4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 2

CHAPTER VIII INTERNAL STRUCTURES

Given the fact that camps accommodated soldiers, their significant height when the camp was built), others remain as baggage, horses, mules and supplies for a relatively short substantial mounds within the camp perimeters, as at space of time and accommodation took the form of leather Brompton (the SE corner) and Stretford Bridge. At Llanfor I tents, their interiors contained few, if any, built features, and the W defences of the camp carefully skirted the margin of a those which did exist rarely reveal themselves as large Bronze Age barrow (which must have stood to an archaeological entities. Structures that we do know of within appreciable height); hence, a kink in the course of the camp camps include tribunalia – earth or turf platforms used for defences where the ditch curves inwards in order to avoid the ceremonial or auguratorial purposes – illustrated on Trajan’s mound. It is interesting to note that the same barrow proved no column, rubbish and latrine pits, and cooking facilities – obstacle to the presumably slightly later ‘supply base’ at hearths and ovens. In respect of the last named structures Llanfor, which incorporates it within the enclosure. On large-scale excavations within the 45-ha (110-acre) camp at occasion, however, the mound, instead of being excluded, as is Kintore in Aberdeenshire has now produced evidence for over the case at Hindwell Farm I, was actually incorporated within 180 ovens and numerous pits. But such large-scale excavations the angles of the defences, as at Bromfield (the SE corner) and within temporary camps are uncommon. Moreover, the Kintore Stretford Bridge I, thus potentially forming an elevated look- ovens have produced a variety of dates suggesting that not all out point, though, of course, the mound may have been were necessarily Roman in date (Alexander 2000; Cook & levelled by the builders. At Stretford Bridge I the crop-mark of Dunbar 2004). It may be occasionally difficult to distinguish an oval, ditched enclosure – probably a prehistoric funerary or features contemporary with the camps from those of earlier or ritual monument – lies within the NW part of the site and may later date, especially when revealed as crop-marks, and the also have affected the tented arrangement in this quadrant. ovens at Kintore are a case in point. At others, disturbances More problematical are archaeological features of such as the tile-stone quarries and bomb or shell craters at Y indeterminate date, either pre-dating or post-dating the Pigwn are evidently of more recent origin, as are the hollows building of the camp. Settlement sites are a case in point. For to the rear of the ramparts at Esgair Perfedd and Arosfa Garreg example, a substantial semicircular defensive enclosure, (these are clearly later at the former since they cut through possibly of late prehistoric date, is located within the NW what appear to be post-Roman features; see p. 135). corner of Blaen-cwm Bach. The RCAHMW (1976, 25) In the case of the crop-mark evidence this requires analysis suggests that the NW circuit of the enclosure was left to determine whether it relates to the presence of unfinished, though it is equally possible that these defences archaeological features which are earlier, contemporary or were partly levelled, presumably by the camp-builders; in which later than the usage of the camp. case the enclosure is earlier. An equally strong case can be made for the enclosure being later than the camp, since it would EARLIER AND LATER STRUCTURES have been sensible for the camp-builders to level the entire site. Camp I at Hindwell Farm has two rectangular enclosures The presence of man-made features such as prehistoric – probably late prehistoric/Romano-British farmsteads – settlement sites, ceremonial and burial monuments is not within the E part of the site, one situated actually on the line of uncommon on camp sites, and in some instances appears to the NE defences. The latter, if early, would have required the have affected the layout. Some of these are of considerable infilling of its ditch when, or before, the camp was built. antiquity and would probably have caused minimal, if any, At Arosfa Garreg a solitary hollow measuring ca.1.5m inconvenience to the camp-builders, such as the palisaded across is situated immediately to the rear of the rampart on the enclosure of Neolithic date which lies beneath the E part of ESE side and about 22m from the NE corner. This is very Hindwell I, or the similar ‘Meldon Bridge’- type enclosure similar to a series of hollows (a total of 25 noted after the last which lies beneath Walton II and possibly Walton III, or the site visit) to the rear of the rampart on all four sides of the circular enclosure, also of probably late Neolithic-Early camp at Esgair Perfedd. These attain a maximum depth of Bronze Age date, which lies beneath Walton I and II. More 0.4m and measure ca.2m x 1.5m, with the long axis at right common, and with a greater propensity to affect the internal angles to the rampart. Those on the N and E are the most dispositions of the camp, are burial monuments, specifically numerous and are accompanied by upcast mounds. St Joseph round barrows. Whilst mostly surviving as ring-ditches, as at (1969, 125, Fig.10) considered them to be quarry-pits. Whilst Glanmiheli (where two ring-ditches are known) and Bromfield it is tempting to suggest that they may have been pits for the (four barrows, at least two of which may have survived to a disposal of rubbish, or functioned as latrines, or even

32 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 3

Figure 23. Aerial view of the W corner and parts of the SW and SE sides of Hindwell Farm I in 1979, showing a series of pits running within the camp ditch. (Copyright reserved Cambridge University Collection of Air Photographs CJW 79). NPRN 302933.

ovens/cooking-emplacements (as at Blaen-cwm Bach), some Inchtuthil plateau (Fig. 7) (Pitts & St Joseph 1985, 229-39, of these appear to post-date peat-cutting in the interior, which Fig 71-72; Pl. XXXVIII, XXXVII, XXXIX). Alternatively, effectively rules them out as ancient features. The rock-cut they have taken the form of a single row of pits just within the oven at Blaen-cwm Bach was entirely infilled and invisible on line of the rampart, as at Bromfield, where they follow the the surface. The use of the hollows at Esgair Perfedd and curve of the NE corner and continue for some 60m to the W, elsewhere as rifle-pits in the context of earlier-twentieth- or appear as a very faint linear mark or row of pits, resembling century military manoeuvres is a strong possibility. a ditch or palisade at Hindwell Farm I. At the latter they are intermittently visible along the NW and SW sides, running CONTEMPORARY FEATURES parallel with the camp ditch and approximately 4m from its inner lip (Fig. 23). They have similarities to the inner ditch of Where contemporary features have been recognised within the campaign base at Rhyn Park (Shropshire), but whether camps in Britain they are sometimes revealed through crop- they represent a ditch or some other feature remains to be marks, such as rows of pits in the interior, as at Glenlochar tested by excavation. Pits dug for rubbish disposal, and (Frere & St Joseph 1983, 27-9, Fig. 15), Dalginross and the so- particularly to serve as latrines (cf. excavated examples at called ‘labour-camps’ at Inchtuthil and elsewhere on the Inchtuthil), must have been common, as were features that

33 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 4

when excavated have proved to be connected with food- from the excavations at Kintore. preparation. Cooking areas or field ovens have been readily Further knowledge of the interiors of the camps in our area identified during excavations on camps in Scotland: for example is limited. The benefit of the excellent survival of the remains cooking-hollows at Lochlands III (Stirlingshire), Lyne II in upland settings means that they do not produce evidence on (Peeblesshire) and possibly Inveresk (East Lothian), and field aerial photographs, unlike a few lowland crop-mark sites. In ovens (and on a large scale) at Kintore (Aberdeenshire) and addition there has been very little work undertaken on the Beattock Bankend (Dumfriesshire) and Pathhead I (Midlothian). interiors of these sites with the exception of Bromfield, which At Blaen-cwm Bach three cuttings to the rear of the rampart did produce evidence for internal features. Excavations on on the WSW side, and one in the SW corner, produced temporary camp sites in Wales have been limited and evidence of wood-ash, but the most significant discovery was concentrated on defence sections. The two geophysical that of a rock-cut pit, ca.0.75m in diameter and 0.25m deep surveys have also produced limited evidence for their interiors. with a ‘tail’ or stoke-hole extending about 1.5m to the E Where undertaken at Hindwell Farm it has not shown features (Chouls 1983). This feature was invisible on the surface and it which need be Roman, whilst at Llanfor the situation is almost certainly represents an oven. At Bromfield no fewer complicated by the existence of two later, permanent Roman than four ovens were excavated in 1991 (Hughes, Leach & military sites and a vicus, together with a veritable palimpsest Stanford 1995), three of which lay close together in a row of archaeological features ranging from the Bronze Age to some 3.5-5m from the course of the camp ditch, the fourth medieval times. some 20m to the south and 15m from the ditch. They were of Excavations have not, for the most part, extended figure-of-eight form, comprising the oven itself and a sufficiently far into the camp interiors to pick up such firing/raking chamber, the whole measuring about 3-3.8m ephemeral traces of activity as may exist, though it must be long, 1.4-2m wide and from 0.55-0.75m deep. Part of the stressed that according to our ancient authorities the area to the collapsed clay dome was found in one oven. Associated plant rear of the defences – the intervallum – was kept clear to allow remains included unidentified charred cereal seeds, together for the circulation of troops in an emergency, though with one spikelet of spelt, and three possible bread fragments. archaeological evidence from Scotland shows ovens Whilst their role as bread ovens seems certain, they also sometimes located immediately to the rear of the defences. appear to have been fired on several occasions, which may This area immediately to the rear of the bank is precisely indicate that the camp was not merely an overnight halting where we might expect to find areas reserved for rubbish- place, a point further reinforced by the occurrence of some disposal, latrines and probably cooking as well, together with iron slag in the lower filling of the camp ditch and by the data such material as might prove valuable for dating purposes.

CHAPTER IX THE REUSE OF CAMPS WITHIN THE ROMAN PERIOD

‘If a multitude of soldiers stays too long in autumn or summer in the same place, then drinking water contaminated by the pollution of the water-supply and air tainted by the foul smell itself give rise to a most deadly disease. This can only be prevented by frequent changes of camp.’ Vegetius III, 2.

The above passage from Vegetius explains why the camp may In the context of patrolling by relatively small numbers of have a short life-span and the reasons behind site-shift or a men, ‘... re-use of earlier fortifications, ... which were designed change in the configuration of an existing site. Since Roman to hold large numbers of men, could turn into a death-trap for soldiers were trained to construct a camp quickly and a small patrol if cornered inside’ (Austin & Rankov 1995, 180). efficiently, it may have been just as easy for them to build new The time factor is critical here. After all, the passage of a defences from scratch, rather than reoccupying an old camp whole season would have thoroughly cleansed a site that might site, having to refurbish and modify its defences as otherwise have become fouled, or at least churned-up, and appropriate. On the other hand, troops on the move might which could perhaps not have been reused by an army in the chose to reoccupy a camp as found and could economically same campaigning season. adapt the defences of the existing site, since no sensible The reuse of the same camping-grounds, if not of the actual general would seek to have a larger camp than was necessary. site, is graphically illustrated in a number of instances where

34 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 5

key locations were used by successive armies as ‘gathering Dialogue box above). Scrutiny of the aerial photographic grounds’ or springboards for launching operations into Wales. evidence pertaining to the camps at Walton suggests that Camp The classic location is the vicinity of the legionary fortress at II may have been reused. The evidence pertains to the NNW Wroxeter (and its probable precursor, the campaigning base at gate of the camp, which suggests that this entrance may have Leighton), where a minimum of four large camps are been blocked in the Roman period, perhaps due to reuse, or clustered together (Attingham Park, Ismore Coppice and possibly had additional entrance protection, as was noted at Norton I and II), with another three (Cound Hall and Eskbank in Midlothian (Maxfield 1975). At the multiple-phase Uffington I and II) lying within 5km. Collectively they site of Beattock Barnhill (Dumfriesshire) a traverse is clearly emphasize the strategic importance of the site, commanding a visible outside a continuous ditch, indicating either that the major river crossing on an important N-S route in the context camp ditch was deliberately filled in for a second phase or that of communication links, and offering a convenient riverine the gate was subsequently closed (see Maxwell and Wilson route into the heart of Wales. Other ‘gathering grounds’ in the 1987, fig, 9 ‘C’; Neighbour et al 1994, 7-9). Welfare and Swan Marches are the Buckton Park area to the W of Leintwardine (1995, 23; 57-60) report that some of the entrance gaps on the and Brompton. In Wales there are fewer instances of multiple-gated site of Rey Cross (Co. Durham) show signs of marching-camps clustering close together, thereby indicating blocking based on field survey of the upstanding remains. The strategic imperatives at work, though this absence of clusters S camp at Burnswark (Dumfriesshire) has three pronounced may be more apparent than real and owe more to differing mounds (known as the ‘Three Brethren’) outside the three agricultural regimes than any real lacunae. The discovery of entrance gaps in the NW side, often referred to as ballistaria, Hindwell Farm II and Llanfor II through geophysical survey or artillery emplacements. Field survey suggests that the camp graphically illustrates the potential of this method in the may have been reused, thereby implying that the tituli on this investigation of possible clusters. side were enlarged in a second phase (RCAHMS 1997, 181-2; The five camps in the Walton Basin, of which Hindwell Maxwell 1998b, 46-9). Campbell has recently argued that Farm II forms part, represent the only certain marching-camp these tituli were so enhanced as to be a defence against heavy grouping in Wales. Occupying a key position at the interface objects being rolled down from Burnswark Hill towards the between lowland and upland the armies gathered here had the besieging Romans (2003, 28-9). option of exploiting several routes into the interior, once past There are a handful of sites where excavation has the stricture at the W end of the Basin. There are, of course, concentrated upon gate openings. Examples include Brompton comparable locations, signalled by the positioning of in Shropshire, where soil-stripping located the butt-end of a campaign bases or forts elsewhere along the Anglo-Welsh ditch, probably a gate in the SW side (Welfare & Swan 1995, border, such as the Hay-on-Wye/Clifford area in the Wye 150-3). Again at Dullatur I in Lanarkshire there was no valley, which has the potential for revealing a camp cluster, evidence for the reuse of the excavated gate in the S side, though only one probable camp, Boatside Farm, is presently although the W and possibly the N side of the camp were known, close to the campaign base or large fort at Clyro. reused in the perimeter of Dullatur II (Lowe & Moloney 2000). However, at Dunning in Perthshire excavations suggested possible recutting of the ditch on the N and W ‘Camps should be built according to the number of entrances (Dunwell & Keppie 1995). Elsewhere, crop-mark soldiers and baggage-train, lest too great a evidence is rarely suggestive as at Walton, although multitude be crammed in a small area, or a small excavation would be required to support this hypothesis. force in too large a space be compelled to be spread Sometimes most of the circuit of an existing camp was used out more than is appropriate.’ either when the site was reoccupied or when the force in Vegetius I, 22. question was either enlarged or marginally reduced in size. The net effect is the retention of three sides of the extant camp, effectively producing the ‘reduced’ plan frequently Though there are instances of the placement of successive encountered in both camp and permanent fort contexts. camps in close proximity to one another and on a similar Uffington and Tomen y Mur East are good examples, although alignment, as at Walton, such appear to be rare and the we cannot always be certain that the sequence involves a circumstances must have been special. It is suggested that reduction in the secondary occupation. Indeed, surface Walton I - III represent the consecutive arrival of three units of evidence would seem to indicate that the inner Tomen y Mur similar size within the space of a relatively short time span – East I was the earlier, the remains of its SE rampart being perhaps a few days or weeks – which inhibited the initial slighter than that of Tomen y Mur II, which appears to overlie construction of one large camp for the concentrated force for it on the NE side, raising the possibility that the defences of the reason of security (see also Chapter X) (Vegetius I, 22; earlier camp were ‘slighted’ prior to the extension of the

35 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 6

second camp in this direction. troops demolished the primary practice-work, in keeping with Also common are examples of the utilisation of much the Scipio Africanus’ methods of exercising his soldiers (see p. 71), same ground, but with the camps – frequently of differing the site being thereafter reused; and, secondly, when troops sizes – adopting different, and often overlapping alignments, seem to have returned to complete a specific piece of work. In as at Llanfor. Occasionally camps of differing sizes can lie the first instance we have the rare example of two successive ‘within’ one another, as at Brompton, possibly sharing part of camps, partly overlying one another, at Allt yr Hafod-fawr (see the same southern defensive perimeter. But the most extreme Fig. 96). G.D.B. Jones’ suggestion of reuse at Dolddinas II on case is that of Y Pigwn, where the smaller, later camp (Y the basis of the recutting of the ditch is, however, not Pigwn II) is fitted almost entirely within the circuit of the supportable (see p. 181-2). Insofar as the second occasion of earlier, with the defences only marginally intersecting on the reuse is concerned, and this is a much more hypothetical E and SW. Both have a ratio of 6:5, which strongly suggests explanation, the well-preserved claviculae of Camps II and III construction by two armies which either shared the same on Gelligaer Common, which have two entrances but agrimensor, military manual, or a remarkable fondness for only one clavicula, can be potentially explained by troops this ratio. returning from the parent fort at Gelligaer for the express There are, as yet, no instances in our study area of the reuse purpose of practising the building of a specific type of gate. of temporary camps based upon excavated evidence, such as is (see p. 87). demonstrable in Scotland (see Chapter VII). However, it is We are of the opinion that there was probably far more worth reiterating that the minimal evidence from Wales and reuse of camps than we have been able to detect from the the Marches does not currently provide data to support the surface evidence. The excavations at Kintore (Aberdeenshire) suggestion of reuse, but it is apparent elsewhere that this was (Cook & Dunbar 2004) are particularly instructive in this not uncommon. respect, since they have produced finds suggesting more than The contexts which define the reuse of practice-camps are, one phase of occupation, yet excavation of a substantial of course, different, since here we are dealing with what are portion of the camp ditch does not give any hint of its functionally very different types of field entrenchment, being recutting. Whilst it is possible that a very detailed designed expressly to test the ability of soldiers to build much topographical survey of the upstanding camps in Wales might larger encampments, though possessing geometrically and provide clues which hint at reuse, it is much more likely that defensibly very similar types of perimeter defence. Only on such evidence is only to be forthcoming from large-scale two occasions is this likely to have occurred. Firstly, when excavations on the perimeter and interior.

