kans, it simply is not the right long-term solution for our scouts. Washington D.C., 14 June 2001, p. 4-3. As we attempt to transform to a modular force that will “see 2FM 3-90, Tactics, GPO, Washington D.C., 4 July 2001, p. 12-2. 3Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-90, Objective Force Maneuver Units of Action, accessed online at http://www-tradoc.army.mil, 28 November 2005. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6FM 3-0, p. 4-3. 7Tony Capaccio, “More U.S. Troops Die in Iraq Bombings Even as Armoring Improves,” Bloomberg Online, at www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=1000010 3&sid=aftH7bcepI8I&refer=us, on 13 October 2005. 8Ibid. 9Global Security, “M1114/XM1114 HMMWV Up-armored Armament Carri- er,” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1114.htm, 14 No- vember 2005. 10Ibid. 11Army-Technology Online, “Army-Technology: Fennek,” at http://www.army- technology.com/projects/fennek, 16 October 2005. 12Ibid. 13Ibid. 14Ibid. 15Ibid. 16Textron Incorporated Online, “Textron Marine and Land//Textron Systems: ASV Specifications,” at http://www.systems.textron.com, 16 November 2005. 17Ibid. 18Ibid. 19Ibid.

Captain Jim Golby is currently the assistant S3, 25th Special Troops Battalion (STB), Schofield Barracks, HI. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes the Armor Captain’s Career Course, the Armor Offi- cer Basic Course, Scout Leader’s Course, and Cavalry Scout One Station Unit Training. He has served in various com- “The increased protection of the M1117, combined with a fully enclosed turret and mand and staff positions, to include executive officer, B Troop, 360-degree observation from inside the vehicle, greatly increases the crew’s ability 1st Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry (1-4 Cav), FOB MacKenzie, to rapidly and effectively engage targets. The Guardian is equipped with the de- Iraq, and Schweinfurt, Germany; scout platoon leader, C pendable firepower provided by the Cadillac Gage™ up-gunned weapons station, Troop, 1-4 Cav, FOB Wilson, Iraq, and Schweinfurt; and tank consisting of an MK-19 40mm grenade launcher and .50-caliber machine gun.” platoon leader, C Troop, 1-4 Cav, Schweinfurt.

10 — July-August 2006 Death Before Dismount: A Relic

by Captain Irvin W. Oliver Jr.

Operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq ing (IET) with the increase in dismount- as the M240 machine gun ground mount have seen the deployment of armored ed training for individual soldiers and kits and single channel ground and air- forces well prepared for high-intensity op- at the unit level; however, Army opera- borne radio system (SINCGARS) man- erations against national armies transitions in the Balkans and current opera- pack kits, enabled our squad-sized pa- tion to mid-intensity operations against tions in Iraq illustrate a need for dis- trols and platoon quick reaction forces irregular insurgent forces. Once high-in- mounted training from the company lev- (QRFs) to handle most situations they tensity operations subsided, the role of el to crew level. were likely to face. The biggest shortfall large armored forces changed, requiring was the lack of training in urban opera- additional skills and formations not typi- As a tank platoon leader in Kosovo, my tion and dismounted tactics that our pa- platoon conducted numerous dismount- trols had to execute daily. cal to the armor community. ed patrols and HMMWV-mounted pa- The current operating environment re- trols in rural urban environments, as well During initial operations in Iraq, our quires the U.S. Army’s armored forma- as surrounding wooded areas. The use of tank company conducted dismounted re- tions to reorganize to conduct credible our M1A1s was minimal and usually only connaissance operations and traditional dismounted operations. As any given con- for large-scale operations or power pro- light infantry tasks, such as raids, ambush- flict or operational deployment transitions jection. With some training and equip- es, and cordons and searches. Due to the to mid- and low-intensity levels, the util- ment additions, we were a credible force quickly changing battlefield, our task ity of heavy armor lessens, but never com- for the ongoing stability and peacekeep- force planning and rehearsals focused pletely goes away; the practicality of ar- ing operations. mostly on high-intensity operations with mored vehicles also decreases as the in- limited emphasis on counterinsurgency. tensity of conflict decreases. The platoon regularly had combat ser- Once we saw the high-intensity phase of vice support (CSS) soldiers from the sup- the conflict end with the seizure of Bagh- My own experiences in Kosovo and port battalion attached for extra man- dad, we began to focus and train on sta- Iraq have solidified in my mind the need power, as well as interpreters to com- bility and support operations. for additional training and flexibility in municate with local nationals. Addition- the armor community and the Army as al personnel allowed us to execute mis- While this did prepare us for some of a whole. Many of these changes are cur- sions normally conducted by larger infan- our required tasks, it did not train soldiers, rently occurring during initial entry train- try platoons. Additional equipment, such company and below, on the tactics need-

July-August 2006 — 11 “During initial operations in Iraq, our tank company conducted dismounted reconnaissance operations and traditional light infantry tasks, such as raids, ambushes, and cordons and searches. Due to the quickly changing battlefield, our task force planning and rehearsals focused mostly on high-intensity operations with limited emphasis on counterinsurgency.”

ed for mid-intensity urban operations. • 7 bore lights available for dismounted operations. If The training we received prior to deploy- • 14 SINCGARS/ASIP manpacks the tank company has HMMWVs in addi- ment was better tailored to current oper- tion to its tanks, there will not be enough ations than to operations conducted dur- While a tank company lacks the M249 radios for all vehicles and squads. How- ing 2002 and 2003. However, that train- squad automatic weapon (SAW) organic ever, with solid mission, enemy, terrain, ing had to compete with everything else to infantry companies, the additional troops, time, and civilian (METT-TC) we were doing in preparation for deploy- M240s will more than make up this short- analysis, the number of radios is not an ment, so we were unable to get as many age. However, employment con sider a- operational constraint. If possible, add- repetitions as we would have preferred. tions may differ due to the weight and ing PRC-127 lightweight radios or the Had there been a plan to effectively and additional amount of weapons in the pla- multiband inter/intra-team radios, versus credibly reform into provisional rifle com- toons and company. Adding other weap- the regular SINCGARS radios, would panies (PRC) and train as a PRC, opera- ons systems, such as the M203 grenade reduce weight and simplify user issues tions in both places would have been launcher and the M12 combat shotguns common to the standard SINCGARS. much easier and would have provided with its lethal and nonlethal munitions commanders and staffs added flexibility and thermal weapons sights, to the MTOE A typical airborne infantry company is in planning and executing mid-intensity will enable the provisional dismounted authorized 133 soldiers (6 officers, 127 operations. squads to act more independently than the enlisted members). This includes a nine- current MTOE allows. man weapons squad and a six-man 60- With some modifications and additions, mm mortar section.3 A provisional rifle the weapons and equipment organic to The additional equipment will provide company would include 114 soldiers (5 armor formations enable them to conduct improved target acquisition, communica- officers, 109 enlisted members), but would modified dismounted operations tailored tions, and firepower to the squad. During lack the weapons squad and mortar sec- for the mid-intensity operational spec- high-intensity operations, all rifle alloca- tion. The “legacy” airborne infantry com- trum.1 To conduct mid-intensity operations should be for the M4 carbine. Ad- pany is used as an example because the tions effectively, the tank company would ditional rifles and M203s take up added nine-man squad foundation has proven to request the following additional equip- space in the crew’s storage area and crews be effective in recent operations in Iraq ment be added to its modified table of or- will not have space for other required and Afghanistan, and because the nine- ganization and equipment (MTOE) to equipment. The M4 is also a better fit for man squad would be easier to implement, more effectively conduct infantry opera- HMMWV-mounted operations and room/ even though an 11- or 13-man squad is tions: building clearing missions as the M4 al- preferable.4 lows more mobility in confined spaces. • 28 M240 dismount kits Much like the airborne infantry compa- • 24 M4 carbines With 28 SINCGARS radios, the tank ny, the provisional rifle company orga- • 28 M203 grenade launchers company has more than enough FM ra- nization is built on a nine-man infantry • 6 M12 combat shotguns dios available to equip all squads and have squad. Because the provisional company • 57 PEQ2A, PVS-7/14 enough remaining to outfit a company lacks organic mortars and a weapons • 114 CCO/reflex sight command post or tactical operations cen- squad, the platoon headquarters includes • 28 M145 machine gun optics ter (TOC).2 The tank company simply re- two additional M240B machine guns; all • 8 PAS-13 thermal weapons sights quires conversion kits to make the radios eight of the tank platoon’s M240s are in-

12 — July-August 2006 Light Infantry Rifle Company

OFF EM 5 125 cluded in the provisional platoon’s LT organization. If the provisional platoon receives additional weapons, CO HQ ANTIARMOR SEC MORTAR SEC RIFLE PLT OFF EM OFF EM OFF EM (60mm) OFF EM such as the Javelin antitank weap- 1 33 on, the platoon head quarters would 2 7 0 13 0 6 provide soldiers to man the added weapons, unless they are task or- KEY WEAPONS ganized to the squads. Regular ri- 6 – MG 7.62/5.56mm PLT HQ RIFLE SQD flemen could also double as Jave- 6 – DRAGONS OFF EM OFF EM lin gunners, depending on the situ- 2 – 60mm MORTARS 1 6 0 9 ation.5 Figures 1 and 2 compare the organization of the provisional ri- Figure 1 fle company and the airborne or light infantry company. The capabilities and limitations of the provisional infantry unit and a conventional light infantry unit are very sim- Provisional Rifle Company ilar. The biggest differences would most likely be in the execution of small-unit operations — the provisional infantry unit OFF EM would require additional training before 5 109 operational deployment because infantry operations are not the primary focus during most of the training year. CO HQ IN PLT OFF EM OFF EM When designing the provisional rifle 2 7 1 34 company, it is important to remember that

having a fewer number of soldiers in ar- COMPANY WEAPONS mor formations will limit those forma- 114 x M4 tions’ abilities to conduct large-scale in- 28 x M240B fantry operations; the lack of a weapons 28 x M203 6 x M12 PLT HQ IN SQD OFF EM squad at the platoon level and no organic 2 x M2 .50 CAL OFF EM 1 7 0 9 mortars at the company level will drive 114 x M9 planners to consider the best way the mit- igate these disparities. However, a tank company or battalion that is transformed Figure 2 into a provisional rifle unit should also have additional medical and fire support augmentation similar to its light infantry sibling. Because these tasks are not the day-to- pared, forcing it to conduct an arduous, day norm for typical armor units, dis- hastily planned training schedule. Due to the nature of the contemporary mounted infantry training should culmi- operational environment (COE), the ar- nate with a certification asserting the ar- One quarter of each year will be dedicat- mor community should integrate light in- mor unit’s ability to effectively conduct ed to light infantry training with mainte- fantry training into its normal training operations. The typical annual training nance- and vehicle-related business being schedule with the same emphasis and pri- calendar for a combined arms battalion economies of force. With vehicle main- ority as gunnery or a combat training cen- focuses on three major training events: tenance taking a backseat to light infan- ter (CTC) rotation. The likelihood of a two gunneries and a CTC rotation. If the try training, the time available for other tank battalion finding itself on a short- battalion is aware of its deployment to an peripheral training is increased. The bat- notice deployment to a war zone with a operational theater, it will conduct a train- talion would be able to conduct two phys- minimum number of tanks and missions up relative to the tasks it expects to conical training sessions five days a week, requiring light infantry skills is very high. duct during the deployment. Often times, advanced rifle marksmanship, and many Common armor unit training schedules these different training events are com- other relevant training events common will require extensive modifications to bined or overlap, and dismounted train- to the infantry community. The METL develop proficient dismounted infantry- ing should be no different. However, in- would also require revision to accommo- men capable of short-notice deployment. stead of training in preparation for a date the provisional rifle unit mission. This type of training will require armor known deployment, the armor commu- Some proposed METL additions include units to add additional mission essential nity should plan and conduct light infan- conduct route reconnaissance; reconnoi- task list (METL) tasks and train these new try training during annual training cycles ter a built-up area; conduct a cordon and tasks regularly. These new METL tasks to maintain a fundamental proficiency search in a built-up area; conduct a raid; will require as much focus as gunnery in these skills so short- or no-notice de- conduct an ambush; conduct an attack of and mounted maneuver training events. ployments do not catch the unit unpre- a built-up area; conduct convoy escort;

July-August 2006 — 13 conduct patrol operations; conduct secu- security, raids, and cordon and searches. win and win decisively. Those same ar- rity operations in a stability environment; This model, although current in Iraq, will mored forces lose some functionality once conduct tactical movement in a built-up be relevant in future conflicts because the conflict moves from high intensity to mid- area; control civil disturbance; defend in U.S. Army will always have to secure the intensity, counterinsurgency, and stabili- an urban environment; establish a base ground it seizes. ty and reconstruction operations. While camp; establish checkpoints and/or road- At the end of the light infantry train- we must always be prepared to fight and blocks; react to snipers; secure routes; ing quarter, the tank companies’ training win the nation’s wars, we must also re- conduct operations with armored or mech- would end in a certification exercise, con- main relevant by maintaining utility in all anized infantry vehicles in an urban en- firming their ability to execute the new situations and environments. Reorganiz- vironment; handle enemy prisoners of tasks and providing one last major training tank companies as provisional infan- war; process captured documents and ing event to prepare for operational de- try companies will create that utility and equipment; and secure civilians during ployment. The required changes to the flexibility. operations. battalion’s training cycle will force the Armor companies within the new MTOE The above METL tasks are primary tasks battalion to adjust other events that will would form provisional rifle companies for operating in a mid-intensity environ- occur outside of the light infantry quar- with some augmentation from their typi- ment and are a good start to an effective ter. This way, a minimum of one quarter cal attachments, such as the combat recov- training plan. The tasks listed have some of each training year will be specifically ery teams and mechanized infantry pla- overlap with tasks the armor community set aside for new training tasks. An add- toon. The company would reorganize the already trains on, but are included be- ed benefit of a light infantry training quar- remaining two tank platoons into squad- cause they are different enough that when ter is that it will set aside time every year based elements, capable of conducting re- a company executes them dismounted, to train and maintain other critical tasks, quired missions. Task-organizing provides they would require more attention. For such as common task testing and the com- the infantrymen in the company the add- high-intensity operations, the full light in- bat lifesaver course, as well as advanced ed benefit of training and sustaining infantry company METL tasks would need rifle marksmanship, close quarters battle fantry skills the 19Ks have, as well as to be training topics. training, and reflexive firing for all sol- building on those skills to provide the com- diers. All soldiers could participate in pany the capability of conducting more During training, particularly during CTC these training events because light infan- complex tasks. Our company organiza- training and deployment, light infantry try training is low cost when compared tion had 24 men in each tank platoon — operations should be an essential element to tank-mounted training, which is an in- the equivalent of three eight-man squads of training. A possible training exercise herent money-saving opportunity. (six four-man teams). These teams also would begin with a high-intensity com- had the capability to fully man the unit’s bat operation. On mission completion or The global environment in which we live 15 M1114 HMMWVs and still put boots seizure of an objective, the training unit requires the U.S. Army to be more flexi- on the ground. would execute missions necessary to ble and agile during its operations. Since maintain order in an urban area, such as Operation Desert Storm, the world has “Death before dismount” is an outdated establishing traffic control points, convoy witnessed the armored force’s ability to relic of history and the armor force has to adjust.

Notes 123d Armor Division, Table of Organization and Equipment (LCD with FXXI and IBCT Annexes), Fort Knox, KY, 2003. 2Ibid. 3U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Com- pany, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 14 December 1990. 4Claim is made using analysis of various after-action reviews from Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. 5Headquarters, Department of the Army G3, Unit of Action Briefing, 5 February 2004.

Captain Irvin Oliver is currently serving as company commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (4ID), FOB Iskandariyah, Iraq. He received a B.A. from Prairie View A&M University. His military education includes Com- bined Arms and Services Staff School, Ar- mor Captains Career Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S3 plans officer, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 4ID, Fort Hood, TX; S3 air, Task Force 1st Battalion, “During high-intensity operations, all rifle allocations should be for the M4 carbine. Additional rifles 37th (1-37) Armor, 1st Armored Division (1AD), and M203s take up added space in the crew’s storage area and crews will not have space for oth- Baghdad, Iraq; mortar platoon leader, 1-37 Ar- er required equipment. The M4 is also a better fit for HMMWV-mounted operations and room/build- mor, 1AD, Friedberg, Germany; and tank pla- ing clearing missions as the M4 allows more mobility in confined spaces.” toon leader, 1-37 Armor, 1AD, Friedberg.

14 — July-August 2006 FBCB2: Past, Present, and Future by Captain Shane Robb

In the mid-1990s, when Force XXI was FBCB2 evolves into FBCB2-JCR, and (enemy, friendly, neutral, or unknown). the “in vogue” name for the Army’s fu- later JBC-P, it will get better, becoming Additionally, any obstacles that were re- ture force, one of its primary components more user friendly with greater capabili- ported via FBCB2 were displayed on the was Force XXI battle command brigade ties. map as well. FBCB2 provided a means and below, better known as FBCB2. At for commanders and leaders to maneu- the time, FBCB2 was still an emerging When FBCB2 was fielded in the mid- ver and direct forces faster and more ef- technology with plenty of room for im- 1990s, it was heralded for its capabili- ficiently than ever before. The capabilities provement. Through recent experimen- ties. FBCB2 combined global position- FBCB2 provided to the force were a giant tations and use in combat, the system has ing satellite (GPS) capabilities, comput- leap ahead for the Army and earned the continued to improve and is currently un- ers, and tactical radio-based networks, al- praise of those familiar with its abilities. dergoing major system redesigns, to in- lowing soldiers to communicate horizon- clude a new version of software called tally (be tween platforms) and vertically Units equipped with FBCB2 enjoy tre- FBCB2–joint capabilities release (JCR). (to tactical operations centers) to auto- mendous advantages over units without it. FBCB2-JCR will vastly improve the sys- matically share their position reports on Unit situational awareness (SA) has im- tem, overcoming many of the shortfalls of a common operational picture. For the proved exponentially to levels unachiev- the previous version. JCR will provide the first time ever at the platform (vehicle) able just 10 years earlier. Knowledge of foundation for the U.S. Army and Marine level, FBCB2 provided a very accurate SA facilitates better situational under- Corps to converge fully on a single com- near real-time graphic depiction or “pic- standing and decisionmaking. FBCB2 en- mon FBCB2-based system for platform ture” of the current situation. A tank or ables commanders and leaders to com- battle command called joint battle com- Bradley commander could actually see mand and control units more efficiently mand–platform (JBC-P). JBC-P will meet his vehicle’s icon projected onto a digital and effectively and adapt more quickly joint command and control and situa- map (or satellite imagery), as well as the than the enemy — in short, it enables bat- tional awareness (C2/SA) requirements icons of other FBCB2-equipped vehi- tle command. FBCB2 has also served as and will include new hardware, dismount- cles, which revealed locations of friendly an input for combat identification to in- ed solutions, and beacon capabilities. As forces and any other reported entities form “shoot/don’t shoot” decisions. Nu- merous reports from Opera- vivability information and in- tions Iraqi and Enduring Free- creases the risk of inter-ser- dom indicate that many lives vice fratricide. More to the on the battlefield were saved point, the Marine Corps’ sys- using FBCB2 to help prevent tem could not see the Army; fratricide incidents. the Army’s system could not see the Marine Corps’; and FBCB2 serves as the C2/SA even within services, there link between platforms and were various incompatible the C2/SA systems located in C2/SA systems that could not operations centers at all lev- share information. els. On 7 April 2003, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, se- The Joint Requirements nior leaders at the Pentagon Oversight Council (JROC) watched in near real-time the recognized the capability gap advance of 2d Brigade Com- “When FBCB2 was fielded in the mid-1990s, it was heralded for its ca- that incompatible service-spe- bat Team, 3d Infantry Divi- pabilities. FBCB2 combined global positioning satellite (GPS) capabili- cific C2/SA systems present- sion as they drove into Bagh- ties, computers, and tactical radio-based networks, allowing soldiers to ed and issued a memorandum dad. Never before had such an communicate horizontally (between platforms) and vertically (to tactical in August 2003, directing a accurate picture of reality on operations centers) to automatically share their position reports on a convergence among the joint the ground been available at common operational picture.” community to “a single joint all levels of command simul- capability.” A year later, after taneously. Its significance is an exhaustive study and brief summed up by this statement back to the JROC regarding from the 3d Infantry Division’s Opera- and down through the hierarchy of net- the convergence, JROC directed that “the tion Iraqi Freedom after-action report works and servers. Such networks and Marine Corps will adopt Force XXI bat- written in May 2003: “The single most services are complex to plan, but most sig- tle command brigade and below (FBCB2) successful C2 system fielded for Opera- nificantly, they require reconfiguration for both platforms and dismounted ap- tion Iraqi Freedom was the Force XXI when a new unit task organization is or- plications.” In short, General Pace (who battle command brigade and below – dered, because of their linkage to hierar- at the time was the Vice Chairman of the blue force tracking (FBCB2–BFT) sys- chy. Although mainly automated, such a Joint Chiefs of Staff) directed that FBCB2 tem. It is important to mention that the reconfiguration of networks and services would be the joint C2/SA system at plat- FBCB2 system used during this opera- is complex to manage, yet critical to the form and dismounted levels for both the tion was not fielded to facilitate division successful operation of FBCB2. U.S. Army and Marine Corps. command and control, but rather to facil- In contrast, FBCB2-BFT’s celestial- As a result of that directive, the Program itate tracking of friendly forces at eche- based network is basically plug and play. Manager (PM) FBCB2 began developing lons above division. Even so, BFT gave The operator is not limited by task orga- an interim joint system (FBCB2-JCR). In commanders situational understanding nization or non-operational servers. Sim- parallel, the U.S. Army Training and Doc- that was unprecedented in any other con- ply turning on the system will allow op- trine Command (TRADOC) Capability flict in history.” erators to see icons. It is not reliant on Manager (TCM) for platform battle com- FBCB2 has evolved considerably since other FBCB2s to act as servers; because mand and combat identification began the its introduction. There are currently two FBCB2-BFT uses a celestial network, it extensive process of capturing and docu- primary variations of FBCB2, which use can provide beyond line-of-sight com- menting joint C2/SA requirements for a the same software and hardware, but rely munications over great distances. The new joint battle command-platform sys- on different networks and radios. The first primary limitations with FBCB2-BFT tem that would meet the requirements of variation, FBCB2-enhanced position lo- are due to limited bandwidth. Moving the Marine Corps, Army, Special Opera- cating and reporting system (EPLRS), platform accuracy can be off as much as tions Forces, aviation, and other various uses a terrestrial-based (line-of-sight ra- 800 meters because of FBCB2-BFT’s components within the joint force. dio) network that harnesses the ability of slower update rates (once every 5 min- FBCB2-JCR is the interim joint sys- EPLRS radios to transmit secure data in utes, or if moving, every 800 meters, tem under development by PM FBCB2 a tactical environment. The other varia- whichever is sooner). The transmission and Marine Corps Systems Command tion, FBCB2-BFT, commonly referred to of large messages, such as graphics, is (MAR CORPSYSCOM). It is currently as blue force tracker (BFT), uses a celes- sometimes unreliable because of the lim- scheduled to begin testing in October 2006 tial-based (commercial L-band satellite ited bandwidth available. and will address many of the interopera- communications) network. Another limitation learned during Oper- bility gaps identified in Operations Iraqi Each variation has unique advantages ations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom was and Enduring Freedom. and disadvantages. The terrestrial-based many of the numerous service-specific There are three primary development ef- FBCB2 provides more bandwidth than C2/SA systems are not interoperable be- forts of FBCB2-JCR, which include net- BFT and a faster update rate that allows cause of different data standards, proto- work, database, and software. Using ex- a more accurate report on the positions cols, security domains, and network ar- isting FBCB2 hardware, FBCB2-JCR of moving platforms. Also, the terrestrial chitectures implemented by each separate will redesign the terrestrial network to variation supports type-I encryption and service. This major deficiency adversely take advantage of new radios and higher allows secret information to pass over the affects the ability of joint warfighters to bandwidth at battalion level. This will network. However, it suffers from reli- achieve information dominance in their divorce the network from the existing ance on a network whose architecture is joint areas of operation. This lack of plat- unit hierarchy. Instead, FBCB2-JCR will based on task organization. Position reform level interoperability prevents shar- support “communities” of users connect- ports (which are the basis of SA) pass up ing vital friendly, enemy, and other sur- ed to higher bandwidth networks and

