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Of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947 David F. Rudgers. Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. vii + 244 pp. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-1024-2. Reviewed by Charles C. Kolb Published on H-Diplo (September, 2000) Donovan as "Father" of the Central Intelli‐ Rudgers' thesis is that that William J. "Wild gence Agency: Myth versus Fact -- Tom Troy and Bill" Donovan, the former chief of the Office of Dave Rudgers Strategic Services (OSS) from 1942-1945, was not a [Disclaimer: The opinions expressed herein prime mover behind the founding of the CIA. This are those of the reviewer and not of his employer is in direct opposition to the "official" CIA history or any other federal agency.] written by Thomas Troy, who prior to his retire‐ ment was Middle Eastern Affairs analyst in the This significant volume provides new insights CIA's Office of Training, and who authored several on the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency volumes on Donovan's role in establishing the (CIA) during the transitional years from the end of CIA. Rudgers maintains that the creation of the World War II to earliest phases of the Cold War. agency was not simply the brainchild of William The author, David Rudgers, is an independent his‐ Donovan but in reality was the result of many torian who was formerly a staff archivist at the months of protracted and delicate negotiations National Archives and Records Administration among numerous policy makers, including Secre‐ (NARA) in Washington, DC, before joining the Cen‐ tary of the Navy James Forrestal and Under Secre‐ tral Intelligence Agency as editor and senior intel‐ tary of State Dean Acheson. The United States Con‐ ligence analyst. He is an historian, holding a doc‐ gress, the Department of State, the Department of torate from George Washington University, and Justice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Bureau of began his study of the founding of the CIA during the Budget all played roles in the creation of the his tenure as an archivist at NARA who was "secret state," the CIA that operates at the margin charged with CIA, navy, and congressional docu‐ of the American political process (pp. 2-3). ment declassification. He continued his primary research on his own time from 1990 to 1999 both In 1975 Tom Troy completed his monograph, during and after his CIA employment. Donovan and the CIA, written as a "very limited" two-volume edition (originally marked SECRET) H-Net Reviews which provided a history of the formation of the Interestingly, Stephenson's own suppressed CIA.[1] In this treatise, Troy traces the prewar account of the formation and activities of the years (1920s to 1941) including the establishment wartime British Security Coordination (BSC) in of the COI (Coordinator of Information), the evolu‐ the United States, written in 1945, has only recent‐ tion and activities of the OSS (1942-1945), and the ly been published with elucidating prefatory re‐ postwar "CIA era" (1945-1947). Troy contends that marks by Nigel West. [6] Only 20 copies of this re‐ the origin of the CIA is the result of a plan Dono‐ port were ever made and nearly half were subse‐ van devised and sent to President Roosevelt in quently destroyed. There is nothing in this compi‐ late 1944 that would establish a permanent, lation to suggest a pre-1940 Donovan and peacetime central intelligence organization. This Stephenson connection. Rudgers does not cite "first edition" of Troy's monograph was declassi‐ Stephenson's volume among his sources but the fied and commercially published in 1981 with the contents have no bearing on his thesis that Dono‐ deletion of six pages of typewritten material. [2] van had no role in the actual formation of the CIA. Tom Troy more recently argues [3] that it was Rudgers, who employs the most recently de‐ Donovan, rather than William S. Stephenson, the classified documents on this issue, has without legendary "Intrepid" who directed British intelli‐ doubt written the definitive assessment that sup‐ gence in the United States during World War II, plants Darling's history of the CIA written in 1953 who was the force behind the creation of the CIA. (but published in 1990) and Bradley F. Smith's Troy also notes that "Part 2: The Coordinator of Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the Information and the British Intelligence: An Essay C.I.A. (1993).