CHAPTER X THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE MARCHING-CAMPS

The establishment of a chronology for marching-camps in securely stratified) of a large camp at Lochlands near Camelon Britain is either largely dependent upon the interpretation of (Stirlingshire). Elsewhere, if datable material is not ancient sources (thereby placing camps within a historic forthcoming, sequences have been established on the basis of framework), upon an independent, archaeologically-based excavated evidence where camps intersect one another, or chronology by means of the interrogation of overlapping camp where they may be chronologically linked to permanent sites sequences, or by their relationships with features such as – fortresses or forts – of known age, on the basis of proximity. Roman roads and well-dated permanent military installations. Occasionally, camps can be proposed as part a ‘series’ on the The linking of morphological characteristics such as size, basis of size, morphology and spatial relationships, and if one shape and gate-type has led to groupings of numbers of camps, can be dated on the basis of the grounds cited above, then that for example camps equipped with Stracathro-type gates in date has been transferred to the others in the series. However, Scotland (e.g. St Joseph 1969). There are also examples – the problems with such groupings has been recently especially in Scotland – where a chronology has been obtained demonstrated during excavations at Dunning, frequently on the basis of datable material, such as pottery found in the grouped with Abernethy on grounds of morphology and ditch fills at Abernethy and Dunning (both Perthshire), Gogar spacing. The former produced pottery of Antonine date, the Green (Midlothian), Dullatur I (Lanarkshire) and Inveresk latter a Flavian sherd (see Dunwell & Keppie 1995). (East Lothian), or Roman glass in the ditch of the W camp at Unfortunately, in our study area similar opportunities for Girvan (Ayrshire), and, finally, a coin of Vespasian, in mint cross-dating are exceedingly few, and for the vast majority of condition, found in the upper fill of the ditch (though not camps we can only hazard a guess as to their precise date.

36 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 7

Excavations have not produced any closely datable material inexact and dangerous exercise, since so much depends upon from any of the camps in our study area, yet there is a inference, supposition or educated guesswork as to their presumption that a broad chronology is applicable to the context and relationship to permanent installations. In the majority on the basis of historical sources – principally Tacitus Marches there are several sites which by virtue of – which provide us with a number of contexts when camps will geographical location, if not proximity to a permanent have been established by Roman armies operating within the installation, are likely to be pre-Flavian in date. Such is the region between ca.AD 47/8 and 77. However, the possibility case with Uffington and Whittington, both isolated sites, but of later operations cannot be entirely dismissed. After all, which, when combined with Pen Plaenau and Penrhos, would the Ordovician rebellion of the first year of Agricola’s possibly mark a route whose start-point is sufficiently far to governorship and the subsequent capture of Anglesey have the E to suggest a possible pre-Flavian campaign. merited a mention were it not for the role of Tacitus’ father-in- Where camps exist in close proximity to permanent law in the affair? Whilst there are no recorded later risings installations in Wales their context appears to be against Rome in this western region, the possibility cannot be overwhelmingly Flavian. They frequently lie within 500m of dismissed altogether. Be that as it may, current scholarship an auxiliary fort, as at Beulah, or close to the line of a Roman considers that the Welsh and Welsh Marches camps are road as at Cwm Nant. The latter appears to represent a line of unlikely to be later than the first century AD (see p. 54). march from the Dolau/Nantmel area N towards the Severn Can their location hold a clue as to their chronology? valley, which is then perpetuated by the road. Linking the forts Certainly clues as to the chronology of some camps may be of Castell Collen and Caersws, its course lies only some few gleaned in respect of their relationship to well-dated sites such hundred metres to the S of the camp, and it is difficult to as military bases and their road links. For example, camps in escape the conclusion that the sequence of campaign followed the vicinity of the legionary fortress at Wroxeter – abandoned by the establishment of garrison posts and linking road system by AD 90 at the very latest – are probably earlier than this is one which follows in rapid succession, though a minimalist terminal date, since to judge by the numbers of camps within view would be simply to state that it demonstrates that the 5km of the fortress the locality was a ‘gathering ground’ for route was a good one. Further examples of temporary camps Roman armies for much of the conquest period. The fortress and forts in close proximity are Derwin Bach (Pen Llystyn), was established ca.AD 50/55, and it may be reasonably Coelbren, Thornbury (Forden Gaer) and Tomen y Mur East I inferred that a proportion of the camps will pre-date the and II. At Llanfor, a site where the interrelationship between fortress, representing armies in the area prior to its camp and permanent installation is graphically represented, construction, though it is by no means impossible that some Camp I must predate the large fort and the adjacent may be contemporary and relate to episodes when the army ‘compound’, since the defences of both intersect with that of was concentrated prior to offensives against the tribes of Wales the camp, whilst the vicus attached to the fort obtrudes onto the in the later 50s, or early 60s, and again in the early/mid 70s. site of the camp. Unfortunately, neither the fort nor The camps at Attingham Park, Ismore Coppice, Norton I and ‘compound’ are dated (but see Davies, 2005). There is a strong II and Cound Hall all fall into this category. The Stretford presumption that the camps at Boatside Farm (Clyro) and Bridge camps are also likely to be pre-Flavian on the grounds Hindwell Farm I and II and possibly Walton I-III are pre- that the arterial road linking the fortresses at Wroxeter and Flavian by virtue of their proximity on the one hand to the Usk, the latter also of pre-Flavian origin, traverses Stretford Neronian campaign base at Clyro (Nash-Williams 1969, 77- Bridge I. Though the camps at Brampton Bryan and Walford 80) and to the securely dated Claudio-Neronian-Flavian fort at cannot be certainly linked with a pre-Flavian site, their general Hindwell Farm (Pye 1976; Davies 1999b, 68-9) on the other. proximity to the pre-Flavian forts of Brandon Camp and Jay Situated some 400m to the W of the fort, Hindwell Farm I Lane, coupled with their general location, suggests that they occupies by far the best location of the five known marching- have a high probability of pre-Flavian origins at a time when camps in the Walton Basin. The intersection of the SE side of Roman armies were exploiting the minor river valleys the camp and the road running W from the fort suggests that debouching from the upland of central Wales. That some could the camp pre-dates the road, a project which could, admittedly, be later, however, is suggested by the sequence at Brompton, be as late as the Flavian period, but which is probably earlier. occupying a similar topographical position, where the two The camp is, therefore, possibly one of the earliest Roman camps lie next to the Flavian-Hadrianic fort at Pentrehyling. military sites in the basin. Camp II is not located on such good The only clue as to their relative chronology, however, is that ground, and whilst its broad size range (1.6-8 ha) could easily the ditch of the road leading to the E gate of the fort cuts the place it in a size category for a construction-camp for the fort, ditch of Camp I (Cane & Allen 1989), and the road is, this is purely speculation. therefore, later. The three camps S of Hindwell Farm fort and the Dating camps on the basis of proximity is, of course, a most Summergil Brook, Walton I – III (see Fig. 24), have generally

37 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 8

Figure 24. Aerial view of the three camps at Walton, taken from the W in 1979 with Walton II in the centre. (Copyright reserved Cambridge University Collection of Air Photographs CKR 79). NPRN 94006.

been considered and published as examples of ‘practice- Scotland also sit within this size range (Hanson & Maxwell camps’ due to their similar size and character (St Joseph 1969, 1983, 119; Jones, 2005b). Whilst there must have been an 121; Wilson 1990, 15; Musson 1994, 18). However, their size, element of ‘practice’ in the construction of many of the camps ranging from 2 to 3.1ha (5 to 7.7 acres), fits well within the by an army on manoeuvres, the camps at Walton are unlike context of marching-camps and other camps believed to have other practice-camps in Wales and were almost certainly housed troops, rather than constructed purely for practice intended to house troops. If the initial construction of the purposes. Indeed, many of the camps in England fall into this camps was contemporary, it seems unlikely that three separate size range and are not believed to be ‘practice-camps’ (Welfare camps would be built, as the construction of a larger camp & Swan 1995, 11), and many of those believed to be would be conventionally be expected to house all the troops. construction-camps on the line of the Antonine Wall in Therefore, it appears more likely that there was a time lapse

38 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 9

between the building of these camps. However, this time lapse site of the SW gate, and a Flavian date is possible. A similar could be very short, as reuse of an existing site might sequence is observed at Tomen y Mur East I and II, though the otherwise be proposed due to economy of effort (Welfare & relative position of these successive camps offers a number of Swan 1995, 22). At Walton if the neighbouring camp had only alternatives in respect of their relationship to the Flavian- been recently abandoned then the ground might not be suitable Hadrianic fort and the road running to the SE. It has already for reuse due to fouling (Vegetius III, 2; Hanson 1978, 142), been stated (see p. 12) that these camps do not occupy what is and it would seem more appropriate to construct a new camp tactically the most advantageous ground (occupied by the fort from scratch. The layout of the three certainly suggests that the itself), which could indicate that the fort was already in presence of the other camps was acknowledged, although the existence when the camps were built. Hence, they could date slightly differing alignments and the fact that the entrances are to the Flavian period or later. Alternatively, the forces which not aligned between the camps dictate against contemporane- camped here were too large to be accommodated in an area ity. It is possible to interpret the arrangement as the product of which was broken by a steep-sided ravine, in which case the the consecutive arrival of three separate units, operating in camps would pre-date the fort. The road running SE of the fort conjunction in the same campaigning season, who effected a traverses the site of both camps, possibly via a camp gate, concentration at this site. It is interesting to note that on which suggests that the camps must ante-date the road; though grounds of size the three camps – 2.5ha (6 acres), 3.1ha (7.7 again the alternative would be to think in terms of the camps acres) and 2ha (5 acres) – taken together produce a larger camp straddling the line of the road, and thereby clearly Flavian, or of 7.6 ha (18.7 acres), a size frequently found on camps in later, in date. Only excavation of the Romano-British barrow Britain, e.g. Chew Green I (Northumberland) (Welfare & cemetery, itself aligned upon the course of the road, and which Swan 1995, 85-90), Cappuck (Roxburghshire) and Eshiels II had developed on the site of the camps, is likely to produce (Peeblesshire). Finally, it is possible that Walton I and II were proof positive as to absolute chronology on the site. constructed in the same season but were not occupied at the The majority of the camps are isolated and divorced from same time, since there is evidence for the possible reuse of permanent site or Roman road (with the possible exception of Camp II (see Gazetteer). If such is the case, the movement Pen Plaenau) as at Uffington, Whittington, Penrhos, Pen-y- (closure) of at least the NNW gate would have, therefore, gwryd, Bromfield, Glanmiheli, Esgair Perfedd, Trefal, Arosfa taken place sometime later, and Walton III may be the last of Garreg, Blaen-cwm Bach, Carn Caca, Pen-y-coedcae and the three to have been built. Twyn-y-briddallt (see Fig. 29). Moreover, though it has On occasion the only clue as to date may be the relationship already been mooted that the first three may be of early date between camp and Roman road. At Thornbury the road from and may relate to the same campaign (see p. 37), the remainder Wroxeter to Forden Gaer probably clips the NW corner of the are mostly of disparate size and frequently too geographically camp, but the road alignment itself seems to point to a fort far removed from one another to be inter-linked. Though a which underlies the Flavian-Valentinianic fort which survives number of those in upland Glamorganshire, Carmarthenshire, as an earthwork. Whether the putative precursor is pre- or Radnorshire and Caernarfonshire may relate to stages of the early Flavian in date remains to be determined. The isolated Flavian conquest, the jury is still out as to where they fit into camp at Plas-y-gors not only appears to perpetuate the line of the story. Judicious excavations of the ditch terminals and a campaign from the Glamorganshire uplands to the upper Usk internal features such as pits and ovens, located by means of valley, a route again echoed by the Roman road from the fort geophysical survey, may redress this hitherto unpromising at Coelbren to Brecon Gaer, but the road physically crosses the picture. But in the meantime we shall have to make do with site from SW to NE. Indeed it seems to exit close to or via the supposition and inference.

CHAPTER XI THE HOLDING CAPACITY OF MARCHING-CAMPS It has long been agreed that the overall extent of the temporary intervallum space and the main streets within, the via or marching-camp is closely related to the size and praetoria, via principalis, via quintana and via decumana (see composition of the army that was quartered within, although Fig.25). In the meantime, the advance party responsible for other factors may also have come into play in determining its building the defences will have accomplished their task layout, topography being a prime example. Internally, if not speedily. Consequently, when the main body arrived, each necessarily externally, it will have possessed a standard layout, unit, and the contubernium (unit of eight men) within, knew on the result of hundreds of years of practice on the part of arrival where their allotted space was located within the military surveyors, who marked out the ground on the basis of finished perimeter.

39 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 10

No formula for calculating the relationship between the munitionibus castrorum (?mid-second century AD) (Roy overall size of the camp (in hectares/acres) and that of the 1793, 52-3; Grillone 1977; Hanson 1978; Lenoir 1979; force camped within has yet been found which can be said to Richardson 2003), as against modern calculations of the have received universal acceptance. The result is that the capacity of a camp based upon the close examination of its holding capacity of camps of different sizes has been the dimensions (Maxwell 2004). Hyginus’ description is that of a subject of continuous debate. To a large extent this has 34-ha (83-acre) camp for a very large, and entirely revolved about the credence given by the ancient sources to hypothetical, army of 40,000 which bears little relation to the housing armies as diverse in strength as Polybius’ consular much smaller forces which clearly operated in a Welsh or army of two legions, and an equal number of allied infantry Welsh Marches context, although the treatise does make plus cavalry (mid-second century BC), and Hyginus’ De allowances for armies of different composition. Larger forces

PRAET ENTURA

LATERA PRAETORII

RETEN TURA

Figure 25. Schematic drawing of Hyginus’ marching-camp (after Maxwell 1989 Fig. 3.1). RCC/033.

40 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 11

were operating in Scotland, and historical sources tell us of the actus, and that its overall size was calculated by simply adding arrival Septimius Severus’ expeditio felicissimae Britannicae up the tented space required by each unit from a standard in the early third century (Dio Cassius LXXVI, 11; Herodian allocation and then increasing that sum by a certain factor to III, 14). allow for intervallum space, roads and quarters for the senior General Roy was the first to initiate the debate and is one of officers. Utilising the Hyginian figure, he calculates a spatial the few to suggest a low-density capacity. Basing his requirement of two actus quadrati (an actus quadrati being the calculations upon Polybius, he suggested that a legion could be equivalent of 0.32 acre or 0.12ha) per cohort, or approximately accommodated in an area of ca.23 acres (9.2ha), giving a one nominal cohort per acre (0.4ha), a holding density in density of 192 men per acre (0.4ha). By way of contrast agreement with Grillone’s. The actus as an unit of Grillone’s reconstruction of the Hyginian camp more than measurement is also used by Maxwell (2004, 82-5) in the most doubled the density to almost 480 men per acre (0.4ha) recent attempt at calculating the holding capacity of the camp, (Grillone 1977); whilst Lenoir (1979), again utilising the same but with a far more generous allowance of space per man. manual, calculated an even higher figure of 495 per acre. Utilising detailed measurements from temporary camps such Richmond and McIntyre’s intermediate figure of 300 men per as those at Little Clyde (Lanarkshire) and Y Pigwn, and small acre, based not upon the ancient sources, but upon their legionary camps such as those near York and Chester, he interpretation of the holding capacity of the 20-acre (8-ha) calculates that the camps were laid out on the basis of the camp at Rey Cross (Richmond & McIntyre 1934), was much square actus, with the measurements being taken from within more modest and long accepted, until Hanson (1978), in a the rampart. Maxwell’s figures suggest that a legionary cohort reassessment of Grillone’s figures (Grillone 1977), produced of 480 men would have required 8 sq. actus, i.e. 1 hectare, or an alternative figure of approximately 380 men per acre within the equivalent of 1 sq. actus per century giving a density of a hypothetical legionary camp which he calculated would 194 men per acre, a figure close to Roy’s. On this basis even measure 14.35 acres (5.7ha). He considered Grillone’s figures the camp at Durno in Aberdeenshire, 58ha in extent, and long as leading to excessive cramping and suggested, instead, a a bone of controversy in terms of its historical context, could density of 350 men per acre (0.4ha) for the ‘average’ camp. fit into a scheme of Flavian operations. Maxwell also takes G.S. Maxwell (1982) bravely addressed the problem by issue with Hyginus’ figures in respect of the space allotted to looking at the holding capacity of the temporary camps next to legionaries and auxiliaries, and concludes that he was the legionary fortress at Inchtuthil, where rows of rubbish pits allotting a restricted space to both because the author seemed to delineate the pedatura – the area allotted to a was trying to reduce area surveying to ‘a mathematically legionary century (see Fig. 7). Unfortunately, his calculations elegant system’, not necessarily close to reality. Were Roman were based upon a slightly inaccurate assessment of the military surveyors, may we ask, in any way disposed to follow dimensions of Camps 2 and 3. He considered the former, at 44 such guidelines? After all, they had been laying out camps for acres (17.6ha) – but now believed to be 49.2 acres (19.9ha) in generations, without any tribulation. Maxwell concludes that size – to be capable of accommodating 12,500 men, a density our assessment of Hyginus has, hitherto, been far too of 284 men per acre, or 255 in respect of its actual size. Pitts simplistic and that we should treat his figures with caution. & St Joseph (1985, 39-44) in their report on the Inchtuthil Such is the range of scholarly opinion as to the holding complex were inclined to accept Hyginus’ density and capacity of temporary camps. However, there are other caveats suggested that Camp 2 could have accommodated a force of which have also been voiced and which need to be considered 21,825 – a density of over 440 men per acre. Clearly these independently of the Hyginus controversy. numbers are substantially divergent. What is significant Maxwell acknowledges that camps were presumably though is that, irrespective of the density of tented planned to accommodate the numbers of men (and animals) in accommodation, the Inchtuthil camps cannot be accepted as paper-strength units, and that estimates of their capacity must, the norm, since they are almost certainly linked with the therefore, represent a maximum. Stressing the point that the legionary fortress, and as such their holding capacity should smaller the camp the smaller the proportion of the overall area not be considered in the same light as other temporary camps. available for accommodation, he also acknowledges the fact Gilliver (1999, 84-5), applying Hyginus’ methodology, that the larger the camp, the greater the likelihood that it proceeded to rework the holding capacity of the Rey Cross contained a proportionately larger number of auxiliary units camp, which at 18.6 acres (7.53ha) she suggests could have who may have received a more restricted allocation of space. accommodated 8,640 men, a density of about 460 men per But whether this applies to cavalry is, of course, unknown. acre (ca.1,150 per ha), but concludes that this methodology Hanson (1978, 142) made much the same point in suggesting has to be used with caution. that the larger the army the greater the likelihood of more A. Richardson (1997; 2000; 2003) in several complex cavalry being present, with a consequential decrease in the papers suggested that the camp was laid out on the basis of the average number of men per hectare. He also adds a further