16 — July-August 2006 systems via FBCB2 gateway services at base on each box via a small amount of missions and requirements. The JBC-P one of many tactical services gateways system information shared across the product line will consist of the following (TSGs). The network will be area based, network. family of systems: rather than task-organization based and will work similar to a cell phone network. FBCB2-JCR will rewrite the FBCB2 • JBC-P full capability will be the stan- With this architecture, a platoon leader is soft ware to comply with direction re- dard computer, screen, and software. It is not limited to specific servers within the ceived from the Carnegie Mellon Soft- still under development, but will include unit; systems will automatically connect ware Engineering Institute, making it integrated GPS, more memory, faster to any TSG on the battlefield. This TSG more modular and reusable. This sup- processors, and will be the same size or could be from an adjacent unit or even ports creating other battle command prod- smaller than the current versions of the from a different service (Marine Corps or ucts that could reuse the core software FBCB2 V4. Users will be able to remove Army). When the system is on, the near- components of FBCB2-JCR and add new the screen from its mount and move it to est TSG will pick it up and begin to act software components for new product- different locations within or around the as its server. The vehicle’s FBCB2-JCR specific functionality. platform, up to 15 feet away. Select leaders’ vehicles will also receive a dismount- will transition from TSG to TSG as it Perhaps the most important improve- moves across the battlefield. The TSGs able personal digital assistant (PDA)-like ment is interoperability. FBCB2-JCR will product, which can dock with the full will tie the FBCB2 net into the higher begin fielding to both the U.S. Army and bandwidth networks available at the bat- capability, but when dismounted, con- Marine Corps in 2007, and will increase tinue to receive and send C2/SA infor- talion level via joint network node (JNN), compatibility with other C2/SA systems joint enhanced core communications sys- mation while the user is a short distance across the joint force. This will improve from the platform (300+ meters). tem (JECCS), command and control on- the combined operational picture at all the-move network, digital over-the-hori- levels, help reduce the risk of fratricide, • JBC-P partial capability describes sys- zon relay (CONDOR), or the warfighter and enable battle command. tems that require a level of interoperabil- information network–tactical (WIN-T). As early as 2008, JBC-P, the new vari- ity with JBC-P, but may not use the same The lower tier of the network will be ation of FBCB2-JCR, will begin to be hardware or software to achieve that in- based on EPLRS (11x), which provides fielded. JBC-P is the family of hardware teroperability. These systems do not pro- greater bandwidth than earlier versions and software products generated by com- vide the same level of capabilities as JBC- and a limited number of single channel bining the requirements of the joint com- P full capability. For example, a partial ground to air radio system (SINCGARS). munity and lessons learned in recent com- capability system designated for rotary As joint tactical radio system (JTRS) ra- bat operations to build an improved joint wing aircraft needs to be able to share dios become available, they will also be FBCB2 system. JBC-P will greatly im- C2/SA, but does not have the space to incorporated into the network. FBCB2- prove on FBCB2 and replace it as the mount a completely new JBC-P comput- JCR will also enhance the celestial net- cornerstone of the joint blue force situa- er and screen in the cockpit. This system work by improving the bandwidth avail- tional awareness (JBFSA) capability en- may use its own hardware, some of the able, which will speed communications, visioned to support the joint warfighter. JBC-P hardware, or may or may not use increase update rates, and increase posi- Specifically, it will provide the joint war- JBC-P software. Regardless, it will be in- tion location accuracy for celestial sys- fighter unprecedented C2 and SA capa- teroperable at a minimum level so C2/SA tems. bility and enable them to achieve the in- information can be shared among all JBC- formational and situational dominance P platforms. Another example of a par- The database is inadequate for the ex- necessary to fight and win our Nation’s tial capability system is the movement isting system. As currently configured, wars. tracking system used by Army logisti- the database for the Army and Marine cians. It uses its own hardware and soft- Corps is burned onto each FBCB2 hard JBC-P is a family of systems that can ware, but can share SA and communi- drive, causing the development of data- share C2/SA across the joint battlespace cate with JBC-P to a specified level. Par- base products to take up to three months. from various platforms with disparate tial also includes a handheld C2/SA de- Once the database is updated, vice. This system will not it is loaded onto each hard have all of the capabilities of drive, requiring each system’s the JBC-P full, but will share hard drive to be physically SA and send and receive C2 touched. FBCB2-JCR will messages. greatly improve the database process by initially loading a • JBC-P beacon is a one-way small (unit sized) and more beaconing device to populate simplified database on each the common operating pic- hard drive. The system would ture and other JBC-P prod- then “learn” the rest of the da- ucts with blue (friendly) po- tabase as it receives informa- sition location information tion from other users on the (PLI) tracks for combat iden- net. FBCB2-JCR will elimi- tification purposes. Basically, nate the need to create a mas- it tells everyone with JBC-P sive database that must be up- where the beacon is and what dated and copied onto every kind of platform it is on. It hard drive. It will also enable will also send a “9-1-1” emer- much more flexible use of “Units equipped with FBCB2 enjoy tremendous advantages over units gency message; with the push FBCB2 by the user, and the without it. Unit situational awareness (SA) has improved exponentially to of a button, a message is sent system will automatically and levels unachievable just 10 years earlier. Knowledge of SA facilitates bet- telling leadership where the dynam ically update the data- ter situational understanding and decisionmaking.” platform is located and that it

July-August 2006 — 17 is in need of assistance. A cur- handheld version of JBC-P for rent example of a beacon de- each platoon of infantry and vice is the mini-transmitter for each reconnaissance or (MTX) used by Special Forc- Special Forces team. es and the U.S. Air Force. Bea- The capabilities envisioned cons will be less expensive for JBC-P are coming soon than full versions of JBC-P to the joint force. The evolu- and will be fielded in enough tion of FBCB2 to FBCB2- quantities to ensure at least JCR and then to JBC-P is one for every two platforms is scheduled to correlate with sending position reports to the the Army’s software blocking common operating picture. schedule. The current version Beacons will also aid in com- of FBCB2 (6.5) correlates bat identification with a pri- with software block (SWB) mary objective of informing 2; FBCB2-JCR will be field- “shoot/don’t shoot” decisions “Since the emergence of FBCB2 on the battlefield, combat commanders ed in conjunction with SWB and preventing fratricide. and leaders recognize its significance and have used it to great effect. 3; and JBC-P (version 1) will JBC-P will introduce many FBCB2 has provided unprecedented levels of situational awareness at be fielded in conjunction with all levels of command and has provided an enhanced means of enabling SWB 4. new capabilities that were not battle command to commanders and leaders.” available before in FBCB2. Since FBCB2’s emergence Among the new products for on the battlefield, combat com- JBC-P is a dismountable PDA- manders and leaders recog- type device that can be docked and un- proved hardware, which integrates em- nize its significance and have used it to docked from a standard JBC-P full capa- bedded GPS and training software to re- great effect. FBCB2 has provided un- ble product. When undocked, the de- duce maintenance and operator class- precedented levels of situational aware- vice will share C2/SA through the host room training requirements. JBC-P also ness at all levels of command and has platform communications via a wireless incorporates a “hide” capability for Spe- provided an enhanced means of enabling connection. Leaders and commanders cial Forces, which allows them to receive battle command to commanders and lead- can undock the PDA to take with them for SA and have only their transmitted SA ers. As FBCB2 evolves into FBCB2-JCR dismounted operations a short distance displayed on platforms they choose, and/ and later JBC-P, it will only get better, (up to 300 meters) from their platform, or come within threat proximity of their more user friendly, and more capable. or take to operations order briefings or position (close enough that there is a risk With an increase in quantity of fielded rehearsals at the tactical operations cen- of fratricide). This capability will help C2/SA systems, leaders and commanders ter (TOC). Scouts can also use the devic- maintain operational security for sensi- will have a more accurate picture of the es for listening and observation post op- tive missions. In short, JBC-P will provide joint battlefield. JBC-P will further im- erations. A stand alone handheld product numerous new capabilities that greatly prove situational understanding and de- is also being developed, which will pro- increase the SA of joint leaders and com- cisionmaking and will assist joint lead- vide C2/SA to dismounted infantry, Spe- manders and significantly enhance their ers by making it easier to mass both ef- cial Operations Forces, reconnaissance ability to provide effective command and fects and forces at the critical point of an units, and other users who require a man- control. operation. Most importantly, JBC-P will portable version of JBC-P with integrat- help keep our joint warfighters alive by ed communications. One of the important aims of JBC-P is to increasing combat effectiveness and help- assist in the prevention of fratricide. To ing in the prevention of fratricide. JBC-P will provide greater capabilities accomplish this long-sought-after goal, than those of FBCB2. Warfighters will be JBC-P systems should be fielded in suf- able to download still images from digi- ficient quantities to effectively provide tal cameras onto JBC-P and send them a very high fidelity SA of friendly units. via the tactical internet. They will have a Adequate numbers of systems will allow Captain Shane Robb is a requirements officer, free draw “John Madden-type” capabili- commanders and leaders to know exact- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command ty and will be able to collaborate with oth- ly where their forces are located and (TRADOC) Capability Manager-Platform Bat- ers in near real-time. As combat vehicles where other friendly forces are located tle Command/Combat Identification, Head- fire their main weapons, a vector will be within their battlespace. quarters, U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, sent displaying the direction and target KY. He received a B.A. from Brigham Young The current FBCB2-BFT system has University. His military education includes Air that the weapon is engaging. JBC-P will Defense Captains Career Course, Combined have the capability to display 3-D graph- been resourced to be fielded down to the Arms and Services Staff School, Air Defense ics, which will be especially useful to key leader option (KLO) level (platoon Officer Basic Course Forward Air Defense, Air unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) pilots leader and platoon sergeant level). JBC- Defense Basic Course, and U.S. Army Acquisi- who currently use FBCB2 for situational P will be fielded down to KLO, plus all tion Basic Course. He has served in various awareness and collision avoidance. JBC- shooter and sensor platforms such as tanks, command and staff positions, to include rear P will highlight and display friendly units Bradleys, and UAVs. This will enable the detachment commander, 4th Battalion, 5th Air in various selectable colors and sizes on “shooters” to have accurate SA and know Defense Artillery (ADA), 1st Cavalry Division a user-defined common operating picture where other friendly platforms are be- (1CD), Fort Hood, TX; commander, Headquar- fore they make “shoot/don’t shoot” deci- ters Battery, 4th Battalion, 5th ADA, 1CD, Fort display. It will store sent messages, but Hood; assistant S3, 4th Battalion, 5th ADA, Fort not received messages, and resend or for- sions and pull the trigger. Support vehi- Hood; XO, Headquarters Battery, 4th Battal- ward them when the operator reenters the cles that do not receive JBC-P full or par- ion, 3d ADA, 1st Infantry Division (1ID), Kitzin- net. JBC-P will display “snail trails” or tial will receive beacon devices at a rate gen, Germany; S1, 4th Battalion, 3d ADA, 1ID, retrace the movement of icons through of one for every two vehicles, and dis- Kitzingen; and platoon leader, D Battery, 4th time. It will also provide new and im- mounted forces will have at least one Battalion, 3d ADA, 1ID, Kitzingen.

18 — July-August 2006 ARMOR 101 by Louis Gorenc and Laurie Austin

A professional soldier and tanker wants load the vehicle, usually one-quarter-inch rolling mill and casting techniques, along to know the operating “how and whys” rolled homogeneous plate (weighing 10 with better heat-treating processes, armor of his vehicle. This article is only intend- pounds to the square foot) was used to sur- became more resistant to perforation. ed to provide basic knowledge of modern round all critical components and crew. vehicle armor and its capabilities. Be- The British tested their first prototype Another technique was the sloping of ar- cause armor development continuously tank on 6 September 1916 and it was in mor, which increased the cross sectional evolves, only current armor will be dis- battle by 15 September. It must be re- length for penetration, thus increasing the cussed. membered that naval ships were armored force needed to perforate the same plate for decades and armor technology was thickness. A sloping glacis also increased Steel Armor transitioned to land vehicles. As horse- the chance of deflecting a round. During There are several types of modern ar- power increased, so did the thickness of this period, armor was penetrated by brute mor composed of steel alloys, aluminum steel armor to resist penetration and ex- force. As armor became thicker, round alloys, titanium, composition materials, plosive blast forces. An early technique, calibers increased to 122mm and more. and at times, a mixture of all. The first first used by the French in the Schneider During World War II, thick armor was motor vehicle armor was the application CA1 tank (1915) and still used today, was made vulnerable by a new weapon, the of steel plate riveted on the vehicle to pre- the spacing of armor plates with an air high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round vent small arms bullet penetration. Plate gap between plates to dissipate the round’s using the Munroe effect shaped-charge armor was manufactured by rolling ingots energy. round. In 1888, Charles E. Munroe, work- through huge rollers that progressively re- During World War I, the average antiar- ing at the Naval Torpedo Station, discov- duced the thickness to the size required. mor gun size was less than .50 caliber. ered that when detonated, a void in an ex- The plate was then sheared and tempered The tank has always been used as an of- plosive placed next to a steel plate could in an attempt to make it harder than the fensive weapon with the front the most be focused into impressing an imprint projectiles that would be used against the protected because the front received the into the metal. In Germany, Egon Neu- plate — the harder the armor, the harder greatest assault. By early World War II, mann, in 1910, furthered that effect find- for the projectile to penetrate. vehicle armor was thicker, made denser ing that a conical shaped TNT charge Since the first motorized vehicles were by alloying with small amounts of other would pierce steel to a much greater depth so low in horsepower, and not to over- elements, and with the use of improved than the same amount of explosive would ded in a plastic material “sandwiched” between the steel plates. Later, T-64s substituted a boron carbide ceramic material that was much more resistant to HEAT penetration. The theory of composite armor is it is stronger and lighter than steel and it dissipates the HEAT jet and/or breaks up a hardened steel armor piercing round (kinetic energy (KE)), preventing penetration into the inner armor plate. The hardness of the ceramics breaks up the projectile and the sharp shards further shred the penetrator. More layers were introduced, which offered more protection, and had the ability to absorb the energy of KE hits. Composite armor’s development continued with multiple layers of steel alternat- ed with more layers of steel, ceramics, plastic honeycombs, and other very dense “In 1966, the Russians developed composite armor technology, known as combination K, in its T-64 unique materials for protection against main battle tank. Early T-64 armor used a layering of steel reinforced with glass fibers embedded in both HEAT warheads and kinetic pene- a plastic material “sandwiched” between the steel plates. Later, T-64s substituted a boron carbide ce- trators. In the 1960s, the British developed ramic material that was much more resistant to HEAT penetration. The theory of composite armor is it is stronger and lighter than steel and it dissipates the HEAT jet and/or breaks up a hardened this type of armor and progressed to add- steel armor piercing round (kinetic energy (KE)), preventing penetration into the inner armor plate.” ing tungsten rods or other very dense unique material encapsulated in titanium in a cast aluminum block and placed in the glacis of a tank. This was used to de- dent the steel. This effect was not used breaking, three times the molecular com- flect long kinetic penetrators, causing until World War II in the HEAT round. paction (a higher resistance to penetra- them to expend more energy in piercing The HEAT round was based on a shaped tion), and will break up hardened pene- through the armor. Different types of bal- explosive charge, a hollow void in the cen- trators easier than aluminum armor. So listic energy-absorbing foams were also ter of the explosive, like the bunt in the the trade-off for armor vehicle designers added to dissipate projectile fragments bot tom of a wine bottle. It had a ductile is high-strength, heavyweight steel, ver- as the penetrator rod broke up. Upgrad- metal liner made of copper, and detonat- sus less strength, lighter-weight alumi- ed ceramics were sometimes substituted from a short stand-off distance, pro- num. Note: some aluminum armors are ed for the tungsten or other very dense jecting the copper as a well-focused, nar- superior in protecting from fragments unique material rods because they were row, high-velocity plasma wave (up to 12 (mortars and artillery fire), which is why less expensive to manufacture. For the km/sec) to basically burn a small hole they are used on personnel carriers. same thickness, composite armor can be through the plate, damaging or possibly Titanium is a lightweight, strong, and up to several times more effective than igniting anything in the direct path of its stable metal with excellent ballistic resis- just steel armor plate, but steel and metal jet. By World War II, HEAT could pene- tance properties that can be fabricated by armors have a superior multi-hit capa- trate up to 2.5 times the diameter of the affordable production techniques. Com- bility as compared to composites. Many warhead diameter. With the development pared to steel and aluminum, titanium has composites appear to be superior based of rocket-propelled HEAT rounds, a sol- a density of 0.163 lb/in3, an ultimate ten- on a one-fragment hit, but perform poor- dier could destroy the best armored tank. sile strength of approximately 100,000 ly when hit with multiple impacts. HEAT rounds necessitated new armor to psi, and a hardness of 265 Brinell. It can Reactive Armor resist penetration. be rolled, cast, welded, and easily ma- chined. It approaches rolled homogeneous Israel was the first to develop explosive reactive armor (ERA) in the late 1970s, Titanium and Aluminum Armor armor (RHA) in all areas; however, it is expensive to produce and some designers which was used successfully in the 1982 Aluminum armor was developed for are not familiar with its structural prop- war. Later, Russia and the United States light vehicles that would be air dropped erties. Titanium is finding its way into began developing ERA, made up of lay- for fast combat deployment. Aluminum more armor vehicles, not only in hull ers of high explosives, usually C4, lay- is approximately one-third the weight of plate, but in components that will reduce ered between steel plates, so when struck steel. One square foot of a one-quarter- the weight of the vehicle and still pro- by a shaped charge, the explosive deto- inch thick aluminum plate weighs ap- vide steel-like protection. nated, disrupting the high velocity plas- proximately 3.3 pounds, compared to 10 ma jet of the shaped charge. The ERA was pounds for steel. But, the ultimate tensile Composite Armor manufactured in medium-sized bricks and strength of heat-treated aluminum armor usually attached to the outside of main is about 75,000 pounds per square inch Post-World War II armor developments battle tanks. It is used to defeat HEAT (psi) with a density of 0.102 pounds per were concerned with defeating HEAT rounds, but once the ERA was detonated, cubic inch (lb/in3). When compared to rounds. In 1966, the Russians developed it left an unprotected area vulnerable to steel armor, which is over 148,000 psi, it composite armor technology, known as another strike. Today’s ERA is more so- has a density of 0.284 lb/in3, and twice combination K, in its T-64 main battle phisticated, using fewer explosives or no the hardness of aluminum. This basically tank. Early T-64 armor used a layering of explosives, instead using other materials means steel has twice the resistance to steel reinforced with glass fibers embed- that provide multi-hit protection. This

