Thomas Aquinas on Illumination Vs. Abstraction

MP_C10.qxd 11/17/06 5:27 PM Page 87

Thomas Aquinas on Illumination vs. Abstraction

Summa Theologiae

Part I, Question 84. How the soul, while joined to the body, knows material things

Article 5. Does the intellectual soul know material things in the divine ideas? The ﬁrst point:1 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the divine ideas. For there must be prior and better knowledge of that in which a thing is known. Now the intellectual soul of man, in his earthly life, does not know the divine ideas – for it does not know God, in whom these ideas exist, but is, according to Dionysius,2 united to him as to the unknown. Therefore the soul does not know everything in the divine ideas. 2. Again, in Scripture3 it is said that the invisible things of God are there for the mind to see in the things he has made. But among the invisible things of God are the divine ideas. Thus these divine ideas are known through material created things and not the other way around. 3. Again, the divine ideas are precisely that – ideas. For Augustine says,4 that ideas are the patterns of things existing unchanged in the divine mind. Therefore if we say that the intellectual soul knows everything in the divine ideas, we revive the opinion of Plato who held that all knowledge is derived from Ideas.

On the other hand, there is Augustine’s saying,5 If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see it? Certainly I do not see it in you, nor you in me, but both in the unchangeable truth itself, which is above our minds. But the unchangeable truth is contained in the divine ideas. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all truths in the divine ideas.

1 Cf. 1a. 12, 11 ad 3. 2 De mystic. theol. 3. PG 3, 1001. 3 Romans 1: 20. 4 Lib. 83 quœst. 46 PL 40, 30. 5 Confessions XII, 25. PL 32, 840. MP_C10.qxd 11/17/065:27PMPage88

LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY 88 the divineideasarecontained. tual lightinusisnothingmorethanaparticipatinglikenessoftheuncreatedwhich in thedivineideas,andthatbyparticipationthemweknoweverything.Forintellec- light areseeninthesun.Inthissensewemustsaythathumansoulknowseverything in anotherasaprincipleofknowledge;forinstance,wemightsaythatthingsseenbysun- in Goddothusknoweverythingthedivineideas.Secondly,athingisspokenofasknown thing inthedivineideas;onotherhand,blessedwhoseeGodandeverythingelse images arereflectedthere.Inthissensethesoul,initsearthlystateoflife,cannotseeevery- first, asinanobjectitselfknown,forinstance,whenonemayseeamirrorthingswhose ideas?, thereplymustbethatonethingcanspokenofasknowninanothertwoways: to them. formed accordingtothese,andinadditionthehumansoulknowseverything Ideas whichPlatopositedtheideasofallcreaturesexistingindivinemind.Allthingsare the Ideassufficedforknowledge.AndsoAugustineasks, cipation inthedivineideaswaywhichPlatonistsheldthatmereparticipation are requiredforourknowledgeofmaterialthings,wedonothavethismerelybyparti- thing ismadeknowntous. light ofyourface,Lord,issigneduponus Reply or out allthesethingsthroughtheactualhistoryofplacesandtimes many kindsofanimalsthereare,whataretheseedseachintheir beginnings?Havetheynotsought ideas thatareeternal,theythereforeabletoseeclearlyintheseideas,orcollectfromthem,how dispute mosttruly,andpersuadeusbycertainproofs,thatallthingstemporalaremadeafter are creativesubstances(accordingtoDionysius and withoutmatter–asthePlatonistsheld,sayingthat‘lifesuch’‘wisdom seems alientotheFaiththatformsofthingsshouldsubsistthemselves,outside