Document of The World Bank
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Report No. 5647
PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT
Public Disclosure Authorized TUNISIA
SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 1188-TUN)
Public Disclosure Authorized May 9, 1985
Public Disclosure Authorized Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office
Tib docummthas a resbiced distIbudtn _d my be used by rcipkints only the performane of |dherofficid duiltb cotets may not otherwise be i dcosed witht World Bank anlhorltion. I FOR OMCIL USE ONLY PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT
TUNISIA
SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - LOAN 1188-TUN
Table of Contents
Page No.
Preface...... (i) Basic Data Sheets...... (ii) Highlights ...... (iv)
I. Introduction. 1 II. ProjectPreparation and Appraisal. 2 III. Project Implementation. 4 IV. Project Cost and Disbursements.10 V. Institutionaland OperationalDevelopment .12 VI. EconomicReevaluation .13 VII. Role of the Bank.15 VIII. Conclusions.15
TABLES
1. Actual and Expected Project Implementation.17 2. .^:tualand Appraisal Estimatesof Project Cost.18 3. Actual and Expected Traffic.19 4. EstimatedVehicle OperatingCosts .20
ANNEXES
1. ImplementationChart. 21 2. DisbursementSchedule .22 3. Borrower Comments...... 23
MAP IBRD 11734 (PPA) Tunisia Second Highway Project
IThisdocument has a restricteddistribution andmay beused by recipientsonly in the performance | of their officialduties. Its contents may not otherwisebe disclosedwithout WorldBank authorization.
S (i)
PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT
TUNISIA
SECOND HrGHWAY PROJECT - LOAN 1188-TUN
PREFACE
This Project CompletionReport describes the preparationand implementationof the Second Highway Project in Tunisia, for which Loan 1188-TUNof US$28.0 million was made in December 1975. The loan was closed on September30, 1983.
The present report was preparedby the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office of the Bank on the basis of a review of the Bank files and the Borrowers'progress and completionreports.
In accordancewith the revised proceduresfor project performance audit reporting,this Project CompletionReport was read by the Operations EvaluationDepartment, but the project was not audited by OED staff. The draft Project CompletionReport was sent to the Borrower for comments; their comments are reproducedas Annex 3 to the report. (ii) ERaj=raETlDt REOR
S1=MD HIMMRWM - LON 1& BASIC DATA SHEET KEY1RQ3CT DaTA Appraial Actual or Iem Xcpectation Oxrent Eatimite
Tobtal Project Cost (US million) 52.3 46.8 Weri tX) /11/ loan/Credit hwmDt (US$ million) 28.0 28.0 Disbursed - 22.1 Carwelled 5.95 Pepaid to my 1984 - 2.58 outstandirg 25.42 Date Plysical Ox=nmts Obpleted 6/30/79 6/30/84 Proportion Coipleted by Above Date (%) 100 30 Propotion of ie Ix1erun or Ouerrun (Z) - 100 EcmammcRate of Return (%) 33 33
0TIM EJECT DAMTA Actual or Item r n Plan Rewisins Est. Actual
First Mntion in Files or Timetable - - 00/00/74/2 NegDtiations 10/28/75 / / 10/28/75 BDardApproval 12/18/75 / / 12/18/75 loan/Credit Agreent Date 01/26/76 / / 01/26/76 Effectiveness Date 04/26/76 05/26/76 06/16/76 Clasing Date 12/31/79 12/31/82 09/30/83 /3 Borrowier Governmet of ¶flisia thecuting Agency: Directorate of Public lWrks and Ministry of Tuansportatim and mnicaticns Fiscal Year of Borrower Jnuary 1 - December31 Fbllow-on Project Name Rral Radls Project toan/Credit Nxmber 1601-lUN hnmt (US$ million) 32.0 ldan/Credit Agement Date July 23, 1978
aMJIAXfl EMT,1MADANM ACIUAL DISBURSNEIS (US$'000)
FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 (a) Estinated 2,000 9,400 19,000 25,300 28,000 28,000 28,000 28,000 (b) Actual - - - 1,600 4,860 7,770 11,120 15,630 22,127 % of (b) to (a) 0 0 0 6 17 28 40 56 79
/1 Scope of project was changed. Due to dollar appreciation, there were both umderrmn in terms of dollar and overrm in termr of Inisian Dinar . /2 Project was based on pre-nvestment stidies finaoed uner First Hi*ay Project (ioan 746-WT) and implemented in 1973/75. /3 last disbursement was processed in lhy 1984. Kby 1984, Doc. 2552R (iii)
PRw amlElMN RE
sij H?IA BM_ - IWN 188lU
~fasion Data Date lo. of ND. Of Staff of ken Semth, YBw weeks Persoa Wees A Pt fReappraisal Hmzd1 06/74 and 09/74 1.5 2 3.0 10/18/74 Apaisal o 03/75 3.5 2 7.0 04/30/75 Ibtal 5.0 10.0
Siperi'ision I Hbiad 08/76 2.0 2 4.0 09/09/76 supeA,isi2 II " 05/77 o,.5 1 O.5 06/15/77 A&zrsisni III f 11/77 0.4 2 0.8 12/09/77 &apervision IV t 03/78 0.6 2 1.2 09/22/78 a*pervision v " 11/78 0.6 2 1.2 L2/15/78 Siperviion VI it 04/79 1.0 3 3.0 04/30/79 Saervision Vl to 07/79 0.5 2 1.0 07/17/79 Spevision VIII " 10/79 0.2 2 0.4 11/02/79 5*pervision IX g0o/80 1.4 1 1.4 02/27/80 S sperviionX 04/80 1.0 1 1.0 05/05/80 Sipeuvision xi o 07/80 0.4 2 0.8 08/01/80 Sipervisimoi It 09/80 0.3 2 0.6 10/20/80 Szpervision XIII " 02/81 0.2 2 0.4 03/10/81 &aperision XIV " 05/81 0.6 2 1.2 05/28/81 Supervision x " 11181 0.4 2 0.8 12/07/81 Sxperviision XVI G. de 1atcna 05/82 0.6 2 1.2 05/21/82 &pwvision Vn G. de Mtons 09/82 0.6 3 1.8 10/06/82 Sfpervision XVIII G. de 14tons 02/83 0.2 1 0.2 03/17/83 S.pervision DEX G. de Mbtons 05/83 0.2 3 0.6 06/22/83 Total 11.7 22.1
axNM E^N RAM
Mbmeof hrreny Imisian Dinar (DT) praisal year awerage EDwhgerate: UJSUl- DT 0.385 ntervn years (cnstructton period) U$1 DET0.555 Qmuletidn year average USl =-DT 0.70
11 All Supervisimi missions were imde in cijmictia wit preparation, appraisal, and stpervisian for follow-up projects. As a result, the mnber of nmrweeksallocated for supervision of lomn 1188-8un is estiamted.
Nky 1984, Ibc. 2552R (iv)
PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT
TUNISIA
SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - LOAN 1188-TUN
HIGHLIGHTS
The objectivesof the Second Highway Project were to reduce transportationcosts on a number of roads by improvementof primary and secondaryroads and constructionof bypasses of towns totalling225 km; to assist in transportationplanning by updating the 1968 transportsurvey; and to foster rural developmentthrough preparationof a rural roads improvement program (para. 1.04).
