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The Strategy and Politics of Repositioning U.S. Military Bases in Europe 79 Eastward Bound: The Strategy and Politics of Repositioning U.S. Military Bases in Europe 79 5 EASTWARD BOUND: THE STRATEGY AND POLITICS OF REPOSITIONING U.S. MILITARY BASES IN EUROPE Todd W. Fields This article examines the strategic rationale and political im- plications of the U.S. Department of Defense’s proposal to reposition U.S. military bases in Europe. The Pentagon’s plans call for a withdrawal of U.S. bases and personnel from Ger- many and the creation of various smaller, more flexible bases in Central and Eastern Europe. While the removal of U.S. forces from Germany is appropriate given the absence of an imminent security threat to Europe, revamping the European basing structure in the midst of current trans-Atlantic tensions presents formidable political challenges. Given the impact that base realignment is likely to have on U.S. relations with Ger- many, Russia, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States must exercise a deft diplomatic touch—balancing the pursuit of its strategic interests with the preservation of its regional relationships and alliances.1 The United States is presently in the midst of the most comprehensive shift in its global military presence in the last fifty years. Driven by a desire to develop an integrated global presence that meets the security challenges of the twenty-first century, the U.S. military is revamping its forward bas- ing strategies in key regions throughout the world. Since September 11, 2001, new American military installations have emerged along the “arc Todd W. Fields is a Master of Arts candidate at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University ([email protected]). Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 15/Spring 2004 Copyright © 2004, the Trustees of Princeton University 7 http://www.princeton.edu/~jpia Eastward Bound: 80 Todd W. Fields The Strategy and Politics of Repositioning U.S. Military Bases in Europe 81 of instability,” stretching from Northern Africa to Southeast Asia, in countries including Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Djibouti, and Iraq. Pentagon officials are also hinting at the possibility of establishing future military facilities in Australia, the Philippines, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Ghana, and Mali (Jaffe 2003a). Around the globe, American military power is also on the move. The 10,000 military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia at the height of the recent war in Iraq have been redeployed to Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. In late spring 2003, the Pentagon withdrew 2,500 of the 3,000 troops stationed at Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey. Additionally, the Pentagon is currently crafting plans to pull U.S. troops out of the demilitarized zone that separates North and South Korea and to move the bulk of its operations on the Korean peninsula southward, out of the present range of North Korean weaponry (Demick 2003). In Europe, a significant initiative to move U.S. bases in Western Europe to new NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe is in its beginning stages. Still a remnant of defunct Cold War strategic reali- ties, the U.S. military’s basing structure in Europe is due for an overhaul. Alterations are particularly warranted in Germany, where over 80,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed, despite the fact that Germany and Western Europe face no imminent security threat. The initiative to reposition U.S. bases in Europe comes, however, at an especially uncertain time for the trans-Atlantic alliance, one that some have characterized as the nadir of post-World War II U.S.-European rela- tions. Although the U.S.-European relationship has never been as tranquil as some Atlanticists have romanticized it to be, trans-Atlantic relations have recently been repeatedly strained. Tensions have emerged in the last several years over issues such as the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the preemptive war in Iraq. This last disagreement exposed a vast rift between U.S. and European perceptions regarding the international security threat posed by transnational terrorism and the appropriate use of force in international relations. Altering the U.S. military presence in Europe has the potential to ex- acerbate an already tense trans-Atlantic relationship. While the Pentagon views the geostrategic imperative of retooling the U.S. overseas basing presence as outweighing this potential hazard, the political considerations inherent in the proposed restructuring of the European basing structure must be carefully factored into the plans for any realignment. With U.S. troops slated to begin moving as early as this summer, now is the time to Eastward Bound: 80 Todd W. Fields The Strategy and Politics of Repositioning U.S. Military Bases in Europe 81 carefully examine the implications of base realignment for U.S.-German relations, U.S.