of stone,so,byparticipationinthesameIdea,ourintellectsknowstone.However,sinceit participation inthem;thus,ascorporealmatterbecomesstonebytheIdea arate frommatter.HecalledtheseIdeasandsaidthatourintellectsknoweverythingby ent withtheFaithheacceptedit,butamendedwhatfoundhostile. in thedoctrinesofPlatonists,wheneverhefoundanythingtheirstatementsconsist- careful toavoidwhenwerenouncethesocietyofpagans of thedoctrinespagansarespuriousimitationsorsuperstitiousinventions,whichwemustbe true andconsistentwithourfaith,wemustclaimitfromthemasunjustpossessors.Forsome 10 6 7 Psalms4:6–7. 9 8 Many say:Whowillgiveussightofhappiness Thus whenthequestionisasked:Doeshumansoulknoweverythingindivine Nevertheless, sincebesidestheintellectuallightwhichisinus,speciestakenfromthings Moreover, thatAugustinedidnotunderstandeverythingto beknown Now Plato,aswassaidabove,heldthattheformsofthingssubsistthemselvessep- in theunchangeabletruth De Trinitate De doctrinachristiana De divinisnominibus Lib. : AsAugustinesays, 83 quœst IV . 46. , 16. PL PL 11. 40, 30. II 42, 902. , 40. 6 PG If thosewhoarecalledphilosopherssaidbychanceanythingthatwas in thesensethatdivineideasthemselveswereseenis clear PL 3, 956. 34, 63. lect. , asiftosay,bythesealofdivinelightinusevery- 6. ? 9 and thePsalmistrepliestoquestion, 7 ) –Augustinesubstituted . AccordinglyAugustine,whowassteeped ? 10 For pray,becausephilosophers 8 in thedivineideas in placeofthese The MP_C10.qxd 11/17/065:27PMPage89 of thedivineideas, For Augustinesays 2cf 12 11 The firstpoint from senseimages? Article 1.Doesourintellectunderstandmaterial,corporeal realitiesbyabstraction there areeightissuesfordiscussion: Next tobeconsideredarethemodeandorderofunderstanding,withrespectthese Part I,Question85.TheModeandOrderofUnderstanding 4Cf.1a.12,4, 14 13 than asitreallyisthenheinerror.Buttheformsofmaterial thingsarenotabstract,set eal realitiesbyabstractionfromsenseimages.Forifoneunderstands anobjectotherwise from whathewrites, in images,evenwhenthethingsarenotpresenttosenses ceived ing, andthiswithoutanylapseoftime;butifsomethingdoesnotremainthesame,itcannotbeper- he provesthisintwoways.First,fromthefactthat The firstpoint Article 6.Isintellectualknowledgetakenfromsensiblethings? from thesenses. ledge doesapprehendthetruth.Thereforeintellectualknowledgeshouldnotbelookedfor selves orfalseimages,andnothingcanbeperceivedwhichisindistinguishablefromwhat Yet wecannotdistinguishbymeansofthesenseswhetherareperceivingsensiblethingsthem- From allthistherepliestoobjectionsareevident. He thusconcludesthattruthcannotbeexpectedfromthesenses.Butintellectualknow- .whetherourintellectknowstheindivisiblebeforedivisible. 8. whether,withrespecttothesamereality,onecanhaveabetterunderstandingthan 7. whethertheintellectcanbeinerror; 6. whetherourintellectunderstandsbycombiningandseparating; 5. whetherourintellectcanunderstandmorethanonethingatatime; 4. whetherourintellectnaturallyunderstandsfirstthemoreuniversal; 3. whetherthespeciesabstractedfromimagesarerelatedtoourintellectas 2. whetherourintellectunderstandsbyabstractingspeciesfromsenseimages; 1. Lib. Lib . Secondly,fromthefactthat De veritate another; understood oras . 83 83 quœst quœst : : 12 14 1. Itwouldseemthatintellectualknowledgeisnottakenfromsensiblethings. 1. Itwouldseemthatourintellectdoesnotunderstandmaterial andcorpor- . 9. . 46. X CG , 6. 13 , PL but onlyonethatispureandholy PL II Quodl 11 that , 77. 40, 13. Not anyandeveryrationalsoulcanbecalledworthyofthatvision 40, 30. that whereby we cannotexpecttoacquirethepuretruthfromcorporealsenses . In Meta VIII , 2,1. . II , lect.1. Compend. Theol everything thatwesensebymeansofthebodyalsoreceive things areunderstood; [...] . 81. – suchasarethesoulsofblessed. whatever acorporealsenseattainsischang- ( as forinstanceinsleeporarange what , namely , and is . ). 89 THOMAS AQUINAS ON ILLUMINATION VS. ABSTRACTION MP_C10.qxd 11/17/065:27PMPage90

LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY 90 On theotherhand abstracting them. Reply set apartfrommatterandmateriallikenessessuchassenseimages. being understood 7Ibid 17 16 the intellectbysenseimages. by wayofsomethingbeingabstractedfromsenseimages,butanimpressionmadeon but bycoloursbeingimpressedonthesight.Neither,therefore,doesunderstandinghappen that colourhastosight.Butseeingdoesnottakeplacebyabstractingimagesfromcolours, 01a.76,1. 20 1a.84,7. 19 Ibid 18 15 thing whichinfactexistsindividuatedmatter,butnotas existinginsuchormatter matter, yetnotpreciselyasexistinginsuchorindividual matter.Nowtoknowsome- Accordingly, itisproperfortoknowformswhich,infact, existindividuallyincorporeal images. of streamingouttothem.Thereforeinnowaydoweunderstandbyabstractingfromsense that lighthastocolours,whichisnotofabstractinganythingfromcoloursbutrather it seemtobethefunctionofagentintellect:hassamerelationsenseimages ing speciesfromimagesbutofreceivingalreadyabstracted.Neither,however,does possible andtheagentintellects.Butfunctionofintellectisnotthatabstract- the particular,whichissameasabstractingspeciesfromsenseimages. viduation. Thereforematerialthingscannotbeunderstoodbyabstractingtheuniversalfrom material thingscannotbeunderstoodwithoutmatter.Butmatteristheprincipleofindi- nothing canbeunderstoodwithoutsomethingwhichisrequiredforitsdefinition.Hence abstraction speciesfromsenseimages,ourintellectwillbeinerror. apart fromtheparticularsrepresentedbysenseimages.Thereforeifweunderstandin faculty ofthesoulwhichisformabody,asclear fromwhatwassaidearlier. something immaterial,namelyeitherinthemselvesorGod. sisting withoutmatter,foralthoughangelscanknowmaterialthings,theyseethemonlyin joined tocorporealmatter;suchisanangel’sintellect.Accordingly,itsobjectaformsub- faculties ofthesensepartmanonlyknowparticulars. corporeal matter,andso,sincethissortofmatteristheprincipleindividuation,all eal organ:suchissense.Accordingly,theobjectofeverysensefacultyaformexistingin are threelevelsofsuchfaculties.First,onekindcognitivefacultyistheformacorpor- 4. Again,asAristotlesays, 5. Again,Aristotlesays 3. Again,Aristotlesays 2. Again,materialthingsarenaturalthings,requiringmatterintheirdefinition.Now The humanintellectstandsinthemiddle.Itisnotformofanorgan,althoughita A secondkindofcognitivefacultyisneithertheformacorporealorgannorinanyway De Anima De Anima : Aswassaidearlier, III III , 4.429b21. , 7.431b2. III III , 5.430a14. , 7.431a14. . Thereforematerialrealitiesmustbeunderstoodpreciselyasabstractedor , Aristotlesays 19 15 17 knowable objectsareproportionedtoknowingfaculties,andthere that senseimageshavethesamerelationtointellectualsoul that theintellect 16 in theintellectualsoultherearetwofaculties:namely, 18 that as realitiesareseparablefrommatter,soisitwiththeir thinks theformsinimages . Nottherefore,by 20 MP_C10.qxd 11/17/065:27PMPage91 individual sensiblematter,butnotfromcommonmatter. Thusitabstractsthespecies vidual common ral things. part ofthespecies;butifthiswereso,matterwouldnotbe includedindefinitionsofnatu- 2Asanincidentalcharacteristic, 22 1a.84,1. 