MASTER'S THESIS M -5 5 5
HOLSTINE, Jon David. AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT OUTER MONGOLIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
The American University, M.A., 1964 ' Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Copyright by
JON DAVID HOLSTINE
1965
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT OUTER MONGOLIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
py Jon Dt Holstine
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS
Signatures of Committee:
Chairman, j V W ] ^
Date: Dean oi t
/'wViC.’i.ürtiNI U i'liV tiiO Jl X Date* LIBRARY i jDÊC 1 !i!S!63 WAarilWGION. D. C.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. /
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS...... 1
II. THE MONGOLIANS AND THE SOVIET UNION...... ^ 33
III. THE MONGOLIANS AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC...... 77
IV. RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS...... 123
V. OUTER MONGOLIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS...... lU2
VI. THE FUTURE OF OUTER MONGOLIA ...... 1^6
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 172
APPENDIX...... 178
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THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
After the decline and deposition of the Mongol Dynasty in China,
the Mongols returned to their native steppes and reverted to their
ancient nomadic way of life. Unified Mongols were dangerous to China,
and Mongol unity was something to be avoided. ■ The Ming Dynasty divided
the war-like nomads into east and west wings, with smaller subdivisions
in each wing.^ Since the Mongol tribes were constantly involved in
petty warfare, control for the Ming became a matter of intervening from
time to time and preventing the accrual of too much power in the hands 2 of any one chieftain. This established a system which was to serve as
the framework, with refinements and modifications, for Sino-Mongol rela
tions fraa that time until the last years of the Manchu Dynasty.
During the height of the Ming Dynasty’s power, control of the
Mongols was relatively successful, and no tribe seriously threatened the
marches of the Central Kingdom. Tvice during the early fifteenth cen
tury, the western oirats Mongols almost succeeded in defeating the
eastern Mongols, only to fail on the brink of s u c c e s s .3 m l i i 2 5 , Ming
military support enabled the eastern Mongols to defeat the Oirats. In
lL$3, the oirats rose again under Esen and had actually defeated the
eastern tribesmen in spite of Ming support, only to have victory turn to
ashes when Esen was killed in a struggle arising among the conquerors
for the throne of Mongolia.^
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After lkS3f the eastern tribes retained dominance among the
Mongols, but no leader succeeded in unifying the nomads until Dayan Khan
came into power. Dayan brought about unity, but then proceeded to
destroy it through appanage. His kingdom was divided equally among his
eleven sons upon his death in l$k3*^ The next important phase in Mongolian affairs began when the
Grand Lama of the Yellow Church in Tibet, sonam Qyatso, visited the
ruler of the Ordos tribes, Anda or Altin Khan, in 1576 or 1577. The
visit, marked by great pomp and ceremony, resulted in the adoption by
Anda of Tibetan Buddhism, and was the first apparent contact of the
Mongols with the religion of Tibet since the days of Khublai Khan,
indeed, it was described by the Lama as the meeting of the reincarna
tions of Khublai Khan and Drogon phagspa, the great Khan's Tibetan tutor.
The Lama was given the title of Dalai (Tale in Mongolian, meaning
"ocean," for "Ocean of Merit") which title subsequently was applied to
Sonam Gyatso's two predecessors.^
The meeting of Sonam Gyatso and the Altin Khan had an extremely
important effect; it brought about the linking of two of China's border
peoples. The import of that link can scarcely be overemphasized. It
provided a union of peoples in a great arc from the Himalayan kingdoms
of Bhutan and Nepal to Siberia, encircling the Central Kingdom and
Jeopardizing Chinese control over the Western Land— Sinkiang.
The extension of the Yellow sect of Lamaism to Mongolia . . . bad a bearing not only on the status of Tibet but also upon the whole picture of that part of the world . . . . it had always been the high policy of the Chinese Government to prevent the Hiung-Nu (Mongolians) and the chilang (Tibetans) from Joining hands. The policy had been inaugurated by Han-wu-Ti (reigned lüo-6Ôb.c.) when he set up command posts and garrison forts in Dansu to drive a wedge between these two warlike neighbors.7
Reproducedwith permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3. The link between the Tibetans and the Mongols was further cemented
when sonam Gyatso returned to Mongolia upon the death of Anda in 1587 or
1588 and died there. The Dalai Lama was re-bom not in Tibet, but in g Mongolia. This turn of events gave the Mongols greater purchase in
Tibet and marked the initiation of an involvement in Tibetan affairs
which was to continue in varying degree until the latter part of the
eighteenth century. It should also be pointed out that the Mongo 1-
Tibetan involvement broadened the framework of Chinese relations with
their border regions. Instead of two more or less separate and distinct
areas with'which the Chinese must deal, they had one long and complex
area with even more difficult problems.
This became increasingly apparent in the early seventeenth cen
tury. During the last few years of the Ming Dynasty, the rise of the
western Mongol Dzungars drove the Khoshotes eastward into the Kokonor
region of China. From 1635 to l6H3, the Khoshotes under Qushi Khan
attacked various parts of Tibet, ultimately seizing that country This
is reported to have been at the behest of the fifth Dalai Lama, who was
faced with defeat at the hands of the old Red Sect of Lamaism, still o strong ahd dangerous.^ Li Tieh-tseng has quoted Das as saying that
"from I6ii3 on Tibet was a dependency of Mongolia."
The period during tdiich Gushi Khan was gaining control in Tibet
was an eventful one for China and the Mongols. The Manchus were gaining
control of the northeast gate to China, and soon were to sweep into
Peking and found their dynasty, in l6U0, a conference was held in
northern Mongolia in an atten^t to devise by peaceful means some sort of
unity to counterbalance the growing power of the Manchus.About 1636,
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the Russians made their first successful bid to gain some influence
among the tribes of Mongolia.
The Manchus achieved the conquest of China in a traditional
manner. They were a border people who, unified under Kurhachi in I616,
obtained, sufficient dominance in their homeland to attract and marshal
further support. The Manchus used Chahar Mongol auxiliaries to turn the
flank of the Chinese positions guarding the apprqaches from Manchuria to
Peking. Then, as the eastern Mongols in turn received protection from
the Manchus, a sphere of influence was formed in what is now Inner
Mongolia. The Manchus had control from the western plains of what are
now the provinces of Hsilungchiang, Kirin, and Lianoning, across jehol.
Char, and guiyuan to the desert of Hinghsia.^^ in léltU, the Manchus
were requested to aid the Ming Government, which was reeling under the
impact of civil war, against the bandit Li Tzu-ch'eng. Seizing upon
this opportunity, the Manchus attacked Peking and deposed the Mings in 161^.1^ in the farther reaches of Northern and Western Mongolia, the
growth of Manchu power apparently did not go unheeded, in the year
16LO, a conference was called by Batur Khan, an Oirat prince. A common
code was drawn up and agreed to by the whole of the oirats, and the
Khalkas. in this code was strongly apparent the influence of the
Lamaist Church, for extensive privileges were set forth for the Lamas.
Any cohesive force which Lamaism may have exerted, however, was sub
sequently proven to be insufficient to overcome the traditional patterns of inter-tribal warfare.^^
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The development of Russian relations with the Mongols took place
over a period of years from I616 to l63U before any results were ob
tained. The Russians contacted the chieftain Altyn Khan who ruled in
the western part of Khalka and whose capitol was near the upper Yonisee.
The purpose was the obtaining of the help of the tribe of Altyn Khan
against the Kyrgyz. However, it required the passing of several years
and the efforts of two more missions by the Russians before the Altyn
Khans were willing to accept the Czar as their ruler. This state of
affairs was reportedly agreed upon in l63U.^7
Russian rule over the Altyn Khan tribe was short lived, however.
Two years after the rise of the Manchu Dynasty," Altyn died, and his son
abandoned his campaign against the Russian Kyrgyz. Thereafter, the best
relationship that the Russians could obtain with the tribe was that of
alliance, not their allegiance to the Czar. The tribe of Altyn's son,
Lobdzan, was to receive help against the Dzunghars with whom the
Russians are reported to have been on excellent terms.
The Manchus, as stated earlier, had achieved control of the
closer Mongol tribes as they climbed to power in China. The initiation
of relations between the Manchus and the Tushetu Mongols in 1^32 was one
of the reasons, according to Pavlovsky, for the rapprochement between
the tribe of Altyn Khan and the Russians.The center of power among
the farther Mongols lay to the west, in the tents of one of the Oirats
tribes, the Dzunghars. It was necessary to achieve some sort of check
upon the Dzunghars before the Manchus could successfully rule any of the
border areas. The Manchu Emperors turned to Lhasa.
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The Manchus and the various leaders of Tibet had exchanged
letters even before the Mings had fallen. According to Rockhill, some
of the Khalkha tribes requested the Manchu leader to invite the Dalai
Lama to visit him in 1638. The exchange of letters that followed saw
each element of power in Tibet— the Red Sect, the Yellow Sect, and Gushi
Khan— greeted equally by the Manchus. Good relations with all parties
was desired; the Manchus apparently did not feel the time was ripe for
becoming involved in Tibet's internal dissensions.
Batur Kban, the Dzunghar chieftain who had caused the Mongol
conference of 16I4O, was a follower of the Yellow sect of Buddhism, one
of his sons, who was known as Galdan, was to initiate a conflict with
the Manchus which was to last long after his death. However, at an
early age Galdan was sent to Lhasa to study under the Fifth Dalai Lama. 21 "
The Manchus were undoubtedly aware of the old Khan's Lamaist faith and
realized how valuable the assistance of the Yellow Church could be in
their dealings with the Dzunghars. And, as the Mongols were by this
time involved in the Lamaist faith to the extent that they had their own
Lamaist hierarchs, assistance by, if not outright control of, the seat of
Lamaism would greatly facilitate Manchu efforts to extend their influence
over all their borderland.
Thus, in I6U8 , invitations were sent to the Dalai and panchen
Lamas to visit the Manchu court. The panchen Lama, the second most holy
figure in the Lamaist hierarchy, declined because of his advanced age.
The Dalai Lama, however, accepted and traveled to China, arriving in the
Ordos country in the summer of l652. There ensued an interesting proto col conflict.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 The Dalai Lama was accompanied by a retinue of three thousand
monks, and requested that the Emperor come to meet him at a point some
where on Taika Nor Lake, forty-five miles north by northwest of Ta-liung
Pu in Shansi. The Chinese advisers to the Emperor counseled him not to
journey to meet the Dalai Lama. The Manchu members of the inner court
reportedly counseled that the Emperor should go. To be considered in
making the decision was the agreement by the i^lkas to accept Manchu
overlordship if the Bsperor received the Dalai Lama, it is not clear
whether the Emperor went forth or not; but the Dalai was in the Yellow
Tenple, built for him by the Emperor, the following month. The audience
was held and the Dalai, apparently uncomfortable in the heat of Peking,
went to Jehol and thence to Tibet,.via his caaç> on Taika Nor.22
With the visit of the Fifth Dalai Lama, Lozang Gyatso, the first
steps were taken by the Manchu rulers of China to utilize the relation
ship between the religious rulers of Tibet and the Khans of Mongolia.
Whether the influence of the Lamas made itself felt on the Dzunghar
leaders is difficult to evaluate; Batur Khan died only nine years later,
and the borderlands remained relatively peaceful until about 1671.
In that year, Batur Khan's son and successor, Senge, was killed
by a half-brother, senge's younger brother, Galdan, left his studies in
Lhasa, renounced his monkish vows, and returned to avenge his brother's
death. This Galdan accomplished; and then in l676 or 1677, he killed
his father-in-law, thereby adding a considerable number of Khoshote
tribesmen to his following. Assuming the title of Kontaisha, or great
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chieftain, he turned to the east; and in the years 1678-1679, be took
Kashgar, Yarkand, %mi, and Turf an, subjecting the Moslem peoples of Sinkiang.23
The rise of Galdan had the effect of driving the Khoshote tribes
not subject to the Khan to the border of China, making problems for the
Manchu garrison in the Kansu area. The Manchu court began to attempt
negotiations with Galdan; of missions sent by the Manchu Emperor Sheng-
Tsu to the Mongol chieftains announcing his victory in the san-Fah
Rebellion, the mission to Galdan was the largest. Dissensions among the
Khalka Mongols made them prime targets for attack by Galdan, and the
Manchus desired to achieve some sort of modus vivendi in the Mongol
world before Galdan added Khalka to his holdings.2^
As stated before, the Manchu Emperor had hoped that the influence
of the Dalai Lama would assist in dealing with the Dzunghars. The Dalai
Lama did succeed in influencing Galdan when the Khan wanted to move on
the Elauth Mongols of Koko-Nor. He dissuaded Galdan from his plan and,
subsequently, gave Galdan the title of poshetu Khan, in l679, Galdan
was received as a vassal of the Dalai Lama, but did not give up his plans
of conquest and the Manchus yet feared as united Mongolia.2^
In the next few years, the influence of the Dalai Lama became
even more crutial as à Dzunghar move into Khalka became even more likely.
To complicate matters, the Dalai Lama died in 1680, and his death was
not revealed by the Desi, or temporal administrator of the Dalai Lama.
The Desi chose the infant successor to the Fifth Dalai, but told no one,
thereby retaining for an indefinite period the use of the name of the
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Dalai. The Desi succeeded in using the power to good advantage, settl
ing a dispute among the Khalkas.2^
However, as time wore on, Galdan became increasingly intractable
in his intentions towards the strife-ridden Khalkas. The Manchus
attempted to negotiate with him in 1686 on the basis of his pledge to
the Dalai Lama, but to no avail. The Desi, in the name of the Dalai
Lama, suggested that the Manchus cede to Galdan his demand for the
Tushetu Khan of Khalka and Tushetu's brother the Khutuktu, or Living
Buddha of Khalka. This demand, which would have led to Dzunghar domi
nance over Khalka and seemed inconsistent with the proper interests of
the Dalai Lama, led the Manchus to awareness of the actual state of
affairs in Tibet.27
Galdan attacked Mongolia in 1688, driving the Khalkas south
toward china for protection, jt was at this point that the Khalkas came
under Chinese authority. The Manchus sent a delegate to the Khutuktu of
the Khalkas in l688, when those Mongols were debating whom to choose as
protectors against Galdan. Arani, head of the Chinese Li-fan Yuan
(Board of Dependencies) visited the Khutuktu on behalf of the Manchu
Emperor.2® Apparently the Khutuktu was successful in influencing the
Khalkas to turn to china as a sovereign. At any rate, Galdan resolved
any question which may have existed; for when the Khalkas fled before
him, a process was completed which had begun eighty years before. The
Eastern Mongols were subjected to the IBmcbus. The acceptance by the
Mongols was formally solemnized in I691, when the princes of Khalkha
swore allegiance to Enperor K ’ang Hsi.29
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The year after Galdan drove the Khalkas to Inner Mongolia, the
Manchus signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk with the representative of
Czarist Russia, the first Treaty of China with a western nation. The
Treaty regularized the frontier of Mongolia with Russia, and provided a
relatively peaceful frontier for the next few years. However, the war
with the Dzunghars under Galdan counterbalanced the gains the Manchus
made from the Treaty of Nerchinsk.30 It became necessary at that time
for the Manchus to battle the Dzunghars directly. Galdan was defeated
in a series of encounters, finally committing suicide in 1697.31 How
ever, the Dzunghars were not through and battled the Manchus until 1757, when the Dzunghars were almost extirpated.32
After Galdan had been defeated and committed suicide, there
remained, but for the Western Mongols who came after Galdan, only Tibet
and the Mongols there for the Manchus to subdue, internal developments
in Tibet soon offered the Manchu Emperor the opportunity to assert his
power in that countly. /
Latzang Khan became the ruling Mongol in Tibet around 1700. At
that time, the Desi of Lhasa was the most powerful figure in the Yellow
Church. There developed a struggle between the two leaders, and the
Desi was ultimately slain by Latzang Khan. The Khan reportedly was
rewarded for this by the Manchu Emperor. However, the sixth Dalai Lama,
who had been chosen by the Desi, still remained in Lhasa. Even though
the Dalai was apparently of no political interest or capability, Latzang
Khan wished to remove him. m this endeavor, the Khan could obtain no
help from the other Lamas. The Khan turned to the Chinese.33
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in 1706, a Mongol escort took the Sixth Dalai Lama from Lhasa to
Nagch'uk'a where he died. Latzang Khan then proclaimed a new Sixth
Dalai Lama and entered him at Lhasa. The other Lamas, however, did not
accept the new Sixth Dalai but declared an infant found in Litang the
true successor of the old sixth Lama. At this point the Manchus acted,
taking the infant pretender into protective custody, and sending the
first Chinese official to Tibet, one Ho shou. Yeshes Gyatso, Latzang
Khan's selection for Dalai Lama, was established in Lhasa.3^
The infant pretender to the throne of the Dalai Lama was still
alive after Yeshes Gyatso was installed and, subsequently, became the
subject of a conflict which was to establish firmly Manchu influence in
Tibet. Tsewang Arabtan, a nephew of Galdan, who had begun to increase
his holdings at his uncle's expense, agreed to help the Tibetans of rs' Sera, Drepung, and' Tashilhunpo monasteries in re-establishing the young
Dalai Lama as head of the Lama Faith.35 undoubtedly, Tsewang Arabtan
saw the possibilities of Increasing his own power when he allied himself
with the Tibetans. 1 .
In 1717, the Oirat invaders attempted to obtain custoc^r of the
pretender, but failed, in November of that year, the Oirats did succeed
in capturing Lhasa. The Manchu Emperor viewed this development with
some dismay, as the entire Mongol world seemed concerned with the case
of the Dalai Lama. The Manchus then decided to support the young pre
tender; the Emperor proclaimed that he was returning the prisoner and
was championing the true faith. By 1720, Manchu military power defeated
the Oirats who returned to the H i Region. At that point, there is
general agreement that Tibetan autonomy ceased.
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During the next twenty-five years, however, the danger of the
West Mongols to Chinese control in Tibet loomed more tton once, in
1727, a rebellion occurred in Tibet which was quelled by the Governor of
Ulterior Tibet, part of the general plot was an expedition to Lhasa by
the son and successor of Tsewang Araptan. in 17U7 or 1?L8, another
rebellion threatened, again involving the Western Mongols. It was after
this that Tibet was forbidden intercourse with the Mongols and stricter
measures were applied to keep Tibet under control. The Manchu garrison
in Lhasa was increased to 1,500 men and,the Amban was given powers in
the local government.
The Manchu Emperor Ch'ien Lung took two further steps to estab
lish his control over the Mongols and the Tibetans, in 1757, he
inflicted a terrible blow on the Dzunghars, almost exterminating them,
and bringing to a close a war that had been going on for more than
sixty-five years. The other step was the establishment of rules govern
ing the procedures by which the major Lamaist hierarch were chosen, both
for Tibet and Mongolia.
Steps toward this end had been taken earlier in that century hy
the EPgieror K ’ang Hsi. According to Henry Thdby prinseps, that Ençjeror,
while on an expedition against the H i tribes visited the "Gesoo Tamba"
(jeptsun Dauba?) of the Mongols who was residing at Kukukhoto, or Blue
City. The Gesoo Tamba was slain by a member of the Enperor’s party
(ostensibly due to discourtesy to the En^eror on the part of the Lama)
and the Enperor was forced to call upon the Dalai Lama to keep peace
among the Mongols. At the Dalai Lama’s decree, the Grand Lama of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13 Mongols was from that time forth to be regenerated in Tibet.3® Gerald
Friters reports that the first Tibetan^born Mongol Khutuktu was brought
to Mongolia in 1763.3* A decree was entered by the Emperor Ch|ien Lung
in 1793 requiring the Jebstun Damba to be chosen at Peking in presence
of a member of the Li-fan Yuan; this had the effect of removing the
succession of church leaders from the princely families who had previ
ous ly furnished hierarchs
As for the Tibetans, in 1793 another edict was entered providing
that the selection of a new Dalai Lama was to be made by drawing a name
from several in a golden u m in the presence of the Chinese Amban.
Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, the Manchus had succeeded in
either removing or controlling the remaining sources of power in the
borderlands. % From the earliest days of Manchu power over the Mongols of Inner
Mongolia and Khalka, the Emperor had followed a policy aimed at reducing
the Mongols to as conplete dependency on himself as possible, and at
precluding unification. In 1691, K ’ang Hsi increased the number of
Hoshun rulers from twenty-four to thirty-seven.^2 Later, the number of
such rulers was eighty-seven in Khalka alone, with the hoshungs of the
rest of the Mongol world totaling an additional one hundred twenty.^3
Each ruler of a hoshung paid homage directly to the Manchu Emperor and,
in many cases, Mongol nobles were given a daughter of the Emperor in
marriage, thus increasing their allegiance to Peking. The Mongol lords,
including the hierarchs of the Lamaist church, were enrolled as vassals
to the Emperor and sent tribute in regular amounts and at regular
times.^
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With the establishment of lo^erial control over the hierarchy of
the Lamaist church, and the creation of direct bonds of vassalage of,the
individual Mongol princes to the Emperor, a dyarchy vas created which
kept the great arc of border peoples in hand. As Owen Lattimore points
out, the Manchus were able to perpetuate a Mongol church that was inde
pendent of the princes and looked toward Tibet, while the princes looked
toward the En^ror. As the Emperor had control of the hierarchy in
Tibet, he could accomplish his aims through either or both of the two
relat i onships.
It should be pointed out here that although Lamaism is credited
with having been an enervating and pacifying force upon the Mongols,
this is not necessarily true. Baddeley states that though the Dzunghars
were followers of the Yellow Faith, the Manchus were forced to extirpate
that tribe after a war of several decades.The rest of the Mongols
were driven into the arms of China by the Dzunghars. The stultifying
effect of Lamaism came not from the substance of the faith but from its
function. The practice of assigning properties to monasteries and to chieftains destroyed the traditional mobility of steppe pastoralism.^7
The stage of control thus reached by the Manchus by I8OO was to
obtain in Mongolia through the first half of the nineteenth century.
The Russo-Chinese frontier in the Far East was relatively quiet;
Russian efforts during this period were directed" at Central Asia. The
Treaty of Khiakhta, which was signed in 1727, and which delineated the
Sino-Russian frontier had been for the most part observed. However,
after mid-century China began to decline under the impact of Western
thrusts from the sea and internal rebellion.
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Russia succeeded in extracting permission from China to establish
a trading concern in Urga in i860; this was followed by a Russian
Consulate in that city in I86I. The revolt of Yakub Beg in Sinkiang
provided the Russians with the opportunity to intervene in that area.
The subsequent negotiations between Russia and China enabled the
Russians in the Treaty of St. Petersburg to obtain, in addition to some
valuable land in the H i region, provision for additional Russian con
sulates in Mongolia and other areas of China's border lands.^8
The last decade of the nineteenth century saw China beset from
all quarters by powers bent on developing their own interests within her
boundaries. Mongolia, however, was not initially a target for the
powers; even Russian trade was limited in capital investment and scope
during this period. The quasi-governmental Chinese-Russian Bank, for
instance, established a limited company for the exploitation of gold in
Outer Mongolia, only to have the company almost fold in 190I after only
one year of operation. The Russian Ministry of Finance bailed the con
cern out with a loan of 50,000 rubles for one year of operation.^^
The Sino-Japanese War, and its humiliating outcome for the Chi
nese, however, led the Manchus to atten^t a reversal of their policy
regarding immigration in Outer Mongolia. The Chinese were given per
mission and encouragement to migrate to Outer Mongolia, and a strip of
Chinese colonists was developed along the northern frontier of that
countxy. Inner Mongolia had previously received large numbers of
Chinese colonists who were able to develop with fair success their
traditional intensive agriculture alongside the pastoral nomads.The
results of this policy were to cause difficulties for the Mongols in
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both Inner and Outer Mongolia, and to pose what the Russians considered
a military threat to their security.
The Mongols of Outer Mongolia had experienced a relatively
favorable position during most of the nineteenth century by virtue of
Manchu policy in that area. No Chinese colonists had been allowed into
Outer Mongolia, and the traditional pastoral economy functioned effi
ciently enough to provide relative well-being for most Mongols. Chinese
traders had begun to find their way into Mongolia in the latter years of
the 19 0 0 's, and their use of credit was beginning to upset the tradi
tional economy to a certain degree. Probably the worst enemy of the
Mongol economy was the function of Lamaism in absorbing more and more
able-bodied men and rendering them non-productive. At the same time,
the Mongol princes apparently were exploiting their serfs to a con
tinually higher degree.
The introduction of increased Chinese control and pressure began
to discomfit the Mongols, leading them to appeal to the Russian Consul
at Urga for assistance as early as 1905.^2 By 1910, conditions between
the Mongolians and the Chinese had become extremely strained. A series
of incidents between the Chinese and the Mongols led the Manchus to
attempt an increase of their military strength in Mongolia. As a
further measure of control, it was planned to divide Mongolia into five
p r o v i n c e s .^3 However, shortly after that, the Chinese revolution and
the overthrow of the Manchus marked a decisive end to that chapter of
Mongol history. In July of 1911, a delegation of Outer Mongolian princes
asked for Russian protection. In November of that year, the Mongols
declared themselves independent of China and proclaimed the Khutukhtu
their ruler.
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In the same decade from 1900 to 1910, Russian interests in Outer
Mongolia had b e c c m more sharply defined. A growing desire to increase
commercial possibilities in that countly had been reinforced by the out
come of the Russo-Japanese War of 1901;-1905 when Russia had been pre
vented from penetrating farther into Manchuria. As Friters points out,
it is not clear whether Japan forced Russia to compensate for its loss
in Manchuria by turning toward Mongolia, but it is known that Russia and
Japan signed a treaty in 1905 which delineated the spheres of influence
of those two powers to include Mongolia and Manchuria respectively.^^
Several factors had thus led to an increased Russian interest in
Outer Mongolia; and after the Mongolian "declaration of independence" in
1911, the way was opened for the Russians to increase their penetration
of that area, at the same time finding ways to prevent an outright
partition of Mongolia from China.
In 1912, the Russians signed an agreement with the Mongolians
establishing a favored position for Russia and its subjects in Mongolia.
In the same year, the Chinese Republic began to negotiate with Russia,
having overcome internal difficulties engendered by reaction against a
"weak Mongolian policy." Indeed, so difficult was the obstacle posed by
the Chinese Kuomintang to the arrival at any agreement acceptable to
Russia, that only after President Yuan Shih-k'ai liquidated the Kuomin
tang and banished its representatives from the capital was an agreement
reached.^
A year after the Mongol-Russian agreement was signed, the Chinese
reached an agreement with the Russians, which, though not the most
desirable outcome for the Chinese, established a modus vivendi for the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18
two powers. In the Russo-Chinese Declaration of 1913, Russia recognized
that Outer Mongolia was under Chinese suzerainty and that it was part of
Chinese territory. China recognized in the Declaration the autonomy of
Outer Mongolia and accepted Russian mediation in any negotiations with
the M o n g o l s . ^7 The Government of Russia possessed, therefore, a domi
nant position in Outer Mongolia and the benefits thereof without the
responsibilities or difficulties of having helped separate a part of
China. ■Î 4» As the Russo-Chinese Declaration of 1913 was of a provisional
character, negotiations were again initiated between the two governments.
This time, as provided by the previous treaty, the Mongolians were repre
sented. The Chinese, concerned with the progress being made by the
Russians in developing trade in Outer Mongolia were considerably anxious
to obtain some redress to the Russian dominance. The outbreak of war in
Europe, and Russia's involvement therein, led the Chinese to pursue such
an intractable and unacceptable course in negotiations that the negotia
tions were broken off for some time. When the treaty was finally signed
in June of 1915,^® after about six months of prior negotiation, China
had obtained somewhat better terms but, in the main, Russian influence
was paramount. This had been guaranteed by the Mongols' desire to avoid
offering the Chinese an opportunity to reappear in their country.
The Chinese began a slightly more active policy in Outer Mongolia
from 1915 on; they achieved little, however, until the fall of Czarist
Russia. At that time, they seized on the opportunity to fill the power
vacuum left by the disappearance of Inçjerial Russian authority, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 almost succeeded in drawing Mongolia back into the Chinese family of
peoples.
The Chinese dignitary in Urga, Cheng Yi, was charged in January
of 1919 to obtain an agreement to replace the Tripartite Treaty of do Khiakhta and to serve as a basis for further Sino-Mongolian relations.
Cheng Yi, by enlisting the support of a few Mongol princes who were dis
satisfied with their own positions with regard to the powerful lamas,
was able after several months to reach the brink of agreement with the
government of Outer Mongolia. He is credited with obtaining an equitable
arrangement whereby several specific privileges would be guaranteed the
Mongolians, in return for a Mongolian petition renouncing their autonomy.
However, a General Hsu Shu-tseng was appointed as an Envoy to the North-
r> western Frontier in October, 1919; and when Hsu arrived in Urga, he
pursued a far stricter line with the Mongols. In a month, Hsu had ob
tained an agreement on a basis considerably less favorable to the
Mongols, but alienated even further that people.
Thus were the Mongols welcomed back into the Chinese fold.
Several months later, Cheng Yi returned to Mongolia, with the purpose
of correcting some of the 111 feeling that had arisen as a result of
General Hsu's tactics. Chinese efforts were too late, however, for in
October, 1920, Baron Ungern von Sternberg appeared with his forces at
Urga. Sternberg, a White Russian and follower of Semenov, was beaten
off by the Chinese, but four months later reappeared under the banner of
Pan-Mongolism and with a troop of five thousand Russians, Buriats,
Mongols, and Tibetans, captured Urga. Chinese control had once more
been deposed in Outer Mongolia.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20
The Russian Revolution had spread its ideas far, however, and
several partisan groups had sprung up on the Russo-Mongol border. Near
Kiakhta on March 13, 1921, a "People's Revolutionary Government" was
created under the sponsorship of the Soviet Union, which subsequently
requested the Soviet Union to aid in the removal of remaining White
Russian detachments in Outer Mongolia. "The Mongolian People's Revolu
tionary Army entered Urga in July 1921, and in the following months they
cmpleted their task of liquidating the White Russian troops or driving them into Manchuria, assisted by Soviet troops."^2 The following month,
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Mongolia appealed to the
Government of the Soviet Union not to withdraw their troops pending the
"complete removal of the menace from the common enemy," who was then
"seeking reinforcements on the Eastern Steppes." The Soviet Union com
plied, indicating its intentions to withdraw its troops as soon as the situation permitted.^3
In this manner was the Soviet Union to become the new patron of
Outer Mongolia. Although China protested to Moscow, the only satisfac
tion obtainable was the stipulation by the Soviets in a treaty with
China signed on May 31, 192k, that Outer Mongolia was an integral part
of China and that Chinese sovereignty over that area would be respected.
No contact was provided for the Chinese with the Mongols, as had been
the case in the someidiat similar Russo-Chinese Declaration of a few
years earlier, for the Soviet Union had no intention of letting China
reassert any influence in Mongolia.