Overall, the project achieved well its objectives. 264 km of highways were rehabilitated(instead of 225 km foreseen)at an average cost which correspondedwell with what estimatedat appraisal. Traffic increase on the project roads was substantiallyhigher than foreseen. The project's reevaluatedIRR is above 33%. Substantialprogress in institutionaland operationaldevelopment was achieved (paras.6.02-6.03 and 5.02-5.03).
The project was appraisedin May 1975 on the basis of feasibility studiesand detailed engineeringprepared under the First Highway Project. The list of possible project componentsinitially identified included constructionof the Tunis-Turkiexpressway, the Bizerte bridge, highway modernization,a road maintenanceprogram and consultancyservices with a total estimatedcost of about US$137 million. The foreign cost component was estimatedat US$75 million. The Bank lendingprogram allocationfor the projectwould cover only about a third of this amount. Two issues had to be clarified:availability of other external financingfor part of the foreign cost and availabilityof counterpartfunds (para. 2.02).
The Government resolved these issues by securing Kuwait Fund (KF) financingof the expresswayand Bizette bridge as a separat-eproject and providingadequate counterpartfunds in the investmentbudget (para. 2.03).
However, the budgeted funds were not released in sufficient amounts for payments to both the Bank and KF financed projects. The Government gave priority to constructionof the expresswayand Bizerte bridge. After the initialprocurement of about 30% of the Second Highway Project civil works, the start of the remainingworks was delayed by three years. The project was completedin early 1984 while at appraisal the completionwas scheduled for 1979. The substantialdelays have also contributedto the large undisbursed loan balance, US$5.9 million. The causes of this balance are (i) US dollar appreciationand (ii) miscellaneousreasons among which non-paymentto contractors. Both causes are strongly tied to the delays experienced (paras.5.04, 3.16 and 4.09). - v -
The studies included in the projectwere completed,albeit with some delays, and contributedto a better understandingof the need for transportationplanning and coordination. The rural roads program was prepared according to schedule, leading to an early appraisal of the Third Highway Project (paras.3.13, 3.14 and 3.15).
Points of particularinterest highlightedin the project completion report are:
(i) problems in project implementationdue to shortage of counterpart funds (para. 5.04);
(ii) the importanceof timely acquisitionof right-of-wayand updated designs, coherentwith actual urban developmentand plans for town bypasses (para. 3.22); and
(iii) the advantageof preparing follow-upprojects under ongoing projects (para. 2.01). - 1 -
PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT
TUNISIA: SECONDHIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN1188-TUN)
I. INTRODUCTION
1.01 The highway network in Tunisia consists of 17,500 km of classified roads, of which half have bituminous surfacing, and about 30,000 km of unclassifiedtracks. Road density is high in the coastal area of the northeastwhere more than half the population is concentrated. The railway system includes 1,900 km of standard and meter gauge lines and carries both freight and passengers. Roads carry about 90% of passenger traffic and 85% of freight trafficexcluding minerals. Road traffic growth during the 1970s has been about 15% per year, against rail traffic growth of 6% for passengers and 1% for freight.
1.02 Most of the road network was constructedseveral decades ago to accommodatelow traffic hours of light vehicles. The standards for alignment, width of pavement and pavement strength are inadequatefor today's higher and heavier traffic. Of the 9,000 km of paved roads, 60% have pavement of less than 5 m width, only 7% are surfaced with asphaltic concrete while the remainderare surface treated,40% carry over 750 vehicles per day (vpd), and 19% of traffic is composed of heavy vehicles.
1.03 Little if any road improvementwork was carriedout prior to 1970. The road system was evaluated in the 1968 Transport Survey carried out by ITALCONSULTunder a UNDP-financedproject. The survey was followed by the highway maintenancestudy (SCET-BCEOM)under the Highway Engineering Project, S2-TUN, 19o9, which formed the basis for the First Highway Project, Loan 746-TUN, 1971. This project covered mainly rehabilitationof about 1000 km of roads and 50 bridges, and was completed in 1978. It also included preinvestnentstudies for 350 km of road improvementand modernizationwhich were used for preparing the Second Highway Project. The rehabilitationand maintenanceprogram was resumed subsequentlyunder the Fourth Highway Project, Loan 1841-TUN,1980.
1.04 The Second Highway Project included improvementof 225 km of prioriLy sections identified in the First Project preinvestmentstudies, updating of the 1968 transportsurvey and preparationof a pilot rural roads program. The last item led to the Third Highway Project, Loan 1601-TUN,1978, consisting of improvementof about 1000 km of rural roads and the Fifth Highway Project, Loan 2108-TUN, 1982, which continued the rural roads constructionprogram. A Sixth Highway Project for modernizationof primary and secondary roads is now under preparation. It should be noted also that the Second Urban Transport Project of FY1984 includes constructionof the Tunis East bypass.
1.05 The above sequenceof projects fina.1cixgthe developmentof the highway network shows the continuityof the Bank's irterest in the Tunisian transport sector. Loans were provided also for ..ilways,ports and pipelines. TtheFirst Railway Project, Loan 61.,jCredit150-TUN, 1964, focussed on track renewal and purchaseof equipment ana was completed. Two port projects,Loan 380-TUN, 1964 and 573-TUN, 1969, were also completed. A Third Project, Loan 1797-TUN,is in progress. A gas pipelineproject, Loan 724-TUN, 1971, is completed. Total Bank lending for the transportationsector through FY 1984 is US$238.50 million. -2-
II. PROJECT PREPARATIONAND APPRAISAL
Preparation
2.01 The project was prepared through preinvestmentstudies carried out by consultantsBCEOM (France),SAUTI (Italy)and SETEC (France)under the First Highway Project. In April 1974 the Tunisian Ministry of Planning and the Bank agreed that the Second Highway Project would be included in the FY 1976 program. In September 1974 the project scope was broadly identified. The tentative list of contents included improvementof primaryand secondary roads, deferred road maintenance,rural roads, the Tunis-Turkiexpressway of 32 km, the 250 m long Bizerte bridge, updating of the 1968 transport survey and preinvestmentstudies.
Appraisal
2.02 The project was appraised in April 1975 on the basis of the tentative list and the available feasibilityand engineering studies. The preliminary estimate of the cost of all identifieditems was about US$137 million with a foreign exchange cost oE US$75 million. This raised concerns about availabilityof counterpart funds to finance such a large program within the normal project period of 3 to 4 years. The relative prioritieshad to be determinedand financingof the foreign cost component secured.
2.03 The discussionson the project contents and complementarystudies took several months. In the meantime the Governmentsecured financing from the Kuwait Fund for the Tunis-Turkiexpressway and the Bizerte bridge under a separate projectwhich was appraised in 1975. The deferred road Ziintenance was to be financed fully by budgetaryallocations. The rural roads program was limited to a study for preparationof a pilot project for future Bank financing (Third Highway Project, para 1.04).
2.04 The componentsof the Second Highway Project were finally agreed in August 1975 with a cost estimate of US$52 million and foreign cost of US$28 million. In 1976 the Governmentallocated in the developmentbudget an amount of DT 40 million (equivalentto about US$100 million) with the following distribution:
Tunis-Turkiexpressway DT 13.0 million Bizerte bridge DT 8.5 million Modernizationof 225 km of roads DT 18.0 million Consultingservices DT 0.5 million
2.04 The agreed project componentswere: -3-
A. Highway Improvements
Bypasses in Sousse, El Djem and SEax 44.4 km Improvement of Tunis-Bizerte road 57.7 km Improvement of Mornagbia-El Bab road 38.2 km Improvement of Hammamet-Korba road 37.7 km Improvement of Beja-Jendouba road 46.2 km
B. Consulting Services
(i) Updating of 1968 transport survey; (ii) Preparation of a pilot rural roads improvement project.
