Strangers in Hanoi: Chinese, Americans, and the Vietnamese August Revolution of 1945 Peter M. Worthing Muskingum College

On 30 January 1946, Brig. Gen. Philip Gallagher met with representa- tives of the War and State Departments to report on his observations following his period of service in northern . General Gallagher had been in Hanoi from 22 August to 12 December 1945 as the senior advisor to the Chinese occupation force stationed in northern Indochina. At the time, he was one of a small handful of Americans who had first-hand knowledge of the independence movement that was unfolding in Vietnam. In his interview, General Gallagher offered his opinions on the situ- ation in Vietnam and the relationship between the Vietnamese, the Chinese, and the French in Hanoi. Gallagher noted that the "Annamese" were very well organized, well armed, and fully pre- pared to take to the hills to conduct guerilla warfare should the French attempt to reimpose colonial rule by force of arms. He had been im- pressed by the Vietnamese nationalist administration of Hanoi, de- spite its small numbers, and stated that , the leader of the nationalist movement, was willing to cooperate with the United States, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union in order to forestall a return of French colonial rule.' Gallagher also pointed out that the relationship between the Chi- nese occupation force and the French colonials in Hanoi was extremely tense. He went on to describe the important role he and his staff had played in mediating disputes between the Chinese and the French, restraining both sides, and helping to preserve order in and around Hanoi. His statements reveal not only the contribution Gallagher felt he and his staff had made to keeping the peace, but also the frustra- tion he feit over his assignment there. Although ostensibly neutral between all parties, the Chinese, French, and Vietnamese alike expected American assistance in achieving their goals, forcing Gallagher into

The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 6, Nos. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1997) @ Copyright 1997 by Imprint Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard L. Sharp of the Division of South- east Asian Affairs, January 30, 1946. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter cited as FRUS), 1946, The Far East, 8:16-17. greater involvement in the political struggles of Indochina than he preferred.2 General Gallagher was only one of many American mili- tary men who would experience the frustration of service in Vietnam, yet his experiences in Hanoi in 1945 reflect the extremely complicated political and international situation in Vietnam during the critical pe- riod after the end of the Pacific War and the August Revolution, in which Vietnamese nationalists seized political power in Vietnam. Studies of the Vietnamese August Revolution tend to fall into two groups, each emphasizing one key factor in explaining the success of the movement. One group stresses the historical circumstances pre- ceding the power seizure, namely the Japanese military occupation of Vietnam, the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese coup de force against the French in March 1945, and the Japanese surrender in Au- gust of that same year.3 The other group emphasizes the quality of the Viet Minh leadership and the soundness of Ho Chi Minh's strategy of combined political and military struggle.4 These two positions are by no means mutually exclusive, and for many it is a matter of giving primacy to one factor over the other. However, as David Marr points out in Vietnam 1945 (1995), the August Revolution cannot be treated as a purely Vietnamese affair.5 The scholar must view this complicated event in an international context, analyzing the roles of the various foreign actors, such as the French, the Americans, the Chinese, and the British, as well as the Vietnamese. With this in mind, this essay has two objectives. The first is to illus- trate the complexity of the situation in and the con- fusion on the part of the non-Vietnamese actors. This is accomplished through an analysis of the roles of the Chinese occupation commander, Gen. Lu Han, and his senior American advisor, Brig. Gen. Philip Gallagher. Neither man had clear instructions as to how to handle the emerging dispute between Vietnamese nationalists and French colonials. When Lu and Gallagher arrived in northern Vietnam in August 1945, they had no real idea of the situation that awaited them. Gallagher later said of the mission, "I don't think many people knew where we were, or what we were doing and I sometimes wonder if

2. Ibid., 16-18. 3. This group includes Philippe Devillers, Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 a 1952 (Paris, 1952); Stein Tonnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945 (Oslo, 1991); Kiyoko Kurusu Nitz, "Independence Without Nationalists? The Japanese and Vietnamese during the Japanese Period, 1940-1945," Journal of Asian Studies, 15 (March 1984). 4. This group includes William Duiker, The Communist Path to Power in Vietnam (Boul- der, Colo., 1981); Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism 1925-1945 (Ithaca, N.Y, 1981); John McAlister, Viet Nam: The Origins of Revolution (New York, 1969). 5. David Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power (Berkeley, Calif., 1995), xxiii.