20 — July-August 2006 provides lighter loads and less stress on Slat Armor round using its own heat or kinetic en- vehicles and can be applied to smaller ergy. and lighter vehicles. ERA will not pro- The concept of slat armor goes back to World War II when cages were fabri- Developing armor is like building the tect against KE rounds because the kinet- “un-pickable” lock, someone will always ic rod is capable of passing through the cated by tank crewmembers to prevent shaped charges from impacting their ve- figure out how to pick it. When impene- explosive and penetrating the vehicle’s trable armor is developed, someone will armor. hicles. Usually some type of chain-linked fencing was used to detonate rocket-pro- develop ammunition that will penetrate it. The T-80U Russian main battle tank pelled grenades (RPG). Modern slat ar- uses Kontakt-5, a third-generation ERA mor is composed of steel slats (flat stock) developed by the Russians. Kontakt 5 is welded on a frame, which extends from Lou Gorenc is an equipment specialist, U.S. the first ERA to defeat armored piercing an armored vehicle, and surrounds the ve- Army TACOM, Combat Vehicle Evaluation Pro- fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFS- hicle for complete protection. This armor gram, Warren, MI. He received a B.A. from the DS) ammunition and is composed of ex- resembles a large opened slatted window Concordia College and is currently enrolled in plosives layered between steel plates, blind. The slats are spaced wide enough American Military University’s political science which move sideways when detonated. for the crew to see out of the vehicle, but program. He has served in various positions, This powerful side motion cuts through close enough to prevent an RPG from to include assistant executive officer, TACOM the KE penetrator or the plasma jet to passing through and penetrating its armor. Com modity Business Organization and RE- break it up and reduce the penetration en- This inexpensive and light weight pro- SET Logistics Officer, TACOM, in Warren. ergy. The Russian Black Eagle tank uses tection is not for all types of threats, but Laurie Austin is the assistant product manager upgraded Kaktus ERA. has use in theaters where RPGs are pri- for HMMWV protective kits and long-term ar- Anti-Spall Liners marily used. mor strategy, Light Tactical Vehicle Product Managers Office, Program Executive Office, Anti-spall liners are usually made of Future Armor Combat Support and Combat Service Support, Kevlar or other ballistic fiber material (PEO CS&CSS), Warren, MI. She received a placed inside a hull or turret to prevent Armor is continuously being upgraded B.S. from Lake Superior State University and an M.S. from Embry Riddle Aeronautical Universi- fragments of hull or turret material from for better protection; new materials are ty. She has served in various positions with PEO breaking off and injuring crewmembers being developed, along with new man- CS&CSS, to include assistant product manag- when a round strikes the vehicle. The ufacturing processes and techniques. An er for medium trailers and the M939 five-ton blankets catch these high-speed particles, interesting area of protection under de- truck program; and mechanical engineer/team stopping them before damaging equip- velopment is electromagnetic armor that leader for the U.S. Marine Corps Light Armored ment or crew. deflects or deforms the plasma jet or KE Vehicle Program Managers Office.

“Modern slat armor is composed of steel slats (flat stock) welded on a frame, which extends from an armored vehicle, and surrounds the vehicle for complete protection. This armor resembles a large opened slatted window blind. The slats are spaced wide enough for the crew to see out of the vehicle, but close enough to prevent an RPG from passing through and impacting a lightly armor vehicle.” The Modern Army Combatives Program: Benefits of Integration into Company Training

by Captain Brian W. Loyd

Often in the armor community, we get ciently and effectively by using decentral- day, using train-the-trainer methodology, caught up in the repetitious routine cycle ized train-the-trainer methodology, while MACP is quickly spreading throughout of maintenance, gunnery training, and maintaining high performance standards the Army. maneuver training. Soldiers quickly be- for trained soldiers through aggressive come bored performing preventive main- quality control.1 The home of the MACP is Fort Benning, tenance checks and services on tanks, con- Georgia, where the U.S. Army Combat- In 1995, the 2d Ranger Battalion want- ive School (USACS) resides. MACP conducting chair drills, and sitting through ed to add martial arts training to its train- blocks of instruction on movement tech- sists of four levels of training. Level I is a ing regime.2 At the time, the Army’s cur- one-week course designed to teach basic niques — they beg for change of pace. rent combatives doctrine was rudimenta- Commanders who maintain a creative, combatives techniques, primarily ground ry, not significantly tied to any estab- fighting, basic jiu-jitsu positions, and ba- up-tempo, and dynamic training sched- lished global martial art, and generally ule will suffer from fewer discipline prob- sic drills reinforcing the fundamentals boring. Soldiers developed a lackadaisi- 4 lems with soldiers. of ‘position, then submission.’ Position, cal attitude toward the program. A com- then submission refers to a soldier first One fast growing activity commanders mittee was formed that scoured the earth moving to a position of advantage rela- are using to break up mind-numbing pe- to find a martial art that would drive the tive to his opponent then subsequently riods of maintenance, classes, and recov- new army combative program. Because finishing the fight using a choke, joint ery is the Modern Army Combatives Pro- of its ease to learn, competitive spirit, and lock, or devastating blow. Students prac- gram (MACP). MACP offers command- with the growing popularity of the Ulti- tice these fundamentals and techniques ers a relatively low-resource, easy-to-plan, mate Fighting Championship (UFC) and through drill repetition and competitive and very beneficial training program that the success of the jiu-jitsu in these com- sparring. can be implemented into training sched- petitions, Brazilian jiu-jitsu was selected ules. Training soldiers in combatives re- as the base for MACP. MACP then fur- Level II is a two-week course tailored to inforces the warrior spirit and ethos that ther integrated strengths and specialties teach advanced combatives techniques, should drive them to victory in combat. from other martial arts, such as judo/wres- teaching methodologies, and philoso- Basic combatives knowledge is a require- tling takedowns and muay thai/boxing phies.5 Students continue to expand on ment for every soldier and MACP is the strikes, to make modern army combat- their level I knowledge, learning new po- Army’s approach to training soldiers effi- ives effective and lethal in combat.3 To- sitions of advantage and how to engage

22 — July-August 2006 “One fast growing activity commanders are using to break up mind-numbing periods of maintenance, classes, and recovery is the Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP). MACP offers commanders a relatively low-resource, easy- to-plan, and very beneficial training program that can be implemented into training schedules. Training soldiers in combatives reinforces the warrior spirit and ethos that should drive them to victory in combat.”

in hand-to-hand combat while wearing have the authority to instruct the level I promote a safe combatives program at field equipment. Level II qualified in- course, referee post events, special rules the installation level. Level III and IV structors can supervise level I instructors competitions, and serve as battalion mas- programs are taught only at USACS. To and referee basic competitions. ter trainers for scenario-based training. ensure a certain standard of perfor- Level III is a four-week course designed Level IV is a four-week course designed mance by instructors, a quality control to integrate fighting skills into infantry to teach management skills at the in- team from Fort Benning will tour Army battle drills and close quarters battle stallation level.7 Instruction will focus (CQB).6 Level III qualified instructors on how to design, manage, execute, and Continued on Page 49

July-August 2006 — 23 Rifle Marksmanship for Today’s Battlefield by Captain Joe Morrison

The 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATB) manship training — they train as they will tions prevents bad habits from forming at Fort Knox, Kentucky, has spent the past fight. and eliminates the need to break them be- year dramatically changing the way new Before graduating, soldiers will have fore qualification. Every step of marks- soldiers conduct marksmanship training. spent more than 17 hours learning and re- manship instruction follows the pattern The current operating environment de- inforcing marksmanship fundamentals on of learning on the EST and then practic- mands all soldiers engage and kill the en- the EST 2000. The EST is a valuable tool, ing the skill on a live-fire range. All of the emy with personal weapons. Today’s one- which enables instructors to provide im- ranges the soldiers see during their time station unit training (OSUT) and basic mediate feedback during the critical de- on EST are digital replications of the rang- combat training (BCT) graduates are on velopmental stages of marksmanship. In es at Fort Knox. Teaching in the low-stress the ground conducting close quarters a controlled environment, the new shoot- and controlled surroundings of a virtual combat. The 1st ATB has moved forward er will gain a deep understanding of the environment results in a more comfort- in preparing warriors for combat, placing effects of the four fundamentals of marks- able and confident soldier when they move more emphasis on advanced rifle marksmanship: steady position, aiming, breath- to the actual range. Over the past year, the manship, emerging equipment, offensive ing control, and trigger squeeze. Prior percentage of soldiers qualifying on the firing positions, and the engagement to Fort Knox receiving the EST, a drill first try has risen by 19 percent and the skills trainer (EST 2000) virtual training sergeant or peer coach would observe and number of soldiers failing to qualify is system. critique shooters, which can take all day nearly nonexistent. Soldiers training with 1st ATB now car- and expend multiple rounds. The EST Currently, testing a soldier’s shooting ry individual weapons at all times in ac- provides shooters the ability to see the ability reflects the needs of an expedition- cordance with the weapons immersion point of aim before the shot, point of im- ary army fighting on the offense. Shoot- program. They also wear body armor with pact, point of aim after the shot, the pres- ing from the foxhole or fighting position the small-arms protective plates insert- sure applied to the trigger, and the cant is no longer part of qualification. Instead, ed, as well as elbow pads, knee pads, and of the weapon immediately after firing. they shoot 20 rounds from the prone sup- combat helmets when conducting marks- The ability to make on-the-spot correc- ported, 10 rounds from the prone unsup- ported, and 10 rounds from pletion of each segment to the kneeling position. Al- give soldiers “ownership” of though more difficult, these the training and develop the combat-simulated positions thought processes required provide a better indicator of for close quarters combat. the soldier’s ability to en- At night, they engage tar- gage the enemy while on the gets using the PAQ-4 while offensive. wearing night vision gog- gles, which provides soldiers As a scout platoon leader the confidence of knowing in Iraq, I was called on to they can quickly and accu- dig a foxhole; I do, however, rately engage and hit tar- wish I had learned to shoot gets under nighttime condi- from the kneeling position tions. before deploying. The 1st ATB trains soldiers how to “Once soldiers are familiar with the techniques and equipment, they are giv- Soldiers graduating from create a stable firing base in en the opportunity to practice the skills on a live fire range during ARM mod- 1st ATB are no longer arriv- the kneeling position by ules 3 and 4. During the day, they engage pop-up targets using an M68 from ing at their units with just teaching them correct elbow the high ready, low ready, around a wall, and while moving down range. To the basics. The luxury of placement and how to shift replicate the COE, civilian targets are used to add realism and target dis- training for months or years their body weight onto their crimination to the training.” before being sent to a com- back foot. These properly ap- bat zone is nonexistent. Sol- plied techniques allow soldiers to effec- tures. Aimed quick kill is taught for room diers must be lethal upon graduation tively engage targets while minimizing clearing and engaging targets up to 12 and the 1st ATB continues to update and their silhouettes. meters. Introducing these techniques us- enhance training to provide the Army In Iraq, we used PEQ-2A aiming light/ ing the EST provides soldiers confidence with the most effective weapons on the target illuminators, as well as M68 close in a safe environment and aids in increas- battlefield — “Soldiers of Steel.” combat optics, mounted on M4 carbines. ing their accuracy rate with repetition. We had one noncommissioned officer in During ARM module 2, soldiers learn the company who knew how to boresight how to mount and boresight the M68 and the optic devices. Having had no prior PAQ-4, using the bore light and the prop- training on either device, I lacked confi- Captain Joe Morrison is currently serving as er boresight target. Once soldiers are fa- commander, C Company, 3d Battalion, 81st dence in both devices and was convinced miliar with the techniques and equip- Armor, 1st Armor Training Brigade, Fort Knox, they made my weapon heavier. I was ment, they are given the opportunity to KY. He received a B.A. from Pacific Lutheran more worried about losing them than practice the skills on a live fire range dur- University. His military education includes Offi- learning how to effectively use them. ing ARM modules 3 and 4. During the cer Candidate School, Armor Officers Basic day, they engage pop-up targets using Course, Armor Captains Career Course, and My introduction to short-range marks- Scout Leaders Course. He has served in vari- manship training came after being in an M68 from the high ready, low ready, ous command and staff positions, to include eastern Baghdad for nearly five months. around a wall, and while moving down XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop It was outstanding training, and from that range. To replicate the COE, civilian tar- 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Squadron point on, we made certain all replace- gets are used to add realism and target (1/2 ACR), Fort Polk, LA; and scout platoon ment soldiers completed the training be- discrimination to the training. After-ac- leader, B Troop, 1/2 ACR, Iraq, Kuwait, and fore going on a mission. In most cases, tion reviews are conducted at the com- Fort Polk. soldiers have limited shooting experience prior to deploying. Their training normally includes qualifying from the foxhole and prone position, which is not enough — they need to train for the “real battlefield.” Waiting until they get in country is too late to train the skills they need to fight and win. The 1st ATB requires all soldiers to complete an advanced rifle marksmanship (ARM) program, giving them training and confidence in the equipment and techniques that will make them lethal in combat. During ARM module 1, training on the EST teaches soldiers the fundamentals of the low- and high-ready positions, and firing with a “controlled pair” to the lethal and incapacitating zones. They also have the opportunity to practice the rapid aim technique using the M68, as well as the large and small rear sight aper- Figure 1. Point of Aim

July-August 2006 — 25 The Stryker Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop

by Captain Matthew L. Blome • Stability and reconstruction operations (SRO)-oriented area security missions over a large area, requiring integration of Stryker brigades and cavalry reconnaissance troops have served traditional security tasks, civil assistance and administration, in Iraq since November 2003. After more than five years of ex- and training and integrating internal security forces. istence, including two years of combat service in Iraq, it is time • Border security missions with internal security forces focused to review the experiences of this combined effort with an eye toon smuggling and moving foreign assistance and fighters. ward ongoing transformation. • Low-intensity, enemy-focused area security missions in ur- This article focuses on how the cavalry troop integrates into ban areas. squadron and brigade operations and ways to improve the orga- • Long distance convoy escort missions. nization. Based on battlefield observations, the Stryker cavalry reconnaissance troop, as it is now organized, is an effective and The troop identified a number of problems initially, but quick- adaptable organization able to conduct a wide variety of recon- ly adapted and applied creative solutions. These problems, along naissance and security missions. with their solutions and an examination of current doctrine, are useful starting points to demonstrate how the Stryker concept The Stryker cavalry reconnaissance troop I commanded de- and the transformation of cavalry units may improve. ployed to Iraq from November 2003 until October 2004. The troop conducted a variety of mission sets, which included: Although the Stryker cavalry concept was originally intended to maximize dismount capability, a modified table of organiza- • Operations to isolate the city of Samarra in a mid-intensity tion and equipment (MTOE) shortage of dismounted soldiers at fight. the platoon and troop levels prevents the troop from meeting its

26 — July-August 2006 doctrinal capabilities requirements. Training and operational Organizational Problems deployment experience often shows that dismounts are the lim- While conducting the various mission sets mentioned above, iting factor for many operations. Too few dismounts prohibit three problem areas in current Stryker cavalry doctrine and or- the ability to conduct platoon-level tasks, such as hasty building ganization became clear: the troop is very flexible and adapts searches or covering more than two named areas of interest well to different mission sets, although it requires significant (NAIs) with dismounts. This weakness is often exacerbated by augmentation or task organization efforts for success; the squad- force protection and other outside distracters. ron, and thus recce troops, must be able to operate independent- While the Stryker vehicle has excellent tactical and operation- ly in an economy of force role without the direct support of in- al mobility, the troop has limited ability to sustain itself or con- fantry elements or field artillery fires; and in any environment, duct command and control (C2) on the move because the troop the troop must be able to fight to facilitate its reconnaissance or headquarters is tied to stationary and soft-skinned platforms. security mission, at least against a similar or less capable ene- While human intelligence (HUMINT) soldiers are vital and serve my. This includes both offensive and defensive tasks, particu- as a huge combat multiplier at the troop level, they need to be larly against a squad- or team-sized dismounted threat. located within the troop headquarters to maximize both their These problems made mission execution unnecessarily diffi- capabilities and the platoon’s dismounted strength. Clearly, the cult in Iraq and placed soldiers at unnecessarily higher levels of Stryker cavalry troop requires a more robust organizational ca- risk, particularly in sustained combat. These problems begin at pability, particularly dismounted scouts, to better meet its cur- the platoon level and force the troop commander to mass mul- rent operational requirements in Iraq, as well as those outlined tiple platoons, which can make the most minor contact or obsta- in doctrine.1 cle a troop fight.

July-August 2006 — 27 ideal. This aspect of operations alone immediately reduces the potential number of dismounts available to the platoon from twelve to eight, which might potentially operate in two dismount teams of two scouts and two counterintelligence (CI) specialists each. Although platoons are rarely at full strength, due to normal details, taskings, wounded, and leaves/ passes, even at full MTOE authorization, platoons had only four to six soldiers available for dismounted maneuver. During area security operations in northwestern Iraq along the Syrian border and in Mosul, dismounts were absolutely vital to platoon and troop success. Platoons maximized their dismount capability by using two dismount teams of four sol- “Dismounted patrols were difficult to conduct and often required significantly more dismount diers each. However, the troop found that power within the platoon to handle even a single enemy combatant, especially in an urban en- with the exception of the convoy escort vironment. Even during mounted movement, the Stryker is soldier intensive. With a driver, missions, the degree of success, whether gunner, vehicle commander, and air sentry, it requires a minimum of four soldiers.” in a rural open area or in broken or urban terrain, was directly proportionate to an increased number of dismounts. When the Dismount strength. Dismounted patrols were difficult to con- mission required additional dismounts, platoons left one Stryker duct and often required significantly more dismount power at the squadron forward operating base (FOB) or troop outpost within the platoon to handle even a single enemy combatant, es- to increase the number of dismounts by freeing up the vehicle pecially in an urban environment. Even during mounted move- crew. Dismounted scouts were also pulled from one platoon to ment, the Stryker is soldier intensive. With a driver, gunner, ve- augment another when the entire troop was not required to con- hicle commander, and air sentry, it requires a minimum of four duct a particular mission or task. soldiers. This need for security is especially acute in urban areas, where the terrain is more complex and there are more areas Sustainability. The lack of dismounted strength in the platoon for the enemy to hide. While the current doctrinal platoon and leads to problems with several aspects of the sustainment of troop manual shows only two soldiers remaining on the vehicle combat operations in any level of conflict. In Iraq, it was often during dismounted operations, three are actually required to se- necessary to develop a patrol schedule that rotated platoons cure and effectively command and control the vehicle due to its throughout a 24-hour period to maintain coverage on a wide va- size and the digital systems on board, while four soldiers are riety of NAIs in the troop’s area of operations. The platoon was

“During area security operations in northwestern Iraq along the Syrian border and in Mosul, dismounts were absolutely vital to platoon and troop success. Platoons maximized their dismount capability by using two dismount teams of four soldiers each. However, the troop found that with the exception of the convoy escort missions, the degree of success, whether in a rural open area or in broken or urban terrain, was directly proportionate to an increased number of dismounts.”