The Jeptsun Damba of Urga had been the nominal head of state in
Outer Mongolia since the first days of "independence" in 1911. The
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Khutuktu died in July, 192k, and a new constitution was adopted in
November of that year, proclaiming that Mongolia was an "Independent
People's Republic" (in contradiction of the terms of the Soviet-Chinese
agreement of May 31 ) . only after the promulgation of the constitution
did the Soviet Army depart Mongolia.
It withdrew in 192k-25— but not until the vast province was trans formed into a Soviet dependency, with Soviet "advisers" in every government agency, a Mongolian Army actually under Soviet Command, and the Mongolian economy gradually being integrated into the Soviet economic blood stream.
The status of Mongolia at that point, though legally a part of
the Chinese Republic, was in effect, as Dali in has pointed out, a depen
dency of the Soviet Union. That status was to obtain until 19k5, when
China was forced ultimately to recognize the independence of the
Mongolian People's Republic. During tha period from 192k to 19k5, and
to the present, the MPR was and continues to be heavily inç>rinted with
the stamp of its mentor's influence. However, some attention should be
devoted at this juncture to another facet of Mongolian political activity,
that of the traditional link between Mongolia and Tibet.
Tibet, it will be recalled, had been reduced to dependent status
ly the Manchus by 1720, and Manchu control over the functioning of the
Lamaist hierarchy had been established by 1800. British influence had
gradually encroached on the Himalayan country throughout the nineteenth
century. Britain had established itself to the extent that when the
Manchu Dymsty fell in 1911, and Tibet asserted its independence. Yuan
Shl-k'ai was faced with British diplomatic opposition.^7 Even prior to
1911, in 1907, Britain concluded an agreement with Russia whereby the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22
two powers regularized their attitudes toward Tibet; at that time both 68 agreed not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through China.
The political implications of the Tibetan-Mongolian link are clear
as they affected British and Russian policy on separate occasions. The
syndicate mentioned above which had been formed to exploit Mongolian \ mineral resources was saved from liquidation because the Russian
Minister of Finance, Kokotsov, believed that it would not be politi
cally e3g)edient to liquidate the only large Russian enterprise in
Mongolia "just at the time when the Dalai Lama (who had fled from
British pressure in Tibet)'»was arriving in Urga."^^
Later, in 1913, the Mongol Government concluded an agreement with
the Government of Tibet in which the two governments promised each other
aid against all enemies, "within or without.Inasmuch as Great
Britain feared this to be a Russian move, the former may well have been
motivated by the existence of the treaty when she attenq)ted to negotiate
a new agreement with Russia establishing a stronger British position in
Tibet.No new agreement was reached before the war broke out, and
Britain apparently did not attempt the same sort of negotiation with the
Soviet Union.
However, it is worth noting that Sir Charles Bell, although
doubting the existence of the Mongo 1-Tibetan Agreement referred to above,
reports that there was "constant communication and slow but efficient
news service by commercial agents of the leading Lhasa families. It; is
through these agents also that Japanese and Russian rifles and ammuni
tion, sometimes also machine guns and bombs, are brought to the Tibetan
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 capital." It is to be presumed that this intercourse was taking place
as late as 1920-1921, Bell's last years in Lhasa,72
Mongolia thus continued to play a part in China's border con^lex
at the beginning of the period of Soviet dominance in Outer Mongolia.
Whether the traditional ties still exist, or play any politically sig
nificant role today, is a subject for a later chapter of this study.
Soviet influence in Mongolia, as described earlier, continued
after the 1921-1921; period. Outer Mongolia, although in a legal sense a
part of China, was in effect a protectorate of the Soviet Union. Inter^
nal developments in the Mongolian People's Republic largely reflected
trends in the Soviet Union, until about 1932, when a two-year attempt to
collectivize the Mongolian nomadic and pastoral economy resulted in
serious calamities. Nomad resentment led to the slaughter of livestock
or the removal of herds into China or Manchuria. After June, 1932, the
Mongolian People's Republic was regarded as having entered a "non
capitalist, anti-Imperialist" development^ e.g., a separate road from
that of the Soviet Union, albeit under Moscow's guidance.73
The decade from 1930 to 19hO brought even further involvement of
the Soviet Union in Mongol affairs. Japan had thrust into Manchuria in
1931, to Jehol in 193k and into Western Inner Mongolia in 1936-1937.
With the creation of Manchukuo in 1932 and the Mongolian Autonomous
Government in 1937, Japan had established a long frontier with the MPR
and the USSR. Soviet Russia had been entirely aware of Japanese actions
and had effected two agreements with the MPR providing for the defense
of that country. The first was a "gentlemen's agreement" reached in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2U
193k, the second, a Protocol of Mutual Assistance in 1936 (the latter
was strongly protested China.)7^
A series of border conflicts between the Japanese dominated area
and the MPR occurred over the years; Japan attempted to establish direct
diplomatic relations with the MPR but could obtain only Mongolian par
ticipation in a mixed convention at Manchouli. Then, in 1939, conflict
erupted into a full battle at Nokhon.^^ Japan was defeated by Mongolian
and Soviet troops, the latter in unknown proportions. With Russia and
Japan in a stand-off, no further developments occurred until the Soviet-
Japanese Neutrality Pact of 19kl.7&
At this point, some attention should be given to Japanese poli
cies toward the Mongolians of both Inner and Outer Mongolia, as they
provide another exanq)le of an attempt to utilize Mongol nationalism and/
or religious ties with Tibet. A Japanese officer reportedly visited
TJrga in 1913 or 191k and influenced the Khutuktu to attempt to establish
diplomatic relations with Jeg)an.77
In 1936, the Japanese had thrust from Manchuria into Inner
Mongolia, thus obtaining a frontier with the Mongolian People's Republic.
However, such contact was thwarted by the Russians. Japanese attempts
at direct diplomatic contact were similarly blocked after the First
World War. Thus, little formal influence could be exerted.
The Japanese were operating at a different level toward the goal
of increasing Mongol nationalism and cooperation, if possible, with
themselves. Thus, they encouraged Semenov, the White Russian, in his
attempts to create a Paiv-Mongolian movement, and further encouraged such
a movement with promises of full support from Japan in 1919. However,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 no official admission of such policy was ever made by the Japanese, and
no apparent support was actually given to the cause of Pan-Mongolism,7®
It is reported that Japanese representatives met and were in contact
with Inner Mongolian Lamas. In this connection, it is interesting to
note that a Japanese emissary was in Tibet in 1937.79
The role of the Mongolian People's Republic in World War II was
limited for the most part to supplying the Soviet Union with horses,
sheepskin coats, fur jackets and other pastoral economy commodities.
When the Soviet Union declared war on the Japanese Empire in
19U5> Mongolian troops took part in the Soviet thrust into Japanese
Manchuria. The MPR later applied for membership in the Allied Far
Eastern Commission on the basis of that participation, but was denied.
The MPR was to obtain recognition from China of its independence,
as a result of World War II. Stalin had obtained the provision that the
status quo in Outer Mongolia would be maintained in the agreements
reached at the Yalta Conference in 19k5. The Soviet Union made it clear
to China that by "the status quo in Outer Mongolia" it had contemplated
Mongolian independence. Thus, China was faced with a fait accompli in
Mongolia, and was presented with no actual alternative to the course she
then elected. She agreed to Mongolian independence, provided a plebi
scite held in Outer Mongolia demonstrated an actual desire for independ
ence. The plebiscite was held on October 20, 19k5, and reported a
unanimous approval of independence. The following Januaiy, China
declared that it considered Outer Mongolia an independent state. On
February 13, 19U6, an agreement was concluded establishing diplomatic
relations between the two countries.®^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26
Inner Mongolia underwent a period of bitter turmoil during and
after the war. When Japan was driven out in 19U5, the revolution in
China rendered Chinese control over the entire area almost non-existent.
The Soviet Union established on January iB , 19U6, an Eastern Mongolian
Autonomous Republic under General Uer Tan, graduate of the Soviet
Military Academy. It was at that time thought that the Republic "was
aimed at creating an extension of the 'buffer area' from the Mongolian
People's Republic to the sea."®^ However, a year later, the Chinese
Communists set up a counter government in Inner Mongolia which dissolved
the, earlier government in May, 19k7. In March of that year, the People's
Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia had also been dissolved. By June,
the Chinese Communists had eliminated any lingering Russian influence in
the area, and the Mongols were left to contend with two varieties of
Chinese.®^
Prince Teh, the wily old Inner Mongol who had survived by col
laborating with Japan during the war, had escaped from Peking in 19h6 and
had attesqited to establish an "Independent Mongolian Government," but
his government was put down by the Communist Chinese. In September,
I9U9 , a new "anti-Communist Autonomous Mongolian Republic" was announced
to have been formed on August 11, 19k9, at Tingyu in West Hinghsia 86 province. This last ditch effort came to naught, however, as the
Chinese Communists swept to power and all Inner Mongolia came under the
Chinese People's Republic.
With the accession to power of a strong central government in
China, and the firm division of Inner.and Outer Mongolia between two
modem states, the historical process under discussion thus far was
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conç)leted. In perspective, the events described can be viewed, in
earlier periods, as the operation of a balance of power between elements
in China's borderlands, with the Chinese in good times holding the
balance. In other‘seasons, the borderlands possessed dominance over
China. With the advent of European encroachment— notably in Mongolia,
Tibet, and Sinkiang, large sectors of the periphery were gradually over
run and detached from a declining China. In the case of Outer Mongolia,
the detachment from China is presently in effect, while China has re
claimed Tibet and Sinkiang.
A major factor in the operation of the center-periphery balance
was, very clearly, the common religion of the Tibetans and the Mongols.
Whether such a relationship is still politically meaningful is a ques
tion that must be discussed later in this study. However, it would seem
feasible that the current international relations of Outer Mongolia be
viewed in the context of Mongolia's traditional place in China's border
complex.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28
FOOTNOTES
^John F. Baddeley, Russia, Mongolia and China (London: The Macmillan Co., 1919), p. xTH
^Peter S. H. Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), p. 277.
3lbid.
^Ibid., p. 276.
^Baddeley, og. ci&., p. xli.
^Sir Charles Bell, The Religion of Tibet (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1931), p. 126. ""
7l 1 Tieh-Tseng, Tibet Today and Yesterday (New York: Bookman and Conqjany, I960), p. 30.
^ b i d . , p. 31.
9karl Friedrich Koeppen, Die Religion des Buddha (Berlin; Ferdinand Scheider, 1857-59), Vol. II, p. Ihk.
^^i, og. cit., p. LB.
^^Baddeley, op. cit., p. Ixxvii.
^%ichel N. Pavlovsky, Chinese-Russian Relations (New York: Philosophical Library, 19k9), pp. 9-11.
^3owen Lattimore, Itmer Asian Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographical Society, l95l), p. 7o.
op. £it., p. 279.
^^Baddeley, op. cit., p. Ixxvii.
^^ang, op. £it., p. 278.
17'Pavlovsky, op. cit., p. 11.
^®Arthur W. Hummel (ed.). Eminent Chinese of the Ch* ing Period, Orientalia Division; Library of Ùongress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19h3), p. 265.
^^Pavlovsky, pp. cH., p. 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29
W. Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Tibet and their Relations with the Mancha Emperor, 16LL-1911," T'oung Pao, XI, 1910, pp. 11-12.
^^Hummel, pg. pit., p. 2 6 6 .
^^Rockhill, pg. pit., pp. 17-18.
23Hummel, op. cit.. p. 266.
Zkibid., p. 267.
^^Rockhill, pg. cit., p. 21.
^^Ibid., p. 2 2 .
27ibid., p. 2k.
^®Pavlovskyf PB* cit., p. l5. ZPgaddeley, pg. cit.. Vol. I, p. Ixxxii.
30pavlovsky, pg. cit., pp. 31-32.
3lTang, pg. p H . , p. 2 8 2 .
3^Baddeley, op. cit., Vol. I, p. Ixxxii.
33pockhill, pg. cit., p. 33.
3^Ibid., p. 35.
^ % i d . , p. 37.
3^i, pg. pit., p. k8.
37pockhill, pg. cit., pp. kl-k6. 38Heniy Thohy Prinseps. Thibet, Tartary and Mongolia (London: William H. Allen & Company, 1852), pp. 53-5k". 39(Qetâid M. Friters, Outer Mongolia and Its International Position (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, Ï9k9), p.”35.
kOpockhill, pg. pit., p. 55.
kJ-ibid.
k2priters, pg. cit., p. 152.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30
^3Nikolai Mikhailovich Przheval'skii, Mongolia, the Tangut Country and the Solitude of Mortt^m Tibet (London* Sampson Low Mars ton Searle and RivingTon, iBŸô), Vol.' I, p. 77.
^Friters, pg. cit., p. l53, citing Stefan Lipovtsov, Ulozhenie Kitaiskoi Palaty vneshiykh snosshenii (The Regulations of the Chinese Board of F'oreign Relations), (St. Petersburg* I8 2 8 ), Vol. I, pp. 208, 3k5.
^^attimore, pg. cit., p. 8 9 .
k^addeley, op. cit., Vol. I, p. Ixxxii.
k?Lattimore, pg. pit., p. 97.
^®Tien-fong Cheng, A History of Sino-Russian Relations (Washington* Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. L9. ”
^^Friters, pg. cit., p. 5 0 .
^^Owen Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), pp. 28: ^
^Ipriters, pg. cit., p. 5k.
^^Ibid., p. 1 5 8 .
% i d . , p. 1 62.
^kibid.
^ % i d . , p. 5 3 .
^®Ibid., p. 17k, citing Krasnyi Arkhiv (Red Archives), p. I8 .
^7%ang, pg. pit., pp. 312-313.
^®Friters, pg. cit., p. 1 8 1 .
% i d . , p. 186 .
®^ang, pg. cit., pp. 362-365.
6 llbid., p. 3 6 8 .
®2priters, pg. cit., p. 121.
63ibid., p. 1 2 2 .
®^ang, pg. pit., p. 381.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31
^^Ibid., p. 382.
^^avid J. Dallin, Soviet Russian and the Far East (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19U8), p. T T
^7paul H. Clyde, The Far East (Englewood Cliffs, N. J,: Prentice- Hall, 1958), p. U09.
6®Sir Charles Bell, Tibet, Past and Present (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 192k), pp. 289-291.
^%riters, og. cH., p. 5 0 .
7^^11, pg. cit., pp. 287-289 .
'Tlpriters, pg. cit., p. 258.
7^Bell, pg. cit., p. 2 28.
73oallin, pg. cH., p. 8 0 .
7kpriters, pg. cit., p. lk3.
7^Ibid., p. Ik7.
7^Ibid.. p. Ik8.
77p)id., p. 221.
7®Ibid., pp. 226-230.
79Allen S. Whiting, and Sheng Shi-ts'ai, Sinkiang, Pawn or Pivot (East Lansing: Hichigan State University Press, 1958), p." 56, "51 ting Miscellaneous Documents Relating to the Political and General Situation In Sinkiang (in Japanese), À.6.1.3.k. Vol. II, June 1930-December 1933, ..Japanese Foreign Office archives.
W a l t e r Kolarz, Peoples of the Soviet Far East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 195kJ, p. ikl. ®^Dallin, pg. cit., pp. 35k, 356.
®2priters, pg. cit., pp. 212-213.
®3Associated Press, Dispatch, The New York Herald Tribune, February 15, 19k6. ~
®^Associated Press dispatch. The New York Times, February 11, 19k6; United Press dispatch. The New York times, February 8, 19k6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32 ®5Robert A. Riqjen, "Partition in the Land of Genghis Khan," Current Scene, II (September 27, 1962), pp. 2-3.
®% e v York Times, September 30, 19k9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER II
THE MONGOLIANS AND THE SOVIET UNION
The relations of the Mongolian People's Republic with the USSR
have been based on "Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance of
February 27, 19U6." The treaty, concluded a few months after the
Republic of China's recognition of Mongolian independence, replaced the
Soviet-Mongol Protocol of Mutual Assistance of 1936. Little information
seems available on actual diplomatic contacts between Ulan Bator and
Moscow during the first years after 19U9, although the Sino-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance of February ik,
1 9 5 0 , was the first of a series of events concerning and involving the
Mongols.
At the signing of the treaty, notes were exchanged to the effect
that "... both governments declare the independent status of the
Mongolian People's Republic, resulting from the referendum of 19k5, and
the establishment of diplomatic relations with it by the Chinese
People's Republic, to be fully ensured."1 It is reported that the term
" independent status" was used with regard to the MPR rather than the
word "independent" at the behest of the Chinese. The inclusion of the
phrase "the establishment with it of diplomatic relations by the CPR"
also indicates that Chinese diplomatic contact with Mongolia was made a
precondition to recognition ty China. It is clear, however, that Soviet
predominance in the MPR was the keynote of Mongolian international rela tions at that juncture.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3k
Two weeks after the treaty and notes were signed, an article
appeared in Izvestia commemorating the Fourth Anniversary of the Soviet-
Mongol Treaty of Friendship and MutuAl Aid and Agreement on Economic and
Cultural Cooperation. The article, by its timing, could not help but to
serve as a reminder to the Mongolians and the Chinese of Soviet pre
eminence in Mongolia. Internal developments in the MPR were cited, and
mention was made of the Soviet Union's defense of the MPR's right to
admission to the United Nations.%
In April, 1950, the MPR established diplomatic contact with
Poland and East Germany, who were among the first, if not actually the
first Eastern European countries to enter relations with Mongolia. It
would appear that Moscow considered it necessary to increase Mongolian
contact with the European socialist countries at that time.
Also in April of that year, the Soviet and Mongolian ambassadors
to the MPR and the Soviet Union were changed. On April ik, N. Idamjav
of the MPR presented his credentials in Moscow; on April 30, M. Prikhov
of the USSR presented his credentials in Ulan Bator.3 The newspaper
account of Idamjav's arrival in Moscow referred to Soviet-Mongol friend
ship, and also to the recent establishment of contact between Mongolia
and Poland and East Germany. The latter was praised as strengthening
the canqp of socialism and democracy.^ While no e^gjlanation appeared as
to y h y the change of ambassadors occurred, it might appear that the
Soviet Union, at least, was trying to put its relations with Mongolia
in order. • » On September 30, 1950, the Russian press carried the news that
the Sino-Soviet Agreement and notes of February Ik had been ratified
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by Peking. Shortly thereafter, the agreements were ratified by Moscow.^
Little of record occurred in the following months. An article appeared
in a Soviet journal concerning Russian archeaological discoveries in
Mongolia; it is interesting to note that problems were admitted in that
fossil bone deposits in the MPR extend into China— through Inner
Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet. These problems would have to be solved
by the joint efforts of the Soviet Union, China, and the MPR.® Then, on
July 11, 1951, an article appeared in Pravda commemorating Mongolian
National Independence Day; While no mention was made of the amount of
Soviet Aid to the MPR, achievements of that country's economy with such
aid were listed. Most of the several changes listed dealt in general
terms with progress made in development of newer livestock breeding techniques.7
On October 19, 1951, a Mongolian trade delegation arrived in
Moscow, lead by D. Maidar, Deputy Prime Minister of the MPR. While the
Mongols were in Moscow, the Soviet assistant trade representative to
Ulan Bator came to Moscow. It was apparently an outcome of this visit
that a Soviet-Mongol 1951-195k trade agreement was concluded.®
Ten days after the arrival of the trade delegation from Ulan
Bator, delegates from the MPR Central Counci 1 of Trade Unions arrived in
Moscow. The group, headed by Chairman of the Council Lhamnerengin
Norovsambu came to Moscow from Kazakhstan, where they had spent five 9 days. The visit by the Mongols in the Kazakh S.S.R. was the first
recorded official contact between the peoples of those countries, and
seems to have been the initiation of a relationship that apparently is presently extant.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36
The Soviet Ambassador to the MPR, Prikhov, who had assumed his
post in April, 1950, was replaced in Ulan Bator by G. I. Ivannikov on or
about November 13, 195l. The newspaper account simply stated that
Prikhov had been relieved of his duties.
Soviet-Mongol relations entered a crisis of sorts when Choibalsan,
the old Mongol revolutionaiy and long-time leader of the MPR, died in a
Moscow hospital. Choibalsan had been a staunch ally of the Soviet Union
and his loss at that particular point presented the Soviets with a
problem. With Mongolian-Chinese relations beginning to develop apace,
the Soviets needed to ensure that the new premier of the MPR would carry
out a pro-Soviet policy. Immediately following Choibalsan’s death on
January 26, 1952, there appeared in the Mongol press a strong appeal to
all people and leaders in the MPR to maintain strong friendship with the
Soviet Union. The following month, February (the month of the Soviet-
Mongol Treaty of 19k6) was titled "Soviet-Mongolian Friendship Month"
and celebrations were carried out in both countries.
Some time elapsed before a new Premier was named in Mongolia.
Finally, on May 28, 1952, Yumzhagin Tsederibal was named to that office.
Tsedenbal had pledged his loyalty to the Soviet Union at the death of 12 Choibalsan. While available information does not make Tsedenbal, then
leader of the Mongolian Party, an unlikely choice, it is interesting to
note the lapse of time before his appointment was effected.
The Soviet press printed articles on Soviet-Mongol relations in
April, the month preceding Tsedenbal’s appointment, and on July 11, the
MPR's national holiday. The April article extolled Mongol progress
under Soviet guidance, and the Jùjty item was an editorial of three
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thousand words in Pravda commenting on the Mongolian holiday. The last
paragraph of the latter stated that the Mongolian people follow the pre
cepts of Sukebator and Choibalsan in "dearly cherishing and constantly
strengthening their friendship with the Soviet Union and all people of the socialist canç>,"^3
In mid-August, 1952, Sambu, Foreign Minister of the MPR, arrived
in Moscow to take part in talks between Chou En-lai, Premier of the
Chinese People's Republic and representatives of the Soviet Government.
Two weeks later, on August 28, Tsedenbal arrived in Moscow to join the
talks. On September 5, Tsedenbal was received by Stalin.The results
of the talks in Moscow were two in number. Thé first was a Sino-Soviet-
Mongolian Agreement which provided for the construction of a railway
from the Soviet Union to China through the MPR. The second was the
state visit by Tsedenbal to Peking immediately following his Moscow trip
and the Sino-Mongolian Agreement of October k, 1 9 5 2 . (See Chapter III
for a discussion of the Sino-Mongolian Agreement.)
The agreement of construction of the through railroad was impor
tant, as it would permit Chinese influence to travel into Mongolia from
the south as would Soviet influence from the north. Rupen mentions that
the Soviet Union-MPR branch of the railroad was begun by running a
branch line from Ulan Ude to Khiakhta in 1937; the first train from the
Soviet Union arrived in Ulan Bator on November %, 19k9.^® In a sense,
although the new through railway would expedite trade and shipping between
Russia and China, the Agreement of 1952 also permitted the breaking of
the hitherto Russian monopoly over rail communication and its concomitant
politico-economic influence in the MPR.
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On January 26, 1953, the first anniversary of Choibalsan*s death,
Pravda carried an article on the deceased hero. The article described
the future path of the MPR as including friendship with both the Soviet
Union and China, and all countries of "peace, democracy and socialism." ^7
The possibility exists that such a statement, in contrast with earlier
ones, constituted somewhat of an admission that the Soviet Union no
longer held a simple pre-eminence in Mongolia.
The next event of record was a reception held on July 11, by
Adilbish, the then current Mongolian Ambassador to the Soviet Union. In
attendance were Molotov, Zhukov, Mikoyan, and ministers of various de
partments in the Soviet Government. Not only was the occasion the first
reported Independence Day celebration given by a Mongolian Ambassador,
it was attended by officials of fairly high rank. 1®
In December 26, 1953, the Soviet Government announced a new trade
agreement with the Mongolian People's Republic. Under the terms of the
agreement, the MPR was to furnish to the Soviet Union products of its
pastoral economy, and the Soviet Union was to provide in exchange fabrics, oil products, and industrial equipment.^9 The following year, a Soviet 20 project to dam the Irtysh river was announced. Since this would create
a lake on the MPR-Sinkiang (Chinese) border, it would seem that an
agreement had been reached with the Chinese regarding the project,
although nothing appeared in the general Chinese press at that time.
The Mongols achieved another step in developing their contacts
within the socialist bloc when they attended the communist World Inter
national Broadcasting Organization session in Warsaw during early May, 195U.21
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Little appears of public record during the remainder of the year
concerning Soviet-Hongolian relations. However, in the months following,
developments would appear not to have been favorable for the Soviets.
At the Twelfth Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party,
held from November 11-25, 195k, the Soviet delegation was of surprisingly
obscure official stature. The delegation was headed by one Komarov,
Vice Chairman of the Party Control Committee of the Central Committee of
the CFSU, and Smirnov, "Assistant Head of a department in the Soviet
Communist Party Central Committee." The Chinese delegation, in contrast,
was headed by Ulanfu, ranking Chinese Communist Mongol, and head of the 22 Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.
The same day that the Soviet delegation arrived in Ulan Bator,
November l8, Pravda announced the conclusion of a new trade agreement
for the period from 1955-1958. The items scheduled for shipment by the
Soviet Union showed more variety and importance than those listed in
previous agreements. The list for the 1955 Agreement included consumer goods, farm machinery, and motor vehicles.^3
The timing of the two events— the trade protocol and the obscure
Soviet delegation to the PRP Congress— would indicate that although
Soviet-Mongol commercial intercourse was apparently continuing smoothly,
the Soviets intended to reprove the Mongols by sending a less-tharv-token
delegation to the first Mongol Party Congress in seven years. The
Mongols, however, aside from an observation in Tsedenbal's report that
since the last PRP Congress the CPR had come into existence, gave
neither power special mention, but referred to both in glowing terms.
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Little information appears regarding any diplomatic contact
between the Soviet Union and the MPR in the early months of 1955* How
ever, on September 20, delegates from the Soviet Union and the CPR began
a conference with representatives of the Mongolian government in Ulan
Bator. The purpose of the meeting was the negotiation of agreements
concerning the opening of through railway traffic between the USSR, the
MPR, and the CPR. Twenty-seven days later, on October 17, the con
ference ended. On October 28, the Chinese press disclosed that three
. protocols and an agreement had been signed ly representatives of the
three governments.
The text of the documents was not given, but their titles ap
peared as follows: (1) Protocol on questions of opening a through
traffic railroad through the MPR; (2) An agreement on the railroad of
the Mongolian-Chinese border; (3) Protocol to open through passenger and
freight traffic by railroad from Peking and Ulan Bator; (k) Protocol on
Soviet-Mongolian Joint Committee on the border railroad.^^
During the conference, Tsedenbal reportedly visited Peking for
the October 1 celebration, arriving there September 28. His speech on
arrival gave equal praise to the Soviet Union and the CPR.^® While no
information appears to be available as to what transpired between Tseden
bal and the Chinese during the former's visit, it does not seem likély
that his trip to Peking at that moment pleased the Kremlin.
In December, 1955, an East German parliamentarian delegation
headed by Grotewohl visited the MPR at the letter's invitation. On
December 27, representatives of the two governments signed a joint
statement expressing Mongol-German amity.^7 This was the first recorded
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socialist bloc since the Twelfth PRP Congress the previous December.
Two days later, on December 29, another Soviet Delegation arrived
in Ulan Bator. The Soviets, and a group of Chinese who arrived the same
day, were in Mongolia for the purpose of opening the railway through that
country. The next day, the Mongolian segment of the line from Ulan
Bator to Chamu Ut (Dzamyn Uud) was handed over with due ceremony to the
Mongolians ly the Soviet representative. December 31, 1955, was the
official ribbon-cutting ceremoiy opening that portion of the railway to traffic.2®
The period from 1953 to May 7, 1957, has been referred to by
Rupen as one of increasing Chinese i n f l u e n c e . ^9 jn reference to Soviet-
Mongol relations, it can be seen that the year from December 195k to
December 1955 was not an active year. At the end of the period, with
Soviet withdrawal from the railway in Mongolia, Soviet influence in the
MPR was reduced considerably. The introduction of rail communication
between China and Mongolia (Ulanfu cut the ribbon on the Chining/Ulan
Bator segment on l/l/56) conversely increased the CPR's purchase in the MPR.30
If 1955 had been the year of the freeze in Soviet-Mongol rela
tions, 1956 showed several evidences of a thaw. February 2 8 , the tenth
anniversary of the Soviet-Mongol Treaty of 19k6, was given special
attention in Moscow.3^ One month later, on March 27, another step was
taken toward placing Mongolian relations with socialist countries on a
broader basis when the MPR (and China) were admitted to the Communist 32 Nuclear Research Institute. It would appear that since the Soviet
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Union could no longer monopolize Mongolian foreign relations, the next
most desirable step was the prevention of a Chinese monopoly. Hence,
the encouragement of Mongolian contact with other members of the bloc.
In early April, A. Mikoyan, Moscow's economics trouble-shooter,
stopped in Ulan Bator on the last leg of his trip through Asia. A few
days later, a communique was released disclosing that an agreement had
been reached on Soviet aid to the MPR for the 1956-1960 period. While
no actual figures were given as to the amount of the aid, the projects
describedr-prefabricated housing units, a milk plant, four rolling
mills, and others— obviously entailed a large total value. While the
construction projects were on a long-term credit basis, included in the
agreement was the free transfer to the MPR of the Soviet-Mongolian Ulan
Bator Railroad Company, and the Soloveysk-Bayan Tumen and Choibalsan-
Tamtsak Bulak railway lines, conplete with all equipment and narrow-
gauge rolling stock. The method of repayment for the construction
assistance was to be over a long period at favorable rates.^3
In June or July, S. Bata became the Mongolian Ambassador in
Moscow. Adilbish, formerly in that position, became Foreign Minister of
the MPR. Rupen interprets this as a development favorable to the
Russian position with the MPR, and points out that Idamjav, also
previously in Moscow as Ambassador, became Adilbish's deputy. Thus, the
two leading positions in that department were filled by ostensibly pro-
Russian officials.^^
In late August, 1956, it was announced that the Soviet Union and
other European socialist countries would assist the MPR in the further
construction of its econoiy, their aid to be used in conjunction with
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coincides in part with that projected in the April agreement, there
apparently were planned some additional projects— flour mills, enlarge
ment of an electric power station in Ulan Bator, and others.3^ It is
noted that although Adilbish in an August interview with an Associated
Press correspondent credited the CPR with having sent about l60 million
rubles of aid that year, he "couldn’t remember" how much the Soviet Union had sent.3®
That same month, the first of two trade treaties between Czecho
slovakia and the MPR was announced. The treaties also provided for a
900 million ruble loan by the CSR.3?
On October 6, 1956, a delegation from the Rumanian People's
Republic arrived in Ulan Bator from Peking. The delegation, headed by
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, was welcomed by Tsedenbal and Z. Sambu. While
no communique appeared in the general press, the Rumanian leader is
reported to have said that the trip should develop the friendly relations
between the MPR and the RFR.3®
The following month, the MPR gained a certain amount of prestige
within the socialist group of nations ly vigorously supporting the Soviet
Union in its policy toward the East European blow-up.39 On November 6,
a cable was sent to the "Hungarian Workers' and Peasants' Government"
announcing that the MPR was sending two thousand tons of wheat and one
hundred tons of meat to the Hungarian p e o p l e .