21 ial Ideas,andthatweunderstand,ashavementioned, the factthatitissomehowjoinedtoabody,heldobjectofintellectimmater- realities, justas,inthecontraryway,angelsknowmaterialrealitiesbywayofimmaterial. say thatourintellectunderstandsmaterialthingsbyabstractionfromsenseimages. is toabstractaformfromindividualmatter,representedbysenseimages.Thuswehave in amaterialway,accordingtothemodeofreality. one whounderstandsinanimmaterialway,accordingtothemodeofintellect,andnot understands isdifferentfromthemodeofexistinginthing–aunderstood the oneunderstanding.Forthereisnofalsityifmodeofunderstandinginwho would understandittoexistapartfrommatter,asPlatoheld. standing wouldbefalseifoneshouldsoabstractthespeciesofstonefrommatterthathe standing isfalsewheneveroneunderstandsathingtobeotherthanitis;hencetheunder- than asitis,thestatementistrueif‘otherthan’referstothingunderstood.Forunder- without consideringindividuatingconditionsrepresentedbysenseimages. versal fromtheparticular,ideasenseimages,toconsidernatureofaspecies are nopartofthedefinitionspecies.AndthisiswhatImeanbyabstractinguni- for instancestoneormanhorse,canbeconsideredwithoutindividuatingconditionswhich the applebeingunderstood. definition ofcolour,andthusnothingpreventscolourfrombeingunderstoodapart the opinionorstatementwouldbewithoutfalsehood.Forbeinganappleisnotpartof tion oftheapplewhichhascolour,andgoontoexpressverballywhatwethusunderstand, statement. Whereaswerewetoconsidercolouranditsproperties,withoutanyconsidera- coloured body,orthatitexistsapartfromit,therewouldbefalsehoodintheopinion sensible realities.Forexample,weewetounderstandorsaythatcolourdoesnotexistina not abstractiswithoutfalsehood,itinthesecondway,asclearlyappearswith at all. simple andabsoluteconsideration,aswhenweunderstandonewithoutconsideringtheother when weunderstandonenottobeinanotherorseparatefromit;two,bywayofa cipation inabstractentities. Another wayofspeakingisthusrequired,distinguishingbetween twokindsofmatter, Now Plato,payingattentiononlytotheimmaterialityofhumanintellectandnot Through materialthingsknowninthiswaywecometoalimitedknowledgeofimmaterial 2. Somehavethoughtthatthespecies The proposition,however,wouldnotbetrueif‘otherthan’weretakenasreferringto Therefore whenitissaidthatunderstandingfalse,whichunderstandsathingother I claimlikewisethatwhateverpertainstothedefinitionofanyspeciesmaterialreality, And soalthoughfortheintellectinfirstwaytoabstractobjectswhichrealityare Hence: 1.Abstractionoccursintwoways:one,bywayofcombiningandseparating,as this fleshandthesebones.Theintellectabstractsthespecies ofanaturalthingfrom and designated or individual: common accidens 22 or ‘accident’. of anaturalthingisallform,thatmatternot would be,forinstance,fleshandbones, 21 not byabstraction,butparti- indi- 91 THOMAS AQUINAS ON ILLUMINATION VS. ABSTRACTION MP_C10.qxd 11/17/065:27PMPage92

LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY 92 31a.84,7. 23 to senseimages,asmentionedbefore. since itcannotunderstandeventhethingsfromwhichabstracts specieswithoutturning natures ofthingsasuniversal–andyet,atthesametime,understands theseinsenseimages, these naturesthatthepossibleintellectisinformed. we canconsiderspecificnatureswithoutindividuatingconditions, anditisbylikenessesof ual part.Theagentintellect,moreover,abstractsspeciesfrom images,inthatbyitspower them, justasman’ssensepartreceivesheightenedpowerfrombeingjoinedtohisintellect- agent intellect,arerenderedapttohaveintellectualintentionsorspeciesabstractedfrom are abstractedfromthem.Theyilluminatedbecausesenseimages,bythepowerof the wayinwhichabodyistakenfromoneplaceandtransferredtoanother. that