28 — July-August 2006 the smallest element suitable to conduct combat patrols or establish area security sets to observe countermortar and rocket NAIs during troop operations in northwestern Mosul. Almost immediately, FOB operations often took away dismounted strength for operations to man guard towers and entry control points. FOB quick reaction force (QRF) requirements also took an additional platoon out of the fight. These factors are the unavoidable price of doing business in Iraq. The shortage of dismount strength becomes most troubling when the troop suffers casualties. Due to a shortage of scouts in the recce platoon, several mortarmen were moved to scout platoons, bringing them closer to full strength. From a sim- “While doctrine makes it clear that the squadron will require augmentation to fulfill some tasks ple numbers standpoint, in a four-man re- during high-intensity conflict, the troop will need to be augmented as it currently stands for any connaissance team, if you take away two level of conflict, from SRO to high-intensity conflict. Even in the low-intensity conflict that char- or three of the soldiers, the team is no lon- acterizes the insurgency in Iraq, there is still a huge need for firepower to deal with enemy forc- ger effective. We augmented scout pla- es hiding in bunkers and stone or brick buildings, and those located out of small arms range.” toons from any available source, including the mortars, attached engineers, military police, or infantrymen. Often, recce platoons conducted tact, even in a low-intensity conflict environment. Doctrinally missions with four to five different organic MOS soldiers, in- and organizationally, the troop is on the horns of a dilemma. At cluding the platoon medic. one end of the spectrum, it is perceived as too lacking in combat power to operate in a built-up area, thus it is underutilized as a The troop headquarters struggles to fight and move its assets reconnaissance element. during continuous operations. First, the tactical operations center (TOC) shelter is ridiculously overweight and cumbersome, Upon arrival in Iraq at the end of November 2003, the brigade based on an M1113 chassis HMMWV with a small shelter. This was attached to 4th Infantry Division for Operation Ivy Bliz- configuration gives it no protection, no tactical mobility for the zard, an attack into the city of Samarra to defeat noncompliant troop XO, limited operational mobility, and takes the troop XO forces. The squadron’s first mission was to support the brigade completely out of the direct fight if the commander is lost or by initially conducting a very limited reconnaissance around the gone. Only one soldier fits in the back. Soldiers in the front two city and then isolating the city to prevent insurgents from mov- seats cannot even operate voice radio communications without ing in or out. modifying the vehicle’s hardware configuration — it simply Each troop established traffic control points to control move- cannot operate on the move. ment on main avenues of approach into the city. However, the Ongoing operations in the command post (CP) shelter leave in- recce troops and squadron were restricted from conducting any sufficient space for both an operations NCO and the troop se- kind of reconnaissance in the city of Samarra prior to the begin- nior CI specialist. Since the vehicle is already overweight, it has ning of attacks during Operation Ivy Blizzard for force protec- difficulty pulling the troop headquarters’ equipment trailer, which tion reasons. Units from 4th Infantry Division operating in and must be line hauled over anything other than tactical distances. around the city had more than three weeks of reconnaissance- Without a combat vehicle, the first sergeant also lacks protec- focused operations in the city prior to the attack and were able tion during movement, hampering his ability to accomplish lo- to conduct extensive target development, close target reconnais- gistics package (LOGPAC) operations or facilitate casualty evac- sance, route reconnaissance, and area of operation familiar- uation in the presence of any threat elements without borrowed ization prior to the attack. Had the troops been able to conduct combat power from another platoon. more than one day of reconnaissance within the city, they could have, at a minimum, provided detailed reconnaissance of ave- Finally, the Stryker cavalry troop lacks the combined arms ca- nues of approach, trafficability of routes, close target reconnais- pability that is the hallmark of other cavalry formations in the sance on known targets, and possibly some further target devel- Army — a primary strength of cavalry units. While doctrine opment. As a result of this restriction, the limited information makes it clear that the squadron will require augmentation to available forced the infantry battalions to “troll for contact,” in fulfill some tasks during high-intensity conflict, the troop will the words of one battalion commander, until they could develop need to be augmented as it currently stands for any level of con- their own actionable intelligence or confirm the correct location flict, from SRO to high-intensity conflict. Even in the low-infor identified targets within the city. This reconnaissance could tensity conflict that characterizes the insurgency in Iraq, there is have also assisted troops in identifying heavily and lightly traf- still a huge need for firepower to deal with enemy forces hiding ficked areas to allow for greater focus and refinement to traffic in bunkers and stone or brick buildings, and those located out of control point locations once the squadron began operations to small arms range. isolate the city. The dilemma of Stryker reconnaissance. The troop can gath- Obviously, reconnaissance objectives and allocations of com- er information in an urban area, but often lacks sufficient defen- bat power need to be adjusted to fit the environment and nature sive combat power to do anything but return fire and break con- of the threat. However, in any operation, specific intelligence

July-August 2006 — 29 requirements can be assigned to ground recce troops, for which conducting sustainment operations will reduce the number of rifle companies are not well suited, and will greatly facilitate of- areas for reconnaissance. fensive operations by infantry battalions. Aggressive reconnaissance against a lightly equipped threat is The other side of the dilemma faced the squadron when it was not possible for several areas, which would require more than a required to relieve another unit in the western half of Mosul for platoon for many situations during routine combat reconnais- area security operations in that it was expected to conduct tasks sance patrols. More than one platoon is required to mass suffi- that could have easily exceeded its potential for combat power cient dismounts for types of contact other than defending the without augmentation. This economy-of-force mission allowed unit for the purpose of breaking contact. the brigade to allocate infantry forces elsewhere. While recce troop operations were severely restricted in Samarra, troops ef- Close, stealthy reconnaissance is certainly possible, but com- fectively replaced rifle companies in Mosul. The troop conduct- pletely dependent on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, ed an area security mission focused on countermortar/rocket op- troops, time available, and civilians (METT-TC), and is of lim- erations. ited use in Iraq based on the vast cultural differences and the al- ternating closely built-up or open terrain. While you may hide a In Mosul, the troop handled most security tasks within the city, Stryker in the rolling hills of the open prairie at night, you will which included presence patrols, close target reconnaissance, not hide one in the streets of Mosul at any time.2 The combina- and actions on contact with complex ambushes against platoon- tion of dense middle-eastern construction, dogs, population den- sized enemy elements using small arms, rocket propelled gre- sity, shepherds, children, and close-knit neighborhoods will al- nades, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and vehicle-borne most always prevent concealment. IEDs. Although the brigade prohibited recce platoons from acting as the assault element for cordon and search missions prior The troop’s ability to reduce risk to the Stryker brigade combat to the squadron’s operations in Mosul, recce troops may be bet- team by assuring survivability through information to avoid ter suited than infantry companies for the exploitation phase of contact or achieve overwhelming combat power at the decisive cordon and search operations due to their familiarity with em- point depends entirely on its ability to maintain an economy of bedded and organic HUMINT assets. force at all other places away from the decisive point, at least through observation. This observation is only as viable as the Regardless of its role, the troop must be able to fight with enough troop’s or squadron’s ability to make contact on terms that al- combat power to facilitate its outlined reconnaissance or secu- low the infantry battalions to remain out of contact. rity missions in any environment. While the squadron’s economy-of-force mission was nondoctrinal, the troop spent the ma- Not only will platoons and troops have difficulty meeting all jority of its time conducting missions supporting this role. How- doctrinal requirements, the doctrinal missions have been de- ever, in its doctrinal role, outside of the high-intensity conflict, fined so narrowly that they do not address the missions that the it is still necessary for the troop to fight in contact to allow the squadron is asked to do, both in doctrine and in recent opera- infantry battalions to conduct decisive maneuver out of contact. tional experience. The experience of the squadron at combat Current Doctrinal Position training centers is also consistent with these disparities. These disparities will require minor revisions to doctrine as it current- Ironically, in view of experiences in Iraq and the associated low- ly exists and major changes to the MTOE and force structure of intensity conflict, one might conclude that the troop and squad- the recce platoon and Stryker cavalry troop.3 ron may actually be optimally organized for major theater war within the limitations outlined in current doctrine. This is only A more robust troop organization is required. Current doctrine after considering its emphasis on information gathering through shows an outdated organization for the troop as the commander stealth, a reduced presence on the battlefield, its emphasis on dis- now has a reconnaissance vehicle, the section includes the nu- mounted reconnaissance, and the apparent desire for security clear, biological, and chemical (NBC) truck, and the troop is au- operations mostly out of contact. These emphases are consis- thorized only one E5 supply soldier. tent with an orientation on facilitating the conventional lethal While the Stryker is a uniquely capable vehicle, we are not max- fires targeting drill. In other words, it is the most efficient way imizing its potential as the troop is currently configured. The for a light organization to adapt to conventional high-intensity bench seats actually seat up to ten dismounts comfortably dur- combat. ing tactical movement, while we have at most two or three at While current doctrinal capabilities support the intent of the any one time, including the attached platoon medic. In fact, troop and squadron to operate by stealth in the context of high- when our relief unit relieved us, we fit two scout platoons (near- intensity conflict, a brief comparison of these capabilities, the ly 40 soldiers) in each platoon of RV Strykers, so that every troop’s organizational abilities, and operational requirements man in the relieving unit could participate on the right-seat-ride clearly show disparities between doctrine, organization, and ex- missions. There is also plenty of space for additional communi- perience. Instead of just needing heavy augmentation to per- cations systems. form offensive and defensive missions, the troop requires signif- Recce platoons have plenty of leadership, but not a lot of led. icant augmentation to perform tasks in support of its specified In a 20-man platoon with one officer, ten NCOs, and only 10 missions. enlisted soldiers, there are more leaders than led within each pla- Obviously, strictly mounted operations preclude the conduct toon. This top-heavy aspect of the platoon often creates short- of HUMINT or intelligence collections, and severely limit the ages by grade and confusion among the ranks about who works use of stealth for reconnaissance. How anyone can “with organ- for whom. As a result, dismounted patrols often contain a pleth- ic counterintelligence (CI) assets, conduct detailed mounted op- ora of sergeants, but very few enlisted soldiers. The NCOs fill erations in urbanized terrain (MOUT)-dominant reconnaissance” positions long recognized by the Army, which include a senior in any environment is a mystery, since one simply must dis- scout, vehicle commander, section leader, and team leader. The mount to talk to people. Clearly, this comment on the adverse MTOE seems to have left out the soldiers necessary to fill out affect of continuous reconnaissance is true, since any element the organization.

30 — July-August 2006 Recce Troop Organization

HQs The mortar platoon sergeant is slotted against a (3/0/23) I five-ton cargo truck with trailer. From this plat- 1 x IAV Recce Troop (6/0/142) 1 x FSV form, he is expected to provide command and O O O 2 x CV control in the same environment as his mortar Recce PLT Mortar Section carrier Strykers, as well as provide his own fire (1/0/35) (0/0/14) direction, since the crew of each Stryker is con- O O O 4 X RVs O O O 2 x MCs O O O O O O 2 X MGS 1 x MC (Ammo/FDC) sumed with the tasks of operating the vehicle and 4 X ReconTms the gun. The mortar platoon sergeant should have 2 x 120mm Mortars a vehicle that can operate with the same degree of protection and mobility as the mortar carriers, Figure 1 as well as support the systems required for basic fire direction. The troop definitely requires a more robust organization to address these problems. Proposed Recce Platoon Reorganizing the Recce Troop 1/0/35 3 x platoons per troop The headquarters section should include 4 x RVs per platoon two carrier vehicle (CV) or reconnais- 2 x MGS per platoon sance vehicle (RV) variants, one infantry 19D 19D 19C 19D 19D 19D 19D 3 man RV crew carrier vehicle (ICV), and one fire support E5 E4 02 E5 E4 E3 E3 4 man scout team per RV vehicle (FSV), with a medium tactical ve- 4 man MGS crew hicle-based CP shelter for static and HUM- 1 x LRAS3 per RV INT operations. The most important addi- M2 or Mk19 per RV 19D 19D 19D 19D 19D 19D 19D tion is dismount strength, each RV carries E5 E4 E6 E5 E4 E3 E3 1 x Javelin CLU per RV not only a crew of three soldiers, but also a four-man dismounted recon team, more than doubling dismount strength. The recce platoon retains six vehicles, including 19D 19D 19D 19D 19D 19D 19D 19K 19K 19K 19K four RV and two mobile gun system (MGS) E5 E4 E6 E5 E4 E3 E3 E6 E5 E4 E3 Strykers operating in three two-vehicle sections or two two-vehicle sections.4 This infusion of manpower is vital to address 19D 19D 19D 19D 19D 19D 19D 19K 19K 19K 19K most of the disparities between doctrine, E5 E4 E7 E5 E4 E3 E3 E6 E5 E4 E3 organization, and experience. The additional MGS vehicles provide a combined- Figure 2

Proposed Troop HQs Proposed

3/0/23 Mortar Section

0/0/14

19D 19D 19C 19D 97B 97B 97B CDR - CV E5 E4 03 E6 CP - OPS E5 E4 E4

11C 11C 11C 11C 11C E6 E4 E4 E3 E3 MCV-B

CI/HUMINT 97E 97E 97E 19D 19D 19C 97E E5 E4 E4 E5 E4 O2 E6 XO - CV

11C 11C 11C 11C 11C E6 E4 E4 E3 E3 MCV-B

92Y 92Y 13F 13F 13F 13A SUPPLY E6 E4 E4 E4 E6 O2 FIST - FSV

11C 11C 11C 11C E7 E5 E5 E4 Ammo-FDC

54B 25U 19D 19D 19D 19Z CBR E5 E5 E5 E4 E4 E8 1SG - ICV Figure 4

Figure 3

July-August 2006 — 31 arms capability at the platoon level, as well as a degree of flex- vantage of combat multipliers, such as increased range, stand ibility and robustness now absent, by providing more capability off, mobility, and protection, to do much more with the same. within the platoon, as well as allowing the troop commander to Each time the armor community introduces a digital architec- task organize into four viable maneuver elements. The mortar ture, advanced communications, or long-range sights or weap- section includes two mortar carrier vehicles (MCVs), and a ons, which increase the lethality and span of control capable medical evacuation vehicle (MEV) chassis Stryker (or IAV) within any organization, we immediately trade off the advan- configured to hold additional ammunition and the fire direction tage gained by these changes by reducing the size of our forma- center (FDC) equipment. tions. In other words, every time we add a 25 to 30 percent capability to our formations, we give that advantage back by get- These additional assets are critical to providing the capability 6 to take on limited nontraditional cavalry tasks in support of tra- ting rid of 25 to 30 percent of the formation. We should keep ditional doctrinal cavalry missions. These tasks include hasty that advantage and use it for destroying or defeating 25-30 per- cordon and search missions for targets of opportunity, screening cent more of the enemy, or in the case of reconnaissance, iden- operations against primarily dismounted or motorized threats, tifying the enemy for destruction. It makes no sense for modern and area security over widely dispersed areas for reconnais- tankers and cavalrymen to gain advantage through new technol- sance handover to the brigade’s infantry elements. Also, the com- ogy and training if we discard that advantage by simply reduc- bined arms nature of these organizations will enhance the abil- ing numbers. It is time for the armor and cavalry community to ity to conduct stealthy dismounted reconnaissance and other recognize that it truly has a place in transformation outside of unique capabilities of the Stryker-equipped cavalry troop by the heavy force and design formations that are capable of sus- providing the security and organic sustainability required. tained fighting and winning against any future threat, rather than looking for artificial economies of manpower and equipment Current doctrine and organization seem to treat the Stryker sim- best suited for the Cold War. ply as a limited fighting capability edition of the heavy troop with some cursory mention of “multidimensional aspects of reconnaissance,” rather than as an opportunity to finally provide sufficient dismount capability and robustness to answer the brigade commander’s priority information requirements (PIR) in the full Notes spectrum of conflict. These proposals meet the needs identified 1Since the Stryker brigades helped initiate transformation, they could continue to remain dy- 5 namic, developing and changing with each new version not necessarily organized and equipped in Iraq, as well as the shortcomings identified in doctrine. exactly like the last. In this spirit, I capture these lessons learned and express my views on needed The reorganization of the troop’s embedded HUMINT person- changes. 2The bottom line is the troop is not optimally configured for the full spectrum of conflict. Its cur- nel is also crucial. While they were a huge combat multiplier in rent strengths actually best fit it for high-intensity conflict where stealthy recon is possible. A Iraq, these soldiers need to be reallocated within the troop to more robust MTOE will not reduce its ability to conduct stealthy reconnaissance, and will better equip the troop for low-intensity conflict (LIC) and stability and reconstruction operations. maximize their effectiveness. This is in no way to say that they Stealthy recon is not possible in Iraq, day or night, mounted or dismounted. Stealthy reconnais- should be taken out of the cavalry reconnaissance troop, but they sance in LIC is possible just not as envisioned against a conventional force. are of greater use as a consolidated asset. This proposal would 3The capability to conduct the convoy security mission is probably underrated. The Stryker cavalry troop is arguably the best suited organization in the Army for convoy security, and should be pull 97B personnel out of platoons and keep platoons 19-series listed as “fully capable.” pure. It would reduce the number of 97-series soldiers to three 4Platoon mounted movement is severely effected by the loss of even one vehicle. If the platoon two-man teams, plus one staff sergeant-level senior CI special- is moving independently, let alone by section, which is more likely in high-intensity conflict, it ob- ist in one section, maintained within the troop headquarters. viously only has four vehicles. Should one break down, it immediately requires one more for self recovery, thereby reducing the combat power of the platoon by 50 percent. If the platoon is down This has the key advantage of consolidating the troop staff for one vehicle already, only one vehicle from the platoon remains available and the platoon is essen- information management and analysis, facilitating intelligence tially out of the fight. In less than major theater war, force protection requirements, such as those implemented in Iraq, require a minimum of three vehicles for the platoon to secure itself during information flow up and down reporting channels. It also better movement. allows the commander to mass or distribute assets to each of 5The communications systems need to be significantly upgraded to support the extended dis- his recce platoons, without taking away dismount strength from tances that are possible in the Stryker troop as well. This is another area where we are not taking advantage of the full potential of the Stryker. The current RV has only an FBCB2 and one or two the platoons. As HUMINT personnel are currently configured as ASIP radios for organic communications. Instead of the terrestrial-based FBCB2, all elements an integral part of the platoon, these personnel are used inter- should have satellite-based systems, such as BFT, that can operate over any range and do not require the unit level support of a net control station or retransmission elements. The troop com- changeably with scouts during routine missions and patrols. Of- mander and executive officer’s CVs or RVs should have 3 to 4 ASIP radios, TACSAT, and high ten, to maximize the capabilities of HUMINT personnel, it is es- frequency voice capabilities due to the nature of troop operations in a shared battlespace. All pla- sential to stay at the troop level to avoid being consumed by the toon-level RVs should have added at least one vehicle-mounted long-range communications systems instead of the current dismounted systems. Platoons should have additional dismount radio ground scout role. systems, such as the AN/PRC-116 or PRC-148 with ASIP/HF/TACSAT capability at the dismount level. An even better alternative would be to field these multifunction radios in vehicle mount con- The Stryker cavalry troop is a capable and adaptive organiza- figuration with three per vehicle. Deployment convoy escort and CTC experiences show that ad- tion that can contribute valuable assets within the current oper- ditional communications capabilities proved invaluable to monitor adjacent units, particularly when traversing the battlespace of other elements in or out of the brigade, while the troop is operating environment. There have been several great articles pub- ating throughout the entirety of the brigade’s battlespace as envisioned in the brigade manual. lished recently about how light cavalry troops and tank compa- 6One only need look at the light RSTA organization to see this trend is getting even worse and nies mounted in HMMWVs have successfully adapted to the platoon leaders will be leading under-equipped platoons of roughly the same strength as a WWII infantry squad, such as 15-man platoon versus a 13-man squad. These measures for cost and threat environment in Iraq. However, when one looks closely at manpower savings are at best superficial and at worse stupid and irresponsible if we want to put the MTOE differences between the Stryker reconnaissance troop our scouts in the best position do their missions. and these other light- or HMMWV-mounted organizations, there is little difference, other than a larger vehicle for the same few Captain Matthew Blome is currently assigned to the Infantry School at dismounts to ride in. The Stryker cavalry squadron has also been Fort Benning, GA. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. very successful and has adapted well to combat experiences in His military education includes Armor Captains Career Course, Armor Iraq. Based on a careful examination of doctrine, training, and Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Cavalry Lead- operational experiences, it requires more assets to meet its doc- ers Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to in- trinal and operational reconnaissance and surveillance missions clude assistant S3, 1st Squadron, 14th (1-14) Cavalry, Fort Lewis, WA; in any environment. troop commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1-14 Cav- alry, Fort Lewis; troop commander, B Troop, 1-14 Cavalry, Iraq; troop XO, There seems to be a trend in the armor/cavalry community to 1st Squadron, 7th (1-7) Cavalry. Fort Hood, TX; and tank platoon lead- force organizations to do the same with less, rather than take ad- er, 1-7 Cavalry, Fort Hood.