On December Ik, a protocol was signed in Moscow on trade for 1957
between the Soviet Union and Mongolia. According to the list of
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commodities to be traded, only one item, medicines, appeared to be new
that year.^^
The same month, the second Czech-Hongol trade agreement of 1956
was concluded,^^
Rupen refers to 1956 as the last year of relative Chinese pre
eminence in the MPR before the Soviet Union regained the advantage there.
It was reported that, at the end of August, 1956, the Soviet Union
accounted for 58 to 60 per cent of the MPR's foreign trade, while trade
with China only represented about 20 per cent of the total.^3 At about
the same time, it was reported that Soviet troops still were numerous in
the MPR.kk Rupen, on the other hand, says that 1956 was the year in
which the last Soviet troops left the MPR.^^ The troops must, therefore,
have left Mongolia during the final months of 1956.
The departure of Soviet troops may well have been the beginning
of a new phase in Soviet-Mongol relations. On Januaiy 28, 1957, a "plan
for cultural cooperation" was signed by representatives of the govern
ments of the MPR and the USSR for 1957.^® Also under discussion were
preliminary plans for 1958. A month later, on the anniversary of the
19k6 Treaty, an article by Ambassador Bata appeared in Pravda which
stated that the cornerstone of Mongolian foreign policy is "still
primarily good relations with the USSR."k7
On March 30, Mongolia signed a trade agreement with Poland. A
week later, two Mongol-Czech agreements were concluded; the first was a
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and the second, an Agreement on
Cultural Cooperation. The following month, a Mongol-Czech agreement on
Scientific and Cultural Cooperation was signed in P r a g u e . k8
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After five days of Soviet-Mongolian discussions, a Joint statement by
Bulganin and Tsedenbal was issued which departed from previous practice
and specified somewhat the amount of past Soviet aid to the MPR and that
planned for the future. Thereby, it would seem, the Soviets were serving
notice that they had, after all, done more for the Mongols in t k past
than any other power, and would continue to be the prime assistant to
Mongolian "socialist construction."
The Soviet Union, the statement said, had contributed some 900
million rubles in loans and gifts from 19k7-1957, one-third of which
were devoted to the development of the Mongol oil industry. The state
ment went on to say that the MongoIneft (Mongolian Oil) Trust would be
handed over to the MPR without compensation. Likewise to be transferred
without repayment were the installations and equipment of ths airports
at Sain Shanda (Sainshand) and Ulan Bator, along with a "specific number"
of planes. The Soviet-Mongol joint stock geological and mining company
So\diongolmetal was to be transferred to the MPR on favorable terms, with
payment to be made over thirty years, beginning in 1962. At the time of
the statement, eighteen industrial, agricultural, and municipal estab
lishments were being built in Mongolia with the "material, technical, and
financial aid" of the Soviet Union. These included, in part, the
Nalaikha-Ks^italnaya coal mine, four flour mills, water and sewage
systems, housing units, and others.
Aid for the 1958-I960 period was to include massive assistance to
agriculture— tractors, equipment, diesel and mobile generators, and a
large number of pedigreed cattle. Other enterprises included a radio
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station in Ulan Bator, wood-processing plants for pre-fabricated houses,
and geological prospecting for ore and noxv-metallic minerals. The MPR
was to receive a loan of 200 million rubles "on easy terms" with which
to pay for assistance.
The Tsedenbal-Bulganin Joint Statement, according to Rupen,
marked the beginning of the current period of Soviet pre-eminence in the
MPR.^ While this is true, insofar as the USSR has the largest portion
of Mongol trade, and is the MPR's largest benefactor, it appears that
the terms of Soviet-Mongol relations have changed somewhat. The largest
single items of Soviet aid to the MPR have been, ostensibly, the rail
road, airport, and oil enterprises from which the Soviets have almost,
if not completely, withdrawn, leaving the Mongols in charge. Thus, pre
eminence may have come at the prite of an expensive withdrawal from
points of influence.
Mongolian relations with Eastern Europe were further expanded
with the conclusion of an MPR-QDR Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation ■il and an Agreement on Cultural Cooperation on August 22, 1957, in Berlin.
On August 31, V. M. Molotov, fallen from favor within the SoViet
Communist Party, was appointed Ambassador to the MPR.^^ Little informa
tion appears as to why he was given the Ulan Bator post, but it appears
that the appointment was motivated by two possible reasons, or a combina
tion of both.
The first, that in actuality Ulan Bator is an important post, may
have validity. Certainly Soviet attitudes at that particular point
called for a capable person in the Soviet Embassy in the MPR. However,
the second reason, that it was simply a type of banishment, seems to be
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delegation to the Mongolian PRP Congress referred in detail to the
expulsion of the "antl-Party group" which included Molotov, presumably
in the letter's presence.
The following month, Tsedehbal visited Eastern Europe, stopping
in Budapest on September 12 (where he Joined Kadar in vituperating
against the United States), and a week later in Warsaw.The pattern
of wider contact for the MPR within the socialist camp continued to
develop.
Perhaps one result of the Eastern European trip was the conclu
sion of a Mongolian-Hangarian Agreement on Mon-Trade Remittances in
Budapest on October L, 19S7.25
It is reported that a delegation of high-level Mongolian offi
cials visited Moscow for the Fortieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik
Revolution in November. That same month, the MPR participated in a
Conference of Economists of Socialist Countries in Moscow from the
twenty-sixth to the twenty-eighth of November.
In December, the Soviets and the Mongols signed agreements on the
mutual exchange of goods and, separately, trade between the two coun
tries. The period covered by the agreements was 1958-1960, and the
amount of trade turnover was to exceed one billion rubles. The listed
items showed more of a variety of Mongolian products— including meat,
livestock on the hoof, and silk. The Soviet products ran according to
previous pattern except for the addition of petroleum products.
Against previously granted credit the Soviet Union was to deliver
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during 1958, tractors, farm machinery, saw-frames, and other materials 57 and equipment.
On January 3, 1958, a Mongolian-Bulgarian Trade Protocol was
signed in Sofia; it is not clear whether or not the Protocol was con
cerned with a long-term trade plan or simply one year.^®
The MPR began to participate more actively in Soviet propaganda
campaigns during March of the following year. On March 1, a mass
meeting in Ulan Bator expressed support of the appeal of the Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference for a ban on nuclear testing,pour weeks later,
the Great People's Hural closed in Ulan Bator after expressing support
for Soviet policies evocated the previous year. The Hural vigorously
supported Moscow's proposal for a summit conference.^
The same month, the Thirteenth Congress of the People's Revolu-
tionary Party was held in Ulan Bator. Delegations from the Soviet Union,
China, and all the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia were
in attendance. The Chinese Delegation, headed as usual by Ulanfu,
apparently arrived a day later than did the Soviets, and relatively
little was carried in the general Chinese press regarding their partici
pation in the Congress.
The most notable aspect of the conference was the Soviet referral
to the e:q}ulsion of the group mentioned earlier. Gratitude was expressed
for Mongolian support of the Party's action in the matter, and the
situation was raked over in detail.8l There is speculation that the
speech was intended as a reminder to the Mongols that Mr. Molotov should
not be allowed to associate too freely with the "wrong" people, such as
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of jailer for Molotov.
On April lit, a delegation from Rumania held talks with Mongolian
representatives in Ulan Bator. No reason was given for the Rumanian
visit nor for the talks
On May 20, a Conference of Communist and Worker's Parties was
convened in Moscow. It was announced five days later that the economies
of the Par Eastern communist countries were to be integrated with the
European bloc. Representatives of the respective party organizations of
China, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam were present by invita
tion as observers
The same month, a delegation representing the MPR's Great People's
Hural made a tour to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. After visiting
Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungazy, they returned to Ulan Bator on
June 7, 1958.^^
On June 20, Pravda reprinted an editorial from Unen, the official
Mongolian Party organ, blasting Yugoslavia— with whom the MPR had estab
lished relations some eighteen months previously.
On July 2, a delegation from the Mongolian PRP attended an Inter
national Communications Conference in Moscow.
A significant series of developments in Sovlet-Mongol relations
occurred in July 1958. On July 7, the name of the Buryat Mongol
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was changed, and the word "Mongol"
was deleted by decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. As of the
January 1959 census, the BASSR is reported to have a population of
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671,000, of whom 100,000 are Buryats. An additional 253*000 Buryats
live outside the Autonomous Republic but within the USSR.
The same month, the second largest Mongol population in the Soviet
Union, the Kalmucks, were raised to the status of an Autonomous Republic.
The Kalmucks number about 106,000, over 90 per cent of whom live in the
Kalmuck Autonomous SSR.^^
Ripen reports that the Tuvan Autonomous Oblast (Tannu Tuva, which
was incorporated into the Soviet Union January 10, 19lUt) was involved in
a "border question" in 1958. The MPR was led to register a protest with
Moscow, and then forced to retract. The development ultimately led to
the removal of the Mongolian Foreign Minister, Avarzed, in the summer of 1958.^®
It will be seen later that the developments described involved
far more than simply those Mongol peoples within the Soviet Union.
Another event of importance occurred in Soviefc-Mongolian relations
in August, 1958. The Soviet Union and the MPR concluded an agreement on
the "volume of possible deliveries of commodities" for 1961-1965* and on
Soviet aid to the MPR. Under the terms of that agreement, the MPR was
to receive 10,000 head of livestock, 2,^00 tractors and other equipment.
The agreement was an indication of the new turn events were taking.
In October, Mongolia signed a trade agreement with Bulgaria. The
MPR was to supply wool, leather and "animal products," and Bulgaria, 70 ' canned food, knitted goods, and other daily necessities.
On October 25, a ten-day Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Festival
began. Its purpose was to acquaint the Mongol people with the achieve- 71 ments of the Kazakh S5R. One of the reasons for developing Kazakh-
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Mongolian relations may well have been to present an example of the
benefits of forsaking nomadism for stable, fixed abodes and ranch-type
livestock breeding.
Subsequent events in the MPR made it even clearer that a new,
more militant line was being taken regarding economic development in the
MPR. On December 21, a Unen editorial praised the wise steps taken by
the CFSU and Soviet achievements in agriculture. The editorial extolled
the heroic labor of the Soviet people, and indicated that a comparison
of Soviet agriculture and industry with that of the Western countries
"showed the absolute superiority of the socialist system. . . ."^2
In January 1959* it was announced that the Mongolians were
instituting a "Socialist Emulation Drive*" in which competition between
organizations would be encouraged and incentives offered for higher
production.^^ The following month, Unen printed an editorial on "The
Party’s Role in State Organizations," calling for streamlining and
modernization of Party leadership of socialist construction.^^
The next d^y, February 10, 1959, an agreement was signed in
Moscow by Khrushchev and Tsedenbal on Soviet aid to the MPR in culti
vating virgin lands and in geological surveying. Apparently at the
behest of the Soviet Union, the MPR was to be assisted in becoming self-
sufficient in grain production. In order to help the MPR to achieve
such rapid development, a Soviet-financed agricultural expedition was to
be sent to Mongolia in the first quarter of I960 to locate and examine
virgin lands for cultivation. During 1959-1960, massive amounts of
agricultural equipment were to be sent to Mongolia, on easy credit 75 terms.
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Such a development vas not greeted unanimously as the gateway to
the future in the MPR. Agriculture, and livestock breeding had long
been a trouble spot in Mongolia’s modernization program. Traditionally
a nomadic, livestock-herding people, the Mongols had long regarded
agriculture as degrading, and had steadfastly resisted attempts at col
lectivization and introduction of localized herding.
In addition to sociological and cultural barriers to moderniza
tion, the Mongolian leaders were faced with natural limitations in terms
of available arable land, scanty rainfall, and shortage of surface and
subterranean water. A good case has been made that the MPR had been
operating, prior to the developmental innovations, at or above the
optimum level of livestock raising on the type and amount of grazing
land available.
It would thus appear that the Mongols, under Soviet guidance,
were undertaking two apparently mutually exclusive tasks in attempting
to increase both the level of livestock and amount of cultivated land.
Some of the inplications of the Soviet-Mongol agreement of Feb
ruary 10 became apparent at a Plenary Session of the Central Committee
of the PRP in Ulan Bator, held March 27-30, 1959. The Session discussed
two problems. The first was a report by Tsedenbal on the Twenty-first
Congress of the CPSU, and the conclusions arising from the Congress for
the work of the PRP. The second, a report from the Chairman of the
State Planning Commission, Tsende, concerned "... the Introduction of
Certain Changes in the Three-Year Plan for Development of the MPR, 1958-
1960."^^
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Another matter was resolved at the Plenary Session. Six members
and candidate members of the Political Bureau (Politburo) were removed
from membership. One of the six, Damba, was also removed from the post
of Second Secretary of the Party Central Committee. The reasons for the
dismissals included "profound ideological and political backwardness,
. . . conservatism and inertia," on the part of Damba, and "unfitting
ideological and political levels," on the part of the rest. A seventh
member, Dugerzhav, was removed from the Chairmanship of the Party Control
Committee for having failed to cope with the work.7®
The Mongolian Ambassador to the Soviet Union was replaced on
February 13 by Jaabaldorjit three days after the Agreement. While no
report has linked that change with the purge of the politburo, it ap
pears likely that there was a connection between the two.79
While the expulsion may have been the result of a sort of power
struggle not uncommon within Communist Parties throughout the world, it
appears that the grounds for such a struggle may have been the change to
a rapid pace of socialization. If this is true, there must have existed
at least two factions within the PRP. One apparently was in favor of
rapid development, and sufficiently desirous of Russian aid to pursue a
pro-Russian line. The other faction probably was conservative enough to
react against rapid change.
The rapid development drive was thus well on its way after the
conclusion of the Soviet-Hongolian Agreement of Februazy 10 and the
removal from positions of authority those elements opposing the new
program.
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Eastern European countries also were involved in increased
activity with the MPR in 1959* In March, the MPR signed agreements on
trade and plans for cooperation, respectively, with Albania and 80 Rumania. On April 13, a delegation from Kingary arrived in Ulan Bator,
and after five days a Joint communique disclosed that the two govern
ments had signed an agreement on loans to the MPR and cooperation in
health work.®^
In early May, a delegation from East Germany visited the MPR and
were given the gamut of Communist hospitality, including a Mongol-German
Friendship Rally.Later that year, another series of agreements were
concluded; within 10 days in August agreements were signed on goods
exchanged, trade, and another on trade, respectively, with Czechoslo
vakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The latter stipulated a trade volume Uo per cent higher'in 1960,®3
The following October, President Novotny of Czechoslovakia visited
the MPR, and shortly thereafter, a high-ranking Polish delegation
arrived in Ulan Bator.
The more or less standard gestures were also maintained by the
Soviet Union and the MPR in 1959; June 11 to July 11 was celebrated as
Soviet-Mongolian Friendship Month in both countries. In August, a
Soviet delegation visited Mongolia at the invitation of the MPR for the
twentieth anniversary celebration of the battle of I&ra Gol. It is
interesting to note that no first-line officials met the Soviet delega
tion upon its arrival in Ulan Bator.
By the end of 1959* the MPR’s position in relation to the Soviet
Union had undergone a radical change. Under the conditions of the rapid
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development program undertaken in 1959* Mongolia was rendered dependent
upon the aid of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries.
The extent of such dependence is more clearly visible in examination of
succeeding years * as more data had been made available concerning the
later period.
Certain steps had been taken by the beginning of i960 which fur
thered the MPR’s goals in development. It is reported that ninety-nine
per cent of the individual arat (herdsman, in this context) households
had been brought into the cooperative system, and that approximately
seventy-five per cent of all livestock had become public property.
During the same period more than lU0,000 hectares of virgin lands were
plowed (over a half million hectares of virgin lands were surveyed and
selected for plowing by Soviet experts). Capital investment in agricul
ture increased by seventy-five per cent during the first nine months of 19^9.86
In January, 196O, a delegation from the GDR visited Mongolia, and
on the eighth, a communique was released to the effect that East Germany
was to help the MPR to construct a meat-pressing combine.^7
The following month, the star of the MPR rose higher in the com
munist heaven when Tsedehbal and a delegation of high level leaders
attended a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw
Pact nations in Moscow.®® On February 11, an agreement was signed with
the Soviet Union whereby the MPR would receive some 130,000,000 rubles
in aid to finance larger projects during the Mongol Five Year Plan
(1961-1965).®^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56
In April, Saabu, the President of the Presidium of the Great
Hural visited Poland. It was reported that Gomulka was to visit the MPR
in return. In July, a long-term trade agreement was signed by the MPR
and the GDR, covering the period of the Five Year Plan.90
Another development occurred in July vdiich, obscure in its impli
cations, would seem to have a bearing on Soviet-Mongol relations. A
Tass report stated that one D. Tumur-Ochir, a secretary of the PRP of the
MPR had been relieved of his duties and dismissed from the Politburo.
Tumur-Ochir had been elected to the Politburo following the purge of
February, 1959.^^ No reasons were given for Tumur-Ochir’s dismissal,
but subsequent events show that the official’s demotion may have been . ..
related to Soviet-Mongol affairs. The possibility of such a connection will be discussed at a later point.
In September, I960, negotiations were completed between the Soviet
Union and the MPR on the fhrther expansion of economic cooperation
between the two countries. On September 9 , an agreement was signed
whereby the MPR was to receive some 615,000,000 rubles, half of which
was earmarked for development of agriculture during the Five Year Plan.
Provision was also made for the deferral of payment of a debt of
2^5*000,000 rubles owed by the MPR from previously extended credits.93
While it is not possible to ascertain what the Russians and the Mongols
may have contemplated when the initial large-scale agreements of 1959
were concluded as to the future level of Soviet loans and aid, it is
clear that the trend has been an upward one.
That same month, the Soviet Ambassador to Ulan Bator, Molotov,
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vas replaced by Alexei Khvorostukhln. Molotov vas being appointed to a
post in Vienna, as Soviet Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
In October, i960, a delegation of Mongols visited the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR in Moscow. From this came plans to assist the
Mongolian Committee on Science and Higher Education to become an Academy
of Sciences. An agreement was also signed on October I8 , I960, on the
conditions for exchanges of students and graduate students at civil
higher educational institutions and research institutes. Further aid in
the scientific field may have been forthcoming for the MPR under a
scientific agreement concluded in December 1960.95
Therefore, during i960 the ties between the M P R and the Soviet
Union were, in one sense, drawn even tighter. The projects of develop
ment in the Mongolian economy made strides forward where this result
could be obtained by direct application of Soviet expertise and technical
aid. Under the agreements of 1956, 1957, and 1959, over three thousand
tractors, some nine hundred combines, and more than three thousand
trucks were delivered to the MPR. The amount of virgin land plowed
reached a quarter of a million hectares, i&mgarian experts drilled a
total of fifteen wells in diyer areas of the MPR.96
It is also noted that the total number of livestock in the MPR is
reported to have decreased from 19^8 to I96O from 23,U00,000to
22,000,000 head.97 This is probably a result of reducing grazing land
available to herding enterprises by plowing iqp "wastelands." It may also
be a human phenomenon in that cooperativization of the herders is reported
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to have caused the arats to slaughter the cattle or drive them into
Chinese Inner Mongolia.
A report by Victor Oganesoff in I96 I from Ulan Bator stated that
Soviet exports to the MPR in i960 amounted to some $59 million, compared 92 to $22 million from China. Although Russian trade predominates
Mongolian foreign commerce, a decrease is noted from previous years.
This was explained in a 1959 Russian article by the fact that agreements
on mutual deliveries of goods changed the terms of economic interchange—
less consumer goods were shipped to the MPR, and more machinery and equipment.99
In 1961, the MPR became more esqjlicitly involved in the growing
ideological dispute between the Soviet Union and the OPR. In February,
a delegation from the MPR took part in a mission to Tirana, in company
with Chinese and Korean delegations, to try to heal the breach between
the Soviet Union and Albania.
Whether or not the mission to Albania was successful, it appears
that the Kremlin was satisfied with Mongolia's attitude in the matter.
On February 15, the MPR and CSR signed an agreement whereby the latter
would extend to Mongolia some 7.2 million rubles (this figure was
accompanied by the notation "at present currency rates," and may indi
cate a value in new rubles) during the 1961-1965. This aid was to be
used in the construction of several enterprises, including a cement
factory, a two-hundred-bed hospital, and others.
Two days later, an agreement was signed between the MPR and
Hungary, under the terms of which Mongolia was to receive a loan of it.5
million rubles (again, at "existing currency rates") for the purpose of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 building a clothing factory and esqpanding the Ulan Bator bio-chemical
factory. More wells, seventy-five in number, were to be drilled.^®^
The following month, a Soviet Military delegation visited the MPR
for the letter's Army Day, led by Marshall Malinovsky. The Chinese
delegation was headed by General Hsu Kuang-ta, Vice Minister of National
Defense, and was apparently a bit outranked by the Soviets.^^3
On March 30, a Soviet-Mongol Protocol was signed in the imple
mentation of the i960 Agreement (s). On April 7, 196I, a Technical
Cooperation Agreement was signed between the two, followed six days
later by an Agreement on Economic Cooperation. Under the terms of the
last pact, the MPR was to receive some 5U2 million rubles (122 million
new rubles), apparently in loans, and payment was again to be deferred
on previous debts owed to the Soviet Union.
Very quickly, five days after the major Soviet-Mongolian Agree
ment was concluded, an apparently unusual expanded session of the
Politburo of the PRP Central Committee, the MPR Council of Ministers,
and the Presidium of the Great People's Khural was convened to discuss
the results of the Moscow negotiations. Tsedenbal gave a report on the
Agreements, a vote of thanks to the USSR was returned, and the Agreement
ratified.While there were no reasons given for the extra-ordinary
procedure, it would appear that the e^qsanded session served as a means
to re-as sure the Kremlin as to the loyalty of the MPR and the unanimity
of Mongolian desires regarding continued rapid development.
On April 30, the MPRP sent greetings to the Central Committee of
the CPSU, assuring that the former is still learning from the I96O
Congress of the CPSU. Again, no e^qolanation appears for a re-affirmation
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of Mongolian loyalty to Moscow in the ideological dispute at this
particular juncture.
In July, the Fourteenth Congress of the MPRP and Fortieth Anni
versary of the MPR's independence took place in Ulan Bator. The event
was played to great heights as a demonstration of Mongolia's close ties
with the Soviet Union, and with the Eastern European Socialist countries.
M. Suslov led a Soviet Party and Government Delegation to the Congress
(thereby snubbing the Chinese, as no Soviet representative attended the
celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the CPC in Peking), and an
exhibition on Soviet economic achievements was held concurrently in Ulan
Bator. Suslov's speech to the Congress on July 10 did not mention the
CPR.^®*^ Nor did Ulanfu's speech on July i^th mention the Soviet Union.
Further gloss was added to the occasion by the presence of
Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz of Poland, who headed a list of Eastern
European delegations. Gomulka's presence in the MPR provided the occa
sion for the conclusion of an agreement between Poland and the MPR. The
agreement provided for the extension of a nine million ruble loan to the
MPR for the I961-1965 period.^09
Although Soviet aid personnel were in evidence in the MPR during
1961, no record appears of any Soviet-Mongol diplomatic events until
November, 196I. On November 3, the Mongol and Soviet Embassies gave a ■
joint party in Peking. The occasion was the Fortieth Anniversary of the
establishment of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and the Soviet
and the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship. Since the event
celebrated occurred prior to any formal Chinese recognition of Mongolia's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6l independence, and was protested by the Chinese government of that time,
no defter or sharper needle could have been applied to Chinese pride.
That same month, following the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU
in which the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute came clearly into view, a
meeting was convened of Mongol Party leaders in Ulan Bator. On November
28, L. Tsende, Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the PRP,
made a speech which was released to the USSR on November 29, blasting
Albania's ideological attitude and praising the CPSU's analysis of the
international situation. It extolled the Congress as the greatest event
of our time, and thereby placed itself squarely on the side of the Soviet
Union in the dispute.
On February 2, 1962, Tsedenbal in a speech in Ulan Bator reported
on the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU and reiterated Mongolian sup
port of Moscow's role in the Congress. He then went on to criticize the
HIP for having built a cult of personality about Choibalsan, and accused
that figure of having been guilty of placing himself above the Party.
The apparent ingjlication of the " de-Choibalsanization" drive is that the
leaders of the PRP desired to show that they were faithfully following
the lead of the CPSU in all phases of Party activity. Another possible
e:q)lanation is that the "pro-development" faction, thus far successful
in maintaining control of the Party apparatus, may have seized upon the
derogation of Choibalsan to gain an advantage in their struggle for
continuing power.
Mongol nationalism was given a healthy boost when the eight
hundredth birthday of Genghis Khan was celebrated on May 31, 1962. A
monument was set tq> and a commemorative stanq> issued.For such a
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manifestation of national feeling to occur at a time when "international
proletarianism" is the order of the day, is a bit surprising. From the
timing of subsequent events, however, it appears that Moscow, while not
pleased, was satisfied that no danger was present in the occasion.
On June 10-12, 1962, the MPR was admitted to the communist
nations' Council on Economic Aid (COMECON)China was not admitted,
and the difference was eiqplained as being that the MPR was at a stage
when long-range planning was necessary, tdiile the CPR had not reached
such a stage. Khrushchev is reported as having stated in the summer of
1962 that the MPR is an example of a country needing aid from all
socialist countries.
During the first session of the Executive Committee of COMECON,
Molomzhants, Finance Minister of the MPR, was in attendance. The meeting
held from July 10-12, 1962, called for "international division of
labor." While such planning, if carried out, would serve to inte
grate the economies of the socialist countries, and thus draw them
closer together politically, including the MPR, it is noted that the
justification for Soviet aid in the 1959-I960 virgin lands program was
to render the MPR self-sufficient in wheat production.^^7
In September, a report was released that Tumur-Ochir, who had
been removed from the Politburo in July, I960, was again e x p e lle dfrom
the Politburo and removed from his post as Secretary of the Central
Committee of the MPRP. The reason given was that during the period of
criticizing the "cult of Choibalsan" he had been anti-Party in action
and had attempted to revise resolutions against nationalism. Tumur-Ochir
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had cast aspersion on the Marxist-Leninist character of the MPRP. The
report said that the ousted official had been elected to office in
January, l?6l.^^®
Soviet-Mongol relations apparently continued smoothly during the
remainder of 1962, and, as clearly as may be ascertained, thus far in
1963. Molomzhants continued to represent the MPR at the sessions of the
COMECON Executive Committee, at least in late September and again in December.^^9
On December 29, 1962, the Soviet Union and the MPR signed a
protocol on trade turnover in 1963. Two days later, they concluded a
trade treaty for the same period, as well as an agreement on the list of
goods subject to delivery to the MPR paid for by previously granted
credits. The list of cmmodities to be exchanged was extensive, in
cluding machines, industrial equipment, vehicles, agricultural machinery,
flour and sugar, in part, from the Soviet Union. The MPR was to furnish
animal husbandry products, as it had in years past, but with the addi
tion of woolen fabrics and clothing and leather coats.
It appears that one of the pre-conditions of the MPR's continued
good standing with the Soviet Union is careful avoidance of any sus
tained manifestations of nationalism. A Unen editorial reprinted in
Pravda on November 1, concerned the expulsion of Tumur-Ochir from the
Politburo and from his Central Committee post. The editorial dwelt on
Tumur-Ochir's attempts to play down internationalism in favor of
nationalism, his idealization of Genghis Khan, and his attempt to have a
celebration of the eight hundredth anniversaiy of Genghis Khan's birth.
(Italics added). Since it is known that there was indeed a celebration
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of Genghis' birthday, the reference to attempts would appear to be in
tended to convey the meaning that there was really no such celebration,
as all intelligent people were, naturally, against it.^^^
On November 15, it was announced that the conference of editorial
councils of agricultural publishing houses of members of CŒiECON, opening
in Moscow was to publish a two-volume agricultural dictionary in eight
languages. These include Russian, Czechoslovakian, German, Hungarian,
Rumanian, Polish, Bulgarian, and English. Mongolian, however, was not
included. Pravda reported at the same time that beginning January 1,
196 3 , a Russ ian- language newspaper Novosti Mongol it (News of Mongolia)
would be published in Ulan Bator.
Thus, Iv the end of 1962, the MPR had become firmly set in the
path to modernization, and committed to a continued need for Soviet aid.
Not all is rosy, however, in spite of massive aid to agricultural
development and capital construction by the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries. It is relatively easy, albeit expensive, to build
meat packing combines and flour mills, electric power plants, and steel
rolling mills. The traditional problems of Communist regimes in mo
bilizing the peasant in modernization of agriculture are just as trouble
some in the MPR as they have been in the Soviet Union.
In addition to nationalism on the part of some quarters in the
top-level of educated Mongols, of whom there are none too many, other
ancient patterns are apparently extant among the herdsmen. Reports as
late as 1962 refer to the task of Party agitators to ejqîose the powers
of the lamas, large numbers of whom have discarded their clerical garb
and roam throughout the MPR.^23 official Buddhism is in the hands
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 of the state; one Dorjeni is reported to be the official head of the
Lamaism in Mongolia, but his main task is to represent Mongolian Lamaism
to Buddhists of other c o u n t r i e s .
There are reports that the number of livestock in the MPR dropped
in 1961 to 20,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 , a loss of one and one-half million from 196O,
Although drought, and the probable diversion of surface water for agri
cultural purposes, undoubtedly caused part of the trouble, failure of
the local herding organizations to live up to more stringent preparation
requirements of the new agriculture contributed to the loss. Mongolian
agricultural writers refer to this, as well as the tendency of organiza
tions to deliver breeding stock in fulfillment of their quotas for
delivery to the State.
It is also noted that the list of Soviet exports to the MPR men
tioned in the December 1962 Trade Agreement included flour, even though
Mongolian self-sufficiency in wheat and flour production had been one of
the reasons for the virgin lands campaign. It appears, therefore, that
the projected wheat and flour production has not yet been achieved in
spite of some 750,000 hectares of virgin land put to the plow by 1962.
In January of 1 96 3, Tsedenbal made a speech wherein he said that
the MPR is now planning the transformation of the Mongolian economy from
that of an agrarian-industrial stage to its final stage of industrial-
agrarianism. This is to be done within the complex.of the socialist
world, over the next several years. But, to work for a communist
society, the MPR must attain an industrial base roughly equal to the
other socialist countries.^26 in a sense, Tsedenbal's statement com-
piares with another made by a Mongolian economist in an article appearing
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in 1961. The article addresses itself to an analysis of the problems of
modernizing agriculture in the MPR, and referred to the necessity to
change the ancieht pastoral economy into a new, industrial system. As a
pre-condition to the modernization of agriculture he said:
. . . we will need a broader economic and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries .... The problem of putting the nomadic population and the pastoral economy on a permanent basis in our country . . . with our present re sources alone is out of the question; this can be solved only with the powerful material, technical, economic, scientific, and personnel aid of the fraternal socialist countries .... (NOTE: By this we mean a much broader aid than trade and loan assist ance— Author). 127
While there is no indication within the article whether this sug
gestion was intended for the eyes of the Soviets, or for the more
conservative faction within the MPR, it would appear that the Mongols
feel their position strong enough to obtain what they need from the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. If Mongolia is to be
retained in the Soviet orbit, it appears that massive aid will be the
principal means of keeping her there. Soviet-Mongolian relations since
19i;9 seem, in retrospect, to fall into four more or less distinct periods.