2.05 The project roads' design standards provided for a design speed of 100 km/h, 7 m wide carriageway and 3 m shoulders, maximum single axle weight of 13 ton and asphaltic concrete surfacing.
2.06 The project cost estimate and loan allocation were as follow:
Loan Cost Estiamiate Foreign Allocation Item DT US$ Cost Component US$
Highway improvements 13.09 34.00 53Z 18.00 Consulting services 0.44 1.14 70Z 0.80 Contingencies 6.60 17.16 54Z 9.20
Total 20.13 52.30 53.5% 28.00
Contingencies included 102 for quantities and 38? for price escalation. Price escalation was estimated on the basis of the construction time schedule (expected completion in 1979) and the prevailing inflation trends.
2.07 Negotiations took plaLxe in Washington from October 28 through October 31, 1975. The Government agreed to prepare by April 30, 1976, new regulations on taxation of road users and to put these regulations into effect by December 31, 1976. The Government agreed also to implement by December 31, 1978, equitable compensation of Public Transport Companies Lor losses due to reduced tariffs applicable to social services provided at the Government request. These Loan Agreement covenants were to implement the recommend-tions of studies carried out under the First Highway Project.
2.08 The loan of US$28 million with an interest rate of 8 1/2Z and maturity of 24 years including 4 years grace was approved by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors on December 18, 1975, signed on January 26, 1976 and declared effective on June 16, 1976. The agreed closing date was December 31, 1979. The executive agency for civil works and the rural roads study was the -4-
Directiondes Ponts et Chauss6es (DPC) of the Ministryof Public Works (MPW), while executingagency for the transportationstudy was the Ministry of Transportand Communications(MTC).
III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
A. Effectivenessand Start-up
3.01 The loan became effectiveon June 16, 1976, about seven weeks after the initialApril 26, 1976 deadline in the loan documents. This deadline had been prorogatedtwice, due to the delay of the ratificationof the Loan Agreementby the Tunisian Parliament.
3.02 The project started slowly. In 1976, DPC began the prequalification procedurefor contractors,but none of the five scheduledroad construction works was launched that year. The first road to be startedwas the Tunis-Bizertesection, in 1977, roughlyon schedule,and the second road was the Hammamet-Korbasection, in 1978, two years after the scheduleddate. The two studies also began late, but were completedbefore the end of 1979. All the other items were launchedonly after the closing date agreed upon in the loan documents.
3.03 Most of the engineeringstudies for the projectroads were completed by late 1975, at the time of the negotiations. The start-up problems encounteredart thereforeattributable to the lack of fui.,saccorded to MPJIby the Ministry of Finance. As is shown below (paras.3.18 and 4.08) this initialdelay *iasthe main cause of the discrepancybetween the appraisal disbursementschedule and the actual one. The problemof the non-availability of local funds for agreed upon componentswas repeatedlydiscussed between the Bank and the Ministry of Finance,but the funds were not made availableas foreseen.
B. Revisioi..in Civii Works
3.04 During implementationcertain revisions were made to the civil works. They can be divided into three categories:modifications brought to some operations,deletion of one item foreseen in the project, and addition of new works.
ModificationsBrought to some Operations
3.05 There were changes brought tc four operations:the Sousse bypass, the El Djem bypass, the GP5 road from Mornaghia to Medjez-el-Bab,and the Hammamet-Korbaroad. As regards the Sousse bypass, works could not respect the alignmentproposed in 1975, since at the time foreseen for constructionin 1980, this alignment had become a major city street througha built-up area. Thereforethe DPC proposed,and the Bank concurred,to undertakeconstruction of the alignmentfarther away from the city center; in fact, this new bypass surroundsthe cities of Sousse and Hammam-Sousse,between GP1 road at North and MC82 road at South. It is 14 km long and comprises4 large bridges and viaducts. The sections to be improved on GP1 have been reduced consequently, from 26.9 km to 18.3 km.
3.06 In El Djem, the alignmentwas too close to archaeologicalsites and to protect them the bypass has been redesignedfarther, thus increasingits length from 3.2 km to 4.7 km.
3.07 The GP5 section, planned as a two lane 6 m wide road, was widened to 7m, so it could be consistentwith the Tunisian design standardsestablished for primary roads and also correspondbetter to the expected increasing traffic; along with this change drainage has been improved on the existing alignmentas well as on the new section of Sidi-Mediene.
3.08 The Haumamet bypass was one element of a series of improvements planned for the MC28/MC27 road from Hammamet to Korba. It proved impossible to complete right-of-wayacquisition before the new loan closing date: funds were allocatedonly in 1981, and some oppositionstill remained in 1982/83for the availabilityof land. Although that operationwas reviewed thoroughlyby the DPC and the Bank missions, it could not be financed under this project. All the other elements of this item were completed.
Deletion of Item from the Project
3.09 Regardingthe Sfax bypass, preliminaryenquiries had shown that right-of-wayacquisition might cost about 6DT per mz in 1979, about six times the value estimatedin 1975. The DPC regarded such prices as excessive. As in Sousse, the close in alignmenthad beccme a major urban arterial. The DPC thereforecontemplated a future bypass on an alignment farther from the city center, and proposed the abandonmentof the Sfax bypass under this project. The Bank concurred.
Addition of New Operations
3.10 In September1981, the Tunisian Governmentmade the two following proposals to add new operations to the project, in substitutionfor those that were deleted: (i) rehabilitationand widening of a key sectionof the GPI between Sousse and El Djem (44 kIn);and (ii) constructionand rehabilitation of four bridges as part of the on-going improvementsto the GP6 road between Beja and Jendouba. The proposed improvementswere within the general descriptionof the project to support the Government'sprogram in "reducing transportationcosts on a number of more heavily traffickedroutes by constructingbypasses and upgrading the present facilitiesto modern two-lanes highways, thus providingreliable connectionsbetween major cities in the regions concerned."
3.11 Rehabilitationof the GPI sectionhad received high priority and bidding documentshad been prepared as part of the first-yearprogram under the Fourth Highway Project.
3.12 The four bridges on the GP6 road were studied in 1973 as part of the feasibilitystudies conducted during preparatiunof the Second Highway Project, and at that time the economic viability of constructiotnand rehabilitationwork was found to be marginal. However, with the increase in trafficand consideringthe poor physical conditionof the existing bridges, improvementsproved to be feasible 8 years later.
C. Revisions n Consulting S_ervices
3.13 The rural roads study began later than foreseen,June 1977 instead of March 19, 1976, due to delays in finalizingthe terms of referenceand in the bidding procedures. But once started, it was carried out normally and quickly by SECTEC-SOTUETEC,a French-Tunisiancompany.
