The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War

he stunning and unexpected success myth created (whether unconsciously or of the Zulu army over the British by design) and nurtured until it is accepted Tat the battle of on 22 as fact. With regard to the Anglo-Zulu War, January 1879 forced the invading British have assumptions about the war-readiness drastically to reassess Zulu military of Zulu fighting-men been sufficiently capability and brought Zulu military questioned, and has the effectiveness of prowess dramatically to the attention of the Zulu army been considered critically the British public. The death of the ill-fated enough? Prince Imperial of France in Zululand on In south-eastern Africa the reputation of 1 June 1879 while out on patrol further the victorious Zulu army goes back to the cemented internationally the reputation the 1820s when King kaSenzangakhona Zulu already enjoyed in southern Africa was consolidating the by as a warrior people who were a constant incorporating or displacing his enemies, threat to the security of their neighbours. and was sending raiding armies far to the More than that, it ensured that their north and south. Already in the Eastern reputation has survived to this day as the Cape the British authorities where aware quintessential warrior race. that Zulu raids close to their borders might Yet is this military reputation entirely destabilise the region, and that the Zulu deserved? So often a commonly held kingdom was a power to be reckoned with. perception turns out to be essentially a The Portuguese came to the same conclu-

37 Natalia 39 (2009), John Laband pp. 37 – 46 Natalia 39 (2009) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2010 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War sion when in 1833 King kaSen- a confederation that might involve it in an zangakhona sent an army to Delagoa Bay unwelcome Zulu war. Consequently, the to assert his dominance over the traders High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, who there. When the Voortrekkers invaded the was driving the confederation process, Zulu kingdom in late 1837 seeking land on decided that he must break Zulu military which to settle, they were very wary of the capacity. To persuade the British govern- power of the Zulu state and initially sought ment that it was necessary to risk war to to negotiate a territorial grant. The subse- do so, he made it his determined business quent hard-fought war of 1838 between the to exaggerate and hammer home the threat Voortrekkers and the Zulu made the Zulu the Zulu military system posed to the secu- far more widely known across southern rity of the neighbouring colonies of Natal Africa. The Zulu destruction of many of and the Transvaal, and to claim that the the Boer encampments in the foothills Zulu were putting themselves at the head of the Drakensberg on 16 – 17 February of a ‘black conspiracy’ aimed at driving 1838 and the rout of Boer commandos at the British out of . As a result, eThaleni on 10 April 1838 and the White for the first time the British government Mfolozi on 27 December 1838 confirmed and public consciously conceived of the the reputation of the Zulu as warriors to be Zulu as a dangerous military nation, and greatly feared, as did their crushing of the Frere’s lurid characterisation of the Zulus Port Natal settlers allied to the Boers at the as a ‘frightfully efficient man-slaying war- battle of the Thukela on 17 April 1838 and machine’ caught the British imagination. their sacking of their trading settlement at Yet the commander of the British Port Natal () between 24 April and troops preparing in late 1878 for the in- 3 March 1838. vasion of Zululand, Lieutenant-General Thereafter, Zulu campaigns against Lord Chelmsford, as well as his staff, the Pedi in 1851 and the Swazi until the entertained a rather different view of the early 1850s kept apprehension among their enemy they were to fight. On the one hand, neighbours alive, as did the civil war of Chelmsford employed the Natal Border 1856 and its destabilising repercussions Agent, Frederick Fynney, to prepare for for both the kingdom’s settler neighbours, distribution to his officers his detailed Natal and the booklet called The Zulu Army and Zulu (SAR). Genuine British concern about Headmen outlining the sophisticated Zulu Zulu military potential only surfaced in military organisation and capability the the mid-1870s when the imperial drive for British were about to face; while on the the confederation of South Africa under other, the general and his staff remained the Crown gathered pace. The continued caught up by their recent experiences existence of an independent and belliger- fighting the Gceleka and Ngqika Xhosa ent Zulu kingdom was seen as stumbling in the Ninth Cape Frontier War and pre- block to the process not only because of sumed (despite Fynney’s booklet) that they the existing territorial dispute between would defeat the Zulu as handily as they the SAR and the Zulu kingdom that the had the Xhosa. It was because Isandlwana British inherited when they annexed the so unexpectedly overthrew this fatal but Transvaal Territory (formerly the SAR) pervasive under-estimation of the Zulu in 1877, but also because the Cape Colony army, and because it was highly unusual (the most important piece in the confedera- and deeply shocking for British troops to tion puzzle) was wary of becoming part of be routed and massacred in one of Queen

