Enhancing the Governance of Tropical Fisheries at A

ENHANCING THE GOVERNANCE OF TROPICAL FISHERIES AT A

LARGE SPATIAL SCALE:

CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES, CASE STUDIES AND FINANCING

CONSIDERATIONS IN WEST AFRICA AND THE WESTERN AND

CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN

John Virdin

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Marine Studies

Spring 2016

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ENHANCING THE GOVERNANCE OF TROPICAL FISHERIES AT A

LARGE SPATIAL SCALE:

CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES, CASE STUDIES AND FINANCING

CONSIDERATIONS IN WEST AFRICA AND THE WESTERN AND

CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN

John Virdin

Approved: ______Mark A. Moline, Ph.D. Director of the School of Marine Science and Policy

Approved: ______Mohsen Badiey, Ph.D. Acting Dean of the College of Earth, Ocean, and Environment

Approved: ______Ann L. Ardis, Ph.D. Senior Vice Provost for Graduate and Professional Education

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: ______Biliana Cicin-Sain, Ph.D. Professor in charge of dissertation

Signed: ______Ishac Diwan, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

Signed: ______Sunny Jardine, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

Signed: ______George Parsons, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

Signed: ______Linwood Pendleton, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely and deeply thank my Advisor, Dr.

Biliana Cicin-Sain, for her constant guidance and support throughout this research, it has been a wonderful learning experience. I would also like to thank the members of my committee for their generous support during this effort: Dr. Ishac Diwan, Affiliate at Harvard University’s Belfer Center and Chaire d’Excellence Monde Arabe at Paris

Sciences et Lettres Research University; Dr. Sunny Jardine, Assistant Professor in the

School of Marine Science and Policy, University of Delaware; Dr. George Parsons,

Professor in the School of Marine Science and Policy, University of Delaware and Dr.

Linwood Pendleton, International Chair of Excellence at the European Institute for

Marine Studies, University of Brest.

I would also like to thank Mary Barton-Dock, Special Envoy to Haiti, Idah Pswarayi-

Riddihough, Director and Sari Soderstrom, retired, from the World Bank, for their support and encouragement to pursue this research while working under their direction.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my wife Hilary, without whom my research would never have been possible.

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ...... viii LIST OF FIGURES ...... xi ABSTRACT ...... xiv

Chapter

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1.1 Context for the Research ...... 1 1.2 Research Question ...... 6 1.3 Methodology and Format of the Dissertation ...... 7

2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ...... 18

2.1 The Context: the Ocean Environment and the Fish Stocks it Supports .. 18 2.2 Major Actors: the Diversity of Fisheries Systems that have Developed throughout the Ocean ...... 32 2.3 Description of the Problem: the Current Status of many Ocean Fisheries Systems as Overfished ...... 40 2.4 Historical Development of the Problem: the Increase in Overfishing in the Ocean since the 1950s ...... 53 2.5 The Rationale for Solutions: Reducing Overfishing often leads to a Recovery of Fish Stock ...... 59

3 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING OCEAN FISHERIES GOVERNANCE REFORM ...... 62

3.1 Historical Development of the Governance Concept as a Response to the Overfishing Problem ...... 66 3.2 Description of the Concept of Ocean Fisheries Governance ...... 98 3.3 Introducing Dynamism to the Ocean Fisheries Governance Concept: Reform ...... 190

4 EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF CASE STUDIES IN LARGE-SCALE TROPICALFISHERIES GOVERNANCE REFORM ...... 229

vi 4.1 A General Empirical Review of the World Bank’s Portfolio of Investments in Tropical Fisheries Governance Reform ...... 229 4.2 Empirical Review of Governance Reforms Financed by the First Phase of the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program ...... 264 4.3 Empirical Review of Governance Reforms Undertaken in the Western and Central Pacific Islands ...... 342 4.4 Comparison of Indicators for Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms Supported in 5 World Bank Projects ...... 377

5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 393

5.1 Discussion of Results ...... 395 5.2 Conclusions ...... 400

REFERENCES ...... 412

vii LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Top species and species groups recorded by FAO as caught commercially in 2012 (44% of total) ...... 35

Table 2. Net producers and consumers of fish products in 2012* ...... 37

Table 3. Summary of historical development of the concept of governance as part of the solution to the overfishing problem ...... 95

Table 4. Selected international policy statements of principles relevant to ocean fishery systems ...... 108

Table 5. Summary of fisheries objectives and targets in Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation ...... 116

Table 6. Summary matrix of common horizontal characteristics of policies for governance of ocean fishery systems ...... 153

Table 7. Summary of Ostrom's classification of rules based on the 'intention or aim' ...... 168

Table 8. Summary matrix of the common characteristics of rules for tenure in ocean fishery systems ...... 181

Table 9. Summary matrix of the common characteristics of governance organizations in ocean fishery systems ...... 187

Table 10. Summary of the common vertical and horizontal characteristics frequently used to describe the three components of ocean fishery governance ...... 193

Table 11. Summary of the types of economic costs associated with ocean fisheries governance reform ...... 195

Table 12. Simple illustration of likelihood of achieving consensus on proposed ocean fisheries governance reforms, based on the distribution of potential economic costs and benefits ...... 202

viii Table 13. Illustration of simple assessment of political feasibility of a hypothetical proposed governance reform from Figure 21 ...... 203

Table 14. Indicative classification of a sample of case studies in ocean fisheries governance reform from Cunningham et al (2005) ...... 211

Table 15. ‘Second-Tier’ Variables or Indicators used in SES Frameworks ...... 218

Table 16. Variables for Indicators for the Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms ...... 219

Table 17. Categories of economic costs of fisheries governance reform ...... 226

Table 18. Ocean fisheries governability assessment matrix ...... 228

Table 19. World Bank fisheries portfolio reviewed ...... 236

Table 20. Summary of the types of fisheries governance reforms supported in the portfolio ...... 239

Table 21. Break-down of financial costs of ocean fisheries governance reform in 5 World Bank projects* ...... 243

Table 22. Synthesis of Governance Reform efforts in 8 World Bank Projects ..... 256

Table 23. Comparison of Indicators for Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms Supported in Five World Bank Projects ...... 260

Table 24. Aggregated data for benefits from West Africa's ocean fishery systems in 2009, by country ...... 270

Table 25. Local value added from West African fisheries in 2009 ...... 276

Table 26. Examples of the contribution of small-scale fisheries to West Africa's economy in 2010 ...... 276

Table 27. Summary of the types of fisheries governance reforms supported in WARFP Phase I ...... 289

Table 28. Break-down of financial costs of ocean fisheries governance reform in Phase One of the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program* ...... 293

