THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
NAPOLEON IN THE NINTEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS
MADISON KANTZER Spring 2010
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for baccalaureate degrees in History and Art History with honors in History
Reviewed and approved* by the following:
Mark Neely McCabe Greer Professor of History Thesis Supervisor
Catherine Wanner Associate Professor of History and Religious Studies Honors Adviser
* Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the role of Napoleon Bonaparte in the nineteenth century American
consciousness, and the different aspects of the French emperor that were emphasized by different
factions of American society. The figure of Napoleon Bonaparte was especially prominent in the
American consciousness during the War of 1812 and the Antebellum and Mexican War Eras, two periods in which Americans struggled to determine what it mean to be a republic as they struggled to define themselves in relation to the powers of Europe. As the European figure that figured most prominently in the American political and popular culture, Napoleon became instrumental in helping different elements of American society articulate ideals and maxims they wished to apply to the evolving republic. To different elements of American society Napoleon represented completely opposite ideals, either the ultimate threat to the fledgling America republic, or the ultimate example of heroics and military might. He became the antithesis of manhood or the ideal to which young men should aspire. The way in which Americans envisioned Napoleon in the eighteenth century thus reflects the way in which they envisioned an ideal American society and its leaders.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
FIGURES………………………………………………………………………………………...iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………..………iv
Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………....……………………………...…….1
Chapter 2: Napolen, Patriotism and the First American Party System……...... 4
Federalists and Patriotic Displays of Francobia…………………………………..……….....8
Republicans and the Napoleonic Paradox…………………………………...... 23
Future Implications of the Early Nineteenth Century Napoleonic Image….………………………..27
Chapter 3: Napoleon in American Popular Culture ...... …...……..29
Chapter 4: Ideals of Napoleonic Manhood in Antebellum America…………………...………..47
Napoleon as a Role Model for Martian Men...…………………………………………………...49
Restrained Manhood, or Napoleon as a Warning………………………………………………...63
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Implications …..………………………………………………….....70
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..71
Appendix A: Antebellum Song Sheets……………………………………………………………………76
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 3-1 Napoleon Crossng the Alps………………………………………………………..…33
Figure 3-2: Napoleon, Emperor of France………………...…………...……………………...... 34
Figure 3-2: Napoleon in the Highest Degree of Prosperity……………..……………………….35
Figure 3-4: The Battle of Waterloo………………………………………………………………37
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Mark Neely for keeping me on task, helping me to make sense of my research, recommending primary and secondary sources that were instrumental in the final formation of my Thesis, and for editing my work and pointing out problems as I went. I would also like to thank Dr. Amy Greenberg for teaching me how to do historical research and for sparking an interest in American History, and Dr. Silvia Neely for everything I know about
Napoleon. 1
Chapter 1
Introduction to Napoleon and Nineteenth Century America
Born to a minor Corsican noble shortly after the island’s occupation by France, Napoleon
Bonaparte was a highly intelligent individual who profited from skill and circumstance to change the course of European history. At the age of nine he was admitted to a French military school, where he became an extremely successful student despite constant ridicule about his humble origins by his aristocratic schoolmates. Due to changes instituted during the French Revolution, in which army offices were declared open to talent rather than pedigree, Napoleon was able to rise through the ranks of the French Army and was ultimately conferred the rank of General.
After successful campaigns in Italy and Egypt General Bonaparte began to achieve fame and notoriety within France. On November 9, 1799, with the help of the Abbe Sieyes and Roger
Ducos, Napoleon overthrew the Directory and established himself as the First Consulate of
France.
Upon his ascension to power Napoleon promptly set about restoring order to a France that had been ravished by revolution and war. Bonaparte began by reconciling with the émigrés
(nobles who has left France after the start of the Revolution) and establishing peace treaties with
Austria and England, countries with which France had been at war. During the proceeding 14 months of peace, Napoleon instituted the Code Napoleon, which formally harmonized legal traditions of the past. During this time Napoleon also began establishing himself as the Emperor of France, effectively revitalizing the court culture of the Ancient Regime. In 1803, the peace with England dissolved, and for the remainder of his reign Napoleon constantly engaged in warfare with the nations of Europe. Between 1805 and 1809 Napoleon undertook a series of campaigns in Central Europe, which ultimately led to French dominance of the continent, and a 2
continental boycott of British goods. Following the failed invasion of Russia, Napoleon was
forced to abdicate and in 1814 was exiled to the Isle of Elba. He remained there until 1815, when
he reentered France, and reigned for 100 days. On June 18, 1815 Napoleon was finally defeated
by the Duke of Wellington at the Battle of Waterloo, and he spent the remainder of his life
imprisoned by the British on the Island of Saint Helena. 1
From the beginnings of his military career though his final defeat at the Battle of
Waterloo and through the present day, the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte has occupied a
significant place in the American consciousness. Whether Americans see the French Emperor as
a great military hero, tyrannical usurper of the French crown, or an exemplar of manhood,
Napoleon Bonaparte has become a looming presence in the American consciousness, a European
figure whose cult rivals that of American national heroes such as George Washington and
Ulysses S. Grant.
The nineteenth century in American history was a dynamic era, which saw the rapid growth of American institutions and the development of a national identity and culture. The first half of the century focused on the establishing the nation as a viable political entity with a stable
system of government, while the middle of the nineteenth century is better described as a phase
of social evolution and an attempt to cope with these changes.2 Throughout the growth and
evolution of America during this time Napoleon Bonaparte remained a prominent figure in the
American consciousness.
1 Rafe Blufarb, Napoleon Symbol for an Age: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/ St. Martins, 2008), 2-19. Contains a brief outline of Napoleon’s life and career and includes key primary documents from Napoleon’s life. Sylvia Neely, French Revolution and the Napoleonic Era: Class Lectures (Penn State University, Spring 2008). Some information in this section is taken directly from course notes, from a course taught by Dr. Neely in the Spring of 2008. 2 William Chambers. “Party Development and the American Mainstream,” in The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development, ed. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 23. 3
The figure of Napoleon Bonaparte took on particular significance during the War of
1812 and the Antebellum and Mexican War Eras, two periods in which Americans struggled to determine what it mean to be a republic; how they wanted to define themselves in relation to the powers of Europe. For different political, social, and intellectual factions of society during these periods, the character of Napoleon in the American consciousness personified the hopes and fears of these different and often competing elements of society. During the War of 1812, as
Americans came to terms with the political realities of a two-party republican system and began to redefine its relationship with the powers of Europe, politicians and political leaders used the person of the Emperor to define what it meant to be “patriotic.” After the War of 1812, as
American social institutions and maxims evolved, and Americans became more confident in their republic, the figure of Napoleon began to embody more complex issues, and helped
Americans articulate the traits of an ideal political leader, or the ultimate American man.
Additionally, Napoleon began to provide American political and intellectual leaders with lessons in republicanism, expansionism and morality. Napoleon thus occupies a multifaceted place in the
American consciousness, and provides the historian with insight into the evolution of American thought.
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Chapter 2
Napoleon, Patriotism and the First American Party System
When the Constitutional Convention met in 1787 to reorganize the government of the
United States of America, the founding fathers believed that they had laid the foundations of a
government in which petty rivalries among opposing factions would be eliminated. They
believed that with the new Constitution, they had created a form of republicanism which would
enable conflicting interests and diverse elements within society to work together in the pursuit of
justice and liberty.1 However, as the American republic developed, so too did rival factions; and
by the end of the eighteenth century two competing organized political parties, the Federalists
and the Republicans, had begun to dominate American politics. This early system of political
rivalries is known to modern historians as the “First American Party System,” and it is the
development and organization of the First American Party System that shaped political thought
and rhetoric from the beginning of the nineteenth century through the end of the War of 1812
and the victory of Andrew Jackson at the battle of New Orleans in 1815.
Paradoxically, this First American Party system developed within a republic that did not
believe in “political parties,” so to early Americans the development of two prominent,
organized rival political factions signaled the existence of subversive forces which threatened to
destabilize the new government.2 Political parties peacefully coexisting and working together
within a republic was a concept that neither existed in the American historical consciousness, nor in its political experience; and because of this neither the early Federalists nor the early
Republicans regarded the views of the opposing party as legitimate opposition. Rather, each
1 Paul Goodman, “The First American Party System” in The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development, ed. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 56. 2 Goodman, 56 5
party believed itself to embody the ideals and spirit of the Constitution, and felt that the
opposition party was a factious element that was disloyal to the ideals of the American Republic.
When the opposite faction held political offices they were seen as temporary and illegitimate office holders, and as a threat to the American government. To a Republican, for example, the
only legitimate office holder was another Republican, as their party was the “embodiment of the
nation’s will.”3 This attitude was emphasized by laws such as the “Alien and Sedition Acts,” and court cases in which the opposing political parties would accuse each other of sedition and treason simply for criticizing the other’s political views. These cases were not uncommon, and in
1806 the Republicans sued the Connecticut Currant, a Federalist newspaper, for “libel on the
President and Congress of the United States, contained in the Connecticut Currant, of the 7th of
May, 1806, charging them with having in secret voted two millions of dollars as a present to
Bonaparte for leave to make a treaty with Spain.”4 The case of the United States versus Hudson
and Goodwin (the editors of the Connecticut Currant) illustrates just how volatile Americans felt
the United States government was, and just how much each party distrusted the other. The
Republicans in this case believed that the Federalists had published their story in an attempt
undermine Republican power and the American republic; while the Federalists believed that the
Republicans were actually making secret deals with the French Emperor in an attempt to
undermine the United States.
Not only did each political party distrust its rival party, but the First American Party
System was largely a deferential system, and voters continually returned recognized elites to
office rather than men from a more humble “log cabin” background. Most early nineteenth
3 Mark Neely, Professor of American History at the Pennsylvania State University, March 12, 2010. Goodman, 57 4 United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, Supreme Ct of the US, 13 February 1812, 7 Cranch 32, 11 U.S. 32, 1812 WL 1524 (U.S.Conn.), 3 L.Ed. 259. Westlaw Campus. 6
century Congressmen and Presidents, such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, came from a class of self-conscious elites; although there were no legal titles as the old world European gentry had, the American “elite” still acted like aristocrats and gentlemen. 5
As democracy in the United States evolved, so too did the ideologies of these competing
political parties, a process that was strengthened by the outbreak of the French Revolution and
War in Europe in 1793.6 The main differences between the Federalists and the Republicans, as
they existed in the early nineteenth century, lay in each party’s attitude towards the French
Revolution, and in the leadership of each party. The Federalist leadership consisted mostly of
elites who had risen to power before or during the Revolutionary War, many of whom still felt
cultural and ancestral ties to Great Britain and believed that the French Revolution had become a
discredit to republicanism and democracy. Federalists feared the spread of French values to the
United States and worried that the forces which had caused the failure of French Republicanism,
Jacobinism, would threaten the republic of the United States. The Federalist party was most influential in New England, although its congressional delegation had been greatly diminished by the beginning of the War of 1812, a phenomenon that the already insecure Federalist elites conceived of as an attack on the rightful practitioners of authority.7 Most Federalists ardently
opposed the War of 1812, believing that by declaring war on England, a nation that was fighting
to defeat Napoleon, America had declared war on the wrong enemy and was leaving the country
vulnerable to Napoleon’s territorial ambitions.
Conversely, Republican leaders, according to Paul Goodman, were “more often
ambitious newcomers, outsiders who had been excluded by dominant groups from positions of
5 Dr. Neely, March 12, 2010 6 Goodman, 74. 7 Goodman, 76 7
prestige and power. Denied equal access to government, they believed that they were victims of
an erstwhile aristocracy and identified emotionally with French Revolutionary attacks on
entrenched privilege.”8 These disenfranchised elites still harbored Anti-English sentiments from the American Revolution and turned their interest to America’s ally during her revolution,
France. 9 The Republican Party achieved a wide following in southern and western states,
agricultural societies, and it was from the Republican party that the “War Hawks” of 1812, such as John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay, came, as did Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison.10
By 1812 the Napoleonic Wars between Great Britain and France had begun to affect the
commerce of America, as each nation issued decrees, such as the French Milan and Berlin
Decrees and the British Orders in Council, which violated the neutrality of American merchant
ships. The need to respond to the belligerent acts of both European powers created great
dissention within the United States between the Republicans and the Federalists, who disagreed
over which power posed a greater threat to the sovereignty and rights of the American republic.
The Federalists believed that the Continental System of Napoleon represented a more egregious
violation of American neutrality, while the Republicans felt that British impressment of
American soldiers and the Orders in Council represented graver abuses of American rights. In
June of 1812, despite much controversy, America declared war on Great Britain. The declaration
of war increased tension between Republicans and Federalists, and increased efforts on both
sides to discredit their opposition. The Federalists saw the declaration of the War of 1812 as
8 Goodman, 76. 9 Joseph I. Shulim, The Old Dominion and Napoleon Bonaparte a Study in American Opinion (New York: AMS Press, Inc, 1968), 42. This French influence can be seen in Jeffersonian architecture, such as Monticello, which was not only inspired by classical Roman designs, but by the French Classical Baroque, which took an ordered and geometrical approach to Greek orders. 10 “War Hawks” were a group of highly vocal members of Congress in 1812 that pushed for war with England. 8
proof of s subversive and Napoleonic influence in the United States government, and began to use the image of Napoleon Bonaparte in their political propaganda and rhetoric to discredit the
Republicans and reveal their unpatriotic control of the American government. By claiming that the Republicans had become puppets of the French Emperor, Federalists accused the
Republicans of being unpatriotic and disloyal to the ideals of the Constitution. For the
Republicans, the person of Napoleon presented a more complex problem, and they struggled to reconcile Napoleon’s obvious tyranny over the French people with their support of French revolutionary ideals. Republicans were much more reluctant to discuss the French Emperor or to draw public attention to the despot with whom the United States, if even circumstantially, was engaged in a common cause. When the Republicans did write about Napoleon, they presented conflicting images and rhetoric about the character and cause of Bonaparte. Even individual
Republican had conflicting views and feelings about the Emperor, a phenomenon that is best observed through the writings of Thomas Jefferson. To both the Federalists and the Republicans one’s support of Napoleon became a question of patriotism, and the American conception of
Napoleon in the first two decades of the nineteenth century was thus molded by their political affiliations and regional locations.
Federalists: Paranoid Patriotism
By the early nineteenth century the westward expansion of the United State coupled with the dramatic population growth in the south led to a rise in the political power of the two regions, and consequently the Republican Party began to dominate the United States government. New
England Federalists did not see this shift in power as an indication of their own declining importance, but rather as a result of malevolent political forces, and began to believe that the
United States government had become a “consolidated empire under the absolute control of a 9
few men.” 11 The Federalists of New England thus began to feel that its constituents’ interests were being overlooked in favor of the selfish ends of the majority party, and that the Republican dominated government was becoming a tyrannical threat to American institutions and values.