[7] The Darling volume according to on Origins" [4] was actually written in 1970. A ma‐ Rudgers is "discursive, colorless, and outdated" jor reason for the publication of Troy's 1996 vol‐ (p. 213) and he further contends (p. 219) that the ume was to disprove the then extant rumor that best overall histories of the CIA are written by Donovan was actually a British agent and had British nationals John Ranleigh and Rhodri Jef‐ been recruited by Stephenson in 1916. Troy con‐ freys-Jones. [8] This reviewer would argue that demns and refutes this story, documenting that Rudgers's own evaluation also surpasses these Donovan and Stephenson frst met after July 1940, works. and that the supposition was a very likely compo‐ Structurally, Creating the Secret State con‐ nent of a Stephenson deception but that it distort‐ tains an introductory essay, ten chapters, end‐ ed the history of the American intelligence past. notes (558 total), an extensive bibliography (over [5] 120 entries), and a 16-page double- column index of predominantly proper noun rather than topical entries. In the main, Rudgers employs archival and other primary documents in preparing his as‐ sessment. These include 29 archival sources com‐ prising 9 record groups from National Archives and Records Administration, 16 from Presidential Libraries (2 from the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, 13 from the Harry S. Truman Library, and 1 from the Herbert C. Hoover Library), the papers of Edward Stettinius, George C. Marshall, and William J. Donovan, and documents in the Air Force Historical Research Agency. Donovan's pa‐ 2 H-Net Reviews pers, which Rudgers reports are in need of an independent agency (not unlike the FBI) re‐ archival care, are deposited in the collections of porting to the President are advanced versus a the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle military organization combining features of the Barracks, Pennsylvania. In addition, Rudgers also ONI, SIS, OSS, and MID/G-2 (Office of Naval Intelli‐ uses 5 published primary sources, 12 official pub‐ gence, Special Intelligence Services, Office of lications, 15 congressional documents, 17 frst- Strategic Services, and the Military Intelligence person accounts, 26 secondary sources, 13 journal Division, which became Army Intelligence, G-2). or magazine articles, and 5 (New York and Wash‐ Rudgers also reviews the 25 August 1942 plan de‐ ington) newspaper titles. Among the documents veloped by Brigadier General John Magruder enti‐ he consulted were Tom Troy's own working pa‐ tled "Proposed Plan for Joint Intelligence Bureau," pers now declassified and available at NARA and the 23 October 1944 "Post-war Intelligence (Troy, Thomas F., Papers. RG [Record Group] 263, Policy of the United States" authored by the Joint Records of the CIA). As Rudgers stated during his Intelligence Staf. The ideas expressed in the latter 8 June 2000 lecture at the National Archives and document "stood in direct opposition to the revo‐ Records Administration (and in other "book talks" lutionary ideas developed by William J. Donovan" in the Washington, DC area): "If he [Troy] used all (p. 17). the material he had collected, I wouldn't be here." Chapter 2 considers the initial formal paper [9] submitted by Donovan to General Walter Bedell The CIA's web site ( http://www.cia.gov/ ) cur‐ Smith (General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff) on 17 rently briefly covers among other topics the histo‐ September 1943 in which the future needs of ry of the agency from its creation with the signing overt and covert intelligence operations are expli‐ of the National Security Act by President Truman cated. On 18 November 1944 Donovan sent Presi‐ in 1947, through the naming of The George Bush dent Roosevelt his formal proposal to establish a Center for Intelligence, to current agency mis‐ peacetime central intelligence organization (pp. sions and activities. The web site's "Genesis of the 20-22; see also Darling, pp. 20-29; Troy Wild Bill CIA" includes the statement that "most of the spe‐ and Intrepid_, p. 210), and FDR ultimately passed cific assignments given to the CIA by the National the proposal to Admiral William D. Leahy, his per‐ Security Act, as well as on police and internal se‐ sonal military advisor and presiding officer of the curity functions, closely follow the Presidential di‐ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS critiqued the rective creating the Central Intelligence Group plan, particularly for its references to "subversive and were influenced by Donovan's 1944 plan" operations abroad," and by January had devel‐ (http://www.cia/publications/facttell/genesis.htm oped a "constructive counterproposal." It may be ). However, the "Key Events in CIA's History" do that the reputation of the OSS as an elitist organi‐ not mention Donovan after his military promo‐ zation may have colored the assessment (see also tion in 1944 ( http://www.cia/publications/facttell/ Kermit Roosevelt [10] for the "in-house" view). De‐ keyevent.htm ). tractors often termed the OSS as "Oh So Social" be‐ In hisfrst chapter, Rudgers summarizes the cause of the sociocultural backgrounds of many of "dual road" -- domestic and military -- leading to its personnel which included motion picture stars, the formation of the CIA. According to Troy college athletes, society "playboys," etc.
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