Table 29. Liberia fisheries judicial and administrative penalties imposed from 2010 - 2013 ...... 305

ix Table 30. Summary of WARFP-financed outputs recorded vs. targets ...... 321

Table 31. Estimated NPV of changes in resource rent between 2010 and 2015 as a result of governance reforms (US$ millions) ...... 332

Table 32. Summary of Indicators for Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms Supported in the WARFP ...... 334

Table 33. Pacific Ocean under the jurisdiction of World Bank member countries ...... 344

Table 34. Summary of the horizontal characteristics of fisheries governance reforms introduced for WCPO purse seine fishery since 2009 ...... 358

Table 35. Break-down of financial costs of governance reform in Phase One of the Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program* ...... 360

Table 36. Summary of Indicators for Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms Supported in the Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program (PROP) ...... 373

Table 37. Summary of Indicators for Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms Supported in 5 World Bank Projects ...... 378

Table 38. Variables for Indicators for the Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms ...... 408

x LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Roadmap to the Dissertation ...... 17

Figure 2. Groups of Fished Species of the Ocean ...... 22

Figure 3. Generic components of a simple commercial fishery ...... 26

Figure 4. Generic components of a simple commercial fishery, including broader human components ...... 27

Figure 5. Simplified Socio-Ecological System ...... 30

Figure 6. Simplified Ocean Fishery Socio-Ecological System (SES) ...... 31

Figure 7. Percentage of total fish products by value in 2012 ...... 37

Figure 8. FAO status of ocean fish stocks in 2011 ...... 41

Figure 9. Percentage of assessed fish stocks in FAO major fishing areas categorized as overexploited ...... 58

Figure 10. Simplified ocean fishery socio-ecological system (SES) ...... 63

Figure 11. Illustration of institutions for facilitating collective action ...... 79

Figure 12. Illustration of the governance concept to solve social dilemmas ...... 80

Figure 13. Illustration of institutions for facilitating collective action to solve commons problems* ...... 84

Figure 14. Isolation of institutions for governance as the independent variable for fishing activity ...... 91

Figure 15. Embedding the fisheries governance concept in a SES framework for ocean fishery systems ...... 97

Figure 16. 'Smoothed' illustration of the components of the concept of ocean fisheries governance ...... 99

xi Figure 17. Illustration of polycentric components of the concept of ocean fisheries governance ...... 103

Figure 18. Illustration of categories of policy principles and objectives, and their Trade-Offs ...... 107

Figure 19. Theoretical illustration of relationship between efficiency and equity to future generations ...... 144

Figure 20. Continuum of property rights relating to fish harvesting ...... 175

Figure 21. Conceptual framework for ocean fisheries governance, focusing on tenure in the harvesting segment ...... 189

Figure 22. Change in resource rents due to rule change over 10 years - in comparison to status quo alternative scenario ...... 199

Figure 23. Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms: i.e. an updated/modified classification system for ocean fisheries governance, embedded within a SES framework ...... 216

Figure 24. Growth in the World Bank's portfolio of investments in fisheries ...... 237

Figure 25. Vertical characteristics or entry points for World Bank ...... 238

Figure 26. Horizontal characteristics: types of rule changes supported ...... 242

Figure 27. Break-down of financial costs of reform ...... 244

Figure 28. FAO data on West Africa's ocean fisheries production in 2009, by location of catch ...... 267

Figure 29. Sea Around Us Project data for West Africa's ocean fisheries production, by location of catch ...... 268

Figure 30. Flow of illegal fishing in West Africa ...... 282

Figure 31. Break-down of financial costs of reform in WARFP Phase One ...... 294

Figure 32. % of known industrial fishing vessels operating in Liberia and Sierra Leone's waters, sighted as committing a rule infraction (trawling < 6 miles from shore) ...... 316

xii Figure 33. Example of the conceptual framework for ocean fisheries governance reform in Senegal: introduction of management rights for coastal demersal fisheries in Ngaparou (2005 - 2010) ...... 341

Figure 34. WCPO 'fish bank': tuna stocks in the water ...... 351

Figure 35. Trends in WCPO purse seine catch and capacity ...... 364

Figure 36. Trend in purse seine catch in PNA waters + high seas ...... 365

Figure 37. Fishing effort in WCPO waters outside of PNA ...... 366

Figure 38. Bangkok price of a ton of skipjack ...... 368

Figure 39. Current economic benefits to Pacific Island countries from WCPO tuna fisheries ...... 369

Figure 40. Indicative growth in purse seine foreign access fees received by PICs ...... 371

Figure 41. WCPO tuna access fees from foreign fleets as a % of GDP ...... 372

Figure 42. Conceptual framework for ocean fisheries governance reform in Western & Central Pacific: introduction of effort rights for purse seine tuna fishing (2010 - 2015) ...... 376

Figure 43. Distribution of financial costs of ocean fisheries governance reform in 7 cases ...... 404

xiii ABSTRACT

Approximately 29 percent of the ocean’s fish stocks that have been assessed are considered as ‘overfished’, with levels increasing the most in tropical waters which often border developing countries. Following over two decades of international agreement that overfishing is a global environmental problem, on September 25, 2015 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution setting 17 ‘Sustainable

Development Goals’ that included a commitment to end overfishing by 2020. Global models have suggested that achieving this target will require a significant reduction in the amount of fishing effort, with unknown costs to states or in aggregate to the international community.

Acknowledging that there are many determinants of human fishing behavior, this dissertation adopts an institutions perspective on fisheries, to focus on governance as one of the key (and most feasible) variables that can be changed in order to reduce current levels of overfishing. Governance is defined as a systemic concept relating to the exercise of control or influence over fishing activity by political, economic and social institutions, and the organizations emerging from them and articulating policies to implement or change them or establish new rules.

xiv Given the diversity of different types of fisheries, any changes or reforms to governance in order to reduce overfishing will be context-specific and only likely to achieve the

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) in the aggregate. As such, empirical analysis can be useful to understand the types of governance reforms that could support progress in different contexts and at different scales, and their potential costs. Although a wide body of literature exists on governance reform efforts at the level of specific fisheries, and a growing body on national-scale reforms in developed countries with temperate waters, relatively few cases have been documented of national or large-scale fisheries governance reforms in tropical developing countries, where the trends in overfishing are growing.

This dissertation aims to contribute conceptual tools that could be used to expand the body of empirical analysis of fisheries governance reforms in tropical developing countries at a national or large spatial scale, and answer the following questions: (i) what is the conceptual framework that would be needed to support greater empirical analysis of fisheries governance reforms in tropical developing countries at national or large spatial scales, and (ii) what conclusions can be drawn from a first application of this framework to a relatively new body of experience in tropical fisheries governance reforms, based on the recent portfolio of investments by the World Bank? To answer this question, a conceptual framework for ocean fisheries governance reform has been developed based on a literature review, as a common lens by which to assess changes in different cases and contexts, and the potential costs. This lens has been applied to

xv the World Bank’s portfolio of public investments over the last 10 years, which provides a relatively unique body of data on developing country large-scale reform efforts, including financial cost data. Within this dataset, two case studies from different types of fisheries and geographies are described in detailed, one coastal in West Africa, the other with small islands in the western Pacific.