3.14 There were some problems with the implementationof the review of the transportsurvey. The study was awarded ir.July 1978 insteadof August 1976 as foreseenand it got off to a slow start becausc of lergthyprocedures within the Ministry of Transport and Communication. ConsultantsLouis Berger Internationalsubmitted their draft report in May 1979. The Government and Bank felt it needed revision and expansion,and the consultantswere asked to: (i) develop an investmentprogram for the period up to 1986 for each mode, and (ii) make clear and specific recommendationson transportsystem improvements (road user charges, tariff levels, organizationand operation of transport companies). The final report submittedin December 1979 did not really, for lack of sufficientdata, develop all these points, especiallythe investment program. Another reason for the reduced scope of this study was that because of working conditionsand reorganization,the MTC has not been able to retain or recruita sufficient number of staff to be assigned to the study. As a result, the objectiveof initiatingthe "updatingof the transportsurvey on a continuingbasis" could not be reached under this project.
3.15 As several transport studies had been completedin 1979 (in particularthe SEMA Master Plan for Land Transport),and as the Governmentwas beginningpreparation of the Sixth DevelopmentPlan (1982-86),it requested Bank assistancein revi-wing studies and in drawing up an investmentprogram. The Bank concurredand agreed in early 1980 on the appointmentof consultants SETEC-ECONOMIEfor a Transport Sector Review Study, aiming at the following: (i) comparisonof basic data and assumptionsused in the Louis Berger and SEMA studies; (ii) recommendationsdrawn from both studies covering regulatory, fiscal and tariff matters, as well as transportinvestment guidelines; and (iii) proceduresto be used in preparing the investment programfor the Sixth Plan. This was to be based largely on a review of investmentsin the transportsubsectors, being prepared by the relevantmodal agencies themselves. This study was carried out quickly between March and August 1980, and although the invrestmexntprogram still suffered from lack of relevant data, the study proved to be a good basis for the work program of the Transport Planning Unit that MTC has now set up under the Fourth Highway Project. -7-
D. ImplementationSchedule
3.16 A detailed implementationschedule was met out in the appraisal report. On the whole, implementationwas expected to take place over four years,1975/79. This program implied that the availabilityof local fuids and the acquisitionof necessary rights-of-wayshould raisc no problem.
3.17 Table 1 and Annex 1, which give the actual and expected project implementationdata, show that:
(i) the overall implementationperiod lasted 8 years, from mid-1976 to mid-1984;
(ii) only two sections of civJl works (Hamniamet-Korbaand Tunis-Bizerte) were implementedduring thieperiod set forth in the loan agreement, and only one section (Tunis-Bizerte)was completed before the initial closing date (12/31/79);and
(iii) the two main studies were completcLdwitllin the initial period.
In fact, two different periods can be disLinguished in the actual project implementation. In the first period,which covers the first four years, implementationof major parts of the project was suspended because of financialconstraints. In December 1979, after the Bank having voiced its concern at several occasions, the Ministry of Planning gave a financial planning comnitnientwhich would permit constructionto begin on the remaining six items. The second period covers the period from this date till the end of the project.
3.18 Works on GP8 were the first to be undertaken, in early i977. Two sub-lots were completednearly on time: sub-lot 9A (km 14 - Km 25) and sub-lot 10 (km 0 - km 14). The third sub-lot 9B (km 25 - km 57.7) was completed in December 1980 with a 16 month delay, due essentially to scarcity of local funds which did not allow to keep a good pace. The second item was road MC27/MC28 (lot 6) which began only in April 1978 and encountered two kinds of problems:scarcity of funds, and bypassesalignment (finally the Hammamet bypass was not included in this contract). The works ended in October 1981 with a delay of 11 months.
3.19 For the first extension of the loan closing date (December31, 1979 to December 31, 1982), two conditionswere agreed upon, viz. the establishment of a satisfactoryfinancing and physicalexecution program, agreed upon in December 1979, and a new official schedule,as shown in Annex 1, which foresaw the completiondate for December 31, 1982. Although some additionaldelays still occurred (see below), the revised implementationschedule and financial plan agreed were substantiallyfollowed. The new problems encounteredwere:
(i) the contractoron lot 5 (GP5) went bankrupt 17 months after the beginning of works, and the contractwas cancelled in August 1982. Three subsequent sub-lots were awarded in the beginning of 1983, for the bridges on the new section (sub-lot 5A), the pavement on the existing section (sub-lot 5B), and the pavement on the now section (sub-lot 5C);
(ii) works on lot 7A (exLstingsection of Sousso bypass) and lot 11 (GP6) had to be partly redesigned,since the engineeringstudies, carried out in 1975, were obsolete in some points, poorer conditions than envisaged entailedan additional length to be improved, and alignment and drainage to be modified and improved;
(iii) the SEax and El Djem items were to be undertakentogether under lot B. When the right-of-wayissues in Sfax provoked the deletion of this item, the El Djem bypass was launched in September 1981 under lot 8A.
3.20 The schedule for the two new items included in late 1981, expected to be completedbefore the December 31, 1982 closing date, proved to be too optimistic:
(i) the rehabilitationand wideningof GPI between the Sousse and El Djem bypasses,both of which were being constructedunder the project, took place between September 1981 and February 1983;
(ii) all the four bridges on GP6 took longer than the six-month constructionperiod allowed. One of the contractorswas diverted from the works for an emergencyrepair to a bridge on another route where a pier had been washed out, and additionallyencountered a serious problem with the piles for one of the GP6 bridges due to insufficientsubsurface investigation. This required relocating the new bridge, and finally overallworks ended only in February 1984.
3.21 At the end of 1982, the projectwas prorogateda second time, for nine months to September 30, 1983. As demonstratedabove, this extension was still insufficientdue to optimistic assumptions. Although all works were committedby that date, the main works were only all completed in early 1984, and some outstandingminor works will be completed in June 1984. In view of the lengthyextensions already accumulateda further closing date extension beyond September 30, 1983 was not considered. However, the Bank agreed to continue honor disbursementrequests receivedup to March 31, 1984 related to commitmentsmade prior to the closing date.
3.22 In summary, the project suffereda time overrun of 100 percent, since the overall implementationneeded eight years instead of four. The main reason is that counterpartfunds to carry out the project were not made availableat the rate agreed at negotiations. We have assumed that this cause may explainan overall delay of two years (the implementationchart in Annex 1 shows that this is a realisticassumption). The remainingdelay of two years is explainedby two other causes: difficultiesin right-of-wayacquisition and alignmentproblems of bypasses:
- The First Highway Project (Loan 746-TUN)had already encountered right-of-wayproblems, and had shown that the original time - 9 -
schedule should have allowedabout one supplementalyear for making availablethe necessaryrights-of-way. This had not been taken into account in the Second Highway Project, since the appraisalschedule did not mention this point explicitly (see para. 3.17 above). The consequencesof these difficultiesare not only lengtheningthe time schedule,but also increasing project cost. Inflationand land speculationcaused right-of-way costs on some sections to greatlyexceed estimates,and since additionallocal funds were not availableto cover these extra costs, they entailed major implementationdifficulties.
- Several alignmentcorridors were studied for the main city bypasses. The DPC had a policy whereby the initial alignmentof the national highway .(GP)route through the city center would be replaced by a circumferentialbypass of small radius. This bypass would in its turn then be abandonedin favour of a larger radius beltway. This was consideredby DPC to be a contribution towardsstructuring the cities, which were always short of funds for major thoroughfareconstruction. The DPC thereforeopted for rather close in locationsfor the bypasses,which were in effect urban arterials,with dual roadways. At the time of construction,however, these close in alignmentshad become major city streets throughbuilt-up areas, and constructionhad to be undertakenon alignmentsfarther from the city center. To alleviate such issues in future projectswith main cities bypasses components,their design should take into account the time between design and implementationand ideallybe based on an up-to-dateurban master plan.