The first, from 19U9 to September 1952, was characterized by a continua
tion of the Soviet preeminence of the preceding decades. In September,
1952, the second period began with the establishment of Sino-Soviet rela
tions. This period was one of relative decrease of Soviet influence, and
lasted until December, 1955. The third period, one of renewed Soviet
attention to Mongolian affairs, started in early 1956 and lasted until
November, I9 6 I. The fourth period is that beginning in November, I9 6 I,
and continuing to date, wherein the Mongols have clearly chosen the
Soviet Union as their major ally.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67
In the first period, as indicated, although the CPR had come into
being, little change was apparent in Soviet attitudes toward the MPR.
The colonial pattern established before 19lf9 continued to mark Soviet
policy in Mongolian affairs.
In September, 19$2, Tsedenbal visited Moscow and established
contact with Chou En-lai. That month a tripartite railway agreement was
concluded between the three countries; the following month the Sino-
Mongolian Agreement for Economic and Cultural Cooperation was signed in
Peking. These events marked the beginning of the second period.
That period, from 1952-1955, can be characterized as one of
decreasing Soviet influence vis-a-vis the MPR. By "decreasing" it is
meant that the Russian monopoly was weakened relatively ly the increase
of Chinese activity in Mongolia. The Soviet Union maintained its
economic activity— at least insofar as trade was concerned— with regard
to the MHl, but it must have been apparent to the Kremlin that a change
In policy was in order.
Such a change could be seen in Soviet policies after December,
1955. The third period described can be further divided into two parts,
the first including the time from January 1956, to May, 1957. During
those sixteen or seventeen months, increased Soviet attention was
devoted to Mongolian affairs and made it a time of transition in policy.
This attention was manifested in the form of increased economic aid to
the MPR, and due to the terms of some of the aid, resulted in a change
in the terms of the Soviet-Mongolian relationship. The first part of
the third period came to a climax and a close with the issuance of the
Tsedenbal-Bulganin Joint Statement of May 17, 1957. Soviet aid, it was
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revealed, would be massive in the coming years. More important, Soviet-
Mongol Joint stock enterprises all had been or were to be liquidated in
favor of Mongolia.
During the latter, longer part of the third period of Soviet-
Mongolian relations, the Soviet Union contributed increasing amounts of
financial, material, and technical aid toward the development of the
MPR. The Eastern European satellites likewise contributed substantial
amounts of aid, both financial and technical, toward the development of
the Mongolian economy. The effect of the third period was to transform
the framework of Mongolian relations with the Soviet Union from that of
a simple, one-to-one, colonial arrangement to a multilateral relationr
ship wherein the Mongolian economy approached dependence on the aid of
European "Socialist" nations.
The fourth and current period began with the clear evocation of
Mongolian support for the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet dispute in
November, 1961. While Soviet aid had brought about Soviet pre-eminence
in Mongolia during the previous five years, the Mongols had succeeded in
keeping their relations with China operating fairly smoothly. Even
after the Hoscow^Peking ideological argument had come into the open in
i960 and 1961, the Mongols were successful in carrying out their bal
ancing act. This reached its epitome, as described earlier, in the July
11, 196 1 , celebrations in Ulan Bator; it came to a close in November,
1 9 6 1 , five months later.
Again, it is emphasized that the decline of Soviet influence was
relative, brought about by the reappearance of the Chinese on the
Mongolian scene. To counter that decline, Soviet policy changed, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 with it changed the terms of Soviet-Mongolian relations. Mongolia has
been "up-graded," given a seat in COMECON and other bloc organizations,
and enjoys a relatively improved economic status as a result of bloc
assistance. This happened because with a united China to the south of
the MPR, the pre-19U9 Soviet policies would no longer suffice; nothing
would make the Soviet-Mongolian relationship as secure for the USSR as
it had been before the CPR entered the scene. The Soviet Union then
elected the course described, that of increasing Mongolian economic and
political involvement with the European "socialist" nations.
Now the Mongols appear to be squarely on the side of the Soviet
Union and set in a pattern of increasing economic involvement with the
European'"communist" world. The price tag for this has been shown to be
ejqaensive for the Soviet Union. The Mongols have made it known that
they anticipate a great deal of aid from Russia and the rest of the
European bloc; what the future might be for this pattern is discussed in
the final chapter.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70
FOOTNOTES
^Pravda, February 15, 1950, p. 1; in Current Digest of the Soviet Press II, 8 (April 8, 1950), p. 17 . (Hereinafter deferred to as CDSP).
2lzvestia. February 28, 1950, p. Uj in CDSP II, 1Ô (April 22, 1950), pT2T:
^Ibtd., April 3 0 , 1950, p. irj in CDSP II, I8 (June 17, 1950), p. 39
^Pravda, April lU, 1950, p. 1; In CDSP II, I6 (June 3, 1950), p. 37
^edomosti Verkhovna Soveta, November 1 6 , 1950, p. I4; in CDSP II, U5 (December &3, lÿ5o), p7 ^
^ i t e r ^ a Gaze ta, April 12, 1951, p. 2; in CDSP III, 18 (June 3, 1951), pp. 6-7 .
7pravda, July 11, 1951, p. 3} in CDSP III, 28 (August 25, 1951), pp. 20-21.
®Robert A. Rupen, "Notes on Outer Mongolia Since 19U5," Pacific Affairs, XXVIII (March, 1955), p. 78.
9pravda, October 30, 1951, p. Uj in CDSP III, Wi (December 15, 1951), p T l ^
% b l d .. November lb, 1951, p. 3; in CDSP III, U6 (December 29, 1951), pp. 33-3b.
l^Paul Wohl, "Outer Mongolia Seen in Sino-Soviet Shadow," Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 1952.
^^Associated Press dispatch. The New York Times, May 30, 1952.
13pravda, July 11, 1952, p. 3 ; in CDSP IV, 28 (August 23, 1952), p. 1 5 . l^Rupen, op. £^. , p. 7b.
^^Ibid.
l^lbid., p. 76.
^7pravda. January 2 6 , 1953, p. 3; in CDSP V, b (March 7, 1953), pp. 15-ÏT:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71
^®Pravda. July 12, 1953, p. 3; inOTSPV, 28 (August 22, 1953), p. 19.
^^Wev York Times, December 27, 1953 •
20lbid., April l6, 195b.
Zlizvestia, 5/lb/5b, p. 3; In CDSP VI, 19 (June 23, 195b), pp. 23-2b.
22Rupen, op. cit., p. 78.
23new York Times, December 5, 195b.
2bpravda, November 20, 195b, p. b} in CDSP VI, b8 (January 12, 1955), pp. 1-6; and ^r y e y of the Chinese Mainland Press (U. S. Consulate General, Hongkong), Humber 933, p. 8. (Hereinafter referred to as SCMP.) NONA, ll/22/5b.
^^SCMP 1160, p. 5 0 , NONA, 10/28/55.
26special dispatch, Christian Science Monitor, September 29, 1955.
^7sCMP 1199, pp. 25-26. NCNA, 12/28/55.
2®3CMP 1201, p. 37. NCNA, 12/31/55-
2?Robert A. Rupen, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Outer Mongolia," Current Scene I, 11 (August 31, 1961), p. b.
3*^pen, "Outer Mongolia Since 1955," Pacific Affairs, XXX (December 1957), p. 3b5.
3lNew York Times, February 29, 1956.
32pravda. March 27, 1956, p. 2; in CDSP VIII, 13 (May 9, 1956), pp. 7-8.
^^Ibid., April 10, 1956, p. 3; in C ^ VIII, l5 (May 23, 1956), p. 27. ^^Rupen, "Sino-Soviet Rivaliy in Outer Mongolia," op. £it.f p. 5.
35New York Times, August 27, 1956.
^^Associated Press dispatch. New York Herald Tribune, August 19, 1956.
37puper, Outer Mongolia, 1957-1960," Pacific Affairs XZKIII (December I960), p. 1 3 8 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72
^^SCMP 1367, p. 51. N C m , 10/6/56.
39sCMP 1U06, p. h i . MCM, 11/3/56.
^Qs c m p lk09, p. 18. NCm, 11/7/56.
^^Pravda, December l5, 1956, p. 3; in CDSP VIII, 50 (January 23, 1957), p T T T T ^^Rupen, "Outer Mongolia, 1957-1960, ^loc. cit.
^% e w York Times, August 29, 1956.
k^&ssociated Press dispatch. New York Herald Tribune, August 19, 1956.
^^upen, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Outer Mongolia," og. cit., p. 5.
^^ a v d a , January 30, 1957, p. 6; in CDSP IX, 5 (March 13, 1957), p. 15.
^^Pravda, February 27, 1957, p. 3j in CDSP DC, 9 (April 10, 1957), p. 2U. ^®"General Description of Mongolia," Current Background (U.S. Consulate General, Hongkong), p. 5.
^9pravda, May 17, 1957, pp. 1-2; in CDSP DC, 20 (June 26,-1957), pp. 2 7 - ^ ^®Rupen, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Outer Mongolia," og. £it., p. It.
5l"General Description of Mongolia," og. cit., p. 5.
^^Pravda, August 31, 1957, p. L; in CDSP DC, 35 (October 23, 1957), p. 19.
^^D)id., March 20, 1958, pp. 5-6; in CDSP X, 12 (April 30, 1958), pp. 26-2T^ ^^ e v York Times, September 12, 1957.
55 ^^ravda, November 28, 1957, p. 3; in CDSP DC, lt8 (January 8, 1957), p. 16. ^^Ibid., December l8, 1957, p. Uj in CDSP DC, 5l (January 29, 1958), pp. 22-23. 58"Qeneral Description of Mongolia," og. cit., p. 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 ^^SCMP 172U, pp. U6-U7. N C M , 3/l/58. ^°3CMP 17UU, p. 61. N C M , 3/28/58. ^^Pravda, March 20, 1958, og. cit. - ^^SCMP 1753, p. 53. N C M , l|/l7/58. York Times, May 25, 1958. ^^ M P 1789, p. U8. N C M , 6/7/58. ^^Pravda, June 20, 1958, pp. U-5j in CDSP X, 2it (July l6, 1958), p. 19. ^^ugen, "Outer Mongolia, 1957-1960," og. cH., pp. 130-131. 67lbid. 68lbid. 8 % . Karepin, "Exports of Animal Husbandry Products from the Mongolian People's Republic," Vneshnyaya Torgovlya (Foreign Trade), No. 12, 1958; in Joint Publications Research Service (U. S. Department of Commerce, Washington), No. 20I4O-N, November 30, 1959. Hereinafter referred to as JPRS. "^°SCMP 1876, p. 57. N C M , lO/ll/58. 7lsCMP l881i, p. 55. NC M , 10/25/58. 72sCMP 1922, p. 33. NC M , 12/21/58. 73s CMP 1932, p. 26. NC M , 1/7/59. ^^^SCMP 195U, p. 3 8 . NC M , 2/9/5 9 . 7^Pravda, February 11, 1959, p. 1; in CDSP XL, 6-7 (March 18-25, 1959), P. 23; pp. 23-2U. ^^erold J. Wiens, "Geographical Limitations to Food Production in the MPR," Annals of the American Association of Geographers, XLI, U (December, 1951), pp. 3^1^36^. 77pravda, April 1, 1959, pp. 2-3; in CDSP XI, 13 (April 29, 1959), pp. 32-3 3 . 78ibid. 79Rupem, "Outer Mongolia, 1957-1960," c^., pp. 131. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71+ 8QsCHP 1970, p. 1+1+, MCM, 3/5/59; 1972, p. 50, NCM, 3/7/59. Q^SCMP 1998, p. 5U. N C M 1+/18/59. 8^3CMP 2008, p. 39. NCM, 5/U/59. 83scMP 208k, p. 1+5, NCM, 8/19/59; SCMP 2086, p. 33, NCM, 2/8/59; SCMP 2090, p. 1+6, NCM , 8/28/59. ^^*SCMP 2118, p. 1+6. NCM, 10/ll/59. 8^3CMP 20 3 6 , p. 1+1, NCM, 6/11/59; SCMP 206l, p. 3 8 , NCM, 8/16/59. 88l. Tsende, "Socialist Construction in the Mongolian People's Republic," Voprosy Istorii (Historical Questions), 1 (January, 1959), pp. 69-71+; in CbSP XII, 7 (March I6 , I960), p. 21. 87sCMP 2175, p. 3 6 . NCM, I/6/6O. 88Rupen, "Outer Mongolia, 1957-1960," op. £it., p. 132. 8^B. Gombosuren, "The Generous Aid of Socialist Countries," Duchin Jild Ih Barilga (Forty Years of Capital Construction); in JPRS l7, 61+2, February 1I+, 1963. ^°SCMP 2297, p. 1+1. NCM, 7/IO/6O. ^^Reuters Dispatch, New York Times, Juiy 7, I960. ^^ a v d a , April 1, 1959, op. cit. ^^Reupen, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Outer Mongolia," op, cit., pp. 2-3. 9^ ^^W a v d a ,(October 9, I960, p. 3; in CDSP XII, 1+1 (November 9, I960), p. 31. *^Bila Csath, "Water Research in Mongolia," Banyaszati Lapok, 95, 1 (January, 1962), pp. 51+-59; in CPRS Ik, 39k, July 6, 1962. 97 ^ Report by L. Tsende, Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP, made at the XIV Congress of the NPRP, Unen, July 5, 1961, pp. 2-6; in JPRS*1121k, November 27, 1961, p. 23. ^^Wall Street Journal, October 2, 1961. 99vae3hnaya Torgovlya (Foreign Trade), 7 (July, 1959); in CDSP XI, 3k (September 23, 1959), p. 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 iO^rimes (London), February 13, 1961. i^kjombosuren, og. cit., p. 8l. ^Q^Ibld., p. 8 2 . ^Q^s c m p 2k60, p. 2k. æ m , 3/15/61. i®\jombosuren, og. cit., p. 8l. IG^Pravda, April 19, 1961, p. 2j in CDSP XIII, l6 (May 17, 1961), p. 19 ^°^Ibid., April 30, 1961, p. 1; in CDSP XIII, 17 (May 2k, 1961), p. 2k. 107iiSpeech by M. A. Suslov, Chief of the Party and Government Delegation From the USSR, At the Celebration of the kOth Anniversary of the Mongolian Revolution," Translations From UNEN, Ulan Bator (7-11 July 1961), JPRS 11532, December l5, 1961, pp" 3'6-k5. ^Q^scmp 253k, pp. 36-3 9 . lO^Qomborsuren, og. cit., p. 8 I. IIOSCMP 2616, p. 3 2 . NONA., 11/3/6 1 . ll^Tass report, November 29, 1962. ^^^Pravda, February 3, 1962, p. 2; in CDSP XIV, 5 (February 2 8 , 1962), pp."lBr33. --- ll^SCMP 275k, p. kO. NCNA, 6/1/62. ^^^lew York Herald Tribune, June 19, 1962. ii%ommunist, 12 (August, 1962); in CDSP XIV, 36 (October 3, 1962), pp.“ > 7 : ll6pravda, July ik, 1962, p. 5; in CDSP XIV. 28 (August 8, 1962), p. 20. ^^^Pravda, February 11, 1959, p. 1; og. jcU., p. 23. ^i8pravda, September 12, 1962, p. 2; in CDSP XIV, 37 (October 10, 1962), p. W. ^^^ravda, September 30, 1962, p. 5; in CDSP XIV, kO (October 31, 1962), p. l5; and in Pravda, December 21, 1962, p. 2; in CDSP XIV, 52, p. 3 6 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 l^Oijgvestla, December 31, 1962, p. 2j in CDSP XIV, 52 (January 2k, 1963), pp. 35-36. ^^^Pravda, November 1, 1962, pp. 3-kj in CDSP XEV, kk (November 2 8 , 1962), pp. 6-8. ^^^Pravda, November 16, 1962, pp. 5-6; in CDSP XIV, k6 (December 1 2 , 1962), p. 2 0 . 123pfav^, September 7, 1962, p. k; in CDSP XIV, 36 (October 3, 1962), p. 1 9 . ^^^New York Times, January 1, 1962. Jadambaa, "Some Results of 196O Livestock Breeding Work In Suhe Bator Aymak," Ediyn Dzasgiyn Asuudluud (Economic Problems), Ulan Bator, No. 2 (196I), pp. 9^102; i7Tjl>RS 1?, k39, February 1, 1 963, pp. 56-65. ^^8pravda. January 10, 1963, pp. 3-k; in CDSP XV, 2 (February 6, 1963), p . 33 : ^^^Sh. Batochir, "Problems Regarding the Settling of Our Nomadic Population and Pastoral Economy to a Permanent Way of Life," Ediyn Dzasgiyn Asuudluud (Economic Problems), Ulan Bator, No. 2 (19‘5Tl), pp. 103- lk2; In JPRS 17, k39, February 1, 19 6 3 , p. 8 7 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER III THE MONGOLIANS AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC With the inception of the Communist regime in Peking, a new cast was thrown upon the Far Eastern scene; it soon became apparent that China was to regain some of the influence long denied to her in the MPR. As described in the previous chapter, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February Ik, 1950, included a recognition of the establishment of Sino-Mongolian diplomatic contact as one of the conditions guaranteeing Mongolian independence. According to a later report, the first contact between the MPR and the newly-born CPR occurred on October I6 , 19k9, when Choibalsan sent a note to Chou En-lai to the effect that the MPR had decided to establish relations with the CPR. Chou En-lai is described as agreeing with the Mongol decision.! On March 27, 1950, an agreement was signed between the CPR and the Soviet Union establishing a Sino- Soviet Civil Aviation Company, in which one of the three civil airlines to be operated would be from Peking to Irkutsk, via the MPR.^ A Chinese delegation visited Ulan Bator for the Thirtieth Anni versary of the Mongolian Revolution on July 11, 1951. The delegation leader, one Wang Tsai-t'ien, was a member of the CPR's Nationalities Commission, and it may be seen therefrom, in retrospect, that the Chinese had visions at that early date of reasserting ethnic ties.3 In August, 1952, Tsedenbal arrived in Moscow to join the talks going on between Chou En-lai and the Russians. Chou met Tsedenbal at the airport, and at the end of approximately a month of Sino-Mongol- Soviet negotiations and talks, Tsedenbal left Moscow leaving references Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78 to Soviet-Mongol-Chinese friendship floating in his wake. The three governments had also concluded the railway agreement of September l5 (see Chapter II). On September 28, Tsedenbal, having picked up a larger entourage, arrived in Peking. The next day the Mongol leader was re ceived by Mao Tse-tung, and on October k, 1952, a Si no-Mongol Agreement for Economic and Cultural Cooperation was signed.^ The Agreement, consisting of three articles, provided for the development of cooperation in economic, cultural, and educational spheres; for the subsequent enactment of concrete agreements between the appro priate departments of the two governments, and for a ten year period of validity with automatic renewal, provided neither party objected to such renewal.^ Tsedenbal*s visit and the agreement to sign a treaty were cele brated in Peking with a "Sino-Mongolian Friendship Ten Days," while Tsedenbal himself was the subject of royal hospitality. It is noted that both sides referred to the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist camp.^ On December 29, 1952, instruments of ratification were exchanged in Ulan Bator on the October k agreement.? The following month, a Postal and Tele-Communications Agreement was signed in Peking between g the MPR and the CPR. Five weeks later, on February 2k, 1953, a "Non- Trading Credit Agreement was signed in Peking by representatives of the two governments, along with a Protocol on technical settlement of the procedure governing the Agreement.^ All of the 1953 agreements were concluded in the "spirit of the October k, 1952 Agrément." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79 After the relative flurry of Sino-Mongolian diplomatic activity in January and February, little sqjpears of any further activity until early May, save one Mongol cultural delegation in April. It is worth noting that the delegation, an "art" group, were attended by both Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chih.!® On May 1, 1953, a two-man trade delegation from the MPR arrived in Peking, where they were given a desultory official welcome. Nothing more is recorded of them in the general Chinese press, and no developments in the area of Sino-Mongol trade were reported until August 20, when a Goods Exchange and Payment Agreement was signed by represen tatives of the two governments. At the same time, a protocol on clearance of trade of 1951-1952 was concluded.12 From the limited information available, it appears that negotia tions were carried on for a lengthy period before any agreement was reached. It is noted that there apparently was no Mongolian ambassador in Peking prior to July 3, 1953, when Ochirbat presented his credentials to Mao. Speculation arises that Chinese approval of any negotiations was withheld pending the arrival of an ambassador in Peking, as Ochirbat signed the former agreement, while one of the delegates from Mongolia signed the latter. Following the conclusion of the agreements in August, little further actual diplomatic contact is noted between the Chinese and the Mongols, save multitudinous Chinese condolences on the death of Bumatsende, President of the Presidium of the Great People's Hural, on or about September 22, 1953. In April, 195k, a Chinese delegation arrived in Ulan Bator for negotiation of a trade agreement, and on April Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80 7, such an agreement was signed after two days of talks. The occasion was not marked by the presence of top-level officials of either side, although it is noted that the MPR ambassador to the CPR, Ochirbat, was present. The agreement called for more goods to be supplied by both countries than last year.^^ The next interchange took place in Peking on May 19, when Ochirbat for the MPR and a Chinese vice-minister exchanged notes on the iraplemenr tation of Sino-Mongol Cultural Cooperation for 195k, in accordance with the 1952 Agreement. On July 31, 195k, Chou En-lai stepped in Ulan Bator for two days on the last leg of a trip that had taken him to Berlin and Warsaw. Little was reported of the substance of any conversations, although it is noted that he spent considerable time in contact with Tsedenbal while in Ulan Bator. During the last five months of 195k, several Mongol delegations were in the CPR, including a Mongol Cooperatives group, a Mongolian newsman, and at least one other, MPR Government delegation which attended the October 1 Celebration in Peking.!? Evidence of the operation of the October, 1952 Agreement and sub sequent Sino-Mongolian pacts was presented when the last of ten thousand Mongol horses arrived in China on October 10, 195k. These were shipped by the MPR under the specific terms of the April, 195k Agreement.!® A week later, a Mongolian trade delegation arrived in Peking, led by the Mongolian Minister of Trade.The relatively high official level of the Mongolian mission appears Interesting considered in conjunction with Tsedenbal's reception of the head of a Chinese cultural delegation Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 and the Chinese Ambassador, Ho Ying, on October 3.20 report appears of a comparable reception of the Mongolian delegation leader in Peking; his arrival was greeted by the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade.2! The negotiations carried out by the MPR's emissaries and the Chinese government apparently were lengthy and not without difficulty, as no agreement was reported until the middle of December, some two months later. In the interim period, however, occurred an event which may have had a great bearing on the outcome of the continuing talks. The Twelfth Congress of the MPRP began on November 19, 195k, with a Chinese delega tion led by Ulanfu in attendance. The Chinese reports on the Twelfth Congress refer to Ulanfu as an "alternate member of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party," although the Soviet press apparently po translates it differently. It will be recalled that the disparity in official stature of the Chinese and Soviet delegations was so noticeable as to give the impres sion that the Mongolians had sunk in Soviet regard. Such, obviously, was not the case with the Chinese contingent. While Ulanfu's speech on November 22 credited much of the MFR's progress to Soviet aid, and re- f ferred to friendship of the peoples of the CPR, MPR, and the Soviet Union, he referred also to the October, 1952 Agreement and to the new railroad. Such items could not have helped being subtle reminders to the Russians of the changed situât ion.23 Another indication of Mongol efforts to ensure Chinese good will appeared in a Unen editorial reproduced in the Chinese press supporting the CPR's position vis-a-vis the Republic of China and its treaty with the United States.2^ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 Whatever the factors Involved, a Protocol on Mutual Stqiply of Goods for 1955 was ultimately signed in Peking on or about December 17. Little comment was offered regarding the pact, except that it had been the result of "cordial and friendly negotiations."2^ In February, 1955, the CPR announced that it was doubling the number of horses to be purchased from the MPR during 1955, although it is not clear whether this was the. result of the December pact or sub sequent negotiations.^^ On March ik, 1955, China and Mongolia exchanged notes in Ulan Bator on the 1955 Executive Plan for Cultural Cooperation between the 27 two countries. Whether or not the Plan for Cultural Cooperation was the vehicle, at some point in early 1955, agreement was reached between China and Mongolia concerning the introduction of Chinese laborers into the MPR. Rupen cites a Soviet scholar to the effect that by summer, 1955, over a thousand Chinese arrived in Mongolia to labor in the "socialist sector of the Mongolian economy, principally in agriculture."28 These laborers were to be the first noticeable evidence of Chinese aid to the MPR's "socialist construction." Perhaps to distract attention from the movement of Chinese la borers to the MPR, during July and August, 1955, a Mongolian Army "Song and Dance Ensemble" toured China. The Ensemble, drawing hugh crowds and high honors at every turn, was given thorough press coverage throughout their ten-week visit. At one point, the Mongol Ensemble leaders were received by Chou En-lai and Chu Teh, and apparently were the first Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 "foreign" Mongols to visit Kuke Khoto, capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.2? In September and October, occurred the negotiations (described in Chapter II) regarding the establishment of the through railway from China to the Soviet Union via the MPR. These negotiations culminated in the conclusion of four separate agreements governing the basic principles of tri-partite agreement and some of the mechanics of the actual opera tion. The following December, a Sino-Mongolian Broadcasting Agreement was signed in Ulan Bator. The event was not highly attended by officials of any high rank.30 On or about January 3, 1956, a ceremony was held at the Sino- Mongolian border between Chining and Chamu Ut linking the Chinese and Mongolian segments of the new railway. Ulanfu, who ranked prominently in the ceremony, represented China's most ideal Mongol— a dedicated servant of the Motherland. He also represented a Chinese attempt to gain the utmost value from the fact that the new railway linked Inner Mongolia, as well as the CPR, to the MPR. A Sino-Mongolian protocol on mutual supply of goods was signed in Ulan Bator on February 7, 1956. Although no mention in the Chinese press indicated the length of the negotiations preceding that day, it was reported that the talks were "friendly." The protocol envisaged a doubling of the 1955 trade volume between the two countries, although no apparent changes occurred in the type of commodities being exchanged.3! Three weeks later, the signing of another Sino-Mongolian agree ment was signed. The pact, concluded on February 27, in Ulan Bator, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81i provided for the exchange of postal parcels between the two countries. The agreement, although innocuous in itself, indicated the greater presence of Chinese within the MPR, as no particularly sizable elements from that country are known to have been in the CPR at that time.32 . Almost immediately after the conclusion of the February 27 Agree ment, the Central Committee of the CCP sent greetings to its counterpart in the MPRP on the occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Party's founding. The greeting is the first of such nature recorded by the Chinese press, and lauded the "disinterested help" of the Soviet Union in Mongolia's development.33 The Party greeting was followed the next day an editorial in JenrMin Jih-Pao saluting Sino-Mongol friendship. The editorial mentioned the 1952 Treaty, and the new railroad, as evi dences of Increasing friendship, and blasted blockage of the MPR's admission to the United Nations.3k A few weeks later, more activity came afoot when an economic delegation from the CPR arrived in Ulan Bator.3^ Shortly afterwards, on March 29, 1956, Chu Teh arrived in the Mongolian capitol. While Chu Teh was given a royal welcome, and his two-day visit was marked by celebra tions of Sino-Mongolian friendship, little coverage was given regarding the reasons or outcome of the visit.3& it is noted that Chu's visit came only ten days before Mikoyan arrived in Ulan Bator to negotiate the terms of the Soviet-Mongol agreement on Soviet aid to the MPR of April, 1956.3? Another step toward a close contact between the Mongols of the IMAR and the MPR was taken when a group of Inner Mongolian artists and writers arrived In Ulan Bator on or about May 2k, 1956 for a visit.3® Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85 It is noted that some years later, the celebration of the anniversary of the birth of Genghis Khan was held on May 31. While, of course, the proximity of the dates may have been coincidental, a week-long visit culminating on the thirty-first would appear not inconsistent with standard Chinese practice. A Chinese Government delegation headed by Vice-Premier Li Hsiennien appeared in Ulan Bator on July 9, for the MPR's Independence Day celebrations.39 Immediately prior to their arrival, Tsedenbal and Oamba, then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP, had received a Chinese economic mission. While no record appears of the mission's arrival in the general Chinese press, it is noted that Chian Ming, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade was present in Ulan Bator at that time. Both Chinese officials left Ulan Bator on July l5.^^ An un attributed newspaper article says that the negotiations carried on ly the Chinese mission of late March lasted for five months before an agreement was reached.While this statement seems somewhat extreme, the possibility exists that the Chinese economic delegation mentioned as visiting Tsedenbal and Damba on July 6 could have been working on con tinuing negotiations. Normal trade seemed to be operating smoothly, however, as a ship ment of a thousand thoroughbred Mongolian horses (sic) arrived in China on July 30, the first of some forty thousand to be delivered by the MPR.^ It was also reported that by August, 1956, some ten thousand Chinese laborers had arrived in the MFR.kS In late August, 1956, a cultural delegation from the MPR arrived Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86 In Kuke Khoto for a month's visit in the IMAR, perhaps returning the visit of the Inner Mongolian group who visited Ulan Bator in M a y . k k On August 29, 1956, a Sino-Mongolian agreement was concluded which would grant outright to the MPR some 160,000,000 rubles from C h i n a , k5 the negotiations had been initiated in late March, then they must have been long and arduous, indicating willingness on neither part to accept terms suggested by the other. On December 22, 1956, a protocol on mutual supply of goods was signed in Peking by representatives of the governments of the MFR and the CPR, While the volume of trade was not mentioned, the lists of items to be supplied exhibited somewhat more variety than those of previous years.k® At the end of 1956, an agreement was announced between China and Mongolia whereby cattle from the two countries would be allowed to graze across the international boundary separating their two countries.k7 gy the middle of January, 1957, Chinese cattle were being herded to the MPR U8 for winter pasturage. In early March, a delegation arrived in the MPR for the purpose of concluding an executive plan for Sino-Mongol cultural cooperation in 1957. The plan was adopted on March 8 , and the following day it was announced that the MPR would work with the CPR in the areas of science, general education, hygiene, the film industry and broadcasting. The cultural delegation was not received by an official higher, apparently, than Shirindib, then First Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers.k? In late March, a delegation of Chinese, headed by Vice Chairman of the IMAR Hafengah, visited Mongol herdsmen from the MPR who were Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 caring for cattle they had herded into China for the winter. The cattle were some forty thousand head in number, and projects were outlined to aid in their care and protection.50 Contact between the Mongols of the IMAR and of the MRl continued in the following month as the first of May, tenth anniversary of the IMAR, drew nearer. Some 1+20,000 head of Chinese cattle were returned from the Choibalsan area of the MPR, and at the same time, a group of wrestlers from the MPR were invited to the Nadhom (traditional Mongol ' holiday) being held in the IMAR, also on May 1. The MPR was also represented in a more official capacity at the Anniversary/Nadom celebra tion in Kuke Khoto by a goverment delegation headed by Suran jab. Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP.^! At the same time, it was announced that the MPR would open a consulate in Kuke K h o t o . ^ 2 Rupen has indicated that the exertion of cross-boundary ethnic ties among the Mongols figured in the increase of Chinese influence in the MPR in 1955. One step in the process, perhaps aimed as much at the local Mongols as at those of the MPR, was the restoring of the ancient Mongolian name of "Kuke Khoto" to Kwêisui. That city had been given its Chinese name during the years of the Republic.In August, 1955, the CPR announced that the Mongolian language of the IMAR would be modernized by the adoption of the Cyrillic Mongolian written language of the MPR.5k In May, 1956, the People's Daily announced that the Alashan and Edsingol Mongols of Northwest China had been incorporated into the IMAR, extending the common boundary of that area with the MPR almost to Sinkiang.55 Another traditional aspect of Mongol life, that of Buddhism, also came into increasing use by the Chinese regime in 1956 and 1957. When Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88 the Chinese began to stabilize their position in Tibet, it became advanr tageous for them to accommodate as much as possible the ruling priestly hierarchy In order to obtain that group's cooperation. Thus an agree ment was concluded in 1951 on "Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" wherein provisions pledged to carry out a policy of freedom of religious belief, respect the customs and habits of the Tibetans, pro tect the monasteries and the lamas, and to make no change in the income of the monasteries.^^ In 1956, a Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region was inaugurated and simultaneously a Tibetan Commission for Religious Affairs came into being. In October of that year, the Chinese Buddhist Association in Tibet was founded.5? The situation in Tibet apparently had not developed satisfactorily in the eyes of the Chinese by late 1956- early 1957. Continued oppressive tactics in that area could not have appeared attractive to other peoples, like the Mongols, who were still largely subject to the same, traditional ties with Tibet as before. Perhaps in the interest of pursuing a Tibetan policy more palatable to the Mongols, the Chinese changed their tack during the first half of 1957. The Twentieth Meeting of the Standing Commission of the Preparatory Committee for the TAR on June l6 , 1957, adopted a resolu tion on "no reforms in Tibet for six years." The rationale advanced was that although most of the people were in favor of reforms in Tibet, the majority of the "upper strata" were not yet ready.The Dalai Lama, honorary chairman of the Chinese Buddhist Association, reported that the work of the Tibetan branch of that organization had been satisfactory up Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 to that time, but recommended the development of closer ties between 59 Tibetan Buddhists and the Buddhists of the rest of the country. Chinese activity among the Buddhists of Inner Mongolia occurred around the last of April, 1957, when an Inner Mongolian Buddhist Con ference was convened.It would appear that Chinese actions among their border peoples were at least in part designed to reap the most possible benefit from each of the traditional avenues of influence. Shortly after the Nadhom festivities, the Mongolian delegation hedded by Suranjab traveled to Peking, where Chou En-lai received the Mongolian leader. Immediately following that group's departure for home, a new ambassador arrived from the MPR, one Lubsan.