The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War he stunning and unexpected success myth created (whether unconsciously or of the Zulu army over the British by design) and nurtured until it is accepted Tat the battle of Isandlwana on 22 as fact. With regard to the Anglo-Zulu War, January 1879 forced the invading British have assumptions about the war-readiness drastically to reassess Zulu military of Zulu fighting-men been sufficiently capability and brought Zulu military questioned, and has the effectiveness of prowess dramatically to the attention of the Zulu army been considered critically the British public. The death of the ill-fated enough? Prince Imperial of France in Zululand on In south-eastern Africa the reputation of 1 June 1879 while out on patrol further the victorious Zulu army goes back to the cemented internationally the reputation the 1820s when King Shaka kaSenzangakhona Zulu already enjoyed in southern Africa was consolidating the Zulu kingdom by as a warrior people who were a constant incorporating or displacing his enemies, threat to the security of their neighbours. and was sending raiding armies far to the More than that, it ensured that their north and south. Already in the Eastern reputation has survived to this day as the Cape the British authorities where aware quintessential warrior race. that Zulu raids close to their borders might Yet is this military reputation entirely destabilise the region, and that the Zulu deserved? So often a commonly held kingdom was a power to be reckoned with. perception turns out to be essentially a The Portuguese came to the same conclu- 37 Natalia 39 (2009), John Laband pp. 37 – 46 Natalia 39 (2009) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2010 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War sion when in 1833 King Dingane kaSen- a confederation that might involve it in an zangakhona sent an army to Delagoa Bay unwelcome Zulu war. Consequently, the to assert his dominance over the traders High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, who there. When the Voortrekkers invaded the was driving the confederation process, Zulu kingdom in late 1837 seeking land on decided that he must break Zulu military which to settle, they were very wary of the capacity. To persuade the British govern- power of the Zulu state and initially sought ment that it was necessary to risk war to to negotiate a territorial grant. The subse- do so, he made it his determined business quent hard-fought war of 1838 between the to exaggerate and hammer home the threat Voortrekkers and the Zulu made the Zulu the Zulu military system posed to the secu- far more widely known across southern rity of the neighbouring colonies of Natal Africa. The Zulu destruction of many of and the Transvaal, and to claim that the the Boer encampments in the foothills Zulu were putting themselves at the head of the Drakensberg on 16 – 17 February of a ‘black conspiracy’ aimed at driving 1838 and the rout of Boer commandos at the British out of South Africa. As a result, eThaleni on 10 April 1838 and the White for the first time the British government Mfolozi on 27 December 1838 confirmed and public consciously conceived of the the reputation of the Zulu as warriors to be Zulu as a dangerous military nation, and greatly feared, as did their crushing of the Frere’s lurid characterisation of the Zulus Port Natal settlers allied to the Boers at the as a ‘frightfully efficient man-slaying war- battle of the Thukela on 17 April 1838 and machine’ caught the British imagination. their sacking of their trading settlement at Yet the commander of the British Port Natal (Durban) between 24 April and troops preparing in late 1878 for the in- 3 March 1838. vasion of Zululand, Lieutenant-General Thereafter, Zulu campaigns against Lord Chelmsford, as well as his staff, the Pedi in 1851 and the Swazi until the entertained a rather different view of the early 1850s kept apprehension among their enemy they were to fight. On the one hand, neighbours alive, as did the civil war of Chelmsford employed the Natal Border 1856 and its destabilising repercussions Agent, Frederick Fynney, to prepare for for both the kingdom’s settler neighbours, distribution to his officers his detailed Natal and the South African Republic booklet called The Zulu Army and Zulu (SAR). Genuine British concern about Headmen outlining the sophisticated Zulu Zulu military potential only surfaced in military organisation and capability the the mid-1870s when the imperial drive for British were about to face; while on the the confederation of South Africa under other, the general and his staff remained the Crown gathered pace. The continued caught up by their recent experiences existence of an independent and