41 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 12

rider, insofar as the larger the camp, the smaller proportionally who had set up their tents at the foot of the camp rampart were would be the area occupied by the roads and intervallum unable to escape when German cavalry suddenly appeared, space, which could lead to more troops being quartered within. though he informs us (BG VI, 36-7, 40) that on another To these factors we might add the problem of unsuitable occasion when the enemy was threatening lixae were allowed ground within the perimeter, which could either mean a more within the defences, but the merchants who had ‘camped close intensive use of space, or a proportional drop in the numbers under the rampart’ were excluded. of men quartered within, as, for example, at Arosfa Garreg and Clearly, there are major differences of opinion insofar as Y Pigwn, where on the one hand a ravine, and steep slopes on how we might effectively calculate the holding capacity of a the other, would have caused major dislocations not only in temporary camp, leading to holding densities which diverge by terms of overall layout, but in holding-density. There is the well over 100%. We might also bear in mind that the Roman added complication of baggage animals and of carts/wagons, army was not hide-bound, but flexible, and that the praefectus coupled with addressing the problem as to where the soldiers’ castrorum, charged with the task of choosing the camp-site servants were quartered. For example, Fulford (2000, fn.34) might, according to circumstances, abandon the manual. As suggests the provision of 1000 mules per legion (for mules in long as we bear the above caveats in mind, and acknowledge a military context, see the archaeological evidence from the that calculating the size of individual armies is still, Varusschlacht site of Kalkriese, Germany, where three legions essentially, a paper exercise, then our present endeavours will under Varus were destroyed by the German tribes in AD 9; not be entirely misplaced. Wells 2003, 54-5). These and other baggage animals and We are inclined, on the basis of his analysis of the vehicles had to be cared for, and together with soldiers’ holding-capacities of certain of the Scottish and Welsh ‘servants’ had to be quartered somewhere. These factors are camps, to consider Maxwell’s (and Roy’s) figure as being frequently not considered. more realistic, and also much more in line with what we One factor, however, which has no immediate call upon the know of the operational strength of both Roman and spatial requirements of the Roman camp is that of merchants medieval armies. A lower density also obviates (or at and camp-followers (lixae), who followed the army because it least reduces) the problem of how large numbers of baggage offered them a living. They did so at their own risk, since they animals and their handlers, cavalry mounts and their grooms, were not allowed within the camp perimeter, sometimes with together with soldiers’ servants might be accommodated dire consequences. Caesar (BG VI, 3) recounts how traders within the camp.

Name Dimensions Hectares Square actus; Square actus; Capacity based in metres p. m. * p. D upon Maxwell 2004

Arosfa Garreg 486 x 365 17.8 141 108 11,280 or 8,640 Attingham Park > 330 x 290 > 9.57 - - > 4,593 Beulah 408 x 344 14 112 88 8,960 or 7,040 Blaen-cwm Bach 908 x 295 26.79 215 166 16,880 or 13,280 Boatside Farm > 255 x 125 > 3.1 - - > 1,488 Brampton Bryan 535 x 460 23 195 153 15,600 or 12,240 Brompton I ca.375 x 390 ca.15.5 ca.115 ca.92 ca.9,200 or 7,360 Brompton II ca.230 x230 ca.5.2 ca.42 ca.32 ca.3,360 or 2,560 Bromfield 330 x 260 8.5 68 54 5,440 or 4,320 Carn Caca 239 x 203 4.85 38.3 30 3,064 or 2,400 Coelbren 440 x 318 14 110 88 8,880 or 7,040 Cound Hall ca.550 x 470 26 206 160 16,480 or 12,800 Cwm Nant 340 x 215 7.3 57 46 4,560 or 3,680 Derwin Bach > 205 x 34 ca.3.3 - 4.2 - - ca.1,584 - 2,016 Esgair Perfedd 270 x 235 6.35 50 40 4,000 or 3,200 Glanmiheli > 175 x 45 > 0.8 - - > 400 Hindwell Farm I 475 x 371 17.6 137 111 10,960 or 8,880

42 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 13

Name Dimensions Hectares Square actus; Square actus; Capacity, based in metres p. m.* p. D. upon Maxwell 2004

Hindwell Farm II ? >1.6 - - >760 Ismore Coppice ? - - - - Llanfor I 430 x 282 12.5 96 75.5 7,680 or 6,000 Llanfor II >120 x 50 >0.6 - - >250 Norton I ca.450 x 300 ca.13 106.6 92 8,560 or 7,360 Norton II - - - - - Pen Plaenau 540 x 335 18 139.5 112 11,120 or 8,960 Pen-y-coedcae 480 x 320 15.36 121.5 96 9,600 or 7,680 Pen-y-gwryd 220 x 183 4.03 33 24.75 2,640 or 1,980 Penrhos >375 x 440 ca.16.5 ca.129 ca.103.3 ca.10,320 or 8,264 Plas-y-gors 376 x 240 9 70.3 57 5,600 or 4,560 Stretford Bridge I >440 x 375 ca.13 ca.105 ca.80 ca.8,400 or 6,400 Stretford Bridge II ca.125 x 105 ca.1.3 ca.10 ca.7.5 ca.800 or 600 Thornbury 140 x 100 1.4 12 8.6 960 or 700 Tomen y Mur East I >110 x 125 >1.37 - - >680 Tomen y Mur East II >130 x 165 >2.14 - - >1,000 Trefal 370 x 230 8.5 67 53 5,360 or 4,560 Twyn y briddallt 402 x 183 6.5 56.5 45 4,520 or 3,600 Uffington I 540 x 350 18.9 150 118 12,000 or 9,440 Uffington II 490 x 350 17.1 137 107 10,960 or 8,560 Upper Affcot ca.300 x 200 ca.6 ca.47 ca.37 3,760 or 2,960 Walford 390 x 250 9.7 77 60 6,160 or 4,840 Walton I 170 x 145 2.5 19 15.5 1,520 or 1,200 Walton II 192 x 163 3.1 24 19 1,920 or 1,520 Walton III 168 x 121 2 15.5 12 1,200 or 960 Whittington 460 x 330 15.3 120 95.5 9,600 or 7,640 Y Pigwn I 430 x 360 15.48 120 97 9,600 or 7,760 Y Pigwn II 360 x 290 10.29 80 56 6,400 or 4,480

* For a discussion of the pes monetalis and pes Drusianus see Dilke 1985; Walthew 1981 and Chapter XIV.

Figure 26. Relative dimensions and holding capacity of marching-camps.

It has long been appreciated by a number of scholars that the clustering to occur at 24 acres (9.6ha) 32 acres (12.8ha), 40 British camps tend to cluster about particular size-ranges, acres (16ha) and 64 acres (25.6ha). Richardson also noted that which should reflect specific norms in terms of the size and the the 8 acre (3.2ha) difference is particularly marked at the lower composition of the army quartered within. Welfare & Swan end of the series, and on this basis suggested that the Roman (1995, 10-11) show the larger camps bunching at 3.1-4ha (7.6- army often operated in units of multiples of 8 cohorts, since he 9.9 acres), 7.7-9.7ha (19-24 acres) and from 15-16.8ha (37- considers that a legionary cohort only required one acre of 41.5 acres). Richardson (2001) also noted the tendency to space (but a figure which we suggest, following Maxwell cluster, with groups of camps differing in area by roughly 8,16 2004, is unlikely to be correct). Richardson, furthermore, and 24 acres, whilst in Scotland the tendency is for the ventures on the possibility that an army was thus based upon a

43 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 14

If we accept that camps were probably laid out utilising the pes monetalis, utilising the actus of 120 Roman feet as the module (this certainly seems to be the case at Y Pigwn I and II where the camps measure exactly 120 and 80 square actus apiece), then the following gradation in terms of size emerges.

Name Area (Hectares) Square actus

Stretford Bridge II ca.1.3 ca.10 Thornbury 1.4 12 Walton III 2.0 15.5 Walton I 2.5 19 Walton II 3.1 24 Pen-y-gwryd 4.03 33 Carn Caca 4.85 38 Brompton II 5.2 42 Upper Affcot 6.0 47 Esgair Perfedd 6.35 50 Twyn-y-briddallt 6.5 56.5 Cwm Nant 7.3 57 Trefal 8.5 67 Bromfield 8.5 68 Plas-y-gors 9.0 70 Walford 9.7 77 Y Pigwn II 10.29 80 Llanfor I 12.5 96 (Aiming for 100 sq. actus ?) Stretford Bridge I 13.0 105 Norton I 13.0 106 Coelbren 14.0 110 Beulah 14.0 112 Brompton I 15.0 115 Whittington 15.3 120 Y Pigwn I 15.48 120 Pen y coedcae 15.3 121 Penrhos 16.5 129 Hindwell Farm I 17.6 137 Uffington II 17.1 137 Pen Plaenau 18.0 139.5 (Aiming for 140 sq. actus ?) Arosfa Garreg 17.8 141 (Aiming for 140 sq. actus ?) Uffington I 18.9 150 Brampton Bryan 23.0 195 (Aiming for 200 sq. actus ?) Cound Hall 26.0 206 (Aiming for 200 sq. actus ?) Blaen-cwm Bach 26.8 215 (Aiming for 200 sq. actus ?)

Figure 27. Table showing size of marching-camps.

32 notional cohort force and goes on to explore the sites, indicating that the number of occupants, and therefore implications in respect of the ratio of legionaries and the size of the force, might be infinitely variable. auxiliaries in the encamped force (Richardson 2001). Maxwell The following three cluster patterns emerge according to also notes the tendency for camps to cluster in groupings of Maxwell (2004), Welfare & Swan (1995) and that which about 8.7, 12.5 and 16ha, with parallels across the range in emerges in our study area. Given that only a partial circuit England, Scotland and Wales, and with area equivalents of ca. survives at nearly 18% of the sites in Wales and the Marches, 75, 100 and 125 square actus. Between and above these and that the pattern is probably going to require revision, groupings lies what appears to be a random distribution of nevertheless what emerges is a clear concordance between the

44 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 15

Maxwell, Welfare & Swan and our pattern in terms of MAXWELL CLUSTERS clustering at about 7-10ha; then between Maxwell’s and our ca.8.7 ha ...... ca.75 sq. actus pattern at about 12.5ha, and again at ca.16ha, where the 12.5 ha ...... ca.100 sq. actus Welfare & Swan pattern also fits in. 16 ha ...... ca.125 sq. actus It would, therefore, seem that the optimum size of the forces accommodated within the camps and thence in the field, in England and Wales at least, is in the order of (a) 3-5,000; (b) WELFARE & SWAN CLUSTERS 6-7,500; (c) 7,700-9,000. Only exceptionally were larger 3.1-4 ha ...... ca.25 sq. actus forces of 11,000-13,000 put into the field, and particularly 7.7-9.7 ha ...... ca.60-75 sq. actus when large forces were campaigning in northern Britain. 15-16.8 ha ...... ca.115-130 sq. actus It is instructive in terms of comparability to consider the size of the royal armies deployed against Wales in the DAVIES & JONES CLUSTERS thirteenth century. For the war of 1277 Edward I could dispose of a maximum of 15,500 men. For the war of 1282-3 about 3.1-6 ha ...... ca.25-50 sq. actus (6 sites) 20,000 men were raised, whilst for operations against the 6.0-10.3 ha ...... ca.50-80 sq. actus (9 sites) rebels in 1287 and 1294-5 he raised 11,000 and 31,000 12.5-15.5 ha ...... ca.100-120 sq. actus (9 sites) respectively (France 1999, 129). It is important to note that 16.5-19 ha ...... ca.130-150 sq. actus (6 sites) these are overall numbers: they were neither in being at one 23.0-27 ha ...... ca. 200 sq. actus (3 sites) time nor were they ever deployed in one place. In terms of holding capacity it is noteworthy that the largest camps tend to lie in the Marches, the natural ‘gathering ca.8,500-11,000 men; the last two possibly being part of a grounds’ for armies that were marshalled prior to being long-distance campaign. The remainder of the camps are of launched against the communities of upland Wales, though the more modest size, either capable of accommodating the more dense population of this interface between upland and equivalent of a legion and its auxiliary complement (ca.6- lowland may also partly explain the necessity of quartering 8,000 men) as at Llanfor I, Beulah and Coelbren, or the much large bodies of men in the region. The exceptions are camps smaller camps such as Esgair Perfedd and Pen-y-gwryd with a such as Blaen-cwm Bach (ca.13-16,000 men), anomalous in capacity for 2-4,000 men; probably either representing the every way, though scarcely more than an hour’s march from splitting of a large army into separate groups, or the tactical the Glamorganshire lowlands, and sites such as Arosfa Garreg, usage of such modest forces best suited to deal with hostiles in Pen Plaenau and Penrhos with holding capacities ranging from true upland environments.

CHAPTER XII MARCHING-CAMPS IN WALES AND THE MARCHES: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In order to contextualise the temporary camps it is a 18). The Ordovices are only one of three polities in this region prerequisite to consider the historical background to that – let us for the sake of convenience call them tribes – who are period of intermittent campaigning which saw their foundation specifically recorded as having offered resistance to Rome; the within the geographical compass of that region now described others being the Decangi (sic) and the Silures. as Wales and the Marches. The question of the geographical placement of the political Wales and the Marches did not exist as a separate entity for units which Rome was to encounter in a region whose eastern the Romans of the first century AD; however, the region must boundaries, on the grounds of the concentration of military have taken on a shape and significance to the invaders, not sites, we would extend to the lower reaches of the river Dee only in geographical terms, by virtue of the fact that it was the in the N and the line of the middle and lower Severn to the first substantial upland mass which the army encountered in S, is difficult. Unlike the communities of southern and southern Britain, but also because its inhabitants, seemingly more eastern England they did not have recourse to a ‘tribal’ politically fragmented than their neighbours to the east and coinage, whilst an analysis of ceramic distribution – pottery south-east, offered much more stubborn, long-term resistance, being a commodity often linked to tribal groups (such as heralding intermittent conflict for some 30 years, which Durotrigian Ware) by students of prehistoric societies, though apparently only ended with the suppression of the rebellion of only found in quantity in southern Shropshire, Herefordshire the Ordovices in the late summer of AD 77 (Tacitus, Agricola and the lowlands of Glamorganshire Monmouthshire – only