Throughout the War of 1812 Federalists, especially those in New England, largely distrusted and hated Napoleon Bonaparte, and felt that his influence in America would cause a collapse of the
American democracy, just as he had caused the fall of the French Republic. Not only did
Federalists fear the ideological influence of Bonaparte; they also feared that his territorial ambitions would eventually include the United States, and thus they viewed England as an obstacle to Napoleon’s potential designs on America. This distrust and fear of the French
Emperor became associated with their anxiety over the Republican control of Congress, and they began to believe that the Republican party had only achieved its position of power with the help of the French Emperor. Thus, Federalists began publicly “revealing” examples of Napoleonic influence within the government, in an attempt to discredit the Republicans and highlight their own patriotism. Additionally, Federalists began to celebrate Napoleon’s defeats in elaborate and highly public ceremonies, in what became displays of patriotism and “American values.” The
Federalists believed that they were defending the new American nation against an enemy whose alien political values would infiltrate the government and cause the collapse of American republican values and liberties.12
By equating Republican leaders, especially Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, with the figure of Napoleon, claiming that the Republicans were puppets of the French
11 James M. Banner, To The Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts 1789-1815 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970), 40. James M. Banner is quoting Joseph T. Buckingham from The Ordeal: A Critical Journal of Politics and Literature published in Boston in 1809. 12 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis: Federalist 1765-1848, Vol II (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913). 10
Emperor, and exposing Napoleonic influence in laws and resolutions proposed by the
Republicans, the Federalists attempted to portray the Republicans as illegitimate holders of
power and “false patriots.” For Federalists, Napoleon became the symbol of a corrupt and
traitorous administration. The style of rhetoric used by Federalists to accuse the Republicans of
subversive intentions is one that is prevalent in the history of American politics. Called the
“Paranoid Style,” it arises when one party feels that its interests cannot be reconciled with those
of the opposing party, and is intensified when a party feels that it is losing representation in the
political process. A party thus begins to accuse their opponents of conspiracy theories, and feels
a patriotic duty to expose the forces that they perceive to be a threat to government and society.13
Napoleon thus became the target of Federalists “paranoid rhetoric” and they began to expose the
“subversive influence” of the French Emperor in American politics in hopes that the rightful wielders of office would regain power in the United States.
The Federalist distrust of the Republicans, and their belief in Napoleonic influence within the government, was reinforced by Jefferson’s and, subsequently Madison’s, embargo policies which crippled New England commerce. To the Federalists the Embargo of 1807 and the “Non
Intercourse Act” were deliberate acts by the Republicans that were aimed at undermining the power of New England and the United States, in favor of French, or Napoleonic, interests.
Timothy Pickering, a prominent Massachusetts Federalist, contended that the Embargo of 1807 was actually the result of a secret alliance between Napoleon and Thomas Jefferson that was aimed at “destroy[ing] the prosperity of New England.”14 Pickering’s accusation demonstrated the increasing anxiety of New England Federalists that a subversive Napoleonic influence was
13 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 33. 14 Banner, 44; quoting a letter from Timothy Pickering to Rufus King, February 3, 1809 and Timothy Pickering, to Gore, 1808 11
present in the government, and that this influence was aimed at destroying the New England states. In an analysis of the Jefferson administration Pickering wrote, “So then, Mr. Jefferson’s embargo, which prostrated our immense commerce, which ruined many and seriously injured all, of our citizens, was founded on an empty menace! I am now leaving every intelligent reader to judge, whether the real object of the embargo was, ‘to keep in safety our vessels and merchandise’ –or, to render the French Emperor’s decree of the blockade of the British Isles
‘complete’.”15 Jefferson, according to Pickering, was colluding with Napoleon, and explicitly endangering American commerce to aid Napoleon in his continental ambitions. Pickering’s accusation was not simply hyperbolic rhetoric, but reflected a real fear of Napoleonic influences in American foreign policy. To Pickering, it was his patriotic duty to expose the perfidy of
Jefferson, in the hopes that the true representatives of the American people, the Federalists, would regain their rightful offices in government.
A similar accusation was repeated in the Federalist paper the Columbian Centinel, which claimed that “To protect commerce an Embargo was imposed… That this abominable act was the offspring of a crouching spirit, which trembled at the powers of the tyrant; which yielded honor, property, the independence of the government and the obligations of the constitution to
15 Timothy Pickering, A Review of the Correspondence between John Adams, the Late President of the United State and the Late William Cunningham, Esq. Beginning in 1803 and ending in 1812, 2nd edition, (Salem: Cushing and Appelton, 1824), 33. Although the book is primarily a review of the correspondence of John Adams, he includes letters between Thomas Jefferson and French diplomats as well as those between James Madison and French diplomats, and writes at length of the communication leading up to the Embargo of 1808. In the book Pickering uses the correspondence to directly accuse the Jefferson administration of a secret agreement with Napoleon to engage in common cause against Great Britain. The review of the correspondence was not published until 1824, long after it would have been useful in discrediting the Republican dominated Congress. However, in Octavius Pickering and Charles Upham’s The Life of Timothy Pickering, published in Boston in 1873 and which contains reproductions of speeches and letters written by Timothy Pickering, the authors allude to the “secret stipulation” uncovered by Pickering. Octavius reproduces on page 156 a letter to John Jay written by Timothy Pickering December 10, 1808 in which Pickering says, “In exposing the deception of the President’s ostensible causes for laying the embargo, I expected some interruption.” Thus one can assume that Pickering did make these accusations known during the Jefferson Administration. 12
the will of Napoleon.”16 By implying that Napoleon was ultimately responsible for the Embargo,
the Centinel accused the Republicans of being too weak to withstand the will of the French
Emperor, and instead were working in concert with him at the expense of American honor and
independence. To the Federalists, the Madison and Jefferson administrations were deliberately
pursuing foreign policy that favored French interests over American ones, weakening commerce,
and the country, and leaving the United States vulnerable to the dangers of French tyranny and
despotism. When President Madison intensified Jefferson’s embargo, towns in Maine and
Massachusetts, such as Ellsworth, began passing resolutions that likened Madison to the despot
Napoleon Bonaparte. The town of Castine, Maine, even complained that an “unseen hand”
(Napoleon’s) was behind the new embargo acts.17
Timothy Pickering, then a member of the House of Representatives and an unwavering
supporter of Great Britain throughout the War of 1812, began publishing essays, first in the
Federal Republican and later in the Salem Gazette, that accused the administration not only of passing laws that supported the interests of Napoleon, but of being in a direct alliance with the
Emperor of France. To Pickering, the Republican- Napoleonic alliance was meant to insure that the Republicans maintained their power in Congress, and it was this alliance, not the declining influence of his own party, which prevented the Federalists from regaining power in the United
States government. In his tenth “Address to the American People,” Pickering told Americans that
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were acting, “ not for your [the American] ultimate
16 “General Miscellany, The Present and Future State of this Disgraced and Degraded Nation; Drawn from facts Universally Known from the AVOWED Principles of its Rulers and From Observations and founded in Nature and Experience”, Columbian Centinel, 2878, November 6, 1811, Boston, Massachusetts, 1. 17 Samuel Eliot Morison, “Dissent in the War of 1812,” Dissent in Three Wars, ed. Samuel Eliot Morison, Frederick Merk, Frank Freidel, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), 10- 11. After the Embargo of 1808 the towns of New England, and especially Maine, had developed an extensive black market trade. The motives to engage in contraband trade were partially inspired by economic need but they were also a protest against the act and the Jefferson Administration. James Madison later passed an embargo act that was aimed at limiting this contraband trade, and it was this later act that caused the protest of the New England states. 13
advantage, but that your leaders, pretended patriots might obtain and hold power and place and
the emoluments of office…Like spaniels they submit to be spurned and kicked by the French
Emperor.”18 Thus the members of Republican administration were primarily concerned with their own political power and ambitions. They were sacrificing the honor of America to remain
in office, an accusation that implied the American Republic would be better protected under a
Federalist government. Pickering further accused the Republicans of being “partizans of France
in congress,” thus implying that the Republicans were not even Americans, but Napoleonic
agents whose loyalty to the French Emperor eclipsed their loyalty to the American republic.19
The Federalist party had not been legitimately voted out of office because the American people favored Republican values; instead Republican leaders have taken over the government with the help of Napoleon and were conspiring to turn America into a Napoleonic vassalage.20
The use of Napoleon to discredit Republican officials also appeared in political satires
written in the early nineteenth century. One, written by the “patriotic Hone,” appeared to
encourage Bostonians to vote for Republican Elbridge Gerry for governor in the election of
1812, and explained that “I am happy to inform you that the Emperor Napoleon has been
graciously pleased to approve of all our proceedings from the years past. He has written to me,
that in case he succeeds in establishing a die-nasty in the United States, that I shall be invested
18 Gerald H. Clayford, “Pickering Timothy”, American National Bibliography Online, 2000. “Politician: Mr Pickering’s Address to the People of the United States, No X,” The Balance and State Journal, May 28, 1811, 1:22 (Albany, New York), 172. Originally published in the Salem Gazette. Timothy Pickering was a radical Federalist, who continually hoped for the secession of New England from the Union, and was convinced that Thomas Jefferson was bent on destroying the United States of America. 19 The Balance and State Journal, May 28, 1811, 172; Banner, 44. Accusing American political leaders of being French or Napoleonic conspirators was not new to politicians in the 1810’s; it was a tactic that had been used in the 1790’s by the Republican- Democrats to combat “false patriots” and the “illegitimate state.” 20 Banner, 44-45 14
with the principality of Massachusetts-- and then let the tories look to it.”21 “Hone’s” satire explicitly gave voice to the belief of New England Federalists that the Republicans were usurpers working for Napoleon. Although it was only a satirical accusation, it was based on real Federalist perceptions and fears.
In 1811, when the United States began to consider a war against Great Britain, the
Federalists of New England felt that the United States were going to war with the wrong enemy, and that the Republicans were allying themselves with the tyrannical Napoleon against Great
Britain in a move that would bring “economic ruin…open warfare…despotism and corruption” to the United States.22 The Boston Centinel called a war with England “Boyish Folly,” and wrote
There are tens of thousands of thoughtless, deluded… democrats who think themselves good ‘Republicans,’ who rejoice excessively at the successes of the military despot of France [Napoleon]; and most heartily wish the downfall and conquest of old England, from whence they are descended. They know that nothing under heaven can hinder Bonaparte from sending his cut throat legions, and having his prefects, sub prefects, commissaries, and lazy officers of his legion of Dishonor, in every county, town and parish in the United States, but the British Navy, and which it is the great object of his “continental system” to destroy –yet they, deluded souls, have the folly to wish the very navy sunk into the depth of the sea, or bearing the bloody flag of Napoleon over the globe. Such gross delusion and infantile ignorance is truly lamentable. It reminds one of the poor silly boy; who on the death of his father, exultingly exclaimed: --- ‘Well, Father is dead, and I can now cut bread for myself --- ‘I wish Mother was dead, and then I could spread the butter too.’23
In the Boston Centinel’s anecdote England was thus represented as the father or parent of
America, and the Republicans are portrayed as the petulant child who is not able to fully comprehend what his father provides for him and protects him from, and instead rebels against a small act of inconsequence. “Boyish Folly” demonstrates the Federalist fear that if Napoleon
21 Lodowick Lash’em, “Patriotic Sentiments”, The Satirist , 10, April 11, 1812 Lodowick Lash’em is the editor’s pseudonym. 22 Banner, 50 23 “Boyish Folly”, Alexandria Daily Gazette, vol XI, 3022, April 26, 1811, Alexandria, Virginia, 3. The article is a reprint of the an article from the Boston Centinel. 15
defeated Great Britain, the Untied State’s parent nation, then nothing would stand in the way of
Napoleon’s conquest of the United States. Additionally, by comparing the Republicans to “the poor silly boy,” the Boston Centinel questioned the ability of the Republicans to make educated and informed decisions on behalf of America.
When Congress voted to declare War on June 1, 1812 none of the thirty-nine Federalists in Congress supported the war, and throughout the conflict Federalists referred to the War of
1812 as “Mr. Madison’s War.”24 New England was especially vocal in its opposition to the War
of 1812, and throughout the war she supplied neither funds nor soldiers to the United States. 25
Many New England Senators and Representatives, when making speeches that opposed the war
or the way in which the Republican administration was carrying it out, used the figure of
Napoleon to discredit the administration. The Federalists saturated their rhetoric with Napoleonic
parallels, constantly reminding the American people of the Napoleonic influence in the
Republican party. They accused the dominant party of acting in the Napoleonic spirit of
despotism and claimed that the Republicans instituted tyrannical policies which ignored the
rights of United States citizens. In November of 1812 a bill was introduced into Congress that
would allow army recruiters to offer men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one higher
wages and greater democratic privileges, upon their return from war, if they joined the army
(during the War of 1812 twenty-one was the age at which men were officially liberated from
their parents, and able to vote and join the army). Many Federalists opposed this bill, and in a
speech to Congress Josiah Quincy III, a senator from Massachusetts, asked, “Why it has been
24 Morison, 22. In 1812 Jack Lowell published several pamphlets accusing the administration of refusing any peace settlements offered by Great Britain, among which were two entitled Mr. Madison’s War and Perpetual War, the Policy of Mr. Madison. It is worth noting that President James Madison is not called “President Madison’s War” but the more disrespectful title of Mr. Madison, thus further discrediting the President’s and the Republican’s war efforts. Jack Lowell was also one of the primary agitators for reorganization the union consisting only of the original thirteen states. 25 Morrison, 22. 16
told us, on the other side of the house, that this is the thing they do in France. That age between
eighteen and twenty-one is the best age to make soldiers. That it is the most favorite age, in
Bonaparte’s conscription. Well sir, what then? Are we in France? Is Napoleon our King? Or is he
the President of the United States?”26 By comparing James Madison to Napoleon, Mr. Quincy
was accusing the administration of raising soldiers for the war in an unpatriotic manner and
ignoring American needs in favor of French policies.27 Not only did many Federalists feel that
changing the age and tactics of recruiting soldiers violated the rights of American citizens but
many also believed that the proposed tactics to recruit young men created a military government
in America. One Federalist from Philadelphia, William Milnor, warned Congress that, “We are not… to be organized into a military Government. However necessary some may deem this war, all will desire a short one. Thank God, no Napoleon has yet risen up amongst us to change our free institutions into military despotism. Encourage, if you please, a military spirit… but let it be done in the spirit of the constitution.”28 Milnor used the figure of Napoleon to echo the Federalist
paranoia that the War of 1812 and the unpatriotic recruiting tactics of the Republicans would
encourage the same kind of despotism that existed in France, endangering the republican
institutions of America. Because America was still a young republic, she was vulnerable to
foreign and despotic influences, and Federalists were afraid that Napoleonic policies or
influences would cause the American republic to fall to the control of a militaristic despot. Thus,
26 16 Annals of Congress 105-106 1013-1814 Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United States at the First Session of the 13th congress, City of Washington, Monday May 24th 1813. Josiah Quincy III. Mr. Quincy later in the speech to congress says “Sir the great mistake of this whole project lies in this: that French maxims are applies to American States. Now it must never be lost sight of by the legislators in this country that the people of it are not and never can be Frenchmen- and on the contrary, that they are, and can never be anything else than freemen.” 27 It should be noted, a major opposition to impressing American men between 18 and 21 is that this was often the age young men were apprenticed and learned trades, so many Federalists felt that this measure would disrupt the economy of the United States, and that it was unconstitutional because it violated the contracts between these young men and their masters. 28 25 Annals of Congresss, 161-162 Pay of the Army, History of Congress, November, 1812. 17
in addition to a frightening foreign figure that embodied the unpatriotic aims of the Republican
Party, Napoleon Bonaparte also served as a lesson about what could happen to the republic if it
allowed itself to act in a despotic manner.