38 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War

Victoria’s routine ‘small wars’ of imperial to repel the British invasion that began on conquest, that Zulu military ability became 11 January once Frere’s ultimatum with so notorious. After all, only the very best its impossibly stringent demands expired. warriors in the world could have defeated Prior to that, in September 1878, several a British army, so their military skills amabutho had been mobilised to stage simply had to be astounding. That is what mock hunts along the Natal-Zululand bor- made the British defence of Rorke’s Drift der as a show of strength during the esca- so magnificent, and warranted the award lating crisis that culminated in the delivery of eleven Victoria Crosses. of the British ultimatum on 11 December The subsequent Zulu defeat in the 1878. In October 1878 King Anglo-Zulu War once the British had kaMpande had mobilised much of the Zulu adjusted their tactics appropriately to army believing that war was imminent, make proper use of their overwhelming but had let it disperse again in November fire-power in all-round defensive posi- when the British took no action. Seventeen tions like laagers and squares, years prior to that, in mid-1861, the Zulu was consequently cried up as a hazardous army had partially mobilised against the and laudable achievement by British arms Transvaal Boers who were making incur- over a truly formidable foe. Disastrous sions into north-western Zululand, and Zulu defeats such as at Khambula on 29 these military precautions had set off the March 1879 and Gingindlovu on 2 April so-called Zulu ‘Invasion Scare’ in Natal. 1879 were not therefore presented as Zulu Yet not one of these three mobilisations be- strategic and tactical failures so much fore the final one in January 1879 preceded as noteworthy British successes against actual hostilities against either the Boers heavy odds. And this is the position that or the British. In that sense, they were no has endured in much of the literature of different from the annual mustering of the the Anglo-Zulu War, for where would the amabutho in the Mahlabathini plain for the drama be if the war was really nothing but umKhosi (first-fruits ceremony) when the a predictable British military promenade army was ritually strengthened. In fact, the through Zululand, punctuated by a few last mobilisation that had resulted in an careless lapses that gave the Zulu some actual campaign against whites had been unexpected and undeserved victories? in December 1838 during the Voortrekker- It is not the intention here to detract Zulu War, 40 years before. in any way from the undoubted courage And what was the Zulu military record of Zulu fighting-men or the skill of their in wars against other African polities in commanders. Nevertheless, by probing the the 40 years between the Voortrekker- conventional wisdom regarding the Zulu Zulu War and the Anglo-Zulu War? Taking military performance in 1879, problems advantage of the Voortrekker defeat of the with Zulu battle-preparedness will be Ndebele on the highveld in 1836 – 1837, brought to light, and it will be suggested the Zulu raided the Ndebele between June that Zulu irregulars were more success- and September 1837, although with disap- ful in facing the British than were the pointingly limited success. After the Boer amabutho (age-grade regiments) of the victory at Ncome on 16 December 1838 in conventional military system. the Voortrekker-Zulu War, King Dingane Consider first Zulu battle-preparedness. attempted to carve out a new kingdom In early January 1879 the amabutho mobil- north across the Phongolo to put space ised fully in the Mahlabathini plain in order between him and the Voortrekkers. In the