45 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 16

succeeds in raising issues concerning manufacturing and certainly Whitchurch (Shropshire) on the basis of the distances exchange within groups who may eventually fall within given from Wroxeter and Chester – then it implies that the territories of the historically-attested tribal groups (see Ordovician territory extended into north Shropshire, not in below, p. 47). itself impossible, but unlikely given that Ptolemy places these Thirty years ago Jarrett and Mann (1968) in a seminal paper two particular poleis in Cornovian territory. Much more likely analysed the evidence available for the geographical is another Mediolanium/Mediolanum, since a Mediomanum is placement of tribal groups in Wales and the Marches. Jarrett’s listed in the Ravenna itinerary running west from Wroxeter recension (Jarrett 1994a; 2002) of it only serves to heighten an to Segontium (Caernarfon). The site has been tentatively awareness of its imperfection and the sweeping generalisations equated with the auxiliary fort at Caersws in the upper which follow from it. Manning (1981, 15-23) further reaches of the Severn valley, for which the name, meaning commented upon the evidence in respect of the geographical ‘centre of the plain’, is entirely appropriate. The extension of compass of the Silures and the border with their eastern Ordovician territory into the far NW of Wales may also be neighbours, the Dobunni. recorded in place-name evidence, the place-name Dinorwic The evidence falls into two categories: literary/epigraphic in Snowdonia being a case in point, though Ptolemy’s and archaeological. The literary evidence comprises classical information, imperfect though it may be, strongly suggests an texts, such as Tacitus’ Agricola, Annals and Histories, eastern mid-Wales focus. Ptolemy’s Geography and the Antonine Itinerary, together The existence of other tribes is attested by Ptolemy’s with occasional post-Roman place-name evidence which reference to the Octapitai in the region of St David’s Head in may have a bearing upon the situation within the Romano- Pembrokeshire, whilst post-Roman sources confirm the British period, albeit not specifically within a first century Deceangli in the far north-east of Wales – Tegeingl being one AD context. of the cantrefi of Flintshire – with the possibility of another Tacitus’ reference to the tribes of the region is highly polity in the lower Conwy valley if the reference to Degannwy selective – he names only three, the Decangi (sic), Silures and rock as the arx Decantorum in the Annales Cambriae refers to Ordovices – and geographically vague. Ptolemy lists a number an otherwise unrecorded Decanti. Ptolemy also records of poleis with their latitudes and longitudes, some of whose Ganganorum Promontorium - the Llˆyn peninsula in NW locations concur with places known to us from the early-third- Wales - and by implication the community of the Gangani, century road-book, the Antonine Itinerary, and may be further though Rivet & Smith (1979, 365) have suggested the attested in epigraphic texts. Places such as possibility of a name transferred in error from Ireland, in Maridunum/Moridunum (Carmarthen) in the territory of the which the people referred to occupy an analogous position. Demetae or Venta Silurum (Caerwent) in that of the However, in post-Roman times communities with branches on eponymous Silures are firmly fixed, as are Bullaeum/Burrium both sides of the Irish Sea, or at least people with close links, (Usk) in Silurian territory. Unfortunately, far less certainty are common, and an analogous split people may be entertained exists in respect of poleis such as Luentinum in the territory of within the first century AD. the Demetae and Branogenium and Mediolanium in the The epigraphic evidence comprises those inscriptions territory of the Ordovices. It is particularly unfortunate in recording places certainly within the territory of a named tribe, respect of the last-named tribe because they figure such as the civitas Silurum and civitas Cornoviorum prominently in the record of hostility to Rome. Indeed, it was dedications from the fora at Caerwent (Monmouthshire) and apparently in their territory that the celebrated British dux, Wroxeter (Shropshire) respectively, and the text on a Caratacus, with an army drawn from a number of tribes, milestone from Kenchester (Herefordshire) which can be fought a pitched battle against Roman forces in AD 51. plausibly expanded to state that it was set up within the civitas Branogenium is usually equated with the Bravonio of the Dobunnorum. It also includes lead ingots or ‘pigs’ (RIB II, Antonine Itinerary, and with Leintwardine (Herefordshire). A 2404.31-34) which relate to a territory and a tribe living within Branogenium also appears in the Ravenna Cosmography (see in it, if not to a civitas, and which have a tightly circumscribed Rivet & Smith 1979, 185-215) as a place between Magna distribution, such as those found in the region of the lower Dee (Kenchester) and Viroconium (Wroxeter). Even if the place is and which refer to Deceangl – pretty certainly Tacitus’ not equated with Leintwardine, a location in the central Decangi (sic). We have already considered the relevance of the Marches is certain, and a pointer to Ordovician territory medieval cantref of Tegeingl in the context of the location of encompassing at least part of this region. Hitherto scholars this community. have been reluctant to expand their territory into this region; a The archaeological evidence is much more contentious. reluctance which may, in part, be due to the location of the Mention has already been made of the role of pre-Roman Anglo-Welsh border. Mediolanium is another problem. If it is coinage and ceramics in this respect, though the role of the equated with the Mediolanum of the Antonine Itinerary – former is more substantive. Where a ‘tribal’ coinage impinges

46 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 17

upon our region some interesting observations have emerged. England – would have encouraged political fragmentation, Manning (1981), Sellwood (1984) and Van Arsdell (1994) whilst variable socio-economic systems and demographic have drawn attention to the fact that Dobunnic gold and silver, differences will have to led to a weakening of political links circulating in the period ca.35 BC-AD 43, have quite different for much of the upland mass, if not for the more fecund distributions. The latter scarcely exist west of the Severn, landscapes of the Marches and coastal regions. Many of our though a few reach the coastal belt of Glamorganshire and named tribes – and the Ordovices, whose territory seemingly Monmouthshire, presumably as a product of cross-channel spans a large area, is a classic instance – were probably exchange. Manning and Sellwood have suggested that the composed of clans who only came together in times of stress. extreme scarcity of silver from areas west of the Severn, in By way of contrast, it has been suggested that in the case of the contrast to gold which circulates on both sides, is to be Cornovii the tribal territory had a geographical coherence explained by the fact that the region west of the river did which might itself have encouraged unity (White & Barker not form part of Dobunnic territory at the time of the 1998, 33; Fig.13; 36) Roman invasion. We must, then, envisage west To further muddy the waters, a uniformly hostile attitude on Gloucestershire and south Herefordshire either as a border the part of these communities is improbable. Factionalism zone, occupied by an unnamed tribe (or tribes), or, would have prevented unanimity, and the presence of socii alternatively, they may have formed part of Siluria. In this (allies) in the region is probable. Indeed, such has been respect the movement of Legio XX from Colchester in AD 49 suggested in the case of the Cornovii (Webster 1975, 24; White and the establishment of legionary encampments to keep the & Barker 1998, 33) and for at least part of the Dobunni (Allen tribe in check - one key site being Gloucester – makes 1961, 101-2; Van Arsdell 1994, 21ff)), since it was an attack eminent sense if Gloucestershire west of the Severn was (from the west) on communities allied to Rome that prompted Silurian territory. the Roman army to move into the west Midlands in AD 47. If Ceramic evidence – a traditional means of recognizing communities were prepared to come to terms with Rome so ethnicity or ‘identity-conscious interest groups’ – is much much the better. The governor could look to them for military more problematic by virtue of its general scarcity (being supplies on the spot, whilst their territory provided a safe relatively common only in the southern Marches and the haven and springboard for further operations. We must, south-eastern part of Wales), chronological difficulties and the therefore, be acutely aware of split loyalties among our tribal meaning that may be placed upon its distribution. For communities and the all-important role of diplomacy in the example, Malvernian Wares, a widespread style of saucepan story of the conquest. pot with stamped and grooved decoration, probably continuing in use up to the Roman conquest in the central and more DOCUMENTARY SOURCES AND especially southern Marches, form part of a wider network of RECORDED CAMPAIGNS commercially produced pottery which probably spans more than one ‘tribal’ territory. More restricted in distribution, and The late M.G. Jarrett was the first to consider the documentary perhaps more ethnically meaningful, is a dolerite-tempered evidence for campaigning in Wales and the Marches, and the ware from the Clee Hills current in the central Marches. problems inherent in the ancient sources, against the then Similarly, the chevron-eyebrow decorated Llanmelin-Lydney known archaeological background in a seminal paper in the style pots have a tight distribution which might conceivably Archaeological Journal (Jarrett 1964b), with a brief résumé in define a ‘Silurian’ heartland in coastal SE Wales. South- the second edition of V.E. Nash-Williams The Roman Frontier Western Decorated Wares of Group 3 of the Glastonbury Style, in Wales (1969). They have been further discussed by Manning by way of contrast, have a much wider distribution, embracing (1981; 2004), both in the context of the foundation and parts of both Dobunnic and Silurian territory, though possibly abandonment of the legionary fortress at Usk and a more up- imitated in the latter. (For discussion, see Lynch, Aldhouse- to-date archaeological perspective. The literary sources commence Green and Davies 2000, 199-202). with Tacitus’ Annals (XII, 31) recording the arrival of Ostorius Clearly, then, the distribution of penultimate prehistoric Scapula as the new governor of the Province in AD 47: ceramics is a less reliable guide to tribal distribution in Wales and the Marches. Cumulatively, the evidence indicates that ‘In Britain, the governor Ostorius arrived to find a Wales and the Marches were divided into a minimum of eight disturbed state of affairs. In the expectation that a new tribal areas (see Fig. 28), of which two, the Cornovii and general, with a strange army, and at the beginning of Dobunni, lie in that interface between upland and lowland. winter, would not dare to meet them, the enemy had However, the term ‘tribe’ itself should be viewed with a degree made a furious inroad into the territory of our allies. of circumspection. Topography alone – inimical to the creation But Ostorius ... hurried up his light cohorts, of the seemingly centralized communities of much of southern slaughtered such as resisted, and followed up the

47 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 18

Figure 28. Distribution map of pre-Flavian permanent and semi-permanent sites. RCC/072.

48 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 19

dispersed forces of the enemy; then to prevent their collusion between them would have become much more gathering again, and for fear that an armed and difficult. Jarrett (1964b, 25) went as far as to suggest that the treacherous peace should leave no rest either to himself ultimate objective was Anglesey. He regarded the island not or his army, he proceeded to disarm the suspected only as a centre of Druidism and the focus of anti-Roman tribes, and establish forts to hold in check all the feeling, but as the granary of NW Wales; its capture being an country between the Trent and the Severn’. essential preliminary to the pacification of Snowdonia. Some interesting points emerge from this operation. Firstly, The result of these operations – involving the expelling of an the failure of the Deceangli to offer battle in a location which unnamed enemy (highly mobile raiding bands?) and would have favoured the deployment of Roman troops. accomplished swiftly through the employment of auxiliary Secondly, their failure to successfully ambush the Roman troops (possibly largely cavalry) – was the military occupation columns. The plural form is interesting. Does it relate to of the West Midlands and the disarming of allied communities several axes of advance or are the columns the product of on a large scale. Either the raiders had come from within this splitting the army into separate battle-groups involved in region or its inhabitants were affected by the raid; and, to plundering expeditions? Thirdly, the reference to booty being safeguard them it was necessary to establish garrisons which driven off sounds very much like the capture of livestock – could, in turn, project Roman power against the hostiles. It is extra supplies for the army, the denial of foodstuffs for the impossible to determine from whence the raiders came; Deceangli. It has echoes in King Edward’s operations in 1277, conceivably Wales, as suggested by Jarrett (1964b, 25). when we are told that royal soldiers penetrated inland from Presumably if Caratacus had been involved he surely would Rhuddlan and Flint and were ‘able to gain possession of the have been mentioned. A borderland origin for the cattle kept at the prince’s vaccaries and drive them to feed his troublemakers is not impossible. The rash of military soldiers’ (Smith 1998, 428). The reference to the army having installations, frequently long-lived, in Shropshire strongly almost reached the sea facing Ireland is particularly suggests that the Cornovii were far from peaceable. Also of interesting. The tone suggests that it cannot be taken literally some interest is evidence for what appears to be a violent end as, say, the seashore between the Dee estuary and the mouth of to occupation of the Wrekin hill-fort, near Wroxeter, where the Clwyd. The impression is of a coastline much further west, timber roundhouses were burned and two Roman javelin heads perhaps on the margins of Snowdonia, such as the region of the (pila), one from the hill-fort’s gate, strongly suggest that the Orme’s Head or the area of modern Penmaenmawr; though we perpetrators were Roman soldiers (White & Barker 1998, 38). should not read too much into a deliberately vague statement. This, however, is only one rare instance and its significance This operation should have resulted in the establishment of temporary should not be exaggerated. camps; possibly the earliest known to us in a Welsh context. Then in 48, or possibly 49, (Dudley & Webster 1965, 147) The Tacitean narrative then moves on rapidly, since following the suppression of a rising of the Iceni we hear that: following successful Roman intervention in Brigantia:

‘... the army was then led against the Decangi (sic). ‘The tribe of the Silures was turned neither by brutality Their territory was wasted, and much booty was driven nor by clemency from pursuing war and requiring off, the enemy not venturing on open battle: and if they encampment of legions (castrisque legionum) to keep it attempted to ambush our columns, their trickery met its down. To secure the desired end more quickly, a chastisement. Our army was now nearing the sea which powerful colony was settled upon conquered territory at confronts Ireland, when the general had to turn back in Camulodunum, both as a defence against rebellion, and consequence of a rising among the Brigantes….’. to make our allies familiar with the rule of law’. Annals XII, 32. Annals XII, 32.

Tacitus’ Decangi can be none other than the Deceangli, and the Tacitus does not give us a specific date for this event, but it is tribe could well have been among the insurgents in AD 47. The generally accepted to have been AD 49. The location of these reason for making war upon this tribe is not stated, though it legionary castra is a problem, though Tacitus’ statement could make perfect sense if they were involved in the attack ‘makes it clear that the legions were stationed either in Silurian upon socii, or if it was the Roman intention to continue the territory, or close to it in a strategic position from which advance, the ultimate objective being the conquest of Wales control could be exercised’ (Manning 1981, 31). The other (Manning 1981, 28). The campaign would thus reflect the interesting point is the reference to the Silures not being strategic requirements of the Claudian period. The seizure of swayed by clemency or deterred by Roman brutality. Clearly their territory in NE Wales would have effectively separated hostilities had been in progress for some time prior to 49. the tribal communities of Wales and northern Britain, and Could the Silures have been among the enemy who attacked

49 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 20

Roman allies in 47? Certainly operations against them must least into mid-Wales, if not beyond, if we are correct in have necessitated operational bases (castra) prior to the bringing Ordovician territory within the compass of this transfer of Legio XX from Colchester to the battlefront. region, though the precise date at which this shift took place is From now on it is the Silures and the Ordovices who unclear. We might expect temporary camps in both tribal areas, become Rome’s chief protagonists in the W. Nothing more is before as well as after Caratacus’ capture, since it is clear from heard of the Deceangli, and it is not impossible that they were Tacitus’ narrative that the war against the Silures was far from incorporated in the province in 48, though the archaeological over and ferocious fighting continued until Scapula’s death in evidence is mute in this respect; no certain pre-Flavian office in AD 52. military establishments being known in their probable territory What is interesting about the events of AD 51-2 is that we (Fig. 28), other than the large fort which succeeds the hear of fort- building in Silurian territory, but not in that of the campaign-base at Rhyn Park (Shropshire) Ordovices. Whether this implies that Ordovician territory was Following the transfer of Legio XX to the Silurian front in not garrisoned, or that we are dealing with the omission of AD 49 we are told that: ‘(Then) the Silures were attacked’ such detail on Tacitus’ part is unknowable. What we may be (Annals XII, 33). The chronology of the Silurian war then certain of is that as far as the Silures were concerned the becomes compressed, Tacitus being largely concerned with campaigning phase, and thus that of camp building, was giving chronicling the role of Caratacus as war-leader among the way to the phase of garrisoning, at least as far as part of the western tribes, until his defeat and capture in AD 51. tribe’s territory is concerned. We hear that:

‘Besides their own high courage, they put their trust in ‘A praefectus castrorum with legionary cohorts which Caratacus, whose many battles, some doubtful had been left behind in Silurian territory to build (in outcome), some victorious, had raised him to garrison posts, was surrounded; if news of their plight pre-eminence among the princes of Britain.’ had not been brought to the nearest forts, so that help was sent, they would have been massacred. Even so Annals XII, 33. the praefectus castrorum, with eight centurions and the Caratacus and the Silures seem to have come under intolerable pick of the troops, was killed. Soon afterwards the pressure between AD 49 and 51. The implication is successful enemy put to flight a party of our foragers as well as Roman campaigning, which should be attested by the some squadrons of cavalry which had been sent out to foundation of temporary camps. This caused Caratacus and his support them. Ostorius then brought up his auxiliary war-band to change tactics. Tacitus informs us that, ‘... he infantry and finally the legions before he was able to shifted the war to the country of the Ordovices.’ This could in halt the retreat.’ itself suggest that Silurian and Ordovician territory was Annals XII, 38. juxtaposed. ‘There, ... having gathered to himself all who dreaded the Peace of Rome, he staked everything upon one The episode concerning the praefectus castrorum (camp battle.’ Annals XII, 33. prefect) and the legionary cohorts – plural and therefore at This battle is one of the high points of the British war; a set- least two in number – could be construed as having taken place piece engagement, reminiscent of the clash of arms at Mons whilst Ostorius and the bulk of the army were away dealing Graupius in Caledonia in AD 83 where another war-leader, with Caratacus; the Silures being in the process of having their Calgacus, behaved in a like manner. Though Caratacus’ federate territory, or at least part of it, occupied on a permanent basis. army held a strong position against Scapula’s forces, it was to Tacitus then moves on to deal with another incident which no avail. The Britons were defeated; Caratacus fled to the Brigantes, he says took place ‘soon afterwards’, probably, but not and, thereafter, was handed over as prisoner to the governor. certainly, largely focussed upon Siluria, in which the governor The battle site has long been sought, and a number of candidate was involved, and thereby to be placed after the defeat of sites have been suggested. The late G.D.B. Jones canvassed as Caratacus. What follows is an account of continuing warfare a possible location Llanymynech Mountain, on the on the Welsh ‘front’ between AD 51 and 52, in which the Montgomeryshire / Shropshire border (Jones 1990, 57-64), Silures were involved, though they were clearly not alone, though no proof was offered. The battle site ought to have a because Tacitus states: Roman camp in relatively close proximity, and its defences – The most stubborn resistance was that offered by the given the proximity of the enemy – should be strong, if Vegetius’ Silures, being inflamed by a saying of the Roman emperor dictum is to be believed (Vegetius I, 24; III, 8). Following a which spread around, that, just as in former days the reconnaissance of the British position it was from his Sugambri had been extirpated or transplanted into headquarters within a camp that Scapula decided upon a frontal Gaul, so should the Silurian name be blotted out now.’ assault. It is clear that, geographically, operations had moved N, at Annals XII, 39.