existedbeforeinthesenseimages,shouldnowcometoexistpossibleintellect be abstractedfromsenseimages,andnotasthoughaform,numericallythesameone intellect, butonlywithrespecttothespecificnature.Anditisthusthatspeciesaresaid turn, representtherealitiesofwhichtheyareimages),alikenessiseffectedinpossible intellect. said. Consequently,theycannot,oftheirownpower,makeanimpressiononthepossible have thesamemodeofexistenceashumanintellect–isobviousfromwhathasbeen on thecontrary,sincetheyarelikenessesofindividualsandexistincorporealorgans,donot the facultyofsight.Consequently,theycanimpresstheirlikenessonSenseimages, ity asabstractentities. above, heldthatallthethingswehavespokenofasabstractedbyintellectexistinreal- even fromcommonintelligiblematter,asisevidentinimmaterialsubstances. is toabstractthemfromindividualintelligiblematter. intelligible matter–thoughtheycanbeconsideredapartfromthisorthatsubstancewhich some from sensiblematter.Theycannot,however,beconsideredapartanunderstandingof – canbeconsideredapartfromsensiblequalities,andthisispreciselytoabstractthem do. Hencequantities–numbers,dimensions,shapes(whichareboundariesofquantities) ing quantity.Nowitisobviousthatquantityinheresinsubstance,beforesensiblequalities – hotandcold,hardsoft,etc.whereas intelligible matter individual andcommon the intellectfromfleshandbonesassuch. fore canbeconsideredwithoutthem.However,thespeciesofmancannotabstractedby nature –theyare,rather,asAristotlesays,partsoftheindividual.Thespecificthere- of manfromthisfleshandtheseboneswhichdonotpertaintothedefinitionspecific 5. Ourintellectbothabstractsspeciesfromsenseimages – insofarasitconsidersthe 4. Senseimagesareilluminatedbytheagentintellectandfurther,itspower,species However, invirtueoftheagentintellectandbyitsturningtosenseimages(which, 3. Colours,asexistinginindividualcorporealmatter,havethesamemodeofexistence Plato, however,sincehegavenoconsiderationtothetwomodesofabstractionmentioned Finally, somethings–suchasbeing,oneness,potentialityandactuality,etc.canbeabstracted Mathematical species,ontheotherhand,canbeabstractedbyintellectfromboth substance asunderlyingquantity–whichwouldbetoabstractthemfromcommon . For sensible matter sensible matter means corporealmatterasunderlyingsensiblequalities 23 – though not from common (but onlyindividual) – thoughnotfromcommon(but intelligible matter means substanceasunderly- MP_C10.qxd 11/17/065:27PMPage93 that which theysaidwerethingsactuallyunderstood.) (It mayberecalledhowthePlatonistsheldthatallsciencesareconcernedwithIdeas, cerned withthingsexistingoutsidethesoul,butonlyspeciesinsoul. only speciesexistinginthesoul,itwouldfollowthatnoneofsciencesbecon- stand arethesameasobjectsofscience.Therefore,ifthingsweunderstandwere received init.Thus,againaccordingtothisopinion,thesespeciesare to thisopiniontheintellectunderstandsonlywhatisexperiencedwithinit,i.e.,species them, forinstance,thatthesensesperceiveonlyimpressionsmadeontheirorgans.According Reply understands. 26 The firstpoint 7Aristotle, 27 Cf. 25 possibility tobederivedfromotherdoctrinesthatwerebeingheld. by someofStThomas’scontemporaries,otherwiseunidentified; orelseheraisesthequestionasa likely thatthearticleistobeexplainedhistoricallyinoneoftwo ways.Eithertheopinionwasheld in averylimitedway)toPlato.Sincethesehistoricalattributionsare veryuncertain,however,itseems the ideato‘ancients’,atermusuallyreservedforPresocratics, andtoalesserextent(andonly of ourknowledgeareideasorimagesimpressedonthemind knower.Heimplicitlyattributes StThomasisnowturningtoaconsiderationof‘representationalism’ –thetheorythatobjects 