belliger- fighting the Gceleka and Ngqika Xhosa ent Zulu kingdom was seen as stumbling in the Ninth Cape Frontier War and pre- block to the process not only because of sumed (despite Fynney’s booklet) that they the existing territorial dispute between would defeat the Zulu as handily as they the SAR and the Zulu kingdom that the had the Xhosa. It was because Isandlwana British inherited when they annexed the so unexpectedly overthrew this fatal but Transvaal Territory (formerly the SAR) pervasive under-estimation of the Zulu in 1877, but also because the Cape Colony army, and because it was highly unusual (the most important piece in the confedera- and deeply shocking for British troops to tion puzzle) was wary of becoming part of be routed and massacred in one of Queen 38 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War Victoria’s routine ‘small wars’ of imperial to repel the British invasion that began on conquest, that Zulu military ability became 11 January once Frere’s ultimatum with so notorious. After all, only the very best its impossibly stringent demands expired. warriors in the world could have defeated Prior to that, in September 1878, several a British army, so their military skills amabutho had been mobilised to stage simply had to be astounding. That is what mock hunts along the Natal-Zululand bor- made the British defence of Rorke’s Drift der as a show of strength during the esca- so magnificent, and warranted the award lating crisis that culminated in the delivery of eleven Victoria Crosses. of the British ultimatum on 11 December The subsequent Zulu defeat in the 1878. In October 1878 King Cetshwayo Anglo-Zulu War once the British had kaMpande had mobilised much of the Zulu adjusted their tactics appropriately to army believing that war was imminent, make proper use of their overwhelming but had let it disperse again in November fire-power in all-round defensive posi- when the British took no action. Seventeen tions like laagers and infantry squares, years prior to that, in mid-1861, the Zulu was consequently cried up as a hazardous army had partially mobilised against the and laudable achievement by British arms Transvaal Boers who were making incur- over a truly formidable foe. Disastrous sions into north-western Zululand, and Zulu defeats such as at Khambula on 29 these military precautions had set off the March 1879 and Gingindlovu on 2 April so-called Zulu ‘Invasion Scare’ in Natal. 1879 were not therefore presented as Zulu Yet not one of these three mobilisations be- strategic and tactical failures so much fore the final one in January 1879 preceded as noteworthy British successes against actual hostilities against either the Boers heavy odds. And this is the position that or the British. In that sense, they were no has endured in much of the literature of different from the annual mustering of the the Anglo-Zulu War, for where would the amabutho in the Mahlabathini plain for the drama be if the war was really nothing but umKhosi (first-fruits ceremony) when the a predictable British military promenade army was ritually strengthened. In fact, the through Zululand, punctuated by a few last mobilisation that had resulted in an careless lapses that gave the Zulu some actual campaign against whites had been unexpected and undeserved victories? in December 1838 during the Voortrekker- It is not the intention here to detract Zulu War, 40 years before. in any way from the undoubted courage And what was the Zulu military record of Zulu fighting-men or the skill of their in wars against other African polities in commanders. Nevertheless, by probing the the 40 years between the Voortrekker- conventional wisdom regarding the Zulu Zulu War and the Anglo-Zulu War? Taking military performance in 1879, problems advantage of the Voortrekker defeat of the with Zulu battle-preparedness will be Ndebele on the highveld in 1836 – 1837, brought to light, and it will be suggested the Zulu raided the Ndebele between June that Zulu irregulars were more success- and September 1837, although with disap- ful in facing the British than were the pointingly limited success. After the Boer amabutho (age-grade regiments) of the victory at Ncome on 16 December 1838 in conventional military system. the Voortrekker-Zulu War, King Dingane Consider first Zulu battle-preparedness. attempted to carve out a new kingdom In early January 1879 the amabutho mobil- north across the Phongolo to put space ised fully in the Mahlabathini plain in order between him and the Voortrekkers. In the 39 The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces The war-readiness and military effectiveness of the Zulu forces in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War winter of 1839 he made a serious attempt attempt.