39 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War winter of 1839 he made a serious attempt attempt. Most importantly, they were con- to conquer the southern half of the Swazi cerned that the British were consistently kingdom, but the Swazi defeated four of opposed to wars that might destabilise the his amabutho at the battle of Lubuye and region, and they hoped to secure British forced him to abandon the project. support in the longstanding standoff over A dynastic dispute in Swaziland in the the Disputed Territory with the Boers of mid-1840s gave King Mpande kaSen- the SAR. Consequently, when Cetshwayo zangakhona a fresh opportunity for Zulu planned Swazi campaigns in 1874, 1875 intervention. One claimant, Prince Mswati and 1876, his council dissuaded him on waSobhuza, who in July 1846 had secured every occasion. the military assistance of the Ohrigstad Self-destructively, the Zulu fought each Boers (in what would later be part of the other too. In the First Zulu Civil War of SAR) defeated Prince Malambule waSob- 1840 Prince Mpande, who in September huza, the claimant supported by Mpande, 1839 had fled with his adherents to the and pursued him into northwestern Zulu- Boers of the Republic of Natalia for fear of land. This gave Mpande his casus belli being liquidated by his half-brother, King and his amabutho invaded Swaziland in Dingane, returned in January 1840 and early 1847. Baffled by Swazi irregular defeated Dingane’s army at the Maqongqo warfare and Boer firepower, the Zulu Hills. Each side at the Maqongqo Hills withdrew in July 1847. In 1848 Mpande fielded about 5 000 men who faced each invaded again. This time Mswati had no other armed with spears and shields and Boer support because they had switched it arrayed in traditional chest and horns to another royal claimant, Prince Somcuba formation. waSobhuza, and expediently submitted The Second Zulu Civil War was fought to Mpande, paying tribute for a while. in 1856 when Prince Cetshwayo and his But Mpande had to stop short of outright half-brother Prince Mbuyazi kaMpande conquest because the British in Natal were fought for the right to succeed their father, concerned at the growth of Zulu power and King Mpande. On 2 December between threatened military intervention. In 1852 15 000 and 20 000 uSuthu (as Cetsh- Mswati rose up against Zulu control, and wayo’s adherents were known) routed Mpande responded with a major raid that 7 000 of Mbuyzi’s iziGqoza at the battle swept the country clean of cattle. Fearing of Ndondakusuka, killing 5 000 warriors a massive influx of Swazi refugees, the and slaughtering some three-quarters of Natal government put pressure on Mpande the thousands of non-combatants shelter- to withdraw, and Mswati was able to start ing with them. Ndondakusuka thus saw the consolidating his hold over his kingdom. heaviest casualties in any one battle ever Mpande contemplated new raids in 1858 fought by the Zulu. and 1862, but internal unrest in Zululand The two sides were again arrayed in and British disapproval prevented him. traditional formation, but what was new On his accession in 1872 King Cetsh- at Ndondakusuka was a contingent of 35 wayo was ardent for a fresh Swazi cam- Natal frontier police and 100 African hunt- paign to blood his younger amabutho and ers and some white hunter-traders under to acquire booty to reward their loyalty. John Dunn placed on the iziGqoza left But Swazi power had grown in the 20 years horn. With their firearms these iziNqobo, since the last Zulu invasion, and many or ‘Crushers’, did considerable execution of his councillors advised against a new before the collapse of the iziGqoza’s right

