David F. Rudgers. Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. vii + 244 pp. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-1024-2.

Reviewed by Charles C. Kolb

Published on H-Diplo (September, 2000)

Donovan as "Father" of the Central Intelli‐ Rudgers' thesis is that that William J. "Wild gence Agency: Myth versus Fact -- Tom Troy and Bill" Donovan, the former chief of the Ofce of Dave Rudgers Strategic Services (OSS) from 1942-1945, was not a [Disclaimer: The opinions expressed herein prime mover behind the founding of the CIA. This are those of the reviewer and not of his employer is in direct opposition to the "ofcial" CIA history or any other federal agency.] written by Thomas Troy, who prior to his retire‐ ment was Middle Eastern Afairs analyst in the This signifcant volume provides new insights CIA's Ofce of Training, and who authored several on the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency volumes on Donovan's role in establishing the (CIA) during the transitional years from the end of CIA. Rudgers maintains that the creation of the World War II to earliest phases of the Cold War. agency was not simply the brainchild of William The author, David Rudgers, is an independent his‐ Donovan but in reality was the result of many torian who was formerly a staf archivist at the months of protracted and delicate negotiations National Archives and Records Administration among numerous policy makers, including Secre‐ (NARA) in Washington, DC, before joining the Cen‐ tary of the Navy James Forrestal and Under Secre‐ tral Intelligence Agency as editor and senior intel‐ tary of State Dean Acheson. The Con‐ ligence analyst. He is an historian, holding a doc‐ gress, the Department of State, the Department of torate from George Washington University, and Justice, the Joint Chiefs of Staf, and the Bureau of began his study of the founding of the CIA during the Budget all played roles in the creation of the his tenure as an archivist at NARA who was "secret state," the CIA that operates at the margin charged with CIA, navy, and congressional docu‐ of the American political process (pp. 2-3). ment declassifcation. He continued his primary research on his own time from 1990 to 1999 both In 1975 Tom Troy completed his monograph, during and after his CIA employment. Donovan and the CIA, written as a "very limited" two-volume edition (originally marked SECRET) H-Net Reviews which provided a history of the formation of the Interestingly, Stephenson's own suppressed CIA.[1] In this treatise, Troy traces the prewar account of the formation and activities of the years (1920s to 1941) including the establishment wartime British Security Coordination (BSC) in of the COI (Coordinator of Information), the evolu‐ the United States, written in 1945, has only recent‐ tion and activities of the OSS (1942-1945), and the ly been published with elucidating prefatory re‐ postwar "CIA era" (1945-1947). Troy contends that marks by Nigel West. [6] Only 20 copies of this re‐ the origin of the CIA is the result of a plan Dono‐ port were ever made and nearly half were subse‐ van devised and sent to President Roosevelt in quently destroyed. There is nothing in this compi‐ late 1944 that would establish a permanent, lation to suggest a pre-1940 Donovan and peacetime central intelligence organization. This Stephenson connection. Rudgers does not cite "frst edition" of Troy's monograph was declassi‐ Stephenson's volume among his sources but the fed and commercially published in 1981 with the contents have no bearing on his thesis that Dono‐ deletion of six pages of typewritten material. [2] van had no role in the actual formation of the CIA. Tom Troy more recently argues [3] that it was Rudgers, who employs the most recently de‐ Donovan, rather than William S. Stephenson, the classifed documents on this issue, has without legendary "Intrepid" who directed British intelli‐ doubt written the defnitive assessment that sup‐ gence in the United States during World War II, plants Darling's history of the CIA written in 1953 who was the force behind the creation of the CIA. (but published in 1990) and Bradley F. Smith's Troy also notes that "Part 2: The Coordinator of Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the Information and the British Intelligence: An Essay C.I.A. (1993).[7] The Darling volume according to on Origins" [4] was actually written in 1970. A ma‐ Rudgers is "discursive, colorless, and outdated" jor reason for the publication of Troy's 1996 vol‐ (p. 213) and he further contends (p. 219) that the ume was to disprove the then extant rumor that best overall histories of the CIA are written by Donovan was actually a British agent and had British nationals John Ranleigh and Rhodri Jef‐ been recruited by Stephenson in 1916. Troy con‐ freys-Jones. [8] This reviewer would argue that demns and refutes this story, documenting that Rudgers's own evaluation also surpasses these Donovan and Stephenson frst met after July 1940, works. and that the supposition was a very likely compo‐ Structurally, Creating the Secret State con‐ nent of a Stephenson deception but that it distort‐ tains an introductory essay, ten chapters, end‐ ed the history of the American intelligence past. notes (558 total), an extensive bibliography (over [5] 120 entries), and a 16-page double- column index of predominantly proper noun rather than topical entries. In the main, Rudgers employs archival and other primary documents in preparing his as‐ sessment. These include 29 archival sources com‐ prising 9 record groups from National Archives and Records Administration, 16 from Presidential Libraries (2 from the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, 13 from the Harry S. Truman Library, and 1 from the Herbert C. Hoover Library), the papers of Edward Stettinius, George C. Marshall, and William J. Donovan, and documents in the Air Force Historical Research Agency. Donovan's pa‐