24 be true.Forifafacultyknowsonlywhatisexperiencedwithinit,thatitcan the speciesmentioned. sion thatwhatisactuallyunderstoodintheintellect,andthusitnothingotherthan material, nothinginthemcanbewhatisactuallyunderstood.Thereforeitfollowsbyexclu- exist. Butitdoesnotexistinanythingoutsidethesoul,for,sincethingssoulare Therefore thisspeciesiswhatactuallyunderstood. understood thereisnothingintheintellectwhichunderstandsexceptabstractedspecies. one whounderstands;itis,infact,identicalwiththeintellectasactualized.Butofthing tion toourintellectas intellect aswhatisunderstood? Article 2.Dospeciesabstractedfromsenseimagesstandinrelationtoour senses. Butsensibleimagesarenot On theotherhand understood. stand. Thereforethingsexperiencedinthesoul,namelyspecies,areactually But wordssignifythingsunderstood,sinceweusepreciselytowhatunder- takes place.Thereforethespeciesisnot Second, becauseaconsequencewouldbetheerrorofancientphilosopherswhosaid The opinion,however,isobviouslyfalsefortworeasons.First,becausethethingsweunder- 3. Again,Aristotlesays 2. Again,whatisactuallyunderstoodmustexistinsomething,orelseitwouldsimplynot Peri Hermeneias all appearancesaretrue : Somehaveheldthatourcognitivefacultiesknowonlywhatisexperiencedwithin De veritate : Metaphysics 25 1. Itwouldseemthatspeciesabstractedfromsenseimagesdostandinrela- , aspecieshasthesamerelationtointellectassensibleimage X , 9, I , 1.16a3. CG that which III IV , 5.1009a8. 26 , 11. , 27 that implying thatcontradictoryopinionscouldatthesametime In Deanima 24 spoken wordsarethesymbolsofthingsexperiencedinsoul is understood.Forwhatactuallyunderstoodexistsinthe what what is sensed;theyarerather III , lect is understood,but . 8. that bywhich that bywhich what is understood. the intellect sensation . 93 THOMAS AQUINAS ON ILLUMINATION VS. ABSTRACTION MP_C10.qxd 11/17/065:27PMPage94

LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY 94 solid materials–accordingtoAristotle’steaching, means ofsolidswithinit,etc.Thusifweunderstandthespeciesasolidinsteadactual 8Aristotle, 28 sight seesthecolourofanapplebutnotitscharacteristic scent. Thusifoneasks:Where the intentionofuniversality)existinintellect. are applied,existsonlyinindividuals,whereas‘beingunderstood’ and‘beingabstracted’(or nature, towhich‘beingunderstood’andabstracted’ (or theintentionofuniversality) are two,namely,thenatureofathinganditsstateabstraction oruniversality.Thusthe is understoodandthebeingunderstood.Andlikewisein term‘abstracteduniversal’there a likenessofit. does notfollowthatanabstractedspeciesiswhatactuallyunderstood,butonlyit lect, justasalikenessofsensiblerealityistheformsensewhenactualized.Henceit intellect asactualized,insofaralikenessofthethingunderstoodisformintel- This isthemeaningofsayingthatwhatactuallyunderstoodidenticalwith outside thesoul. soul butitsform intellect understands.Tomakethematterclear:althoughtherearetwokindsofactivity to truth. follow thateveryopinion–andindeedperceptionofanykindhasanequalclaim ment willbetrue.Foreachmakeshisjudgmentassenseoftasteisaffected.Itthus Similarly, ifasickman,whosesenseoftasteisaffected,experienceshoneyasbitter,hisjudg- a manwhosesenseoftasteishealthydiscernsthathoneysweet,hisjudgmentwillbetrue. cerns, namely,whatisexperiencedwithinit,andaccordinglyeveryjudgmentwillbetrue. Therefore thediscernmentofacognitivefacultywillalwaysjudgethingtobewhatitdis- discern. Nowathing‘appears’inaccordwiththewaycognitivefacultyisaffected. 