40 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War horn precipitated the rout that engulfed (who were aged 58 and 56 respectively) the iziNqobo. were mainly kept in reserve in the Mahla- If we discount the incident at the umKhosi bathini plain to protect the king. Small, on 25 December 1877 when a fracas local contingents of superannuated am- between jealous amabutho, primarily the abutho might still take the field as did the uThulwana and iNgobamakhosi, resulted uDlambedlu and the 55-year-old izinGu- in some 60 deaths, Ndondakusuka was the lube at the battle of Nyezane on 22 January last time the Zulu fought a battle before 1879, but their contribution was a minor Isandlwana, some 23 years later – a gap one. Otherwise, not one of the remaining (to put it into familiar perspective) two twelve amabutho who fought in the Anglo- years longer that that between the First and Zulu War had seen the field of battle: this Second World Wars, or three years longer was to be their very first campaign. Even than the gap between the Anglo-Zulu War the most prominent amabutho in the war and the Anglo-Boer South African War. – the uMbonambi, uMcijo, uMxhapho, Rather a long hiatus in active service, one iNgobamakhosi and uNokhenke – were might say, for such an apparently ferocious previously unblooded warriors between warrior nation. their mid-20s and mid-30s. Naturally, a gap of 20 years between This is not to deny that they were des- battles does not mean that many individu- perately eager to face the British in battle als who had fought in earlier campaigns and were completely confident in their did not do so again in 1879. Of the Zulu ability to beat them. But that is precisely commanders at Isandlwana, for example, the problem. Who among them had any Chief Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khosa, who experience in facing disciplined soldiers was born in about 1823, had probably armed with modern breech-loading ? fought in some of the Swazi campaigns; It is true that the four amabutho who had Chief Mavumengwana kaNdlela Ntuli, fought at Ndondakusuka had all been on born in about 1830, definitely took part the right horn and had faced the firepower in the invasion of Swaziland in 1847 and of the iziNqobo, and some had probably probably fought at Ndondakusuka – as had been fired upon by Boers in the Swazi King Cetshwayo himself. Prince Dabu- campaign of 1847. Yet those firearms were lamanzi kaMpande, who commanded at flint-lock , not nearly as effective Rorke’s Drift, was born in 1839 and likely as breech-loading Martini-Henry rifles. was present at Ndondakusuka. Moreover, they were fired by men in open Four of the amabutho who fought in skirmishing order. Now it is true that at the Anglo-Zulu War (namely the iSangqu, Isandlwana the British, relying on their uThulwana, iNdlondlo and uDloko) were experience in the Ninth Frontier War, were aged between 41 and 47. They had been also deployed in skirmishing order, but formed before the Second Zulu Civil War only one of the four veteran amabutho of of 1856 and all had fought at Ndondakusu- Ndondkusuka (the iSangqu) formed part of ka. It was the practice to incorporate newly the Zulu attack on the British camp when formed amabutho with favoured aging they advanced as part of the outflanking ones such as the 33-year-old iNdluyengwe right horn. The other three veteran am- with the 45-year-old uThulwana to keep up abutho (the uThulwana, iNdlondlo and their strength, but during the Anglo-Zulu uDloko, plus the iNdluyengwe incorpo- War other veterans of Ndondakusuka like rated with the uThulwana) were part of the iNdabakawombe and uDlambedlu the uncommitted reserve at Isandlwana

41 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War and went on to attack Rorke’s Drift. And thinking. Isandlwana had been a victory here they fought the sort of battle no Zulu because the British were in an extended had faced since their fathers were broken linear formation with flanks that could be before the Voortrekker laagers at Veglaer turned in accordance with traditional Zulu (emaGebeni) on 13 – 15 August 1838 and tactics that depended on swift manoeuvre Blood River (Ncome) on 16 December and envelopment in the open field. At the 1838, and no veteran amabutho of that war battles of Khambula, Gingindlovu and were with the Zulu army in January 1879. the fort, laagers and Attacking an all-round defensive position put the Zulu in the same disadvantageous at Rorke’s drift defended by desperate men situation they had encountered at Rorke’s armed with modern rifles and bayonets was Drift: they had to throw themselves in therefore an entirely novel experience for waves against prepared, all-round defences all elements of the Zulu army operating in bristling not only with rifles and 1879. It was an encounter in which remark- but, at Ulundi, with Gatling guns as well. able courage and tenacity could not make What had not succeeded at Rorke’s Drift up for the inadequacies of tactics based on in considerably more favourable circum- traditional hand-to-hand combat. stances in terms of numerical odds and And here we encounter the intractable surprise had even less chance of doing problem of the paralysis in Zulu tactical so in these later set-piece battles. Yet the

Men of the uNokhenke ibutho photographed in c. 1879. Photo courtesy of the Cecil Renaud Library, University of KwaZulu-Natal, .