Reporting
3.23 The tirst progress report was related to the period July-September 1977 and was sent in February 1978. There were thirteenreports in total, and the last was received in August 1982, covering the period January-June1982. Althoughsome delays occurred,on the whole the reportingwas good as long as it lasted.
Procurement
3.24 Governmentprocedures for biddingand contractaward were good and no difficultywas experiencedregarding application of the Bank's I.C.B guidelines,except on two points. The first one was raised when the DPC, in connectionwith the new lot launched in late 1981 for the constructionof four bridgeson GP6, used limited local competitivebidding for the separate fabricationof steel pile casings for the bridge foundations. In view of the modest amount of the contractand the urgency of passing the contract to meet the constructionschedule of the main contractors,the Bank considered the procedurereasonable and approved the contract,as an exception,
3.25 The second procurementissue is related to the applicationof price variationformula. The TunisianGovernment admitted price escalation only on the dinar payable part of the contract,and the foreign currency labeled part - 10 -
had to stay fixed. The Bank, though aware of the possible distortionsof such procurementconditions, agreed to permit ongoing projects to continue to use the existing clauses. A firmer position of the Bank was expected to have led to substantialdelays of the project and was thereforenot adopted. A satisfactorysettlement of this issue has not yet been achieved.
3.26 Of the 14 lots for road improvement,10 were won by Tunisian contractors,2 by Italian,1 by French, and 1 by a French-Tunisianjoint venture. Both lots for major bridge constructionwere awarded to foreign contractors(I German and 1 French).
3.27 The consultingservices were procured following invitationsto a short list of 10 firms of Tunisian, Italian,French, American and German nationality. The selected firms were French-Tunisianand American.
Performanceof Participants
Consultants
3.28 The preinvestmentstudies for rural roads were satisfactorily completedby the joint venture SETEC-SOTUETEC. However, some problems arose with LBI's (Louis Berger International)study on transportcoordination, due to differing interpretationsof the terms of reference. A follow-upstudy, aimed at reviewing recent transportsurveys and drawing up an investment program for the transport sector was entrustedby the Government,with Bank's concurrence,to consultantsSETEC-ECONOMIE which successfullycompleted it.
Contractors
3.29 There were few major problems with contractorson the project, except for two: (i) EFFERT, in charge of works on GP5 road, went bankrupt in August 1981, thus contributingto the second extension of the loan closing date, and ii) IMPRESA PESSINA, whose quality of works on some sections of GP8 road was considered insufficientby DPC.
Government
3.30 Tunisian Highway Department staff carried out construction supervisionthroughout the project. Their performancewas satisfactory. Had the necessary funds been made available in a timely fashion to this technical department, it could have carried out the project at a rate nearer the one agreed at negotiations.
IV. PROJECT COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS
4.01 Details of actual costs, contractamounts and appraisalestimates are shown in Table 2. The dollar equivalencyhas been calculatedusing an exchange rate of US$1 = DT 0.385 for the appraisalestimate of costs (currency - 11 -
value as for April 1975), and US$1 * DT 0.555 Eor the actual costs (based on the actual expendituresand their repay dollar equivalency). In fact the last figure r*isksa broad spectrum of exchange rate, from 0.400 for the first withdrawal in August 1978, to 0.740 for the last one in May 1984.
4.02 The actual costs of civil works were 25.4 million dinars. The base estimate at appraisalfor equivalent road sections (allowingfor subsequent changes, i.e., the cancellationof Sfax and Hammamet bypasses) was 17 million dinars, thus leading to an overrun of 492. Of this, about 162 was due to changes in quantitieson initial list of works, and 332 came from additional works on GPl and GP6.
4.03 For the initial list of works, the actual costs as proportionof total contract amount is 1.42. This increase is due to physical contingencies by 112 and price escalationby 31X. This compares well with the appraisal assumptions,which were 102 for physical contingenciesand 38Z for price escalation. The major variationsconcerned three items:
. GP6 : quantities33X, price 50% * GP5 : quantities 45S, price 252 * PC : quantities23%, price 232
4.04 The total estimate for consulting services at appraisal was 0,650 million dinars, while the actual cost was 0,590 million dinars, thus showing a decrease of 9%. The main reason is the overestimationof the review of the transportsurvey, 254,000 dinars at appraisal,while the LBI study and the complementary SETEC review amounted to 200,000 dinars actually. The scope of the rural roads study was unchanged.
4.05 The strong appr'ciationof the US dollar (by an average b4Z over the project period) led to a general decrease of the actual dollar costs in comparison to the appraisalestimates in that currency. Thus, although change in overall scope of project provoked an overrun of 30% in terms of dinar, this resulted in an underrun of 11X when expressed in dollar.
Disbursements
4.06 The actual and forecast disbursementsare shown in the key project data table and in the graph of Annex 2. This graph shows also what would have been the actual disbursementsin case of a constant exchange rate equal to the appraisal rate. In total, 21 applicationswere submittedover 96 months, an average of 4.5 months between applications. The loan was closed on September 30, 1983.
4.07 The total project costs were US$46.8 million, of which the Bank financingof US$22.13 million represented47.3?, compared with the 53.5? estimated at appraisal. The uncommittedpart of the loan, cancelled in June 1984 (effectiveMay 28, 1984 the date of the last disbursementpayment), amounted to US$ 5,872,508.97. Assuming a constant exchange rate, the loan amount (US$ 28 million) would have been insufficientto cover the total consequentdisbursements (US$ 32.27 million). - 12 -
4.08 The rate of disbursementforcRecn at appraisalwas about US$ 7 million per year. As can be seen from Annex 2, a delay of about two years was establishedfrom the beginning of thc projcet. If one neutralizes these two years (the causes of which are explained in para. 3.23) then one can observe that on the remainingperiod of six years:
- the actual rate of disbursementIs 3.7 millions per year, about half of the appraisal rate, integratingboth delay in constructionschedule and exchangc rate variation;
- the currencyconstant value disbursement rate is 5.4 millTion per year, about 75S of the appraisal rate. This reduction representsthe actual delay due to a slower construction schedulc.
4.09 The unused amount of the loan, US$5,9 million, can be split into two main parts related to (i) works committedbut for which no withdrawalhas been made (ii) appreciationof the US dollar.
- The first part can be estimated to US$2.9 million (differencebetween the actual foreigncost of the project, US$25 million, and the total amount disbursed,US$22.1 million). This situation is due to (i) lagging payment to contractorsby the borrower; (ii) slow processing of disbursementrequests, resulting in the fact that by the loan closing date, a lot of commitmentseligible for financing under the loan could not be reimbursedfor lack of formal applicationwith the required documentation. In this respecta more intensiveuse of disbursementprocedure No. 3, allowing direct payments to suppliers or contractors,proved to be efficient. It was only in mid-1983 that this procedurewas used for the project and the positive effect of the accelerationof the disbursementsappears clearly in Annex 2; about one-thirdof of the total amount disbursedwas made following this procedure.
- The second part amounts to US$3 million (balance to reach the amount of the loan, US$28 million). This part is due to the strong dollar appreciation.