One of the most vocal dissenters in the War of 1812 was Alexander Contee Hanson,
editor of the Federal Republican, a Federalist newspaper in Baltimore that was highly critical of
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and the War of 1812. Like many Federalists, Hanson believed
that the Republicans had deliberately sought a war with Great Britain, disregarding the interests
of the United States. On Saturday, June 20, 1812, the Federal Republican published an article
that described James Madison as the “tool of Napoleon,” which caused massive riots to break out
around the publishing house.29 The riots, which resulted in the death of two generals and the crippling of Hanson, reflected the gravity and seriousness with which the accusations were both levied and received by Hanson and the Republicans. The Federalist fear of the Republican subversion of the American republic was thus not simply political rhetoric, but a deep-seated
Federalist belief. The controversy surrounding the Federal Republican launched Hanson’s political career, and, once in Congress he continued to use the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte to discredit the administration. In 1813 a resolution was presented to the House of Representatives by Daniel Webster that called upon President Madison to disclose the exact date on which he had received word that the French government had repealed the Berlin and Milan decrees.30 As the resolution was being debated in the House of Representatives Hanson gave a speech attacking the administration, in which he accused the Republicans of subverting the American republic in favor of Napoleonic interests. Hanson further claimed that the War of 1812 and James Madison
29 Gary L Browne. “Hanson, Alexander Contee.” http://www.anb.org/articles/03/03-00206.html; American National Biography Online Feb. 2000. Oxford University Press. 30 The argument here is that had James Madison revealed these documents earlier he could have prevented war, and Hanson is accusing Madison of allying himself with Napoleon and deliberately pursuing War. 18
were unpatriotic and a danger to the United States. In response to remarks made by “War Hawk”
John C. Calhoun defending the war and the administration Hanson proclaimed,
You, sir, are not now to be informed that thousands and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of the free and enlightened people of this Republic, judging from the mysterious acts of the Administration, the constant and (in my judgment) abominable practice of suppressing information and a curious coincidence in our measures and those of a foreign power [France], are firmly persuaded, if not riveted in the opinion that the destinies of this nation are directed by a distant hand [Napoleon]…in addition to these considerations, upon a late and memorable occasion the “invincible and super-eminent Napoleon” declared to his Conservative Senate of slaves, in pretty direct terms that we were engaged in a common cause with him… ‘for this new principle Americans fight,’… a tyrants praise…it was not for those who might concur with him [Hanson] in opinion to contradict and quarrel with Bonaparte about the charge of a criminal and impeachable nature against the President, but it was a duty which had especially devolved upon those whose honor and love of country are particularly implicated.31
Hanson’s speech thus first discredits the Madison administration by claiming that it has deliberately misled the American people and acted in the best interests of Napoleon and France, rather than the United States. It is clear from Hanson’s speech that by engaging in common cause with Napoleon, a tyrant and despot, James Madison and the Republicans have betrayed the republican ideals of the United States, proving that they are usurpers who are not devoted to maintaining and upholding the principles of the Republic. To Hanson, the only patriotic act would be to oppose the tyrant Napoleon Bonaparte, and only then would American interests and honor be maintained. The War of 1812, to the Federalist opposition, was an unpatriotic war, deliberately pursued by Republicans to subvert American interests. By associating prominent leaders and Republicans with Napoleon Bonaparte and claiming that the French Emperor’s influence had endangered the Republican system of government the Federalists attempted to
31 26 Annals of Congress, 105-106 (1813-1814). Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United States, at the 1st Session of the 13th Congress begun at the city of Washington Monday May 24, 1813. 180- 182. John C. Calhoun was a prominent Republican and one of the most vocal advocates of the War of 1812. He will be discussed more in depth in the next chapter. It should be noted that the person who transcribed the activities of the House of Representatives used both first and third person; I have included clarifying names in brackets when necessary. 19
discredit the War of 1812 and the Republican Party. Hanson’s speech and similar acts by
Federalists to show that the Republicans were partisans of France or Napoleonic agents, were not
simply political rhetoric or hyperbole, but reflections of genuine Federalist fears that the
government was being undermined, and part of a Federalist attempt to replace the “usurpers”
with legitimate politicians and policies. The Federalists had thus begun to see Napoleonic and
subversive influences in every avenue of American politics, and their distrust of the Republicans and fear of Napoleon bordered on paranoia.
By 1813 Napoleon had become the Federalists’ favorite symbol of Republican weakness and false patriotism. In order to demonstrate their own loyalty to the ideals of the United States
Constitution and republicanism, New England citizens, particularly in Boston, held public
celebrations of the victories of the official enemy of the United States, Great Britain, over
Napoleonic tyranny. 32 Much to the chagrin of many Southern and Western Americans,
Bostonians celebrated Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow and the allies’ entrance into Paris with
more “energy and enthusiasm” than American naval victories over the British. Opposition to the
government was still considered to be suspect, thus celebrating the victories of America’s enemy
was also a form of protest against the Republicans.
On March 25, 1813 the citizens of Boston held an event called the “Solemnities and
Festival in Honor of the Russians.” The festival, which was planned and attended by the elite
Federalists of Boston, included “solemnities” and prayers of thanks in King’s Chapel and a large
banquet at the Exchange Coffee-House in which many toasts were given in honor of the
Russians. One toast was made to “The Memory of Washington… rendered more precious by the
errors and follies of the present time,” and alluded to the supposed alliance of the Republican
32 David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1997) 261. 20
administration with Napoleon Bonaparte.33 By toasting the memory of George Washington, the father of America, the Federalists emphasized their belief that the Republican administration was flouting the ideals and principles of the foundations of the American republic. In describing the festival, the Columbian Centinel wrote,
The citizens of Boston, surpassed by none in their love of liberty, and their zealous and vigilant attention to every event, either in their own country or foreign relations, which may either directly, or remotely affect its interests, have viewed with no ordinary emotions, the gigantic power which had erected itself upon the ruins of the Republican system of France. No people evidenced a more candid sensibility and joy at the prospect of the establishment of a moderate, well regulated government in that country… These feelings, highly honorable in themselves, derived additional force from the evidence, not to be resisted, that our own administration either blinded by the arts, or seduced by the intrigues of France, were virtually cooperating in her schemes of Universal Dominion.34
Thus the Boston Federalists were not only celebrating the liberation of the French from the
“gigantic power” of Napoleon, but the liberation of the American administration from the
“intrigues” of Napoleon. The Federalists were not only celebrating the victory of Russia over
Napoleon, but they were also celebrating what they hoped would be the end of America’s cooperation with the French Emperor, and thus the end of American despotism.
On June 15, 1814, the Federalists of Boston staged a similar event, a “Solemn Festival in
Commemoration of the Goodness of God in Delivering the Christian World from Military
Despotism,” which celebrated the abdication of Napoleon and his exile to Elba.35 The celebration
33 Solemnities and Festival in Honor of the Russians,” Columbian Centinel, March 27, 1813, 3023, Boston, Massachusetts, 2 34 Columbian Centinel, March 27, 1813, 2. It should be noted that throughout the entire festival the name of Napoleon seems not to have been used. I do not have complete record of every prayer, ode or benediction delivered at the Solemn Festival in Honor of the Russians however none of the texts I have mention Napoleon by name, and it is possible that the omission of the proper noun “Napoleon Bonaparte” symbolized the complete eradication of the French emperor from the political arena. 35 Henry Channing, “Discourse, delivered in Boston, At the Solemn Festival in Commemoration of the Goodness of God in delivering the Christian World from Military Despotism”, Discourse delivered by William Ellery Channing, Minister of the Church in Federal-Street Boston. June 15, 1814. Henry Channing’s publication contains the Discourse delivered at the Festival, resolutions passed by Bostonian Elites and Federalists celebrating the downfall 21
began with a full organ concert and included several invocations and benedictions condemning
the despotism and wars of Napoleon. Music from Handel, such as the “Hallelujah! Chorus,” was
played and resolutions were passed by the Boston Federalist elite congratulating France on her
liberation. Songs were sung which celebrated the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty, a discourse
was delivered by William Ellery Channing celebrating the downfall of Napoleon, and fireworks
were set off. 36 To the New England Federalists, who believed that Republican government was
being heavily influenced and controlled by Napoleon Bonaparte, the fall of Napoleon meant the
renewed freedom of America from tyranny, despotism and subservience to the French emperor.
Thus the celebrations of the defeat of Napoleon were patriotic celebrations of the renewed
freedom of America. On the day of this “solemn festival,” Boston’s leaders issued a declaration
asserting that “It is with the greater joy they perceive this liberality and true wisdom in the allied
councils, as it affords a well grounded hope of the restoration of peace to this country, on terms
compatible with its interest and its honor. It is because the recent events in Europe have a direct
tendency to render liberty secure, to check anarchical propensities, to restrain ambition… that
this assembly hail them as blessings.”37 The first sentence in the declaration alluded to the War
of 1812 and professed hope that the war would soon end. Because Napoleon had been the
originator of the “continental system” that had in turn caused the British Orders in Council and
the infringement of America’s trading rights, the end of Napoleon in Europe meant the end of the
continental system, and thus peace for America. The reference to “anarchical propensities”
referred to the fate Federalists were afraid would befall America if the Republicans remained in
of Napoleon, a list of the Festivities that took place of June 15, 1814 and the lyrics to an Ode written by L.M. Sargent, Esq. to the Tune of “Ye Mariners of England”. 36 Morison, 8 37 Resolutions passed at the “Solemn Festival in Commemoration of the Goodness of God in Delivering the Christian World from Military Despotism” on June 15, 1814 as published by Henry Channing. 22
power. The reference to restraining “ambition” referred to the supposed alliance of James
Madison’s administration with Napoleon Bonaparte; an alliance that the Federalists felt was
inspired in part by Madison’s desire to keep the Republicans permanently in power. Thus, the end of Napoleon’s ambitions of the continent signaled the end of President Madison’s ambitions in the United States. Boston’s leaders could now hope for the renewal of republicanism and
liberty to the American government.38
In light of the paranoid rhetoric which the Federalists used to expose the Napoleonic
influences within the United States, Federalists were clearly relieved by the downfall of the
French Emperor, and these two fetes were thus patriotic displays of the liberation of America from the influence and control of the tyrant Napoleon Bonaparte.39 In the years leading up to the
War of 1812, and throughout the war, the Republicans continually accused the Madison and
Jefferson administrations of either directly conspiring with Bonaparte to undermine national
interests or being weak puppets of the Napoleonic administration, and Federalists were
continually warning Americans against the seditious influences Napoleon Bonaparte and his
despotic institutions could have in the United States of America. Although the Bostonians called
their celebrations “fetes,” and not political rallies, these “solemn festivals” also conveyed an
unsubtle partisan message, and thus allowed Boston Federalists to show their opposition to the
Republican party in a subtle manner that would now subject them to accusations of sedition. The
Federalists of Boston truly believed that the fall of Napoleon signaled the freedom of America
38 Morison, 55. Samuel Morison proposes a similar idea in his analysis of Harrison Gray Otis, a prominent Boston Federalist, however Morison attributes these toasts and resolutions to a lack of “American feeling” rather than to patriotism. Interestingly, Morison claims that Napoleon was probably more hated in Boston than anywhere else outside of London. 39 In fact, these fetes were similar to modern celebrations of Independence Day. 23
from seditious forces attempting to undermine American liberties and institutions, and the fetes of Boston were patriotic displays of this renewal of freedom.
Republicans and the Napoleonic Paradox
While the Federalists of the early nineteenth century clearly saw Napoleon Bonaparte as a foil to American democracy and used the figure of Napoleon in their rhetoric and propaganda to discredit the Republican party, the Republicans had a much more complex relationship with the Emperor of France. Although Republicans recognized that Napoleon was despotic and the destroyer of the French experiment in republicanism whose territorial ambitions might one day threaten the United States, they also recognized that Napoleon and America shared a common enemy in Great Britain. While Napoleon’s campaigns achieved success on the European continent, the British would not be free to bring the full force of their navy against America, and the United States would stand a better chance of emerging victorious from the War of 1812.
However, if Napoleon became too successful in his wars against England, he could become a threat to the United States. Additionally, France and Napoleon, with the Berlin and Milan decrees, had enacted trading restrictions against American vessels, just as the English had.
The relationship of the Republicans with the figure of Napoleon was further complicated by the Federalist paranoid accusations that the Republicans were conspiring with Napoleon or acting as his puppets in order to undermine the American republic. Thus, if a Republican politician publicly praised the French Emperor or spoke in his favor the speech would likely have been cited by the Federalists as proof of allegiance to Napoleon Bonaparte. Because of the paradoxical relationship the Republicans had with Napoleon, they did not use his image in political propaganda and rhetoric in the same manner that the Federalists had, and thus Napoleon figures comparatively less in Republican articles and speeches. However, despite the general 24
tendency of Republican leaders to avoid mention of the French Emperor, the figure of Napoleon
is not completely absent from the Republican rhetoric, and throughout the War of 1812 the
Republicans developed several, often competing, images of Napoleon. Some Republicans
attempted to justify Napoleon’s Emperorship by pointing out the progressive and liberating
nature of the laws the French Emperor had enacted, while others condemned him outright. Some
Republican publications avoided writing their own stories about the French Emperor, instead
simply reprinting news articles from abroad. While the Republicans mostly refrained from
mentioning the French Emperor in their propaganda and rhetoric they counteracted the
accusations of French and Napoleonic influence by launching a vigorous and arguably successful
attack against the Federalists, claiming that they were under English influence, which they
argued was more prevalent and dangerous than the French influence in America.40
One of the best examples of the complex relationship between the Republicans and the
image of Napoleon Bonaparte can be seen in the views of Thomas Jefferson towards the French
Emperor. Thomas Jefferson had originally been a supporter of the French Revolution, feeling
that a republican victory in Europe would bolster the democratic experiment in America, and
thus he was extremely disappointed when Napoleon declared himself Emperor and “Consul for
Life.” When Napoleon abdicated on July 5, 1814, Jefferson told John Adams, “The Attila of the
Age [has been] dethroned, the ruthless destroyer of 10 millions of the human race, whose thirst
for blood appeared unquenchable, the great oppressor of rights & liberties of the world.”41 To
Jefferson, Napoleon was a tyrannical usurper of the French Throne, and Jefferson’s opinion of
40 Shulim, 270. Shulim’s study of Virginian’s opinion of Napoleon Bonaparte only covers the first decade of the nineteenth century, although my sources indicate that his analysis of Virginian’s opinion continued to be true through the War of 1812 with few changes. 41 Joseph I. Shulim, “Thomas Jefferson Views Napoleon,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 60: 2 (April 1952), 300; Shulim is quoting Jefferson Papers, CCI, 35820. The following section is based largely on the work of Joseph Shulim, who conducted a much more through study of the attitude of Thomas Jefferson towards Napoleon Bonaparte. 25
the Emperor was unimproved by ambivalent and sometimes hostile French policies towards the
United States.42 On January 20, 1811 Jefferson wrote to John Hollins calling Bonaparte’s
Trianon tariff and licensing system a “new trick on Bonaparte, opening the seas & shutting his
ports to us.”43 However, once the British declared the Erskine agreement to be invalid, Jefferson
began to view England as the primary enemy of the United States.44 Jefferson recognized that as
the enemy of England, Napoleonic success in the Baltic Sea would be beneficial to the American
effort in the War of 1812, and thus began to desire partial success for the French Emperor.