2 H-Net Reviews pers, which Rudgers reports are in need of an independent agency (not unlike the FBI) re‐ archival care, are deposited in the collections of porting to the President are advanced versus a the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle military organization combining features of the Barracks, Pennsylvania. In addition, Rudgers also ONI, SIS, OSS, and MID/G-2 (Ofce of Naval Intelli‐ uses 5 published primary sources, 12 ofcial pub‐ gence, Special Intelligence Services, Ofce of lications, 15 congressional documents, 17 frst- Strategic Services, and the Military Intelligence person accounts, 26 secondary sources, 13 journal Division, which became Army Intelligence, G-2). or magazine articles, and 5 (New York and Wash‐ Rudgers also reviews the 25 August 1942 plan de‐ ington) newspaper titles. Among the documents veloped by Brigadier General John Magruder enti‐ he consulted were Tom Troy's own working pa‐ tled "Proposed Plan for Joint Intelligence Bureau," pers now declassifed and available at NARA and the 23 October 1944 "Post-war Intelligence (Troy, Thomas F., Papers. RG [Record Group] 263, Policy of the United States" authored by the Joint Records of the CIA). As Rudgers stated during his Intelligence Staf. The ideas expressed in the latter 8 June 2000 lecture at the National Archives and document "stood in direct opposition to the revo‐ Records Administration (and in other "book talks" lutionary ideas developed by William J. Donovan" in the Washington, DC area): "If he [Troy] used all (p. 17). the material he had collected, I wouldn't be here." Chapter 2 considers the initial formal paper [9] submitted by Donovan to General Walter Bedell The CIA's web site ( http://www.cia.gov/ ) cur‐ Smith (General Eisenhower's Chief of Staf) on 17 rently briefy covers among other topics the histo‐ September 1943 in which the future needs of ry of the agency from its creation with the signing overt and covert intelligence operations are expli‐ of the National Security Act by President Truman cated. On 18 November 1944 Donovan sent Presi‐ in 1947, through the naming of The George Bush dent Roosevelt his formal proposal to establish a Center for Intelligence, to current agency mis‐ peacetime central intelligence organization (pp. sions and activities. The web site's "Genesis of the 20-22; see also Darling, pp. 20-29; Troy Wild Bill CIA" includes the statement that "most of the spe‐ and Intrepid_, p. 210), and FDR ultimately passed cifc assignments given to the CIA by the National the proposal to Admiral William D. Leahy, his per‐ Security Act, as well as on police and internal se‐ sonal military advisor and presiding ofcer of the curity functions, closely follow the Presidential di‐ Joint Chiefs of Staf (JCS). The JCS critiqued the rective creating the Central Intelligence Group plan, particularly for its references to "subversive and were infuenced by Donovan's 1944 plan" operations abroad," and by January had devel‐ (http://www.cia/publications/facttell/genesis.htm oped a "constructive counterproposal." It may be ). However, the "Key Events in CIA's History" do that the reputation of the OSS as an elitist organi‐ not mention Donovan after his military promo‐ zation may have colored the assessment (see also tion in 1944 ( http://www.cia/publications/facttell/ Kermit Roosevelt [10] for the "in-house" view). De‐ keyevent.htm ). tractors often termed the OSS as "Oh So Social" be‐ In hisfrst chapter, Rudgers summarizes the cause of the sociocultural backgrounds of many of "dual road" -- domestic and military -- leading to its personnel which included motion picture stars, the formation of the CIA. According to Troy college athletes, society "playboys," etc. In the frst [Donovan and the CIA, p. 211) and Rudgers (p. weeks of February 1945, newspaper reporter Wal‐ 150), the frst use of the name Central Intelligence ter Trohan published a series of articles about Agency dates to a 24 March 1942 U.S. Marine Donovan's "Super Spy System," including the en‐ Corps memo. On the domestic side, arguments for tire text of Donovan's November proposal, setting of a political and public furor. The discussion

