Russia's Intelligence System

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24/01/15 RUSSIA’S Mark Galeotti NTELLIGENCE Professor of Global Affairs I Director, Initiative for the Study of Emerging Threats YSTEM SPS Center for Global Affairs S New York University Mark Galeotti @MarkGaleotti New York University https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/ Continuity Continuity 1st CD SVR Espionage Foreign Intelligence Service 2nd/3rd/5th CD FSB Polit. Sec. Federal Security Service 9th CD FSO Praetorians Federal Guard Service 8th/16th CD FAPSI, then FSB/ SIGINT GRU 1 24/01/15 Continuity Continuity SVR FSB Foreign Federal Security Intelligence Service Service Continuity What is Distinctive? GRU Overlapping Responsibilities Constant and direct turf wars—and not just Main Intelligence for funding and access Directorate of the Emphasis on active operations General Staff “Wartime” mindset Corruption Level of political support under Putin 2 24/01/15 Overlapping Responsibilities Overlapping Responsibilities SVR SVR Crimea FSB GRU FSB GRU Turf Wars Turf Wars Key Key Budgets Budgets Resps. Resps. 2000-2 ‘Tri Kita’ case Putin’s Business Putin’s Business Ear Opps. Ear Opps. CONFLICT CONFLICT2003, end of FAPSI 3 24/01/15 Active Operations Wartime Mindset Gather • Espionage Zero-Sum/Cold War Intel. • “If the West loses, we gain” Inform Sense of Real Threat • Advocacy Policy • “Russia is at risk” Action-oriented Direct • Action Ops • “Better action than inaction” Corruption Corruption Lack of Lack of Lack of Controls Lack of Controls Transpar- Transpar- ency ency Informat- Informat- ion & ion & Force Sub-Lt JeffreyForce DeLisle Culture of Corruption Culture of Corruption 4 24/01/15 Putin’s Boys Putin’s Boys 2008-13 decline Budgets of GRU Budgets Freedom Freedom Demands Demands Outcomes Outcomes Massive and sustained expansion in networks and Massive and sustained expansion in networks and increased scale, tempo and aggressiveness of ops increased scale, tempo and aggressiveness of ops “the threat from Russian espionage Relative lack of oversight, so long as believed to be Relative lack of oversight,continues so longto be assignificant believed toand be is delivering delivering similar to the Cold War …the number of Russian intelligence High level of corruption High level of corruptionofficers in London is at the same level as in Soviet times.” Unwillingness to tell hard truths Unwillingness to tell hard truths -- MI5, 2010 Takes heavy Kremlin pressure to get them to “play Takes heavy Kremlin pressure to get them to “play nice” nice” 5 24/01/15 Outcomes Conclusion: Beware what you wish for Massive and sustained expansion in networks and technically increased scale, tempo and aggressiveness of ops They are highly capable, even if sometimes badly tasked Relative lack of oversight, so long as believed to be delivering They now reinforce Putin’s assumptions, not inform his world view High level of corruption They reinforce the world’s view of Putinism Unwillingness to tell hard truths Takes heavy Kremlin pressure to get them to “play They are cynical opportunists at home, loyal nice” to themselves 6 .

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