Jefferson’s relationship with the French Emperor was further complicated by Napoleon’s return
from the Island of Elba and the popularity with which he was greeted. Jefferson recognized that
Napoleon had, in fact, preserved some of the gains of the French Revolution and that French
citizens saw the restored Emperor as their protection against the restored émigrés. Thus, to
Jefferson, Napoleon became a legitimate, if despotic, ruler. It was not until after Napoleon’s final defeat at the battle of Waterloo that Jefferson finally settled on an opinion of the French
Emperor, writing that Napoleon had “been the author of more misery & suffering to the world than any being who ever lived before him,” and seeing Napoleon as a threat to the future of republicanism and “liberalism.”45 Thus, to Jefferson Napoleon became a paradoxical figure, at
once liberal yet despotic, whose character and relationship to the United States was problematic.
However, Jefferson’s inner conflict over the figure of Napoleon was largely a private conflict,
and although he wrote about Napoleon in letters to friends and fellow politicians, he made few, if
42 Shulim, “Thomas Jefferson Views Napoleon,” 288-295. 43 Shulim, “Thomas Jefferson Views Napoleon,” 298; Citing “To John Hollins”; Jefferson Papers, LC, CXCII, 34182 44 Shulim,” Thomas Jefferson Views Napoleon” 297. The Erskine agreement was an agreement between a British minister and James Madison, in which the President was assured that the British would revoke the Orders in Council and stop infringing on the rights of neutral ships in the Atlantic. 45 Shulim, “Thomas Jefferson Views Napoleon “ 304; Citing “To Gallatian,” October 16 1815, Jefferson Papers, CCV, 36478 26
any, public statements about the Emperor of France. Even Jefferson was seemingly reluctant to
mention Napoleon in the public sphere, regardless of his personal feelings towards the emperor
and he was keenly aware of the possible political consequences that might have arisen from any
mention of Napoleon.
Just as Jefferson struggled with his understanding of the French Emperor, so too did the
rest of the Republican party. Although most recognized him to be a usurper of power and
illegitimate ruler in France, some publications were tempted to justify his reign by pointing out
the liberal reforms he had instituted in France. In December of 1812, shortly after the outbreak of
war with England, the National Intelligencer, a Republican paper and mouthpiece of the party, published an article entitled “A Comparison between the Old and New Governments of France,” in which the changes instituted by Napoleon were praised as liberal reforms. The Intelligencer wrote “Under Napoleon there is not Corvees; he supports the roads out of the taxes raised upon the whole of the people. And does the reader believe, that the people of France are over anxious to have the Corvees restored?”46 The National Intelligencer continued, “the truth is that France is
a republic, except merely in name. There are no nobility, and no clergy any more than there are
in the United States of America…society is essentially republican.”47 Thus, despite the fact that
Napoleon was a despotic ruler, he had instituted republican reforms, and liberated the people of
France, and thus his reign could be seen as justified, or at the very least preferable to Bourbon rule, and certainly more liberal than the monarchy in England or absolute rulers throughout the rest of Europe. The Virginia Argus similarly praised Napoleonic legislation that ended the
46 “A Comparison between the Old and New Governments of France; Extracted from Cobbett’s Register.” The National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser. XIII:1901 (Washington DC: December 19, 1812). Corvees were a kind of conscription that had been enacted under the Ancient Regime in which peasants and laborers could be required by the King to work on public projects, such as building roads. 47 The National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, December 19, 1812. 27
persecution of the Jews, the “illiberally despised people.”48 Justifications such as these eased
Republican worries about engaging in common cause with Napoleon, and thus legitimized the
American war with Great Britain.
However, while some aspects of Napoleon’s reign could be justified by his liberal
policies, on the whole most Republicans became disillusioned and disappointed with Napoleon
Bonaparte once he crowned himself Consul for Life, and their opinions and editorials were
similar to those of the Federalists, on those rare occasions when the felt compelled to discuss the
subject. In general, Republican writings and rhetoric tended to avoid mention of the French
Emperor in favor of accusations of the English influence in America.
Because Napoleon presented such a paradoxical character to the Republicans, one at odds
with the Republican cause and subversive in her foreign policies, yet one engaged in common
cause against Great Britain, the Republican treatment of Napoleon was inconsistent and
complex, with no uniform ideology of the emperor emerging in the public sphere. Rather than
grapple with the complex array of problems Napoleon posed to Republican ideologies, they generally refrained from mentioning Bonaparte.
Future Implications of the Early Nineteenth Century Napoleonic Image
Throughout the War of 1812 and the early nineteenth century, American opinion of the
French Emperor was largely molded by their political beliefs and perceptions of who the real
enemy of American sovereignty and commerce was. For Federalists, the enemy of the United
States was Napoleon Bonaparte and the French government, and thus disavowal of the French
Emperor became akin to the disavowal of the party in power, the Republicans, who the
Federalists truly believed were trying to subvert American interests, and subjugate her to French
48 Shulim, The Old Dominion and Napoleon Bonaparte a Study in American Opinion, 279. Citing The Virginia Argus, May 18, 1808 originally published in the New York Oracle. 28
rule. Conversely, although Republicans recognized the despotic and tyrannical nature of
Napoleon, they felt that the true enemy of the American Republic was Great Britain, and thus they tended to avoid mention of the French Emperor in favor of rhetoric which discredited the
Federalists and accused them of being English partisans. Following the final defeat and exile of
Napoleon to St. Helena, and the simultaneous collapse of the First American Party system, the figure of Napoleon and discussions of his moral and personal character became less prevalent in
American prose and rhetoric, and his image would not become renewed in the American consciousness until the middle of the nineteenth century as an age of Romanticism dawned and the United States began pushing her boundaries westward.
29
Chapter 3
Napoleon in American Popular Culture
As the United States entered the middle of the nineteenth century, the mood of the
country began to shift. The First American Party system collapsed to be replaced by what historians have dubbed the “Second American Party System,” and America entered an era of
rapid economic, commercial and territorial expansion. Improvements in technology,
transportation and communication broke down geographic barriers, increased travel, and brought
greater importation of European literature and culture.1 As the nineteenth century progressed
Americans began to look westward for expansion, with many believing that it was their destiny
to extend to borders of the country westward to the Pacific Ocean. Out of this drive came the
first war for territorial expansion in American history, the war against Mexico which began in
1846 under the presidency of Democrat James K. Polk.
The Mexican American War occurred amidst a period of Romanticism in America.
Unsatisfied with the lack of Romantic elements in their young nation, many Americans saw the
first war in an exotic land against a foreign foe as a romantic episode in their nation’s history.
For many Americans the Mexican American War provided a new source of American heroes and
demonstrated that a republic was in fact capable of carrying out a successful foreign war.
Influenced by authors such as Sir Walter Scott and lacking a long past in which to look for
chivalric heroes, the American romantic mind became captivated by Romantic heroes and
military histories of Europe. In the 1840s the greatest wars in recent memory were the
Napoleonic Wars, on which both sides had published a considerable amount of literature
romanticizing the wars and the heroes that they created. Napoleon Bonaparte began to capture
1 Robert W. Johannsen, To The Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), vii-viii 30
the American imagination, with many authors finding him to be the “embodiment of romantic
genius,” a figure whose defeat at the battle of Waterloo especially, captured the romantic
imagination of mid-century Americans. Parallels were drawn between the Wars of Napoleon and
the Mexican American Wars, and American generals and heroes were held to the Napoleonic
standard. Thus, the figure of Napoleon loomed larger in American popular culture than almost
any other European military figure in history, leading to the proliferation of popular prints,
songs, and novels dedicated to the French Emperor.2
One of the most interesting testaments to the popularity of Napoleon in America can be
seen in the lithographs produced by the printing giant Currier & Ives during the second half of
the nineteenth century. Begun by Nathaniel Currier, who later partnered with James Merritt Ives
and headquartered in a New York factory, Currier & Ives used lithographic stones to create
popular prints at low unit cost and sold their prints in print-shops all over the country, advertising
themselves as “the best, cheapest, and most popular firm in a democratic country.” They
provided “colored engravings for the people.”3 Criticized by purveyors of “fine art” for selling
“cheapened art,” Currier & Ives intended their prints to be hung like modern day posters on the
“walls of America’s homes, stores, barbershops, firehouses, barrooms, and barns,” which
historian Bryan F. Le Beau called a “widely successful” enterprise. Unlike “highbrow” culture
and art, prints were not commissioned by individuals as an original painting or sculpture might
be, rather they were mass produced and the consumer then chose which print to buy from a pre
determined selection. Harry T. Peters, a prominent collector of Currier& Ives Prints, called them
2 Johannsen, 75. 3 John Ibson, Review [Untitled], Journal of American History, 90 no.1 (Organization of American Historians, June 2003). 229-230.; Bryan F. Le Beau, Currier and Ives, America Imagined, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 1. Note that in my discussion of Currier and Ives prints I am covering the era from the beginning of their publications in 1840 through the end of their production in 1907. The lack of dating on many of the prints and available evidence makes it difficult to contain the discussion to the Antebellum era alone. 31
“mirrors of the national taste, weather vanes of popular opinion, reflectors of American attitudes.”4 Currier & Ives prints were intended not for the elite of America, but rather for the
middle class individual and business owner, and as such the production of prints reflected
popular demand. Prints that sold well were produced in greater quantities and prints that
floundered in the market were discontinued.5 Thus, the prints of Currier & Ives reflected the
tastes and trends of nineteenth century America, the printers were business men and not artists,
and they would not have produced a print that they did not think would appeal to a wide
audience.
During their years of production Currier & Ives produced over 7,000 different prints, the
majority of which depicted American scenes, landscapes and heroes. In the body of Currier &
Ives prints, the most often printed figure was George Washington, of whom over 75 prints were
produced during the lifetime of the company. The second most popular American figure appears
to be Abraham Lincoln, of whom over 35 prints were made. Other popular American figures,
including Ulysses S. Grant and Thomas Jefferson had between 10 and 20 prints produced of
them, on average. It is thus surprising that a firm which was committed to creating American
prints and engravings produced at least 16 different engravings and prints of Napoleon
Bonaparte. More prints were made of the French Emperor and General than of many prominent
American figures, and certainly more than any other European figure. 6 Among these was a
4 Le Beau, 2 quoting Harry T. Peters, Currier and Ives: Printmakers to the American People (New York: Doubleday: 1929, 1942), 7. 5 Le Beau, 3 6 Currier and Ives A Catalogue Raisonne, A Comprehensive Catalouge of the lithographs of Nathaniel Currier, James Merritt Ives and Charles Currier, including epherma associated with the Firm, 1834-1907. Compiled by Gale Research Company (Detroit Michigan: Gale Research Company, 1984), v1 and 2. The numbers given here reflect the data from the Catalouge Raisonne and were compiled by searching the list of prints for the names of popular American and European figures. Because some prints were given titles other than the name of the person they depicted, they may have been missed by me while compiling data. However, these numbers still closely reflect, within about 10 prints, the number of prints made for each individual. Additionally, I have left Currier & Ives body 32
reproduction of Napoleon Crossing the Alps, based on the painting by the French artist Jaques
Louis David, and a depiction of Napoleon: The Hero of 100 Battles as well as several entitled
Napoleon: Emperor of France. Although we do not know how many of each print was actually produced, the fact that there was enough demand to warrant the creation of more Napoleon prints than any other European figure, including Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Hannibal testifies to the popularity of Napoleon in America. Like religious icons, these prints testified to the convictions of American, and showed what they deemed to be desirable in a heroic figure.
Although we cannot be certain what these prints represented to each American who purchased them, the Currier & Ives prints of Napoleon have common themes and each one emphasizes specific characteristics of the Emperor such his militarism and generalship, the majesty of his
Emperorship, and his paternalistic qualities; all of which were traits that Americans considered to epitomize “manhood.” None of these prints were related to the political images of Napoleon, and they characterized him as neither a tyrant nor a republican. Thus to the middle class American, the consumer of these prints, Napoleon was not a political figure, instead he is a heroic figure, one who appears glorious in victory and worthy of veneration and imitation.
In the image, reproduced below, of Napoleon Crossing the Alps, for example, Napoleon is shown at the head of a long military column leading the way to Italy, with his bright red cape dramatically swirling around him. The bright and swirling cape of Napoleon along with the energy created by the tail of his horse create drama and energy in the print, adding intensity to the figure of Napoleon, making him appear to be a powerful force. Thus, the image of Napoleon is heroic and romanticized, with the Emperor mounted upon a classic white horse, and with a stern and determined look on his face. Napoleon is a dynamic picture of leadership and authority, of religious prints out of this discussion as they are unrelated; however they do comprise a significant number of prints. 33
and one imagines that this image would have inspired courage and a military spirit in the viewers
or owners of such an image. If this print was hung in the home of a militia man or a solider it
would have provided an ideal to which that individual could aspire, a general on the brink of a
glorious victory despite great obstacles. Interestingly, although the Currier & Ives print was
clearly intended to echo the original painting by David, the printers have changed elements of the original painting, adding the large column of soldiers behind Napoleon, and leaving out engravings that David had added to the rock at the feet of Napoleon’s horse which read
“Napoleon” and “Hannibal.” Although these changes may simply reflect the practicalities of mass-produced prints, they may also reflect a change in emphasis, from the historical validation of the Emperor to his ability to command and inspire a large force.
Figure 3-1: N. Currier, Napoleon Crossing the Alps, 1835-1856, print, lithograph, hand colored, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA. 34
Similarly, the reproduction of Napoleon, Emperor of France, echoes the original painting by Jean Auguste-Dominique Ingres, yet with changed made by the printers, either for practical or ideological purposes. In Napoleon, Emperor of France, Napoleon sits enthroned on what appears to be the top of the world, between two eagles and two allegorical figures. The French emperor wears a crown of laurels, symbolic of his authority, and in one hand holds a scepter with its fingers raised in a Christ-benediction, while the other hand reaches out as if to confer a blessing
(or the ceremony of the royal touch) on the earth beneath him. The splendor and wealth of his robes is emphasized through the use of gold and the “royal” colors of red and purple on his robes and throne. Thus this print of Emperor Napoleon emphasized the regal and authoritative qualities of Napoleon, while his gestures and halo like crown of laurels echo visual imagery of
Christ.