Analysis of the World Bank’s portfolio showed several common types of fisheries governance reforms supported with varying degrees of success in contributing towards reducing or preventing overfishing, including establishment of co-governance partnerships between the state and resource users to create (or in some cases return) management rights for the latter over coastal and multi-species sedentary fisheries; introduction of effort and catch rights in industrialized fisheries; and enhanced efforts of state agencies to support reforms, notably to increase compliance with existing rules.

The financial costs, i.e. those costs incurred by states, of reforms in the cases was on the order of $245 million total, across 11 countries and one regional agency (i.e. the regional effort in the SWIOFP), over a period of 5 years maximum. The financial costs of policy formulation and reform were relatively small across the cases, though this was often a relatively lengthy time process, while the majority of the costs were incurred in developing and enacting rule changes or new rules – generally the transaction costs of establishing and supporting community/stakeholder management rights in co- governance partnerships, and also the costs of enhancing operations of state

xvi organizations charged with supporting harvest rules, such as monitoring and surveillance to enhance compliance – essentially the enforcement costs. In terms of the economic costs of the reform, foregone production and resource rent did not happen at a large scale in West Africa, where effort reductions were achieved by reducing illegal fishing effort and the industrial vessel buy-back in Senegal never occurred. In the Pacific

Islands, the introduction of reforms in the purse seine fishery prior to overfishing, offered the potential to avoid effort reductions and foregone rent, in favor of a cap or limit.

More broadly, the scale of financing for reform – some $245 million in 11 countries over 5 years – is both significant and yet a fraction of the ocean fisheries in many of these countries: representing seven districts in eastern Indonesia, four out of nine Pacific

Island Countries, 10 percent of the EEZ in Tanzania, just under 20 pilot sites for coastal sedentary fishery systems in four countries of West Africa, etc. The duration of reform has been a minimum of five years in these cases, with many not considered complete after this period.

Given the timeframe, and the mixed picture of success (as well as lack of data) in the cases examined, a note of caution may be warranted as to the scale of reform efforts needed in tropical ocean fishery systems in order to meet the Sustainable Development

Goal target. Both significant time horizons and some $245 million in external financing resources were needed in order to achieve globally modest reductions in fishing effort,

xvii though prevention of overfishing in the Western and Central Pacific purse seine fishery system seems likely to be more cost-effective. Even if much more external financing became available, in the cases reviewed the entry points and characteristics of reform suggest a process of years. While care must be taken in extrapolating from case studies, this research suggests that at the current rate the Sustainable Development Goal target seems unlikely to be met. Greater empirical research to understand the types of large- scale fisheries governance reforms that have led to reductions in overfishing in different developing country contexts, notably in the tropics, and the economic costs and benefits of these reforms, are urgently needed. This could lead to more causal research on the amount of new investment in ocean fisheries governance reform needed to end overfishing and meet the Sustainable Development Goal.

xviii Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context for the Research

The current situation for many of the populations of fish in the ocean. The current level of ‘overfishing’ by commercial fleets in the global ocean is considered one of the major environmental problems of our time, notably for coastal and island developing countries

(United Nations, 2012).1 For the world’s ocean fish stocks that the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has assessed since the 1950s, currently some 29 percent are considered as ‘overfished’, where the size of the stock is less than 40 percent of the amount that would be present in the ocean in the absence of fishing (Ye et al.,

2011), often with significant impacts on wider ecosystems (Worm et al., 2009). This level of ‘overfishing’ has resulted in lost benefits that include an estimated 16.5 million tons of fish per year that could sustainably be added to the world’s food supply (Ye et al., 2013), and an estimated $50 billion per year in profits that could sustainably contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction (World Bank and FAO, 2009).

An estimated 600 to 850 million people rely on these fisheries together with the world’s

1 See for example paragraph 168 of the ‘Future We Want’ outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (‘Rio+20’).

1 fish farming operations for their livelihoods, more than 90 percent of whom live in developing countries (FAO, 2012a). Overfishing has been increasing the most in the tropical waters of these developing countries, for example at a steady rate in African waters after the mid-1970s, and even more so in Asian waters where the number of fishing vessels more than doubled during this time period (Srinivasan et al., 2010). On top of these demands for food fish and fishing livelihoods, the world’s population is expected to grow to 9.6 billion by 2050 (UN DESA, 2013).

A new global objective to change the status of the populations of fish in the ocean.

Overfishing was recognized by states as a global problem during the United Nations

Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992 (United Nations, 1992).

Since that time, states have set goals to end overfishing and rebuild ocean fish stocks, during the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 as part of the

Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (United Nations, 2002), and at the 10th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2010 as part of the Aichi biodiversity targets (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2013).

Following these precedents, on September 25, 2015 the United Nations General

Assembly adopted a resolution setting 17 ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ and a number of more specific targets for progress towards solving selected global problems, including Goal 14 to “conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”, with a target (14.4) to “effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and

2 destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics” by 2020

(United Nations General Assembly, 2015).

Changing the fishing behavior of humans in order to change the status of fish populations in the ocean. There is general scientific consensus that fishing activity is the single biggest determinant of the biological status of ocean fish stocks, rather than fluctuations in ecological characteristics (Beddington et al, 2007, Worm et al., 2009).

Global models have suggested that achieving targets such as those included in the

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) to ‘end overfishing’ and ‘restore fish stocks…to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield’ will require a change in fishing behavior to reduce the amount of fishing effort by 36 to 43 percent from 2008 levels

(Ye et al, 2013). While there is no single determinant of human behavior, drawing from the characterization of complex human interactions with the environment such as fishing in the ocean as coupled socio-ecological systems (SESs) (Berkes et al., 2003;

Lui et al, 2007; Levin and Clark, 2010; Perry et al., 2010; Ommer et al., 2011), this dissertation adopts an institutions perspective on fisheries (Ostrom, 2005), considering behavior such as fishing that interacts with the natural environment to be determined largely by the: (i) biophysical characteristics of that environment in a given context, (ii) social characteristics, and (iii) governance institutions (the rules, norms and shared strategies in use). Of these three types of characteristics in any given fishery, the

3 governance institutions may be the most feasible to change (Ostrom, 2005), and a wide body of literature has identified failures in governance as the primary reason for current levels of overfishing (Garcia, 2005; Cochrane, 2009), and the key determinant of changes to these levels (Grafton et al, 2008).