32 — July-August 2006 Armor Basic Officer Leaders Course III by Captain Mark Belinsky and Lieutenant Colonel Steven Duke

Armor Officer Basic Course (AOBC) The modular force has changed the re- hicles (RVs) in a reconnaissance, sur- will transition to Armor Basic Officer quirements of our officer basic courses. veillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) Leaders Course (BOLC) III in July 2006. The Armor Officer Basic Course has pre- squadron; or lead a mobile gun system This new course is an 85-day training pared armor officers to be tank platoon (MGS) platoon of three antitank guided course, designed to teach armor second leaders for the Division XXI structure. missile (ATGM) Strykers, which are or- lieutenants the fundamentals of both tank Under the Division XXI structure, 62 per- ganic to a Stryker infantry company. A and reconnaissance platoon operations. cent of all armor lieutenant positions were second lieutenant assigned to an infantry BOLC is an officer education system in tank units and 38 percent were in re- brigade combat team (IBCT) will lead a (OES) initiative designed to better pre- con units. In the modular force, 54 per- six M1114 recon platoon. A second lieu- pare lieutenants for combat and first unit cent of all armor lieutenant positions are tenant assigned to the last armored cav- assignments. The BOLC initiative is made in recon units and 46 percent are in tank alry regiment (3d ACR) may lead a tank up of three phases: BOLC I, II, and III. units. The BOLC transition is an excel- platoon or a six CFV recon platoon. BOLC BOLC I is a pre-commissioning course lent opportunity for the Armor School to III will train lieutenants capable of tech- for lieutenants, which includes the Re- retool the basic course curriculum and nically and tactically leading a platoon serve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), ground armor second lieutenants in re- and ensure they are familiar with the var- Officer Candidate School (OCS), and the con and tank fundamentals. ious weapons platforms that make up the U.S. Military Academy. BOLC II is a The armor force and its core missions armor force. common core, combat skills training have not changed dramatically, but the The armor version of BOLC III is the course that provides six weeks of train- versatilities and capabilities of platoons Mounted Officer Basic Course (MOBC). ing to all officers regardless of branch. have changed. Armor lieutenants must be Building on the successes of current BOLC II courses are developed to teach capable of employing one of six different AOBC specialty teams, five training teams lieutenants leadership basics, warrior platoons in the modular force. A second will conduct MOBC. The foundation, tasks, and battle drills. Fort Benning, lieutenant assigned to a heavy brigade weapons, tactics, stability and reconstruc- Georgia, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, are the combat team (HBCT) may lead a tank pla- tion operations (SRO), and field training BOLC II sites. BOLC III is branch-spe- toon of four M1A1s or M1A2 SEPs; or a exercise (FTX) teams will train recon and cific training during which lieutenants at- recon platoon of three cavalry fighting ve- tank fundamentals to armor lieutenants. tend their functional basic branches. Dur- hicles (CFVs) and five M1114 gun trucks. AOBC and MOBC differ significantly, in ing Armor BOLC III, armor lieutenants A second lieutenant assigned to a Stryk- that many of the common-core classes and will train to be both a tank and reconnais- er brigade combat team (SBCT) may lead mandatory training are completed during sance platoon leader. a recon platoon of four Stryker recon ve- BOLC I and BOLC II. The cost of BOLC

July-August 2006 — 33 I and BOLC II for armor students is the cessful completion of the tank crew gun- the tactics phase, with a ratio of at least time allocated for BOLC III. During nery skills test (TCGST), Bradley crew one captain to 36 students. This particu- AOBC, students were trained on tank gunnery skills test (BCGST), and proper lar portion of the training offers frequent platoon fundamentals in 92 days. In execution of live fire crew drills and fire quizzes and quick decision exercises MOBC, students will train recon and tank commands. This gate is not a weapons (QDEs) during class. The quick decision fundamentals in 85 days. A more effec- system qualification because of the time exercises provide students with a histor- tive training methodology (more hands constraints and inability to pair student ically based tactical situation requiring on during field training versus classroom/ tank commanders with experienced gun- an immediate decision. Students are re- platform presentations) will enable bet- ners. quired to brief their plans to the class and ter trained lieutenants in less time. Class The tank phase of the live fire team is are then presented with the historical out- size for BOLC III will increase from the similar to the traditional AOBC. During come. current AOBC size of 64 students to 72 the tank phase, students focus on unit con- The core tactics phase trains students students. At various collective training duct of fire trainer (UCOFT), TCGST, on the fundamentals of tactical move- times, these 72 students will be divided and maintenance. During gunnery, stu- ment, maneuver, battle drills, intelligence into a reconnaissance or tank track and dents must demonstrate proficiency as a preparation of the battlefield, reporting, then rotated to the opposite track once tank commander on an M1A1 or M1A2 battle tracking, and operations orders training is completed on the initial track. SEP tank. During the recon phase, stu- (OPORDs). Repetition of troop leading BOLC II graduates in-process in MOBC dents focus on Bradley conduct of fire procedures is stressed with a new com- with the foundation team. The students trainer (BCOFT), BCGST, and light cav- pany/troop order delivered by an instruc- spend three days with the foundation team alry weapons, which include the M249, tor almost daily. Each student is required where they study the armor branch’s his- M240B, flex M2, and MK19. Passing to produce platoon sketches and an order tory, qualify with the M9, and learn the students will then rotate to the opposite for every company/troop OPORD. Once vehicle protective mask. track and repeat training on the different every student grasps this fundamental The weapons team is charged with teach- platforms. Once students pass both live- base of tactics, they transition to a recon ing crew-level weapons systems for tank fire gates for tank and recon, they transi- phase and an armor phase. and recon platforms to create competent tion to the tactics team. The tactics recon phase trains the fun- vehicle commanders and train students The tactics team trains students on the damentals of recon and security by using on the capabilities and maintenance re- fundamentals of troop leading procedures the technique of classroom learning, ter- quirements of the weapons systems they (TLP) and tactics common to recon and rain board exercises, and then executing will employ as platoon leaders. The 72- tank platoons. The initial portion of tac- the recon task in the field. Recon phase man class will be divided into a tank track tics training is common core and students students learn route recon in the morn- and a recon track; each track culminates are also equally divided into a tank pla- ing; rehearse route recon on the terrain with a live-fire gate that each student must toon track and a recon platoon track. Cap- board during the same afternoon; and pass. The weapons team gate requires suc- tains are the primary instructors during the next day, transition to the field for a situational training exercise (STX). The Scout Leader’s Course program of instruction was used as the baseline for Ar- mor BOLC III’s reconnaissance training. The recon dismounted practical exercises consists of a short demonstration by instructors, followed by evaluated recon missions. Students move back to the classroom and continue this same learning pattern for area/zone recon and screen operations tasks. Once students complete the dismounted screen exercise, they conduct a written tactics and terrain board exam gate. The recon phase culminates in a four-day platoon recon STX. During the recon STX, students use the M1025 gun truck as their base platform and conduct crew, section, and platoon lanes. Once the recon phase is complete, students move back to the classroom to begin the armor tactics phase. The armor tactics phase uses the terrain board and close combat tactical trainer (CCTT) as its primary training tools pri- or to the tank platoon STX. Students are issued company level OPORDs and must produce platoon orders, conduct rehears- “In the modular force, 54 percent of all armor lieutenant positions are in recon units and 46 percent als, and execute offensive and defensive are in tank units. The BOLC transition is an excellent opportunity for the Armor School to retool the missions on terrain boards. This process basic course curriculum and ground armor second lieutenants in recon and tank fundamentals.” allows for a rapid transition to executing

34 — July-August 2006 “The armor version of BOLC III is the Mounted Officer Basic Course (MOBC). Building on the successes of current AOBC specialty teams, five training teams will conduct MOBC. The foundation, weapons, tactics, stability and reconstruction operations (SRO), and field training exercise (FTX) teams will train recon and tank fundamentals to armor lieutenants.”

platoon- and company-level missions in sist of platoons manned by lieutenants action (ROI). After successful comple- CCTT while reinforcing practical appli- and soldiers from the support company, tion of the culmination FTX, students re- cation of tactics, reporting, crew-level du- 1st Squadron, 16th Cavalry. The culmi- cover their vehicles and transition to the ties, and Force XXI battle command, bri- nation FTX consists of a mix of tank pla- SRO phase of BOLC III. gade and below (FBCB2). toons and recon platoons in company/ team-like organizations. Students receive The SRO team prepares students for Every student is evaluated on TLP and at least one formal evaluation as a pla- deployment to the COE. This is the final mission execution through CCTT. Each toon leader conducting a tactical mission collective training event in armor BOLC student must pass the CCTT platoon lead- during the culmination FTX. Again, the III because it is likely to be the first com- er evaluation gate before moving on to class is divided between a tank track and bat environment graduates will face. The the tank platoon STX. The tank platoon a recon track and students rotate at the SRO team conducts instruction on re- STX introduces the student to field craft midpoint of the FTX to the opposite pla- flexive fire, room clearing, cordon and on a tank and executes platoon missions toon type. searches, personnel and vehicle search- on real terrain. Platoons begin with crew- es, raids, checkpoint operations, forward level lanes, which train how to fight a Recon platoons are made up of M3 operating base security, convoy/patrol tank, and progress to section- and pla- CFVs and M1025s, and M1A1 or M1A2 missions, and armor integration in an ur- toon-level lanes. After the tank platoon SEP tank platoons. The platoons conduct ban environment. STX, students get a bit of a break from zone recon, screen, hasty attack, and hasty field training to execute an urban opera- defense missions. Throughout the opera- The SRO team focuses on hands-on tions tactical exercise without troops be- tion, platoons must constantly react to an training and the 10 days culminate in a fore heading back to the field for the cul- OPFOR contemporary operating environ- 72-hour continuous operations scenario mination FTX. ment (COE) platoon of support soldiers in an urban environment, tanks and M3s playing roles as civilians on the battle- in support. The base platform for the SRO The culmination FTX is a nine-day ex- field and terrorists ambushing sites with training is the M1025 gun truck. A tank ercise that trains tank and recon platoons improvised explosive devices and rock- platoon and M3 section will also com- to work together in a full-spectrum envi- et-propelled grenades and causing civil plement the urban operations training, ronment. The culmination FTX uses the disturbances. The OPFOR platoon forc- and as Strykers become available, they Gauntlet training concept that places Ar- es students to deal with a continuous run- will also be integrated into training. mor Captains Career Course (AC3) stu- ning scenario and comply with the rules dents in charge of formations, which con- of engagement (ROE) and rules of inter- Continued on Page 40

July-August 2006 — 35 Leader Development at the Company Level

by Captain C.J. Kirkpatrick

“Squint with your ears. The most impor- seling everyday. Just do what Sergeant As technological parity is achieved, or tant skill for leaders is listening. Intro- First Class Davis and I say and you’ll be the thinking enemy negates the United verts have a great edge, since they tend to alright.” States’ technological edge, “the most ef- listen quietly and usually don’t suffer (Captain Smith and Lieutenant Jones fective and efficient way for the Army to from being an ‘interruptaholic. Leaders maintain its competitive edge is by en- should ‘squint with their ears.’ Too many nine months later) “Lieutenant Jones, this is your rater OER counseling. First, I’d hancing the effectiveness of people and bosses are thinking about what they will organizations.”2 say next, rather than hearing what is be- like to say, it’s been a pleasure working with you and I’m sorry to be leaving. ing said now.”1 All leadership is based on natural abili- Honestly, I was a little worried about you ties, learned traits, and previous experi- — Major General Perry M. Smith when you got here and I wasn’t sure you’d ences. Specifically, the future force will Lieutenant Jones reported for duty to make it as a platoon leader, but you’ve value self-awareness and adaptability; the his company commander: “Sir, Lieuten- impressed me and I think this OER re- two traits are inseparable. An officer who ant Jones reporting as ordered!” flects that. Do you have any questions?” is not self-aware changes for change’s sake; an officer who is not adaptable can- “At ease, Lieutenant Jones. Good to Army Values and Ideology not recognize a change is required, nor have you here. My name is Captain 3 The above scenario is all too familiar to see it as a positive thing. At the company Smith. You’re going to be in 3d platoon. 4 most company grade officers. No one grade level, this is especially true. Lead- Go check in with Sergeant First Class ership at this level is direct leadership, Davis, he’ll let you know what’s up.” should be surprised about their performance during officer evaluation report encompassing the squad leader through “Umh, okay sir. Thank you.” (OER) counseling. Who failed Lieuten- the battalion commander. At this level, ant Jones? Was it the company com- no leader can become adaptable or self- Lieutenant Jones checked with SFC Da- aware without developing — and being vis, and got the lowdown on his platoon. mander; the XO; Lieutenant Jones’ prior military education; or was it all three? developed by — counseling, coaching, He then checked with the XO and asked teaching, and mentoring.5 if the commander was going to conduct The modern battlefield is increasingly an initial counseling session. “Nah, he complex with diffuse responsibilities and At the core of our Army’s dominance is never does, says he does informal coun- ever decreasing decision-reaction cycles. a common understanding of doctrine and

36 — July-August 2006 values, enhanced by constant self-evalu- leader, you set the example and attitude ate your development plan based on your ation and adaptability at the organiza- of 15 soldiers. This team cannot meet results.” tional level as evidenced by after-action our missions or represent our vision without your whole-hearted participation.” “Okay sir, I’ll see what I can come up and bottom-up reviews. The Army is with.” missing key gains in “enhancing the ef- “Okay sir, sounds great. How do I fit fectiveness of people and organizations” in?” Finally, discover what his problems by failing to adequately synergize and might be and develop a plan immediate- promulgate a leader development system Next, discuss your OER support form ly to resolve them. This will conclude focused on individual development of with Lieutenant Jones, showing how your Lieutenant Jones’ initial or reception self-awareness and adaptability at the lev- performance goals and individual goals counseling.10 el that requires it the most — the direct support your rater’s OER support form, 6 “Finally, do you have any initial prob- leadership level. and the higher organizational vision. Of- lems we need to cover? Any housing is- fer Lieutenant Jones the opportunity to sues, pay problems, or transportation Setting the Stage develop his own support form and sched- complaints?” for Leader Development ule an appointment to review it and develop an individual development plan “No sir, I’m straight.” Counseling is defined as “subordinate- 9 centered communication that produces (IDP). “Sounds good. Before you leave, I need actions necessary for subordinates to “Lieutenant Jones, let me show you my you to read over this developmental coun- achieve individual or organizational OER support form. I developed this form seling form, which basically outlines ev- goals.”7 This should be the focus of your based on my initial counseling with the erything we just discussed. Pending your average company-level counseling ses- battalion commander. Specifically, I want questions, just sign right here, and you’re sion. However, all too often, the initial to focus on two performance goals: en- dismissed.” inbrief and counseling goes something sure the Apaches are combat ready for like this: “Okay, this is what I expect of the upcoming training center rotation by This empowers Lieutenant Jones and you, here’s my command philosophy, planning and executing tough, realistic immediately integrates him into the or- here’s my OER support form; have yours training leading to a “T” on all METL ganization. Lieutenant Jones immediate- turned in to me within 30 days, and it tasks; and maintain 100 percent account- ly understands that his input is valued should look just like mine, only rewritten ability of all Apache equipment, and en- and his personal concerns are appreciat- at the platoon level.” Fundamentally, this sure an operational readiness of over 90 ed. Again, this is not revolutionary, but process is not in conflict with Army reg- percent. Based on this OER support form, in accordance with current guidance on leader development and counseling, and ulations. Actually, this is probably an I want you to develop your support form 11 optimistic view of what happens; what for your platoon. Your fellow platoon tools readily available. Lieutenant Jones experienced is more the leaders, the XO, and your platoon ser- In the subsequent counseling session, norm. geant are great resources for developing take time to examine and refine the OER your own support form to standard. We’ll support form Lieutenant Jones brings, Instead, if we discuss our organization- get back together in two weeks and cre- al vision, values, and priorities, then all and develop his IDP. This requires some the focus is on the organization.8 We then discuss why Lieutenant Jones is important to the organization. Lieutenant Jones reported to his company commander for duty: “Sir, Lieuten- ant Jones reporting as ordered!” “At ease, Lieutenant Jones, have a seat. Good to have you here, I am Captain Smith. First things first, here is my command philosophy. Of particular note are the company’s vision and its core values. The Apaches are a cohesive combat team, whose members are mentally tough, physically fit, and motivated. We have the tools, the skill, and the will to destroy an enemy on any battlefield. Our core values are: we are technical masters of the M1A2 SEP; our PT program is battle focused; we care for soldiers and families; we train to excellence at every opportunity; and our company leadership is disciplined, motivated, and our leaders are technical experts. This company vision supports our company mission essential “An officer who is not self-aware changes for change’s sake; an officer who is not adaptable can- task list (METL), which includes the fol- not recognize a change is required, nor see it as a positive thing. At the company grade level, this lowing tasks… As a part of this organi- is especially true. Leadership at this level is direct leadership, encompassing the squad leader zation, you need to internalize our vision through the battalion commander. At this level, no leader can become adaptable or self-aware and embody our core values. As a platoon without developing — and being developed by — counseling, coaching, teaching, and mentoring.”

July-August 2006 — 37 “Everyone desires a role model to use as a personal mirror for their own actions, beliefs, and values. In the Army, a mentor should serve this role. Company- grade leadership in the Army considers mentoring to be a serious shortcoming in leader development.”

for company training during motor sta- bles, include in company training calendar NLT 1 December 05. Company XO approves schedule NLT 18 November 05 under the planning block. That goal supports both your first and second performance objectives. Now, let me show you how this DSF supports the rest of your OER support form…” Now, you are ideally positioned to conduct quarterly (minimum) or monthly education and use of the development quantifiable goals.15 Also, while the goals support form (DSF). should be quantifiable, encourage long- (ideal) counseling using the DSF and term goal orientation (five years or more). OER support form as points of reference. DSF as a Part of the Leader This may exceed the rating period, but Performance Counseling Development Process: Coaching not the mentorship. Also, it will provide 16 and Teaching The DSF is sparsely referenced, often focus for future IDPs. underappreciated, and sometimes mis- “Lieutenant Jones, thanks for coming Performance counseling is a quarterly requirement for all personnel. Perfor- understood.12 It has been used to pass by. Let’s see what you came up with for on personal inspirational insights, copy your OER support form.” mance counseling (when done) is often performance objectives from the OER an awkward affair, with the rater stum- “Sir, here are my two focused perfor- bling in the dark to remember what the support form, and establish generic goals mance goals: ensure 3d platoon is com- which cannot be measured or quanti- discussion points were during initial coun- bat ready for the upcoming March train- seling and the ratee trying to pretend he fied.13 ing center rotation by executing tough, has focus and direction. According to U.S. Army policy, the DSF realistic training during company and concept is designed to “drive develop- platoon STX 2. Maintain 100 percent ac- Armed with an OER support form, ment and integrate it with performance. countability of 100 percent of my person- which is integrated with the DSF, perfor- As with the support form, the rater di- nel and equipment, 100 percent of the mance counseling is really an in-progress rects the process, with active participa- time; and maintain operational readiness review (IPR) of ongoing actions by the tion from the rated officer. The form is through aggressive maintenance manage- rater and ratee. Positive feedback and ar- used to build a developmental plan based ment.” eas that need improvement or more at- on tasks that target major performance tention are noted on the developmental “That’s great, Lieutenant Jones. Your 17 objectives listed on the OER support counseling form. Much like an after-ac- performance objectives are right on track. tion review (AAR), we can note the “sus- form.”14 Now, let’s discuss what you think your tains and improves,” and then writing the Clearly, the Army has a reason for us- weaknesses are as a leader.” OER is a snap. And if we decide that’s ing this form. The OER support form pro- “Well sir, I’ve been told I’m kind of qui- good enough, we’re failing our subordi- vides nested performance objectives, but et.” nates yet again. these may or may not be quantifiable, AARs never end with “sustains and im- measurable goals. The OER support form “No problem. Based on your weaknesses and your performance objectives, what proves” identified. Every leader assigns is the emphasis on what the officer should responsibility for the “sustain or improve,” be. The DSF offers you the opportunity do you think are some measurable goals we can set for your performance?” and a comprehensive AAR develops plans to provide your subordinate with what to achieve the desired effect. Why can’t they must know (personal developmental “Uhhh… I guess I could brief opera- we do this during the counseling pro- goals) and do (measurable, quantifiable tions orders and stuff more often?” cess? Both parties should review the IDP, developmental goals). This is the basis of “Okay. How about this? You will brief a which was jointly produced, and address the IDP. Instead of providing inspiring the actions that are not working, stop ac- quotes or generic goals, cross-reference platoon operations order from a company operations order at least six times pri- tions that the subordinate has developed the DSF with the OER support form and beyond, and revise ongoing actions to use it to quantify performance objectives. or to deploying to the training center no 18 later than 29 November 06. That will sup- reflect the subordinate’s development. This plan is not completely directive. port your first performance objective. “Lieutenant Jones, welcome. This is Encourage self-awareness and develop We’ll take that goal and put it in your your quarterly performance counseling. the DSF jointly with Lieutenant Jones. DSF under the communications block. Let’s review your OER support form… Encourage Lieutenant Jones to highlight We’ll also put in: develop a six-week Looks like you’ve met your performance his weaknesses and focus on achievable, schedule of -10 level maintenance tasks objective for developing individual train-

38 — July-August 2006 “Experience leads to learning, permeat- ing a common use and understanding of proper leader development. A deeper understanding propagates the importance of proper leader development. Direct leaders will make the time to conduct leader development when there is a common acceptance of its importance.”

ing; I’ll just make a note on the back of your support form. Okay, now looking at your DSF, it appears you briefed your six operations orders. How do you feel about your communications skills now?” “Sir, I’m definitely improving, but I think I still need some work. The XO sat in on the last two briefings and he gave me some pointers.” “Okay. We’ll revise that goal for you to brief three more prior to the training cen- pany commander’s have a responsibility tion is devoted to what subordinates ter rotation and give a professional devel- to develop subordinates in every way pos- should expect from superiors. Too often, opment class to the company leadership sible, which may include using a mentor. leaders learn what they were supposed to on rules of engagement. That should help do long after the opportunity has passed round you out.” “Lieutenant Jones, I’d like to introduce to implement leader development in their you to Major Percy, he is the Brigade S4 organization. “Sounds good, sir.” and would like to have a chat with you “How about your maintenance pro- before you head home. I’ll see you to- The OER system was adapted to program?” morrow at PT.” vide company-level officers an environment in which to develop without fear of “That went really well. The XO helped “Hey Lieutenant Jones, it’s good to hyper-competitive “block-checking.” This me revise my plan, and I supervised the meet you. I’d like to be your mentor while breakthrough resulted in second lieuten- training. I received good feedback from you’re here at Fort Hood. Basically, I’d ants through captains being required to the platoon sergeants.” like to discuss your experiences as a pla- have the DSF integrated into their devel- toon leader and as a leader in the Army. “Okay, great. You’ve met that goal, so opment, which set the stage for true trans- Nothing formal, we’ll just get together for formation of leader development at the we’ll set a new planning goal and review lunch every month or so…” the rest of your DSF…” direct leadership level. If the OES em- Clearly, leader development is a well- phasized a comprehensive leader devel- Writing the OER is still a snap, but now defined system in the Army and is con- opment system to our most junior offi- Lieutenant Jones has an ongoing action stantly evolving through feedback from cers at their commissioning source and plan, and isn’t stalled out. the officer corps. However, the system basic courses, then they would know what to expect when they enter the force. Sim- Mentoring and Leader Development does not always work. The first and most likely excuse is lack of time.21 At the di- ilarly, if captains were immersed in a Everyone desires a role model to use as rect level of leadership, demands on a pre- comprehensive discussion of the system, a personal mirror for their own actions, cious resource, such as time, are immedi- they would have a standard for their or- beliefs, and values. In the Army, a men- ate and all-encompassing. Considering, ganization when they assumed command. tor should serve this role. Company-grade filling out, tracking, and updating coun- Subsequently, all leaders would under- leadership in the Army considers men- seling takes time, and is unfortunately the stand the importance of a comprehensive toring to be a serious shortcoming in integrated leader-development program. 19 first victim of an intense operational tem- leader development. po. However, an initial investment in lead- Experience leads to learning, permeat- Mentoring is defined as, “The voluntary, er development makes the remainder of ing a common use and understanding of developmental relationship that exists be- the process a benefit to commanders, sub- proper leader development. A deeper un- tween a person of greater experience and ordinates, and the entire unit at a minis- derstanding propagates the importance of a person of lesser experience that is char- cule cost. proper leader development. Direct lead- 20 ers will make the time to conduct leader acterized by mutual trust and respect.” The second and most unfortunate reason Generally, this relationship is separated development when there is a common ac- is lack of knowledge. The synergy of the ceptance of its importance. by rank and the mentor and mentee are OER support form, DSF, developmental not in the same chain of command. counseling form, and OER is not empha- “Lieutenant Jones, this is your OER Company grade officers must be aware sized in the officer educational system counseling. First, it’s been a pleasure of the Army’s policy on mentoring and (OES).22 At the commissioning source, serving with you. Based on all our discus- understand current policies and values on students are taught only the barest funda- sions, let’s review your significant con- mentoring. If company grade officers do mentals regarding counseling, which is tributions. Okay, based on all the goals not understand mentorship in their cur- only focused on subordinate counseling. we established on your DSF, I think you rent grade group, they certainly won’t do The officer basic course experience isn’t achieved a successful training center ro- it right when they become mentors. Com- much more detailed. Little, if any, atten- tation. Specifically, you received a com-