35
Figure 3-2: N. Currier, Napoleon Emperor of France, 1847, print, lithograph, hand colored, Library of Congress Prints and Photograph Division Washington, D.C. 20540, USA. Although it is unlikely that Currier & Ives are suggesting Napoleon is Christ like, or like a saint,
it is possible that this print is attempting to depict Napoleon as the savior of France, ruling by the
will of god, in much the same way the Ancient Regime justified their role as the rulers of France.
This print is especially interesting when contrasted with the “log cabin” ideal that mid nineteenth
century presidential candidates boasted of to prove their humble origins, and thus present
themselves as true representatives of the people. Napoleon Emperor of France clearly exhibits
none of these humble origins, only his regal qualities, and thus it is his regal manliness and not
political traits that are emphasized by this print.
Figure 3-3: Currier & Ives, Napoleon in the Highest Degree of His Prosperity, print, lithograph, hand colored, Currier and Ives Gallery, C4370, G4740 36
Another print produced by Currier & Ives, shown above, was entitled Napoleon at the Highest
Degree of his Prosperity, and depicts Napoleon in his imperial regalia, symbols of his conquests, and his arm around a boy who the viewer assumes is his son. The print thus suggests that success is not only measured in Napoleon’s military and governmental accomplishments, but in his children as well. In fact, Napoleon’s military accomplishments are only peripheral details of the print, and his son is the accomplishment that is given the greatest detail and occupies a place in the print that is secondary only to Napoleon himself. The owner of such a print would conceivably have thus been one who valued the traits of paternity and the domestic responsibilities of a man. Even for the “Great Emperor Napoleon” the highest degree of his prosperity is in his domesticity.
None of the Currier & Ives prints show Napoleon as anything less that regal and prosperous, even the Battle of Waterloo shows Napoleon calm, steady and regal amidst the carnage that surrounds him. The victor of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington is not even depicted, and the print even shows a Scottish prisoner eyeing Napoleon with a look of interest, rather than one of hate or fright. 37
Figure 3-4 N. Currier, Battle of Waterloo, June 18 1815, print , lithograph, hand colored, 1835- 1856 Currier & Ives : a catalogue raisonné / compiled by Gale Research. Detroit, MI : Gale Research, c1983, no. 0489. While each of these prints emphasizes a different Napoleonic trait, they all emphasize
traits that Americans valued in their conceptions of manhood, military might, personal glory and
paternity. Thus, an American who would have hung one of these popular prints in their home or
business would presumable have admired these traits and felt that Napoleon was a supreme
example of a figure who embodied manliness and success.
In addition to prints and images of Napoleon, there were songs and odes written to the
French Emperor and preformed at town halls and in concert venues across America. Like the
Currier & Ives prints these songs were produced for popular rather than elite audiences, and were
thus short melodies that seem to have been comprised of simple tunes. One such composition
was entitled The Grave of Bonaparte, written by L. Heath in the mid nineteenth century, which
was reproduced by Thomas M. Scroggy onto embellished song sheets and sold “wholesale and 38
retail.”7 The Grave of Bonaparte mourns the passing of the French general, with the chorus lamenting “no sound can wake him to glory again.”8 In a concert given in the “Town Hall” on
Wednesday May 10, 1848, The Grave of Bonaparte is listed among the “popular songs” of L.
Heath to be preformed that evening. In fact, L. Heath is introduced as the author of The Grave of
Bonaparte demonstrating that this was one of his most popular compositions, and testifying further to the prominence of the French Emperor in popular culture. Another song written about
Napoleon in the antebellum era was entitled Dream of Napoleon Bonaparte in which a man recounts a dream he had of the Emperor Napoleon, who told him, “When I crossed the rude Alps famed in story; With the legions of France, for her sons were in my pride; And led them to honor and glory,” the song continues, “and wherever my banner the eagle unfurl’d; ‘Twas the standard of freedom all over the world.”9 Thus just as the Currier & Ives print of Napoleon Crossing The
Alps glorifies the military spirit and victories of Napoleon, so too does this popular song, but depicts him also as a heroic spreader of liberty and freedom, bringing honor and glory to his own troops.
In addition to prints and songs, the figure of Napoleon was popular among American generals and military tacticians. General Winfield Scott, one of the two principal generals of the
Mexican War, actually modeled the United States Army after the Napoleonic example, and produced a system of tactics which borrowed heavily from the French tactics of 1815
(Napoleonic Tactics). In his book General Regulations, which was instrumental in the development of the U.S. Army prior to the Mexican War, Scott drew largely from French essays
7 Henry S. Washburn, The Grave of Napoleon Bonaparte, printed by Thomas M. Scroogy (Philadelphia: Card and Fancy Job Printers, 1853-1857). 8 Washburn. see Appendix A for reproduction of the entire song. 9 Alfred W. Auner, John H. Johnson, Dream of Napoleon Bonaparte (Philadelphia: American Antiquarian Society and Newsbank, 1860-1869). See Appendix A for reproduction of Dream of Napoleon Bonaparte. 39
about the governance of armies and campaigns as well as from Napoleonic campaign manuals. 10
Additionally, Denis Hart Mahan taught a course at West Point during this period that stressed
Napoleonic military theory and the study of the Napoleonic campaigns.11
Perhaps the most important inspiration for the popular conception of Napoleon was the
numerous biographies and accounts of the Napoleonic Wars that were published in America
during the antebellum era. Just before the outbreak of the Mexican War Aldophe Thiers’ History
of the Consulate and Empire Under Napoleon (1845) and William Hazlitt’s Life of Napoleon
Bonaparte (1847) were published in the United States, along with American editions of W.F.P.
Napier and Charles William Vane’s histories of the Peninsular War between Napoleon and
Spain. These works became popular among American readers, and were reproduced in
periodicals such as The Literary World, which printed Hazlitt’s work in six parts during 1847.12
The works were so popular among Americans that one review said of Hazlitt, “These six numbers of Napoleon’s life contain more to fascinate the attention and excite the feelings than any fifty novels we ever read.”13 In addition to the publication of European biographies and
works on Napoleon in American editions, the antebellum era also saw the publication of the first
two American works written about Napoleon, Joel Tyler Headley’s Napoleon and His Marshals
published in 1846 followed by John Steven Cabot Abbott’s History of Napoleon Bonaparte,
published in 1855. Unlike modern biographies, these were not works produced by professional
historians who were interested in producing objective and scholarly works on their subjects;
10 Robert M. Epstein, “The Creation and Evolution of the Army Corps in the American Civil War,” The Journal Of Military History, Vol 55. No 1 (Jan, 1991), 21- 46. 11 Epstein, 21-46 12 Johannsen, 77 13 “Review 1- No Title” Ladies National Magazine, v XI no 5, (May 1847). 197. 40
rather, Headley and Abbott sought to tell a dramatic and romantic story that would appeal to a
broad American public.14
Napoleon and His Marshals, written just as America entered into conflict with Mexico, used language and prose that was extremely similar to American justifications of the Mexican
War. Written in two volumes, and reproduced in numerous editions, Napoleon and His Marshals
gives a history of Napoleon first as a general and then as an Emperor, honoring Napoleon and the
“distinguished men Bonaparte gathered around him, and with whom he obtained and held the vast power he wielded."15 As the first book about the French Emperor written by an American,
Headley’s Napoleon and His Marshals was intended to “clear his [Napoleon’s] character from
the aspersions of English historians, and the slanders of his enemies.”16 Headley believed that
until his biography, the image of Napoleon in America had been tainted by biased historians, and
that a proper conception of the French Emperor could not be drawn from the works of his
enemies alone. Headley was not just an author, but an editor of the New York Tribune, alongside
Horace Greeley, and was an ardent supporter of American expansionism, explaining that “war
waged for principle, is the same as that carried on by the direct command of heaven.”17 Thus
Napoleon and His Marshals was a popularized history of the French Emperor, written from the
point of view of a Democrat and expansionist. It espoused the same ideals and beliefs to justify
the actions of the Napoleon as Americans did to justify their own territorial ambitions. 18
Among the biographies produced on Napoleon included an extremely popular and comprehensive illustrated History of Napoleon Bonaparte written by John Stevens Cabot Abbott
14 Geroge H. Callcott, “Historians in Nineteenth Century America,” The New England Quarterly, 32:4 (December 1959), 496-50. 15 Joel Tyler Headley, Napoleon and Hi Marshals, 1:4 (New York: Baker and Scribner, 1846), i. 16 Headley, iv. 17Headley, iv. 18 This point will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter, in which the image of Napoleon during the Mexican American War is examined at greater length. 41
in 1854. Begun as a series of articles written for Harpers Monthly Magazine, John S.C. Abbott’s
History of Napoleon Bonaparte comprised of two volumes, comprising about 600 pages each,
with text embellished with prints and engravings. The work was “astonishingly cheep” and
extremely popular, reprinted several times throughout the nineteenth century, and in the
Encyclopedia Britannica Hugh Chrishlom credits the work as being “partisan and unscholarly,
but widely popular and very readable”.19 The biography covers the life of Napoleon Bonaparte
from his infancy through his entombment at the Invalides in Paris, and like Headley, Abbott
takes an extremely favorable view of Napoleon throughout the entire series. As a source of
Napoleon’s popular image, Abbott presented a version of the French Emperor that provided a
hybrid of Antebellum intellectual ideals of Martial and Restrained manhood.20 Abbott goes even farther than Joel Headley does, and in addition to lauding Napoleon as the democratic hero of
France, the savior of the Republic, and the foe of aristocracy. Abbott actually presents Napoleon as a purveyor of peace throughout Europe, and excuses even the most egregious transgressions of Napoleon by claiming they were done for the glory of France, for misunderstood moral reasons, or because he had no other alternative, and in each case Napoleon’s actions were only committed with the utmost guilt and regret on the part of the Emperor.
To understand Abbott’s Napoleon, who became a staple in the American consciousness, it is first important to understand the author himself. John Stevens Cabot Abbott was a minister in the Congregational Church who published numerous popular histories and books on Christian
19 “Review 1- No Title” New York Evangelist, 23:7, (July 1 1823), 108; Hugh Chrishlom, Encyclopedia Britannica, 11:1 “Abbott, John Stevens Cabot (1805-1877),” (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1910), 26 20 In my next chapter I will deal with the conflicting images of martial and restrained manhood, and how American authors and intellectuals used the figure of Napoleon to either present an ideal of Martial manhood or provide a warning against militarism and in favor of restrained manhood. 42
ethics. 21 Included in Abbott’s works on Christian ethics is a guide entitled The Mother At Home, and its companion work, The Child at Home, which were intended to afford “mothers in the common walks of life, plain and simple instruction in respect to the right discharge of their maternal duties, and at the same time, some practical aid in leading the minds of their children to proper views of their obligations to god, to their parents, and to one another.”22 At one point,
Abbott actually used Napoleon as a model for mothers in his work, and in his chapter entitled
“The Mother’s Difficulties” Abbott told mothers
but few persons have ever exemplified a more correct knowledge of human nature than Napoleon, and few have ever exerted such a control over the mind… when the ravages of a Parisian mob were scattering terror through the city, Napoleon himself went to suppress it. He led on at a quick step several companies of artillery. Immediately upon arriving at the scene of devastation the soldiers retiring to the right and left opened upon the riotous multitude the formidable cannon. Not a word was said not a moment of hesitation intervened but at once the voice of Napoleon was heard in the thunder of the artillery and the compact mass of the multitude was plowed through by a cannon ball. The mob unprepared for such decisive measures and terrified at the havoc fled with the utmost precipitancy in every direction. Then did he pour in his blank cartridges, Peal after peal thundered through the streets adding to the consternation of the affrighted multitude and in a very few minutes scarcely a solitary straggler was to be seen. The whole effect was produced by one ball fired at the proper time. Such was the general character of the measures which this extraordinary man adopted and which gave him an ascendency over the public mind almost unparalleled in the history of man. Someone afterward suggested to him. in respect to the case above described that it would have been more merciful if he had first tried the effect of blank charges, and then, if necessary, had proceeded to extremities. But he very justly replied, that by such tardy measures the mob would have had time to collect their courage, and many more would have fallen before they could have been compelled to fly.
Now the principle illustrated in this anecdote is of universal application. Real benevolence prompts to decisive measures. The mother who first coaxes, then threatens, then pretends to punish, then punishes a little, and finally a little more,—is only making trouble for herself and sorrow for her family. But, on the other hand, if she promptly meets acts of disobedience with firmness, and inflicts necessary punishment decidedly, and at once, she is, in the most effectual way, promoting her own happiness, and the best welfare of her child.23
21 Chrishlom, 26 22 John S.C. Abbott, The Mother At Home, or the Principles of Maternal Duty Familiarly Illustrated (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1855), v. 23 Abbott, The Mother at Home, 98-102 43
Abbott offered a model of manly authority and an example of a military leader to instruct mothers how to raise their children, almost suggesting that women should act like men in raising their children. Abbott was not suggesting that women emulate just any man, but Napoleon, a general and conqueror and emperor of France. Throughout the work, women were not instructed to follow the examples of specific women, but rather unnamed mothers of great historical men or the men themselves. Thus, if one is to examine Napoleon within the context of Abbott’s literature and works, for Abbott Napoleon becomes a demigod and the purveyor not just of a military ideal or an ideal of manhood, but the ideal of humanity and Christianity. He thus combined both martial and restrained characteristics, ones that could serve as examples to both men and mothers.
Abbott was not writing works or biographies that he meant to be read by the intellectual elite of America; rather his works were intended for people from “common walks of life.” It makes sense that Abbott’s Napoleon was “the foe of aristocratic privilege.”24 Abbott also intended the History of Napoleon Bonaparte to be “a powerful advocate of the cause of peace.”
Thus Napoleon according to Abbott – and Abbott’s was the Napoleon that gained popularity in
America -- was one who exhibited values of individualism and of the middle class Christians, one who exhibited the values even of the Congregational Church.