9Aristotle, 29 like isknownby species isalikeness. that whichisunderstood.Butwhatunderstoodfirsttherealityofaparticular own understandingandthespeciesbywhichitunderstands.Thusaresecondarily form accordingtowhichtheintellectunderstands. the facultyofsightsees,andlikewisealikenessthingunderstood,i.e.,species,is proceeds isalikenessoftheobject.Thusitaccordingtovisiblethingthat heated), soalso,inasimilarway,theformfromwhichanactivityremainingwithinagent is liketheobjectofactivity(forinstance,heataheaterthatthing a form.Nowjustastheformfromwhichanactivityextendingtothingoutsideproceeds into athingoutside(e.g.,heatingorcutting)–neverthelesseachisproducedinaccordwith one thatremainswithintheagent(e.g.,seeingorunderstanding),andpassesover 0Ibid 30 We canmoreeasilyseethisbycomparisonwiththesenses. Forinstance,thesenseof 2. Thephrase‘whatisactuallyunderstood’involvestwopoints:namely,thethingwhich Hence: 1.Whatisunderstoodintheonewhounderstandsbymeansofitslikeness. We mustsay,therefore,thatspeciesstandinrelationtotheintellectas For instance,ifthesenseoftasteperceivesonlywhatisexperiencedwithinit,thenwhen This is,infact,alreadyevidenttheopinionofancientphilosopherswhoheldthat However, sincetheintellectreflectsuponitself,bysuchreflectionitunderstandsbothits III , 8.431b29. Metaphysics De Anima – itwillfollowthatbymeansofspeciesthesoulknowsthingswhichare . 29 For theyheldthatthesoulwouldknowsolidsareoutsideitby I , 2&5.404b17;409b25. VIII , 8.1050a23. 30 it isnotthestonewhichpresentin that bywhich 28 the – MP_C10.qxd 11/17/065:27PMPage95 singulars, therefore act, sinceactivitiesareofindividuals.Thereforeourintellect knowsthesingular. practical intellectmustknowsingulars. our intellectknowsthissingular,forinstanceSocrates. tion, a combinationknowsthetermsincombination.Butourintellectcombina- 1Cf. 31 The firstpoint Article 1.Doesourintellectknowsingulars? this regardtherearefourpointsofinquiry: What ourintellectknowswithrespecttomaterialrealitiesisnextbeconsidered,andin Material Realities Part I,Question86.WhatourIntellectKnowswithRespectto individuationis things whichtheintellectformulatesforitselfinordertounderstandoutside. ing. Thereforewordsdonotsignifytheeffectsproducedinpossibleintellectbutthose definition, andanenunciationorpropositionsignifiestheintellect’scombiningseparat- statement, whichisthensignifiedbywords.Thusthemeaninganamesignifies when itisthusinformed,formulateseitheradefinitionorelseanaffirmativenegative produced inthepossibleintellectsofarasitisinformedbyaspecies;andthen,secondly, never seen. of imaginationformulatesforitselfamodelsomethingabsentoreven change effectedbysensibleobjects.Theotheractivityisa‘formation’whichthefaculty change effectedfromoutside,thustheactivityofsensesisfullycarriedoutthrougha intellect wherethereisalikenessofthespecificnature,butnotindividuatingconditions. sequent intentionofuniversality)canbeattributedtohumanityonlyasperceivedbythe being apprehendedwithoutindividuatingconditions(i.e.,its‘beingabstracted’andthecon- is alikenessoftheonebutnotother. scent canbeattributedtoitonlywithrespectsight,insofarasthesenseofsightthere the colourseenexistsonlyinapple,butonotherthatbeingperceivedwithout does thiscolour,whichisseenapartfromthescent,exist?,itobvious,ononehand,that 4. Again,sinceahigherpowercandowhateverlowerone can,andthesensesknow 3. Again,ourintellectunderstandsitself.Butitissomething singularorelseitcouldnot 2. Again,sinceitisdirectiveofactivities,andactivitiesare concerned withsingulars,the Now bothoftheseactivitiesarejoinedintheintellect.For,first,thereisindeedaneffect 3. Inthesensepartofmantherearetwokindsactivity.Onetakesplacebywaya Similarly, humanity,whenunderstood,existsonlyinthisorthathumanbeing,butits .whetheritknowsthefuture. 