3 H-Net Reviews about the "leak" and who provided Donovan's re‐ NARA). Readers should note the April 12, 1945 port to the press makes interesting reading. None‐ date -- the day of FDR's death -- and may speculate theless, Roosevelt wrote to Donovan on 5 April as to when the rejection was actually formulated granting him the opportunity to present his plan, and if Roosevelt had authored or condoned it. By but Roosevelt's death a week later in Warm 22 January 1946, Truman issued a directive for Springs, Georgia left the proposal in the hands of the establishment of a new central intelligence President Truman. system. We are informed in the third chapter that Rudgers then assesses the role of Dean Ache‐ Harry Truman was "a marked contrast to his pre‐ son, the opposition to a CIA by FBI Director J. decessor" and that he possessed considerable Edgar Hoover, the role of Alfred McCormack and knowledge of both the federal government and the Intelligence Advisory Board. Intrigues and in‐ the military. Donovan and Truman met face-to- fghting, dismantling the wartime bureaucracy, face on 14 May 1945-- the only time that they ever eliminating the duplication of efort, and debates met -- and Rudgers states that "they never got over centralized versus decentralized intelligence along and had no regard for each other" (p. 36). operations during this budget-cutting postwar pe‐ Hence, the issuing of Executive Order 9621 of 20 riod are reviewed. A research and intelligence September 1945 dissolving the OSS as of 1 October need was perceived, particularly the collection came as no surprise, and the assets of the OSS and analysis (decryption and translation) of com‐ were transferred to the departments of State and munications as the Cold War formalized. War. An endnote provides a salient assessment (p. Bureaucratic infghting among the Joint 194): "With Roosevelt dead, rejection of Donovan's Chiefs of Staf, National Intelligence Authority, In‐ plan by the State, War, Navy, and Justice Depart‐ telligence Coordinating Committee, and Interde‐ ments became largely a formality. In a crisp partmental Security Coordinating Committee, memo informing him of the April 12 [1945] deci‐ among others is considered in Chapter 5. Rudgers sion, Secretary of War Stimson commented that, examines the 15 September 1945 JCS proposal, the although there was a need for a 'vigorous and co‐ 21 September 1945 Justice Department proposal ordinated system of intelligence' after the war, he (based on the FBI's Latin American operations did not consider Donovan's proposal 'sound,' but model), and the State Department's plan which rather as running counter to the 'strong system of was ultimately rejected. In the meantime, McCor‐ intelligence for national security' envisioned by mack prepared a "Central Intelligence Agency" the War Department. He believed that the secre‐ proposal submitted on 6 January 1946 in which he taries of state, war, and navy had primary foreign wrote (p. 85) that "while the OSS accomplished a intelligence responsibility and therefore 'should great deal during the war, it came nowhere near either themselves constitute the coordinating au‐ to flling the role that it desired, chiefy because of thority, or acting jointly they should directly cre‐ its remoteness from the operating units. Reports ate and supervise the coordinating authority.' In were frequently based on less than all the avail‐ his view, Donovan's proposed agency 'would sub‐ able information, not because the information ject departmental intelligence operations to the was withheld but because OSS tried to cover too control of ofcers outside the departments and large a feld of intelligence that it could not main‐ not responsible to the heads of those depart‐ tain adequate machinery for getting all the avail‐ ments.' This, Stimson thought, was 'dangerous and able information." The need for secret intelligence impractical'" (Stimson to Donovan, undated, PPD and strategic intelligence reports became clear as 350.05, Section XI, Cases 314-333, Operations Divi‐ the inadequacies of America's prewar intelligence sion Decimal File, 1942-1945, Record Group 165,