50 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 21

The Tacitean narrative dwells upon ‘... a series of skirmishes Given the fact that this man was retained as governor of fought mostly in guerrilla fashion, in woods or morasses, as Britain until AD 57 he can hardly be classed as ineffectual as chance or each man’s courage might direct: some planned Tacitus makes him out to be. Tacitus is clearly at pains to show beforehand, some not: some for plunder, some for revenge: that Gallus’ successes were limited; driving back the Silures some at the orders, others without even the knowledge, of the being the most memorable, as well as making a few territorial officers.’ Annals XII, 39. gains through the establishment of forts. Clearly the thrust of It is difficult to place these events in the context of a the commentary is that offensive operations were limited and properly executed campaign. The forces involved appear small eventually called off, the emphasis thereafter being on and in a Roman context may just as well be sallying from containment and consolidation. We might thus expect the permanent bases within or without Siluria. Tacitus records that archaeological evidence to be dominated not by the building in Siluria ‘... two auxiliary cohorts, which through the cupidity of camps by expeditionary forces, but by the establishment of of their Prefects had been incautiously sent out after plunder, permanent garrison bases, such as legionary fortresses, like were cut to pieces; ...’ Annals XII, 39. As G. Webster (1978, those at Wroxeter and Usk, both certainly in existence by the 61) points out the word intercepere here has a much stronger late fifties if not before, and auxiliary forts. The whereabouts meaning than mere ‘interception’. This episode again sounds of the forts established beyond the boundaries of the province as though it represents the incautious forays of auxiliary units which he inherited in AD 52 are not known. As far as we know stationed in Silurian territory. Tacitus informs us that the result they might not even be located in Wales and the Marches. of this continuing resistance by the Silures was to tempt other South-western England is a possibility. Whether we ought to tribes to desert (thus, they must have been allied to Rome) by entertain the thought of campaigning under Gallus up until 54 gifts of spoils and captives. Scapula also died at this juncture and Claudius’ succession by Nero, as suggested by Jarrett and was rapidly replaced by Aulus Didius Gallus. (1964, 33), is open to question. Clearly, extensive, long- The governorship of this man, as Jarrett (1964b) observed, distance campaigning seems to be out of the question. has received unflattering notices in the Annals and scarcely Matters changed with his replacement by Quintus Veranius more unfavourable attention in the Agricola (14), where in AD 57, though he died in office in the following year. This Tacitus states that: individual does seem to have had some valuable experience, as governor of Lycia and Pamphylia, in fighting mountain- ‘Didius Gallus held what his predecessors had dwelling communities in Asia Minor, and has the distinction gained and advanced a very few forts beyond that, of having a book on military science dedicated to him to win thereby the reputation of having expanded (Onasander’s The General). As such his appointment as his province.’ governor of Britain may have been deliberate, though Tacitus in the Agricola again deliberately plays down his role, saying: In the Annals we are told that: ‘... Veranius had conducted some petty plundering ‘Though journeying with all speed, Didius found expeditions against the Silures; but all further matters still worse on his arrival, owing to the defeat operations were cut short by his death.’ of the legion commanded by Manlius Valens ... This mishap also was the work of the Silures, who scoured Annals XIV, 29. the country far and wide till they were driven back by The fact that Tacitus was able to discuss Veranius’ will, which the advance of Didius.’ declared that: ‘...in two years’ time, ... he would lay the whole Annals XII, 40. province at (Nero’s) feet’ (Annals XIV, 29) indicates that serious operations had indeed recommenced in Wales, and that Again in the Annals we are informed that: the governor only envisaged a couple of years’ campaigning to conquer the whole of that country. We need not take Tacitus’ ‘... Didius himself, being old and sluggish and surfeited reference to ‘petty plundering expeditions’ too literally, since with honours, was content to act on the defensive and as Webster (1978, 85) has shown Tacitus ‘is more concerned leave everything to others.’ to prepare a platform from which to extol the great success of Annals XII, 40. Paullinus’ than in telling the truth. The Silures against whom Veranius’ troops were operating ‘The governor Aulus Didius, as I have already entioned would obviously have to be those outside the province, given had done no more than hold his own.’ the fact that part of the tribal territory had garrison posts – including a legionary fortress at Usk – situated within it. Annals XIV, 29. However, we must beware of Tacitus’, as well as other Roman

51 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 22

authors’ (e.g. Pliny), unspecific usage of the name, frequently shipping could have landed the army at a number of used to encompass the inhabitants of south Wales as a whole. convenient bays, particularly along the eastern coast of the After all, in the context of Iulius Frontinus’ operations in island, negating the whole exercise of boat-building. Wales in the period AD 73/4-77 all that we have is a reference The reference to the auxiliary cavalry utilising fords, but to his conquest of the Silures. No other tribe is mentioned, but swimming with their horses in deeper water, sounds very the evidence suggests that his conquests were much more much like the employment of the crack auxilia of the period, inclusive and probably included the Ordovices. These are only namely the Batavian regiments. Where the crossings were named once thereafter, and that in the context of the effected is uncertain, but the western side of the Lafan Sands suppression of their rebellion in the late summer of AD 77; an between Llanfairfechan and Beaumaris is highly probable. occasion when Tacitus is at pains to demonstrate his father-in- After all this is the route taken by the Holyhead mail-coach in law, Iulius Agricola’s, credentials as a man of action. the earlier nineteenth century. It is also the probable location Veranius was succeeded by Suetonius Paullinus in 58, who of Edward I’s ill-fated bridge-of-boats in 1282. On the other Tacitus in his Agricola writes: hand, the foundation of the Flavian fort at Caernarfon, close to the western entrance to the Strait, is itself suggestive of a ‘... enjoyed two years of success, conquering tribes and crossing point, albeit later in date. The army would surely have establishing strong forts.’ established a camp on the Caernarfonshire foreshore, but its Agricola 14. discovery in the light of the topographical changes which have affected this coastline will prove difficult. If an eastern These two years must, therefore, have seen extensive crossing point is envisaged, then a situation above the 15m operations, initially at least against the Silures, thereby contour, perhaps somewhere between Aber and Llandegai, just finishing off the task which had recommenced under Veranius, east of Bangor, is possible. before Paullinus could embark on much more ambitious Although the landing was opposed, Roman discipline projects. He attacked Mona (Anglesey) in AD 60, and such an prevailed and the defenders defeated. The island was operation cannot have been envisaged without the garrisoned, and Roman troops engaged in the desecration of pacification, albeit perhaps temporarily, of much of mid-, if the sacred places on the island. The archaeological traces of not of north-eastern Wales. If the death of Veranius, as Jarrett the operation ought to comprise a beach-head camp on the suggested, took place in the winter of AD 57-8, then the island, where the flat-bottomed boats could be secured out of spring/summer operations of AD 58 and 59 must have been the water, and at least one major camp somewhere inland, with wide-ranging and will surely have left a legacy in the form of the possibility of something more substantial (a fort or forts) if temporary camps. There is a strong possibility that at least Tacitus’ reference to Paullinus being engaged in the some of these, hitherto virtually unknown in south-east Wales, garrisoning of the island means anything. There should also be are to be sought in the vicinity of those permanent installations a series of camps echoing the passage of the army from its established in the period AD 49-60, such as the legionary start-point to its Anglesey destination, together with (we fortress at Usk and auxiliary forts as at Abergavenny presume) another series, perhaps more widely separated in (Monmouthshire), Castlefield Farm (Kentchurch) and view of the forced march back to south-eastern England to Blackbush Farm, both in Herefordshire. deal with the Boudiccan rebels. Paullinus himself with the The Anglesey campaigns of AD 60 and 77 are the only cavalry would have moved much more swiftly, perhaps even Roman operations in Wales and the Marches for which we can eschewing the security of an overnight camp. claim a precise geographical compass. Whereas that of AD 77 News of the outbreak of the Boudiccan revolt must have led seems to have been very much of an ad hoc affair according to to the abandonment of plans for the retention of these Tacitus’ Agricola, Paullinus’ was very much a carefully territorial acquisitions, at least insofar as the NW of Wales is planned operation. The island is said to have been thickly concerned, since all the excavated garrison posts in the region populated and a sanctuary for many refugees. Since the have produced no evidence of occupation prior to the early Romans were aware of the tidal nature of the Menai Strait, Flavian period. The situation elsewhere in Wales and the creating large areas of shallow water and sandbanks which Marches is much more uncertain, though the legionary could foil any attempt to utilise standard transports to convey fortresses and the auxiliary forts founded in the late Claudian troops across, Paullinus ordered the construction of flat- or early Neronian period seem to have been largely retained, bottomed boats to take the Roman infantry across. We do not and it is even possible that the exploitation of lead-silver know where these were built, though not impossibly directly deposits in Flintshire may have been initiated in this period if across from the island on the Caernarfonshire foreshore. the lead pig from Carmel (RIB II 2404.38) dates to this period. Otherwise, their prefabrication and conveyance by cart must Our sources say nothing about the situation in Wales and the be envisaged. Water transport must be ruled out, otherwise Marches in the period AD 61-73/4. There is no record of

52 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 23

campaigning, indeed such would have been difficult since the The reference to his conquest of the Silures alone is last year of Paullinus’ governorship and certainly part of that misleading. The tribal name, as already indicated above, seems of Petronius Turpilianus (AD 61-3) was spent in the to have been synonymous with the inhabitants of southern suppression of the rising in eastern and southern England, for Wales, since they were by far the most famous community in which the last named gained the distinction of ornamenta western Britain; a term analogous to the Caledonii of Scotland. triumphalia (Annals XV, 72). Certainly the situation in the Pliny could even speak of the shortest crossing to Ireland west could not have been ignored, but it may well be that the being made from the district of the Silures, a distance he says campaigning which had been undertaken in the period AD 57- of 40 miles, though it is clear that his crossing-point lies in 60 may have taken such a toll of Rome’s enemies that the Pembrokeshire; in Roman times probably part of the land of simple expedient of retaining a chain of legionary bases and the Octapitai/Demetae. Moreover, we hear that when forts – forming a de facto frontier, running from Chester in the Frontinus was replaced by Agricola in the late summer of AD N to Cardiff in the S – will have been a sufficient safeguard to 77 the newly arrived governor faced a rebellion of the secure the provincial boundary in the W. Treaties with those Ordovices. Evidently, then, this tribe’s territory had also been tribes who had previously offered resistance would have been overrun. Only Anglesey, and by implication Snowdonia, another factor in consolidating Rome’s position. seems to have remained inviolate. The years AD 73/4-7 must The withdrawal of Legio XIV from Britain in AD 66/7 – have seen extensive operations over Wales, which, to judge by hitherto based at Wroxeter in the central Marches – is another the distribution of auxiliary castella established in their train, signal of peaceful conditions in the west, whilst the dynastic extended as far W as the counties of Cardiganshire and wars which followed Nero’s suicide in AD 68 and the outbreak Carmarthenshire, and included the southern uplands of of hostilities in northern Britain in AD 69, with the toppling of Glamorganshire and Monmouthshire, together with all of mid- Cartimandua, the pro-Roman ruler of the Brigantes, must have Wales, probably as far north as the estuary of the Mawddach effectively inhibited any moves towards the annexation of that in the west. unconquered part of Wales by the new emperor Vespasian, Upon Agricola’s arrival in the late summer of AD 77 he even if he entertained such thoughts at this early stage in his faced what was clearly a rebellion of the Ordovices (Tacitus, reign. However, that emperor must have decreed that the Agricola 18). The tribe, according to the Agricola, had nearly conquest of the remainder of Wales had to be completed as wiped out a cavalry regiment stationed in their territory. soon as Brigantia had been annexed. Although northern Britain Agricola took swift action: gathering together a scratch force must have been a priority for the two governors of the period of legionaries, hitherto employed on detachment duties, and a AD 69-73/4,Vettius Bolanus and Petillius Cerealis, the bulk of small force of auxiliaries (the numbers do not seem unduly the provincial army being concentrated in this area, it is clear large) he led this battle-group into an upland environment and that moves were afoot, probably in the last year of Cerealis’ succeeded in cutting to pieces almost the whole fighting force governorship, if not before, to bring reinforcements to the of the tribe. This is manifestly a punitive operation, but its Welsh front. A freshly-arrived legion, Legio II Augusta, geographical placement is problematic. Some writers, (Hanson hitherto based upon Exeter, had certainly initiated the building 1987, 46-7; Manning 2004, 71) suggest that Ordovician of a new fortress at Caerleon in the winter of AD 73/4 (Davies territory extended as far as Anglesey and that this punitive 2004, 92), and this can only be explained as a move to operation is to be located in NW Wales. One of the present strengthen Rome’s forces in the west in order to facilitate writers, however, is inclined to circumspection and favours campaigns of conquest. mid-Wales as the Ordovician heartland (Davies 2004, 92). Scholarship credits Cerealis’ successor, Julius Frontinus Wherever the campaign took place the next move can be (AD 73/4-77), with the conquest of Wales, although Tacitus firmly fixed, since Agricola then went on to capture Anglesey, records only his subjugation of the Silures. Unfortunately, that an operation which Tacitus tells us was hastily conceived and historian’s account of these operations, which would have a total surprise insofar as its inhabitants were concerned. It is been chronicled in his Histories, are lost to us. Only the brief difficult to imagine that the Snowdonia massif was already summary of events survives in his Agricola: reduced at this stage, with Roman troops garrisoning forts such as Segontium (Caernarfon) looking across the Menai Straits to ‘The heavy burden was taken up by Julius Frontinus, a an unconquered island. This really does look like a repeat of great man, insofar as greatness was permitted. He the Paullinian operation of AD 60: seize the island and wait for conquered the strong and militant tribe of the Silures, the inevitable surrender of dissidents who held out in the triumphing alike over the valour of the enemy and mountainous mainland opposite. The fleet was apparently difficulties of the terrain.’ unavailable and Agricola did not give orders for the building of boats. Instead he launched an attack solely by his auxiliary Agricola 17. units against the island, certainly including cavalry. This

53 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 24

sounds very much like the employment of the Batavians again, impossible that the summer operations of AD 78 which because Tacitus says quite explicitly that these auxiliaries, involved Agricola in the reconnoitring of estuaries and forests ‘had been trained at home to swim carrying their arms and and the launching of plundering raids, terminating in the surrender keeping their horses under control’ (Agricola 18). Their of communities which hitherto had been hostile, together with successful crossing caused the islanders to sue for peace. The the establishment of a ring of forts around their territory island was then surrendered. (Tacitus, Agricola 20), could be placed in a NW Wales setting, This operation again should have left its marks on the though NW England has been the traditional location. landscape, and though the start-point is again unnamed there is The thread of Roman historical narrative embracing Wales a high probability that it was either the upper Dee valley or and the Marches is thus broken with the capture of Anglesey. conceivably that of the lower Conwy, since NE Wales had As far as we are able to judge no further military operations certainly been incorporated within the Province from AD 74 at were to take place in a landscape which for a generation at the latest; imperial exploitation of the rich lead-silver deposits least was to be a zone under strict military control, with no in modern Flintshire being evidenced in the form of lead pigs fewer than three legionary fortresses disposed on the with stamps of that year (RIB II, 2404.31-2; Arnold & Davies upland/lowland margins for a further decade; the remainder 2000, 101) . A coastal advance is possible, with the Agricolan exhibiting a dense network of auxiliary forts, a few of which army establishing a temporary camp on the mainland were to be retained in occupation into the fourth century. immediately prior to springing the surprise attack; then Whilst we cannot dismiss the possibility of native uprisings another on the island itself. after AD 78 (the rebellions of 1294 and 1400-12 are instructive The follow-up must surely have been the reduction of in the context of medieval Welsh history) there is no literary Snowdonia, an operation which could conceivably have been evidence for such. The only camps we might expect to be built left until the following spring, unless the seizure of Anglesey by the Roman army in Wales and the Marches thereafter fall caused the mountain communities to surrender in a short time. into a very different category, namely those connected with the The Roman forces involved need not have been large, and the instruction of troops in the art of Roman castrametation known camps in this region are of modest size. It is not (Chapter XIV).