^^ The timing of the new ambassador's arrival and presentation of his credentials— on May l6 , 1957— seems to indicate a coordination of that ceremony with the Tsedehbal-Bulganin statement of May 17, 1957. June, July, and August saw several delegations of various natures traveling back and forth between China and Mongolia. On the last day of August, a Mongolian Agricultural and Pastoral mission arrived in Kuke Khoto on a visit to the IMAR set up by the 1957 Executive Plan on Cultural cooperation for 1957.^2 Thus the pattern continued. In midrSeptember, a series of tri-partite talks between the CPR, MPR, and the Soviet Union got underway in Ulan Bator for the purpose of examining matters "concerning the operation of through train traffic." The talks were not concluded until early October, when a protocol was signed on the conference of the Joint committee on the Sino-Mongolian railway. Another protocol was signed at the same time, but no indica tion was given of its content save that it concerned the conference. ^3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 In late November, it was announced that Mongolian cattle would graze in still another part of China, in Sinkiang.^k As the IMAR's boundary with the rest of China does not extend into Sinkiang proper, it might appear that contact between the Turkic-language groups of Sinkiang and the MPR might have been at least part of the rationale. Another more cogent reason for the fairly widespread cross-boundary grazing between Mongolia and China may have been that at that time no settlement had been made of the border differences reflected in Chinese •» and in Mongolian and Russian maps. The Chinese, rather than argue with the Mongols, may have felt that mutual penetration into each other's territory would postpone necessity of settlement of the border dif ferences until some future date more propitious to their chances. In January and Februaiy, 1958, a spate of agreements were con cluded between the CPR and the MPR, whereby most of the year's activi ties seem to have been planned. The first two pacts, .signed in Ulan Bator, concerned themselves with the establishment of air communication between the two countries in conjunction with the opening of air service. Included in a description of the negotiations was a reference to tech nical cooperation. This would indicate another field of Chinese aid to the MPR not listed in the general press. Shortly after the conclusion of the first two pacts, a Sino- Mongol protocol on exchange of commodities was signed in Peking.®® The agreement, signed on January 28, 1958, was apparently the result of another long bout of negotiations, as the last recorded Mongol trade delegation to arrive in Peking prior to the date of the pact appeared in the Chinese capital in late September, 1957.®? A few weeks later. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91 representatives of the two governments concluded in Peking an agreement on cultural cooperation in 1958.®® A Chinese Communist Party delegation headed by Ulanfu arrived in Ulan Bator on March l5, 1958, to attend the Thirteenth Congress of the MPRP. Although the Chinese emissaries were met upon arrival by the highest officers of the Politburo, it appeared from Chinese press coverage that the Chinese position had undergone a perceptible shift from that enjoyed in 195k at the Twelfth MPRP Congress. Although the Chinese still presented a relatively more important personage in the person of Ulanfu than the Soviet did in Ignatov, the CCP mission ap parently did not call on Tsedenbal or an equivalent leader.®9 The length of the group’s stay in Ulan Bator was shortened b y some four days — from fifteen to eleven— in 1958. No greetings passed from Chou Enrlai, Mao Tse-tung, or Chu Teh, as had happened in 195k.?® Whether or not the slightly reduced part the Chinese played in the Thirteenth MPRP Congress was an indication of cooling relations between the MPR and the CPR, the Mongolians seemed to want to maintain as good a feeling as possible. On April 27, 1958, it was announced that the MPR would present China with 15,000 draft horses, equaling the number the CPR was purchasing from Mongolia. The horses would be de- 71 livered during the coming summer and autumn. The alternate possi bility, of course, is that transferral of the horses was part of the terns of the January protocol on exchange of commodities. The next month, another gesture of Mongolian appreciation for Chinese aid was made when Sambu, President of the Presidium of the Great Hural, presented fifty-eight Chinese workers with medals for their Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92 contribution to the MPR’s socialist construction. Sambu added the comment that services rendered by the laborers in the past three years had deepened the friendship between the MPR and the CPR. At the same time, there was a party and a send-off for those workers returning to China.72 On June 19, 1958, Mao Tse-tung ratified the Cultural Cooperation plan of Februaiy 21, "in accordance with the decision of the 96th meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress."?3 Whether announcement of the "ratification" constituted an acknowledgment to the MPR of the correctness of their attention to Chinese aid is unknown. It is noted that not all agreements concluded between the two countries are subsequently announced as ratified. In July, 1958, a group of Inner Mongolian archers and wrestlers visited Ulan Bator to take part in the MPR’s version of Nadhom (celebra tion of which begins on July 11), under the leadership of Hasabatir, Vice-President of the Inner Mongolian Physical Culture and Sports Com mittee.?^ It may be seen that the earlier pattern of encouraging contact between the Mongols of the IMAR and their counterparts in the MPR continued, although not at the same pace as the previous year. In late July and early August, the transfer of the first five hundred and fifty Mongol gift horses was accomplished. On August 1, the same day that the horses were handed over, the Chinese Ambassador in Ulan Bator, Ho Ying, received a medal from the Mongolian Government.?^ On August 9, a Sino-Mongolian Trade Protocol was signed.?® The rapid turn of events during those few days and the months following indicates Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93 a new intensity of activity in Sino-Mongolian relations during the remainder of 1958. On August 29, the CPR and the Mongolians reached an agreement on the grazing of twenty thousand head of cattle from the South Gobi area of the MPR in Inner Mongolia. The cross-boundary grazing was to enable the livestock to escape drought conditions in their native pastures.?? On September 20, as Mongolian herdsmen completed moving their herds into China, a new Ambassador arrived in Ulan Bator to replace Ho Ying. No reason was given for the arrival of the new envoy, one Hsieh Pu-sheng, but Rtqjen cites speculation that this development was a pos sible indication of lessening Chinese influence in the MFR.?® A few deys after Hsieh Fu-sheng took up his new post in Ulan Bator, a military delegation arrived in Peking under the leadership of B. Dorzh, Mongolian Minister of the Army and Public Safety. No mention was made of the purpose of the visit, but the group was entertained by 79 Peng Teh^huai, Dorzh* s counterpart in the Chi nest Government. What ever the purpose, the "friendly visit" marked the first overt contact between the Mongol and Chinese military establishments in some time. On September 30, 1958, a Mongolian-Chinese Friendship Association was established with Sharap, Secretary of the Presidium of the Great Hural as Chairman and one Natsakdorzhi as Vice-Chairman. ®® It is in teresting to note the relatively late date at which the Association came into being, as well as the actual juncture of the occasion. In November, a direct flight service from Ulan Bator to Peking and return was opened in accordance with the terms of the January 17 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9h agreement. There were to be three flights each month between the two cities.®! The following day, November 12, Chinese officials handed over to the MPR four new construction projects which had been constructed under the terms of the August, 1956 Agreement. The projects included a large vegetable farm, a four-story building for foreign specialists in the MPR, a gymnasium and a sports a r e n a . ®2 The November 12 announcement was the first of several such reports originating in Ulan Bator concerning Chinese aid projects. On December 23 and 26, the Mongolians disclosed that China was building the second of two thermal power plants under the 1956 agreement, and a glass factory. The Chinese, it was disclosed, had already constructed a brick and tile plant during the year.83 On December 23, D. Holomzhants, the Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR led; a delegation arriving in Peking at the invitation of the CPR for talks on economic cooperation. Three days later, the group was received by Chou En-lai, and on December 29, 1958, a Sino-Mongolian Economic and Technical Agreement was signed. Under the terms of the agreement, CPR was to advance a long-term loan of 100,000,000 rubles to Mongolia at the letter’s request. Premier Chou was present for the signing. The rubles were tc be used in con structing during the period of 1959-1961 two electric power stations, three highway bridges, a poultry farm) starch and alcohol factories, a metal workshop and housing projects of fifty thousand square meters. The loan was to be repaid with commodities over a fifteen-year period beginning in 1962.®^ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 5 . The rapid pace of Chinese-Mongolian activity in the closing months of 1958 indicates that both sides were well aware of the probable effect on Sino-Mongolian relations of increasing Soviet-Mongolian at tention to the MPR’s development. China’s position vis-a-vis the MPR had continued to improve somewhat, although not at the same pace, apparently, as it had in earlier years. While Chinese trade with the MPR had increased five times from 1952 through 1957, it accounted for less than 25 par cent of Mongolian exports and furnished less than 20 per cent of inqjorts to Mongolia in 1958.®^ There are indications that the terms of Chinese influence in the MPR had changed by the close of 1958. Besides the less spectacular Chinese participation in the Thirteenth MPRP Congress, it appears that the CPR’s attençtts to utilize any bonds between the Mongols of the IMAR and of the MPR may have tapered off, if not backfired. A speech given at the Fifth Session of the First National People’s Congress in February, 1958, admitted that during the period of "big blooming" and "big con tending" elements in the IMAR attacked the Party and socialism under the cloak of nationalities, advocating "separate governments for the Mongol people" and "independence for Mongolia."®® Rupen also reports that Chinese plans for the adoption of a Cyrillic Mongolian writing system were junked in 1958 in favor of a Latinized alphabet,®? which would indicate an attempt to separate, rather than to unite, the peoples of the MPR and the IMAR. Sino-Mongolian affairs in 1959 began with the arrival in Ulan Bator of a Chinese trade delegation on January 30. The delegation, headed by Chiang Ming, Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade of the CPR, was Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 greeted by Damba, then Second Secretary of the MPRP’s Central Committee, and Suronjab, First Vice-Chairman of the Mongolian Council of Ministers. The following day, the Chinese ambassador gave a reception in honor of the occasion. The ambassador commented that the increase in trade volume between the two countries was due to economic and trade cooperation and 00 solidarity. If such a statement was a warning to the Mongolians, it apparently was not heeded, as no report follows of any agreement being reached on trade per se in 1959. On April 10, 1959, a Unen editorial came out in support of Chinese actions with regard to the situation in Tibet, and condemned a SEA.TO council meeting as intervention in the "Tibet question." The same day, Unen also loosed a blast at the Wellington SEATO Conference on broader terms, thereby supporting closely the Chinese "line."®? A few days later, Ulan Bator reported that Mongolian Buddhists in the MPR were condemning the rebellion in Tibet. The article observed that Mongolian Buddhists had kept close touch with Buddhists in Tibet and knew that the latter had a happy life.?® As mentioned earlier (see Chapter II) official Buddhist affairs in the MPR are under a member of the govern ment. On July 3, 1959, D. Sharab presented his credentials as the new ambassador to the CPR, replacing S. Lubsan. As usual, no reasons were given for the change. However, it would appear to have some significance occurring close to the July 11 independence célébrations of the MPR. Aside from the actual timing of the switch, Lubsan’s departure may have had no particular significance, as he had been in Peking since May, 1957.9! Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 In August, a Chinese Parliamentary delegation arrived in Ulan Bator where they were met by their counterparts in the Mongolian govern ment. The occasion, as is appropriate for parliamentarians, was marked by long speeches of Sino-Mongolian friendship, including a reference by Jargalsaihan to the growth of friendship under the leadership of the COP and Chairman Mao Tse-tung.92 On August 28, Tsedenbal and a company of Mongolian government officials arrived in Peking on his way to Viet Nam and India. Tsedenbal met with Chou En-lai that day and left Peking the next day for Nanking and another stop on his way south. The first Mongolian Ambassador pre- Ofi sented his credentials in Hanoi on August 28. Not only did Tsedenbal pay the Chinese the courtesy of visiting Peking on his vay south, but also returned to China, to Kunming, on his route from Viet Nam to India. The Mongol leader was met with a full- scale, warm welcome in Kunming and cabled Chou from that city.9ü In mid-September, a report appeared in the Chinese press that Mongolian-Chinese friendship activities were getting underway in Ulan Bator.A delegation of Inner Mongolian artists had left for the MPR for the occasion, and a group from the Chinese-Mongolian Friendship Association followed a few days later.9^ ulan Bator exhibited a photo graphic display on the CPR and a Chinese Film Week was celebrated. The October 1 celebration was likewise honored by the presence of Mongol government— including Tsedenbal— and workers* delegations.9® Tsedenbal and Chou En-lai talked again on October ii, 1959, although no indication was given of the reason for or outcome of the visit. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 Following the weeks of celebration in Ulan Bator and Peking, a Mongolian economic delegation arrived in Peking on October No report followed of any developments while that group was in Peking, but they were received by Vice-Premier Chien Yi on November 27, 1959, prior to their departure the next day.*^^ In late October another group of Chinese workers were awarded honors in Ulan Bator, and delegations con tinued to move to and from the MPR and the CPR.102 Thus the year 1959 was marked by a maintenance of the relatively high level of cultural and organization activity between the two coun tries. At the same time, news of substantive political developments decreased noticeably, with scarcely a mention of so much as a trade agreement until late December. With the presence of an economic delega tion in Peking and no apparent outcome of the visit, it appears that the Chinese and the Mongolians may have found it difficult to come to terms. However, in view of later developments, it appears more likely that the Chinese simply were not revealing as much concerning their dealings with the MPR as previously.103 Tours for visiting delegations continued to comprise the reported Sino-Mongolian activity during the first month of I960. On February 3 of that year, a delegation led by Delgerzerab, MPR Minister of Trade, ar- 105 rived in Peking for talks. After three weeks of discussions, a protocol on mutual supply of goods for I960 was concluded. The lists of items to be supplied included for the CPR trucks and machine items in addition to the silk, woolen and cotton textiles listed in previous years. The MPR was to furnish its usual animal husbandry Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 9 products. The agreement also provided for Chinese aid to the MPR for the construction of several building projects.in addition to the protocol on goods supply, the two countries also concluded a 196O executive plan for cultural cooperation.!®® It became apparent that more was in the offing when Tsedenbal received the Chinese ambassador on March 31, i9 6 0 , in the presence of Molomzhants and Tseven, respectively, the MPR*s Minister of Finance and Deputy President of the State Planning Commission.!®^ Five days later, Tseven led a delegation arriving in Peking.!®8 Shortly after Tseven and his delegation arrived in Peking, another glittering array of Mongolian officialdom arrived in Peking conqjrising a Great People's Hural mission on a visit at the invitation of Chu Teh.!®? Whether the second group were to distract attention from the first is not certain; Tseven's group is not mentioned in subsequent reports, while the Hural delegation led by Jargalsaihan were hosted by Chu Teh, by Liu Shao-chi, and ultimately by Mao Tse-tung. It is noted that a speech by Jargalsaihan in Peking on the MPR's progress in economic development praised the aid of the CPR highly, while referring to the leadership of the Soviet Union. Ü® On May 6 , the Broadcasting Administration Bureaus of the two countries concluded a broadcasting cooperation agreement in Peking. The same day it was announced that Chou En-lai, Premier of the CPR, would visit the MPR late in May.Ü ! The work of Tseven!s delegation may have had its outcome in a protocol of May 25 on the final clearing of accounts concerned with the Agreement on Economic Assistance of August 1956. The final clearing Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 disclosed an unused balance which was to be used by the MPR for more projects. The agreement was signed by the Mongolian ambassador Sharab and Li Chiang, Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade of the CPR. The MPR delegation had been received by Chien Yi the previous day.ü^ On May 27, Chou En-lai and Chien Yi left for the MPR with a large, high-level retinue. Arriving in Ulan Bator, the Chinese were met by Tsedenbal and an immense group of higher level Mongolian officials. It is interesting to note that Tsedenbal*s welcoming speech made the ob servation that many changes have occurred since Chou's last visit six years earlier, both in the MPR and abroad. In a luncheon meeting that same day, Chou.admitted to Tsedenbal that Chinese help to the MPR was limited, but that he hoped that the visit would help promote friendship between the MPR and the CPR. Chou gave credit in his speech to the Soviet Union as the head of the so cialist camp.!!% Although the then still incipient Sino-Soviet ideological conflict was as yet not publicly aired, it appears that the dispute, at least in part, was a motivation for Chou's visit and its outcome. On May 31, I960, the CPR and the MPR concluded in Ulan Bator a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. The Treaty (see appendix for full text) was signed by Chou En-lai and Tsedenbal and provided for consultation between China and Mongolia on all "inçortant international questions of common interest . . ." and for the provision of all pos sible aid hy each party to the other in their socialist construction. The provision for economic aid was given a healthy boost when the two countries concluded an agreement on economic and technical aid given Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 by the CPR to the MPR whereby the latter would receive a 200,000,000 ruble long-term loan, More aid may have been in the offing because there is also reference to an Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between the CPR and the MPR.Ü® It would appear that whether the CPR desired to obtain the poli tical support of the MPR in its ideological differences with the Soviet Union, or sinQ)ly wanted to maintain its position with the Mongolians, it paid a certain price. Another contact, albeit limited, occurred between the MPR and Sinkiang in July 22, I960, when a four-member delegation from the Sinkianr-Uighur Autonomous Region visited Mongolia. The delegation under the leadership of S. Yasinov, Director of the Department of Agriculture and Reclamation, under the Autonomous Regional Committee of the CPC, came to the MPR to attend the twentieth anniversary celebration of the founding of the Bgyanulegei (Bayan-Olgii) Province. The Mongolian province is situated in the extreme western tip of the MPR, adjoining the Sinkiang area of China. Ü7 On September 20, I960, representatives of the two countries con cluded an agreement whereby the MPR was to receive more assistance in the form of workers dispatched by China. The agreement, signed in Ulan Bator, did not mention specific details, but it is reported that a greater diversification of skilled labor was stipulated in the agreement.!!^ The Sino-Mongolian Treaty of May, I960, came into force when a Protocol on the Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty 13.9 was signed in Peking on October 12, I960. The Chinese had ratified it on September 20.^^® Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102 The position of the Chinese with regard to the MPR had in a large sense improved in i9 6 0 . The conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance provided the CPR with definite influence in Mongol actions on the international scene. It had also committed them to provide continuing aid to the MPR and may well represent a v e ry basic quid pro quo arrangement for subsequent developments. From October I960 until the following March, little information appears concerning Sino-Mongolian activities. In mid-March I9 6 1 , a Chi nese military delegation headed by a Vice-Minister of National Defense of the CPR visited the MPR for the letter's Array Day celebration. It ap pears highly unlikely that anything of a political significance tran spired between the Chinese and the Mongolians as a Soviet delegation headed by Malinovsky was also present. A few weeks later, discussions in Ulan Bator culminated in the annual executive plan for cultural coopera tion between the two countries. Some quarters report that the April 7 agreement provided for the exchange of highly trained personnel, scien tists, and public health workers; although in view of the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China the previous year, it does not appear that the CPR had any great number of personnel to s p a r e . 121 The following week more Chinese workers in the MPR were awarded metals prior to their depar ture from that country.Ulan Bator was the scene of more activity when a high-level Chinese trade delegation arrived on April 25. The delegation head, Ych Chi-chuang, was received by Tsedenbal and engaged in talks with Mongolian officials.After two days of talks, the two government contingents signed a Commerce Treaty. The Treaty provided for the usual Items to be exchanged, with the addition of raw materials for industry Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 from the CPR. It appears that the April 26 agreement vas the first trade pact to be termed a "treaty,” all previously having been protocols, pacts, or agreements. It was disclosed a day later that a Protocol on Exchange of Goods for 1961 was signed along with the Commerce Treaty.125 Chinese labor continued to be mentioned in the news in the fol lowing months. On May l5, Ulan Bator reported that some 3,300 Chinese laborers and functionaries and their families were working in the Mongolian capitol to help beautify it for the celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the victory of the Mongolian people's révolu- In June, it was reported that a contingent of Chinese workers and functionaries were dispatched to the MPR at the letter's request to aid in production and construction. Another group of Chinese had returned to China the previous month after periods of service of from three to six years. A week later, on the eve of the Fourteenth Congress of the MPRP, three projects constructed by the Chinese were turned over to the MPR. The projects consisted of a forty-meter seven-stoiy building and two big guest houses. A protocol was signed effecting the transfer on the same day, June 26.!^® The Fourteenth Congress of the MPRP and the Fortieth Anniversary of Mongolian independence celebrations provided the setting for a peculiar display of Mongolian political gymnastics. When Ulanfu and the usual Chinese Party delegation arrived in Ulan Bator on July 2, they were met by Tsedenbal, Sambu, Tsende, and the entire MPR Council of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 Ministers.Two days later, When Ulanfu addressed the Congress, he made no mention of Soviet relations with the MPR, extolled Sino- Mongolian relations, and took an indirect ideological pot-shot at Moscow with a blast at Yugoslavia.!3Q The same day, July 5, a six-member delegation from the IMA.R and Sinkiang left Kuke-Khoto for Ulan Bator and the Fortieth Anniversary festivities.!®! Three days later a Chinese Friendship Delegation left Peking for Ulan Bator, while a Mongol delegation was leaving for Peking for the ten-day Chinese-Mongol Friendship Festival.^32 Peking for the next ten days was the scene of continual recep tions, parties, and e:qpressions of Chinese-Mongol good will; at least three Mongolian delegations were given high honors during that time.!33 On July 17, a delegation of the Mongolian-Chinese Friendship Association headed by A. Otgonbayar, Vice-President of the Association and First Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Commission (with ministerial rank) arrived in Kuke-Khoto for a three-day visit. The Mongol contingent were to take part in the activities of "China-Mongolia Friendship Week," at the invitation of the Chinese-Mongol ian Friendship Association.!^^ It is to be borne in mind that Just a week earlier Ulanfu had spoken of Sino-Mongolian friendship, to which Tsedenbal responded the following day with a radio speech referring to the "vanguard of the socialist camp, our invariable and the most loyal friend, the Soviet Union."!35 It is also noted that the CPR again announced the ratification of a trade agreement, that of April, 1961, on July 25, 1961.!®® Four days Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 later, Chinese workers and functionaries sent at the MPR’s request for 1961 began to arrive In Ulan Bator in groups.!®^ There followed in August and September what appeared to be the result of the April agreement on Cultural Cooperation. In early August, the CPR Vice-Minister of Education, Tung Chun-tsai, visited the MPR to attend the Mongolian Third Teacher's Congress.!®® The newspaper account of Tung's journey mentioned a Charge d'Affaires ad interim as being ranking Mongolian officer in Peking, However, when the MPR's Minister of Public Health, G. Tuvan and his party of two arrived in Peking on September 27, they were met by Sharab, among others. It appears that Sharab may have been called back to Ulan Bator for consultation during that period.'^39 Subsequent reports show that Tuvan was in Kuke Khoto for three days prior to his return to Mongolia.It appears, however, that IMfLR-MpR contact in the form of cross-boundary livestock grazing was not to occur that year. A November 23 report indicated that Mongolian herdsmen were having trouble with drought in South Gobi Aymak as they had had in previous years; although the Chinese printed the Ulan Bator item, they made no mention of repeating a previous arrangement, that of allowing the MPR cattle to be herded to the IMAR.!^! The Chinese may also have been suffering drought problems of their own, in spite of irrigation and well-sinking projects. In late December, a Chinese government delegation arrived in Ulan Bator to turn over a plant built with Chinese aid. On December 27, Maidar in a speech disclosed thât the CPR had extended long-term credits totaling 3 0 0 ,000,000 rubles "after the loan made in 1956."!b2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106 The year I96I had been an active one for Sino-Mongolian relations; as of the Fourteenth Party Congress in Ulan Bator, the Mongolians had played their part veil. Whether subsequent developments, such as the Mongolian support for the Russian side in the Twenty-second CPSU Con gress, or the Soviet-Mongol Embassy Party in November, indicated a less advantageous position for the Chinese is difficult to ascertain. It is clear, at any rate, that the Chinese revived a previous pattern in 1961, that of utilizing the cross-boundary ethnic ties between the Mongols of China and those of the CPR. In addition to the delegations moving back and forth from the IMAH to the MFR, the Chinese also made •quite; a drive for the loyalties of the Buddhist-faith Mongols. In early 1961, the Chinese promulgated regulations on the care of cultural objects, including Buddhist Monas teries and c a v e s . while this probably was not aimed at just the Mongols, it undoubtedly did not fail to help the Chinese aims to some extent. Mongolian-Chinese relations in 1962 began with the signing of the year's executive plan for cultural cooperation in Peking on January 1 3 .IUU Three days later, the first regular through train from Peking to Ulan Bator pulled out, some six years after the line had been originally opened.Although some information had from time to time appeared in the Chinese press indicating that special trains had made the journey from the MPR to China, or vice-versa, no train had made the trip on a regularly scheduled basis. That such a schedule came into existence as late as 1962 might indicate that the Soviet Union had previously made it clear to the Mongolians that regular rail contact with China would not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107 be favorable to Soviet-Hongolian relations. Only after the MPR clearly supported the Soviet side of the growing dispute, it would appear, would Moscow agree to regular rail contact between Ulan Bator and Peking. The following month, Gombozhab and a Mongolian trade delegation arrived in Peking for talks. After four days of talks and a visit between the delegation and Chou En-lai, the 1962 protocol on mutual supply of goods was concluded. The list of items to be furnished again showed an increase on the part of China; the CPR was to furnish machinery and machine parts In addition to the products listed the year before. The occasion was given a great play in Peking, with more than the pre viously usual number of banquets and receptions.1^6 On April 10, 1962, a meeting was held in Ulan Bator to celebrate the birth of the ancient Chinese poet Tu FU, under the sponsorship of the Mongolian Peace Commission, the Mongolian-Chinese Friendship Associa tion, and the Mongolian Writers' Union.The nature of the celebra tion would link it with the Genghis Khan celebration the last of May, and perhaps represent another aspect of Chinese policy toward the MPR, as well. Ten days later, an eleven member economic gr^p arrived in Peking from the MPR for talks on Sino-Mongolian economic and technical assist ance.!^® No outcome, however, is reported In the general Chinese press of the Peking talks, presumably occurring undefc the May, I960 Treaty. On May 5> 1962, D. Sharab, MPR ambassador in Peking was recalled and left Peking. The Chinese gave the departing envoy a large and enthusiastic send-off.!H9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108 A few days after Sharab left Peking, reports began to appear on Chinese workers who were beginning to depart the MPR, On May l5, one hundred and forty-six workers who had been in the MPR since May, 1959, received medals for their services. The same day, a banquet was given for representatives of three thousand Chinese workers who were leaving Mongolia after fulfilling terms of service there. Some of the workers had been there for several years, it was reported, and the general occasion was a large and festive event. On June 17, 1962, a Chinese delegation to the Conference of Ministers of Railways of Socialist Countries arrived In Ulan Bator under the leadership of Yu Kuang-sheng, CPR Vice-Minister of Railways. The Korean and Viet-namese delegations arrived by the same train. Eight days later, the three delegations left on the same train, thus exhibit ing solidarity on the Chinese side of the ideological dispute now rampant.!^! In the meantime, however, a new Mongolian ambassador had arrived in Peking on June 20. The new envoy, D. Tsebegmid, was greeted merely by a deputy director of the Protocol Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Tsebegmid called on Ch'en Yi the next day and discussed the presentation of his credentials. The two officials are reported as having a "cordial talk."!^^ Not until June 25 did Tsebegmid present his credentials, and then the occasion was given considerable pomp and cir cumstance. The new ambassador complimented the CPR on its peaceful foreign policy and expressed Mongolian gratitude for Chinese aid. Liu Shao-chi spoke, referring to the Treaty of May, 1960.!^^ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 It vas also announced on June 25 that a number of Chinese workers in the MHl whose terms had e^qpired had returned home in May and June. Arrangements for the return of the workers had been made in Peking recently by agreement of representatives of the Mongolian and Chinese governments.!^^ It would seem possible that the February delegation, headed by Gombozhab, may have been a party to those talks. On July 10, 1962, a delegation from the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, headed by Vice-Minister Yang Chl-ching arrived in Ulan Bator on the occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Mongolian Ministry of Public Security.!55 In mid-August, MPR Ambassador Tsebegmid paid a morning call on Chu-Teh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. No reason was given for the talk, which was reported to have been cordial and friendly. On September 3 0 , 1 9 6 2 , Tsebegmid paid another call, this time on Chou En-lai. Again, no details were given as to the reasons for or outcome of the c a l l . ! 5 6 On October 5, 1962, a ceremony occurred during which representa tives of the Chinese Government transferred to the MPR three buildings of a guest house which had been built with Chinese aid. It was dis closed that a Chinese construction company exists in the MPR by agree ment of the two governments and that some twenty-six projects had been completed.!^^ In mid-December, 1962, Chou En-lai invited Tsedenbal to Peking to sign a Sino-Mongolian Boundary Treaty. Two days later, on December I8 , Tsedenbal accepted.158 Tsedenbal arrived in Peking a week later. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110 Several factors appear to have determined Chinese and Mongolian decisions regarding the border sëttlement. China had been engaged in what might be termed the process of rationalizing her frontiers. The modern political boundary must have relevance to the nationality or ethnic character of the peoples inhabiting the territory it encloses. In a land like the Himalayas country, for example, traditional cultural patterns and political loyalties had roughly delineated the sphere of Chinese control prior to 1900. Since the advent of the CPR, however, Chinese policy seems to be fairly consistently aimed at obtaining a well-marked frontier, as well as a frontier which included land pre viously detached, in China's view, by foreign incursion. This process had been completed for the southern-most portion of the Chinese frontier, but met with obstruction in the Himalayas in the form of Indian reluctance to withdraw from that area. This obstruction and the subsequent Sino-Indian armed conflict had at least two effects for Chinese policy to take into account. The first was that it put a crimp in what appears to have been the overall Chinese plan for the frontier, a plan that would have enabled Peking to approach border nego tiations with the MPR from a more favorable position. The second effect was that it put the Chinese in a relatively bad light, and confirmed the fears of smaller Asian countries that "dragon throne imperialism" was being revived. Thus, China in the midst of its difficulties with India, turned to Ulan Bator. A border settlement with the MPR offered remedies to the two problems outlined above. First, it enabled the Chinese to "pin down" the other end of the ethnic frontier crescent, and tq regain some Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ill of the prestige it must have lost among the border groups in their struggle with India. Second, it helped to prove to the world at large, and more particularly the smaller Asian countries, that China really pursues a peaceful foreign policy, as long as she is permitted to do so. As for the MMl's reasons for accepting the settlement, it would appear that the conditions and terms of the border agreement must have been made fairly palatable for the Mongolians. Secondly, and no less inqaor- tant, the agreement obtained for the MMt the benefits of a clearly delineated, hopefully peaceful border. In view of worsening Sino-Soviet relations, such an agreement was essential for the Mongols to maintain stable, if cool, relations with the CPR. Whatever price the Chinese may have paid to obtain the coopera tion of the Mongols in concluding the border agreement, it did not cause the Mongols to abandon their careful adherence to Moscow's line in the ideological dispute. Tsedenbal limited his remarks for the most part to the salutory effect the treaty would have on Sino-Mongolian relations, even foregoing the perfunctory blasts at the United States, usually added in courtesy to the Chinese.!®^ The treaty was then concluded on December 26, 1962. While the treaty itself is reasonably specific, later developments show that it was basically an agreement in principle. Tsedenbal departed Peking on December 27, leaving the Chinese satisfied with only one aspect of his action.!®® The Treaty was ratified by the CPR on March 6 , 1963, and ratifi cation instruments were exchanged in Ulan Bator on March 25. On April l6 . Lu Ching, Chief Delegate for the Chinese to the Chinese-Mongol ian Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112 Joint Boundary-Surveying Committee arrived in Ulan Bator to attend the first session of the Committee.!®! General Sino-Mongolian relations seemed to have returned to a more normal pace after the slight cooling in 1962. A goods exchange protocol was signed between the two countries on March I8 , I9 6 3 , with few changes in products to be exchanged. On March 30, 1963, the Execu tive Plan of the Sino-Mongolian Cultural Cooperation Agreement was signed in Ulan Bator.!®2 Whether or not Sino-Mongolian relations have regained the level of previous activity in all respects is difficult to ascertain. The CPR's position vis-a-vis Mongolia depends on several factors, including the volatile Sino-Soviet relationship. Some possibilities regarding the future of Sino-Mongolian relations will be discussed in the final chapter. At this point, it may be useful to re-examine on a broader scale the events described in this chapter. The information available con cerning those relations is of sufficient scope only to present a con fused, incomplete, and often self-contradictory impression. While the period does not easily lend itself to any clear-cut divisions, it is possible to sketch three rough phases of Sino-Mongolian relations. The first phase of modern Sino-Mongolian relations began with Tsedenbal’s Moscow meeting with Chou En-lai in September, 1952. That period lasted until late 1958 and may be generally characterized as one of increasing Chinese influence. The second phase started in late 1958 and lasted until November, 196I. During this period the level of Sino- Mongolian relations was irregular but, in general, fairly good. The Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 third period, November, 1961 to the present, has been one in which Chinese influence with and in the MPR seems to have declined steadily. During the first period outline, Chinese influence in the MPR grew from little or none to a fairly high level. Exactly how strong it became is virtually impossible to say; information is too scanty. How ever, the means by which the Chinese pursued their aims with regard to the MPR included the conqjlete spectrum of possibilities. Trade, grants- in-aid, cultural exchanges, and utilization of traditional ethnic ties were all present. Sino-Mongolian relations progressed fairly smoothly from 1952 to 1958; in spite of some apparently quite rigorous negotia tions from point to point, the Chinese were able to achieve continually improving relations. It should be observed that China's relations with the Soviet Union were, for the most part, unruffled during this phase, and the principle of "good relations among socialist nations" made Sino- Mongolian dealings relatively easy. In late 1958, it became apparent that the terms of the Peking- Ulan Bator relationship had changed or were about to change. The CPR had reconsidered its policy of using Mongol ethnic ties as a policy tool toward the MPR; it will be recalled that the Chinese plan for the adop tion of Cyrillic Mongolian for Inner Mongolia was discarded. Then, in August, 1958, came the announcement of a large grant-in-aid ty China to Mongolia, hard on the heels of a Russian grant that same month. It would appear that the CPR, under the guise of cooperation with the USSR, had entered into a period of competition with the Russians. It should be pointed out that the Chinese undoubtedly had no idea of attenqjting to match or surpass Soviet aid to the MPR. However, by Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. l i 5 staying in the picture and offering what they could, they prevented the Soviet Union from monopolizing Mongolian ties. It would appear that China could have done no less; it further appears that the Mongols chose to obtain the utmost advantage from the situation. After the August, 1958, Chinese grant-in-aid, a change was apparent in both the channels of Sino-Mongolian activity and the actual quality or importance of events reported. Where there had been solidity at many points, ceremony seemed to take its place. Concrete agreements seemed fewer in number and greater in celebration. Cultural contacts aimed at exploiting ethnic ties seemed to diminish to a few carefully timed demonstrations or delegations; other more institutional approaches came into play; e.g., the Mongolian-Chinese Friendship Association. In view of the difficult negotiations experienced by the Chinese and the Mongolians at many points, it appears that both sides were bent on taking advantage of the situation. Not always, however, were either or both successful. In spite of the diminished substance of many aspects of Sino- Mongolian relations, the Chinese were able to obtain a Treaty of Friend ship and Mutual Cooperation with the MPR in late May, I96 1 . Although the Treaty was undoubtedly expensive financially for the Chinese, it represented a sort of diplomatic triumph in regard to the growing Sino- Soviet dispute. Thus, the relations between Ulan Bator and Peking con tinued, on the whole irregular, until November, 1961. With the MPR's declaration of support for Moscow in its dispute with Peking, the relatively smooth, if sometimes difficult, Sino-Mongolian relations which had continued since 1958 were doomed to disruption. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 The November, 1961, developments marked the beginning of the current period of Sino-Mongolian relations. Only in the very latest months have things deteriorated to any alarming degree; the Chinese and the Mongolians were able to work out what appears to have been an equitable border settlement in December, 1962. As was outlined earlier, both countries had their own reasons for wanting a settlement at this juncture. Underlying almost every development in Chinese relations with Mongolia; since 1961, however, has been the fact of Mongolia's support for Moscow. No Chinese maneuver has succeeded in obtaining such support for the Middle Kingdom; the Mongols have firmly set themselves on the far side of the fence. In summary, it should be pointed out that the presence of a united, dynamic China has irrevocably altered the situation in the Far East. Mongolian reactions to this fact led the MHi to pursue a policy of good relations with its giant neighbor, a fairly realistic and not particularly risky policy as long as the Soviet Union is around to support the Mongols. Now it would appear that such a policy has become difficult if not impossible. What the future may bring is discussed in the final chapter. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116 FOOTNOTES ^Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press U33 (Hongkong: United States Consulate General), p. 3Iu (Hereinafter cited as SCMP.) ^Ibid., p. 3 5 . 3lbid. ^Robert A. Rupen, "Notes On Outer Mongolia Since 1955," Pacific Affairs, XXVIII (March, 1955), p. 75. ------ ^Pravda, October 6 , 1952, p. 10; in Current Digest of the Soviet Press IV, 56 (November l5, 1952), pp. 15-16. (hereinafter referred to as CDS?) ®SCMP 529, pp. 1-7. NCNA, 10/5/52. 7sOtP, 585, p. 5. NCNA, 1/2/53. ®SCMP 595, p. 35. NCNA, l/l6/53. ?9CMP 519, p. 11. NCNA, 2/25/53. !°SCMP 557, p. 8 . NCNA, 5/27/53. Ü9CMP 563, p. 36. NCNA, 5/5/53. !2sCMP 636, p. 9. NCNA, 8/20/53. 13lbid. !^SCMP 786, p. 8 . NCNA, 5/9/55. !^SCMP 8l5, p. 31. NCNA, 5/21/55. !®SCMP 860, p. 25. NCNA, 7/31/55, !7s CMP 871, p. 7, NCNA, 7/15/55; SCMP 883, p. 58, NCNA, 7/18/55, 3CMP 902, p. 28, NCNA, 10/3/55. !®SCMP 905, p. 23. NCNA, 10/10/55. !?3CMP 909, p. 29. NCNA, 10/17/55. 2®SCMP 902, p. 52. NCNA, 10/3/55. 2!SCMP 909, p. 29. NCNA, 10/17/55. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117 22sOiP 933, p. 6 . NCM, 11/22/55. 23lbid. 2^*SCMP 959, p. 12. NC M , 12/15/55. 2 % C W 950, p. 5. NCM, 12/16/55. 2®SCMP 992, p. 29. NCNA, 2/l8/55. 27sCMP 1008, p. 20. NCNA, 3/l5/55. 2®Rupen, "Notes On Outer Mongolia Since 1955," og. c^t., p. 35. ^^SCMP 1085, p. 22, NCNA, 7/9/55; ^ 1110, p. 35, NCNA, 8/15/55. ®°SCMP 1197, p. l5. NCNA, 12/22/55. ®!x MP 1227, p. 23. NCNA 2/7/56. ®2sCMP 1237, p. 35. NCNA, 2/28/56. ®®SCMP 1250, p. 27. NCNA, 2/29/56. ®^^SCMP 1251, pp. 16-17. NCNA, 3/1/56. ®^SCMP 1257, p. 39. NCNA, 3/25/56. ®®SCMP 1261, p. 33. NCNA, 3/29/56. 37pravda. April 10, 1956, p. 3; in CDSP VIII, 15 i(May 23, 1956), p. 27. ®®SCMP 1299, p. 31. NCNA, 5/25/56. ®?SCMP 1327, p. 36. NCNA, 7/9/56. ^°SCMP 1331, p. 35. NCNA, 7/15/56. ^^hristian Science Monitor, August 9 , 1957. ^^SCMP 1352, p. 21. NCNA, 7/30/56. ^®Robert A. Rupen, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Outer Mongolia," Current Scene I, 11 (August 31, 1961), p. 5. ^^^*SCMP 1360, p. 55. NCNA, 8/25/56. ^%qjen, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Outer Mongolia," og. £ ^ . , p. 5. ^®SCMP 1539, p. 36. NCNA, 12/22/56. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 ^7sCMP 1557, p. 33. N C M , 12/30/56. ^®SCMP 1552, p. 33. M C M , l/l5/57. ^?SCMP 1588, p. 29. N C M , 3/8/57. % C M P 1598, p. 23. N C M , 3/22/57. ^!sCMP 1520, pp. 21-22. NCM, 5/27/57. 52s c MP 1521, p. 35. N C M , 5/29/57. 53New York Herald Tribune, April 26, 1955. 5i|Rupen, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Outer Mongolia," og. £ H . , p. 5. 5^ew York Times, June 3, 1956. Recent Reports on Tibet," Current Background (Hongkong: United States Consulate General), February 7, 1958, p. 25. ^7ibid. ^%bid., pp. 1-2. ^9ibid., p. 23. ®QsCMP I5l6, p. 15. NCNA, 5/29/57. ®!s CMP 1535, p. 22. N C M , 5/l6/57. ®2sCMP 1605, p. 35. N C M 8/31/57. ®3sCMP 1626, p. 59. NCM, 10/3/57. ®%CMP 1665, p. 56. N C M , 11/29/57. ®%CMP 1696, p. 35, N C M , l/l5/58j S W 1701, p. 36, N C M , 1/25/58. ®%CMP 1703, p. 37. NCM , 1/28/58. ®7s cMP 1622, p. 39. NCM , 9/29/57. ®%CMP. 1719, p. 25. »CHA, 2/21/58. ®?SCMP 1735, p. 37. N C M , 3/15/58. 7®See reports in SCMP Numbers 930-950 for Chinese comments on 1955 Congress; Numbers 1735-1750 for the reaction to the 1958 Congress. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 7!s CMP 1761, p. 57. NCM, 5/27/58. 7%CMP 1772, pp. 56-57. NCM, 5/10/58. 7%CM P 1799, p. 35. NCM, 6/20/58. 7^CM P 1807, p. 58. NCNA, 7/5/58. 7^SCMP 1828, pp. 56-57. NCM, 8/1/58. 7®SCMP 1832, p. 3 8 . NCNA, 8/7/58. 77sCMP i860, p. 58. NCM, 9/20/58. 7%upen, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry In Outer Mongolia," og. ci&., P* 5. 7?SCMP 1865, pp. 39-52. NCM, 9/26/58. ®°SCMP 1871, p. 8 0 . NCM, 9/30/5 8 . ®!sCMP 1895, p. 62. NCM, 11/11/58. ®%CMP 1896, p. 5 9 . NCM, 11/22/58. ®®SCMP 1923, p. 3 1 , NCM, 12/23/58; SCMP 1925, p. 52, NCM, 12/26/58. “ % C M P 1926, p. 5 5 . NCM, 12/29/58. ®%upen, "Outer Mongolia, 1957-1960," Pacific Affairs XXXIII (December, i9 60), pp. 127-129. ®®FFifth Session of 1st National People's Congress, VI, Some Statements on Minorities Problems," Current Background (Hongkong; United States Consulate General), 500, March 31, 1958, p. 3. ®7Rupen, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Outer Mongolia," og. cit., p. 5. ®®SCMP 1959, p. 39. NCNA, 1/30/5 9 . ®?SCMP 1993, p. 31. NCM, 5/10/59. ?°SCMP 1997, p. 2 3 . NCM, 5/16/5 9 . ?!sCMP 2051, p. 5 7 . NCM, 7/3/5 9 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120 ?^SCMP 2090, p. 35. HC M , 8/28/59. ?^ b l d ., pp. 39, 56. 2095, p. 53, NCM, 9/7/59; 9CI£ 2096, p. 55, N C M , 9/8/59. ?%gHP 2098, p. 33, N C M , 9/15/59; SCMP 2101, p. 3 3 , N C M , 9/15/59. ?^CMP 2103, p. 57. N C M , 9/22/59. ?7s c m p 2105, p. 56. NC M , 2/23/59. ?%CMP 2108, p. 55. NCM, 9/27/59. ? ?scatp 2113, p. 20. N C M , 10/5/59. !°%CMP 2121, p. 52. N C M , 10/16/59. 2158, pp. 35-36. N C M , 11/28/59. !°%CMP 2129, p. 38. N C M , 10/26/59. 103,'SCMP 2166, p. 36. N C M , 12/23/59. !°^ M P 2192, p. 55. NCM, 2/3/60. !°%CMP 2206, p. 50. NCM , 2/23/60. 10®Ebld. 107,SCMP 2232, p. 5l. NCM , 3/31/60. !°% C M P 2235, p. 5l. NCM , 5/5/60. !°%CMP 2238, p. 55. N C M , 5/8/60. !!%CMP 2258, p. 37. NCM, 5/9/60. Ü^SCMP 2256, p. 55. NCM , 5/6/60. !!%CMP 2268, p. 5l. NCM, 5/25/60. !!%CMP 2271, pp. 36-39. N C M , 5/27/60. !!W. , pp. 53-55. !!% a g 2273, pp. 3?-51. H C M , 6/1/6O. !!%id. , P . 53• Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121 ü Tschp 2306, p. 5 2 . NCM, 7/22/6 0 . !!%CMP 2355, p. 19 . NCM, 9/20/6 0 . !!?JSCMP 2361, p. 5 0 . NCM, 10/12/6 0 . 233 8 , p. 51. NCM, 9/10/6 0 . !^^SCWP 2575, p. 35. NCM, 5/7/6 1 . ! ^ ^3CMP 2581, p. 5 0 . NCM, 5/15/6 1 . !^ ®SCMP 2586, pp . 31-3 2 . NCM, 5/25/6 1 . 2587, p. 32. NCM, 5/26/6 1 . !^ %CMP 2588, p. 3 8 . NCM, 5/27/6 1 . !^ ®SCMP 25 0 0 , p. 51. NCM, 5/15/6 1 . !^7scmp 252 5 , p. 37. NCM, 6/20/6 1 . ! ^ ®SCHP 2 5 3 0 , p. 3 8 . NCM, 6/26/6 1 . ! ^ %CMP 253 3 , p. 5 5 . NCM, 7/2/61. !®°SCMP 2 5 3 5 , pp . 3 6 -3 9 . NCM, 7/5/61. !®!lbld.. p. 39. !® ^SCHP 25 3 6 , pp . 35-36. NCM, 7/7/61. !®®Ibtd.. pp. 37- •51. !®^^SCMP. 2552, p . 35. NCM, 7/17/6 1 . !® ^SCMP 2 5 3 8 , p. 32, N CM , 7/10/61} S Ç W 2539, p. 5l, NCM, 7/11/61. !®®SCMP 2558, p. 3 0 . NCM, 7/25/6 1 . !®7scmp 255 1 , p. 3 5 . NCM, 7/29/6 1 . !®%CMP 2556, p. 50. NCM, 9/5/6 1 . !®?SCMP 2591, p. 5 0 . NCM, 9/27/6 1 . !^°SCMP 2 6 0 0 , p. 3 8 . NCM, 10/11/6 1 . iH^scmp 262 8 , p. 31. NCM, 11/23/6 1 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 ^^%CMP 2652, p. 32. N C M , 12/27/61. lit3tProvisional Regulations on the Protection and Care of Cul tural Objects," Current Background (Hongkong: United States Consulate General) 65U, June iL, 1961. lUtscHP 2636, p. 21. NCM, l/lL/62. l^^SCMP 2663, p. 29. NCM, 1/16/62. l^^SCMP 2689, p. 28. NCM, 2/25/62. l^^SCMP 2720, p. 3U. NCM , U/lO/62. 2726, p. 38. N C M , U/20/62. ^*^9sCMP 2738, p. 2k. NCM, 5/H/62. ^^°SCMP 27li2, NCM, 5/15/62j SCMP 27b3, pp. 28-29, NCM, 5/15/62. 2765, p. 27, NCM, 6/17/62; SCMP 2769, p. 36, NCM, 6/25/62. l^ZscMP 2766, p. 25, NCM, 6/20/62j SCMP 2767, p. 2li, NCM, 6/21/62. l^^SCMP 2769, p. 36. NCM, 6/25/62. iSLibld. l^^SCMP 2779, p. 2. NCM, 7/10/62. l^^SCMP 2805, p. 33, NCM, 9/17/62; SCMP 2833, p. 33, NCM, ,9/30/6 2 . I^TSCMP 2836, p. 31. NCM, 10/5/6 2 . 158scmp 2888, pp. 37-3 8 . N C M , 12/23/6 2 . 159SÇMP 2889, p. 3 0 . NCM, 12/25/6 2 . l^Oibid. , , 2937, p. 3 8 , NC M , 3/8/63; S Ç W 2963, p. 29, NCM, u/16/6 3 . 1 6 2 ^ 29U3, p. 2 3 , NCM, 3/25/63; ^ 2952, p. 27, NCM, 3/30/6 3 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER IV THE MONGOLIANS AND OTHER NATIONS Prior to the inception of Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia, and the establishment of the Mongolian People’s Republic, representatives of several nations had found their way into that country. After 1921, little contact transpired between the MPR and other countries until the post-World War II period. Apparently the earliest contact occurred in I9U8 when a Mongolian delegation participated in the East Asian Nations Conference in Calcutta.% As noted earlier, expansion of Mongolian relations with Eastern European countries began shortly after the 1950 Sino-Soviet Agreement. The MPR’s first diplomatic relations with an Asian country, other than the CPR, were established with the "Democratic Republic of North Korea." J. Shambun, the first Mongolian Ambassador to North Korea, arrived to present his credentials on or about August lU, 1950.^ Little appears concerning Mongolian contacts with non-communist nations during the next few years. However, in September, 1952, it was reported that troops believed to be from the MPR were fighting for the North in the Korean conflict.3 Nothing appears to corroborate the rumor, although the Chinese delegate to the United Nations later repeated the charge and offered witnesses as proof.^ In June, 1955, Ho Chi Minh, Vietminh leader, appeared in Ulan Bator for a brief visit on his way from Peking to Moscow. Tsedenbal met the Vietnamese communist at the airport and a mass rally in Sukee Bator Square tensued',^ No record of Ho Chi Minh’s Mongolian visit appeared in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12U the general Chinese press of that period, nor does it appear that exten sive relations had previously occurred between the new-born North Vietnamese state and the MPR. In December, 1955, the Governments of India and the MPR announced that they were going to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassa dorial level. Menon, India’s representative in the United Nations had expressed unequivocal support of the MPR’s statehood on December 7, 1955»^ and on or about December 23, Unen announced that the Indian and Mongolian ambassadors to Peking would be accredited to Ulan Bator and New Delhi.7 Some quarters have found significance in India’s accred iting their ambassador to Peking to Ulan Bator, rather than their ambassador in Moscow, but an Indian press officer in Washington assured the writer that the reason was purely one of geographical convenience. It would also appear that, in view of increasing Chinese influence in Tibet and. the disputed Sino-Indian border areas ethnically linked to Tibet, India’s decision to establish relations with the MPR may have been prompted by a desire to increase her own influence in those areas. On February 8, 1956, an "Asian Solidarity Committee" was estab lished in Peking under the sponsorship of the CPR. The Committee in cluded representatives from sixteen nations, one of whom was the MPR.® Such international bodies, of course, expand Mongolian contacts with other countries, including non-communist neutral states, and undoubtedly have led to more concrete ties with them. From the initial establishment of Mongolian-Korean relations in 1950, a healthy rapport seems to have had developed between the two. Rupen cites a Soviet source to the effect that some two hundred Korean ^Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125 children of pre-school and school age came to the MPR during the diffi cult days of the Korean conflict, along with seven Korean teachers.? It also appears that Korean students at higher levels were at one point studying in the MPR.^® On May 9» 1956, it was announced that Premier Kim II Sung of North Korea was to visit the MPR at the head of a delegation. No reason was given for the visit, except to note that it was at the invitation of the Mongolian Government. 11 When Sung's visit actually came about is unknown, as no record appeared in the general press. In July or August, 1956, the MPR applied to the Japanese Govern ment for visas for a Mongolian delegation to enable the group to attend the Nagasaki World Rally for Banning Atomic and %drogen Bombs.On August 17, 1956, the Chinese press carried an account of the Mongolian Delegation's denouncement of a Japanese refusal to grant the visas.13 This apparently was the first official or semi-official Japanese- Mongoiian contact since World War II. B y the end of 1956, the MPR's diplomatic contacts had e^anded to include all the Eastern European socialist countries and India, as well as Indonesia and Burma, with whom Mongolian relations were established, according to Rupen, in 1955-1956. The Indian and Burmese Ambassadors, both resident in Peking, visited Ulan Bator for the Thirty-fifth Anni versary celebrations in July, 1956.1^ Mongolian contact with two of China’s neighbors were established; it appears that Mongolia’s old role in the Chinese border complex may have been translated Into modern terms. In 1957, little appears of Mongolian relations with non-communist countries until August, when five delegates from the MPR participated in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126 the Tokyo World Rally for Banning Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. The dele gation’s leader,. Professor Ts. Daminsur, expressed a wish to prepare for Mongolian-Japanese diplomatic contact while at the conference. According to the same Japanese source, Tsedenbal also called for diplomatic rela tions with Jspan on three separate occasions in 1957. This desire had, in addition, been expressed to a Japanese newsman who visited Ulan Bator that year.^® On August 28, a delegation led by Tsedenbal arrived in Yugoslavia on the heels of the departing Ho Chi Minh. Tito and Tsedenbal conferred in Belgrade on August 30, although no information was released on the 17 subject of their discussions. In September, 1957, the Vice-President of India visited the MPR, returning on September 23. Rupen reports that, in roughly the same period, an Indian scholar visited Mongolia and was presented with "tons" of historical material in Mongolian and Tibetan.Thus Mongolian- Indian relations continued, with some tinge of border politics present, at least on the academic level. Rupen reports that the MPR concluded trade agreements with Switzerland and the United Arab Republic (Egypt) in 1957.20 In February 1958, Czechoslovakia, Byelorussia, and Hungary attempted to seat Mongolia in the Conference on Rights of Land-Locked States, to no avail.21 Such an attempt may have been a means of bringing the MPR into world bodies such as the U.N. by the side door. That same month, a Mongolian cultural delegation was visiting North Vietnam and I n d i a . 22 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 On March 1, evidence appeared that the MPR was aiming at in creasing its influence with the Afro-Aslan neutralist nations. That day a mass meeting was held in Ulan Bator in support of a resolution passed by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo on the need for a ban on atomic testing and the use of atomic weapons. The rally also "adopted" a message to be sent to the Conference.23 On March l8, 1958, the Mongolian Government issued a statement supporting a March 7 "peace proposal" of the North Vietnamese Govern- ment. 2 h This took place while a North Vietnam Party delegation was in attendance at the Thirteenth Congress of the M P R P . 2 5 On May 2U, the MPR signed a trade contract with a French firm, thereby broadening its contact with Western E u r o p e . 26 The following month, Mongolia continued its efforts with regard to the Afro-Asian countries h y announcing that it planned to publish works by Asian and African writers .27 In October, the MPR's special organ for Asian-African affairs, the Mongolian Asian and African People’s Solidarity Committee, cabled greetings to newly independent G u i n e a . 28 In November, a new Indian Ambassador presented his credentials to the Government of the MPR. 29 In late December, a four-day Mongolian Youth League Congress opened. In attendance were delegations from China, the Soviet Union, and the other European and Asian "Socialist" countries, as well as from some other Afro-Asian nations.30 In 1959> a series of developments of greater importance occurred in Mongolian affairs with the world. On March 1, 1959» an announcement Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128 appeared that a Burmese Government official was to visit the MPR.31 in mid-May, a Vietnamese Ambassador presented his credentials in Ulan Bator, in the first such report recorded in the Chinese press.3% In June, Kim II Sung again visited the MPR for a three-day whirl of Mongol ian-Korean friendship consolidation. The MPR observed a day of solidarity with the Korean people, and Mongo 1 ianrKorean friendship meetings were conducted in Ulan Bator.^3 sung left on June l8; on July 2, 1959, a Mongol ian-Korean Trade Agreement was announced.3^ A week after the trade agreement was concluded with Korea, a Mongolian trade delegation arrived in Hanoi. On July l5, the MPR and North Vietnam signed a barter trade protocol for 1960.3^ At the same time, another delegation from the MPR was traveling to Baghdad for the first anniversary of the Republic of Iraq. It appears that the MPR had diplomatic relations with Iraq at that time.36 Iraq was apparently the MPR’s first contact with the Arab world. New York Times correspondent, Harrison Salisbury, visited the MPR in July and August, 1959, the first American Journalist to be in Mongolia since Jack Raymond wrote his series of articles in 1956. Salisbury reported that, as of July l8, 1959, the MPR had diplomatic relations with eighteen nations including the socialist countries, India, Indonesia, Burma, and Ceylon, and "other Afro-Asian c o u n t r i e s . "37 it appears that the Mongolians were not particularly free with details concerning even the fundamental facts of Mongolian "extra-socialist" international relations. The total number of countries makes it pos sible to deduce that the "other Afro-Asian countries" referred to are singly Guinea and Iraq. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 On August 12, 1959, the MPR signed a trade agreement with Japan. Mongolia was to furnish animal products and "other commodities," and Japan, piece goods and "other commodities." It was not disclosed whether the flow of trade would take place through the Soviet Union or China. In view of Mongol attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the Japanese, to date still unsuccessful, the conclusion of a trade agreement with that country must have been viewed in Mongolian eyes as something of a triumph.3® On or about August 28, it was announced that Prime Minister Nehru had extended an invitation to Tsedenbal to visit India in 1959.^9 Whether the invitation was timed to take advantage of any pre-knowledge that the Mongolian leader would be in Vietnam shortly thereafter, or Tsedenbal had arranged the invitation for that time after earlier, un reported correspondence, is unknown. At any rate, a government delega tion headed by Tsedenbal left the MPR on August 28 for a trip to Vietnam and India, with stops in the CPR.^^ Also on that day, a Mongolian Ambassador, Sarab, presented his credentials to the Government of the Vietnamese "Democratic Republic. As discussed earlier in Chapter III, Tsedenbal stopped in Peking on his way to Vietnam and again briefly in Kunming, China, enroute from Hanoi to Delhi. The Mongolian head of state was in contact with Chou on both occasions; whether the contact involved close consultation or simply Mongolian diplomacy is uncertain. Since the subject of the Mongoliait- Indian talks was likely the situation in Tibet, Chou may have been aiming at undercutting as much as possible any Indian gains from the Mongolians' visit. This possibility is given some added credence by a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130 consideration of later Soviet attitudes in the Sino-Indian border ho dispute. Two more examples of Mongolian contacts with the non-communist world on a semi-official basis occurred in September and October. The first was a conference of scholars of twenty-six nations held in Ulan Bator in September on Mongolian studies.^3 The second was the presence in Ulan Bator of Communist Party delegations from France, Syria, and Lebanon in mid-October.^ In i9 6 0 , little of record occurred with regard to Mongolian rela tions with non-socialist countries. On January 29, the MPR signed a Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement with North Korea, for the year i9 6 0 . No indication was given as to what the agreement would entail. On February 1, I960, it was announced that the MPR and Cambodia had established diplomatic ties. Another link in the MPR’s relations with the Chinese borderlands had been established.^^ No information seems to have found its way into the general press after January and February i9 60, until the last month of the year, regarding Mongolian non-socialist ties. However, it appears that the MPR may have established diplomatic relations with the newly independent Republic of Mali in September or October; as one diplomat informed the writer that he had seen Mongols in Mali in 196O-196I. The Mongolian Ambassador in Conakry was accredited to Bamako. In December i9 6 0 . Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodian Head of State, spent three days in Ulan Bator. The visit was at the invitation of the Presidium of the Great Riral and the MPR, and Sihanouk spent Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131 considerable time in conversation with Tsedenbal. On December 12, a Joint statement by the two leaders was released. According to the statement, the two governments had exchanged views on the development of friendly relations between their countries and reached an accord on several international issues. These issues included a reference to the situation in South East Asia, and mentioned that China valued highly Cambodian neutrality. At another point, the statement called for Chinese admission to the U. N., and indicated that Cambodia would continue to help the MPR in its at tempt to gain a seat in the world b o d y , ^7 Three weeks after Sihanouk’s visit to Ulan Bator, the MPR estab lished relations— or agreed in principal to do so— with the Kingdom of Nepal. MongolianrNepalese relations established still another tie between Mongolia and one of China’s borderlands. No report of the circumstances leading to the Januazy 6 announcement has appeared in the general press, but again it would appear that Mongolian influence within the Chinese border congjlex may well have been a guiding factor.b® The following month, as mentioned earlier, a group of Mongolians accompanied Chinese and North Korean delegates to Tirana in an attempt to heal the ideological breach between the Albanians and the Soviet Union. The following month, the MPR extended recognition to the dis sident Gizenga government in Stanleyville.^® It appears that the MPR was stç)porting the Soviet Union’s policy in the Congo by recognizing Gizenga, rather than attempting to broaden its international contacts. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132 In April, the United States announced that it vas contemplating the establishment of diplomatic ties with the MPR. American plans seemed to call for the establishment of an Embassy or Legation in Ulan Bator to find out if the country vas actually independent,^^ There was specula tion that the United States hoped to drive a wedge between the USSR and the CPR. In early June, 1961, the United States informed Ulan Bator through the U. S. Embassy in Moscow that it was willing to recognize the MPR.^2 A few days later, the Acting Chief of Mission in the American Embassy carried on talks with the Mongolian Ambassador in Moscow, Sonomiin.^3 shortly thereafter, it became apparent that United States plans on recognition of the MPR were distasteful to the Republic of China.2k In early July, as the time drew nearer for the United States move in the U. N. and at the direct diplomatic level, events seemed to indi cate uncertainty within the United States as to the future of relations between the two countries. On July 9» United States Ambassador to the Republic of China, Everett Drumwrlght, made a flying trip back to Washington to discuss the variance of opinion between Washington and Taipei.22 a few days later, it was learned from Ulan Bator that the MPR was desirous of relations with the United States, despite that country’s designs on obtaining a "listening post" between Russia and China. It was further announced that the MPR would establish relations with Japan regardless of the actions of the United States.26 Japan, however, had already indicated that it would establish relations with the MPR only if the United States did.2? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 On August 12, 1961, the United States announced its decision to withhold recognition of the MPR. Its reason for doing so apparently was to avoid being forced to vote for Mongolia's entry into the United Nations.2® Mongolian relations with Japan, Britain, and other western countries were also thereby postponed. Following the flurry in Washington in 1961, little more appears on the general record until 1963. Reports indicate that the pattern of agreements usually present in MPR relations with socialist countries is being followed with countries outside the socialist family of nations. In February, 1962, the MPR concluded a cultural cooperation agreement with the Republic of Guinea. No details of the agreement, however, are known. In 1963, the MPR increased its contact with the outside world by establishing diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic in February,29 and with Great Britain. Terence Garvey presented his cre dentials as Ambassador of the United Kingdom to the MPR on May 18, 1963. For the time being, however, no Mongolian Ambassador will be resident in London; the MPR Ambassador to Warsaw will be accredited to the United 60 Kingdom. The accrediting of the Mongolian Ambassador in Poland to London brings into focus a problem that faces the MPR in its gradually increas ing diplomatic life. The Mongols simply do not have enough trained personnel to staff in any degree of adequacy numerous posts around the world. For this reason, the United Nations announced on May 29 that it I would extend aid in the amount of $300,000 in the next year to enable the MPR to train more personnel for diplomatic work. One of the tasks Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13k facing the Mongols, for example, is the teaching of English, as very few individuals in Mongolia speak that language. Some enlightenment may have been thrown on the question of the degree to which the MPR must follow the dictates of Moscow in its foreign policy in recent developments between Iraq and Mongolia. On July 3, 1963, the MPR accused Iraq, in the forum of the United Nations, of practicing genocide in its war against the Kurdish population of Iraq. Iraq countered with an announcement that it had broken off diplomatic relations with the MPR due to the letter's unfriendly attitude in intro ducing the Kurdish issue in the U. N.