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European Monetary Union European Monetary Union his century, which saw two world wars devastate the nations of Europe, will likely conclude with the willing surrender of an Timportant national prerogative in the name of European unity. On January 1, 1999, eleven nations in Europe plan to begin a process of replacing their national currencies with the Euro. This event is at once both unprecedented and part of a development in Europe that stretches back over a quarter of a century. The adoption of the Euro is unprece- dented; never before have so many countries surrendered their national monies for a common currency at a single stroke. In this way, the launching of the Euro means that European countries will be entering uncharted waters. But we have some landmarks that can guide our understanding of the likely consequences of the adoption of the Euro, since European Monetary Union (EMU) is the latest stage in a historical process that began in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods Michael W. Klein system in the early 1970s. As shown in the box “Movement toward a Common European Currency,” European monetary union has pro- gressed in fits and starts since that time. Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, and Associate Professor of International Economics, Fletcher Europe in the Bretton Woods System School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. This discussion is based The initial moves toward European monetary union began during on a presentation to the Bank’s Board the final days of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in the early of Directors on January 8, 1998. The 1970s. In the dollar-centered Bretton Woods system, which began after author thanks Lynn Browne, Jeff World War II, currencies of all major industrial countries had a fixed price Fuhrer, Jane Little, Geoff Tootell, and in terms of the United States dollar and the dollar, in turn, had a fixed Robert Triest for useful comments and price of $35 per ounce of gold. The system also fixed intra-European Maurice Obstfeld for helpful discus- exchange rates since, for example, the fixed exchange rates of 4.5 French sion. Steven Fay provided helpful re- francs per dollar and 2.8 deutsche marks per dollar implied an exchange search assistance. rate of 4.5/2.8 5 1.6 French francs per deutsche mark. Movement toward a Common European Currency I. Bretton Woods Era: 1945–1973 3/1971 Werner Report calls for European system of central banks. II. Between Bretton Woods and the European Monetary System, 1973–1979 3/1973 Bretton Woods dollar-peg ends. Snake-in-the-tunnel, then floating snake. III. European Monetary System (EMS) Begins, March 1979 3/1979 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) established: 62.25% bands (Italy 66% bands). Capital controls pervasive. Wide inflation differentials. Eleven realignments from 3/79 to 1/87. IV. Rocky Road to a Common Currency 1987 “New EMS”—fewer capital controls, no realignments, inflation convergence. 1989 Delors Committee sets goal of a common currency. 1989–90 Expansion of ERM to include Spain (1989) and United Kingdom (1990). (Portugal joins in 1992.) 7/1990 German reunification. 12/1991 Maastricht Treaty. 1992 ERM crisis. Denmark votes “no.” German interest rate hike. 9/92 speculative attacks— Finnish markka depreciates, Swedish interest rate rises, United Kingdom and Italy drop out of ERM. Peseta devalued and Spain reimposes capital controls. Later, escudo, punt devalued and Swedish krona and Norwegian krone float. Spring 1993 Denmark votes “yes with opt-out clause” on Maastricht Treaty. British Parliament narrowly votes for ratification. 8/1993 ERM bands widened to 615% in wake of speculative attacks. 1994 Last capital controls removed. The European Monetary Institute, forerunner of the European Central Bank, established. 1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden join European Union. 1996 Italy rejoins EMS with target bands, at devalued rate. The Bretton Woods system came under increasing did not wish to follow the United States’ lead toward pressure in the late 1960s and early 1970s as policies higher inflation. A fixed exchange rate system requires pursued by the United States diverged from policies each member to pursue a common monetary policy.1 preferred by other countries. The United States faced rising unemployment and an increasing current ac- 1 The link between monetary policy and the exchange rate is count deficit at that time. In response, monetary policy through the interest parity relationship, which states that the in the United States became more expansionary. This difference in interest rates across two countries must equal the was at odds with the policy stance required for the expected rate of depreciation of their bilateral exchange rate in order to avoid unexploited profit opportunities from arising. Therefore, smooth maintenance of the fixed exchange rate ar- interest rates must be equal across countries in an exchange rate rangement, since authorities in European countries regime where exchange rates are credibly fixed and the expected 4 March/April 1998 New England Economic Review This tension between the internal goals of the country thought to be important for promoting trade in goods at the center of a fixed exchange rate system, in this and services and capital flows within Europe. Finally, case the United States, and the demands of the ex- exchange rate movements within Europe raised the change rate system itself is, as we will see, a common costs of the agricultural price supports mandated by theme in international monetary economics. the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, In the Bretton Woods system, the tension between costs that made up a significant share of the European the policies of the United States and the desires of Union’s budget. other countries led to speculative pressures against The first efforts to fix intra-European exchange the dollar.2 In an effort to address these pressures rates after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system while still maintaining fixed exchange rates, a dollar had limited membership and were short-lived. The devaluation was negotiated in December 1971. Market “snake-in-the-tunnel” instituted in 1972 attempted to pressure against the dollar continued, however, and in establish bands for European currencies of 64.5 per- March 1973 the Bretton Woods system collapsed. cent around a central dollar rate. This evolved into the “floating snake” with the advent of generalized float- ing in March 1973. This exchange rate arrangement Between Bretton Woods and the European Monetary System The collapse of the Bretton Woods system freed dollar exchange rates to be determined by market forces. This opened the door for other bilateral ex- Tension between the internal change rates also to be determined by market forces goals of the country rather than by government fiat. But market determi- nation of exchange rates raised concerns in Europe. at the center of a fixed Even before the demise of the Bretton Woods system, exchange rate system plans were being made to limit intra-European ex- change rate movements. A committee headed by and the demands of the system Pierre Werner, prime minister and finance minister of itself is a common theme in Luxembourg, began work in 1970 on a report in which international monetary economics. it proposed fixed intra-European exchange rates and a federated system of European central banks. This report was adopted by the European Council in March 1971.3 A common monetary policy was seen as a way to enhance Europe’s role in the world monetary sys- tem. Fixed intra-European exchange rates were also placed the full burden of adjustment on weak-cur- rency countries, which had to respond with restrictive policies, rather than mandating a more even distribu- rate of depreciation is zero. Theoretically, fiscal policy could be tion across all members. The “snake” also did not employed in addition to monetary policy, or even instead of it, to set interest rates and maintain fixed exchange rates. In practice, how- provide for adequate financing to weak-currency cen- ever, monetary policy is more quickly and more easily altered than tral banks during times when their currencies were fiscal policy and therefore it is the tool with which authorities being widely sold. Partially as a consequence of these directly influence exchange rates. 2 Investors face a “one-way bet” against central banks when factors, Great Britain, France, and Italy left the “snake” they perceive an increased likelihood of a devaluation. If the arrangement early on. By 1979 only Germany, the currency does in fact fall in value, then investors who have bet Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, against the central bank by selling the potentially weakening currency will realize capital gains. These investors will not suffer and Luxembourg remained members of the European corresponding capital losses, however, if the exchange rate peg is fixed exchange rate system.4 maintained. 3 The European Council consists of the heads of state or government of the members of the European Union. The European Community, the forerunner to the present-day European Union, 4 For a good discussion of exchange rate policy in Europe in the began with six signatories to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 including period leading up to and including the era of the European Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Nether- Monetary System, see Francesco Giavazzi and Alberto Giovannini, lands. In 1972 the European Community expanded with the acces- Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: The European Monetary System, The sion of Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989. March/April 1998 New England Economic Review 5 The European Monetary System and called for removing all internal barriers to trade, Planning for a Single Currency capital movements, and labor migration within Eu- rope rope by the end of 1992.
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