V. INSTITUTIONALAND OPERATIONALDEVELOPMENT
5.01 The 1968 TransportSurvey identifiedan absence of effective administrativestructure for intermodalcoordination in the transportsector and an excessivedegree of regulation. Followingthe study recommendations the Ministry of Transportand Communication(MTC), was created in 1974 and was subsequentlystrengthened under the Fourth Highway Project by the establishmentof a TransportPlanning Unit. The Second Project Loan Agreement included covenantsrequiring review of road user charges and regulationsand improvementof the financialbasis of public transportcompanies through compensationfor subsidizedservices. While the agreed target dates were not observed,the MTC did pursue the implementationof the covenants throughout - 13 -
the project period. The new road user charges regulationwas draftedand the status of transportcompanies reviewed. The parliamentrejected in 1982 the proposedregulations but work on revised regulationsis presentlyongoing. There was also substantialdevelopment in the nationaland regionalpublic transportationcompanies, which were allowed to merge and operatenationwide on a competitivebasis. The volume of services which did not cover their costs was reducedand a limitedcompensation for the relatedloss was provided. Most of the non-competitivepreferential tariffs were withdrawn.
5.02 Substantialprogress in institutionaland operationaldevelopment was achieved throughupdating of the TransportSurvey, the separate Land Transport CoordinationStudy carriedout for MTC by the consultantSEM and the synthesisof both studies by SETEC. The MTC staff secondedto this work, although insufficientin number,got on-the-job training,while the review of reports and discussionswith the consultantsand Bank staff clarifiedthe issues related to modal distributionof transport,tariffs, regulations and investmentprograms. Implementationof these studiesrevealed the weakness of the MTC structureand staffing and eventuallyled to the establishingof a TransportPlanning ULil Lnder the Fourth Highway Project.
5.03 The present organizationof DPC and divisionaland subdivisionalroad maintenanceunits was establishedin 1972/73following recomendations of the BCEOM-SCETroad maintenancestudy under the Highway EngineeringProject (para. 1.03). The project impact on the DPC developmentwas mainly in the increased capacity for preparation,procurement, administration and supervisionof highway constructionprojects, and, throughthe rural roads program preparation,in better cooperationwith other governmentagencies. Cooperationbe,ween DPC and the Ministryof Agriculturewas excellent throughoutpreparation of the rural roads program and subsequent implementation.
5.04 Constructionof the project roads was considerablydelayed because of the shortage of funds. After issuing the first three contractsin 1977 and 1978 the DPC was instructedby the Ministryof Planning to suspend the procurementof remainingworks, because there was a shortageof funds and prioritywas given to the Tunis-Turkiexpressway and Bizertebridge. The remainingcontracts were let only in mid-1980. The constructionof bypasses was additionallydelayed by problemswith acquisitionof the right-of-way. Sufficientfunds were not availableand with the passingof time inflationand land speculationincreased the cost of expropriationbeyond acceptablelimits, leading to relocationof bypassesand abandoningof some schemes, like the Sfax bypass. The DPC managementperformance was generallygood. The frustrationof the DPC staff caused by the lack of funds and the ensuing delays of constructionis expressedin their final report on the project.
VI. ECONOMICREEVALUATION
6.01 The SAR reported the project to be a highly feasibleone with - 14 -
IRR's for the road sections included ranging from 25% to 35X. The aggregate IRR for all the sections was 33%. A decrease of the benefits by 25X or an increase of the construction costs by the same percentage would still leave a healthy IRR of 27%. Since many of the elements needed for a detailed reconstruction of the economic evaluation are lacking, either from the appraisal phase or concerning the present situation, the economic reevaluation assesses the development of the key parameters which allows conclusions to be drawn about the project and its components. These key parameters are construction costs, traffic, and vehicle operating costs.
6.02 The table below compares the appraisal estimate and the actual construction costs, expressed in constant 1975 DT.
Economic Construction Costs in Project Component 1975 DT 10'
(a) Appraisal (b) Actual b/a
GP5 Mornaghia-Medjez el Bab 1205.6 1317 1.09 MC27/MC28 Hammamet-Korba 1878.6 1794 0.96 GPl Sousse bypass 2578.8 2000 0.78 El-Djem bypass 304.7 203 0.67 GP8 Tunis-Bizerte 1796.0 3303 1.84 GP6 Beja-Jendouba 1098.0 1382 1.26
Total 8861.7 9999 1.13
Considering changes in construction costs only, the project as a whole and all of its components except one remain clearly viable. The 84% cost overrun for the GP8 makes its viability questionable, if all other factors remain unchanged.
6.03 Table 3 shows that actual 1982 traffic substantially surpassed the forecasts by factors ranging from 1.08 to 2.36. The growth rates have been high, between 9 and 18% p.a. during the 1973-82 period. Since project benefits are approximately proportional to traffic volumes, the higher than foreseen traffic growth enhances the viability of the project. With respect to GP8, which had a cost overrun of 842, it is noted that actual traffic was 136Z higher than forecast. Since the SAR shows that an increase in benefits more than compensates for a corresponding percentage increase in construction costs, it is highly likely that for GP8 the 1362 higher than expected traffic, coupled with the 84% construction cost increase, yields an IRR higher than the 35% reported in the SAR.
6.04 With respect to vehicle operating costs (Table 4), no firm conclusions can be drawn as to the2 development. In the present context it has therefore been assumed that there is no significant impact on the rates of return from the possible changes of the vehicle operating costs. - 15 -
6.05 It can thus be concluded that although some of the project components sufferedcost overruns, these were more than compensatedfor by a traffic growth which was substantiallyhigher than foreseen at appraisal. This conclusionis valid both for the individual project componentsas well as for the project as a whole. The project has thus been a highly justified one.
VII. ROLE OF THE BANK
7.01 The Bank's involvementin development of the Tunisian highways commencedwith the UNDP TransportSurvey project of 1967 for which the Bank acted as the executing agency. Since that time five highway projects have been approved,each preparedunder the preceding one, the first includingonly preparatorystudies, two for rural roads developmentand three for primary and secondaryroads maintenance,rehabilitation and improvement. Consulting services for studies and training has helped institutionaldevelopment.
7.02 The Bank's strong representationsin the matter of local funds for the project's civil works helped to obtain in December 1979 the Government's firm comitment for financingwhich allowed substantialcompletion of the project within the next three years. Whether the Bank could have exerted more influencein securing the availabilityof local funds is uncertain since the whole issue was intimatelytied to political and macroeconomicconsiderations.
7.03 The Bank participationin preparation,supervision, review and discussionof the transportsurvey and transport coordinationstudy helped to clarify many issues related to methodologyof data collection,tariffs, and regulationsand investmentprogramming as well as a heightened interest from Governmentagencies for transportplanning.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
8.01 Overall, the project achieved well its objectives. 264 km of highways were rehabilitated(instead of 225 km foreseen)at an average cost which correspondedwell with what estimated at appraisal. Traffic increaseon the project roads was substantiallyhigher than foreseen. The project's reevaluatedIRR is above 33X. Substantialprogress in institutionaland operationaldevelopment was achieved.
8.02 Two problems disturbed the project implementation:shortage of counterpartfunds which delayed project completion by four years, and non-availabilityof the right-of-way,which resulted in delays, major changes in design,extra costs and deletion of some project components. The shortage of counterpartfunds could have been alleviated by better timing of the project and direct payment to contractorsof the loan proceeds, while the right-of-wayproblems might have been more manageable,had there been better coordinationbetween road and urban planning. - 16 -
8.03 Transportplanning capacityof the borrower was improved through the project studies, on-the-job training,and eventually the establishmentof a separate transportationplanning unit in MTC. The rural roads improvement study had extended the Bank involvementin road transport to the rural developmentsector.