The spatial scale of governance changes to influence fishing behavior. Fisheries throughout the ocean are not monolithic, but are as diverse as the different types of ecosystems and fish stocks that support them (Kooiman et al, 2005). The international framework for governance of ocean fisheries, the United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Treaty, accommodates (partially) this diversity by providing states with the jurisdiction to make rules governing fishing activity in the coastal area of the sea where most of the world’s fisheries are located (Wang, 1992). Given the diversity of ocean fisheries and the state-based institutional framework provided by

UNCLOS, changes in governance to help achieve the SDG target for fisheries will be very context-specific on a case-by-case basis, within or between states. Perhaps in an ideal world a single global policy solution would be possible within the framework of

UNCLOS, but ocean fisheries are far too heterogenous, including a wide range of different supply chains based upon very different types of fish resources (e.g. open ocean migrating species versus coastal bottom-dwelling species, etc.) and supporting ecosystems, such that individual fisheries are often defined at sub-national, national or regional scales (Charles, 2001). For this reason, policy solutions will need to be defined

4 at the local and regional scale based on the biophysical characteristics of the ecosystems, and then aggregated in order to meet the SDG target.

Case studies in fisheries governance changes at the spatial scale of nation states in the world’s tropical regions. Spatial mismatches between scales of governance and ecosystems are common (Crowder et al., 2008). The above paragraphs suggest the utility of empirical analysis to understand the types of governance reforms that could support progress towards the SDG target for fisheries in different contexts and at different scales. For many economic sectors, such as agriculture for example, there is a well-developed body of empirical analysis on governance reforms at the spatial scale of the state, but relatively little work in documenting large-scale fisheries governance reform (OECD, 2011). Alternatively, a wide body of literature exists on efforts at the level of specific fisheries, and a growing body on national-scale reforms in developed countries with temperate waters such as Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and the U.S. for example (FAO, 2000a; Cunningham et al, 2005; OECD, 2011). Overfishing actually first occurred in the temperate waters of developed countries (Srinivasan et al, 2010), and with notable exceptions many have reformed fisheries governance and reduced overfishing as a result (Worm et al., 2009). In contrast, a literature search yielded relatively few cases of national or large-scale fisheries governance reforms in tropical developing countries, where the trends in overfishing are growing. If the international community is to meet the SDG target, efforts to reform governance of fisheries in the

5 tropics will need to occur at much larger spatial scales, supported by a greater body of empirical analysis.

1.2 Research Question

In the context of the broader policy question of how the new global target to end overfishing by 2020 will be achieved, this dissertation aims to contribute conceptual tools that could be used to expand the body of empirical analysis of fisheries governance reforms in tropical developing countries at a national or large spatial scale, and answer the following questions: (i) what is the conceptual framework that would be needed to support greater empirical analysis of fisheries governance reforms in tropical developing countries at national or large spatial scales, and (ii) what conclusions can be drawn from a first application of this framework to a relatively new body of experience in tropical fisheries governance reforms, based on the recent portfolio of investments by the World Bank? The intention by analyzing a number of case studies is to test the utility and applicability of a modified or expanded conceptual framework for fisheries governance reform, and to generate initial conclusions on the types of reforms implemented at large spatial scales and any associated changes in the measurements of outcome indicators. On this basis, a new body of research and analysis might be developed on the outcomes associated with different types of fisheries governance reforms in the tropics, in order to inform efforts to meet the SDG target to end overfishing.

6 1.3 Methodology and Format of the Dissertation

The perspective taken. In response to the global policy objective agreed in the SDGs, the research has been conducted to assess the social phenomenon of overfishing in the ocean. Social phenomena exist not only in the mind but also in the objective world, so causal explanations of events or entities can be sought based on the evidence (Miles and

Huberman, 1994). As a response to policy, the perspective taken follows that of the

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005), with the anthropocentric or utilitarian view that places human well-being as the central focus of assessment, while recognizing that the natural environment and biodiversity also have intrinsic values (i.e. it can be of value in and for itself) and that people take decisions concerning the ocean based on considerations of well-being as well as intrinsic value. An anthropocentric or utilitarian perspective focuses on humans’ satisfaction of preferences (welfare), where the ecosystems in the natural environment provide services of value to human societies because people derive utility from their use, either directly or indirectly, or from services that are not currently in use, in all cases linked to deeply held historical, national, ethical, religious or spiritual values in any given community or society (MEA, 2005).

An alternative perspective found in many ethical, religious and cultural points of view, holds that something can have intrinsic value irrespective of its utility for humans, such as the natural environment (MEA, 2005). While these perspectives overlap and interact in many ways, they give rise to different definitions and subsequently measures of

‘success’ in human activities, with no common denominator and usually no possibility

7 for aggregation – though both are used in human decision-making processes (MEA,

2005). The anthropocentric or utilitarian perspective has given rise to a number of methodologies to measure the benefits of the services provided by the natural environment to humans, and the (economic) costs to humans of changes in these services (MEA, 2005). Conversely, a non-utilitarian perspective arises from a variety of ethical, cultural, religious or philosophical points of view, and takes many different forms in the entities that are deemed to have intrinsic value and in the interpretation of what intrinsic value means (MEA, 2005). Ultimately, the perspective taken at the scale of nation states or internationally is a political choice, and the choice of perspective taken in this research is dictated by the policy choice taken at the United Nations in formulating the Sustainable Development Goals. Of course articulation of ideas based on the evidence can differ across different states based on local culture even if the same perspective is taken, for example what may be termed ‘policy’ in Anglo-Saxon political traditions is termed ‘governance’ in Francophone traditions (Kooiman et al., 2005).

Methodology of the research and format of the dissertation. The methodology for answering the research questions, and the format of the dissertation, is summarized in the following paragraphs.

(Chapter Two) Statement of the problem. Following standard methods for qualitative analysis summarized by Miles and Huberman (1994), the dissertation begins by defining the scope of the overfishing problem in terms of the context in which the

8 problem occurs, the major actors involved, a description of the problem, its historical development, and the potential for solutions. More specifically, the statement of the problem includes a brief summary of the literature on:

o The Context for the problem (and the research), through definition and

description of discrete and measurable segments of fishing activity in the ocean

and its various components as the units of analysis, adopting a systems approach

to sketch a mental model of fisheries as coupled socio-ecological systems, or

ocean fishery systems, in order to characterize the unit of analysis;

o The Major Actors involved in the problem, including the size and distribution of

the units of analysis (ocean fishery systems) throughout the ocean, organizing

the information available in the literature and global databases into different

categories, such as modes or types of fishing, inputs and outputs, and regions;

o A Description of the Problem of overfishing, aiming to make a complicated

phenomenon understandable by reducing it to its component parts and the

various scales at which it occurs, describing both the heterogeneity of different

segments of ocean fishing activity;

o Historical Development of the Problem, highlighting the major drivers over time

of the development and extent of overfishing throughout the global ocean; and

o The Rationale for Solutions, based on the theory and experience to date that

reductions in fishing activity can end overfishing and restore ocean fish stocks.