CHAPTER XIII CAMP GROUPINGS, CAMPAIGNING ROUTES AND TACTICS

CAMP GROUPINGS geographical contexts such as those of Anglesey or SW Wales, where evidence for camp building might be expected on the Our perception of the routes and distances covered by Roman basis of historical or archaeological evidence respectively. Any expeditionary forces, implicit in the ’temporary’ nature of the attempt at fitting the camps into a historical perspective, which sites themselves, is governed by the present distribution of is itself fragmentary and piecemeal from a variety of sources these camps, itself a function of their survival as earthworks or (see Chapter XII), must perforce take into account this partial the recognition of their traces from the air. The relationship survival of the evidence. between the camps has been traditionally approached on the Though some camp-grouping may well be valid, we must basis of comparisons of overall size, plan (including gate-type, be careful that in our attempt to group camps of similar size if known) and geographical proximity, on the grounds that, and proportions into the context of specific campaigns we do theoretically at least, each campaign should have left its traces not over-rationalise what may well be a much more complex in the form of temporary camps. There have also been attempts scenario. To begin we should certainly not underestimate the to link certain camps to a legionary standard on the basis of versatility of the Roman army on campaign. The splitting of plan, and especially gate-type, though there is presently forces in the context of one campaign or campaigning season, nothing in our data which is inclined to lead towards the as, for example, recorded in Agricola 25, may well have been identification of a ‘legionary type.’ We must be aware of the common practice, whilst units may have combined in different absence of traces of temporary camps in those areas where, on ways at different times and places depending upon the strategy historical grounds, we might expect camps to have been built: that was employed. Moreover, operations in any one for example, in the Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire campaigning season may have had several starting points and lowlands as precursors to permanent bases such as the involved units of differing composition and strengths, such as legionary fortress at Usk. Similarly, their absence in is paralleled in twelfth and thirteenth century AD operations

54 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 25

against the Welsh princes. For example, in 1114 there was a minor river valley (the Mule) into Wales, although that valley convergence of three armies at the site of Tomen y Mur; one has been proposed as a route of a Roman road (Houghton under Gilbert FitzRichard from SW Wales, the second under 1961, 233). Henry I coming either from Oswestry or Shrewsbury, and the A key factor which we need to take into account in our third under the Earl of Chester and Alexander, king of Scotland attempt to comprehend the relationship between one from Chester. temporary camp and another, and which has long been central Initially, at least, there must have been problems in to the study, is the spatial relationship between camps of about formulating strategy in order to bring hostile communities to the same size and plan, since it is only by examining such heel, since in the first instance there were no reliable maps and relationships in a micro-geographical context that we can the collection of data about distances, topographical features begin to address the issue of contemporaneity, and in the long and the attitude, compliant or hostile, of native communities, term, strategy, since this could itself be dictated by the pace of will have been an on-going process from the first Roman advance. In this respect the Scottish camps have long been contact with the tribes of the borderland. Austin and Rankov subject to such analysis and some useful statistics in respect of (1995, 15ff) have argued for the use of ‘Itineraries’ in this spacing have emerged. For example, the four camps of about respect. Whilst Roman armies did not advance blindly, they 44ha, which appear to form part of a series – Normandykes, were probably heavily dependent upon local guides in order to Kintore, Ythan Wells I and Muiryfold – average 14-15km apart; work out approximate routes until a socio-political- the 52-ha camps average some 20km apart; and the dozen or topographical framework had been worked out. The result is so comprising the 25-ha series average 16.4km apart (see the location of some temporary camps in what we can only details from a number of sources, including St Joseph describe as ‘peculiar’ locations, and campaigning routes that 1969;1973;1977, Hanson 1987 and Maxwell 1989). In most seem to defy common-sense. A good example here is that of cases the distance covered can be highly variable, especially if the newly-discovered camp at Pen Plaenau in the Berwyns, a river crossing is involved. Whilst Vegetius (I, 9) which echoes a campaigning route from the Shropshire recommended a march rate of 20 Roman miles (29km) in a lowlands over the watershed into the upper reaches of the Dee. five-hour period at the military pace, or 24 (35km) at the We, who tend to think of ‘natural’ campaigning routes into the quicker pace, it is important to note that these distances relate heart of Wales via the coast or the major east-flowing river to training and take no cognisance of the size of the force, the valleys, are inclined to be surprised by the choice of such a pace of the baggage-train and most importantly the nature of difficult route, though it may well be the precursor of that the terrain. Whilst some generals, such as Julius Caesar, had a followed in 1165 in the context of Henry II’s campaign (again reputation for pushing their armies forward at considerable a two-pronged operation from Chester and Oswestry) against speed (50 Roman miles in two days) these were forced forces drawn from Gwynedd, Deheubarth and Powys which marches, equivalent to Vegetius’24 Roman miles in five hours had been marshalled against him at Corwen (Brut y (Vegetius I, 9). For the most part 15-20 miles per day would Tywysogyon (Peniarth MS. 20 version)). The account is of have represented a good speed. some interest, and is as follows: Comparative data from the medieval period is again instructive. Larger armies of the period moved fairly slowly. In ‘And as they were thus on both sides staying in their 1300 Edward I’s army in Scotland only moved 30 miles in four tents, without the one daring to attack the other, at last days; in 1346 Edward III’s army in France rarely exceeded 10- the king of England was enraged; and he moved his 12 miles in a day; and in 1355 the Black Prince’s force, host into the wood of Dyffryn Ceiriog, and he had that involved in a great raid, covered 25 miles on one day, but only wood cut down, and felled to the ground…. the king averaged 10 miles for the rest. Smaller forces rarely moved and his armies advanced, and he pitched his tents on faster. A specific Welsh example is the departure of a force of the Berwyn mountain. And he stayed there a few days.’ about 1,400 men from Llanbadarn (Aberystwyth) on April 12th 1283, reaching the castle of Bere on the 15th, the distance Clearly, in a twelfth century context an approach to grapple the travelled being about 35 miles (Morris 1901,193) or about 10 opposition via a direct route (possibly offered by a Roman miles per day. road: see Gazetteer p. 105) by means of a minor river valley Clearly, if a camp represents a Roman expeditionary force (the Ceiriog), thence over the Berwyn, was preferred to a more on the march, rather than an army ensconced in a specific location circuitous (and possibly much more dangerous) route via the for days or even weeks at a time, then an average interval of narrow, winding valley of the upper Dee. Similar reasoning 10-15 miles (16.7-25km) between camp-sites is likely to may have also applied in the first century AD. Another represent the norm, particularly in the uplands of Wales. example might be the temporary camp at Glanmiheli (see It is important to realise that the camps constitute the only Gazetteer p. 125), which location suggests a force following a body of evidence which testifies to the routes taken by various

55 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 26

Figure 29. Distribution of marching-camps in Wales and the Marches. RCC/073 & 74.

56 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 27

Key to Figure 29. close to the site of forts except Pen-y-gwryd. Llanfor II is wholly isolated from the others and may be connected 1. Derwin Bach 27. Stretford Bridge II with the construction of the large fort and ‘stores-base.’ 2. Pen-y-gwryd 28. Bromfield 3. Tomen y Mur East I 29. Walford The first two could be linked not only on grounds of 4. Tomen y Mur East II 30. Brampton Bryan size, but also on grounds of proximity, since they lie within 5. Llanfor I 31. Buckton Park 15 miles (25km) of one another. Whilst the successive camps 6. Llanfor II 32. Wigmore of Tomen y Mur East I and II also lie within 15 miles of Pen- 7. Penrhos 33. Esgair Perfedd y-gwryd there is considerable uncertainty over their 8. Pen Plaenau 34. Cwm Nant dimensions, and it would be prudent to regard a linkage on 9. Rhyn Park 35. Trefal 10. Whittington 36. Dolau geographical grounds as doubtful. 11. Abertanat / Clawdd Coch 37. Hindwell Farm I 12. Uffington I and II 38. Hindwell Farm II • Camps of 1.3-5ha in mid-Wales and 13. Attingham Park 39. Walton I-III the central Marches 14. Ismore Coppice 40. Beulah 15. Norton II 41. Boatside Farm There are nine sites to consider. They exhibit a wide 16. Norton I 42. Ivington 17. Cound Hall 43. Byford divergence in size, a problem compounded by the fact that in 18. Thornbury 44. Y Pigwn II three instances the overall size is undetermined. For example 19. Forden I 45. Y Pigwn I Boatside Farm and Hindwell Farm II are certainly in excess of 20. Brompton I 46. Arosfa Garreg 3.1ha and 1.6ha respectively, and both may have been possibly 21. Brompton II 47. Plas-y-gors as much as 8ha in overall extent. Stretford Bridge II at 1.3ha is 22. Dolwen 48. Coelbren not likely to have been much larger. The other sites are 23. Glanmiheli 49. Carn Caca 24. Upper Affcot 50. Blaen-cwm Bach Thornbury (ca.1.4ha), Glanmiheli (2.55ha), Buckton Park 25. Stretford Bridge I 51. Twyn-y-briddallt (ca.1.9ha) and the three camps at Walton, 2ha (Camp III), 26. Stretford Bridge III 52. Pen-y-coedcae 2.5ha (Camp I) and 3.1ha (Camp II) in extent. Thornbury and Glanmiheli fall within a comfortable 10-mile (16.7-km) radius expeditionary forces in Wales and the Marches between ca.AD of one another, but the divergent size suggest different 47 and 77/8, or later. Unfortunately, their distribution is, as functions; the former possibly being connected with the discussed above, geographically biased and in all probability building of the first phase of the fort at Forden. Hindwell Farm woefully incomplete. They are also relatively few and exhibit II is of as yet undetermined size and could well fall within the such a diversity of size and shape that they do not readily fall 5-11-ha class. If not, since it lies within 10 miles (16.7km) of into the series such as have been distinguished in Scotland. Buckton the two could be theoretically linked. The Walton The exception appears to be the probable series represented by camps are highly unusual insofar as they are of modest size the camps at Uffington I (18ha), Whittington (15.3ha), Pen and juxtaposed in such a way as to suggest that though Plaenau (18ha) and Penrhos (ca.16.5ha). Penrhos lies some successive, they succeeded one another very quickly, which in 10km to the NW of Pen Plaenau, whilst Whittington and turn suggests that they are broadly contemporary. What we Uffington are situated some 24 and 48km respectively from may be observing here is the concentration of a force hitherto this newly-discovered site. Certainly it is tempting to suggest split into three arriving successively at a predesignated point that they represent the remains of a single campaign, with and affecting a concentration. It is noteworthy that the total missing intermediate camps to the SE, somewhere in the area of the three camps amounts to 7.6ha (18.8 acres), which vicinity of Llanarmon Dyffryn Clwyd and Baschurch. If the equates quite nicely with a battle-group which could be same NW direction of advance and interval were to be accommodated in a camp of ca.7.5-9ha (18-21 acres). It has maintained then the next camp beyond Penrhos would lie already been suggested that Hindwell Farm II could possibly somewhere near Cerrig-y-drudion. be as large as 8ha and indicative of operations involving forces We shall consider the whole issue of campaigning routes in of legionary strength in the region of the Walton Basin. due course. Let us first simply address the camps on the basis of size-groupings within a micro-regional framework and see • Camps of 1.3-5ha in S Wales whether any pattern emerges. There is a solitary example, Carn Caca, enclosing 4.85ha (12 • Camps of 1.3-5ha in NW Wales acres). The camp is wholly isolated on both grounds of size and geography. The direction in which it faces (possibly NW) There are three, possibly five, sites to consider: Derwin Bach suggests a force moving towards the middle reaches of the (ca.3.68ha), Pen-y-gwryd (4.03ha), Tomen y Mur East I and II Vale of Neath. Whether it represents a large detachment from (in excess of 1.5ha) and Llanfor II (ca.2.1ha). All are situated a much bigger force such as that housed in the camp at Blaen-

57 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 28

cwm Bach is unknown. It is a good example of a site in a Nant and Trefal, which are in turn too close to one ‘peculiar’ location, in difficult country. another to be linked to the same campaign, and all three should be treated separately. Furthermore, we would • Camps of 5-12ha in NW Wales withdraw the suggestion that its easterly alignment is necessarily connected with a battle-group heading east. It There are no known examples. The consecutive camps of seems merely to conform to the alignment advocated by Tomen y Mur I and II could fall into this category, though they Vegetius (see p. 14). Its builders could, therefore have been could well be in excess of 11ha. They remain isolated, and marching in a NW or westerly direction. Indeed, its position their possible SE orientation is presently no guide to a missing strongly suggests a force striking out of the Wye valley, site, though such may lie in the vicinity of the SW end of Bala heading over the watershed towards the Elan, or, alternatively, Lake, if the Roman road linking the forts at Tomen y Mur and continuing NW via the Wye but keeping to the high ground on Caer Gai is any guide to an earlier campaigning route. its right bank. Cwm Nant has a northerly orientation and its position pretty • Camps of 5-12ha in mid-Wales and certainly indicates a battle-group proceeding in that direction the central Marches towards the upper reaches of the Severn; a direction ‘confirmed’ by the later (presumably Flavian) road alignment There are eight camps within this micro-region: Brompton II a little to its W. ca.5.2ha (ca.13 acres), Bromfield 8.5ha (21.2 acres), Upper Trefal, the largest of the three, surely indicates a different Affcot ca.6ha (ca.14.8 acres), Hindwell Farm II (possibly campaign. What this camp, and the enigmatic site 1.5km to the ca.8ha/19 acres), Esgair Perfedd 6.35ha (15.68 acres), Cwm south at Y Gaer, Nantmel (see p. 161-2), indicate is that Roman Nant 7.3ha (18 acres), Trefal 8.5ha (21 acres), Walford 9.7ha forces were pushing NW up the Dulas valley from the region (24 acres) and possibly Boatside Farm. Brompton II and of the confluence of the Ithon and Clywedog, north of present- Bromfield lie within 10 miles (16.7km) of one another but are day Llandrindod Wells; thus not too distant from the Wye but of dissimilar size and orientation. Again, Boatside Farm, taking a much more direct route via the lower ground of the Hindwell II and Walford lie within 15 miles (25km) of each Marteg valley, thence the Dulas towards the Severn. other, and also close to pre-Flavian permanent bases suggestive of broad contemporaneity; but there is still no clear • Camps of 5-12ha in S Wales indication of size or orientation at Hindwell or Boatside, and Walford presently stands in isolation. Only three camps fall into this range: Y Pigwn II 10.29ha (25.4 The relative proximity of Esgair Perfedd, Cwm Nant and acres), Plas-y-gors 9ha (22.3 acres) and Twyn-y-briddallt Trefal has given rise to speculation as to their possible links. 6.5ha (16 acres). Twyn-y-briddallt stands in splendid isolation, The discovery of Esgair Perfedd in 1966 and Cwm Nant in both in terms of plan and size. It probably indicates a 1967, the two sites being of broadly similar dimensions and campaign reaching the upper reaches of the Rhondda from a lying only 6.5km apart, led St Joseph (1969, 123-6) to suggest start-point in the Glamorganshire lowlands. that they represented the passage of a battle-group of The divergence in size between Y Pigwn II and Plas-y-gors approximately legionary size moving west, climbing out of the is not great when ‘difficult’ ground within the former is taken upper reaches of the Wye valley and heading for the watershed into account; moreover they are situated only a little over 10 that would eventually provide ready access to the lowlands miles (16.7km) from one another. However, the similarities along Cardigan Bay. The discovery of Trefal in 1987, only end there. Plas-y-gors faces east, though that need not 5km SE of Cwm Nant and 10km from Esgair Perfedd, only necessarily be meaningful in terms of direction of march. served to complicate matters. In a paper given in 2000 (Davies However, its proximity to the course of the later Roman road & Jones 2002; 836) we interpreted the relationship differently, linking the Flavian forts at Coelbren and Brecon Gaer suggests since Cwm Nant has been shown to lie close to the line of a that the force in question was moving in a NE direction. The Roman road running N-S between the auxiliary forts of Castell camp at Y Pigwn II on the other hand faces SW, and its Collen and Caersws (Burnham 1995, 328), hinting at an early location strongly suggests an army moving in that direction campaigning route linking the upper Wye and the Severn after traversing the watershed of the Usk. The two camps are valleys. Cwm Nant can thus be divorced from Esgair Perfedd, thus likely to represent two separate operations. whilst the latter, facing E, was also considered in the same paper to represent the passage of troops in that direction rather • Camps of 12-20ha in N Wales and the Marches than climbing out of the upper Wye en route to the W (Davies & Jones 2002, 836). Nine, or possibly ten sites – if Rhyn Park, possibly a camp It is now possible to add to the discussion. Firstly, Esgair converted into an aestiva is included – fall within this range: Perfedd seems somewhat undersized in relation to Cwm Llanfor I ca.12.5ha (30 acres), Penrhos ca.16ha (ca.40.7

58 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 29

acres), Pen Plaenau 18ha (44 acres), Whittington 15.3ha (38 the high ground south of the upper Usk valley. acres), Attingham Park 13.3ha (33.4 acres), Norton I 13ha (32 Again, Coelbren, Arosfa Garreg and Y Pigwn I could be acres), Norton II (unknown size), Hindwell Farm I 17.6ha conceivably linked by virtue of proximity (all well within a (43.5 acres) and Brompton I ca.15.5ha (ca.38 acres). St Joseph 10-mile (16.7-km) radius of one another across a presently (1973, 244) was the first to suggest tentative links between bleak moorland landscape). However, such a link is Whittington and Penrhos, a link that can now be reinforced improbable since Coelbren’s location suggests that it with the discovery of Pen Plaenau in an intermediary position accommodated a force heading N or NE from the upper 10km from Penrhos and with the strong probability of an reaches of the Vale of Neath; a route echoed by the course of intermediary site or sites near Llanarmon Dyffryn Clwyd and the Roman road linking the forts of Neath, Coelbren and Baschurch, the start-point perhaps being the camp at Uffington Brecon Gaer. The camp at Coelbren may also face the nearby I 18ha (44 acres). The difference in size between the camps in auxiliary fort and, as such, could represent the halting-place of this ‘series’ may be explained by differential topography. an army reaching a pre-existing fort. The camp at Llanfor I is presently isolated on grounds of size, though it could represent a further axis of advance in a • Camps of over 20ha SW direction from the headwaters of the Dee. The Attingham Park and Norton camps reflect the existence Only three examples are known: two, Cound Hall ca.26ha (64 of a ‘gathering ground’ in the Wroxeter region for the acres) and Brampton Bryan 23ha (57 acres) in the Marches mounting of operations further to the W. In this respect the and the solitary Blaen-cwm Bach 26.79ha (66.19 acres) in S camp at Brompton I is likely to have an eastern equivalent Wales. These represent the activities of the largest Roman somewhere in this area, lying comfortably as it does within a armies assembled on the Welsh ‘front’. They are 15-mile (25-km) radius of this great ‘gathering ground’ in the geographically widely spaced and represent three distinct central Marches; it may possibly be one of the Norton camps, operations. Cound Hall’s location places it securely within a whose dimensions are undetermined. ‘gathering ground’ context on the west bank of the Severn. The On grounds of size alone Hindwell Farm I stands in army thus assembled could have thereafter conceivably either isolation, though we may posit an eastern equivalent acting as been split up or continued W in undiminished strength. a launch-pad for this operation, probably in the region of Brampton Bryan’s position could also represent an initial Mortimer’s Cross. concentration, though St Joseph (1973, 242) suggested that it indicated a force moving W via the Teme valley, which in turn • Camps of 12-20ha in S Wales offered a variety of routes either to the NW or alternatives to the SW towards the Lugg valley and beyond. Frere’s view was There are five camps in this category: Beulah 14ha (34.7 similar, in that it ‘…testifies to the army being engaged in a acres), Y Pigwn I 15.49ha (38.25 acres), Arosfa Garreg 17.8ha wide sweep through the hills, mopping up any resistance that (44 acres), Coelbren 14ha (34.6 acres) and Pen y Coedcae was encountered.’ (Frere 1987b, 70). 15.36ha (37.95 acres). The last-named apart this is an Blaen-cwm Bach probably indicates the movement of an intriguing cluster on the grounds of size and broad army along the S Wales coastal belt, specifically the Vale of geographical proximity. St Joseph (1969, 123) drew Glamorgan, before either changing direction and moving N up comparisons between Beulah and Y Pigwn I and suggested the eastern flank of the Vale of Neath, or taking to the high that they could relate to the same campaign: indeed they lie ground before attempting the crossing of the Afon Nedd on a comfortably within 15 miles (25km) of one another. Beulah’s continuing westerly route. NNE orientation, however, strongly suggests an army heading It is evident that the above exercise, attempting to link in that direction towards the upper Wye, an early campaigning camps on grounds of size into what we imagine constitutes a route echoed by the course of the Roman road linking the forts series, is in many ways an unsatisfactory as well as a risky at Llandovery and Castell Collen. exercise. With the exception of Penrhos, Pen Plaenau, The camp at Arosfa Garreg has been hitherto divorced from Whittington and possibly Uffington I, no convincing series has Y Pigwn I on grounds of size. However, one critical feature of emerged. This, of course, does not mean that other series, the former has been ignored; a substantial ravine, giving rise to reflecting individual campaigns, do not exist. Rather it reflects two streams, together with other irregularities within the camp the imperfect survival of the evidence, as well as the simplistic will have reduced the usable area by at least two hectares, way in which it has been approached. Whilst we may accept perhaps to as little as 16ha (39.5 acres) overall. It is thus not the existence of camp clusters on the basis that the forces impossible that they could be related, but the fact that both involved were of a size commonly selected for operations in face in a westerly direction suggests that they belong to the field, the late G.D.B. Jones (Jones & Mattingly 1990, 79) different operations by similar-sized forces moving west along warned that though there may be standard sizes of camps these