4 H-Net Reviews apparatus, which provided a false sense of securi‐ Intelligence) and Souers's role in laying the ty in pre-Pearl Harbor days. groundwork for the assignment and assessment In his sixth chapter, Rudgers reviews a vari‐ of personnel, and plans to produce daily intelli‐ ety of popular and scholarly journal articles that gence summaries. The selection of Army G-2 Lieu‐ engaged in the postwar intelligence debate. tenant General as Souers's suc‐ Among these are articles in Life , Time , Harper's , cessor was critical, and we are informed that Van‐ and Collier's magazines, and Virginia Quarterly denberg (p. 114) "wasted no time initiating his Review and Yale Review . Articles and columns by quest for empire" and that he was "a dynamic op‐ journalists Joseph and Stewart Alsop, and books erator" (p. 127). Rudgers also writes that "thanks by retired Admiral Ellis Zacharias [11] and the to Souers's careful preparation work, Vandenberg military writer Hanson Baldwin [12] helped to left with only loose ends to wrap up" (p. 118) so color public and political opinions. As a minor that he was able to gather up remnants of the OSS criticism, Rudgers does not sufciently consider and other intelligence units being disbanded in the public and political efects the ongoing Pearl the postwar era. Espionage and counterespionage, Harbor attack hearings in opinion formation. and clandestine foreign intelligence operations were established, and the Ofce of Special Opera‐ Quoting from a Senate report, Rudgers re‐ tions (OSO) was created and acquired the FBI's ports (p. 96) that "intelligence of scientifc, techno‐ wartime intelligence network in Latin America logical, and ideological developments afecting with Hoover's blessing. The Foreign Broadcast In‐ the war-making potential of foreign countries telligence Service (originally in the Federal Com‐ cannot be obtained wholly by overt methods. If munications Commission) was also acquired and the importance of an adequate peacetime intelli‐ renamed the Federal Broadcast Information Ser‐ gence service is not recognized and adequate pro‐ vice, and the Washington Document Center was vision made for the utilization of sufciently charged with the translation of captured foreign trained personnel in the reduced military forces documents. Vandenberg left the CIA to head a of the postwar era, retrogression to the situation now independent U.S. Air Force, and turned over which existed during the period following World the DCI duty to Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter. War I is a likely result. All of the considerations Nonetheless, there was still a need for legislation herein brought forth are, of course, heavily un‐ to bring the CIA into legal existence. derscored by the pivotal position, which the Unit‐ ed States has come to occupy in world afairs. As The eighth chapter begins with an assessment the sphere of our responsibilities has widened, of the Central Intelligence Group as a "disorga‐ and our relationships with other nations have nized assemblage of parts." President Truman, we been extended, our need for accurate, compre‐ are informed, had little personal interest and left hensive, and up-to-date information has become the formalization of the CIA to his staf, especially more acute." (U.S. Senate Committee on Naval Af‐ to a young Clark Ciford. The State Department fairs, Unifcation of the War and Navy Depart‐ soon began to perceive the emerging CIA as a ments , pp. 159-163, 1946). threat to its own prerogatives and became con‐ cerned with the domination of the agency -- now In Chapter 7 Rudgers summarizes diverse with 1800 employees -- by the military and a staf opinions on the structure and organization of the which included some of Donovan's "disciples," proposed CIA and considers the role of the Central among them Alan Dulles. Rudgers also reviews in Intelligence Group as a transitional organization. detail the important congressional hearings and He evaluates the importance of Sidney Souers the anti-CIA testimony given by Frederick Libby who served as the interim DCI (Director of Central of the National Council for the Prevention of War,