9 In defining the scope of the problem as described above, the literature from a number of ecologists and social scientists defining fisheries as a coupled social and ecological system (SES) was used as a basis for characterizing the units of analysis. To summarize the major actors involved in the problem, including the size and distribution of ocean fishery systems throughout the ocean, the global databases housed at the United Nations

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) were referenced, among others.

Additionally, to describe the problem and the status of overfishing, these databases as well as FAO’s biannual report on the state of world fisheries was used as the starting point, supplemented by a database housed at the University of British Columbia and a number of key peer-reviewed scientific articles. Lastly, as the historical development of the problem has been widely documented, a number of frequently-cited articles were summarized to further expand the context, together with articles reflecting scientific consensus on the potential for solutions to the overfishing problem.

(Chapter Three) Development of a modified conceptual framework to assess ocean fisheries governance reform. Governance is a systemic concept with its basis in social sciences, becoming widely known in the early 1990s when the World Bank introduced the norm of ‘good governance’ to international development (Kooiman et al., 2005).

However, while a detailed grammar of rules (i.e. structure or language of the types of rules) for self-governance of common pool resources such as fish stocks has been developed based on years of empirical and theoretical research (Ostrom, 2005), definitions of the broad concept of fisheries governance in the literature and its

10 application within a SES framework as the unit of analysis, vary from narrow to broader

(Symes, 2006). For this reason, and in order to develop a common lens by which to analyze precise changes in ocean fisheries governance in different contexts and associate them with changes in measures of system outcomes (e.g. reductions in overfishing), the dissertation modifies and expands the SES conceptual framework by embedding a detailed classification system for ocean fisheries governance reform – with the understanding that examining each component of the concept of governance in terms of its inherent and constructed qualities can give a sense of what contributes to changes in the larger SES towards the SDG target (drawing from Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009 among others). The modified or expanded conceptual framework for ocean fisheries governance reform explains, both graphically and in narrative form, the main things to be studied in a given fishery SES – the key factors, constructs or variables – and the presumed relationships among them (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Essentially, it creates intellectual ‘bins’ containing a lot discrete events and behavior, the former being defined from both theory and experience (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Such frameworks have also been defined as a network or a ‘plane’ of interlinked concepts that together provide a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena (Jabareen, 2009). In general, conceptual frameworks can be rudimentary or elaborate, theory-driven or commonsensical, descriptive or causal, with some relationships purely logical, while others are empirical (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

11 To develop the fisheries governance classification system and embed it within a SES conceptual framework, a literature review with the key words ‘fisheries governance’ was conducted on Academic Search Complete, a multi-disciplinary database of more than 5,300 full text periodicals, including 4,400 peer-reviewed journals. The search yielded 522 papers or articles since 1990, which were scanned as a starting point, and also yielded further references. This review was also supplemented by broader literature on natural resource commons and common property literature. Drawing from this literature, an expanded classification system for ocean fisheries governance reform was constructed sequentially, beginning with the origin and evolution of the concept as a response to overfishing, following with a proposed definition of the concept that specifies its components, and continuing with a description of the characteristics of each of the components of the concept, and ultimately linking these components and embedding them within a SES conceptual framework. The element of dynamism or change is then introduced to the framework, illustrated with a sample of case studies from the literature, in order to complete the construction of a modified or expanded conceptual framework for ocean fisheries governance reform.

(Chapter Four) Empirical review of case studies in large-scale tropical fisheries governance reform. In order to test the modified or expanded conceptual framework described in Chapter Three, a series of case studies in tropical ocean fisheries governance reform at large spatial scales is reviewed and conclusions drawn. A case is defined as a focused and bounded phenomenon embedded in its context, covering an

12 extended period rather than just a snapshot (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Research of the cases aims to give explanatory structure to the events that have occurred, and the series of actions making up human behavior in these specific contexts – providing vivid descriptions that aim to convey the complexity inherent in attempts to reform tropical fisheries governance at a large scale (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In each case study, the information collected consists of: (i) qualitative data taken from documents of past events surrounding governance reform efforts, attempting to arrange events in a causal order and putting one fact in relation to another, linked to (ii) quantitative data on the outputs attributed to these reform events, and the financial costs – reflecting an effort to use both words and numbers to understand events. The data are organized and classified according to the ocean fishery SES conceptual framework modified in Chapter Three, in order to attempt to derive conclusions that can answer the research questions, with a focus on associations rather than causes (given that assessing causality is inherently difficult when it comes to human behavior and the causes of any particular event are always multiple) (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Following common practices of describing cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994), the structure of the presentation of the cases includes the following characteristics:

o Historical context is described in detail;

o Concepts and their variables or structures are measured/described, and measures

of progress in governance reforms explained, using the modified or expanded

SES framework from Chapter Three, including:

13 (i) The vertical characteristics of governance components,

(ii) The horizontal characteristics of governance components,

(iii) Summary of expected economic costs of reform, and

(iv) Associated changes in the outcome measures; and

o Comparable aspects presented and illustrated in the conceptual framework.

Selection of the case studies is drawn from the relative recent body of experiences generated by the portfolio of public investments made progressively by the World Bank over the last 10 years, since the organization formally ‘re-engaged’ to support countries’ fisheries governance reform efforts. Beginning in 2004, by 2015 the organization had committed roughly $1 billion to support governments in developing countries to enhance the benefits from fisheries and aquaculture (World Bank, 2015). Focused almost entirely in tropical developing countries, this portfolio provides a large body of documented cases yet to be analyzed.

Research on the World Bank’s portfolio of investments in ocean fisheries was conducted as part of an effort taken with Nalin Kishor (World Bank), Dan Miller (University of

Illinois) and Catherine Wahlen (independent consultant), to document the organization’s experiences financing governance reforms over the access to forestry and fishery resources as a chapter in an upcoming book on ‘land tenure’, as well as a journal article in preparation, ‘Kishor et al., 2016’. From a dataset of the World Bank’s portfolio of fisheries investment projects, cases involving fisheries governance reforms were

14 selected together with Catherine Wahlen, and summarized broadly. Within this dataset, two case studies were selected for more detailed description, being representative of different types of ocean fishery systems and different geographies (one coastal in West

Africa, the other with small islands in the western Pacific). The case study on West

Africa was described through preparation of a paper for the World Bank, suggesting initial lessons learned from the ‘West Africa Regional Fisheries Program’ of support to

Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone over a five-year period, drawing heavily from trip reports prepared by World Bank staff over this period to document events, as well as monitoring and data collected and shared by Dr. Demba Kane and Mr. Ibrahim

Turay from the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, as part of the program. The case study on the Pacific Islands is based on the project document prepared by staff of the

World Bank to summarize the organization’s investment in the Pacific Islands Regional

Oceanscape Program, as well as a review of existing literature and a spreadsheet maintained by staff of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency of catch volumes and values by fleet and location. The case study was prepared as part of a background paper on Pacific Island tuna fisheries written for the World Bank’s upcoming publication entitled ‘Pacific Possible’, examining scenarios for development of several different sectors of the region’s economy by 2040, including ocean fisheries. This report prepared for the World Bank benefits from comments provided by Robert Gillett, Peter Cusack,

Quentin Hanich and Elizabeth Havice. A portion of the material from this report is being drafted together with Valia Drakou (University of Brest) for an upcoming journal article, ‘Drakou et al., 2016’.