When Abbott’s History of Napoleon Bonaparte was published, it met with mixed reviews from literary critics. Some magazines and newspapers praised the work, calling it one of the
“best biographies of Napoleon extant. It has never been surpassed in vivacity of style, and true glow of description, by any contribution to the life of the great plebian Emperor. It is far from the exaggeration and clap-trap of Headley, the conservative prejudice of Scott, the audacious
24 Abbott, The Mother at Home, v; John S.C. Abbott, History of Napoleon Bonaparte, 1 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1855), iv. 44
extravagance of Hazlitt, tracking the career of Napoleon with evident admiration of his transcendental talent, but without losing sight of his moral defects.”25 However, the Universalist
Quarterly and General Review, which called Napoleon an “extraordinary genius” whose
“ascendancy had the effect of weakening the crowned despotisms of Europe,” still criticized
Abbott’s work saying “we feel that Mr. Abbott has been misled by his enthusiasm, and that,
unconsciously he has given his hero altogether too much of a saintly halo.”26 Graham’s
American Monthly Magazine of Literature, Art and Fashion, which likely targeted a more elite
and intellectual audience, criticized the work highly, saying, “The concluding paragraph [of the
Introduction] caps the climax of Mr. Abbott’s hallucination, by showing that his faith in
Napoleon is equal to his faith in religion…Indeed Mr. Abbott’s Napoleon is not only a good
man, but something of a goodey--a sort of Sunday school teacher raised to imperial power, and
compelled, much against his will, by naughty Austrians and perfidious Englishmen, to spend his life in fighting.”27 One publication, The New York Daily Tribune, even called it a “clerical
romance… our Reverend redactor swallows the whole and turns out Napoleon as a meek, self-
sacrificing, saint, who has no craving for dominion, no stomach for slaughter, and only fought
because the wicked aristocrats wouldn’t let him alone!”28 However, despite the criticism by the
intellectual elite, Abbott’s History of Napoleon Bonaparte remained one of the most popular
biographies of the French Emperor through the end of the nineteenth century, and thus was
instrumental in shaping the popular conception of Napoleon Bonaparte.29
25 Undated and unidentified clipping, America's Historic Newspapers, Archive of Americana 26 “Review 2- No Title” The Universalist Quarterly and General Review, v 12 (July 1855), 324. 27 “Review 1 – No Title”Graham’s American Monthly Magazine of Literature, Art and Fashion (1844-1858), vol XLVIII no. 2, (Aug. 1855), 174. 28 “Abbott’s Napoleon” New York Daily Tribune, (Feb 13, 1854), 2 29 Interestingly, neither Headley’s nor Abbott’s work discusses Napoleon’s attempts to appease and welcome back the French Émigrés. Additionally, neither positive nor negative reviews, that I have come across, mention this omission. 45
What is most extraordinary about the History of Napoleon Bonaparte, and thus the popular conception of Napoleon in the nineteenth century as it was molded by Abbott, is the way in which Abbott excused, apologized for and sometimes complimented even the most egregious acts of Napoleon. When explaining Napoleon’s decision to poison the sick at Jaffa, Abbott wrote,
At Jaffa, among the multitude of the sick, there were seven found near to death. They were dying of the plague, and could not be removed. Napoleon himself fearlessly went into the plague hospital, passed through all its wards, and spoke words of sympathy and encouragement to the sufferers. The eyes of the dying were turned to him, and followed his steps, with indescribable affection, as he passed from cot to cot. The seven, who were in such a condition that their removal was impossible, Napoleon for some time contemplated with the most tender solicitude. He could not endure the thought of leaving them to be taken by the Turks, for the Turks tortured to death every prisoner who fell into their hands. He at least suggested to the physician the expediency of administering to them an opium pill, which would expedite, by a few hours, their death and thus save them from the hands of their cruel foe. The physician game the highly admired reply, ‘My profession is to cure, not to kill!’ Napoleon reflected a moment in silence, and said no more upon the subject but left a rear-guard of five hundred men to protect until the last should have expired. For this suggestion Napoleon has been severely censured. However much it may indicate mistaken views of Christian duty, it certainly does not indicate a cruel disposition. It was his tenderness of heart and his love for the soldiers which led to the proposal.30
Instead of condemning Napoleon for poisoning the soldiers at Jaffa so that he could continue his expedition unhindered by the ill men, which is what historians generally agree happened at Jaffa,
Abbott claims that Napoleon’s desire to kill the soldiers was an act of mercy, saving them from the hands of the Turks. Abbott presents Napoleon not as an ambitious and ruthless general, but as a paternalistic and compassionate figure, whose concern was for the well being of others. It is not Napoleon who is amoral and unchristian, but the critics of Napoleon, who have a misguided understanding of Christian duty. Abbott’s characterization of Napoleon thus presents him as a
30 Abbott, History of Napoleon Bonaparte, 229:1 46
demigod, above reprehension, a hyperbolic personification of a compassionate and moral
general.
The Napoleon of American popular culture was thus very different from the figure of
Napoleon that was used by politicians and the intellectual elite in the early republic and
Antebellum era, where he was a politically charged symbol of republicanism or military tyranny.
To middle class Americans Napoleon was a romantic and heroic figure, one that they could idolize as an anti-aristocratic European figure, an individual who represented the struggle for prosperity and the challenge of defining the individual in a rapidly changing society.
47
Chapter 4
Ideals of Napoleonic Manhood in Antebellum America
The nineteenth century in Western European history is often called an age of
expansionism, when European nations were looking for new territorial outlets and building their
empires, pushing the limits of their borders and bringing “civilization” to previously uncivilized nations in the form of Christianity, technology and enlightened ideals. As a country that still had political and cultural links with Europe, America too began to look for ways of expanding and enlarging her borders, looking to push her borders west towards the Pacific Ocean. With the
Louisiana Purchase in 1803, many Americans began to envision a republic which stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and began to believe that it was their “destiny” to spread American civilization to the west. Coined “Manifest Destiny” by John L. O’Sullivan, the American push west culminated in the Mexican-American War, which began in 1846 and lasted until 1848 under the presidency of Democrat James K. Polk. It resulted in the addition of California,
Nevada, New Mexico and Texas to the territory of the United States. However, not all
Americans supported the territorial expansion of the United States, and many felt that imperialism contradicted republican ideals, and that territorial expansion would cause the collapse of the American republic. The most ardent anti-expansionist Americans were usually
Northern Whigs, including famous figures such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and many from the intellectual elite. Thus Antebellum America was divided between those who supported territorial expansion, and believed that it was the destiny of America to reach the Pacific Ocean, and those who felt that the acquisition of new territory was a threat to American ideals and her republican institutions. 48
The Antebellum era witnessed a multitude of changes to American society, both socially
and economically. According to historian Amy Greenberg, rapid expansionism, industrialization,
urbanization, increased immigration, and agitation for women’s rights made many men feel that
their manhood or “male identity” was eroding. Men began to struggle to redefine “manly
character.” 1 In light of these “threats” to manhood, two different ideals of masculinity evolved --
those who favored “martial” manhood and those who favored “restrained manhood.” Martial
manhood emphasized militarism and bravery in battle, self-confidence and independence from
family and the law, as well as a republican spirit.2 Putnams Monthly Magazine described “Men
of Character” as men who were independent and fearless, who were not “influenced by the
position a man holds or the clothes he wears.”3 Thus martial men were expected to display their
manhood in public forums, and the Mexican War provided young men with an ideal opportunity
to display their manliness.
To justify the War with Mexico and the annexation of Texas, American expansionists espoused a paternalistic mission of bringing liberty and republican values to “uncivilized”
Mexico; in much the same way they claimed Napoleon had rescued France and the continent of
Europe from its oppressive and tyrannical leaders. Napoleon became a model for American military leaders and was depicted as a defender of republican ideals against tyranny, and a spreader of those ideals to other nations.4 However, although the eulogizers of Napoleon praised
1 Amy S Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 139. When making her argument Amy Greenberg also quotes G.J. Barker-Benfield, The Horrors of the Half Known Life: Male Attitudes Toward Women and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century America, 2nd ed. (New York: 2000), 189. 2 Greenberg, 135. 3 Greenberg, 137. Quoting “Men of Character,” Putnams Monthly Magazine (March 1854), 267-9. The phrases martial and restrained manhood were coined by Amy Greenberg to explain the differences in the ideals of manhood during the Antebellum era. 4 Robert W. Johannsen, To The Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press), 76. 49
and glorified his traits of individualism, his bravery and his anti aristocratic mission, they did not
see Napoleon as a true martial an, and instead of praising Napoleon’s militarism they excused his
wars as wars of self defense, and even went so far as to see him as a spreader of peace and
prosperity throughout Europe. For these authors, Napoleon represented a middle-class and
American ideal, the example of what an individual could achieve through hard work and a persevering spirit. However, for advocates of restrained manhood, who believed that the primary role of a man was to be the family provider and the moral example for his peers, the figure of
Napoleon was not one of a republican Emperor, but rather one that presented a warning, both to
young men and to the United States, against the dangers of militarism and ambition. The
Americans who considered the figure of Napoleon to be a threat and a warning to American cultural values and institutions tended to be Americans of the cultural and intellectual elite, who saw the rise of a figure such as Napoleon to be a threat to their own values and institutions.
Napoleonic as a Role Model for Martial Man
Two authors who were instrumental in promoting the image of Napoleon as the epitome of an American middle-class man and leader were Joel Tyler Headley and John S.C. Abbott,
American authors who wrote popular biographies about Napoleon and his career that emphasized
the “American” and “manly” traits of Napoleon. Both of these authors highlighted Napoleon’s
“martial traits,” finding in Napoleon the ideal man who was supremely self confident and acted
independently of established maxims, who was fearless in battle, and who treated other men in a
republican manner, uninfluenced by their background or the “clothes he wears.”5 To these
proponents of Napoleon’s martial traits, Napoleon was a republican leader, promoted by the
people of France, and the Napoleonic Wars were justified because Napoleon brought
5 Putnams Monthly Magazine, 1854 50
republicanism to the “despotic” nations of Europe, and protected them against the aristocratic designs of the English, in much the same way America was spreading republican ideals and values to uncivilized Mexico. However, these proponents of Napoleon’s martial traits justified such traits by portraying Napoleon as the spreader of peace, and an anti-aristocratic hero, and thus Napoleon was not simply an arbitrary conqueror, but the proponent the cause of liberty.
One of the traits that proponents of martial manhood most valued in Napoleon was his independence and self reliance, the ability to challenge the maxims of society and use his own courage and intellect to elevate himself above his peers to achieve success. Because Napoleon began as an unprivileged Corsican, with no noble title that would help to achieve prominence in
France through the system of nepotism, and then rose through the military ranks based solely on his talent and individual merits, he became the ideal representative of these traits. In Napoleon and His Marshals, Headley praised the independence and self reliance of Napoleon. When describing the siege of Toulon, Headley wrote that Napoleon, “Curled his lips at the science of the oldest generals in the army, with an assurance that astonished them…throughout his after career; in those long protracted efforts… We ever find him standing alone, calling none but himself to his aid… with the same easy confidence he vaulted to the throne of France.”6 Thus
Napoleon’s martial traits, self-confidence, and willingness to act independently of established maxims and wisdom were the elements that contributed to his success and rise to power. By praising these traits as the ones which “vaulted” Napoleon to the “throne of France” Headley is providing young Americans with an example of how they themselves may achieve success.
Similarly, in John S.C. Abbott’s History of Napoleon Bonaparte the author often presented the judgments and actions of Napoleon as superior to those around him, and credited this superiority
6 Joel Tyler Headley, Napoleon and His Marshals, v.1, 4th ed., (New York: Baker and Scribner, 1846), 39. 51
to Napoleon’s independence, explaining that he secluded himself from his peers at school and
“buried himself in the midst of his books and his maps. While the rest were wasting their time in
dissipation and in frivolous amusements, he consecrated his days and nights with untiring
assiduity to study. He almost immediately elevated himself above his companions.”7 Thus, it was
Napoleon’s independent spirit that caused him to be a successful student, and this manly virtue was something that should be emulated by young men in order to achieve success.
However, while Abbott presents Napoleon as independent from his fellow students and peers, he does not ascribe to Napoleon the martial trait of independence from law, and in fact
Abbott credits Napoleon as being a “firm friend of strict discipline” who “gave his support to established authority.”8 Napoleon was totally independent of his peers and exercised self-
reliance, but he was not completely martial and lawless; instead he respected authority which
merited his respect. Abbott does tell the reader that there was one exception: Napoleon “took no
interest in the study of the German language” and thus the German professor “entertained a very
contemptible opinion of the talents of his pupil.” Napoleon did not give due diligence to
authority that did not warrant it, and in that respect still exhibited a martial characteristic. 9 Not only did American authors highlight these virtues of Napoleon, thus implying that these were ideal characteristics to which all should aspire, but Americans were explicitly encouraged to emulate Napoleon’s middle class traits. The Boys’ and Girls’ Magazine and Fireside
Compansion told young men and women “he was a poor boy, his remarkable genius and energy raised him to the highest eminence… A portrait of delicacy, energy and perseverance, which you
7 John S.C. Abbott, History of Napoleon Bonaparte, 6 vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1855), 1:23-24. See previous chapter for a discussion of John S.C. Abbott and the popular implications of his work. 8 Abbott, 25 9 Abbott, 25 52
may emulate.”10 Thus the image of Napoleon provided a lesson for young middle class American
men in how self-confidence, independence, and the proper balance of skepticism and respect for
authority could elevate one to the highest levels of success.
Not only did Napoleon exhibit martial independence and self confidence for young men
to emulate, but he was also the epitome of an American martial military man. Napoleon was
renowned for his skill as a military tactician, but many publications also praised Napoleon as a
just and fair general, who exhibited an almost republican spirit in the promotion of officers of his
army, exhibiting the ideal of a leader who was not “influenced by the position a man holds.”11
John Abbott wrote of numerous instances in which Napoleon demonstrated such a spirit when looking to promote officers in his army. For example, when describing the conclusion of the
Battle of Ulm, Abbott wrote
In crossing a swollen stream the captain of a company was swept away by the torrent. A soldier, whom that captain had degraded in consequence of some fault of discipline, plunged into the stream, and saved the life of the drowning officer. Napoleon heard of it. Immediately he sent for the soldier. ‘You are a brave man,’ said he. ‘Your captain had degraded you, and he had reason to do so. In saving his life, you have proved that there is no rancor in your breast. This is noble. You are now at quits. But as for me, I am not at quits toward you. I appoint you quarter-master, and make you chevalier of the Legion of Honor.’12
Thus Abbott’s Napoleon recognized those soldiers who were deserving of merit and promoted
them the by the virtue of their merits, in a truly republican manner, rather than by the nature of
their birth. Even professional soldiers studied and imitated Napoleon. One volunteer, in his
campaign speech for captain inspired his fellow soldiers by saying “tis customary to emulate the
10 Mark Forrester, “Napoleon Bonaparte,” Boys’ and Girls’ Magazine and Fireside Companion, 1 (January 1, 1848), 27. 11 Puntnams Monthly Magazine, March 1854 12 Abbott, 473-474:1 53
high war bearing of… Napoleon.”13 Thus the figure of Napoleon was clearly present in the consciousness of American soldiers during the Mexican War and was held as a standard which soldiers idolized and sought to imitate. This speech was printed in a periodical entitled The Spirit
of the Times, which was a sporting paper, and written primarily for men. The printing of the
“Speech of Captain Foot to his Company” thus was clearly intended to inspire young men to achieve the Napoleonic standard.
The way Napoleon treated his officers and soldiers was highly praised by American authors. J.T. Headley, when addressing the moral character of Napoleon, says, “he was capable of great generosity,” and thus was not influenced by the origins of the men who fought under his banner.14 Moreover, many American generals were compared to Napoleon in praise thus giving
their military exploits credibility. J.T. Headley, for example, dedicated his book Napoleon and
His Marshals to General Winfield Scott, thus equating Scott’s own deeds to those of Napoleon.