5 H-Net Reviews as well as testimony by Chief of Staf Dwight defnition of covert action (pp. 167-171), the NSC Eisenhower, technocrat Vannever Bush, and re‐ 10/2 seminal document drafted by Kennan (18 tired Admiral Zacharias. Anti-CIA concerns cen‐ June 1948), and the selection of General Walter tered on the issue of the CIA's role in collecting in‐ Bedell Smith as the DCI replacing Hillenkoetter on telligence versus its role in policymaking. Ulti‐ 7 October 1950. The Ofce of Policy Coordination mately, "the responsibility of the agency were gen‐ (OPC), America's frst peacetime covert organiza‐ erally described as follows: coordinating govern‐ tion, was also established. ment intelligence activities, advising the NSC [Na‐ The outbreak of the Korean War forced the tional Security Council] on intelligence matters, United States to focus on building a modern intel‐ evaluating and distributing intelligence informa‐ ligence system. Smith, the former Chief of Staf to tion, performing services of 'common concern' in General Eisenhower, had the full support of Presi‐ the intelligence feld as determined by the NSC, dent Eisenhower, and Smith had the prestige and and 'such other functions and duties related to in‐ persuasive powers needed to infuence military telligence afecting the national security' as direct‐ commanders, ambassadors, and congressmen. Ac‐ ed by the NSC" (p. 146). The legislative process cording to Rudgers (p. 177), the CIA would assume was complete by 26 July 1947 and President Tru‐ its present structure under Smith's plan for reor‐ man signed the National Security Act establishing ganization. Structurally, the position of DDCI the agency. New York Times reporter Samuel Tow‐ (Deputy Director of Central Intelligence) was es‐ er wrote on 3 August that (p. 148) "one of the fnal tablished (and flled by ), a Direc‐ steps before adjournment, largely overlooked in torate of Plans was created, and the Ofce of Na‐ the avalanche of last minute legislation, was the tional Estimates (a long-range covert/clandestine stamp of approval Congress placed on the cre‐ analysis group) was revitalized. In sum, Smith "in ation, for the frst time in American history, of an his tenure as DCI had changed history and fnally efective world-wide American intelligence ser‐ brought about the intelligence empire that Dono‐ vice of its own." The CIA ofcial opened for busi‐ van had envisioned" (p. 180). Smith left the agen‐ ness on 18 September 1947 and Hillenkoetter was cy in 1953 to become Under Secretary of State in sworn in as DCI on 26 September. Eisenhower's administration. Rudgers reminds the reader in Chapter 9 that Rudgers suggests in his tenth chapter that the he is not writing a comprehensive history of the CIA never came to dominate the U.S. government agency but is focusing on signifcant develop‐ intelligence apparatus as Donovan had envi‐ ments that transformed the nature and purpose sioned, and that the FBI and military retained ma‐ of the CIA. Among the key elements he discusses jor intelligence operations (p. 181). Likewise, con‐ are the "collapse of the grand alliance" and the So‐ cern remained about the "absence of satisfactory vietization of Eastern Europe, escalating instabili‐ machinery for surveillance of the stewardship of ty in the Far East, concern about nuclear prolifer‐ the CIA" (p. 183), as noted in the Second Hoover ation, friction and resentment of the CIA by "old‐ Commission of 1955 chaired by retired General er" organizations (e.g., FBI and Department of Mark Clark, but the CIA, Rudgers contends, be‐ State), and the need for the clandestine collection came what Donovan wished it to be, unencum‐ of information. The roles of James Forrestal, Carl bered by its own OSS past. Hence, the author con‐ Vinson, George Kennan, and Allen Dulles are also cludes that any resemblance of the CIA to the OSS considered, and the author observes that many is coincidental -- a point he also made in his oral civilians left the CIA during the late 1940s and the presentation in June 2000. military began to dominate among the key per‐ sonnel. Signifcant to the agency was the formal