In summary, given that many case studies in fisheries governance reform have in the past focused on large-scale efforts in developed countries and generally temperate waters, or at a much smaller scale in developing countries with tropical waters, the

World Bank’s recent portfolio provides a relatively unique body of data on developing country large-scale reform efforts, including financial cost data.

(Chapter Five) Discussion and conclusions. The dissertation ends with a discussion on what the case studies indicate about: (i) the utility of the modified or expanded conceptual framework to assess the association between large-scale governance reforms and reductions in overfishing in various contexts, (ii) initial conclusions that can be drawn from the cases in large spatial-scale governance reforms, and the scale of the economic costs (and investment) that may be involved in meeting the global target to end overfishing included in the new SDG, and (iii) the considerations for applying the framework to develop a larger body of empirical analysis of tropical fisheries governance reforms. Of course care must be taken in drawing conclusions from the series of events in the case studies and the historical explanation given to make connections between them, with assumptions explicit (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Even greater care must be taken in generalizing the conclusions from case studies to other contexts (Agrawal, 2001), as the generalizability of explanations increases with the number of cases and comparative analysis across them (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

The discussion proposes the modified or expanded conceptual framework as a tool to

16 help address the need for greater empirical research to understand the types of large- scale fisheries governance reforms that have led to reductions in overfishing in different developing country contexts, notably in the tropics. This could lead to more causal research on the amount of new investment in ocean fisheries governance reform needed to end overfishing and meet the SDG. In the interim, this research aims to contribute tools that can help inform policy-makers to answer the basic question “what will it take” to end overfishing in the ocean and meet the SDG.

What is the Problem? Key elements of solutions

Chapter Two: Statement of the Problem Chapter Three: Conceptual Framework to Assess  Context Ocean Fisheries Governance Reform  Major actors  Origin of governance concept as essential to  Description of the problem solutions  Historical development of the  Definition of the concept and its specific components problem  Rationale for solutions  Conceptual framework for assessing changes in governance  Sample of experiences

Experiences in Developing Countries

Chapter Four: Empirical Analysis of Selected Cases of Reform in Developing Countries  Summary of recent World Bank portfolio  Detailed description of case in the Pacific Islands  Detailed description of case in West Africa

What has been learned?

Chapter Five: Discussion and Conclusions

Figure 1. Roadmap to the Dissertation

17 Chapter 2

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

2.1 The Context: the Ocean Environment and the Fish Stocks it Supports

The ocean environment and oceanography. The global ocean is a vast body of salt water that covers roughly 71 percent of the earth’s surface, and can be subdivided into three large oceans (the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans), two smaller oceans (the Arctic and Southern or Antarctic Oceans), and various semi-enclosed seas and water bodies that essentially act as tributaries to them (Wang, 1992). A deep and rich branch of science is devoted entirely to the study of these interconnected bodies of water, their physical characteristics and the life that inhabits them, known as oceanography (see for example Garrison, T., 2009, among many others2).

Life in the ocean and marine biology. The global ocean supports an estimated 1 to 1.4 million different living species studied by the branch of science known as marine biology, based on the recent 10-year Global Census of Marine Life and current Ocean

Biogeographic Information System (Costello et al., 2010). Of this vast diversity of life

2 See for example the Sea-viewing Wide Field of view Sensor (SeaWIFS), operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which monitors phytoplankton concentrations in the global ocean. http://oceancolor.gsfc.nasa.gov/SeaWiFS/ Additional resources include the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), a network of some 4,000 scientists researching the ocean environment. http://ices.dk

18 supported by the ocean, aside from eukaryota, a majority of the taxa include species that have been harvested by humans over millennia for food, including mollusks, crustaceans and fish species (Costello et al., 2010).

Ocean units of analysis for studying the interaction between the ocean environment and the life within it, and the field of marine ecology. As a subset of marine biology related to a higher level of biological organization than just a population of individuals of the same species or communities of these populations in a given area, the field of marine ecology has defined and studied functional and self-contained units known as

‘ecosystems’ within the global ocean (King, 2007). Ecosystems are defined by their largest global assessment to date, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), as a dynamic complex of plant, animal (including humans), and microorganism communities and the non-living environment interacting as a functional unit (MEA,

2005). Ecosystems can be defined across a wide range of sizes, from a small pond to an entire ocean basin, such that each may be analyzed for discrete characteristics – though with the understanding that ecosystems are not isolated units but are linked by biological and physical processes (King, 2007). Notably, humans are an integral part of marine ecosystems (Ommer et al., 2011). While there are no fixed boundaries for the ocean’s ecosystems (in fact the boundaries placed between them are largely artificial), for the purposes of monitoring and management an effort began in the 1990s to define the boundaries of a number of ‘large marine ecosystems’ (LMEs) along the coasts of the continents, based on shared hydrography, bathymetry and productivity, generally on the

19 scale of 200,000 square kilometers or more (Sherman et al, 1993). Since that time some

49 LMEs have been defined around the world, supporting over 90 percent of the fish caught in the ocean (Sherman et al, 1993).

Marine ecosystems such as these are typically characterized by incredible complexity

(Walters and Martell, 2004), yet within them almost all life relies directly or indirectly on plants and therefore depends on the availability of plant nutrients (Pauly and

Christensen, 1995; King, 2007). Across marine ecosystems, a number of key factors help determine the availability of plant nutrients and the abundance of plants as a basis for animal populations in addition to the availability of sunlight, including: (i) winds

(and the surface currents created as they drag on the water); (ii) currents driven by the temperature differences between the equator and poles, by winds and by the rotation of the earth which deflects their course; (iii) upwelling currents that occur when surface water is swept away from the coast by the wind, and replaced by deeper water rising to the surface and rich in nutrients; and (iv) physical features such as the shape of the coastline and of the ocean bottom (Charles, 2001). Some of these ecosystems have been further grouped according to common physical features and nutrient productivity:

(i) estuaries that support large mollusk fisheries and serve as spawning/nursery

grounds for a wide range of commercially valuable fish and crustaceans;

(ii) coral reefs that support a wide diversity of fish and invertebrate species;

(iii) continental shelves that often support highly valuable bottom-dwelling fish

species;

20 (iv) continental slopes that in some cases support rockfish and hake species; and

(v) oceanic surface waters that support free swimming and schooling fish species

like herring and anchovy, and tuna (Charles, 2001).