42 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War

Zulu command and the rank-and-file of the ish break-up of the Zulu kingdom, he ap- amabutho could apparently not conceive plied the tactics of mounted infantry with of any alternative to tactics that had repeat- devastating effect against his conventional edly failed. As the Duke of Wellington said uSuthu adversaries. During the Anglo-Zulu of the French at Waterloo, they came on War he played his part as a senior induna in the same old way and were sent back in of the uDloko in conventional operations, the same old way. but the day before Isandlwana his mounted Yet tactical alternatives were available scouts effectively masked the movement and some Zulu saw that. By 1878 there of the Zulu army from Siphezi to the were about 12 000 inferior, obsolete fire- Ngwebeni valley from British patrols. On arms like muzzle-loading flintlock muskets the eve of the his mounted in Zulu hands, as well as some 7 500 per- men adroitly lured Lieutenant-Colonel cussion-cap rifles and 500 breech-loading ’s reconnaissance-in-force rifles reserved for men of higher status. across the Mahlabathini plain into an However, most Zulu tended to employ ambush from which they were fortunate firearms as secondary weapons in place to break free. of throwing-spears, to be cast aside when A war of manoeuvre was the antidote (in their minds) the hand-to-hand fighting to the conventional set-piece battles ensued with the iconic stabbing-spear. In conservative commanders, both Zulu and any case, amabutho were untrained in the British, preferred. Here Zulu commanders effective use of their mainly inferior fire- seem to have lost sight of the lessons of arms and marksmanship was consequently the Voortrekker-Zulu War where at eTha- very poor. leni and at the White Mfolozi the Zulu Yet by the 1870s several hundred Zulu caught the Boers outside their laagers and were familiar with modern firearms defeated them in running fights. Surely through contact with white hunters, trad- Chief Godide kaNdlela Ntuli, who was ers and adventurers in Zululand. The Zulu nearly 70 years old in 1879 and most snipers posted on Shiyane during the battle probably had fought the Voortrekkers in of Rorke’s Drift posed a genuine threat to 1838, had this lesson in mind when he at- the defenders. tempted to ambush the British at Nyezane Once the 800-odd Martini-Henry rifles (Wombane) while they were strung out on captured from the British at Isandlwana the march. This certainly was the sensible were distributed into skilled hands they and appropriate tactic and failed largely were used effectively at Khambula where because he was in command of second-rate Zulu marksmen posted in the rubbish troops (all the crack amabutho were with heaps above the camp discomforted the the army fighting at Isandlwana the same British with enfilading fire and drove back day) who could not effectively co-ordinate a British sortie. their movements and had not the stomach Some of the younger Zulu commanders to press home the attack. were more innovative than their very con- The truly great mystery of the war ventional seniors. Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, is why the Zulu never again attacked a the ambitious Mandlakazi chief who was British column while vulnerable on the born in about 1841, grasped the effective- line of march, but waited until they were ness of combining guns and horses in Boer installed behind their defences as the commando style. In the Third Zulu Civil Boers had been in 1838 at Veglaer and War of 1883 – 1884 that followed the Brit- Ncome. It is true that it was Cetshwayo’s

43 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War plan that Colonel Evelyn Wood be lured confined to the regularamabutho and most, out of his fortified camp at Khambula by but not all, of their usually elderly com- a feint towards Utrecht, and that this sen- manders. It has already been noted how sible strategy was ruined by the younger the innovative Zibhebhu broke the con- amabutho who insisted on an immediate, ventional mould in his ambush of Buller’s direct attack to prove their mettle. But this reconnaissance patrol the day before does not explain why Chelmsford was not Ulundi; the performance of the unknown attacked on the march before Gingindlovu commander of the Zulu forces stationed and again before Ulundi. Certainly, that is at eZulaneni under Zungeni Mountain what he expected and feared. was no less adroit. On 5 June 1879 his Is it sufficient to explain this lack of 300 men, most of them carrying firearms, pragmatic innovation in terms of a conser- successively repulsed 300 British irregular vative Zulu military culture that valued the horse and then 500 regular through prowess of hand-to-hand fighting above employing effective skirmishing and enfi- all things, and put more store on the vin- lading tactics and making the best use of dication of individual masculine honour the broken terrain and dense cover. in combat than in victory itself? After all, The most successful practitioners of there would have been much more oppor- this form of irregular warfare were in tunity for this form of toe-to-toe fighting north-western Zululand. There Mbilini in ambushing and overwhelming a column waMswati, a Swazi prince who had lost a on the march than there was in hurling succession dispute in 1865 and had given oneself with spear and shield against an his allegiance to Cetshwayo with his ad- impenetrable wall of fire directed from herents, emerged as the most successful firm defences. commander in the region along with Sik- After Rorke’s Drift, why replicate tactics hobobo kaMabhabhakazana, an abaQulusi that repeatedly failed? Isandlwana had induna. Mbilini swooped down on an un- been a victory because of faulty British prepared British convoy encamped at the dispositions that in the dispersal of units Ntombe River on 12 March and overran it; and the presentation of vulnerable flanks while on 28 March he and Sikhobobo cut were reminiscent of an escorted convoy or off and routed the British under Colonel column on the march. Was not the lesson Wood raiding Hlobane Mountain, inflict- clear? After all, expert Zulu scouting and ing casualties second only to Isandlwana intelligence gathering (so superior to the in their severity. For months the Kubheka invaders’ fumbling efforts) kept them in people under Manyonyoba kaMaqondo close touch with every move the enemy waged a very effective campaign from made. Moreover, as Isandlwana and Nye- their caves in the Ntombe valley, bottling zane demonstrated, they had the capability up the Luneburg garrison and surviving of bringing up large forces undetected a series of mounted sorties intended to by the British. Undoubtedly, therefore, subdue them. Wood’s forces never suc- they had the ability to attack a column on ceeded in entirely pacifying the region, the march before it could form laager? and the abaQulusi and Kubheka were the So why was the ambush at Nyezane the last Zulu units to remain active in the field only attempt to adopt this obvious line once the regular amabutho dispersed after of attack? Ulundi, the Kubheka only finally surren- Interestingly, Zulu lack of tactical flex- dering on 8 September 1879, two months ibility and innovation seems to have been after the battle.