Zachary Taylor was also compared to Napoleon, with one author writing, “we were all satisfied, for never did Napoleon…possess in a more unbound degree the confidence of his men and his officers.”15 Both the dedication of Napoleon and His Marshals to General Scott and the comparison of General Taylor to Napoleon demonstrate that many in America recognized
Napoleon to be the ideal military man, whose bravery and fearlessness other military men and
Americans should aspire to imitate. Additionally, in The History of Napoleon Bonaparte John
S.C. Abbott continually praised Napoleon’s bravery in battle, and highlighted this martial characteristic throughout his book. When describing the March to Cairo and the Battle of the
13 “Speech of Captain Foot to his Company,” Spirit of the Times, a chronicle of the Turf, agriculture, field sports, lite. 17 (Novemebr 27, 1847). 14 Headley, 52. 15 Johannson , 116. Johannson includes this quote in his chapter about a “new stock of heroes,” but it is unclear from his endnotes where this quote originated. It is most likely from J.W. Gibson’s Letter Descriptive of the Battle of Buena Vista (Lawrenceburg, Ind. 1847), 2. 54
Pyramids, Abbott wrote “twenty-four thousand men were stationed with powerful artillery and
musketry to sweep his [Napoleon’s] ranks, and a formidable body of ten thousand horsemen, on
fleet and powerful Arabian steeds, awaiting the onset, and ready to seize upon the slightest
indications of confusion, to plunge with the fury which fatalism can inspire, upon his bleeding
and mangled squares. It must have been with Napoleon a moment of intense anxiety. But as he
sat upon his horse in the centre of one of the squares… no one could discern the least trace of
uneasiness.”16 Napoleon’s ability, according to Abbott, to retain his composure in the face of
hordes of foreign soldiers, who could be likened to the Mexicans in their foreign nature,
exemplified the martial man, fearless in the face of battle.
In using Napoleon as an exemplar for young men, and as an example of the ultimate ideal
of manhood, American authors created in the American consciousness a vision of an ideal
political leader, one who was strong and confident and fearless. While these qualities were
important, no American author could justify giving such praise to a tyrant, who stood against the
republican ideals of America. Thus, to the martial American imagination, Napoleon did not
represent a French tyrant; rather he became a republican leader, one who originated as a common
citizen. Although he was not elected to office in the way American republican leaders were, so
popular among the French citizens was he that he was still a representative of the masses. One of
the most often cited examples of the “republican” nature of Napoleon was his return from the
island of Elba and the 100 days. Many Americans found that because Napoleon had been re-
elevated to the French throne with so much popular support that his return resulted in no blood
shed, that it was akin to a popular election. Throughout Napoleon and His Marshals Headley praised Napoleon as a republican leader, and in his description of Napoleon’s return from Elba
16 Abbott, 194 55
he wrote, “Without any plotting beforehand… he boldly cast himself on the affections of the
people. An established throne, a strong government, and a powerful army were on one side-- the
love of the people on the other.”17 Thus Headley claimed that although not popularly elected,
Napoleon still governed at the behest of the French people and might qualify as a republican
ruler.
Abbott saw Napoleon in a similar light, claiming that Napoleon exercised power on behalf of the French people, and that the French wanted Bonaparte to be their sole sovereign.
Thus despite not having been popularly elected nor sharing power with anyone else, Napoleon
still reigned in the republican spirit. Abbott recorded that “The people did not relish this
declaration [by Napoleon’s enemies] that Napoleon had become an advocate of the rights of
Kings. Napoleon had achieved all his victories and attained his supremacy as the recognized
advocate of the rights of the people.” 18 Even authors who acknowledged that Napoleon was a tyrannical ruler still ascribed to him republican attributes. One writer even contended that the
French people wanted an emperor, and that Napoleon, by crowning himself Emperor, was reigning by the will of the people and could still be seen as exhibiting the virtues of a republican leader. In an article published in the American Literary Magazine entitled “The Coronation of
Napoleon,” Napoleon’s reign was justified this way: “The French people were grateful for the immense services he [Napoleon] rendered them… public opinion… ran rapidly towards the centralization of authority and the people willingly submitted to a government alike, splendid
17 Headley, 57 18 Abbott, 349 56
and strong which gave them security and protection.”19 Thus, even Napoleon’s centralization of
authority and despotism were desired by the French people.
As the model republican ruler and martial man, Napoleon Bonaparte epitomized the
defender of republicanism and democracy in Europe. In much the same way as the Americans
were spreading republican ideals to the people of Mexico, Napoleon was seen as the savior of
nations from their tyrannical and absolutist monarchs, thus justifying his program of militarism
in the same way that American militarism was justified. John S.C. Abbott summed up this
position perfectly, writing
Napoleon was now compelled to gather up his strength to contend against England upon the sea, the gigantic empire of Russia in the North, and the insurgents of Spain and Portugal in the South, roused, strengthened, and guided by the armies of Great Britain. It was a Herculean enterprise. With Herculean energy Napoleon went forth to meet it. His allies rallied around him with enthusiasm. It was the struggle of liberty against despotism. It was a struggle of the friends of reformed governments and of popular rights throughout Europe against the partisans of the old feudal aristocracy.20
By comparing Napoleon’s struggle to the labors of Hercules, the ultimate figure of masculinity,
Abbott emphasized the monumentality of Napoleon’s task and his role in bringing democracy to
the rest of Europe. This “struggle of liberty against despotism” was often equated to America’s
own struggle against England in the Revolutionary war, with one paper writing “Napoleon…like
our own revolutionary struggle, was equal rights defending against tyranny.”21 Other articles
used the same language to praise the “democratic” struggle of Napoleon, with Joel Tyler
Headley writing, “He [Napoleon] was not only defending France against aggression, but democracy against aristocracy-equal rights against privileged oppression…This single man, this plebian, stood up amid the monarchies of Europe and bending his imperial frown on the faithless
19 George Henry Burnham, “The Coronation of Napoleon,” The American Literary Magazine, 2 no. 4 (April 1848), 217. 20 Abbott, 201 v2. 21 “New Publications,” New York Observer and Chronicle, 24 no. 19 (May 1846), 74. 57
Kings that surrounded him, smote their royal foreheads with blow after blow.”22 Again,
Napoleon is portrayed as the champion of democracy, a hero for Americans to admire. These
authors were not anomalies, and their language although seemingly hyperbolic, was the language
used by many others who wrote about the Napoleonic wars. One reviewer of Captain W.
Siborne’s History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815 wrote, “The cause of Napoleon was
the cause of France, of humanity, and of the world… the soldiers of freedom contended against
the hirelings of absolutism.”23 Thus Napoleon’s Empire could be justified because it spread
republican ideals throughout Europe and rescued nations from their tyrannical leaders. Abbott
even explicitly told readers that nations welcomed Napoleon as their savior, writing that upon
entering Vienna Napoleon and his army were, “received with loud and long shouts and welcome
by the populace, hungering for Republican liberty.”24
During the Antebellum period many Americans believed that their form of republican
government was unique, and that they had a “model republic.” Additionally, many justifications
for the United States’ war with Mexico claimed that as a model republic America had a duty to
“rescue” her neighbor from the tyranny and oppression of the Mexican government, just as
Napoleon had rescued Europe from the despotism and oppression of its ancient regime tyrants.25
The author to the introduction of the American edition of W.F. P. Napier’s History of the War in the Peninsula, and in the South of France; From the Year 1807 to the Year 1814 drew implicit comparisons between the war in Spain and the American war with Mexico, finding France to
22 Headley, 26-57. 23 “Review 3- No Title”, The Western Reserve, 1:1 (April 1846), 38 24 Abbott, 1: 155 25 Johannsen, 288. 58
represent the “cause of civilization.”26 Additionally, in Napoleon and His Marshals, Headley drew specific parallels between the Napoleonic wars and the Mexican war, and when he justified
Napoleon’s position as Emperor he wrote, “As ignorant of liberty and undisciplined, as the South
American states and Mexico, she [France] would have been rocked like them with endless revolutions, until European powers had overcome her, and replaced a Bourbon on the throne.”27
Thus Napoleon brought liberty and discipline to France, just as America would bring liberty and discipline to Mexico.
Not only did Napoleon and America share the cause of spreading democracy to Spanish- speaking tyrannical dictatorships, but they also shared what was perceived as a common enemy,
England. The chief protagonist in Napoleon’s quest to “free Europe from tyranny” had been
England, a country which still figured largely in the American consciousness and resentment from the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. One of the popular arguments in favor of territorial expansion during the mid-nineteenth century was the argument that America needed to protect herself against an England that surely wanted nothing more than to re-subjugate the
United States of America by conquering a vulnerable Mexico and Texas. English presence in
Mexico and Texas would her to compete economically with the United States, and would give
England a presence on United States borders from which she could easily invade. Anglophobia thus figured largely in the American psyche during the antebellum era.28
To many, Napoleon became the personification of American Anglophobia and anxiety of
English aims towards the United States. One author who clearly saw Napoleon as the defender of
26 Johannsen, 74.Citing W.F.P Napier History of the War in the Peninsula, and in the South of France; from the year 1807 to the year 1814 (New York, 1847), iii-v. 27 Headley, 50. 28 Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest Design, American Exceptionalism and Empire, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 47. 59
liberty against the English was Joel Tyler Headley, who titled the opening of his book “A defense of him [Napoleon] against English Historians.”29 Headley felt that the history of
Napoleon, which until his book had been written primarily by English historians, had been biased against Napoleon and that they had attempted to justify Britain’s cause by calling
Napoleon a despot and dictator, when in fact he had been a republican sovereign. Headley blamed most of the problems of Europe and the Napoleonic wars not on France or on Napoleon but on the English, assigning them responsibility for exacerbating the continental wars. In a section entitled “Perfidy of England” Headley wrote, “But with England constantly counteracting him [Napoleon], and throwing fire-brands in the cabinets of the continent, he would be engaged
in perpetual conflicts and wrangling…England knew that in a protracted war France must fall;
for her very victories would in the end melt away her armies, before the endless thousands all
Europe could pour upon her; and this she determined to accomplish. But war at this time was the last thing Napoleon wished.”30 Headley blamed the British believed so strongly in this that he
wrote an entire section of Napoleon and His Generals dedicated to blaming the English for the
Napoleonic Wars. He also cited the English violation of the Treaty of Amiens as the reason for
renewed hostility on the continent, writing, “The truth was England, with her accustomed
jealousy of other nations acquiring colonial possessions… resolved, though in violation of her own treaty, not to give them up.”31 Headley’s interpretation of the English violation of the Treaty
of Amiens could also be read as a warning to America, which had recently acquired Texas and
had negotiated with England for Oregon, that England was watching the expansion of America
with jealousy. In fact, a lot of the political rhetoric in favor of the annexation of Texas had
29 Headley, 17. 30 Headley, 20 31 Headley, 19. 60
claimed that the English themselves had had designs on the lands of Texas and were going to
establish a colony in Texas to rival the cotton production of the southern American states.32
Headley even explicitly compared the treatment of France at the hands of the English to the treatment of the United States by the English, writing, “But England commenced an unprovoked war on a peaceful people, and reduced them to slavery for no nobler motive than the love of gold. It is time that Americans who have suffered so much from the imperious policy of
England… should look on her conduct subsequent to the French Revolution, through other medium than her [England’s] own literature.”33 Thus Napoleon provided a warning for
Americans against England, and Headley was cautioning them to be wary of English policies.
Reviews of Headley’s book praised this Anglophobic attitude, with one reviewer quipping, “In his sketch of Napoleon… we are glad to see that he… places the responsibility for the blood and carnage which deluged Europe in his [Napoleon’s] time, where of right it belongs, upon England herself.”34 Similarly, in a review of an English work about the one hundred days
following Napoleon’s return from Elba, an American author wrote, “If any proof were wanting
of the political and military superiority of Napoleon, it could be found from an examination of
the treatment which he received at the hands of England…the fallen man was sent to a distant
and unhealthy island to be slowly assassinated… How cowardly it was!”35 Thus criticizing the
English literary treatment of Napoleon as well as the actual treatment of Napoleon became an
outlet for Americans’ Anglophobic fears, warning Americans of the dangers posed to their own
sovereignty and economy by the English.
32 Hiteala, 47 33 Headley, 28 34 The Courier and Enquirer 35 The Western Review, (April 1846). 61
For some authors, the Napoleonic struggle against England became a defensive struggle,
not against a nation trying to curb his expansion into Europe, but against a nation trying to invade the territory of France. In an article about the Battle of Waterloo, the final defeat of
Napoleon, The Western Review called the battle an “outrageous attack which the English oligarchy made upon their [French] native land.”36 This depiction of the Battle of Waterloo thus
identified the British as the aggressors, and the attackers of French sovereignty, rather than the
saviors of Europe, as traditional accounts usually depicted the battle. By blaming the attack
specifically on the “English oligarchy,” The Western Review reinforced the notion that the
Napoleonic Wars were a struggle between aristocracy and liberty. Additionally, in the History of
Napoleon Bonaparte, Abbott wrote “England…the unrelenting inciter of these wars…
succeeded, by the aid of enormous bribes, in inducing other nations to attack France.”37 Thus
England was not only the inciter of the conflict against Napoleon, but the allies of England were forced and bribed to fight the Emperor. They did not do so of their own free will, implying that had England not interceded these nations might have embraced Napoleon and his policies.
It was the notion that England had engaged Napoleon in a defensive war, and thus forced him into a belligerent program of expansion, that allowed authors such as Headley and Abbott to excuse Napoleon’s “overly martial” traits. To these authors, although Napoleon exhibited the martial traits of individualism, republicanism and self reliance, he was actually a supporter of peace who cared deeply for his soldiers and for the rights of conquered nations. Headley wrote,
“Peace, which Bonaparte needed and wished for, being restored, he applied his energies to the development of the resources of France.”38 Abbott was especially prominent in his promotion of
36 Western Review, (April 1846). 37 Abbott, iv-v. 38 Headley, 18 62
Napoleon as a peaceful leader who was forced into war by his enemies, and introduced his book
with the hope that it would be “a powerful advocate of the cause of peace.”39 Throughout his
work Abbott continually justified Napoleon’s wars and actions as necessities, and claimed that
he was forced into war either to protect France, or to protect the people whom he conquered from
the oppression of their governments. When explaining the Expedition to Egypt Abbott wrote
It was the plea of Napoleon that he was not going to make an unjust war upon the unoffending nations of the East, but that he was the ally of oppressed people, drawing the sword against their common enemy, and that he was striving to emancipate them from their powerful usurpers [the English], and to confer upon them the most precious privileges of freedom. He marched to Egypt, not to desolate, but to ennoble; not to enslave, but to enfranchise; not to enrich himself with the treasures of the East, but to transfer to those shores the opulence and the high civilization of the West. Never was an ambitious conqueror furnished with a more plausible plea. England, as she looks to India and China must be silent. America, as she listens to the dying wail of the red man, driven from the forests of his childhood and the graves of his fathers, can throw no stone.40
Thus, the wars of Napoleon were not products of ambition or expansionism, but missions to
being civilization and emancipation to the people of the East, a humanitarian rather than a
militaristic mission. Not only was Napoleon thus a humanitarian, but Abbott depicted him as
more worthy of praise than America or England, pointing out that both countries have done
similar things to peoples of other races, yet with less noble motives and thus are in no position to
criticize or slander Napoleon. Not only were Napoleon’s wars for just causes, but the makeup of
his army reflected this ideal, as Abbott tells Americans, “for the first time in the history of the
world, literature and science, and art formed a conspicuous part of the organization of an army. It
was agreed that Napoleon should take forty-six thousand men, a certain number of officers of his
own selection, men of science, engineers, geographers and artisans of all kinds.”41 Thus, the composition of Napoleons army did not represent a conqueror bent on subjecting rival nations,
39 Abbott, iv. 40 Abbott, 175. 41 Abbott, 176 63
but an enlightened humanitarian who was facilitating cultural exchange between France and
foreign nations, bringing them civilization, and his militarism was thus justified.