59 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 30

should not be envisaged as exclusive groups, since each category will contain a range of sites spread slightly over and ‘This place is the soldier’s second homeland, with under the ‘average’ area. The result is that camps placed in two ramparts for city walls, and his tent is his hearth distinct groups could conceivably relate to the same campaign; and home.’ units having been split off from a larger body, or effecting a conjunction. A good historical example is the division of Livy, History of Rome 44, 39 Agricola’s army during the summer campaign of AD 82, each of the three components building its own overnight camp (Tacitus, Agricola 25). The so-called ‘Stracathro’ series of The marching-camp has also been construed as an instrument camps, again in Scotland, are also a case in point. These are of of aggression as well as defence, since it offered a secure base a mixture of sizes, yet the diagnostic gate type would perhaps from which an army could either have continued its advance, indicate the whim of an individual praefectus castrorum and or provided a local base from which smaller-scale operations that the camps thus reflect the existence of a ‘legionary’ could have been conducted (Goldsworthy 1998, 111-13). Its preference in gate type and, by implication, an encamped force vital role in the context of security for the troops, however, under the direction of officers from a specific legion. The must not be forgotten. Not only did it serve as a repository camps may thus reflect a much more diverse and complex (under guard) for an army’s baggage whilst it was engaged in movement of troops in field operations even within the context battle, or split into detachments operating in the vicinity, but a of one campaigning season. If such is acceptable in a Scottish much more effective sentry-watch was possible, particularly at dimension then our interpretation of camp distribution in our night when the resting army was prone to harassment by region perforce needs to be more flexible and much less hostiles who conducted guerrilla-type operations. The night inclined towards a monolithic presumption of groupings based attack by the Caledonii on the camp of Legio IX, recorded by solely upon size and the notion of a day’s march between Tacitus (Agricola 26), is a classic instance; fighting inside the comparable sites. The three largest camps in our region, Cound camp then moving out to the gates, when timely relief arrived Hall, Brampton Bryan and Blaen-cwm Bach, are a classic case for the hard-pressed soldiers. Had this division of Agricola’s in point. Rather than implying the existence of a regular series army neglected to construct a defensive perimeter, however of such camps, as envisaged by St Joseph and Frere, on slight, then the results could have been far worse. This is why grounds of size as well as rarity, they should be seen as classic Tacitus (Histories 4, 75) admonished those individuals, such examples of Maxwell’s ‘gathering ground’ (Maxwell 1991), as Petillius Cerealis, who neglected such precautions. where they served as mustering bases for an army prior to the The problem with most Roman military operations is, to the commencement of field-operations, or alternatively a brief modern eye, the relatively slow speed of advance (but see p. 55), reunion of hitherto dispersed forces during the course of a itself partly a function of the problem of conveying baggage campaign or their concentration at its close. such as tents and the need to guarantee food supplies and fodder for cavalry mounts and baggage animals; a critical CAMPAIGNING ROUTES AND TACTICS factor in dealing with nimble and highly mobile foes. On occasion these requirements could have affected even the If the presently-known distribution of temporary camps offers direction of march and overall strategy, especially if operations little in the way of clear evidence for individual campaigns were conducted through unfavourable, sparsely populated based upon the recognition of camp-series, at least they do regions; though such is unlikely to have been prominent in the indicate something of the routes taken by successive Roman context of campaigning in Wales and the Marches. Excessive expeditionary forces as well as the broad strategy adopted by baggage (including beeves driven as a fresh food-supply) the governors and their advisors (amici) of the Claudian period simply slowed the army’s progress and, given the relatively onwards in bringing the communities of our region under modest distances involved, a three days ration per man, as Roman rule. evidenced by Josephus (Jewish War III, 96 ), would have been The temporary camps are eloquent testimony to at least 30 sufficient for troops in light order (expeditio) engaged in years of warfare between Rome’s professional army and native operations from a base camp. If an operation of longer communities, led on occasion by individuals such as Caratacus duration was involved then the carriage of the necessary and his comitatus of warriors; operations which, as we have supplies would have been a prerequisite, since relying upon seen, are only sparsely and imperfectly recorded in our foraging may not always have been an option, especially in surviving literary sources. It is legitimate to ask whether they those parts where pastoralism was dominant and where reflect standard Roman military tactics in the first century AD, hostiles could have easily have driven their livestock into perhaps tailored to specific requirements, and ponder as to hiding. The peninsular nature of the Welsh landscape meant whether they can inform us about contemporary tactics. that for certain operations supplies (including prefabricated

60 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 31

flat-bottomed craft for river crossings such as those built by large extent upon the nature of the opposition and their modes Paullinus for the crossing of the Menai Straits) could be of waging war, as well as the geographical compass within transported by sea; since in all probability a large army on the which operations were conducted. Certainly, the Roman march, and in the field for weeks at a time, would have emphasis was on the offensive, and, if possible, bringing a war required resupply on a regular basis irrespective of whether to a swift conclusion by fighting a single decisive battle, as soldiers were provided with the 17 days supply of food allegedly at Mons Graupius in Scotland in AD 83. If such referred to by Ammianus (XVII, 9, 2). could not be achieved since the enemy did not wish to oblige A.K. Goldsworthy makes an important point in his by offering a pitched battle (and forces which had no wish to observation of the effect that the construction of temporary fight in such a manner were very hard to engage), then the camps would have had upon the enemy, symbolising as they alternative was the devastation of hostile territory, the seizure did the inexorable advance of the Roman army, whether that of its capital, if such existed, Sarmizegetusa Regia in Dacia was in a single column or a number of columns ready to being a good example (Lepper & Frere 1988, 304-9), and the deploy into the triplex acies of the army in battle-order. He destruction of settlements, crops and livestock. considers that camp construction, combined with the Roman history is replete with examples of this particularly discipline of the army on the march, slow and methodical brutal form of economic warfare, destruction of property and though it might have been, conveyed the impression that it was livelihood being an integral part of the strategy. Germanicus unstoppable and that capitulation was the best course of action. led an army across the Rhine in AD 14, and ‘... devastated the In simple terms the building of the camp was part and parcel country with fire and sword for fifty miles around. No pity was of the strategy employed by Rome to intimidate the enemy shown to age or sex. Religious and secular buildings were into submission: the appearance of force being just as razed to the ground’ (Tacitus, Annals I, 51). Caesar’s important as its reality. ‘The camp was part of an attempt to operations in northern Gaul were conducted in similar fashion, intimidate the enemy into submission’ (Goldsworthy 1998, 113). since his opponents, as in Augustan-Tiberian Germania, had The size and distribution of temporary camps raises no centres of political importance. In the territory of the questions concerning the aims and objectives of Roman war- Eburones, ‘Every village and every building they saw was set making in Wales and the Marches, issues which are on fire; all over the country the cattle were either slaughtered infrequently mentioned in our ancient sources and then dealt or driven off as booty; the crops…were consumed by the great with in the most cursory fashion. Only rarely are geographical number of horses and men’ (Caesar, Gallic War VI, 3). These objectives specified. The island of Anglesey, ‘a source of harsh methods produced the required results: ‘The Menapii did support to the rebels’ (Tacitus, Agricola 14), and ‘which had not collect any soldiers, but relying on the protection of the become a refuge for fugitives’ (Tacitus, Annals 14, 29) is a rare terrain took refuge with all their belongings in the forests and example of an objective whose capture appears to have been marshes. Caesar put Fabius and the quaestor M. Crassus in regarded as a key to the Paullinian campaign in N Wales in AD charge of detachments, and the three columns advanced ... 60. However, most of Rome’s operations were not about the Burning farms and villages, and taking a large number of cattle seizure of territory as such but were conducted against a polity, and prisoners. By this means the Menapii were compelled to a state, a tribe or a confederation thereof. send envoys to sue for peace’ (Caesar, Gallic War VI, 3). It is What may we infer about Roman military/political notable that in this context Caesar left the army’s heavy objectives in dealing with the communities in our region and baggage in camp; he then divided his forces into three separate the strategy by means of which these were attained, on the components, each provided with a week’s rations. If resistance basis of the distribution of the temporary camps? Do the was too stubborn then further harsh measures followed. camps necessarily indicate the geographical compass of Ostorius Scapula, or Claudius himself, threatened the Silures operations directed at attaining specific ends? Did the with a fate akin to that of the Sugambri (Tacitus, Annals XII, campaigning force usually return to its base by the same route 39), transplantation, whilst the fighting-strength of the or return by a different route? Ordovices is said to have been cut to pieces (a term which has Before we turn to these questions let us consider some been taken to imply near annihilation) following their revolt in general issues and questions concerning Roman war-making. AD 77 (Tacitus, Agricola 18). Over a century later, following Did the Roman army always have specific objectives in mind a rebellion of recently conquered tribes in northern Scotland, when operations were launched or was it a case of simply Septimius Severus is said to have instructed his soldiers to kill tailoring standard military practices to suit the occasion? Was everyone they found, saying: ‘Let no one escape total it simply a case of goading the enemy into committing himself destruction at our hands, not even the child carried in its to a set-piece engagement where Roman training, discipline mother’s womb, if it be male; let it not escape total and superior technology could be brought to bear, by destruction.’ (Dio Cassius, 76, 15). penetrating his territory? These are issues which depend to a It is likely that such methods will have seen the army

61 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 32

encamped for days or even weeks on the same ground, as long upland contexts and brought to heel in what were probably as conditions remained favourable, as is probably indicated by relatively small-scale engagements. The operations against the the evidence of successive firings of ovens at Bromfield and, Decangi (sic) in AD 48 and the Ordovices in AD 77 or 78 more recently, the evidence from the camp at Kintore in appear to have involved relatively modest numbers of men, Aberdeenshire (Cook & Dunbar 2004). It has echoes of the and the preponderance of camps of less than 15ha in the Welsh swift-moving destructive raids or chevauchée of the English uplands perfectly illustrates this strategy. army in fourteenth-century France (Prestwich 1996, 10) and The course and direction of Roman campaigning would will have necessitated the usage of cavalry (in this case have been further influenced by the density and overall mounted archers) on a large scale for the method to be distribution of the indigenous population, whether peaceable successful. This strategy of widespread destruction was or hostile, together with the presence, or rather lack, of a deliberately adopted as a means of reducing the enemy’s strategic objective, such as a city or high-status centre. The military capability and forcing him either to offer battle or capture of such in a highly centralized polity could lead to its come to the conference table. Though the damage to the collapse, but if such was lacking, or political authority was economy could ultimately be repaired, the seizure or fragmented and placed no such reliance on strong places, then destruction of crops and livestock represented a massive blow the seizure of such places may have been of little consequence. to a fragile economy, instilling fear in the hearts of the In the context of Wales and the Marches we are here alluding opposition and may well have broken their will to offer to hill-forts, densely packed in the border counties and with a resistance. size-distribution within our region which has been interpreted Essentially similar methods were recommended and as indicating differing forms of socio-political structures ultimately put into effect in subduing Wales in the thirteenth (Davies 1995, 676-78; Lynch et al. 2000, 146ff). However, century and put a gloss on what is likely to have occurred 1200 there is an inherent danger in assuming that these represent an years before. Gerald of Wales’ advice on how Wales might be element, and a possibly dominant one, in the settlement pattern conquered was to foster internal divisions and to mount an of the conquest period, insofar as the chronological range of economic blockade, and in battle it was best to employ light- the great majority is unknown; moreover, many of the armed troops against the Welsh. In the war of 1277 in N Wales excavated examples are known to have an attenuated life span such methods were employed to bring Llywelyn to heel by which may have ended well before the first century AD, e.g. depriving his men of supplies. Edward I’s soldiers penetrated Holgan Camp in Pembrokeshire (Williams & Mytum 1998, inland from Rhuddlan and Flint on the coast, ‘and were able to 69). Occasionally occupation continuing into the first century gain possession of the cattle kept at the prince’s vaccaries and is demonstrable, as at Tre’r Ceiri in Carnarfonshire and Castle drive them to feed his soldiers’ (Smith 1998, 428). Again, in Ditches, Llancarfan, Glamorganshire, though occasionally the the Anglesey campaigns of 1277 and 1282 the possession of a final prehistoric sequence ends with the destruction of internal fleet allowed the king’s soldiers to reach the island in time to buildings, as at the Wrekin (Shropshire), where radiocarbon ensure his reapers would be able to deprive the defenders of dating is suggestive of the burning down of four-post their harvest. Indeed, contemporary chroniclers saw the structures ca. AD 50 and two pila (javelin) heads indicate that operations as, more than anything else, a siege of Snowdonia the perpetrators were Roman soldiers (White & Barker 1998, which left Llywelyn’s men threatened with starvation; royal 38). Other fortified settlements have produced Roman military forces having already deprived them of the most agriculturally items, such as the catapult bolt heads from Whitton, productive areas (Smith 1998, 434). Glamorganshire (Jarrett & Wrathmell 1981, 189-90, Fig. 75, Economic warfare would also benefit the perpetrator of the 1-2), and arrowheads from Dinorben, Denbighshire (Davies classical age insofar as the requirement of supplying an army 1977), but whether this material is necessarily connected with was rarely straightforward, and additional supplies, resistance against a Roman assault is unproven. particularly of forage and fodder for cavalry mounts and In all probability it is the lightly enclosed and unenclosed baggage animals, would have been most welcome. It was a settlements, many of which can now be demonstrably shown strategy not without some risk, as is evidenced by the Silures’ to have been occupied into the first century AD and beyond, rout of Roman foraging parties (Tacitus, Annals XII, 39). If which offer the most reliable guide to settlement density specifically designed to goad the enemy into offering battle, in (Lynch et al. 2000, 162-72). However, lacunae, apparent or which case Roman superiority in equipment and discipline real, in this distribution pattern represent an added would prevail, then the tactic was occasionally successful; interpretative complication, especially if they coincide, as is Caratacus and his confederate force being defeated somewhere the case in the Glamorganshire uplands, with the appearance in Wales in AD 51. However, if our written sources are reliable of marching-camps. Does this imply the existence of then pitched battle was rare in western Britain and the hostiles, settlements which are not archaeologically manifest in the who resorted to guerrilla tactics, had to be searched for in trench-like valleys of this region? Or, do they represent a phase