-Russian relations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO). THE STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR EUROPEAN BASE REALIGNMENT The present global realignment of U.S. forces is being driven by the Pentagon’s growing belief that the current overseas basing structure is inadequate to address the requirements of the twenty-first century se- curity environment. The main security threat in this environment is not a major strategic competitor such as the Soviet Union, but a variety of asymmetric threats: transnational terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); failed and failing states; and rogue states. In particular, the potential confluence of these asymmetric threats—rogue nuclear states cooperating with transnational terrorist groups to attack the United States—presents the gravest of national security threats (Bush 2002). Citing September 11 as a precedent, the Bush administration does not believe that all of these threats can be deterred and seeks the capacity to preemptively eliminate them before they materialize.2 Commenting on the Pentagon’s threat assessment, Andy Hoehn, deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy, stressed that the “unprecedented destructive power of terrorists—and the recognition that you will have to deal with them before they deal with you—means we will have to be out acting in the world in places that are very unfamiliar to us. We will have to make them familiar” (Jaffe 2003a). To achieve this familiarity, the American security perimeter is being expanded to encompass nearly the entire planet. In order to patrol this global perimeter to address, and potentially preempt, emerging asymmetric threats, the U.S. military is evolving into a “global cavalry of the twenty-first century,” possessing a “worldwide network of frontier forts” to rapidly project decisive power into any region in the world (Donnelly and Serchuk 2003). At present, the U.S. global force structure is ill-equipped to meet these ambitious demands, with 80 percent of U.S. soldiers in Europe stationed in Germany and 75 percent of U.S. troops in the Pacific congregated in Japan and South Korea. To achieve a broader geopresence, the U.S. military is pursuing a holistic transforma- tion of its global posture by enhancing its force capabilities, regional alli- ances, and basing structures. This in-depth transformation aims to create a lighter, faster, and more flexible set of force options for the Pentagon to rapidly and simultaneously address a variety of geographically diverse asymmetric threats.3 Eastward Bound: 82 Todd W. Fields The Strategy and Politics of Repositioning U.S. Military Bases in Europe 83 A revamped forward basing strategy, emphasizing long-term military access to countries over long-term military presence within countries, is at the heart of the Pentagon’s transformation efforts. The movement to realign U.S. bases in Europe reflects this strategic priority and would bring to fruition a policy that has been considered by the Pentagon in various forms since the end of the Cold War. The timeline to implement these changes was accelerated in the spring of 2003 by the following events related to the war in Iraq: 1. The unified German, French, and Belgian opposition to the U.S.-led war effort. 2. The denial of access to Austrian rail lines to transport U.S. troops and equipment en route to Iraq, slowing the overall theater deploy- ment. 3. The Swiss and Austrian denial of overflight permission—complicat- ing U.S. flights from airbases in Germany and Britain to the Middle East and Italy. 4. The intentional delays of the Italian government in permitting the Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade, based at Aviano Air Base, to deploy to the Iraqi theater. 5. The Turkish government’s refusal to grant the United States permis- sion to use Turkish territory as a staging ground to open a northern front against Iraq. All of these developments brought into sharp relief the political and logistical limitations of deploying U.S. forces to the Middle East from bases in Germany and Italy. Furthermore, they raised questions in the Pentagon about the reliability of U.S. allies in Europe and the degree of flexibility the U.S military possesses to quickly access and deploy its military assets based in the European theater.4 Given the importance of speed of deployment in the current security environment, the operational successes of temporary U.S. bases established in Bulgaria and Romania in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the possibility of additional U.S. preemptive military actions, and the widespread European aversion to preemptive operations, the Pentagon has expedited its rebasing efforts to ensure that its military assets in Europe can be fully and rapidly utilized in future operations. Eastward Bound: 82 Todd W. Fields The Strategy and Politics of Repositioning U.S. Military Bases in Europe 83 In April 2003, General James Jones, commander of the U.S. Euro- pean Command (EUCOM), began unveiling his vision for a retooled and transformed U.S.
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