July-August 2006 — 39 mendation from our company OC… army.mil/search.products/TRNGQTR/articles/coaching/ 18French and Tiberi, Coaching, Teaching, Mentoring, Coun- coach.asp, accessed 16 October 2005. seling: Turning Buzzwords into a Process, p. 3. “Based on your contributions and goals, 6AR 600-100, Army Leadership, p. 1. 19ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army, 25 May 2001, p. I wrote the following comments. Let me 7U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, OS-10. know if you have any questions…” GPO, Washington, D.C., May 1987, p. C-1. 20Army Mentorship Handbook 2005, Army Mentorship Re- source Center, accessed at: http://www.armyg1.army.mil/hr/ 8Allen, Nate, and Tony Burgess, Taking the Guidon: Excep- mrc.asp#dod, 16 October 2005. tional Leadership at the Company Level, Center for Company- “No sir, this is exactly what we’ve been 21 discussing for the past nine months.” Level Leadership, Delaware, 2001, pp. 6-21. French and Tiberi, Mentoring: What Will Your Legacy Be 9 as a Rater?, p. 1. French and Tiberi, Mentoring: What Will Your Legacy Be 22 as a Rater?, CALL, https://call2.army.mil/search.products/ ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army, pp. OS-13–OS- TRNGQTR/articles/Mentoring/legacy.asp, accessed 16 Octo- 15. This study recommends specifically that a leader develop- ber 2005. An IDP is easily developed and linked to the junior ment model be taught in detail throughout the OES from the officer development support form. lowest to the highest level. Notes 10FM 22-101, Army Leadership, GPO, Washington, D.C. , June 1985, p. 39. 1Major General Perry M. Smith, “Learning to Lead,” Marine 11Ibid, p. 38; DA PAM 623-105, pp. 5-7; and Allen and Bur- Captain C.J. Kirkpatrick is the assistant S3, 1st Corps Gazette, January 1997; quote contributed by Tony Bur- gess, pp. 141-143. Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, gess, taken from http://companycommand.com on 16 October 12Through research, the primary discussion of the DSF is in 2005. DA PAM 623-105 and AR 623-105, the official proponent. Fort Hood, TX. He received a B.S. from the 2U.S. Army Regulation (AR) 600-100, Army Leadership, U.S. Few articles, books, or communal leadership tools offer more U.S. Military Academy. His military education Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., Sep- than a passing reference. includes Armor Captains Career Course, Ar- tember 1983, p. 1. 13ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army, 25 May 2001, p. mor Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, 3The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) OS-3. This report discusses inadequacies in the current system. and Scout Leaders Course. He has served in Officer Study Report to the Army, 25 May 2001, p. 2. Specific observations of misuse of the DSF are based on author’s personal experience and general conversation with peers. various command and staff positions, to in- 4Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 623-105, The 14DA PAM 623-105, p. 10. clude S4, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry (2-8 CAV), Officer Evaluation System “In Brief,” GPO, Washington, D.C., 15 Fort Hood; scout platoon leader, 2-8 CAV, Fort June 1997, p. 10. Allen and Burgess, pp. 50-51. 16 Hood; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters 5Colonels Daniel H. French and Paul Tiberi, Coaching, Teach- French and Tiberi, Mentoring: What Will Your Legacy Be ing, Mentoring, Counseling: Turning Buzzwords into a Pro- as a Rater?, p. 4. Company, 2-8 CAV, Fort Hood; and tank pla- cess, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), https://call2. 17Ibid., p. 1. toon leader, A Company, 2-8 CAV, Fort Hood.

BOLC from Page 35 To keep training current and relevant as current AOBC standards and students will is currently available for recent graduates new tactics, techniques, and procedures continue to be exposed to more training and their supervisors at www.knox.army. (TTP) emerge from the force, SRO team opportunities, including ruck marches mil/survey/AOBGraduateFieldSurvey instructors are selected based on recent and combatives. As in current AOBC, and for commanders at www.knox.army. experiences in theater. The SRO team some lieutenants will not successfully mil/survey/AOBSupervisorFieldSurvey. handles the challenges of the ever-evolv- complete the course and will either be re- The input provided will continue to help ing tactics of anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), as cycled and retrained, sent to another produce better trained armor platoon well as our own TTP, by reinforcing fun- branch, or discharged from the Army. leaders. damentals and relying on instructors re- The first BOLC III pilot course began cently back from theater. At the comple- on 3 March 2006 and graduated on 15 tion of the SRO phase, students return to June 2006. Much of the resources need- the foundation team to receive some fied for the new BOLC III pilot are being Captain Mark D. Belinsky is currently the S3 Air nal training to polish their skills. This observer controller-trainer, 3d Battalion, 395th training instructs on how to train a pla- paid for “out of hide” by the Armor Cen- Armor (TS), Fort Hood, TX. He received a B.A. toon, platoon administration, and disci- ter and the 16th Cavalry Regiment; how- from Dickinson College. His military education pline. Students then out-process, conduct ever, full implementation is planned for includes the Cavalry Leaders Course, U.S. a dining in, and graduate. BOLC II in June 2006 and BOLC III in Army Combined Arms and Services Staff July 2006. There will likely be some re- School, Armor Captains Career Course, Armor MOBC will produce better trained lieu- sourcing challenges for full implementa- Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, and Air tenants who are familiar with all armor tion, although more resources are antici- Assault School. He has served in various com- pated to come online with each succes- mand and staff positions, to include small platforms and grounded in the fundamen- group instructor, 2d Squadron, 16th (2/16) Cav- tals needed to be successful mounted pla- sive fiscal year. Regardless, armor lieu- alry, Fort Knox, KY; commander, K Troop 2/16 toon leaders. Officer instructor interaction tenants will gain a greater understanding Cavalry (AOBC), Fort Knox; commander, B with second lieutenants will increase of all armor operations through BOLC Troop, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Camp Garry dramatically. Second lieutenants will be III, and will be better prepared to assume Owen, Korea; and tank platoon leader and an- coached and mentored consistently dur- command of any mounted platoon to titank platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry ing the tactics phase and culmination which they are ultimately assigned. Lieu- (OPFOR), Hohenfels, Germany. FTX by captains and senior noncommis- tenants bound for reconnaissance platoons are still encouraged to attend the LTC Steven Duke is currently serving as com- sioned officers. mander, 2d Squadron, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox, Scout Leader’s Course; however, when KY. He received a B.S. from Middle Tennessee The backbone of the course is still the this does not occur, an arriving lieutenant State and an M.S. from Webster University. His sergeant first class (SFC) platoon trainer, will still be grounded in the fundamen- military education includes the U.S. Army Com- known to the students as “Black 6.” Black tals of reconnaissance and surveillance mand and General Staff College and the Ar- 6 stays with the platoon from in-process- operations, along with tank platoon op- mor Captains Career Course. He has served in ing to graduation and serves as the stu- erations. various command and staff positions, to in- dent’s enlisted advisor. clude XO, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Feedback from the force on the perfor- Fort Hood, TX; XO, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Standards for successfully completing mance of MOBC students is critical for Fort Hood; and S3, 1st Brigade, 2d Infantry Di- the numerous gates will be higher than making improvements. An online survey vision, Korea.

40 — July-August 2006 Mortar Platoon Training Focus to Meet the Evolving Battlefield

by Captain Stephen Ward

In the past, the 120mm heavy mortar platoon’s key focus was maneuver battalion, which would create more platoons with no different than that of a light mortar platoon. The focus of fewer mortar vehicles. their training was oriented on how fast they could deploy and Losing one FDC and two mortar vehicles prevents a platoon fire accurately. Although this is still a critical mission-essential from effectively operating as separate sections, eliminates the task, a heavy mortar platoon brings a key element to the fight redundancy of fire mission calculations, and reduces the bat- that forces them to expand their training focus. tlespace that the platoon can effectively engage. Whereas a pla- The M1064 (mortar carrier variant of the M113 chassis) makes toon could operate as two separate, three-mortar sections and the heavy mortar platoon an armored maneuver element, which cover a wide sector, it no longer has this capability due to the opens the platoon to new missions far from its traditional role. loss of one mortar vehicle per section and one FDC. This reduc- Convoy escort, cordon and search operations, and raids are all es the linear coverage of the platoon from 900m (75m burst ra- missions that a heavy unit must be able to accomplish. The cur- dius per gun) to 600m with a four mortar vehicle platoon. To rent gunnery training in a heavy battalion, or combined arms compensate, often the platoon leader’s M998 becomes a second- battalion (CAB), only tests the platoons in its traditional role. ary FDC. This only works if it is a cargo back, and even then, it The training needs of the platoon have expanded. To best pre- does not have all the utilities of an M577. pare soldiers for combat, they must be exposed to the types of After the initial advance into Iraq, mortar firing was severely missions they will be conducting. reduced due to the urban environment, a different battlefield requiring a different skill focus. Iraq is more of an environment Just prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the 120mm mortar for heavy mortar platoons because they bring flexibility to the platoons reorganized from six M1064 mortar carriers and two fight. A 120mm mortar platoon is capable of firing both 81mm M577 fire direction centers (FDC) to four M1064 and one FDC. and 120mm ammunition, but more importantly, it brings an ar- It was decided that four mortars could still effectively support a mored vehicle to the fight.

July-August 2006 — 41 The platoon practiced advancing and breaking contact as a section and squad leaders quickly learned they had more responsibilities than just their vehicle. Once the squad leaders mastered these tasks, we added the whole crew to the equation. Since a 360-degree live-fire range was not available, this training was conducted as a blank fire. During this segment of the training, the entire crew manned their sector on the vehicle and the section moved out as a unit. Contact would be made and the section sergeant would make the decision to advance through contact or break contact. The focus was to increase the gun crews’ situational awareness about the .50-caliber traversing to engage targets, as well as maintain their sectors of fire. After two days of training, we added all-inclusive training segments that covered losing a vehicle, actions to establish a perim- “During this segment of the training, the entire crew manned their sector eter, recovering the crew and weapons, and evacuating wound- on the vehicle and the section moved out as a unit. Contact would be ed. This training made soldiers realize the depth of the new mis- made and the section sergeant would make the decision to advance sions they would be conducting in Iraq and how critical it was through contact or break contact. The focus was to increase the gun to master these critical tasks prior to deployment. crews’ situational awareness about the .50-caliber traversing to engage targets, as well as maintain their sectors of fire.” In the conventional role, there is new equipment now available to the mortar platoon. On the future battlefield, the Army has transformed into a digital army. This has created new equipment, such as the XM31 mortar ballistic computer, a Windows- Mortar platoons need to shift focus from purely effective mor- based fire control program digitally linked to each gun allowing tar firing to survivability. A mortar is useless if the crew cannot for speed and accuracy in processing fire missions. get to the battle safely. A simple solution is to apply tank direct fire concepts to the mortar platoon. Any senior mortarman will It is imperative for mortar platoons to change their training fo- probably tell you that prior to deployment, he never fired an M2 cus. The number of fire missions they conduct is decreasing; the .50-caliber from a moving M1064. Contact drills and maneu- number of other missions they conduct is increasing. To accom- vering in contact are not normal situations for a mortar platoon. plish these missions, mortar platoons must change focus from a The modern battlefield forces the mortar crew to be an active traditional role to a full-spectrum operations role. During three part of the fight. Mortar crewmembers must know how to orient days of training, my platoon learned that even simple concepts on the move and what to do if they make contact. This is easily take time to master. Mortar platoons must be given an opportu- trained once they understand that regardless of what occurs out nity to train for the number of missions they will conduct in the- of sector, mortarmen must maintain their sector of fire. Squad ater or pay the consequences in blood. leaders must now think and talk to their fellow vehicles, much like a tank commander — they must learn to maneuver. Maneuvering begins at a basic level that teaches squad leaders Captain Stephen Ward is currently a student at the JFK Special Warfare and drivers direct fire control. The focus is communication be- Center, Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B.A. from Virginia Military Institute. tween the crews. Crewmembers have to be taught skills, such as His military education includes the Armor Captains Career Course, Mor- shooting on the move, bounding, and supporting the maneuver tar Leaders Course, and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served in of other vehicles. When this concept was introduced to my mor- various command and staff positions, to include mortar platoon leader, tar platoon, it took a few attempts before they grasped the idea. 1st Battalion, 72d Armor, Camp Casey, Korea; and tank platoon leader, B This was something entirely new from the vehicle perspective. Company, 1st Battalion, 72d Armor, Camp Casey. Our platoon first began training with a single vehicle, on the move, shooting multiple targets. The platoon was then placed on the range with another mortar carrier and they fought the range in sections no different from two tanks attacking the range. They quickly grasped the concepts of covering each other on the move and engaging targets in their wingman’s sector due to reloading or terrain.

“The M1064 (mortar carrier variant of the M113 chassis) makes the heavy mortar platoon an armored maneuver element, which opens the platoon to new missions far from its traditional role. Convoy escort, cordon and search operations, and raids are all missions that a heavy unit must be able to accomplish. The current gunnery training in a heavy battalion, or combined arms battalion (CAB), only tests the platoons in its traditional role.”

42 — July-August 2006 Integrating Iraqi Forces into Company Team Combat Operations

by Captain Justin D. Harper

The U.S. Army has used local national choose which local national units are as- Training new soldiers can be very man- elements to great effect from the Revolu- signed to them. In many cases, each bat- power intensive. This becomes a signifi- tionary War to the present. Scouts, inter- talion task force will have an Iraqi unit cant problem if you are a heavy compa- preters, informants, and many other crit- with which they will train, equip, and con- ny team conducting continuous opera- ical skills have been filled by the indige- duct operations. Given a perfect world, tions in sector. The sixty-three personnel nous population of almost every nation with unlimited resources and time, this of a tank company do not give the com- where the Army has operated throughout would allow a rigorous program of train- mander much redundancy when account- history. Native American scouts formed ing over the course of several months, ing for various red cycles, environmental a critical component of U.S. Army oper- culminating in a capstone exercise simi- and emergency leave, and other require- ations throughout the American West for lar to combat training center rotations ments that drain combat power. Even at- decades, and were used to great effect in that U.S. Army units conduct prior to detached infantry platoons do not ease the the numerous Indian wars fought by the ployment. burden. Mechanized infantry is in high U.S. Government. Even modern conflicts Many U.S. Army units have excellent demand throughout the urban battlefield, of the 20th century furnish examples: dur- training programs in place and are well and reducing combat power committed ing World War II, resistance cells in Ger- resourced and generate well trained Iraqi to the urban fight may not be a viable op- man-occupied Europe provided critical units capable of operating with coalition tion. intelligence to the allies during the Amer- forces in various ways. However, we must Commanders must decide where to as- ican offensive toward Germany; in Viet- assume that the next place we are sent as sume risk. The answer may come from nam, Army of the Republic of Vietnam either commanders or staff officers, we the frequent practice of tank platoons de- (ARVN) soldiers and Montangard tribes- will not be blessed with the same quality ploying without tanks. Making the tran- men were recruited to fight communist training program for local national forc- sition from M1 to M1114 has several ad- forces; and in Afghanistan, Mujahadeen es. This fact alone brings forth the neces- vantages from a personnel standpoint, if fighters were resourced by the United sity to learn how to integrate a unit of not from an operational one. First and States to fight the Soviets. Using these inexperienced soldiers who must fight foremost is the reduced maintenance re- forces was not the most agreeable option; through a language barrier, to ensure the quirement for a truck. While a tank can however, it was necessary due to political, safety of both U.S. and local national per- be operated with a three-man crew, it is military, and resource constraints placed sonnel in such an environment, and to much more difficult to maintain the vehi- on the United States. find the best way to conduct necessary cle under such circumstances. The tank Just as the United States could not choose training and execute multinational oper- platoon must not be designated to pro- which nation it supported in the past, fu- ations. We must have the mental model vide personnel to a training mission, as ture battalion and company commanders built if we are to be successful in such long as they are required to maintain four do not necessarily have the ability to an environment. tanks. Without tanks, the tank platoon be-

July-August 2006 — 43 comes the primary source for non- The advisory team you have es- commissioned officer trainers for tablished should take the lead un- indigenous personnel. Assuming der the supervision of the compa- a requirement to maintain four ny commander. Our assumption trucks and field a three-man crew at this point is that soldiers have for each, two staff sergeants and completed the minimum training two sergeants could become avail- necessary for Iraqi forces. This able for tasking as your company being the best case, your advisor, team Iraqi advisors. Although you along with the supervisory platoon must assess the competence of leader, should work to integrate the these individuals before assigning Iraqi unit into a program of sys- the daunting task of training local tematic rehearsals. This program nationals, there is a good chance will vary based on what kind of you can find qualified and respon- training you plan to conduct, but sible individuals in this group. the most critical element will al- Prior to training, an appropriate ways be weapons safety and dis- sized unit must be determined. An cipline. No matter what type of infantry squad is the largest unit training you conduct, the most dan- appropriate to begin operations in gerous weapon a trainer will face, a company team. A squad-sized el- apart from the ever present ver- ement provides ease of command sions of the improvised explosive and control, as well as supervision. devices, is an undisciplined and While it is reasonable to assume untrained soldier. If you rehearse that at least some of the local na- nothing else, weapons safety, clear- tionals you encounter have a lim- ing procedures, and fire discipline ited knowledge of English, this is “The minimum training necessary for each Iraqi soldier is are critical with a new Iraqi unit. not enough to conduct operations. based on the experience level of the Iraqi chain of command, A heavy company team will most Availability of interpreters makes along with the level of training responsibility with which your likely conduct mounted movement company is tasked. Because you might get a last-minute task- the unit size a problem. This will ing to use an Iraqi unit of unknown quality, it is best to have a as part of every operation. Most be mitigated in the long term as plan to rapidly assess the unit’s capability.” Iraqi units are equipped with mod- the Iraqi command structure gains ernized versions of Soviet-era ve- experience and becomes more sol- hicles or unarmored civilian trucks. id, but for the short term, a small- While this is the vehicle they are er number of soldiers is preferable. Fi- The minimum training necessary for likely to operate with for the long term, it nally, newly enlisted Iraqi soldiers are each Iraqi soldier is based on the expe- is more appropriate to use the organic not as reliable as we expect in the U.S. rience level of the Iraqi chain of com- armored transport available to company Army. Absenteeism is frequent and it is mand, along with the level of training team commanders. This ensures mainte- rare to find an Iraqi unit of any size at responsibility with which your compa- nance is properly conducted on the vehi- full strength, especially one that is new- ny is tasked. Because you might get a cles, that soldiers acting as advisors are ly formed. This is the reason a fire team last-minute tasking to use an Iraqi unit of not exposed in a completely unprotected may be too small to operate. You must ex- unknown quality, it is best to have a plan truck, and that Iraqi forces do not stand pect the squad to operate understrength. to rapidly assess the unit’s capability. out as a soft target in your company convoy. The M113 is the logical choice as it provides limited armor protection, enough room to transport an infantry squad, in- terpreter, advisor, and is organic to your company. If you need additional M113s to augment your company, it is possible to remove the medic markings from your tracked ambulance and give your company two M113s for this tasking.

“Locals provide a level of cultural understanding that your soldiers will never obtain, they can identify foreigners by accent or other characteristics and are more likely to find contraband hidden in vehicles or dwellings used by insurgent forces.”