8.04 The principal lessons learned through this project are:
(i) the timing of the project should concord with availabilityof counterpartfunids; and
(ii) to alleviate local financingconstraints the projects should include either direct payment of loan proceeds to suppliersand contractors, or a special account (revolvingfund) facility agreed upon;
(iii) the importance of timely acquisitionof right-of-wayand updated designs, coherent with actual urban developmentand plans for town bypasses.
Doc. 2552R Po.cr a PLETDNREU
num
SEGN EIUi HOEW - UM 1188-lN
Actual and 1ected Project hipl0mtati-
rof
ziatractor/ t of
and Bid reeipt Citract Band Bsn;ng of k of WazzL Project 2n t Naticality E d tual E ctual Oupctw1 Atual eifbml -oe
A. Civil Works Lot 5/GP5- Mag&da4Edjem-el-bab EFEI (aim) 06/8D 03/76 9/80 9/76 2/8 12/76 Canel.4 5/78 0 . 5A=-strmties SrAM(Mm) 03/83 06/83 06/83 06/a4 . 5B - pew.it an old section ETEP (MnM) 11/82 01/83 /83 06/83 . 5C = new secticn EE (MM) 03/83 04/83 04/83 06/84
Lot 6/M27.28 - 1 t-ICmba Sm7-(ET (fin) 12/77 10/75 03/78 0/76 04J78 05/76 10/81 S W5/M8 5 Lot 7/GPl - Sousse bypass /1 11/75 03/76 05/76 05/18 0 . 7A - North aid South sections MD-INMD(Ttn) 12/79 03/80 08/8D 08/82 . 7B By-pass secticn SIUDEMMm) 12/80 03/81 06/8 06/U_ . 7C - structures SEM (Tn) 12/80 03/81 06/81 12/a3
lot 8AG(PEl Djem sby-s SABAG(uln) 05/81 11/75 08/81 03/76 09/81 nsn6 03/82 12/76 0 Lot 8B/GP1 - Sfax by-s Cacellgd 11/75 03/76 0576 - 01/78 0
lot 9/1(8 - Tkinisr-Bizerte A2 05/76 01/77 02/77 an9 67 . 9 - n114- bi25 SCW :)-S (Fremh Tun) 06/76 01/77 03/77 05/78 . 9B a Kn 25 - klm57,7 DlM-EESSIN (Italy) /4n7 07/77 08/77 12/80 . 10 - lmis - lm 14 1;,4k-lESSDIA (Italy) 10/76 03/77 05/77 03J79
Lot 11/Q6 - Beja - Jeidoubs MRA-MT (Min) 05/80 12/76 09/80 08/77 U1/8D 10/77 09/83 01/79 New lots . GPI - neake - Eldjmn AS (Frenh) 03/81 06/81 09/81 02/83 , CP6- 4 bridges QWThRaM-OUfZ(French) ) 01/82 04/82 05/82 12/83 1C1TfLEI (Gem) ) 01/82 04/82 05/82 A2/S AL [I (Tun) ) 12/81 01W82 04/82
B. Cmsultimu Services Review of transport survey L. Berger (tW) 12/77 O/76 02/78 07/76 07/78 OO876 179 a 5 Rural RDBosStuly III6fEZ (Frenchr 03/77 01/76 05/77 02/76 06/77 0/76 06/78 09/78 Ix Transport studies sutry SEM-mDm (French) 03/80 03/8D 0C/8D
/1 lot 5, lot 7 and lot 9 have been split into 3 sub-lots /2 WL& do not include the bypm awtim in r,,tS Somce; HEWand Bank Files - May 1984, Doc. 2552R W 4ErRE
TnnISIA
SEWD HIGI8Y HRJERC- II 1188-JN
Actual and Appraisal Estiites of Poiert ats %m tousda)cm
Artuil cast - Fp"qxt of kctual Ccets CG.tract Appraisal Eatsates xtc locl Fre Total Awunt local r ii / tal nt Project Cvonet Dr U$ Dr U /2 DT orD T $ or M/2 ET ban si bs (DI)
A. Civil Wbrks GP5: Nbmnaia-jez-el-Bqb /3 1438 2919 3060 5508 1794 1158 31399 2467 6410 1.24 0.86 1.70 MC27hC28; ltimtK-Norba /4 1481 3005 3150 5670 2.537 1695 4965 3607 9369 0.87 0.61 1.24 GP1; Sasse bypass 2402 4876 5111 9200 3465 2335 6843 4959 12907 1.03 0.71 L48 Sfax bypass CANCELLED 734 2149 1561 4060 El-Djen bypass 183 372 390 702 324 260 763 554 1439 0.70 0.50 1.Z0 GP8: Tunis-Bizerte /5 2405 4883 5118 9212 4230 1805 5286 3840 9974 1.33 0.92 1.21 Q6: Beja-Ja-dcuba 1414 2871 3009 5416 1622 1166 3414 2480 6441 1.21 0.84 1.86 Subtotal initial list 9324 18925 19J38 35708 13972 9L54 26819 190 /6 50
GP1: IskerrEl Djan 1309 2657 2785 5013 2097 1.33 GP6: 4 bridges 1315 2668 2797 5035 2363 1.18 Sub-total additional list 2624 5325 5582 10C8 4.60 '
lUrAL A 11948 24250 25420 45756 18432 9154 26819 19480 50599 1.3D 0.3 1.35
B. Qrsultirg Services Reviewof trmnsport suryey 54 227 180 324 153 76 460 25'4 658 Rural PbW study 117 491 390 702 300 119 720 396 1029 Trgqsport studies sm.iy 6 25 20 36 20 TIUALB 177 743 590 1062 473 195 1180 650 1687 0.91 0.63 L25
ITOL A + B 12125 24993 26010 46818 18905 9349 28000 20130 52286 1.29 0.90 1.38
,L Ihe foreign catxnets of total costs are estimated to be 53 for civil wrki and 7I2 for cnsultizr services. /2 Using an exchange rate of tB$l = Dr 0,555 for actual costs and US$ 1 = E 0,385 f q4praisal estit of costs (the latter beng bo m tle acma paid withdrawls and their repay dollar equivaluicy). /3 cP5; cantract amot mefers to the initial costrart with EF}, which h been declated bwipt 18 mths after begiming of urks. ktal costs include the amst paid to EFERrbefore bawtcy and tte actual costs of subseqx.t lots 50., 53 and 5C. /4 MC27i1C28:actual costs do not include the bypass secticn in 8ast /G Q8: includes lot 9A, lot 9B and lot 10. A6 The estiimtiai wouldbe 17,000 without the Sfax and H1 zPt bypasses.
Souree; MK and Baik files May 1984, Doc. 2552R 19 -
Table 3
PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT
TUNISIA
SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT - LOAN 1188-TUN
Actual and Forecast Traffic 1973 and 1982
1973 AADT 1982 AADT Forecast Actual 1973-82 Actual Actual 1982 MADT b/c Growth Rate Section (a) (b) (c) (X p.a)
GP 5 Mornaghia-Medjezel Bab 2117 4567 3892 1.17 9 MC 27/MC 28 Hammamet-Korba 2130 6425 5018 1.28 13 GP 1 Sousse bypass 3990 8792 8124 1.08 9 El-Djem bypass 1132 4315 3336 1.29 16 GP 8 Tunis-Bizerte 2015 8817 3735 2.36 18 GP 6 Beja-Jendouba 1201 3701 2145 1.73 13
Source: SAR (1973 actual and 1982 forecasts). DPC, May 1984 (1982 actual).