62 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 33

in Roman-Silurian relationships akin to that of Edward I and valley, whereby the camps acted as springboards for Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1277 and 1282, when the Prince’s operations directed westwards via both the major and minor E- forces had been driven into the fastness of Snowdonia; the flowing river valleys. He and Frere flagged up the importance existence of refugees or hostiles waging guerrilla war upon of the Severn and its tributaries as key routes into the heart of Rome? Such questions are just as pertinent to those other areas mid-Wales in this respect, but also pointed to the significance where marching-camps are found, but where the indigenous of permanent or campaign bases such as Gloucester settlement archaeology is either thinly represented or non- (Kingsholm) and Clyro which signalled routes into south existent: they are presently unanswerable. Wales, via the coastal plain and the Wye valley respectively. If the polities of the Welsh uplands, in particular, were They also highlighted the significance of minor routes into the fragmented, their forces only combining in extremis, and then Welsh uplands via rivers such as Lugg, Teme and Summergil only for a relatively short time, then warfare against them was Brook, with camp clusters to the west of Leintwardine either settled in one decisive engagement, followed by (Herefordshire) and in the Walton basin. harrying operations akin to that pursued by the army in the Frere was of the opinion that some, such as the camp at aftermath of Mons Graupius, or the polities followed an Brampton Bryan (Herefordshire), signified the army of the independent course of action which led to a much more Claudio-Neronian era ‘being engaged in a wide sweep through protracted phase of operations by the Roman army. The latter the hills, mopping up whatever resistance was encountered’ will in all probability have left a legacy of marching-camps of (Frere 1987b, 70); a policy which eventually led to the modest size, each representing a localised base of operations. establishment of garrison posts to control those areas overrun, When war-leaders such as Caratacus were able to temporarily as seems to be the case with the forts at Jay Lane unite the tribes, they were undoubtedly under pressure to (Herefordshire) and Hindwell Farm. Such broad strategic achieve a swift and successful outcome based upon a decisive objectives as the seizure of low-lying, fertile tracts with a view engagement, since it is unlikely that a confederate force would to establishing bases to control centres of native population have been capable of protracted operations due to the may, however, have been secondary, since the camp cluster in problems of supply. The stand taken by Caratacus somewhere the Walton Basin suggests a desire to penetrate the uplands to in Wales illustrates the problem and the risk presented by such the west of the Basin into the region of the upper Wye and the a policy, whilst any Roman general worth his salt would have broad upland plain to the S of the later fort of Castell Collen. deliberately sought such a confrontation. The same region could have been reached by means of a If we return to the body of evidence itself, then what can the tributary of the Teme, passing over the headwaters of the River distribution of marching-camps tell us about campaigning Aran. In this instance such operations could have been planned routes, Roman strategy and the nature of the opposition? to sever links between Rome’s chief adversaries in the region, Several writers have commented upon this matter, extending the Silures and the Ordovices. the debate into those geographical areas where camps are Jarrett speculated upon the possibility that first century AD presently unknown or unlikely to be manifest anyway, since at campaigning routes might be echoed in the pattern of the early least some elements of the army were transported by sea. We twentieth century rail and road network in Wales and the are informed that Tiberian campaigns in Germany certainly Marches and, thus, compared it with the distribution of involved the movement of at least part of the army by sea temporary camps and permanent installations (Jarrett 1994a). (Tacitus Annals I, 69), as did Agricolan operations in Scotland, He was, thus, able to add a new dimension to the debate. In the and the existence of a maritime ‘base’ at Sea Mills (Manning N he speculated as to whether the camp at Penrhos might have 2002, 40) could be construed as evidence for elements of the been linked with that at Whittington as part of the operation Claudio-Neronian as well as the Flavian army being moved by against the Deceangli in AD 48, the former lying close to the sea along the S Wales seaboard. town of Corwen, a key junction for rail links N towards Ruthin St Joseph periodically updated his views on the issue of and the Vale of Clwyd, and a line thrusting SW towards Bala campaigning routes according to the rate of camp discovery and the temporary camp and large fort at Llanfor. In the case (St Joseph 1973, 241-44; 1977, 145-8), for example following of the latter we may note the existence of a natural corridor the discovery of the camps at Penrhos and Llanfor I, whilst from the upper reaches of the Dee valley to the southern individuals such as Sheppard Frere, G. D. B. Jones, M. G. margin of the Snowdonia massif. Again, an approach via the Jarrett and W. H. Manning speculated upon the same in their Tanat valley and across the Berwyn was mooted, but he was at analyses of the distribution of temporary camps, campaign something of a loss to explain the approach to Anglesey since bases and auxiliary forts. St Joseph was well aware of the the region was bereft of camps. He suggested that the course importance of camp clusters at certain key points (‘gathering- of the A5 was a better guide to the Anglesey campaigns of AD grounds’ to use Maxwell’s term), particularly in the area 60 and 77, rather than a coastal route via Chester, the lower around the legionary fortress at Wroxeter and in the Teme Clwyd and Conwy valleys. Insofar as the central Marches and

63 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 34

mid-Wales is concerned, he considered that the Walton Basin southern Herefordshire and Radnorshire, at Boatside Farm, camps indicated a line of advance via the route of the A44, Clyro, in a region where the Wye valley, debouching from the whilst the cluster of camps in the Teme valley suggested the hills, offers a practical route into the heartland of Wales. We possibility of an advance upstream to Knighton and thence on must conclude that temporary camps must formerly have to the upper Wye near Rhayader. Again he saw the Severn existed in these areas, but their remains await discovery. In this valley as a key operational route, the forts at Forden, Llwyn-y- respect a search for such in the vicinity of early permanent brain (Caersws I) and Caersws II signifying such an axis of military installations, such as Kenchester (see Gazetteer p. 153-4 advance, which may then have seen Roman troops pushing for the possible camp at Byford), Clifford, Monmouth, Usk, over the watershed to the coast. He was much taken by Boon Abergavenny and the Golden Valley forts at Blackbush Farm and Brewer’s (Boon & Brewer 1981) suggestion of early and Castlefield Farm might prove rewarding, as the discovery military establishments being founded on the coast (e.g. of the camp at Boatside Farm, Clyro, just across the county Pennal) with water-borne supplies being brought from the boundary in Radnorshire demonstrates. The same holds true of Mawddach estuary, up the Wnion valley to the fort and ‘stores- the Usk valley in general, with not a single temporary camp base’ at Llanfor. Jarrett was also aware of the significance of being known until Arosfa Garreg and Y Pigwn are reached on the Wye valley as a campaigning route, with its large forts at the very uppermost margins of the same. Its flanks from the Clyro and Clifford, and postulated a route up the Wye as well vicinity of the Neronian legionary fortress at Usk to the W of as SE towards Abergavenny and Monmouth on the basis of the Brecon Gaer must hold clues as to links between the above- two forts in the Herefordshire Golden Valley at Blackbush named camps and the starting-points for these campaigns Farm and Castlefield Farm. As far as the Usk valley route was somewhere to the E. The Vale of Glamorgan too has potential concerned, on the basis of location of the camps on Y Pigwn in this respect, not only as an obvious route for an advance into he envisaged combined operations with troops moving NE up W Wales, but also as a source of information concerning the the Tywi to meet another force advancing W along the Usk. He deployment of Rome’s armies in Siluria in both a pre-Flavian also postulated a pre-Flavian date for such operations on the and early Flavian context. After all, the camps situated in the grounds of the supposedly pre-Flavian origins of the fort at uplands to the north of the Vale, Twyn-y-briddallt, Pen-y- Llandovery. Finally, he envisaged another early campaigning coedcae and Blaen-cwm Bach, Carn Caca and Coelbren, route from Gloucester to Cardiff and beyond, based upon the represent only part of a story which perforce must begin in the pre-Flavian origin of the first military bases at Cardiff. lowlands. With the exception of Coelbren, their location away On the basis of the analysis of the early Roman road system from known Flavian forts suggests that they could be early, in Manning (2004, 64-5) considered two further campaigning which case early Flavian camps could exist in the vicinity of routes into southern Wales, both commencing at Gloucester; forts such as Penydarren, Gelligaer, Caerphilly and the newly- the first via Sutton Grandison, E of Hereford, and thence W discovered Caergwanaf. towards the Wye from Kenchester; the second via Weston Jarrett’s comments about the possibility of military under Penyard to Monmouth and thence Usk. operations utilising the Tywi valley, though in a north-easterly It will be apparent that all of the above authors utilised a direction, as part of a pincer movement to separate the Silures variety of evidence in order to reconstruct likely campaigning from the other tribes (Jarrett 1964b, 29), require consideration routes, sometimes to the near exclusion of temporary camps. in respect of the discovery of forts at Carmarthen (James 2003) Whilst such an inclusive approach is commendable it does and Dynefor Park, Llandeilo (Hughes 2003), and the strategic have dangers insofar as the linking of semi-permanent road which runs for a distance of at least 40km to the west of /permanent bases and campaigning routes is concerned, since Carmarthen, hinting at the presence of forts possibly near St the former are inherently likely to represent a process of Clears and the western Cleddau (James 1990). This was a consolidation based upon extensive geographical knowledge, region formerly regarded as occupied by a pro-Roman tribe, if not map-making, whereas the latter may represent hesitant the Demetae (Nash-Williams 1969), but the discovery of the steps in that direction. At the same time the process can above fort sites suggests otherwise. There is, thus, a high highlight imperfections in our archaeological data. For probability that temporary camps also exist, and it is the example, given the literary evidence for the ferocity of the vicinity of garrison bases such as Dynefor Park, Llandovery, fighting between the Silures and the Romans it is impossible Pumsaint, Llanio and Trawscoed, together with the corridors to escape the inevitable conclusion that the surviving of the linking strategic road network, that offers the best temporary camps are sometimes wholly unrepresentative of opportunity of discovery. those which were occupied. This is particularly true of A broadly comparable situation to that in SW Wales exists Monmouthshire, Gloucestershire and Herefordshire, where in the NE, the territory of the Decangi (sic), and in temporary camps have proved elusive. For example, only a neighbouring Cheshire, with Chester being situated in the solitary probable camp is known on the border between territory of the Cornovii. Campaigned against in AD 48 and

64 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 35

not heard of thereafter, though lead-silver deposits in utilisation of the minor river valleys of the Mule, Onny and Deceanglian lands were certainly exploited in AD 74, if not in Camlad, probably from the vicinity of Stretford Bridge, itself ca.AD 60, the region not only lacks certain evidence of a on the main N-S military road linking Wroxeter and Usk. One military presence (though there are hints of such at Ruthin) can only guess at the objective, especially with the except on its margins. Here the campaign base at Rhyn Park establishment of a Flavian fort at Pentrehyling next to the and the large fort which succeeds it (see Gazetteer p. 155) are Brompton camps. Nothing can be added to the earlier important pointers, both lying close to, if not within, their comments made concerning the use of the Teme valley as a territory, but are essentially undated. However, with the route into mid-Wales, with the area immediately W of exception of the temporary camps at Pen Plaenau and Penrhos, Leintwardine representing another probable gathering ground, which may themselves be connected with a campaign directed other than to echo St Joseph’s reservations about the elsewhere, there are no certain indicators as to the activities of difficulties presented by that narrow, riverine route to the W of the Roman army in a tribal territory known to have offered modern Knighton with the upland mass of Radnor Forest resistance to Rome. The natural corridor of the Vale of Clwyd, barring easy routes beyond (St Joseph 1969). However, such though offering potentially fruitful ground for aerial views need to be tempered in the light of the undeviating photography, has hitherto proved somewhat disappointing, at nature of some of the routes taken by Roman armies; that over least insofar as the valley floor is concerned, a predominantly the Berwyns being a case in point. The same holds true of the pastoral regime inhibiting the appearance of crop-marks, gathering ground exemplified by the camps further to the S in though its flanks have proved more productive (Manley 1991). the Walton Basin, yet these and the Roman road running W of In this respect surveillance of its margins together with the the fort at Hindwell Farm demonstrate the existence of a route coastal strip, whose geomorphological history is known to be around the southern margin of Radnor Forest, either directed complex (Davidson 2002 passim), together with the corridor SW towards modern Builth Wells or NW towards the Ithon of the strategic road linking Chester and Caerhun in the valley and the upland plain around Llandrindod Wells. Support Conwy valley, may ultimately prove to be rewarding. It is for both routes comes in the form of forts at Colwyn Castle and gratifying to note that the discovery of Pen Plaenau in an Castell Collen, the former possibly of pre-Flavian origin (Frere intermediate position firms up St Joseph’s (St Joseph 1973, 2004). The critical nature of this region bordering the upper 244) views concerning the links between Penrhos and Wye is graphically illustrated by the appearance of camps Whittington, all three forming part of one operation. More lying relatively close to one another (Esgair Perfedd, Trefal serious is the continuing absence of evidence for pre- or early- and Cwm Nant). There is also a high probability that some, Flavian military activity in the area to the S and W of the such as Cwm Nant, and Beulah to the S, lying close to the Flavian fortress at Chester, surely a significant area for the corridors of Roman roads, may illustrate routes taken by marshalling of forces to penetrate N Wales via the coast; a Flavian (?) armies; routes that were later consolidated by the route which in the literature seems to have been neglected in construction of a road. favour of the inland route via the upper Dee. Little can be added to the discussion pertaining to the thin Mid-Wales and the central Marches have proved a more scatter of camps in NW Wales, other than to point to the fact fruitful ground for the investigation of campaigning routes and that three, Derwin Bach and Tomen y Mur East I and II, lie tactics. The significance of Wroxeter as a gathering-ground for close to forts whose origins are manifestly Flavian and thus Roman armies, whether in a pre-fortress or contemporary probably belong to that stage in military operations which saw context, has been enhanced with the discovery of the large the reduction of that mountain fastness in the first year of Cn. camp at Cound Hall, the only one to be discovered on the SW Iulius Agricola’s governorship (AD 77 or 78). Only one, Pen- bank of the Severn. Should the Clawdd Coch and Abertanat y-gwryd, is known in the heart of Snowdonia and illustrates (see Gazetteer p. 156-8) sites prove to be those of temporary the fact that there was no sanctuary for dissidents. As for the camps then the most likely starting-point for such operations, routes taken by these forces we can only hazard a guess. directed towards the Tanat valley, a tributary of the Severn, is Whilst Derwin Bach and Tomen y Mur East I and II could the Wroxeter region. The same is probably true of the origins have been established by forces circumscribing the Snowdon of the small camp at Thornbury, close to the fort at Forden, massif, either from the Arfon plain to the N or coming from the where other temporary camps may lurk in the palimpsest of S along the corridor of the Roman road from the Mawddach, it crop-marks in the vicinity of the fort. The upper reaches of the is equally possible that the latter camps relate to forces moving Severn from Forden to the Caersws basin again exemplifies a from the SE, the region of Bala Lake; difficult country, but camp lacuna, which, given the location of the successive forts now known to be traversed by a road linking the forts at at Llwyn-y-brain and Caersws, is surely illusory. To the S the Tomen y Mur and Caer Gai. As for the camp at Pen-y-gwryd camps at Glanmiheli and Brompton probably indicate a there are several alternative routes for its founders: from the campaigning route not from Wroxeter up the Severn but the Caernarfonshire coastal strip to the NW and through the

65 4-ROMAN 32-66 24/8/06 4:54 am Page 36

Llanberis pass, or from the NE up the valley of the Llugwy and Tomen y Mur East, are to be ascribed to it. The case for such through modern Betws-y-Coed and the Vale of Conwy, or a gate type being associated specifically with Legio II Adiutrix from the SE along the route of the modern A5. That leaves us has, however, been weakened as a result of recent geophysical with two manifest campaigns which presently lack survey which suggests that the fort at Caergwanaf archaeological data; those involving Anglesey. The first, in AD (Glamorganshire) and Fort II at Dynefor Park (Carmarthenshire) 60, Tacitus informs us, involved the building of flat-bottomed may also possess gates of ‘parrot’s beak’ type. boats, presumably within a camp and a coastal one at that. The If specific legionary roles were allocated by a commander- defeat of the defenders was also followed by moves to garrison in-chief, then how might this be demonstrated in the case of the island, and consequently the presence of a camp or camps legions which showed no inclination towards innovation in might be expected. The seizure of the island in AD 77 or 78 terms of camp morphology, particularly gate type? All that we will also presumably have involved camp-building. The discovery might safely conclude is that prior to the foundation of the of these putative establishments on the mainland and on the fortress at Chester the legions based upon Wroxeter and Usk island will prove a rich reward for the future researcher. from the mid-50s to the mid-60s, Legio XIV Gemina and Legio Finally, in the light of recent observations by G. Maxwell, XX Valeria respectively, (with Legio XX taking over at let us consider the issue of tactics in relation to the size and Wroxeter following the departure of Legio XIV ca.AD 67) are identity of the forces employed in field-operations, with likely to have played the key operational roles, with their specific reference to the legions known to have operated spheres of responsibility being broadly defined as N Wales and within our region. Maxwell (2004, 85) has suggested that on a the northern marches for the former and S Wales and the comparative basis the tactics and methodology practised by southern Marches for the latter. For major operations, of Roman commanders in first-century AD Scotland differed course, detachments from the other British legions, IX from those of their predecessors in Wales and the Marches; Hispana and II Augusta, may well have been summoned, and that, furthermore, the more frequent occurrence of very though their role will have been subordinate to that of the key large camps in Scotland, coupled with their more varied formations. The net result is that in the Marches it is morphology, offers clues as to the possible identity of the impossible to distinguish marching camps which are specific builders. In this respect he identifies those equipped with the to Legio XIV or Legio XX, simply because not only does the exotic ‘Stracathro’ type of gate – ‘where clavicular terminals region exhibit great diversity in camp size and morphology, are complemented by an oblique external traverse’ – as most but also because the majority of these are larger than those likely the products of Legio II Adiutrix, based at Chester from camps considered to have been designed to accommodate a ca.AD 71 until its departure from Britannia ca.AD 86 or 87. legionary battle-group. Only with the onset of Flavian Additionally he suggests (Maxwell 1998) that the closely operations under Frontinus, and the transfer of Legio II comparable distribution pattern of forts provided with sharply Augusta from Exeter to Caerleon, may there be an opportunity, inturned multiple ditch terminals at the gates (for which he has as Maxwell (2004, 85) points out, to distinguish camps coined the term ‘parrot’s beak’-type gateways) could be established by battle-groups of approximately legionary construed as showing that the legion was also responsible for size in S Wales, a region which might be reasonably the supervision of the building of permanent forts. Whilst no considered to fall within the compass of this legion’s Stracathro-type camps have been so far identified within our operational zone. However, such camps (i.e. of ca.10ha region, there is a solitary example of a fort with ‘parrot’s beak’ enclosed) which we would consider to be most probably type gates at Pen Llystyn in Caernarfonshire (Hogg 1968), a foundations of the period AD 73/4-77/78, such as Plas- site whose foundation is most likely to be Agricolan, and a y-gors and Twyn-y-briddallt, are rare and share no possible example at Coelbren (see p.116). It is, therefore, not distinctive common features other than clavicular gates. impossible that the nearby small camp at Derwin Bach (see Most of the temporary camps in S and mid-Wales are as p. 98) was built under Legio II Adiutrix’s imprimatur, if not divergent in size as their Marcher comparators. We must, by a force which included a vexillation of the legion. therefore, conclude that at present there are no convincing Indeed, given the relative proximity of its base at Chester, grounds for assigning camps within our region to we might expect that this unit, or detachments thereof, played specific legions on the basis of morphology, and that the a key role in the final conquest of north Wales, and that other apportioning of tactical roles to the legions, either singly or in camps in Snowdonia, such as those at Pen-y-gwryd and combination, remains a matter of reasonable speculation.

66