44 — July-August 2006 Typical operations for a squad of Iraqi trolled environment. Checkpoint operations. While not ideal, the current operat- soldiers will be relatively simple parts of tions also provide newly assigned sol- ing environment demands units execute a company-level cordon and search or diers some good basic training while op- in less than ideal situations. The U.S. reinforcing a checkpoint. During each erating in sector. Army has found a way to integrate local and every one of these operations, it is nationals in every conflict, from U.S. in- necessary to provide close supervision of The desired end state of this on-the-job dependence to modern day fighting in Iraqi soldiers. Initially, it is best to have a training is producing capable and confi- Iraq and Afghanistan. We must continue 1-to-4 ratio of advisors to Iraqis, which dent Iraqi soldiers who can assist your to develop simple and effective models ensures accountability and safety, as well company team in the difficult job of bring- that allow us to make use of this poten- as ensuring Iraqi soldiers complete as- ing safety and security to Iraq. The ben- tially massive pool of combat power in signed tasks. Long duration check point efits of using local national soldiers out- the form of local national forces. missions are a case in point. Newly ar- weigh the downside. Locals provide a rived Iraqi units may be motivated but level of cultural understanding that your “When one treats the people with benev- they may not understand how to main- soldiers will never obtain, they can iden- olence, justice, and righteousness, and tain discipline on long-duration opera- tify foreigners by accent or other charac- reposes confidence in them, the army tions. This can only be counteracted by teristics and are more likely to find con- will be united in mind and all will be hap- strong on-site NCO supervision. This is traband hidden in vehicles or dwellings py to serve their leaders.” a good example of why it is beneficial to used by insurgent forces. Once you have — Sun Tzu have multiple advisors, even for small fixed the training and safety deficiencies units. Multiple advisors allow an effec- of local soldiers, they can be an unbeat- tive supervisory rotation and allow the able combat multiplier. unit to maintain discipline for longer du- As a company team commander in Iraq, Captain Justin D. Harper is currently serving rations. you will probably be assigned local na- as operations officer, 3d Armored Cavalry Reg- tional attachments of various training lev- iment, Fort Hood, TX. He received a B.S. from In addition to the considerations listed els. It is your responsibility to develop ap- Texas A&M University. His military education above, you must assume that your at- propriate mental models, which will al- includes Armor Captains Career Course and tached local national elements are com- low you to quickly and effectively use Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served in promised by insurgent intelligence. While various command and staff positions, to in- the Iraqi soldiers may not be members of indigenous forces in the absence of an clude scout platoon leader, Headquarters and an insurgency, they cannot be trusted to established training program. The sim- Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 12th Cav- have the same understanding of opera- ple steps listed above assume a directed alry, Fort Hood, TX; and tank platoon leader, task to employ relatively untrained local C Company, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Fort tional security expected of U.S. soldiers. Hood. For this reason, you must carefully choose national troops in company-level opera- when and how to employ your new combat elements. Framework or steady-state operations are a component of almost every unit in Iraq. Some of these routine tasks can best assess the capability of the Iraqi unit in an environment outside the forward operating base. Checkpoint operations serve as a good example of such tasks. While this type of mission can be high adventure at times, it allows you to take advantage of the cultural understanding of Iraqis in a relatively con-

“...the most critical element will always be weapons safety and discipline. No matter what type of training you conduct, the most dangerous weapon a trainer will face, apart from the ever present versions of the improvised explosive devices, is an undisciplined and untrained soldier. If you rehearse nothing else, weapons safety, clearing procedures, and fire discipline are critical with a new Iraqi unit.”

July-August 2006 — 45 Recognition of Combat Vehicles Training Saves Lives

by Dr. William M. Rierson and David A. Ahrens

“Fratricide is the employment of friend- lenger, killing two of the crew and seri- ment are the cornerstones. Individual and ly weapons and munitions with the intent ously wounding two others. Both tanks collective training is the glue that binds to kill the enemy or destroy the equipment, were fitted with visual and thermal com- these aspects together. To help prepare our or facilities, which results in unforeseen bat identification panels (CIPs), which forces to prevent or reduce the potential and unintentional death or injury to friend- were in working order, but the second for fratricide and simultaneously increase ly personnel.” Challenger crew could not obtain a clear combat effectiveness, U.S. Army Train- visual view due to the hull-down position ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) — U.S. Army Training and Doctrine of the tank.1 is currently implementing a five-tiered Command Fratricide Action Plan This dramatic and costly incident, and training approach for CID. This training The first reported ground fratricide in- several others with similar fratricidal re- will provide “trigger pullers,” a graduat- cident during Operation Iraqi Freedom sults during OIF, amplifies the continued and increasingly robust training pro- (OIF) occurred shortly after midnight on ing need for not only a viable technical gram to meet current and projected CID 25 March 2003, when a British Challeng- solution to combat vehicle identification challenges. Regardless of the technology, er II tank fired on another near Basra. (CVI) but also the imperative to improve or the ability of the command and con- The tanks were engaging pockets of Iraqi our overall combat identification (CID) trol architecture to provide near-perfect soldiers near a bridge over the Qanat Shat training. As of 31 January 2006 in OIF, situational awareness, once the vehicle Al Basra canal, which runs along the there were 27 U.S. Army fratricides, 26 commander or individual shooter recon- western edge of the city. In a nearby sec- from direct fire and one from indirect fire. firms the target is hostile before firing, the tor, a troop of Challenger IIs was track- Two of those incidents were ground-to- final decision to engage a target by direct ing, through thermal sights, a group of en- air engagements, and one was an air-to- fire is, and will always be, relegated to the emy personnel that had been reported by ground strike. Fourteen incidents occurred shooter — the gunner with his finger on the battle group headquarters. The “tar- during daylight hours and 13 at night, re- the trigger. get” was reported as an enemy bunker po- sulting in 11 U.S. Army soldiers killed in The basis and foundation of TRADOC’s sition. The targeted Challenger was un- action and 10 other military fatalities. As fortunately in turret-down position; its these statistics verify, CID is still an un- five-tiered CID training plan is CVI train- crew working on the turret top was mis- resolved problem on the modern battle- ing within a graduated training model identified by the second Challenger crew field for the U.S. Army, even during sta- as shown in Figure 1. The primary CVI as the reported “enemy” troops. The tank train ing aid of choice is the recognition bility and reconstruction operations.2 commander requested clearance to shoot, of combat vehicles (ROC-V) and train- which was granted. Firing two shots of CID is made up of a multitude of facets ing aids, devices, simulators, and simu- high-explosive squash head (HESH) at — situational awareness and target iden- lations (TADSS) with embedded imagery 4,000 yards blew the turret off the Chal- tification within specified rules of engage- from the ROC-V program. ROC-V is a

46 — July-August 2006 thermal sight training program that oper- The Army Training Support Center 2Countermeasure, Volume 27, 03/06, Army Combat Readi- ness Center’s Operations Division, online at https://crc.army. ates on any computer with the Windows (ATSC) has assumed responsibility for mil/MediaAndPubs/magazines/countermeasure/2006_issues/ operating system. ROC-V helps soldiers distribution of compact disc versions of cmmar06.pdf. learn to identify the thermal signatures ROC-V through the Joint Visual Informa- 3CID tiered training model developed by TRADOC Capabil- ities Manager for Platform Battle Command and Combat Iden- of combat vehicles through the use of an tion Activity, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania at tification (TCM PBC/CID). interactive curriculum that teaches the http://dodimagery.afis.osd.mil. ATSC de- 4Army-Marine Corps Board-CID, 27 Aug 04, directed ROC- unique patterns and shapes of vehicle “hot- signed these compact discs as a supple- V image sets be established as the joint standard for CVI training; AMCB principals requested that JFCOM lead an effort to spots” and overall vehicle shapes. ROC-V mental distribution method to the web- develop and publish joint policy establishing ROC-V as the also provides soldiers with practical ex- based, online download method for sol- joint training system/standard for ground platform visual/thermal recognition training. Joint Requirements Oversight Coun- perience in the use of individual weapon diers who cannot access the website. TRA- cil Memorandum (JROCM) 076-05, OIF Major Combat Oper- thermal-sensor image controls. Through DOC, in partnership with Program Exec- ations Lessons Learned — Fratricide, 14 Apr 05, directed the use of virtual sight controls, soldiers utive Office for Simulation, Training, and DOD to institutionalize ROC-V as a CVI training standard. 5ROC-V Online User Survey, 13 March 2005, conducted by learn to effectively adjust their thermal Instrumentation (PEO STRI), is working USJFCOM/JFIIT. optics to find targets and reveal their toward embedding ROC-V imagery in thermal identification cues. ROC-V in- combat vehicle tactical trainers and im- cludes training and testing to support the plementing it into TADSS and future com- Dr. William M. Rierson is the lead analyst, U.S. Army soldier’s manual common task bat system trainers. Future efforts also Ground Combat Division, Joint Fires Integra- (SMCT) skill level 1 for visual vehicle include developing a web-based SCORM tion and Interoperability Team, BAE Systems, Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), FL. He received a identification. conformant course that can be hosted by bachelor’s degree from Troy State University, a individual services. ROC-V is currently the standard ground master’s degree from North Georgia College, Leaders must ensure they have a plan to and an Ed.D. from University of West Florida. CVI training tool within the U.S Army His military education includes Officer Candi- 4 reduce the risk of fratricide. Along with and Marine Corps. Headquarters TRA- date School, Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, DOC has directed implementation of improving situational awareness during Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and Com- ROC-V across multiple mission area spe- operations, the key is tough, realistic CVI bined Arms and Services Staff School. He has cialties for both soldier common skills training before operations. ROC-V meets served in various command and staff posi- and specialty CVI training. The training that training requirement. The ROC-V tions, to include systems analyst, Joint Com- program includes paper trainer versions computer-based training (CBT) is ex- bat Identification and Evaluation Team, Eglin for reference without a computer. The in- ponentially ahead of traditional train- AFB; fire support instructor, Air Ground Oper- structor control module permits individ- ing methods. Bottom line — ROC-V train- ations School, Hulburt Field, FL; field artillery ing saves lives. battery commander, 3d Battalion, 1st Field Ar- ual and collective training, testing, and tillery, Bamberg, Germany; battalion and troop tracking scores. ROC-V is the only train- fire support officer, 2d Battalion, 10th Field Ar- ing aid available for currently fielded tillery, Fort Benning, GA; and assistant profes- JCIMS devices. ROC-V is available via sor of military science, North Georgia College, website download at https://rocv.army. Notes Dahlonaga, GA. mil. 1Defense Update International Online Defense Magazine, Year 2004, Issue 2, “Blue-on-Blue Ground Incidents During Mr. David A. Ahrens is a retired field artillery of- A recent survey of ROC-V users indi- OIF,” online at http://www.defense-update.com/features/du-2- ficer with 28 years active duty service. He con- cates that 79 percent have improved in- 04/fratricide-2.htm. Incident also described in UK MOD pro- tinues to serve the U.S. Army as a military ana- duced report Progress in CID by the Comptroller and Auditor lyst working CID issues for TRADOC’s Deputy dividual CVI skills, and 87 percent rated General, HC 936 Session 2005-2006, 3 March 2006, pp. 7 and the ROC-V program as an effective CVI 20, online at http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/ Chief of Staff of Operations and Training locat- 05-06/0506936.pdf. ed at Fort Monroe, VA. training aid. The survey also provided specific recommendations to improve the program to better meet the needs of the warfighter.5 Feedback from instructors Tier Level Type Training and graduating students at master gunner schools also indicates user satisfaction 1. Individual CVI with ROC-V with the training program. Many recom- 2. Individual and team AGTS, BATS, UCOFT, CCTT mendations from these users have been incorporated into the current version of 3. Team and unit Gunnery, ranges, NGATS ROC-V. 4. Unit and collective Force-on-force training exercises with JCIMS at home Representatives from the four armed ser- station and CTCs vices are involved in direct consultation 5. Collective and joint Virtual mission rehearsals, combined arms rehearsals, with the ROC-V development team to rock drills produce the next generation of ROC-V to meet other specific mission area appli- AGTS Advanced Gunner Training Simulator cations. The ROC-V team has already pro- BATS Bradley Advanced Training System duced a look-down aspect angle version for the air-to-ground mission areas, such CCTT Close Combat Tactical Trainer as fixed-wing close air support, attack and CTC Combat Training Center reconnaissance rotary-wing platforms, JCIMS Joint Combat Identification Marking System and AC-130 gunships. It is currently in use by Marine Corps light attack heli- NGATS New Generation Army Targetry System copter squadrons. This same product im- UCOFT Unit Conduct of Fire Trainers provement has potential utility for tactical unmanned aerial system (UAS) sensor analysts. Figure 1. TRADOC Combat Identification Tiered Training Model3

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48 — July-August 2006 MACP from Page 23 installations and inspect instructors’ lev- to 0930 hours to begin teaching level I in Depending on the post, MACP resourc- el of knowledge. segments — some soldiers were imme- es may vary, but generally, every post has diately comfortable with the training, someone trained in MACP. Some posts My first experience with modern army while others were a bit more timid. Once have dedicated trained personnel who do combatives took place during Christmas they started with live grappling, everyone nothing but train soldiers on combatives, break of 2004-2005. Our task force in gave 100 percent. No one wanted to lose while smaller posts may just have a sol- Germany was on a quick-reaction force or get tapped out. Eventually, it came dier who has been through an instructor (QRF) mission and soldiers were only time for the punch drill, where soldiers level combatives course. Worst case, if permitted to take local leave or none at are required to takedown an instructor your unit currently has no trained person- all. Our task forces’ combatives instruc- while wearing boxing gloves. nel, the best idea would be to send some- tors put on a level I ‘leader teach,’ where one to USACS at Fort Benning. USACS company commanders, executive officers, Once soldiers learned the basic drills, schedules about 33 level I, 15 level II, 18 platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants NCOs incorporated the drills into physi- level III, and 6 level IV classes annually, went through the course together. Re- cal training a few days per week to keep and classes are not usually at full capac- maining noncommissioned officers took soldiers familiar with the techniques. Af- ity. Current Army guidelines require one care of the soldiers while the rest of us ter training my tank platoon, I moved up level I instructor per platoon, one level II beat the heck out of each other at the to the brigade recon troop (BRT) and laid instructor per company, one level III in- gym for two weeks. on an entire week of combatives during structor per battalion, one level IV in- On the first day, no one knew what to the mornings, while we deactivated the structor per brigade, and two level IV in- expect. We went through the basic warm- unit and turned in equipment in the after- structors per division/installation.8 up and stretching drills, got a little back- noons. ground on the program, and then went Ultimately, the MACP is another re- After conducting combatives training source commanders can use to break up right into the fundamentals of ground with two separate units, I noted that the fighting. We learned and practiced all of monotonous periods of skill-level I train- soldiers from both units responded simi- ing. Everyday, more and more soldiers the basic jiu-jitsu positions and finished larly. First, they are always interested. the day with the ‘circle of hell.’ This was are exposed to MACP training and are They enjoy watching the Ultimate Fight- spreading the word. It is interesting, phys- the fun part: everyone partnered up in a ing Championship (UFC), so they really big circle, grappled live, or at 100 per- ically demanding, and generally enjoy- enjoy learning the same moves that pro- able for all soldiers from the youngest, cent effort, for 3 minutes, then the inner fessional mixed martial arts (MMA) fight- group rotated onto the next opponent. At newest private to the oldest sergeant ma- ers use on television. No one has a prob- jor. Commanders should implement a first, everyone thought we would just ro- lem staying awake during combatives tate a couple times and be done; instead, combatives training plan at the earliest classes. Everyday someone would come time to reap the benefits prior to deploy- we rotated through the entire circle for in talking about a new move he wanted to nearly an hour and a half of pain. At this ment. Soldiers will be better prepared to try or asking questions about when the handle hand-to-hand combat and progres- point, our knowledge of combatives did unit is going to have a level II class. By not allow us to know how to ‘finish the sive escalation of force in stressful situa- the end, without even realizing it, the sol- tions on foreign lands. fight,’ only to grapple for a position of ad- diers had learned more than just combat- vantage. This reinforces the ‘position, ive skills. then submission’ fundamental of army combatives. After even a few level I sessions, sol- Notes After the first day, I had no idea how I diers underwent some beneficial chang- would make it through the entire course. es. Soldiers who were timid at first be- 1U.S. Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, Army Training and came more aggressive and able to turn Leader Development, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), I could barely drive home because my on their aggressiveness at the right time. Washington D.C., 13 January 2006. grip was expended, and once I got home, 2United States Combative Arts Association Homepage, avail- The company became more cohesive; pla- able online at http://www.moderncombatives.org. I could not do anything but lie on the 3 couch and attempt to recover. Over the toons would size themselves up against FM 3-25.150, Combatives, GPO, Washington, D.C., 18 Jan- other platoons and would rather watch uary 2002. next two weeks, we went through the en- UFC fights than conduct hip-pocket train- 4U.S. Army Infantry Homepage, available online https://www. tire level I curriculum and were exposed infantry.army.mil/combatives/content/purpose.htm. ing. Soldiers who could not finish a two- 5 to some level II material. We had a sig- Ibid. mile run indirectly got some physical 6Ibid. nificant attrition rate. By the end, sud- 7 denly people had ‘stuff to do,’ and on training out of it. Then, of course, is the Ibid. obvious increase in the platoon’s knowl- 8Modern Army Combatives Program Concept Plan as of 12 the last day, there were about seven peo- edge of hand-to-hand combat lethality October 2005, available online from https://www.infantry.army. ple who showed up. My first experience mil/combatives. with MACP was outstanding. My instruc- — soldiers not only have the ability to tors were excited about teaching, the stu- engage enemies at long range, but also at dents were excited about learning, and close range with punches, kicks, elbows, Captain Brian W. Loyd is the commander, B even though we limped out everyday, we knees, and chokes if necessary. Best of Troop, 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry, Fort Knox, all, it gets soldiers out of the motor pool KY. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military continued to want to learn more. I found and doing something different besides Academy. His military education includes Ar- myself looking up new chokes, sweeps, maintenance and gunnery training. Fully mor Captains Career Course, Armor Officers and submissions on the internet over the trained combative soldiers have the abil- Basic Course, and Ranger School. He has weeks following the course. The next step ity to close the distance, gain a dominant served in various command and staff posi- was to start teaching the rest of the sol- tions, to include XO, Brigade Recon Troop, 3d diers. position, and finish the fight. They are Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germa- physically fit, individually capable, team ny; and platoon leader, 1st Platoon, A Compa- The task force scheduled the gym one oriented, and thirst for expeditious con- ny, 1st Battalion, 63d Armor, 3d Brigade, 1st day a week during the morning from 0630 flict resolution. Infantry Division, Vilseck.