Doc. 2552R - 20 -
Table 4 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
TUNISIA
SECOND HIGHWAYPROJECT - LOAN 1188-TUN
Vehicle Operating Costs 1975 and 1982
Vehicle Operating Costs (Exclusive of Taxes) 103 DT (1975)/km on a Level, Straight, Percent Vehicle Type Paved Highway in Good Condition Increase
1975 1983
Car 42 30 -29 Van 43 42 -2 Truck, 3.5t 69 60 -13 Truck, 3.5t 83 104 25 Trailer 132 208 58 Bus 169 214 27
Source; 1975 - SAR 1983 - "Estimation des cofits d'exploitation des vehicules". Setec International - Sotuetec - Sotinfor, September 1983.
Note: Since the assumptions and methodology underlying the 1975 values are not available, no meaningful compar-ison of the figures can be made. It can be suspected however that much of :he differences can be explained by differing assumptions regarding definition of vehicle types, utilization, etc.
Doc. 2552R hillEl 1
.1~~~~~~~2
------
- -F ------
-li------_----
r ______~ . _ ___ -W_ F ------1
M - - ~~~~~~~------
-~ r- .. ______
_ ___9______------8~~~~~~~ __~~~~ ._ - - -__- -_- - -___-
' N-----I ------i-
- ___-e _ __ __l_ -____- ____
- ID ------E ----- I.~~~t ---
a' ~~~------1------1-----
------PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT TUNISIA SECOND HIGHWAYPROJECT 32 LOAN 1188-TUN1
Disbursement Schedule 28
25
OM Ap raisal Esti ate 0 z 1-4
10~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
H 51
~~~~ 20
0' U~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
*1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1
5~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -23 - Page 1
.1-1052/65April 16, 1985 Fremch (Tunisia) OtD M'cM:law
Translation of commts by Tunisian authoritLes on Project Completion Report - SecondHighWa Project, dated December 21, 1981.,prepared by the World Bnlk and dispatched undr letter or Janur 2, 1985.
Region's Comments: Pain (I) ,____ Lie 3 of the Frenchversion Incorrectly reads "US$30million" instead of -English ver- "@US$28millon." sion correct
Pius (L1).. Llne reading"Proportion Completed by Above Date (2)." What does the This figure means figure 30 sigifJy? Percentge of result? Wrongpercentage. Z physical works completed by original comple- tion date
orrwr: chbae to read "Mai.try of Plamdgl" 10rted of 'Directorate*Eaglish of Pub1Li Verbs _miMi4stry of Trammportatioc *ad Commicatiesm." 'version correct FMUe(v) line 3 (Frenchtext) PMe (tiv)third end second linesfrom the bottom(English tezt) The use of the term "US dollarappreciation" for a revaluationis hard to-Englishversion explain. correct
Par&. 1.03. The FLrst Eigbway Project covered more than "rehabilitation -The 350 km of of about 1000 km of roads and 50 bridges." road improvement and modernization The Bank shouldconsult its PCR for this project to ascertain that. uderin the First the project. somo 350 km of roads weremodernized and som 1200km wer Project are pre- rehabllitated, making a total of approximately 1550 km. investment studies of which a portionwas carriedout in the Pam 3 (Freneh)/Paie2 (Entlish2 SecondProject PPra. 2.04. The distributioncited for the 1976 budet of DT 40 million -PCR refers to is incorrect,as the Surveyconducted in thatyear gave the following budgetary distribution: allocations
1. Expresway 11.3 2. Bisertebridge 6.2 3. Modernizationof 225 km of roads 22.0 445 Consultingservices 0.5 Total DT 40 million - 24 - ANNEX 3 Page 2
For your informatLon, the breakdownof the program changedan foliova over the period 1976-84: 1976 1979 1980 L981 1982-84
1 11.3 13 13 14.49 15.6 2 6.2. 6.8 8.5 8.5 8.5 3 22 19.7 is 16.51 20.4 4+5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Total 40 40 40 40 45
In addition,the Sfax bypass(GPI) was deletedfrom the SecondProject and budgetedat a cost of DT 4 million, whichwas adjustedto OT 5 million in 1984. Pas.8 Para.3.19 (ii). Correctgramatical mistakes after "l'etatde la routs" -Englishversion UT.N.: in the Frenchtext l'6tat is treatedas if it were a femininenoun). correct Para. 3.20 (i). tGP4" in the Frenchtext insteadof "GIl." -Englishversion correct Page 13 (French)/Pame12 (English)
Para. 4.09. Contrary to what the writer of the report thought, -Procedure was authorized "procedure no. 3" wa used only in the first quarter of 1984 (not "in in mid-1983; actual mid-1983"). disbursements took place only in the beginning Page 14 (French)(Page13 (English) of 1984 Para. 5.04. One should not overemphasizethe alleged "prioritygiven to the Tunis-Turki expressway and Bizerte bridge,"whLch is said to have prejuAiced the Bank-financed project.
Page 15 (French)/Page14 (Enlish)
Para. 6.02. The figures indicatedunder "(a) Appraisal" seem suspect -The costs are (suSject to verification), particularly in the case of GP8, which is said to those of the have been "submitted" to the Bank at a cost of DT 1.796,000 (in 197S dinars), appraisal The figures shown under "(b) Actual" cannotbe verified without knowledge of the infLation rates used to cowvertactual costs into 1975 DT costs. - 25 - ANNEX 3 Page 3
With regard to GPS, which shows a b/a ratio of 1.84, it should be noted that the roadway was rebuilt by SABAG over a distance of approximately LO km betweem kilometer posts 10 and 25.
Also on the subject of GP8, the World Bank's comment at the end of the -See par. 6.03 saw paragraph should be softened. of PCR IFtRD11754 IPPA
a. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~TtJNISIAJN 5 M ,di'terr onean Sea SECONDHIGHWAY PROJECT
Initial Sub-Proalel HRoada Ir-roved * uss;t'I::iKel | C;iG, lS o Juni Works coincelled Tal!1rho IL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,b.ddItIaj iIWoIh OlaiNt ij jr a --- Roade Improved op ;eX Lerge 1 Hrmomvel MauLt 15~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tU7, pfi 1 /di ...... j < o nv / 7, ,Kf ;< _..A \. / <~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. ENNA ISLANDS I / \ @ ~~~~~~~~~~~~Ci;vifo f Goboeas !~t ~~ Tt. 0-0H ; Gab NgS\fbt 5- ISLAND OF JERlA \ ( ;{;i(rr EL DJERID-2b Kult AF Iy"ve"CA I \ > J 4asmfawnrew ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ LI Y A/ \ cr M;>Zrt < C~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rA RAWD( 1 /LIY ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~wFt2 -*~~~-V: c^.rrrrlrKtV TFM's"aut I. 9 _____t __ h_ _u___ 2 ( -^o~~~~.r.l'. er sW" .. c"_e0- r \ \ Itt Xi~~~~~~~~~~~~~Rietnod I