Not only was Napoleon the savior of eastern nations, but he was also the savior of
Europe, an anti aristocratic figure who freed European citizens from the oppression of tyranny and monarchy. In explaining Napoleon’s rise to power, Abbott tells us that Napoleon purported to be, “called to the throne by the voice of the people my [Napoleon’s] maxim has always been
‘A career open to talent,’ without the distinction of birth.”42 Napoleon could thus represent hope
for middle-class Americans, showing them that talent and merit, not birth or wealth were the
avenues through which young men must pursue success. Abbott’s Napoleon was thus an anti-
aristocratic savior of the common man. Abbott tells us that when Napoleon entered Venice he
“abolished aristocracy, and established popular government, which should fairly represent all
classes of the community… It was a glorious reform for the Venetian nation; it was a terrible
downfall fall for the Venetian aristocracy.”43 To many antebellum Americans, Napoleon was an
anti-aristocratic figure, savior of European nations form their aristocratic governments and
purveyor of liberty and democracy, the ideal American figure.
Restrained Manhood, or, Napoleon as A Warning
While Napoleon generally served as an inspirational figure and role model for middle
class Americans or “common men” who revered martial characteristics in men and saw
Napoleon as an anti-aristocratic hero, for the intellectual and cultural elite of America Napoleon
was not a figure to be praised and revered but a figure who served as a warning to the individual
and to America against unrestrained personal and national ambition. To these Americans the fall
of Napoleon served as a lesson to young Americans, showing what would ultimately befall those
42 Abbott, 23 43 Abbott, 155 64
whose ambition and greed overcame their sense of morality and propriety. Additionally, to
Americans who opposed the Mexican War and the policy of expansionism, believing that it was
a threat to the ideals of the American republic, Napoleon was the perfect example of the dangers
of this expansionist policy. To the intellectual elite and especially anti-expansionists Napoleon became a warning that supported a more restrained ideal of manhood and democracy.
For many Americans, an excess of ambition in an individual was a vice which Americans
must guard against, lest their ambition exceed their morals and cause them to put themselves
before the good of the republic. To these Americans Napoleon represented such an individual, one who was overly ambitious and who attempted to take over the continent of Europe for selfish ends and personal glory. However, as any man who acted amorally and selfishly, Napoleon was defeated, and his fall became a lesson for the individual of what would befall those who acted in such a manner. Many periodical magazines and literary publications published essays, anecdotes and lessons that used Napoleon Bonaparte to teach values of restraint and temperance. In an article published in 1846 entitled “The Fall of Napoleon” readers were warned that “ambition always pays for its splendors by its calamities,” implying that the calamities and misfortunes that befell Napoleon after the Battle of Waterloo were brought on by an excess of avarice and ambition. 44 Similarly, in The Columbian Lady’s and Gentleman’s Magazine’s review of
Headley’s Napoleon and His Marshals Napoleon is criticized for his invasion of Russia. “He is at last intoxicated with his success,” said the review, “[he] unwisely takes counsel of his passions and discards his judgment, and, like all other rash and frenzied men soon finds, to his humiliation, that he is neither infallible in the cabinet or invincible in the field.”45 The same boys
and girls magazine that in its introduction instructed young men and women about which virtues
44 “The Fall of Napoleon” The Episcopal Reader, 24 no. 28 September 26, 1848, 109 45 “The Editors Table,” The Columbian Ladies Magazine, vol 6 no 9, June 1848, 284 65
of Napoleon ought to be emulated, also warned its readers that Napoleon’s, “ambition finally
overthrew him.”46 One publication even went so far as to use Napoleon as a warning against
inspiring expansionist dreams in children. Dwight’s American Magazine and Family Newspaper published an article entitled, “The Example of Bonaparte as a Useful Warning.” Parents and
teachers were warned that “While we, on the one hand, reflect upon the early education of
Napoleon, and on the other, review his blood stained career, let us remind ourselves that
thousands of other children and youth, may imbibe such a taste, and be found, in future days,
wading through slaughter... in Canada, Oregon, California, or Mexico.”47 Napoleon thus, for
many publications throughout the antebellum era, represented the vices and failings of martial
manhood and promoted a restrained ideal of manhood. 48 The article “The Example of Napoleon
Bonaparte Useful as a Warning” expressed exactly this principle when it concluded that parents
and teachers must take care to teach children virtues such as “the humane, the righteous, the
peace making principles of meekness and love,” that do not support the Napoleonic image. 49
Perhaps one of the most interesting examples of the use of the figure of Napoleon as a warning for the modern man against ambition and greed came from the pen of Ralph Waldo
Emerson. In a series of essays entitled Representative Men Emerson outlined lives of historical figures whom he believed to be the highest representations of each category, and to him
Napoleon represented the modern man as a “Man of the World.” Emerson wrote that “The class of business men in America, in England, in France and throughout Europe; the class of industry and skill. Napoleon is its representative. The instinct of active, brave, able men, throughout the
46 Forrester, 27. 47 “The example of Bonaparte as a Useful Warning,” Dwight’s American Magazine and Family Newspaper for the Diffusion of useful Knowledge and Moral and Religious Principles, 2 no 5 (March 7, 1846), 77. 48 Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 49) Dwight’s American Magazine and Family Newspaper, March 7, 1846. 66
middle class everywhere, has pointed out Napoleon as the incarnate Democrat.”50 To Emerson,
Napoleon embodied the American “common man” ideal of a leader who came from an egalitarian background and gained power through his own merits, in much the same way
Presidents such as Andrew Jackson and James K. Polk had attained the presidency, and it is these qualities that made Napoleon a “democrat.” Throughout Emerson’s essay he continually ascribed to Napoleon traits that many Americans sought in their leaders. He wrote “His
[Napoleon’s] principal means are in himself. He asks counsel of no other... He is firm, sure, self- denying, self postponing, sacrificing everything to his aim.”51
Emerson even called Napoleon a republican leader. In Representative Men he wrote, “he knew his debt to his austere education, and made no secret of his contempt for the born kings...
Bonaparte has passed through all the degrees of military service, but was also a citizen before he was emperor and so has the key to citizenship… but, though there is in particulars this identity between Napoleon and the mass of the people, his real strength lay in their conviction that he was their representative in his genius and aims.”52 Although not an elected official, as one would be in a republic, Napoleon was a representative of “the people” of France. By first equating
Napoleon to the “modern middle class man” and then emphasizing his republican qualities,
Emerson encouraged the reader to see in Napoleon traits of contemporary American leaders and citizens, showing that any American can become the next “Napoleon.”
However, Emerson ended his essay with a very different tone, writing, “He was an experiment, under the most favorable of conditions, of the powers of intellect without conscience… Never was a leader so endowed and so weaponed; never leader found such aids
50 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Representative Men: Seven Lectures, (Boston: Philips Sampson and Company: 1850), 220. 51 Emerson, 228-229. 52 Emerson, 236 67
and followers. And what was the result of this vast talent and power, of these immense armies,
burned cities, squandered treasures, immolated millions of men, of this demoralized Europe? It
came to no result… He left France smaller, poorer, feebler, than he found it; and the whole
contest for freedom was to be begun again.”53 Emerson thus ultimately warned Americans to be
wary of the kind of leaders and individuals with selfish and greedy aims. It could even be argued that Emerson was making a veiled reference to the current president of America, James K. Polk, a member of the Democratic party who came from common origins and was an advocate of
American expansion. Emerson, who was opposed to territorial expansion and the Mexican War, could thus be warning Americans against the despotism of the current administration.54
Just as Napoleon was used as a warning against greed and too much ambition, many anti-
expansionist publications criticized Napoleon and his conduct, and portrayed the figure of
Napoleon as a warning to Americans against the kinds of ambitious leaders and policies that
would lead to the destruction of the American republic. Thus many publications used the popular
figure of Napoleon to advocate a more restrained ideal of manhood and as a warning against war
and expansionist activity. In 1838, when America had just begun to look to the west for
territorial gains, a young politician named Abraham Lincoln delivered an address before the
Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield in Illinois in which he warned the young men to be wary of ambitious men, such as Napoleon, who represented a threat to the American Republic.55 Lincoln warned the young men “great and good men sufficiently qualified for any task they should undertake, may ever be found, whose ambition would aspire to nothing beyond a seat in
53 Emerson, 251 54 Amy Greenberg, The Pennsylvania State University, Course Lecture given in November of 2008 55 When John S.C. Abbott wrote his History of Napoleon Bonaparte 17 years later, he would write a defense of Napoleon’s ambition, justifying the “ambitious conqueror” as having just motives. Although Abbott may not have read or seen Lincoln’s speech, Abbott’s work was defending the image of Napoleon against such accusations as Lincoln’s. 68
Congress…think you these places would these places would satisfy an Alexander, a Caesar, or a
Napoleon?—Never! Towering genius distains a beaten path.”56 Lincoln equated Napoleon with
Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar, two men who overturned democratic governments to
forge empires, and warned the young men’s Lyceum to be wary of traits in leaders that could
lead to despotism and the overturn of democracy.
For many Americans, especially Northern Whigs, Napoleon Bonaparte served not just as
a warning to the individual against excessive ambition and greed, but he also became a warning
to America of the dangers of expansionism, which they saw as a threat to the American republic.
In a newspaper article entitled “Effects of War” from The Farmers Cabinet the Napoleonic wars
were used expressly as a deterrent to American expansion. The Farmers Cabinet begins “When
Napoleon with his blood stained army arrived before the walls of Vienna,” and then continues
describing the horrors that befell the French Army at Vienna. The article continues “And in this
demonic work thousands of our country men are now ready to engage for the acquisition of
Oregon.”57 Additionally, many reviews of Headley’s Napoleon and His Marshals disagreed with
Headley’s version of the heroic Napoleon, and in their reasoning often cited abhorrence to the nature of the Napoleonic Wars. These reviewers often echoed the contemporary arguments against the Mexican War. The New Englander, for example, in evaluating Napoleon’s conquest of the continent asked, “Did he wait for just provocation to declare war? Did he stick at any principle in matters of Diplomacy? Did he care more for truth, than the winds that blew by him?”
In the same article, the New Englander argued, “We go for no aggressive wars. Territory, if we
56 Abraham Lincoln, “Lyceum Address,” Springfield, Illinois, January 27, 1838. Lincoln’s address was given shortly after the mob lynching of an African American in Saint Louis, and primarily addresses the issues of mob mentality with its relation to the perpetuation of the republican government of America. Some historians have argues that this particular speech is very revealing of Lincoln’s character at this time in his life. Lincoln had grown up on the frontier, which was lazy and by this point he had learned that he was ambitious, yet he is warning his fellow Americans about the dangers of ambition. 57 “Effects of War,” The Farmers Cabinet, v.44 issue 2, January 1, 1846 69
must have it, we would pay for, not with the heart’s blood of citizens, but their cash.”58
Similarly, the 1846 article “The Fall of Napoleon,” ended with the line, “he who uses the sword shall perish by the sword,” unmistakably arguing against aggressive military expansion, both in the case of Napoleon, but also as it applied to the United States on the brink of war with
Mexico.59
Thus the figure of Napoleon represented the political divisions and class divisions among
Americans during the Mexican War and Antebellum eras, serving as an exemplar and role model for middle class Americans, yet as a warning and advocate of restraint to the cultural and intellectual elite of America.
58 “Mr. Headley’s New Book,” The New Englander, 4 no. 15 (July 1846), 364 59 Episcopal Reader, September 1848, 109 70
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Implications
Napoleon in the nineteenth century American consciousness was an extremely complex and contradictory character. Conceptions of his reign, character and role in French society were different among different groups and individuals within American society, as were the lessons that different Americans drew from the Emperor of France. Napoleon began as an entirely political character in the consciousness of early nineteenth century Americans, representing a grave threat to the young republic and an example of how a democracy might easily fall prey to a despotic ruler. However, after the death of Napoleon at St. Helena, and the threat of a subversive
Napoleonic influence lessened, the character of Napoleon entered the realm of American popular culture, where he took on the role of an American hero and role model, losing the political implications men such as Timothy Pickering and Thomas Jefferson had assigned to his character.
Under the pens of popular biographers such as John S.C. Abbott and Joel Tyler Headley
Napoleon became a republican figure, one that inspired manly virtues and no longer a tyrant of
France, but someone who was ruling at the behest of the citizens of France. To middle-class and
Democrats the expansionism of Napoleon thus could be justified as paternalistic, for the greater good, just as the expansionism of America was spreading liberty across the American continent.
Yet, just as Napoleon represented the ideals of manhood for many middle-class Americans, to
Antebellum intellectuals Napoleon represented the vices of militarism and became a warning for individual Americans.
The image of Napoleon Bonaparte in America began as one that was politically charged, a lesson to the young American republic, and evolved into a popular American hero and a lesson for the individual in the proper conduct of manhood and democracy. 71
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APPENDIX A: ANTEBELLUM SONG SHEETS
77
ACADEMIC VITA of Madison Kantzer
Madison Kantzer 9200 Gatewater Terrace Potomac, MD 20854 [email protected]
Education: Bachelor of Arts Degree in History and Art History Pennsylvania State University, Spring 2010 Honors in History Thesis Title: Napoleon in the Nineteenth Century American Consciousness Thesis Supervisor: Mark Neely
Awards: Deans List, Phi Alpha Theta: The International Honors Society in History
Work Experience: Spring, 2010 Development Intern Hillel, State College, PA Mr. Aaron Kaufman
Summer 2009 Intern National Cryptology Museum, Fort Meade, MD Patrick Weadon
Summer 2008-2009 Administrative Assistant A. Morton Thomas Engineering, Rockville, MD Mrs. Janice Gary
Grants Received: Schreyer Ambassador Grant
Community Service: Gamma Sigma Sigma Service Sorority: Make a Wish Foundation, Jeans For Teens, Homecoming Day of Service, Relay for Life, Folly Fest, Red Cross Blood Drives, Ronald McDonald Foundation, etc. Penn State IFC/ Panhellenic Dance Marathon American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee Alternative Spring Break
International Education: Palazzo Ruccellai Institute in Florence, Italy
Language Proficiency: Introductory Italian, Intermediate French