®^ It would appear that Moscow considered the MPR to be most ex pendable of the socialist nations with regard to Iraq, and chose the Mongols to carry the issue to the U. N. On the other hand, the issue itself is one in which the Mongols may have taken an actual, deep interest. While the Kurds themselves range into the Soviet Union but not into Central Asia, a policy stance by the Mongols which would improve their image with regard to Moslem minorities in Sinkiang could be valuable. This consideration would be consonant with the fairly close ties between the MPR and Soviet Kazakhstan, and also with Mongolian recognition of the United Arab Republic in February, 1963 (at that time the U.A.R. represented the rising star of the Moslem world). In retrospect, the past twelve years of Mongolian history have been exciting ones for the Mongols. Not since the days of Genghis Khan have Mongolians met as many different peoples as in that dozen years. Since 1950, the Mongols have again come into contact with the border Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 135 peoples around China— Korea, Nepal, Viet Nam, Burma, and Cambodia— all of whom play important roles in the future of Asian politics. Now, of course, the relations of which we know take place within the framework of the modern state system. It is also possible to detect throughout the recent period the Mongolian desire to obtain recognition of its place in the world. What ever the degree of dependency upon Moscow for guidance, one thing is clear. The MPR is hungry for contact with the rest of the world, and will probably continue to develop such contact as much as possible within the limits of its political situation. At this juncture, it may be useful to re-examine the events discussed in this chapter on broader and more general terms. Since I9U9 , the MPR has e^qpanded its diplomatic relations to include ties with some twenty-three countries, although two of these, Yugoslavia and Iraq, apparently no longer maintain diplomatic contact with Mongolia. The countries with which the MPR has estab 1 ished contact since I9U9 fall into three broad categories: Russia's neighbors, China and her neighbors, and others. The first group more specifically includes European members of the "socialist" bloc, and the motives for such contacts have been discussed earlier, in Chapter II. It is fairly clear that the MPR's contacts with Eastern Europe have come about as a result of Soviet desires to insure Mongolian contact and involvement with the Soviet-dominated portion of the communist world. The second category includes almost all countries bordering on th? CPR. A notable exception is Thailand, as well as Laos and South Viet Nam. Other South and Southeast Asian countries, such as India, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 Ceylon, and Indonesia, also maintain ties with Ulan Bator. It would appear that Mongolia's traditional place in China's border complex has been translated into modern terms, and that both the Soviet Union and China have attengjted to utilize Mongolia's position for their own reasons. The MPR's position in relation to China has been discussed earlier (see Chapter I and III); potential and/or actual Mongolian in fluence in Central Asia makes that country of vital importance to Chinese ends. The Soviet Union likewise stands to obtain certain bene fits from the maintenance of good relations between the MPR and China's neighbors. In view of the growing Mongolian alignment with the USSR during the last six years, it appears that this consideration has been a major aim of Soviet and Mongolian policy. This sort of statement may be made concerning almost all Mongolian relations with other countries, of course, but it continues to have a special significance with regard to China and her neighbors. Certain developaents reported in this chapter indicate that Mongolia is involved in current Central Asian politics, although it Is difficult to do more than conjecture as to the actual nature or impor tance of those events. Tsedenbal's trip to North Viet Nam and India in 1 9 5 9 , when he punctuated his travels with repeated communications with Chou En-lai, was probably concerned at least in part with the Tibetan situation. Whose ends were being served is difficult to ascertain; it appears that Chou may have been attempting to obtain assurances that Tsedenbal would not take a position unfavorable to the CPR. Prime Minister Nehru, on the other hand, may have been trying to influence Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137 developments in Tibet through the MPR, while Tsedenbal could have been fulfilling Soviet policy in visiting New Delhi, as well as Hanoi. The third category of nations with whom the MPR has, or has had, dealings in the last fourteen years, those countries further removed geographically than those considered in the first two groups, are not numerous. The creation of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and those countries reflects the desires of both the MPR and the Soviet Union, It serves the MPR's efforts to expand its contacts with the rest of the world, and it suits the USSR for Mongolia to enter into such rela tions— usually for specific reasons. The MPR's relations with Guinea and Malin, for example, probably came about because Moscow wanted to increase bloc ties with those coun tries, Wio are well to the political left. Mongolian-Iraqi relations, which existed in name only, may have been encouraged for the purpose of enhancing the Mongol image with regard to the Moslem world of Central Asia. The same statement may be true of MPR-UAR relations. Thus far, only one country in the West has established ties with Ulan Bator, Great Britain. This may well reflect British awareness of Mongolia's traditional place in Central Asian affairs, as well as limited trade possibilities. The United States contenqilation of ties with the MPR was reportedly based on the possibility of gaining a greater intelligence potential vis-a-vis Soviet-Chinese relations, if not ac tually increasing friction between the two powers. As Moscow and Peking have done a thorough job of creating their own frictions, it appears that the second motive would be less important, and the possibility of irt- creased intelligence potential more important, in any future considerations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138 In summary, It may be observed that the MPR's greater diplomatic activity in recent years is a function of the Asian political scene. Its traditional position in that regard seems to be coming once again into focus as Chinese frontier policies become more clearly ascer tainable and the Sino-Soviet dispute grows more intense. What the future may bring in this regard will be discussed in the final chapter. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139 FOOTNOTES ^'Japanese Research Studies on Mongolia," (Tokyo: Continental Research Association); in Joint Publications Research Service (Washing ton: United States Department of Commerce) 570-D, March 3, 1959, pp. 3-k. (Hereinafter cited as UPRS.) Crimes of London, August Ik, 1950. 3lbid., September 26, 1952. Minutes of the 703rd Meeting of the Plenary Session of the Security Council: United Nations Document S/PV.703, December 13, 1955, p. 2 2 . % e w York Times, June 19, 1955. Minutes of the 31st Meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly: United Nations Document A/AC-8o /SR 31, December 7, 1955, pp. Ik6-lk8. ^Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press (Hongkong: United States Consulate General) Number 1199, p. kl. (Hereinafter referred to as SCMP). ICNA, 12/28/55. ®Takashi Oka, "Mysterious Satellite," Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 1956. ^Robert A. Rupen, "Notes on Outer Mongolia Since 19k5," Pacific Affaire, XXVIII (March, 1955), p. 79. Robert A. Rupen, "Outer Mongolia Since 1955," Pacific Affairs, XXX (December, 1957), p. 3k8. . IISCMP 1285, p. 3k. NONA, 5/8/56. 12)1 Japanese Research Studies on Mongolia," loc. cit. 13sCMP 1355. p. 25. NCNA, 8/17/56. iksCMP lkl7, p. 38. NCNA, 11/20/56. l^Rupen, "Outer Mongolia Since 1955," loc. cit. 1®"Japanese Research Studies on Mongolia," loc. cit. l^Times of London, August 28, 1957. 1®SCMP I6l8, p. 39. NCNA, 9/23/57. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. iko l^Rupen, "Outer Mongolia Since 1955," loc. cit. 20Robert A. Rupen, "Outer Mongolia 1957-1960," Pacific Affairs XXXIII (December, I960), p. 1 3 8 . 2lTimes of London. February 12, 1958. 22sCMP 1722,p. 33. NCNA 2 /2 k /5 8 . 23sCMP 172k,p. 53. NCNA, 3 /1 /5 8 . 2kscMP1736 , p. 28 . NCNA, 3 /1 7 /5 8 . 25sCMP 1735, p. 37. NCNA, 3/15/58. 26scmp1781 , p. k6. NCNA, 5 /2 k /5 8 . 27sCMP 1798, p. k3. NCNA, 6/19/58. 28 scMP 1876, p. 57. NCNA, 1 0 /1 1 /5 8 . 29scmp 190k , p. k9. NCNA, 1 1 /2 8 /5 8 . 30scmp1925 , p. 60. NCNA, 1 2 /2 8 /5 8 . 31sCMP 1965, p. k l. NCNA, 3/1/59. 32scMP2019 , p. 3 6 . NCNA, 3/ 15/ 59. 33sCMP 2 0 k l, p. k l . NCNA, 6/18/59. 3kgcMP 2051, p. k8. NCNA, 7/3/5 9 . 35scmp 205k, p. k2. NCNA, 7 /8 /5 9 . 3 6 ib id . 37New York Times, July 18 , 1959. 3%CMP 2078, p. 50. NONA, 8 / 12/ 59. 3Primes of London, August 29, 1959. kOsCMP 2090, pp. 39, U6. NCHA, 8/28/59. klibid., p. 1*6. k2sCMP 2096, p. 1*5. NCNA, 9/8/59. k3izvestia. May 20, 1959, p. Uj in CDSP XC, 20 (June 17, 1959), p. 20. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I k l kksCMP 2121, p. 1*6. NCNA, 10/l8/59. k^SCHP 2190, p. 1*9. NCNA, 1/29/60. k% e w York Times, February 2, I960. k^SCMP 21*01, p. 39. NCNA, 12/12/60. k%ew York Times. January 6 , 1 9 6 1 . k9rimes of London. February 13, 1 9 6I. 2®New York Times. February 17, I9 6 1 . 2llbid., April 21, I9 6 I. 2%bid., June I*, 1 9 6 1 . 2% e w York Herald Tribune. June 8 , 1 9 6 1 . 2W e w York Times, June 10, 1 9 6 1 . 25yashington Evening Star, July 9, 1 9 6 1 . 26rimes of London, July l5, 1 9 6 1 . 27New York Times. July 13, I9 6 I. 2%bid., August 12, 1961. ^^ashington Post, February 18,, 1 9 6 3 . ^PAdam Kellet-Long, "Mongolia Would Like Ties With U.S.," Reuters dispatch, Washington Post, May 21, 1 9 6 3 . ^^New York Times. May 29, 1963. ^2|fashington Post, July 1*, 1963. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V OUTER MONGOLIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS In October, 1961, the Mongolian People's Republic was admitted to membership in the United Nations. The step represented for the Mongolians, and for their advocate, the Soviet Union, the culmination of more than sixteen years of recurrent efforts. The first attempt by the MPR to gain admission to the world bo(%r came in 19k6. On June 2k, 19k6, Choibalsan sent a telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, requesting that the MPR be admitted to the United Nations. To aid subsequent Security Council discussions, the views of the members on the issue were collated in a working paper prepared by the U.N. Secretariat. The Chinese Delegate set forth the opinion that any action of the Mongolian application should be postponed a year. He pointed out that the MPR's contacts with the outside world were quite limited, although there had been several such contacts prior to 1921. He went on to state that he was in no way convinced that Mongolia was really pre pared to take on the obligations imposed by the United Nations Charter. China, however, having given the MPR its independence, would be glad to vote for its admission to the organization when the time was appropriate.^ The Soviet Delegate responded by expressing surprise at the Chinese reaction to the MPR's application. The Soviet Union, he went on, supported the admission of the MPR and wanted to remind the Council of the MPR's part in World War II, on both the Japanese and German fronts. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11*3 He added a statement to the effect that the MPR was not one year but 2 twenty-five years old and had a stable and "democratic" government. The initial reaction: of. the United States and the United Kingdom was to query if the MPR would be willing to expand its diplo matic contacts with the outside world.3 Subsequently, due to a wide spread sentiment among the other members of the Council that there was insufficient information concerning the MPR, a telegram was sent by Sobolev, Acting Secretary General, transmitting a questionnaire to be answered by the MPR.k The questionnaire, sent on August 12, 19l*6, consisted of four questions concerning the nature and extent of current Mongolian foreign relations, the MPR's attitude toward e^qpanding such relations, whether any countries other than the Soviet Union and China had proposed diplo matic contact with the MPR, and the nature of the Republic's constitu tion. 2 The MPR's reply was presented by its representative on August 28, 191*6 , describing in long, historical detail the MPR's international relations and, finally, its constitution.® In the course of the ensuing discussions, the Chinese delegate suggested that consideration of the application be postponed for one year; this was replaced by the United States proposal that the issue be again considered the next time the Security Council shall consider applications for membership in the United Nations. It shortly became clear that the Soviet Union would accept no delay. Consequently, the MPR's application was not accepted, rejection being based not on "legal grounds, nor even on political grounds directly concerned with the problem at stake, but on the unwillingness of those sitting at the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ikk Security Council's table to reach an equitable compromise." The United States and the United Kingdom, both permanent members of the Security Council, and the Netherlands voted against the Mongolian application. Brazil, China, France, Mexico, Poland, and the Soviet Union voted in favor; Egypt and Australia abstained.7 The MPR's application came under consideration again the fol lowing summer. This time, however, the Chinese cited Mongolian incur sions into Chinese territory at Peitashan along the Sinkiang-MPR border. On this basis, the previous Chinese position was reversed, while other delegations pled lack of knowledge of Mongolian affairs. Both the United States and Australia expressed doubts that the MPR was indeed an independent state. As Gerald Friters points out, "the only real cri terion was the relation of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Soviet Union."® After that, the Mongolian application lay dormant for several years. The Soviet Union referred to a statement by the MPR of October l5, 19k8, to the United Nations when in 1961 the Soviet delegate was preparing the way for the MPR's final application.9 No general record appears in the press of an application from the MPR at that time, how ever, and the next indication of United Nations activity regarding Mongolia came in 195k. On September 9^ 195k, a Committee of Good Offices on the Ad mission of New Members delivered its report to the General Assembly. There were twenty-one nations whose applications had been placed before the United Nations for membership, but who had been blocked for one reason or another. Mongolia, along with Eastern European "socialist" Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11*5 countries, was included in the list. The Committee of Good Offices reported that there had been no change in the situation. A meeting of the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Political Committee offered a simple demonstration of the factors involved. In discussing the Good Offices Committee's report, specifically that portion concerning Laos and Cambodia's applications, the Soviet Union used the Western Powers' ob struction of the applications of Mongolia and the Eastern European socialist countries as a reason for Soviet refusals to consider any other countries.!® On September 28, 1955, the representative to the United Nations from the Ukraine made the initial move in what developed into a new Soviet push for admission of the MPR and other socialist states into the organization. The Ukrainian delegate mentioned Mongolia to some length in the course of his speech on revising the U.N. Charter regarding the admission of new members.!! In mid-November, 1955, it became known that a "package deal" was in the works whereby some eighteen nations would be submitted for admission simultaneously. The Soviet Union made it clear that it would accept no less than the full number of states, and certainly would not accept a thirteen nation admission excluding Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and the MPR.!2 At the same time, the United States was at- tei^ting to have the issue brought before the Security Council before the General Assembly would act; according to one quarter, this was to avoid the onus of vetoing the MPR and the other Soviet-sponsored nations.!3 Behind-the-scenes work continued through the rest of the month. A November 19 meeting of the Big Four— China, the Soviet Union, the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ik6 United Kingdom and the United States— brought no agreement on the mem bership problem. The Chinese delegate indicated that he was opposed to the package deal, but had had no specific instructions from Taipei as to the course of action he was to take in the Security Council. The United States indicated that it planned to abstain if the issue reached a vote in the Security C o u n cil.!k The following day, however, the United States announced that it was willing to accept all but the MPR of the eighteen nations put before the United Nations.^2 on November k, another shift in the United States position was made known; the U. S. would make no effort to campaign against the MPR's admission, and would abstain from voting against that country in any Security Council vote on admission.!® As the United States became increasingly more amenable to Mongolian admission, however. Nationalist China became equally more hostile. On November 29, United States Government efforts to influence the Republic of China toward a more conciliatory position on the issue came to naught.!7 On December 1, 1955, the Soviet delegate brought in the question of Mongolian admission to the U. N. before the General Assembly's Ad Hoc 1 A Political Committee in the discussion of admitting new members. A week later, the Committee, over Chinese objections, approved the eighteen- nation blanket admission resolution, after Ambassador Menon of India made his stand in support of the MPR's qualifications.!^ The same day, the Committee's report was brought before the General Assembly. Canada, as author of the blanket-admission resolution, introduced the proposal to the Assembly. The draft resolution was Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1U7 passed and the General Assembly requested that more work be done con cerning the proposal. The issue then passed into the hands of the Security Counci1,20 In the 703rd and 70l|th Plenary Meetings of the Security Council, the issue of the MPR and the package arrangement came under discussion. T. F. Tsiang, the Chinese delegate, was fairly quiet but indicated his dislike of the mass approach and its ramifications. Ambassador Tsiang also referred again to the MPR»s incursion into Chinese territory at Peitashan. In the 70Uth meeting, the same day, the infighting con tinued. Ultimately, China vetoed the Mongolian application; the USSR voted against all states other than the four eastern European nations. In the final vote, China in turn vetoed those applications. 22 The following day, the Soviet delegate called another meeting of the Security Council and announced that it was willing to reconsider its stand of the previous day on one condition. The Security Council was to pass a resolution bringing Japan and the MPR up for admission the next year. The United States attempted to have Japan admitted at that point, and the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. Sixteen nations were admitted, however. The Soviet Union’s campaign in the United Nations on behalf of the MPR continued in 1956. Some references to Mongolia cropped up in the course of various verbal duels in July, but nothing of substance occurred until September, when a cable was sent on September 13, to the Secretary-General from the Government of the MPR.^^ The message called attention to the MPR’s long-standing application for admission to the United Nations and asserted that the Republic considered itself "fully Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ih8 qualified" for membership. Mr. Hammarskjold circulated the message as a "third person note." This is a procedure for handling messages from non member nations addressed to the Secretary-General, but calling for action by the General Assembly, or the Security Council, or both.^^ On December 7, 1956, the Soviet delegate, Sobolev, sent a letter to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a draft resolu tion to admit the MPR to the United Nations.On December 10, Adilbish, the MPR’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, cabled to the Security Council President an appeal on behalf of the Mongolian application. Adilbish pointed out that Mongolia had not been permitted to send observers or representatives to the hearings even though other non-members had been accorded that privilege. On December 12, 1956, the 756th meeting of the Security Council defeated the MPR’s application. This time the negative vote had been cast by the Republic of China, along with Cuba. Japan, however, had gained admission.^® The following year, Mongolia renewed its attack. On July 10, 1957, the Great People’s Rural adopted an appeal to United Nations mem bers to support its application for membership in that organization.29 A cable was sent by the Mongolian Government to the President of the Security Council renewing its application for membership in the organi- zation.30 On September U, Sobolev sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the General Assembly including a draft resolution to admit the MPR to the United Nations. The Soviet delegate requested that the letter be treated as a Security Council document.A few days later Sobolev Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I h 9 presented his draft resolution to the 789th meeting of the Security Council. No vote was taken at that meeting, but the following session the same day, September 9j 1957, the application was defeated by Chinese and United States negative votes.3% After the 1957 attempt and rejection, little more occurred in Mongolia’s relations with the United Nations until 196O. On December 3, at a Saturday evening session of the Security Council, the SoViet Delega tion introduced a resolution to admit the MPR to the United Nations, accompanying the draft with copies of all previous Mongolian applica tions. The current President of the Council, Zorin of the Soviet Union, then attempted in a surprise move to add the question of Mongolian ad mission to the Council’s agenda for that meeting. The move to add the issue of the MPR’s application to the agenda was defeated as China, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States cast negative votes. The Soviet Union, Ceylon, Tunisia, and Poland voted affirmatively in the matter. Subsequently, Zorin precluded discussion of Mauretania’s admission, then pending.33 Zorin told the Council that the status of Mauretania, a former French colony, was more complex than that of any other newly independent state. He recalled Morocco’s claims and observed that the situation con tained many controversial elements. At the same time, the Western Powers refused to accept such an uncontroversial country as the MPR.3^ The outcome of the Soviet effort was only the prolonging of the 911th meeting from 8:30 p.m. on Saturday night to 3*50 a.m. Sunday morning. Both Mauretania’s and Mongolia’s applications were postponed, as it turned out, until the following year. of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission 150 The MPR’s case cane into focus again in the United Nations when Zorin sent a letter on May 6, l?6l, to the President of the Security Council referring to the Soviet letters of December 3, I960, and December 9, I960, (the latter an appeal of no avail to the General Assembly). The Soviet delegate requested that the letters be taken into account in drawing up the agenda for the first Security Council meeting addressing itself to the admission of new members.35 on September 25, 1961, the Soviet Delegation introduced a draft resolution to admit the Mongolian People’s Republic to the United Nations.3& There were elements at work that had a bearing on the prospebts for Mongolian admission. On April 20, I9 6 I, Armand Berard, head of the French Delegation to the U. N., had proposed a ’’re-examination" of the question of Outer Mongolia’s demand to be admitted to the U. N. Ambas sador Berard went on to refer to the Soviet Union’s linking of Mongolia with Mauretania the previous year. It was pointed out that most of the African states had supported the Soviet Union’s aims in regard to the MPR’s application for membership,37 under the same terms, they could hardly help continuing to do so. At almost the same time, reports were appearing that the Chinese would again use their veto against the MPR’s application in the forth coming debates.32 During the course of the summer, Chinese attitudes were entwined with Washington’s views on the question of MPR, both within the U. N. and without. As late as August 2, 196I, the Republic of China reportedly still planned to veto the MPR’s application in the Security Council.39 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151 Following the Soviet Union’s draft resolution on Mongolian ad mission of September 25, further pre-dated material from previous MPR applications and correspondence was submitted in further support of the current application.^^ That the Soviet Union was taking judicious care of the MPR’s interests in the matter was made even clearer in October l8 when Zorin transmitted the text of a telegram from the MPR complaining that its representatives to the U. N. for the hearings were experiencing difficulties in obtaining visas. The Soviets requested that the message be circulated as a Security Council document.^1 A week later the issue of Mongolia’s admission came to a vote, along with Mauretania’s application. China refrained from voting on Mongolia, and the Soviet Union did likewise concerning Mauretania. The Chinese abstention was explained by one quarter as a result of threats that unless she did abstain, she would be faced with adverse votes from Afro-Asian nations the next time the issue of Communist China’s admis sion to the United Nations was discussed.The United States refrained from voting in either case. Thus, the Security Council, on October 25, l?6l, adopted a reso lution admitting the Mongolian People’s Republic to the United Nations. Three days later, the General Assembly admitted Mongolia without a dis sent, although Mauretania, due to Morocco’s claims on Mauretanian territory, was the subject of a three-hour debate between the Arab and the African nations.^3 That the Soviet Union supported the position of the African nations and did not aid Moroccan claims could hardly have helped its relations with Morocco. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152 The first permanent representative to the United Nations of the Mongolian People’s Republic, Ambassador Bayaryn Jargalsaikhan, presented his credentials to Acting Secretary-General U Thant on December l5, 1961. The Soviet Union’s victory in seating the MPR in the United Nations vas, as indicated earlier, the culmination of several years of recurrent effort. It appears that a motivating factor in the Soviet drive was a fear that China would attempt to reclaim Outer Mongolia as it has other traditional Chinese borderlands. By enabling the MPR to gain a seat in the United Nations, the Soviet Union in effect obtained for the MPR an international legal status which would make it quite difficult for the Chinese to justify any attempts at forcible annexation. The actual step-by-step procedures through which the Soviet Union went in gaining this success indicates two essential facets. One was that as time wore on the USSR became increasingly concerned with the MHl’s status. By I960 and I96I, the measures employed by Soviet diplo mats in the United Nations became as forceful as they could be without engendering further opposition. The other facet is the clear necessity of a proper political cli mate. By 1961, most issues which had been considered in conjunction with the Mongolian application and were grounds for basic East-West disagree ment— Japan, the status of the divided countries, and the Eastern European satellites— had either been resolved or shelved as permanently unresolvable. When the matter came up in 196I, it again was considered in conjunction with the status of another country, Mauretania, but the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153 issues Involved were sufficiently removed from primary interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union that compromise was possible. Substantive objections to Mongolian entry into the United Nations also had been removed from consideration. The United States underwent a change in position which helped the Mongolian cause. American motives for this change may well have been the desire to create friction between the Soviet Union and China. The Republic of China was forced into an expedient move against its desires. Moroccan claims to the territory of Mauretania, and Arab support of Morocco’s position were in effect the last barrier to the MPR’s admission. The Soviet Union valued its ends regarding the MPR more highly than the opportunity to gain Arab good will by supporting Morocco’s view vis-a-vis Mauretania. Thus desire met with opportunity, and the USSR’s ends— and the aims of the MPR— were served. Some broader implications of the events discussed will be presented in the next and final chapter. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. l $ k FOOTNOTES 1 United Nations, Security Council Official Records, First Year, Second Series, Supplement Number U, p. 6U. Zibid., pp. 122- 123. 3lbid., p. 6 5 . ^Ibid., pp. 123-12L. Sibid. 6lbid., p. 12k. TOerald M. Friters, Outer Mongolia and its International Position (Baltimore* Johns Hopkins, 19k?), p. 290, citing United Nations, Security Council Official Records, No. 5, 56th and 57th Meetings, August 29, 19k8, p. 8. Qlbid., p. 2 91. - ^United Nations Document s/k9kl, September 22, 1961, pp. 1-2. IQUnited Nations Document A/AC.76/s R 20, October 11, 195k, pp. 3k-35. llUnited Nations Document A/PV.526, September 28, 1955. IZNev York Times, November l5, 1955. 13lbid., November l5, 1955. lUibid., November 20, 1955. l^T. J. Hamilton, special dispatch to the New York Times, November 20, 1955. l% e w York Times, November 25, 1955. I7ibid.. November 30, 1955. l%nited Nations Document A/AC.8o/SR25. December 1. 1955. tjd. 109- 110. 19United Nations Document A/Ae.8p/SR 32, December 7, 1955, p. 162. ZOunited Nations Document A/3079, December 7, 1955, pp. 1-2; also in New York Times, December 8, 1955. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 155 21unlted Mations Document S/PV.703, December 13, 1955, p. 22 22united Nations Document s/PV.70k, December 13, 1955, p. 72. 23United Nations Document S/PV.705, December Ik, 1955, p . 139. 2kunited Nations Document s/k9kl, September 22, 1961, pp. 1-2. 25Nev York Times, September 23, 1956. 26united Nations Document'S/3755, December 7, 1956, pp. 1-2. 27tfnited Nations Document s/3757, December 10, 1956, pp. 1-2. 2%ew York Times, December 12, 1956. 29New York Times, July 7, 1957. 30United Nations Document S/3873 and Addendum 1, September 1, 1957, p. 1, pp. 1-10. 3kJnited Nations Document S/3877, September k, 1957, pp. 1-2. 32united Nations Document S/PV.790, September 9, 1957, p.' 203. 33United Nat ions Document S/PV.911, December 3-k, I960, pp. 62, 152. 3% e w York Times, December k, I960. 35united Nations. Document s/k801. May 8, 196I, pp. 1-2. 36united Nations Document S/k950, September 25, 1961, p. 1. 37Lindesay Parrott, special dispatch to the New York Times, April 20, 1961. 38Nev York Times, April 23, 1961. 3%bi d ., August 2, 1961. kCUnited Nations Document ^ k 9 5 3 and Correspondence 1, September 26, 1961j United Nations Document s/k95k, September 26, I96I. klUnited Nations Document S/k963, October I8 , 196I, pp. 1-2. k2samuel P. Brewer, special dispatch to the New York Times, October 2 5 , 1961. ------ ^^Special dispatch to the New York Times, October 28, 196I. ^Ajnited Nations Press Release M 138k, December l5, 1961. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VI THE FUTURE OF OUTER MONGOLIA The previous chapters of this study have set forth in relative detail developments in the international relations of the Mongolian People’s Republic in recent years. If the term "modern" may be used to describe the situation arising from the last fundamental change in a state of affairs— in this case the inception of tte Chinese People’s Republic— then the modern period of Outer Mongolian international rela tions has been described. Out of that description arise certain patterns. The Soviet Union had enjoyed a period of monopoly in the MPR from 1921 to 19U9 . The period from 1950 to the present has seen the Soviet position in the MPR challenged by the reassertion of Chinese influence in that portion of China’s border conqalex. Where the Russian position was almost unchallenged in the land of the Khalkas, it suddenly had a counterpoise with appearance of a united China. As a result, Soviet attitudes toward the MPR have been forced to undergo a change. Where the Soviet-Mongolian relationship had many characteristics of a colonial situation, it has in many respects been placed on a quid pro quo basis, terms more consonant with alliance than with allegiance. China’s position in relation to the MPR is harder to evaluate. The situation has also been evolving for the Chinese. Starting from a position of no influence Wiatsoever, the CPR could only improve its position with regard to Mongolia. Conversely, such increase of influence Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157 on the part of China could only have an adverse effect on the Soviet Union’s relative strength of influence in the MPR, While Robert Rupen has theorized that the CPR obtained pre-eminence in the MPR from 1952 to early 1957 (see Chapter 2), and events such as the low level Soviet delegation to the 195k MPRP Congress seemed to support that theory, it appears on the basis of information available to this student that another interpretation is more feasible. In view of later events, it seems likely that, although the Soviet Union’s influence was being increasingly offset during that period, it was not being entirely displaced by any means. This increase of Chinese influence caused the Soviet Union to change its policy toward the MPR, and to devote more attention to Mongolian affairs. Since that time, the Chinese, as well as the Rus sians, found it increasingly necessary to put their relations with the Mongolians on a "pay as you go" basis. The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance of May 31, I960, between the CPR and the MPR cost China a healthy amount of aid. It seems entirely likely that the 1962 Border Treaty also had its price. The Mongolians have always operated under the principle that friendship with the Soviet Union is of paramount importance to the MPR. This is not hard to understand since the Soviet Union was directly responsible for the creation of the MPR, had defended it against Japanese and other encroachment, and for a quarter of a century provided the MPR’s contact with the rest of the world. With the advent of the CPR, however, the Mongolians adopted the principle of close relations with both of their giant neighbors. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158 That principle has been observed to the best of Mongolian abilities since 1952. It reached the epitome, for example, in the handling of the Fourteenth MPRP Congress in 1 9 6 1 . It has enabled, the MPR to receive large quantitites of aid from both the Soviet Union and China, and to benefit from whatever spirit of competition that may have entered Moscow’s or Peking’s feelings regarding the Mongol Republic. The position of the MPR was one with ■vdiich the Mongolians could cope as long as the Soviet Union and China remained on relatively good terms. With the revelation of the schism between the two great Communist powers, the role that the Mongols had chosen to play became increasingly more difficult. Having assumed the role of active partners of both the Soviet Union and China, they now find it literally impossible to be neutral. When the Mongolians took the Russian side in the ideological dispute in November, I9 6 1 , they elected, for all intents and purposes, the Soviet Union as their protector and benefactor. The ramifications of their choice are many. It demonstrates, in the first place, the success of the Soviet Union in dealing with the MPR; increasing economic aid to Mongolia and guiding that country’s develop ments into channels of industrialization has gained a commitment on the part of the Mongols to the Soviet Union. The process of modernizing the non-industrial sector of the Mongolian economy, with its far-reaching, modifying effects on traditional nomadic cultural patterns, places the MPR in a position of dependence on the continued assistance of the Soviet Union. Economic development is a goal shared by the Soviet Union, Chin^, and the MPR. Only the Soviet Union, however, is in a position to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159 undertake the projects underway in Mongolia; China, hançiered by the removal of Soviet technical assistance and subject to brought, internal unrest, and the requirements of developing areas within boundaries, could not have offered assistance on the same level or in as great quantities as has the Soviet Union. Thus, the Chinese could not offer the MPR an attractive alternative to alliance with the USSR, The problem of the MPR’s economic and social development is re lated in yet another way to the situation resulting from the recent Mongolian-Soviet alignment. It seems likely that changing the tradi tional nomadic way of life of the majority of the MPR’s population, and thereby the nature of the country, will have implications for the traditional Mongolian role in the Chinese border con^lex. Assuming that the present Mongolian government is successful in stamping out the traditional religious attitudes of the rural Mongolian citizen, one aspect of Outer Mongolian affinity for Mongols and Tibetans within China would be removed. The same would be true of other traditional patterns, such as nomadism and livestock herding, but over a longer period of time. In other words, development of the MPR into an industrial-agrarian econosy would markedly change traditional regional politics in Central Asia. For this reason, the Soviet Union has a great deal to gain from such a course of events. China, on the other hand, in view of their use of traditional cross-boundary affinities, can only regard Mongolian economic evolution as an increasing barrier to the wiedding of ethnic influence. Had the MPR elected the CPR as its ally in the Chinese- Russlan dispute, it seems likely that it would have not received the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160 same sort of assistance that it has from Russia, even if the CPR were able to extend more liberal assistance. It should be made clear, how ever, that for the most part, no one in Moscow or in Peking, and few, if any, in Ulan Bator, doubt that economic development and industrialization are the keys to the future, for the Mongols as well as for the Chinese and the Russians. At present, it would appear that traditional values and roles still have a validity, and will continue to do so until sufficient changes have been wrought in the cultural patterns of both Inner and Outer Mongolian modes of life. This is another ramification of the Mongolian-Soviet alignment, as a marked worsening of Sino-Mongolian relations would create a problem with regard to the Chinese border peoples. The link between the peoples of the MPR and those of Inner Mongolia and Tibet has been shown to be still effective to some degree, at least. If the Chinese are able to maintain good relations with the MPR and to gain that country’s support with regard to Chinese actions in the border areas, as they were able to do in April 1959 (see Chapter III), they can continue to utilize the ancient tools. Now that avenue may be closing. The Chinese cannot afford to have it opened except under conditions they choose. This is for the reason that if anyone is to benefit from Outer Mongolian appeal to the minorities of Inner Mongolia and Tibet, it must be the Chinese, and not the Soviet Union. An awareness of this consideration may well have been a major motivation for the Soviet Union in its efforts to seat the MPR in the United Nations. If China had contemplated attempting to reclaim Outer Mongolia as it had Tibet and Sinklang, the MPR’s international Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I6l legal status as a United Nations Member would have made it extremely difficult for the Chinese to justiiy such an action. As for the Soviet Union and its attitudes toward the MPR and its own Asian minorities, it must be remembered that the Russians took steps to consolidate control over their own Mongol groups in 1958, the same year that the Chinese cut back on their "pan-Mongol" approach. It may be concluded from these observations that the MPR itself, as the only truly national, nominally, if not actually, independent Mongol state, possesses an appeal to the Mongols of the Soviet Union and of China. It would seem reasonable to state that ethnic (and religious) ties among the Mongol and Tibetan minorities of the Soviet Union and China and the Mongols of the MPR present a two-way street. As long as both China and the Soviet Union are on good terms with the MPR, then both big countries may utilize the appeal of the MPR in dealing with their minorities. Conversely, the effect of such ties, when carefully utilized, may be beneficial to both China and Russia in their relations with the MPR. To deny either of the two big powers the means of influence pre sented by the MPR is to give the other the advantage. If the normal channels whereby the CPR has maintained "ethnic communication" are blocked by a freeze in Sino-Mongolian relations, the Soviet Union may, if it so elects, utilize that avenue of influence to good advantage, although it will be pointed out later that this has its dangers. Again, such a consideration is relevant to Soviet efforts to gain the MPR its seat in the United Nations. Had the Chinese been able to bring the MPR Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162 back into the family of five peoples, they would have jeopardized the Soviet Union’s position throughout that part of Asia, At the same time, an independent Mongolia on good terms with the USSR offers the latter a point of control over Chinese expansion and serves as a counterpoint from which the Soviet Union may bargain with the Chinese. While the MPR serves as a buffer in that it prevents the ere and the USSR from having a contiguous boundary, it would seem that in view of the Mongolian position with regard to China, Soviet influence in Mongolia provides the Russians with a wedge driven into thé Chinese border complex. It appears that the Soviet Union has already utilized the Mongols to exert influence on Central Asian minorities. Since 195k, the MPR and the government of the Kazakh SSR have been in fairly pons tant contact and on good terms. With the presence of Kazakh people in Sinkiang, it seems possible that a sort of pincer movement may be in operation. Recent Mongolian actions on behalf of the Kurdish minority in Iraq, also Moslem, can do no harm to the MPR’s relations with Moslem peoples of Central Asia. Another aspect of the importance of the MPR to the Soviet Union is that, at present, the MPR is the only Asian nation left in the Soviet fold, as well as the only "underdeveloped area" exenqjlifying socialist development techniques under Soviet guidance. Some quarters have suggested that the MPR will become the Soviet Union’s means of contact with the Asian and African peoples, replacing a China now become independent and unruly. The values involved, however, indicate that while such a generalization has some validity, it was not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163 the sole motivating factor in Soviet actions to further the Mongolian application for admission to the United Nations. At the time that the Soviet Union did achieve the MPR’s entry into the United Nations, it was at the cost of losing good will with the Arab world, as is indicated earlier. Mongolian action in the United Nations regarding the Kurdish question cost the MPR diplomatic contact with Iraq. It would seem that something else took priority in the timing of the 196I United Nations admission, and in the recent Mongol attitudes toward Iraq. The priority values in those Soviet-Mongolian policy moves appear to be related to the MPR’s position in Asia. As has been discussed, the protection of the MPR against possible Chinese encroachment would seem a more likely reason for Mongolian entry into the United Nations. As for the Mongol policy stance on the Kurdish issue, it appears that the MPR’s function as a channel of communication between the communist bloc and Iraq was subordinated and sacrificed in favor of the image of the MPR with regard to the Central Asian Moslem world. In this connection, it would seem that the MPR’s value as a bridge to the Afro-Asian nations would decrease as its economy is inte grated with that of the European ’’socialist" nations. Mongolia would become increasingly a "European" nation, and less readily acceptable to still struggling Afro-Asian nations as a country sharing their problems. The MPR would have some value, as an example, of course, advertising the benefits of communism. For the present, the MPR may thus be described as presenting certain values to the Soviet Union. First, it will for a while serve as a channel of communication with the Afro-Asian nations. Second, it Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I6k serves in some of the capacities of a buffer state. Third, and most important, it presents the Soviet Union with a point of influence and leverage within China's border complex and a concomitant point of strength, China must also maintain the best possible relations with Outer Mongolia. First, good relations with the Mongols are a priority to the Chinese in the handling of their border peoples. Peaceful borderlands make it easier to maintain good relations, in turn, with China's neighbors. Where armed conflict can be avoided, situations such as the Sino-Indian dispute can be prevented from occurring. Second, the same is true of Peking's dealings with its own Mongols. A third aspect of Sino-Mongolian relations is the necessity of maintaining peaceful fron tiers between the two countries; a border secured by the presence of militaiy forces is an expensive, aggravating situation. The MPR also presents certain common values to both the Soviet Union and China. It helps to keep them apart, in this sense a buffer area, and it probably will be of increasing value as a channel of com munication. With the ideological dispute raging in full voice and view, the possibility exists that such a function will be necessary at quite an early date. As for the MPR itself, it has become increasingly more difficult to satisfy the requirements of relations with both the Soviet Union and China. Undoubted^, the Mongols and the Chinese will both strive to maintain at least the facade of good relations, the Chinese for their reasons and the Mongols for theirs. It is highly questionable that this will be possible, in view of the opening rift between Moscow and Peking. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165 It will require the utmost Mongolian diplomatic skill to meet the requirements of relations with Peking without disturbing Moscow; there are reports that this facade has already begun to crack. In a sense, this brings squarely into focus the question of whether the MPR is a "satellite" of the Soviet Union. If one defines a satellite as a country taking orders from another, larger and more powerful country, then Outer Mongolia is perhaps less a satellite now than it was twenty or even fifteen years ago. If the criterion of satellitism is dependence on another larger and more powerful country for economic or political sustenance, or for existence itself, then the MPR is perhaps more of a satellite than it was fifteen or twenty years ago. This latter definition, or part-définition, however, describes a state of affairs not limited to the smaller dependencies of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it does not allow room for certain complexities of the Soviet-Mongolian equation. For this reason, it may be useful to re-examine briefly certain basic factors underlying the Soviet-Mongolian relationship. First is the geographic location of the MPR, a small countiy of slightly over 600,000 square miles and perhaps a million inhabitants. The MPR is completely surrounded by the Soviet Union and China. It owes its separate existence to the power of the Soviet Union, both initially, during the days of Chinese disunity and weakness, and currently, during this period when China has again been re-united and made strong. Prior to the inception of the CPR, the Soviet Union's pre-eminence was un challenged. Then, the Mongols were presented with a certain amount of choice. As long as Russian policy remained as it had been prior to 19U9, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166 the Chinese could offer the MPR a reasonable alternative to Soviet guidance, and the Mongols began to exercise that option to a degree. Thus, the MPR's position was improved in the period described in this study. The Soviet Union, faced with a loss of relative power in the MPR, changed its policies, and heightened its attention to Mongolian affairs. As described previously, the result of the changed Soviet policies was to bind the MPR more tightly to the Soviet Union and the rest of the European socialist world. It must be pointed out, however, that the MPR's position in regard to the Soviet Union had been improved. If it is assumed that the initial steps taken by Mongolia along the road of rapid development were taken at Mongol initiative and were desirèd by the Mongols, then the present course of action is one of close alliance with, and not allegiance to, the Soviet Union. It can be said of the MPR that it exists because of a balance of power between the CPR and the USSR. Its status as a satellite is diffi cult to define, perhaps because it represents something of a unique case. Internally, it perhaps has greater responsibility for its own affairs than ever before; externally it has been forced closer to the Soviet Union by the Sino-Soviet rift. . It has been shown that the terms of Soviet-Mongol relations have changed in favor of the Mongolians since 1956. It has also been demonstrated that the MPR is following the Russian side of the Russo-Chinese split. The only alternative course of action open to the Mongolians, and it is no longer a real alternative, would have been alignment with the CPR. If Soviet-Chinese divergencies are contained sufficiently, a dif ficult development to imagine at this juncture, then a third course. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167 that of continued active partnership with both the Soviet Union and China, may be possible. The policy options available to the MPR at this point are ex tremely limited. It appears, as a result, that the Mongolians will not likely choose a different course than that which they apparently have already elected. Operating under Soviet guidance is probably the only sure way, in the minds of Mongolian leaders, to gain the MPR's rightful place in the world. There is yet another aspect of the Soviet-Mongolian relationship which has direct bearing on the question of the degree to which the MPR can be termed a Soviet satellite. That aspect is the issue of Mongol nationalism. It appears that part of the price the MPR must pay for its secure position alongside the Soviet Union is the careful management of its own national feeling. It will be recalled that certain Mongol pronouncements were made officially denouncing advocates of nationalism over "proletarian internationalism." Tumur-Ochir, the culprit in the most notable case of that nature, was twice removed from the Politburo for letting his historical awareness of Mongolia's heritage shine too clearly. The Genghis Khan celebration of 1962 was subsequently disowned and its perpetrator, Tumur-Ochir, castigated. Closely related to the question of nationalism in the MPR is another issue which may have a grave bearing on the future of Mongolian political behavior, and as such, is probably of high importance to the Soviet Union. At present, the Mongolian government and party apparatus is controlled b y a group referred to earlier as the "pro-development faction." From incidents occurring in Mongolian-Soviet relations and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168 domestically within the MPR, it seems apparent that there is also present in the MPR a group or groups not enamored of rapid development and its effect on traditional Mongolian cultural patterns. Under the right conditions within the Mongol power structure, such "conservatives" might well, if successful in obtaining broad popular support, be able to seize enough power to change the MPR’s plans for economic development. Such a possibility, if it exists, has implications both for Soviet- Mongol and Sino-Mongol relations. It serves as a caveat to the Soviet Union that the massive amounts of aid flowing into the MPR might in a short time be rendered a loss. A great deal of attention is warranted on the part of Moscow to the problems of the MPR's ruling group to fore stall the possibility of such a loss. The apparent Soviet concern over Mongol nationalism may find part of its motivation in this issue. It seems likely that in the event of an internal rumbling in the Mongolian government that had a n y possibility of resulting in an overthrow of the present leaders, the Soviet Union would take steps to prevent this. Direct, overt, armed intervention, such as occurred in Hungary, does not, however, seem probable; this would involve too much risk of a direct confrontation with the CPR. To view this issue in another manner, it can be said that the present Mongolian leadership for the most part has been in office since the Soviets have applied their recent policies of extensive aid and at tention to the MPR. Most internal rumblings heretofore have been handled fairly successfully by the Mongols themselves; it goes without saying that the Russians would prefer for this to continue as long as their interests are served. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169 Thus the International position of the Mongols is fairly well defined by sheer necessity. Internally, by keeping hard at the tasks of remaking their economy and society, the Mongolian leaders can guarantee a sort of freedom, an increasing absence of direct subordination to a Russian leadership. Externally, by walking closely in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, they can guarantee a fairly constant flow of technical, material, and financial aid, as well as increasing contact with the rest of the world. A not unkind characterization would be to call the MPR a satellite by necessity. The future of Soviet-Mongolian relations seems at the present to be fairly well defined; if no unforeseen domestic difficulty arises for the current ruling group in Ulan Bator, relations with the Soviet Union should continue without major incident. At this point, it may be useful to examine briefly the possibilities for Sino-Mongolian relations. At the present juncture, the situation does not seem favorable for the Chinese in Mongolia. As long as the Sino-Soviet dispute was kept on a muted note, there existed at least the possibility of con tinued, relatively smooth, Chinese-Mongolian dealings. That pre condition seems to have been irrevocably altered, however, and ary hopes on the part of the Chinese or the Mongolians for a continuation of previous patterns have apparently been dashed. The MPR possesses some sort of guarantee against completely unmanageable Chinese demands in their alignment with the Soviet Union. In view of the importance described in this study of the position of Mongolia within the Chinese border complex, it is to be e:qpected that the Chinese will not become intransigent toward the MPR. This issue. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 however, will be resolved as a policy decision by the Chinese; it may prove revealing to learn whether Peking values its ideological image more highly than it does the benefits of a continued fairly close rela tionship with Ulan Bator. In any event, if the Chinese are wont to place too much pressure on the MPR, it would appear that they would consider carefully the effects of such a move on its relations with its own minorities. In this, the Mongols of Outer Mongolia may possess a certain degree of security in their own right. An alternative possibility, of course, would be that cross boundary ethnic ties could appear dangerous to Peking and thus backfire on Ulan Bator. In such an event, the Chinese would most likely take .steps both internally, with regard to their own minorities, and ex ternal ly with regard to the MPR, to negate such a danger. The latter, of course, would be of necessity circumspect, in view of the Soviet Union's support of the MPR. If the Sino-Mongol joint boundary- surveying operation now underway results in a favorable and mutually satisfactory conclusion, it will be an indication that Sino-Mongolian affairs are continuing relatively smoothly for the time being. The seeds of conflict, apparently are present. In conclusion, it appears that the destiny of the Mongolian People's Republic will remain linked with the fortunes and guidance of the Soviet Union. If this characterized Outer Mongolia as a Soviet satellite, the author can only observe that the policy alternatives available to the Mongols are limited; the MPR is literally a "satellite by necessity." The Soviet-Mongol relationship is not a one-sided one; Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171 the Mongolians receive much that they desire from the USSR. One thing is certain, however; the MPR will, eventually, find its place, in the world if desire and national feeling meet with the proper political opportunity. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY A. BOOKS Baddely, John F. Russia, Mongolia and China. 2 Vols. London* The Macmillan Company, 1919. Bell, Sir Charles. The Religion of Tibet. Oxford* The Clarendon Press, 1931. ______. Tibet. Past and Present. Oxford* The Clarendon Press, 1921*. Cable, Mildred. The Gobi Desert. New York* The Macmillan Company, 19W*. Cheng, Tien Fong, Sino-Russian Relations. Washington, D. C.s The Public Affairs Press, 19^7. Dallin, David J. The Rise of Russia in Asia. New Haven* The Yale University Press,"1^9. _____ . Soviet Russia and the Far East. New Haven* The Yale Univer- sity Press, 19hd. Fairbank, John King, and Ssu-yu Teng. Ch' ing Administration. Three Studies. Cambridge* The Harvard Press, i960'. Friters, Gerald F. Outer Mongolia and Its International Postion. Baltimore* The Johns Hopkins Press, 19U9. Hedin, Sven. Jehol, City of Emperors. London* Kegan Paul Trench and Trubner, Ltd., 1932. Riddles of the Gobi Desert. New York: The E. P. Dutton Company, 1933. Howorth, Sir Henry Hoyle. A History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century. 1* V o l s London* Longman Greens and Conqpany, l87^ 1 ^ . Jackson, W. A. Douglas. Russo-Chinese Borderlands. Van Nostrand Search light Series, No. 2. Princeton* The Van Nostrand Cosq)aiy, 1962. Koeppen, Karl Friedrich. Die Religion des Buddha. 2 Vols. Berlin* Ferdinand Schneider, 1851-1859. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171* Lattimore, Owen. Inner Asian Frontiers of China. New York: The American Geographical Society, 1951. ______. Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia. Leiden: The E. J. Brill Conqjany, 19’55T ______. Nomads ^ d Commissars, Mongolia Revisited. Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1962. Li, Tieh-tseng. Tibet Today and Yesterday. New York: Bookman and Company, 196^1 Malomezoff, Andrew. Russian Far Eastern Policy, 188I-190I*. Berkely: The University of Cali'jfofnia Press, 1956. Norins,^Martin. Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang. New York: Day and Company, Pavlovsky, Michel N. Chinese-Russian Relations. New York* The Philo sophical Library, 11^1*9. Prawdin, Michael. (Charol, Leslie). The Mongol Empire, Its Rise and Legacy. London* George Allen anïïTjnwin, Ltd., 1952. Prinseps, Henry Thoby. Thibet, Tartary and Mongolia. London* William H. Allen & Company,” 18^2. Preheval'skii, Nikolai Mikhailovich. Mongolia, the Tangut Country and the Solitude of Northern Tibet. London* Sampson Low Marston Searle and Rivington, IdYSl Tang, Peter S. H. Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. Durham, North Carolina* The Duke University Press, 1959* Wei, Henry. C h i m and Soviet Russia. Princeton* The Van Nostrand Company ,”Î957. Whiting, Allen S., and Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Sinkiang, Pawn or Pivot? East Lansing* Midhigm; State University Press, 1956. Zagoria, Donald S. The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956 W 196I. Princeton* The Princeton University Press, 1962. B. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 1. Current Background Current Background is published by the United States Consulate General Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 175 in Hong Kong, and presents material translated from Chinese Communist publications, each issue being devoted to one topic of interest. Mimeographed. A list of issues used follows* "Fifth Session of the 1st National People's Congress, VI, Some Statements on Minorities Problems." Current Background, 500 March 3, 1958. "A General Description of Mongolia," Current Background, 522, October 10, 1958. "Provisional Regulations on the Protection and Care of Cultural Objects." Current Background, 65U, June ll*, 1961. "Recent Reports on Tibet." Current Background, 1*90, February 7, 1958. 2. Joint Publications Research Translations The Joint Publications Research Service is a part of the Office of Technical Services of the United States Department of Commerce. The Service translates and publishes in mimeographed form material appearing in a n y language on a pertinent, specific topic. A list of translations used appears below* Batochir, Sh. "Problems Regarding the Settling of Our Nomadic Population and Pastoral Economy to a Permanent Way of Life." Ediyn Dzasgiyn Asuudluud (Economic Problems), Ulan Bator, No. ■?7TÏ961), K>. 99-102. JPRS* I77li39, February 1, 1963, pp. 56-65. Csath, Bela. "Water Research in Mongolia." Banyaszatl Lapok 95, 1 (January, 1962), pp. 5h-59. JPRS* ll*,39U, July 15, 1^2. Gombosuren, B. "The Generous Aid of Socialist Countries," Duchin Jild Ih Barilga (Forty Years of Capital Construction), Ulan Bator, 196^1 . JPRS* 17,61*2, February li*, 1963* Jadambaa, S. "Some Results of I960'Livestock Breeding Work in Suhe Bator Aymak." Ediyn Dzasgiyn Asuudlund (Economic Problems), Ulan Bator, No.“T U 9 6 1 ) , M). 99-102. JPRS* 17,1*39, February 1, 1963. Japanese Research Studies on Mongolia. Tokyo* Continental Asia Research Association. JRPS;57C^D, March 3, 1959. Karepin, S. "Exportai of Animal ikisbandry Products from the Mongolian People's Republic," Vneshnyaya Torgovlya (Foreign Trade), 12, 1958. JPRS* 20UO-N, November 3 0 7 1959. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176 Speech by M. A. Suslov, Chief of the Party and Government Delegation from the USSR, At the Celebration of the l*Oth Anniversary of the Mongolian Revolution. Translations from Unen, Ulan Bator, 7-11 July. 1961. JPRS: 11532, December lI^9'5ll'^ppT35-lF'. Tsende, L. Second Secretary of Central Committee of the MPRP. Report made at the XIV Congress of the MPRP, Unen, July 5, 1961. 3. Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press The Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press is published by the United States (Consulate: General in Hong Kong, as is Current Background. It includes a wide sampling of the output of the Chinese Communist news- papers each day, and is published in mimeographed form. These are quarterly indices. This study has utilized the SCMP from August, 1952, to May, 1963. C. DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS Each organ of the United Nations publishes and makes available copies of both its single document reports or resolutions and the minutes of its meetings. This study has used documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as minutes of relevant meetings of both bodies in Plenary Session or their special committees. The period included is from June, 191*6, to December, 196I. D. PERIODICALS Current Digest of the Soviet Press The Current Digest of the Soviet Press is a weekly publication con taining selected items which have been translated from the general publications of the Soviet Union, including both newspapers and journals. These are quarterly indicesi This study has utilized the CDSP from January, 1950, to May, 1963 . Das, Sarat Chandra. "The Hierarchy of the Dalai Lama 11*06-171*5," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, LXXIV, Extra Number I90U (I90I*), fp."3Sl*-3hb. Ekvall, Robert B. "Historical Sites and Cultural Relics," Current Scene, I, 27 (March 20, 1962), entire issue. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 177 Ginsburgs, George. "Mongolia's Socialist Constitution," Pacific Affairs, X30ŒV (June, 1961), pp. ILI-IS6 . Rtqjcn, Robert A. "Notes on Outer Mongolia, Since 191*5," Pacific Affairs, XXVIII (March, 1955), pp. 71-79. . "Outer Mongolia, 1957-1960," Pacific Affairs, XXXIII (December, i9 60), pp. 127- 11*2 . . "Partition in the Land of Genghis Khan," Current Scene II (September 27, 1962), entire issue. ______. "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Outer Mongolia," Current Scene, I (August 3 1 , 1961), entire issue. ” Searls, Guy. "Communist China's Border Policy: Dragon Throne Imperi alism?" Current Scene, II (April 15, 1963), entire issue. Wèlch, Holmes. "Asian Buddhists and China," Far Eastern Economic Review, XL (April ]*, 1963), pp. 15-2 1 . Viens, Hero Id J. "Geographical Limitations to Food Production in the MPR," The Annals of the American Association of Geographers, XLI (DecenSer, 1951), pp. 31*6-369. E. NEWSPAPERS Christian Science Monitor, January, 19l*9-December, 1962. New York Herald Tribune, February, 19l*6-December, 1962. New York Times, February, 191*6-June, 19 6 3 . Times of London, January, 1950-December, I9 6 1 . Washington Evening Star, July 9, 1961. Washington Post, June, 196l-July, 1963. Kellet-Long, Adam. "Mongolia Would Like Ties with the U. S.," Washington Post, May 21, I9 6 3 .------ Oka, Takashi. "Itysterious Satellite," Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 1956. ------ Wohl, Paul. "Outer Mongolia Seen in Sino-Soviet Shadow," Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 1952. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. appendix Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, MAY 31, I960 The Chairman of the People's Republic of China and the Presidium of the Great People's Iktral of the People's Republic of Mongolia, being eagerly desirous of further developing and strengthening the unbreakable fraternal relations of friendship and mutual assistance between the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Mongolia on the basis of the principle of proletarian internationalism and of mutual respect for State sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit, determined to make every effort to contribute to the maintenance and consolidation of Asian and world peace and to the safeguarding of the security of all peoples, and deeply convinced that the development of and consolidation of the relations of friendship and mutual assistance between China and Mongolia accord with the vital interests of all peoples of the world, have decided for this purpose to conclude this treaty and ap pointed as their respective plenipotentiaries: the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China; Chou En-lai. Premier of the State Council; the Presidium of the Great People's Hural of the People's Republic of Mongolia; Um jagin Tsedenbal, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the plenipotentiaries of the two peoples having examined each other's cre dentials and found them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. l8o ARTICLE I The contracting parties will make every effort to safeguard Asian and world peace and the security of all peoples. ARTICLE II The contracting parties will consult with each other on all inqjortant international questions of common interest to the People's Republic of China and the Mongolian People's Republic. ARTICLE III The contracting parties will render to each other ever)' possible economical and technical aid in the cause of peaceful construction of the two countries. ARTICLE IV The contracting parties will reiterate that they will continue to consolidate and develop economic, cultural, scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries in accordance with the agreement on economic and cultural cooperation signed by the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Mongolia on October U, 1952. ARTICLE V The present treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of exchange of instruments of ratification, which will take place in Peking. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 181 The present treaty will remain in force until the contracting parties agree to amend or terminate it. Done in duplicate in Ulan Bator on May 31, I960, in Chinese and Mongolian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China (signed) Chou En-lai Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of Mongolia (signed) Umjagin Tsedenbal Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.