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Why did Donovan fail in his attempt? It ap‐ Agency. Frederick, MD: Alethia Books, University pears that he was out of step with both the Execu‐ Publications of America, 1981. tive and Legislative branches of government, and [3]. Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, was overseas at a critical juncture in the assess‐ Stephenson, and the Origin of the CIA. New Haven ment of his November 1944 proposal. Rudgers and London: Yale University Press, 1996 does not consider Donovan to be the CIA's lineal [4]. Ibid., pp. 19-135 "Father", but he stated in his 8 June 2000 lecture that "Donovan could be the Godfather of the CIA [5]. Ibid;., pp. 165, 176, 177, 192 but, like Moses, remained outside of the Promised [6]. See Stephenson, William S., editor. British Land." Security Coordination: The Secret History of In sum, refecting his training as an historian British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945. and archivist, David Rudgers has written a New York: Fromm International Publishing, 1998. provocative, well-documented assessment of the [7]. Darling, Arthur B. The Central Intelligence founding of the CIA. He has taken the "unpopular" Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950. position that is contrary to the generally-accepted University Park: The Pennsylvania State Universi‐ version of agency history that William J. Donovan ty Press, 1990; Smith, Bradley F. Shadow War‐ played a signifcant role in establishing the CIA, riors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. New the "secret state" that remains independent of the York: Basic Books, 1993. mainstream federal government. To be clear [8]. Ranleigh, John. The Agency: The Rise and about Rudgers's position and his critiques of Tom Decline of the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, Troy's writings, this reviewer also reread key sec‐ 1986; Jefreys-Jones, Rhodri. The CIA and Ameri‐ tions and chapters in Troy's Donovan and the CIA can Democracy. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Universi‐ and Wild Bill and Intrepid volumes. Creating the ty Press, 1989. Secret State is carefully crafted, eloquently writ‐ [9]. Because Rudgers was a former NARA ar‐ ten, and meticulously researched book and its chivist and had used documents now located in persuasive, compelling arguments make it essen‐ that repository in writing his book, he was invited tial reading on the issue of the creation of the Cen‐ to give a presentation at the National Archives tral Intelligence Agency. The author has succeed‐ and Records Administration on 8 June 2000. This ed in his objective to document that the idea of a reviewer had the opportunity to attend Rudgers's postwar intelligence organization developed insti‐ lecture in which he outlined his arguments and tutionally among federal government policy mak‐ presented the results of his primary document re‐ ers in response to a perceived need. The exigen‐ search. Among the members of the audience that cies of the Cold War, nuclear proliferation, and day was Tom Troy, who took exception to some of the fear of another "Pearl Harbor," I believe, exac‐ Rudgers's remarks, and especially the book's dust erbated this need, because the nation lacked an jacket "blurb" written by Wesley Wark (listed on appropriate proactive intelligence agency. the jacket as the author of The Intelligence Revolu‐ Notes tion: Espionage and International Relations Since [1]. Troy, Thomas F. Donovan and the CIA: A 1900). Wark, known for his writings on security History of the Establishment of the Central Intelli‐ and intelligence [Wesley Wark, A. Stuart Farson, gence Agency. CIA Center for the Study of Intelli‐ and David Staford, editors. Security and Intelli‐ gence, 1975. gence in a Changing World: New Perspectives for [2]. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the 1990s. London: Frank Cass, Canadian Associa‐ the Establishment of the Central Intelligence tion for Security and Intelligence Studies, 1991;

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Wark, (ed.) Espionage, Past, Present, Future? Newberry Park, Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass, Intelli‐ gence and National Security 8(3), 1994.], praised Rudgers's volume, stating that "This book is a gem. It out-trumps Thomas Troy's Donovan and should easily achieve the status of the standard account of CIA origins." Troy, who was accompa‐ nied by several of his colleagues, was indignant and accused Rudgers of being iconoclastic and having a liberal bias, which Rudgers readily ad‐ mitted. However, there is more than semantics and book "blurbs" involved in this confrontation -- Rudgers has carefully dismantled the creation myth, and debunks Donovan's supposed key role in the creation of the CIA. This challenges Tom Troy's deifcation of Donovan, the cult of person‐ ality, and the myth that the CIA is the direct lineal descendant of the OSS (p. 190). Rudgers also stated during his lecture that it is considered "treason, blasphemy, and sacrilege if one does not consider Donovan as the CIA's 'founder'." As a sidebar, the actual title of Wark's book that was cited in the cover blurb is The Intelligence Revolution : Espi‐ onage and Statecraft since 1879 (Toronto: Canadi‐ an Scholars' Press, 1992) [10]. Roosevelt, Kermit. War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services). New York: Walker, 1976. [11]. Zacharias, Ellis M. Secret Missions: The Story of An Intelligence Officer. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1947. [12]. Baldwin, Hanson W. The Price of Power. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947 Copyright (c) 2000 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ tact [email protected] or H-Diplo@h- net.msu.edu.

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Citation: Charles C. Kolb. Review of Rudgers, David F. Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. September, 2000.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4484

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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