4. whetheritknowscontingentthings; 3. whetheritknowstheinfinite; 2. whetheritknowssingulars; 1. Socrates isaman IV Sent . : 31 . 50,1,3. 1. Itwouldseemthatourintellectdoesknowsingulars.Forwhoeverknows a fortiori – itis,infact,itsfunctiontoformulatesuchaproposition. Therefore De veritate the intellectmustalso. II , 5–6; X , 5. In Deanima III , lect . 8. Quodl . XII , 8. De principio 95 THOMAS AQUINAS ON ILLUMINATION VS. ABSTRACTION MP_C10.qxd 11/17/065:27PMPage96

LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY 96 91a.12,1. 39 nothing wouldpreventaninfinityofbodiesfrombeingin one place.Butspeciesdoes intellect canknowtheinfinite. – forinstance,number,proportion,andshapehavenon-finitesub-classes.Thereforeour know allotherinfinitethings. 35 1a.84,7. 34 1a.85,1. 33 intellect –assaidbefore The reasonisthattheprincipleofsingularityinmaterialthingsindividualmatter,andour Reply the particularinorderofsense 8Cf. 38 36 32 The firstpoint Article 2.Canourintellectknowtheinfinite? way, whichistoknowtheuniversal. the sensesknowmateriallyandconcretelyintellectknowsinanimmaterialabstract intelligible. as animmaterialsingular–andtheintellectissuchthenithasnorepugnancetobeing it ismaterial–sinceonlytheimmaterialcanbeunderstood.Thusiftheresuchathing in thepracticalintellect. way thatitformulatestheproposition,‘Socratesisaman’. of thespecies,andsingulars(representedinsenseimages)onlyindirectly.Anditisthis On theotherhand 37 an apprehensionoftheparticularinsensepartman. universal argumentinthepracticalintellecthasnomotivatingforceexceptbymeansof position directly,butonlyontheassumptionofamediatingsingularproposition.Hence as Aristotlesays. stand bymeansofthemexceptareturntosenseimagesinwhichitunderstandsthespecies, infinite things.ButourintellectcanknowGod,assaidbefore. lar, because,asmentionedbefore, knowledge onlyofuniversals. But whatisabstractedfromindividualmatteruniversal.Thereforeourintellecthasdirect 3. Again,ifonebodydidnotexcludeanotherfromexisting inoneandthesameplace, 2. Again,ourintellectisbynatureabletoknowclassesandsub-classes.Butsome 4. Ahigherpowercandowhateveraloweronecan,butinsuperiorway.Thuswhat 3. Thesingular’srepugnancetobeingintelligibleisnotbecauseitsingular,but 2. Thechoiceofaparticularthingtobedoneis,asitwere,theconclusionsyllogism Hence: 1.Thefirstsolutionisevident. Therefore, inthissense,itistheuniversalthatintellectunderstandsdirectlybymeans Indirectly andbyaquasi-reflection,ontheotherhand,intellectcanknowsingu- De Anima Nicomachean Ethics Physics De Anima : Directlyandimmediatelyourintellectcannotknowthesingularinmaterialrealities. De veritate I , lect : III III 38 , 11.434a16. , 7.431b2. . 5.189a5. 1. Itwouldseemthatourintellectcanknowtheinfinite.ForGodexceedsall 35 , Aristotlesays II , 9. VII , 3.1147a28. 36 33 But asingularpropositioncannotbededucedfromuniversalpro- – understandsbyabstractingspeciesfromthissortofmatter. . 32 34 the even afterithasabstractedspeciescannotactuallyunder- the universalismoreknowableinorderofexplanation, 37 39 Therefore itcan, a fortiori , MP_C10.qxd 11/17/065:27PMPage97 intellect canknowtheinfinite. seem tobeaninfinitepower.Butpowerextendsthings.Thereforeour 01a.76,1. 40 knowledge oftheinfinitehabitually. more thanonething–habitually.Thereforenothingpreventsourintellectfromhavinga not preventanotherfromexistingatthesametimeinintellect,forwecanknow 4. Again,theintellect,sinceitisnotapowerofcorporealmatter(assaidbefore 40 ), would 97 THOMAS AQUINAS ON ILLUMINATION VS. ABSTRACTION