July-August 2006 — 49 LETTERS from Page 3 sound, training methodology. All of Mr. Graham’s I was surprised to read LTC Allum’s defense been hit by 14 bazooka rounds, the other by 19 points about the difference between ROE and of micromanagement. The cross of centralized bazooka rounds. All the bazooka rounds were RUF, while technically correct, miss the mark. control has been borne by the Army, with rare ineffective, in part because they had to hit ex- Because, other than in conflicts where Ameri- exceptions and only for limited periods, since actly square to even explode. The rounds that ca’s national leadership has designated a “hos- World War II, when it was required to expand exploded did so on the bazooka skirts of those tile” force to be targeted at will, soldiers, sailors, from less than 200,000 to over 8,000,000. Ac- Panzers, so no damage was done from any of airmen and Marines will always be responding cording to LTG Garrison H. Davidson, writing in those hits. to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent Army Information Digest in December 1961, Our infantry units were woefully short on rifle- (much as police officers do on a daily basis in the that centralized control had not yet been cor- men, because our Nation was literally out of United States). Accordingly, it is extremely im- rected and many of us would say it still remains men. Our intended 12-man rifle squad normally portant that our servicemembers are educated today under the name of “micromanagement.” operated with just 5 men. Our intended 40-man on threat identification. It simply does not make As LTC Allum would agree, identification of the rifle platoon had just 19 men. After one attack, sense to ignore the decades of law enforcement most promising future leaders is our goal today, our company was the relief company for one of experience in this area of both law and tactics. but success in that endeavor is far more likely to the successful attacking companies. I took over be achieved by raising aspirants in a decentral- the foxhole of that company commander. He told Individuals who have never personally attend- ized environment that encourages initiative, per- ed the Seminar, never practiced operational law me he had a “foxhole strength of 24 men,” 24 mits mistakes, protects the maverick, and de- men in his entire company. Since his were the in a deployed setting, and who have never been velops confidence. The “Big 12” was designed a tactical end-user of ROE/RUF guidance should only men left on the battlefield that day, we “won” to identify officers whose records show that they that battle. reserve judgment on the Seminar. To a person, have built and will continue to build that neces- operators, and commanders that have attend- sary learning environment. If the supporting sys- The author writes, “However, the question still ed this Seminar (from E-1 to O-8) “get it” and tems (OER, command, schooling, and promo- remains as to why he put his weakest regimen- see its value and need. The only resistance this tion selections) pay heed to the “Big 12,” suc- tal formation (The 14th Mechanized Cavalry cutting-edge training receives is from a small cess in combat will follow as surely as the night Group, equipped with 37mm M8 armored cars group of Army Judge Advocates, primarily ones follows the day. and 37mm M5 light tanks) along the most likely from the Schoolhouse, that seem threatened by avenue of approach in his sector.” a methodology that outstrips their skill sets. JOHN C. FAITH MG, U.S. Army, Retired The armor on those vehicles, light as it was, DAVID G. BOLGIANO was far better than the protection our cotton field LtCol, U.S. Air Force jackets gave us infantrymen. Also the 37mm TUSK Right on Target! gun, as small as it may have been, was far more Balancing the “Big 12” Dear ARMOR, devastating that the 30-06 caliber rifles we infantrymen had. We had no weapon in any of the Dear ARMOR, I read with extreme delight and awe the arti- units in our ground forces that could reliably cle, “Abrams and the Need for TUSK in the Age As one of the original guinea-pig participants stop a German Panzer. Only fire from our fight- of Rapid Urbanization,” so well written by LTC er aircraft could reliably knock out a Panzer. in the drill that developed the list of 29 leader be- Benjamin Harris, in the May-June 2006 issue of haviors that identify “good leaders,” I read with in- ARMOR. I read a similar article the evening be- In the Battle of the Bulge, nobody “stopped” the terest LTC Philip Allum’s concerned letter in the fore in the Marine Corps Times. I was moved Panzers, they merely and literally, “ran out of March-April 2006 issue, as well as LTG Ulmer’s that the U.S. Marine Corps “brass” actually lis- gas.” To eliminate traffic jams, we put our supply thoughtful response in the May-June issue. Since tened to its tank crewmen and are willing to depots off on a side road away from the main our Army is fighting a war with no foreseeable spend their very meager and extremely precious roads. The German Panzers had gone by one end, LTC Allum’s reaction to the list is wholly military budget on upgrading these already awe- such depot that had about 1,000,000 gallons of understandable. The warrior ethic and combat some weapons platforms. gasoline stockpiled in it. Had one little German leadership challenges are inevitably in the fore- recon unit investigated the side roads, the Ger- front of all soldiers’ thoughts and concerns. When I was a Marine tank commander in Viet- man Panzers could have been refueled and nam, we seldom employed the .50-caliber ma- would have easily gotten all the way to Antwerp A little balanced consideration, however, clear- chine gun because it was so poorly mounted before the skies had cleared and our airplanes ly reveals the vital fact that throughout our Ar- (sideways) inside of the tank commander’s cu- could fly again. Had they found that fuel supply, my’s history, the vast majority of time spent on pola. Plus our tank’s loaders did not have an or- it would have been a different war. leadership challenges during an officer’s career ganic weapon — other than a .45-caliber pistol Captain Nance is correct, a WWII mechanized has involved being trained and training the next or possibly a “found” weapon that some hapless cavalry unit was pathetic when it came to stop- generation of young officers and noncommis- (and wounded) grunt had left on our vehicle. sioned officers to be successful leaders. There ping a Panzer attack. But, pathetic or not, a reg- is no question that tactical competence, intelli- JOHN WEAR imental-sized mechanized cavalry unit had far, gence, and courage are critical to successful SGT, USMC, Retired far more fighting power than a WWII infantry leadership in combat, but they are expected of regiment. all who aspire to leadership, though not always To this one-time “ground-pounder,” screening present. They are difficult to assess, except on Mechanized Cavalry Group Was an seems to be a normal employment for cavalry. the battlefield, and they are not discriminators Effective Mobile Combined Arms Unit In the case of the Ardennes, the 14th Mecha- in the long-term training environment. There, the Dear ARMOR, nized Cavalry might have used their mobility to emphasis should be, although unfortunately of- get out of the way and let the (road-bound) ten honored more in word than practice, on fos- I read with great interest the very fine article on German Panzers go on down the road unop- tering a supportive learning environment that de- World War II mechanized cavalry, “The Armored posed. They then could have used their mobil- velops confidence, competence, a willingness to Reconnaissance Squadron and the Mechanized ity and superior (superior to infantry) firepower take risk, and a trust in the chain of command. Cavalry Group,” written by Captain William S. to take out all the support troops behind the Nance in the January-February 2006 issue. Because of the nature of operations in Iraq and Panzers. It was a tough war and tough deci- Afghanistan, commanders and leaders at com- During those days, I was a rifleman, first scout sions are always difficult to make. A mecha- pany level and below are making critical deci- of a rifle squad in the 94th Infantry Division. We nized cavalry group was a very, very effective sions daily and operating without a structured were attacking the pillboxes of the Siegfried mobile combined arms (armor, infantry, and ar- environment. They will expect, or hope for, the Switch Line and defending ourselves the best tillery) unit. The Panzers outgunned them, but same level of responsibility when they return we could against the counterattacking 11th Pan- the Panzers also outgunned everything else we home. Will they find it, or will they be faced with zer Division. In one attack, I saw 300 men go out had in Europe. Captain Nance’s article is out- a chain of command focused on error-free per- into the attack at 0600 hours; they were coun- standing. formance, the next promotion, and the boss’s terattacked by two Panzers. After a day of firing, ROBERT P. KINGSBURY priorities? I saw 30 of them come back. One Panzer had LTC, U.S. Army, Retired

50 — July-August 2006 Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Grossman in On Killing, a book with which general, we must also remember that our lead- Thinking by Malcolm Gladwell, Little, many military professionals are already famil- ers then faced very tough decisions. They had Brown, and Company, 2005, New York, iar. to not get it too badly wrong, as we all para- 277 pp., $25.95 (hardcover) phrase Sir Michael Howard. We had to rebuild This book is a great primer for those who an Army. Our leaders had to answer General want to conduct deeper research into the sci- Abrams’ question, “Why an Army?” We faced Malcolm Gladwell is a writer for The New York- ence of decisionmaking. I recommend this book drugs in the barracks, no established way to er and former science reporter for the Wash- to all who want to gain a better understanding get drug abusers out of the Army, the remnants ington Post. Blink is a very readable and infor- of how we make decisions and how to train to of McNamara’s 100,000, lousy equipment, and mative book on rapid cognition, which is the make more decisions more effectively. As I even lousier morale. There was no NTC, no process of unconscious thought and decision- said earlier, the chapter of the police shooting MILES, no BCTP, no funding for the education making. In fact, the subtitle of the book, The has a special relevance to us in the military system we now take for granted. While it is Power of Thinking Without Thinking, is actually who find ourselves in a counterinsurgency en- chic in the moment of today to denigrate the more descriptive of the content. The author vironment where the effects of a wrong lethal decision to “throw out” counterinsurgency, it is presents no new scientific ideas; rather, he ex- force decision can have huge ramifications. appropriate that we remember where we were plains many existing thoughts and theories on The strength of this book for the military pro- as an Army back then. The struggle at the time unconscious decisionmaking through a mix- fessional is that Gladwell helps break down was for the Army’s soul. ture of real-life examples and interviews with Ph.D.-level science into a high school-level dis- psychologists. cussion. I would also recommend you read That was then; this is now. And because we this book along with Grossman’s On Killing. live in the here and now, there is some urgen- The principle thesis throughout the book is Both help us understand the very complicat- cy about reading and heeding the lessons from that our unconscious minds have the ability to ed business of how we react in life-and-death Military Misfortunes. Our Quadrennial Defense process information and allow us to make de- situations, and both help show us how to do it Review has enshrined the title “The Long War.” cisions in ways we are not aware of, a process better. As we face this challenge, it is more important he calls “thin slicing.” He also demonstrates than ever to bear in mind Cohen’s rejoinder to how we can refine this ability through practice. SHON McCORMICK read history accurately, not comfortably. To make his point, he uses a wide variety of MAJ, U.S. Army examples of rapid cognition. This variety also History allows us to know what decisions were leads to the main weakness of this book, in that made and the conditions at the time of deci- his examples do not seem to clearly support Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of sion. Through an accurate reading of history, any one thesis. In fact, his conclusions from Failure in War by Eliot A. Cohen and we see the second- and third-order effects as some examples seem to be contradictory. John Gooch, New York Free Press, 2006, decisions are translated into action and action 320 pp., $15.00 (paperback) re-release unfolds, meeting friction and a thinking foe that Despite these shortfalls, this book has great always gets a vote. Our Chief of Staff has told applicability to the professional soldier. I will When I deployed to Kuwait prior to the open- us we train for certainty and educate for uncer- caveat that recommendation with the fact that ing stage of Iraqi Freedom, I took five books tainty. The responsibility for education is a per- I have neither the education nor the experi- along, one of which was Eliot Cohen and John sonal and professional responsibility. Indeed, ence to dispute the science he presents. A lay- Gooch’s book. I first read this book during my in our profession, one could say continuing per- man, at best, in the field of psychology, I had time at the School of Advanced Military Stud- sonal dedication to education is a moral im- to accept the author’s thoughts on the many ies (SAMS) in 1991/92. I wanted to remind my- perative. theories presented. self, as we developed our plans for the land component, of the words at the end of the book, I remind the officers in SAMS that no matter I found two examples especially relevant. First, “The causes of military misfortune are com- how well they develop the plan and the order he writes about how life experiences effect our plex… The problem of command is not univer- that translates the plan into action, Soldiers, preconceptions about other people. His spe- sal but particular, and it is defined by the na- Marines, Airmen, and Sailors will die in execu- cific examples on this topic are racial and sex- ture of each military organization and the unique tion. It is a hard fact in the calculus of war. The ual stereotyping, but you can apply the ideas strategic, operational, and tactical challenges urgency now is to be damned sure we don’t get to any situation. One application particular to it faces.” Whether or not we will be successful it too badly wrong in our assessments — ad- the military that came to mind is our ideas on at avoiding military misfortune remains to be vice to policymakers and commanders. A study personal appearance. We, in the military, seem seen, but it will not be from a lack of effort. Ef- of this book and others will help find the path to have a natural bias toward those who ap- fort is one thing, as Clausewitz reminds us that toward adaptive plans and orders. This is not a pear physically fit. However, we all remember the use of force in war in no way precludes the gratuitous cheap shot re-release, it is a sober- people who did not project the prototypical sol- use of intellect. I think this re-release is quite ing reminder that our responsibility is to con- dier image, yet were very competent soldiers. timely. stantly evaluate and think. Cohen and Gooch Do you remember your first impression of this point out that the misfortunes of the past were soldier; did you doubt his or her abilities? The At a recent conference I had the privilege of not sins of commission. Situational awareness author would say that this unconscious incli- speaking with Dr. Cohen about his book. He includes an imperative for historical awareness. nation has far greater effect on our percep- told me the only new portion of the book is the Read this book and take it with you to theater tions of this individual than we might imagine. afterword, which is as worthy as the entire book. — I did. The conclusion of the afterword is rather damn- In his final chapter, Gladwell makes what I ing, Cohen asserts that we, the military, set KEVIN C.M. BENSON feel is his most relevant example for soldiers. ourselves up for misfortune by misreading the COL, U.S. Army He analyzes the incident of the white police of- lessons of history and believing that, “victory ficers in New York who shot an unarmed black came through a tightly controlled, massive ap- man who they mistakenly believed had a gun. plication of force in pursuit of simple and limit- ARVN: Life and Death in the South Viet- Using this incident as a case study, Gladwell ed objectives.” In doing so, we only read the namese Army by Robert K. Brigham, Uni- demonstrates the manner in which we respond history we want to, thereby putting aside the versity Press of Kansas, 2006, 178 pp., to various types of stresses and fears and how lessons of Vietnam and other counterinsurgen- $29.95 (hardcover) we make life and death decisions under those cy efforts. conditions. In short, he reiterates the adage Robert K. Brigham has written an interesting that “in times of stress, you go with what you While I agree that in the late 1970s and 1980s, and topical history of a failed institution — the know.” He offers a spectrum of reaction related our Army, as well as the rest of the defense es- South Vietnamese Army. As we struggle to to our distance in time and space from sourc- tablishment, might have specifically set aside help create a new army in Iraq today, we can es of stress. He also cites the work of David experiences in Vietnam and insurgencies in find in Brigham’s narrative a host of insights

July-August 2006 — 51 and lessons that could have direct application Additionally, Brigham tends to idealize the gues for a “department of global security” or of in Southwest Asia. I recommend it unreserv- communist armies’ practices. I rather doubt that “everything else” to lead his SysAdmin force to edly to today’s armor officer of any grade. they were as good as he makes them out to a unifying effort countering the friction created As the book jacket rightly points out, the Army be. I should mention, however, that Brigham by globalization’s expansion. The roadblocks to of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) became an does not appear to glorify the communists or implementation are first, the American defense- object of scorn from its allies and enemies profess support for their cause. One of the industrial base and its political stranglehold alike. Some might argue that ARVN’s bad rep- great strengths of this work is that it avoids the over Congress. The second roadblock is a re- utation was exaggerated, but despite strong political bias so evident in many works con- sistant army fearing loss of its warfighting ethos. numbers and good equipment, it collapsed cerning the Vietnam War. Brigham tells it as Personally, I still labor over his claim that a large swiftly in 1975 — this book explains why. Brig- straight as he can — this book serves as a great multinational SysAdmin force operating in OIF ham’s work is not a history of the battles of the case study in how not to build an army, an ex- post-dominate phase would have prevented ARVN, although it gives an excellent account tremely valuable today. the post-liberation chaos and stymied any in- of the 1964 Battle of Ap Bac, but it is rather a surgency. My own experience in Iraq makes me WILLIAM R. BETSON lean toward confirming it. study of that force as an institution. It focuses COL, U.S. Army, Retired on how the army was conscripted, indoctrinat- In a chapter dedicated to proving the “func- ed, trained, and sustained. It compares ARVN tioning core” (the parts of the world whose practices with those of its enemies, the Peo- Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth economies are integrated into the global econ- ple’s Liberation Armed Forces (the Viet Cong) Creating by Thomas P.M. Barnett, Put- omy and adhere to globalism’s security rule and the Peoples Army of Vietnam (the regular set) is capable of overcoming social, econom- North Vietnamese Army). The comparison re- nam, New York, 2005, 448 pp., $27.95 (hardcover) ic, and political friction generated by the ad- veals convincingly why the south lost. vance of globalism, Barnett takes aim at critics In Brigham’s view, it was, paradoxically, the Described as “one of the most important stra- in the “futurist” genre. Maybe its a hit on my ego, communist armies’ expounding modern “Marx- tegic thinkers of our time,” Thomas Barnett, a but summarizing Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) ist” theories that managed to create military in- strategic planner who has written for Esquire, Ralph Peters and Robert Kaplan as “Orwell stitutions that reflected the traditional mores of Wired, and the Washington Post, has taught aspirants” that make “frightening extrapola- Vietnamese village culture. That culture stressed and advised military and civilian leaders in the tions that narrow the mind” is bizarre. Person- familial obligations; and through intense ideo- Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the ally, as an avid reader, I place Peter’s assess- logical training, the communists convinced their Joint Staff, Central Command, Special Opera- ments in the context that as a (former) military soldiers to extend those traditional obligations tions Command, and Joint Forces Command. intelligence officer, he is tasked to predict most to party and state. In contradistinction, the His work at the U.S. Naval War College and the dangerous courses of action. These courses of ARVN turned its back on the Vietnamese past. Office of Force Transformation in OSD, under action regularly spill over into his writings. Plus, Beyond telling its soldiers they needed to fight the tutelage of Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, Peters and Kaplan are two of few writers/jour- communism, the ARVN paid little attention to focused on strategic concepts that link change nalists with the courage to venture outside the ideological indoctrination and pursued con- in global security environments to U.S. military safety of Baghdad’s “Green Zone.” scription policies that paid no attention to the transformation; hence, his strategic vision, Pen- Further in the chapter, he expounds a bit on economic and familial needs of the village. In tagon’s New Map, went to print. To follow his short, communist soldiers could understand the current fad in international relations litera- seminal work, Professor Barnett seeks to im- ture focused on “resource wars.” I won’t argue what they were fighting for, and the ARVN only plement his strategic vision in volume two, knew what they were fighting against. the contrary to his critique that money and le- Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating. galities will circumvent fights over raw material Compounding this critical moral issue, ARVN Before getting to the arguments, Professor (water, forests, oil). However, I would refresh his induction practices were terrible, and its train- Barnett’s tone needs to be addressed. He memory that the casus belli for Desert Storm ing haphazard at best. Personnel management bounces between a plain-spoken “from my rear was a claim to oil rights. I would suggest that systems were hugely inefficient, and U.S. ad- view mirror” to that of the detached hallways of those writers are holdovers still hoping to fill visors could never convince their ARVN coun- the “ivory towers.” He rapidly shifts between the 1990’s foreign policy void, but will not cast terparts to take basic training seriously. Only mass-market media appeal and academic cre- their lot in resolving the challenges of the Glob- the poorest officers and NCOs served in the dentialing. It is an obvious battle to gain the al War on Terror. training base. Hence, even a motivated South trust of separate audiences. Vietnamese recruit would soon become disil- What about security policy vis-à-vis our grow- lusioned with the army’s effectiveness. Worse, He begins by examining the debate between ing global competitor China? He advises that he would not be confident in his training as he his largest group of critics, air-power advocates America spend all its time not with the bank- approached battle. It was not difficult for the of “network-centric warfare” and the advocates rupt old colonial powers of Europe, but with ARVN to develop an inferiority complex. of grunt-centric “fourth-generation warfare,” and that of China, India, Russia, and Brazil. No ar- Further, ARVN pay was always very poor. And his blueprint’s need to maintain both a war- gument here; sounds like an argument our perhaps surprisingly for an army operating un- winning Leviathan force and a nation-building friend Peters has made. SysAdmin force. To look back on volume one, der U.S. tutelage, the ARVN was ill fed as well. Professor Barnett believes his vision is for- Stories abound of families, having lost a bread the Leviathan force is plainly the “shock-and- awe” regime toppling forces of OEF and OIF; ward of his time. He claims that the generation winner, being forced to try to supplement their of “echo boomers” (Americans born 1980-1995) soldiers’ meager rations. the SysAdmin forces are post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction-focused stability and will be the cohort in 2025 to employ his blue- In fact, one wonders while reading this book support operators, to include low-intensity con- print. This may be truer than he thinks. The why the ARVN fought at all; and herein lies the flict and small-scale crisis response (what re- echo boomers constitute the bulk of the young book’s weakness. It is clear that many ARVN mains in Afghanistan and Iraq). company-grade officers and junior NCOs that units fought hard, and ARVN certainly suffered are the battle-hardened “strategic corporals” huge casualties. Brigham acknowledges this, The end result of this debate for Barnett is the of OEF, OIF, and the GWOT. For the echo but has difficulty explaining why. He tries to at- necessity for both paradigms to support his two boomers to succeed, he offers an array of char- tribute some ARVN battlefield bravery to the force sets to wage war and sustain peace. He acter descriptions of the “host of heroes,” which fact that the ARVN soldiers saw the army as argues that America will continually engage in we will encounter as his strategic vision is car- the only choice — albeit a poor one — because post-conflict stabilization. To continue — what ried out. Professor Barnett, I will keep my eye they had to protect their families in dangerous in the mid-1990s Marine General (Retired) An- open for them. times. This is an interesting theory, but impos- thony Zinni predicted — more and more oper- sible to prove. ations other than war. On this premise, he ar- JOHN DeROSA

52 — July-August 2006 Patton Museum Volunteers Restore the “Ontos”

“Ontos” is a Greek word, which translated to English means “the thing.” The Ontos has a Chrysler six- or eight-cylinder engine, an Allis Chalmers automatic transmission, a cruising range of approximately 125 miles, and with one inch of armor, it weighs nine tons. Its armament consists of six 106mm recoilless rifles with four .50-caliber ranging machine guns, and a .30-caliber light machine gun. Its effective range is 1,200 yards. The Ontos loads five different rounds, which include the HE, HEAT, HEP-T, WP, and Beehive with a stowed capac- ity of 18 rounds. It is light and thin, making it strictly a hit-and- run vehicle. The Ontos’ crew is made up of a driver, loader, and gunner or an Ontos commander. History Developed for the U.S. Army in 1955 to combat Warsaw Pact tanks during the Cold War, the Ontos was rejected because of its external loading system. In 1957, the U.S. Marines ad- opted the Ontos and replaced the 75mm recoilless rifle. The Ontos made its first appearance at Camp Lejeune, North Car- olina, in the spring of 1957. On 16 July 1958, President Eisen- hower ordered the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 2d Marine Divi- sion to Beirut Lebanon with a platoon of Ontos. Following Beirut, the Ontos went to combat in the Dominican Republic The Ontos sat on a concrete pad outside the Patton Muse- and South Vietnam and was retired in late 1969. um from 1971 until 2001, when a soldier, Sergeant First Volunteer and Restoration Class Don Moriarty, pushed for restoration of the pile of rust. Many laughed at the idea — the Ontos was rusted and On 10 November 1971, on the Marine Corps’ birthday, Lieu- welded shut with no spare parts. tenant Colonel M.F. Manning, USMC, presented the Ontos to the Patton Museum at Fort Knox on behalf of the Comman- A Slow Beginning dant of the Marine Corps. Two years ago, Steven Slaughter, an Ontos veteran from The Patton Museum has a generous and reputable volunteer Vietnam, and Robert Shofner, an Ontos veteran from Beirut, program. On the first Saturday of each month and the third Lebanon, joined in with other volunteers and began the res- Saturday and Sunday of each month, volunteers come to re- toration process, which was primarily funded by donations store vehicles dating back to World War I. Many volunteers from the now retired Don Moriarty. After lots of engine repair, serve as guides during the week at the museum, as well as sandblasting, freeing up and cleaning of the guns, painting, the motor pool, where vehicles are repaired and restored. welding, electrical work, and thousands of volunteer hours, Many of these volunteers simply love being around all these the rusty old relic was transformed into a thing of beauty and historic vehicles, which is reward enough for them. preserved for future generations. PB 17-06-4 PIN: 083284-000

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