The potential amount of animals available for harvesting depends on the productivity of a given ocean ecosystem and the trophic levels of the targeted species (King, 2007). In particular, absence of microscopic plants known as phytoplankton is a useful guide to the availability of a given ocean ecosystem to support animals such as fish (Charles,

2001).

Fished species. Despite the diversity of life within the ocean’s ecosystems, most of the fished species are members of just three large scientific groups:

(a) vertebrate classes that include fishes (over 25,000 living species, 60 percent of

which are marine), with internal bony skeletons and generally grouped into (i)

bottom-dwelling demersal species (e.g. over 500 species of flatfishes, spiny-

rayed fishes including reef-dwelling fishes such as groupers and snappers,

ocean perch, cod and hake, catfish etc.) and (ii) free-swimming schooling

pelagic species (e.g. herring and anchovy species that make up a majority of

fish catch, mackerel and tuna, salmon, sharks, etc.);

(b) the subphylum Crustacea (approximately 35,000 living species), invertebrates

with external skeletons, such as crabs, prawns, shrimps, lobsters, krill, etc.; and

21 (c) the phylum Mollusca (over 50,000 different living species), invertebrates with

external or internal shells, including bivalves such as oysters, mussels, scallops,

cockles and clams, cephalopods such as squids, cuttlefishes and octopuses, and

gastropods such as abalone, conch and escargot (King, 2007).

Additionally, species from the phylum Echinodermata are fished in many areas, including sea cucumbers and sea urchins for example (King, 2007). Charles (2001) maps these groups as follows:

Fished Species

Fish Shellfish Echinoderm s

Pelagic Demersal Crustacean Mollusks s

Herring Cod Decapods Gastropods Mackerel Flatfish Bivalves Sharks Ocean perch Cephalopods Salmon, etc. Catfish, etc. Others

Source: Charles, 2001

Figure 2. Groups of Fished Species of the Ocean

Consistent with fisheries literature, throughout this paper the term ‘fish’ will be used broadly, to include all of the fished species from the vertebrate classes, mollusks, crustaceans and echinoderms (Lackey, 2005).3

Common fishing methods. For millennia, humans have employed a growing variety of methods and technology to catch fish, from picking up sea cucumbers on a reef flat to scooping up large schools of free swimming fish with a purse seine net attached to an engine-powered fishing boat, generally determined by the bio-ecology of the targeted species, the economic returns and the social conditions (Roberts, 2007; Charles, 2001).

Despite their diversity, some of these hunting methods can be loosely categorized as follows:

 Gleaning, spears and traps: gathering or ‘gleaning’ of marine animals (such as

sea cucumbers and sea urchins) and algae from shallow and intertidal areas of

the ocean, use of devices to trap animals by encouraging their entry and

preventing escape (e.g. baited traps or pots for crustaceans, molluscs and fishes);

 Hooks and lines: hook and line gear over a wide range of configurations, from

hand-held lines with baited hooks to long-lines pulled behind a vessel (made up

of a mainline to which branch lines with baited hooks are attached at intervals)

3 For biological and ecological information on fished species by species, see for example FISHBASE and CEPHBASE databases with key facts by species (e.g. life history, growth parameter, spawning behavior, etc.) where scientific names are verified against Escheyer’s Catalogue of Fishes, created by the WorldFish Center together with FAO. www.fishbase.org.

23 at the surface or along the bottom, as well as pole and line with barbless,

unbaited hooks on short lines attached to poles to catch tunas for example;

 Stationary nets: nets passively left in the sea such as gill nets and trammel nets

held vertically in the water column by a series of floats attached to their upper

edge and weights attached to the lower edge, or very long gill nets that drift in

the open water; and

 Towed nets and dredges: trawls (one of the world’s most widely used fishing

methods) and dredges that are towed through the water by boats in order to sieve

out fish and invertebrates, both along the bottom or in the water column, and

purse seining where the net is set in a circle around a school of swimming fish

by first releasing one end attached to a buoy or skiff, and then releasing more of

the net as the boat moves around in a large circle until the two ends are brought

together and retrieved, and the purse wire that runs through the rings around the

lower weighted edge of the net is hauled to cinch the bottom closed (King, 2007).

Fisheries systems and science. The hunting and gathering activities described above, by a group of people in a particular place or for a particular type of marine animal or plant, is often broadly conceptualized by the term ‘fishery’ and studied as such. The United

Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines a fishery as a geographical place, activity, or unit that is involved in raising and/or harvesting fish (FAO Fisheries

Glossary). As a unit, a fishery is typically defined in terms of some or all of the following, people involved, species or type of fish, area of water or seabed, method of

24 fishing, class of boats and purpose of the activities (FAO Fisheries Glossary). Emerging in the last century as biologists increasingly studied the effects of fishing on units of species defined somewhat arbitrarily as a ‘fish stock’, the branch of science known as

‘fisheries science’ evolved over the 20th century to assess targeted fish stocks and predict the production levels under different fishing scenarios, among others (Pitcher and Hart,

1982). Fisheries science distinguishes between a ‘fish population’, studied in marine biology as a biological unit that includes a group of individuals belonging to the same species (King, 2007), and a ‘fish stock,’ defined by FAO as the living resources4 in the community or population from which catches are taken in a fishery (where the fish stock may be one or several species of fish, and also includes commercial invertebrates and plants) (FAO Fisheries Glossary). From the perspective of fisheries science, the definition of a fish stock in a fishery is essentially an operational matter, and may not be a well-defined biological entity (Gulland, 1983). For operational purposes, fisheries have been defined or classified in a number of ways over the years depending on the context, including by:

(i) type of ecosystem (e.g. estuarine, coastal, open ocean, etc.);

(ii) fishing method (e.g. purse seining, trawling, spearing, etc.);

(iii)type of access rules in force (e.g. open access, limited or purchased access, etc.);

(iv) fished species (e.g. salmon, shrimp, sharks, squid, etc.); and

4 The term ‘resource’ is defined as a ‘stock’ that generates a ‘flow’ of benefits for humans (Ostrom, 1990).

25 (v) fishing objective (e.g. commercial fishing for a product to sell, subsistence

fishing for direct consumption, or recreational fishing for sport and leisure);

among others (Lackey, 2005)

Of particular interest here is the last point, that fisheries can be classified at the highest level by the objective as commercial, subsistence or recreational. Much of the subsequent material will focus on fisheries that would be classified as commercial.