44 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War

Chief Zibhebhu kaMaphitha standing centre. Photo C. 740 courtesy of the KwaZulu-Natal Archives (Pietermaritzburg Repository).

Perhaps it was precisely because the It is no coincidence that African states in abaQulusi were not part of the regu- the vicinity of Zululand that best resisted lar ibutho system, and Mbilini’s and white conquest were those of the Pedi and Manyonyoba’s adherents were refugees Sotho who relied increasingly on firearms, and renegades cobbled together on the who used their broken terrain effectively furthest margins of the Zulu kingdom against the invaders and who, in the case that they were so successful in engaging of the Sotho, early adopted horses and the British in hit-and-run, skirmishing fought when appropriate like mounted tactics from secure mountain fastnesses. infantry. Those Zulu who resisted most Certainly, Mbilini gained his military ap- successfully in 1879 did the same. We prenticeship in Swaziland where precisely must not be seduced by the spectacular this mode of fighting was the norm. success of the conventional Zulu army

45 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War at Isandlwana into believing (along with RECOMMENDED READING the British public and white settlers at the Greaves, Adrian, and Ian Knight. Who’s Who in the time) that the regular amabutho best repre- Zulu War 1879. Vol. II, Colonials and Zulus. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, sented the fighting spirit and military skills 2007. of the Zulu. Zibhebhu’s mounted scouts Jones, Huw M. The Boiling Cauldron: Utrecht drawing the British into an ambush on District and the Anglo-Zulu War, 1879. Bisley, the Mahlabathini Plain, Mbilini’s irregu- Gloucestershire: The Shermershill Press, 2006. Knight, Ian. The Anatomy of the Zulu Army from lars firing from behind the rocks of their Shaka to Cetshwayo 1818–1879. London: stronghold on Hlobane: these skilled and Greenhill Books, 1995. daring combatants were at least as valiant Laband, John. The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation. as the regular amabutho and certainly London: Arms and Armour Press, 1997. Laband, John, ed. Historical Dictionary of the Zulu possessed a far better, much more modern Wars. Lanham, Maryland, Toronto and Oxford: notion of how to fight back successfully The Scarecrow Press, 2009. against the British. Laband, John. ‘Bloodstained Grandeur: Colonial and Imperial Stereotypes of Zulu Warriors and Zulu JOHN LABAND Warfare.’ In Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present, edited by Benedict Carton, John Laband and Jabulani Sithole. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008. Laband, John and Paul Thompson. The Illustrated Guide to the Anglo-Zulu War. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2000. Storey, William Kelleher. Guns, Race and Power in Colonial South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

46