The Preemptive Paradox: the Rise of Great Powers & Management of The
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Syracuse University SURFACE Dissertations - ALL SURFACE December 2017 The Preemptive Paradox: The Rise of Great Powers & Management of the International System Jeffrey Treistman Syracuse University Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Treistman, Jeffrey, "The Preemptive Paradox: The Rise of Great Powers & Management of the International System" (2017). Dissertations - ALL. 809. https://surface.syr.edu/etd/809 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Abstract: Since the beginning of the modern state system only a few select nations have achieved great power status. But what can account for their rise? The presence of existing great powers would suggest that aspiring states should encounter formidable obstacles that would render their success implausible. In some cases extant great powers sought to counter the rise of a new peer, but the historical record also reveals that incumbents sometimes did not contest the rise of potential competitors. Thus, great powers have pursued two divergent strategies: contestation and nonintervention. How then do great powers decide on which policy to implement? This dissertation advances the argument that a great power’s military strategy is premised on its national interests. It argues that the reason incumbent powers rarely preempt the rise of aspiring powers is because of the low level of threat they pose to states. Incumbent great powers are far more concerned about contemporary rival powers since they possess the immediate capacity to undermine a state’s interests. The Preemptive Paradox: The Rise of Great Powers & Management of the International System by Jeffrey Philip Treistman B.A., University of Colorado, 2003 M.P.P., Harvard University, 2010 M.A., Syracuse University, 2012 Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. Syracuse University December 2017 © Jeffrey Philip Treistman I. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 II. Preemptive Paradox Explained .................................................................................. 21 III. Prussia & Frederick the Great ................................................................................... 69 IV. United States & the Missing War ............................................................................ 118 V. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 161 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 173 iv 1 I. Introduction Since the beginning of the modern state system only a few select nations have achieved great power status.1 But what can account for their rise? The presence of existing great powers would suggest that aspiring states should encounter formidable obstacles that would render their success implausible.2 To be sure, existing great powers have an inherent security interest to foil the rise of peer competitors (Mearsheimer 2001, 236-237). The emergence of new powers is also assumed to usher 3 in geopolitical uncertainty and instability as a result of systemic transformation. It is therefore puzzling to find that many chose not to contest the rise of a new peer or take any countervailing action whatsoever. This dissertation therefore seeks to answer the following question: how do great powers respond to rising challengers? All great powers should have been compelled to thwart the rise of potential competitors given the threat they pose within the anarchical 4 international system. As a state augments its power it becomes more capable of launching a major war in order to satisfy its interests. “Simply put, the stronger and richer a state becomes, the more influence it wants and the more willing and able it will be to fight to further its interests” (Schweller 1999, 3). A counterstrategy would be to contest the rise of aspiring states as power differentials predict that incumbent forces should be fully capable of blocking new entrants. Even if a rising power was benign and 1 The state system is conventionally dated to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. 2 Throughout this dissertation, I refer to a state that seeks great power status as a candidate great power (CGP) or an ‘aspirant.’ Meanwhile, the term ‘incumbent’ will often be used to refer to an existing great power (GP). 3 Zakaria (1998, 3) remarks that “almost every new addition to the ranks of the great powers has resulted in global instability and war.” 4 This notion is even reflected in other fields such as industrial organization theory: “Because competition destroys industry profits, an incumbent has more incentive to deter entry than an entrant has to enter” (Tirole 1989, 350). 2 sought to maintain the status quo, existing great powers can not be certain of future intentions. Although a state that aspires to achieve eventual great power status may not represent an immediate threat, long term security risks remain unpredictable. There is some evidence supporting this argument. Austria sought to counter Prussian expansionism just as Russia attempted to suppress increases in both Prussian and Japanese power. But the historical record also reveals that incumbents sometimes did not contest the rise of potential competitors. For example, Britain and France both opted not to take any action as Prussia emerged as a great power in the mid-eighteenth century and instead focused on balancing against one another. In other cases, great powers demonstrated indifference to the emergence of a new peer. For example, the United States achieved regional hegemony without encountering any resistance from the existing powers. Thus, great powers have pursued two divergent strategies: contestation and nonintervention. How then do great powers decide on which policy to implement? This dissertation advances the argument that a great power’s military strategy is premised on its national interests. Threats to existing interests or opportunities to advance its objectives influence a state’s military strategy. In this regard, existing great powers are most concerned about threats emanating from rival powers since they inherently possess the immediate capacity to undermine the security of others. In contrast, the rise of a new peer is less of a concern given they possess relatively weaker military capabilities. Thus, this dissertation will argue that the reason incumbent powers rarely preempt the rise of aspiring powers is because of the low level of threat they pose to states. Incumbent great powers are far more concerned about 3 contemporary rival powers since they possess the immediate capacity to undermine a state’s interests. The most perplexing task is providing an account for the absence of war between existing great powers and rising peers which alter the global distribution of power. In many respects, the absence of war is more puzzling and difficult to explain than the occurrence of war. “Identifying nonevents and then finding evidence to explain why they didn’t happen is challenging, and in some cases quixotic,” argues Jeffrey Meiser (2015, xi). Indeed, an objective of Meiser’s research is to provide an account as to why the most powerful state today – the United States – never faced any opposition to its initial rise to great power status. This dissertation not only builds up existing research concerning the absence of war with the United States but briefly examines other nonevents such as the failure to prevent the rise of China in the mid-twentieth century. There is a scarcity of research as to how existing powers responded to the rise of new peers. Related theories concern great power reaction to the hegemonic aspirations of their contemporaries but do not address earlier periods of relative growth. For example, much analysis is devoted to Bismark, Wilhelm II, and Hitler revisionism but not before such hegemonic attempts. Given this lacuna in the literature, my project seeks to shed light on the foreign policy decisions of great powers (GP) toward rising peers or what I call candidate great powers (CGP). These candidate great powers are marked by increases in military power, broad regional or global aspirations, and more assertive behavior on the world stage. How extant great powers respond to the emergence of these candidate great powers can help us understand varying incidents of peace and war. 4 An overarching goal of this study is to assess the general dynamics between great powers and rising states. Current theories of international relations do not provide adequate explanation of the relationship between these two state types. Most theories are restricted to interactions among great powers themselves and omit candidate great powers from consideration. Therefore, a fundamental objective of my research is to develop a generalizable theory of relations between great powers and candidate great powers. The temporal scope of the study focuses on the emergence of new great powers since the formation of the modern state system (conventionally dating back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648) and without regard to geographic limitations.