From an anthropocentric perspective, commercially harvested ocean fish stocks can be defined as a finite natural resource stock, which will produce a flow of benefits to people who use it, such as fish harvesters (Ostrom, 1990).

Ocean Ecosystem Harvest

Wholesale & Retail Ecological unit

Fishing Fleet(s) Europe Fish stock(s)  Fishers  Technology

 Methods North  Fishing Effort America

Source: adapted from Charles (2001)

Figure 3. Generic components of a simple commercial fishery

The above diagram aims to illustrate in the simplest form possible, a fish harvesting unit, or fishery, as defined by FAO (FAO Fisheries Glossary). However, in reality, the ecological unit is incredibly complex and could be analyzed in terms of diversity and interactions at the genetic level, the level of species, their assemblages, communities, habitats, broader landscapes, etc. (Kooiman et al., 2005); while the human (social) component of a fishery includes many others besides those who harvest the resource from its habitat, including for example the families and communities connected to the fish harvesters, the people and enterprises involved in providing supplies and services to the harvesters, and those who process, distribute, market and consume the fish caught in a commercial fishery (Orbach, 1980). With this in mind, a more complete diagram of a simple commercial fishery might be given as follows:

Ocean Ecosystem Harvest Processing Wholesale & Retail

Ecological unit Communities

Families Individuals, Distributors, Fishing Fleet(s) groups, groups, companies, companies Fish stock(s)  Fishers etc. who sell to  Technology (incl. transforming other suppliers and servicers) raw fish into retailers or  Methods the product final  Effort consumers

Source: Adapted from Charles (2001), drawing from Orbach (1980)

Figure 4. Generic components of a simple commercial fishery, including broader human components

27 While this diagram is a simplified depiction of a commercial fishery as a unit of analysis for studying the impacts of human interaction with ocean animals and the ecosystems they inhabit via the act of fishing, it is helpful to illustrate what is frequently stated by scientists who study fisheries: a fishery is a dynamic (i.e. has a propensity to change) system (Hilborn and Walters, 1992; Charles, 1995; Lackey, 2005; Kooiman et al., 2005;

Garcia and Charles, 2007). For reference, Merriam-Webster defines a system as a regularly interacting and interdependent group of items forming a unified whole

(Merriam-Webster). While simple, predictable, mechanistic systems were referred to as

‘clockworks’ by Boulding (1956), given the interaction of biophysical variables in a given ocean ecosystem that determines the size and abundance of a fish stock(s) that is targeted by a group of fishers and their methods, fishery systems are complex, imperfectly predictable, dissipative structures that could be referred to as ‘soft watches’ based on Salvador Dali’s allegory in a 1931 painting to indicate that things may not be as rigid as usually assumed (Garcia and Charles, 2007). In fact, a given fishery system is a plexus of subsystems, while also part of broader natural and human systems and is affected by the global environment, economy, and society within which it exists (Garcia and Charles, 2007).

The scientific study of outcomes from complex interactions (i.e. ‘systems thinking’) has been growing over the last few decades (Senge, 1992), and perhaps nowhere more than in the case of human interactions with the natural environment, such as the human act of fishing in the ocean (Berkes et al., 2003; Lui et al, 2007; Levin and Clark, 2010; Perry

28 et al., 2010; Ommer et al., 2011). Given the scope of this human-environment interaction in the ocean as well as on land, towards the end of the 20th century scientists increasingly cited the need to focus on interdisciplinary analysis of coupled social and ecological systems, as part of a ‘science of sustainability’ (Vitousek et al, 1997; Berkes et al., 2003; Levin and Clark, 2010). While a range of studies examined these interactions, the application of the principles and thinking of complex systems to them is relatively recent (organizing human-nature interactions into discernible sub-systems), and theoretical rather than empirical (Berkes et al., 2003; Lui et al, 2007). Among others, Berkes and Folke (1998) summarized the conceptual framework for studying such interactions, describing a dynamic interaction between people and other parts of ecosystems, with the changing human condition serving to both directly and indirectly change ecosystems and with changes in ecosystems causing changes in human well- being (while at the same time many other factors independent of the environment change the human condition, and many natural forces are influencing ecosystems). This coupling of social systems and natural systems as an interdependent, co-evolutionary

Socio-Ecological Systems (SES) framework, was featured in the Millennium

Ecosystem Assessment in 2005. The SES framework recognizes that such systems are characterized by complex dynamics and thresholds, with multiple scales and possible outcomes and inherent uncertainties (Hughes et al, 2005; Wilson, 2006). -As Ostrom

(2009) wrote, all human-used resources are embedded in complex, SESs composed of multiple sub-systems and internal characteristics (with specific variables) within these

29 sub-systems at multiple levels, “analogous to organisms composed of organs, organs of tissues, tissues of cells, cells of proteins, etc.”

The SES includes a human or social sub-system with various components, as well an ecological sub-system with biophysical components such as fish stocks within ocean ecosystems (Ommer et al., 2011). The SES conceptual framework essentially represents a fusion of natural and social sciences, through systems thinking (Hughes et al., 2005).

Such a conceptual framework is one lens for analyzing the social-ecological interaction of a fishery as a coupled system, and is considered as the most appropriate analytical unit for the study of fishing activity and the outcomes from this activity (Ommer et al.,

2011). In its application to the study of fisheries, the social-ecological interaction represented in a SES framework might be simplified from the above as follows:

Nested Nested Ecosystems Social Systems

Source: Re-drawn from Ommer et al. (2011)

Figure 5. Simplified Socio-Ecological System

The above simplified representation of a socio-ecological system essentially represents the simplified ocean fishery system depicted in Figures 3 and 4, again suggesting the

SES framework as a lens for analysis of these systems (see Figure 6 below).

Consumer Sub-System Consumer preferences

Fishing Effort Wholesale & Retail Sub-System Ecological Unit Distributors, groups, companies

Fish stock(s) Processing Sub-System Individuals, groups, companies

Yield Harvest Sub-System Fishing Fleets, Families, Communities

Ecological System Social System

Figure 6. Simplified Ocean Fishery Socio-Ecological System (SES)

The above simplified diagram shows an ocean fishery SES consisting of nested ecological (biophysical) and social (human) sub-systems, integrated by two-way feedbacks. The diagram again illustrates that an ocean fishery system is not purely a biophysical system isolated from human influence, nor is it a purely social system that functions independently of the ecosystems that provide resources that humans need – essentially any delineation between the social and ecological systems is an artificial

31 arbitrage (Ommer et al., 2011). Such SESs will be used to represent ocean fisheries as the unit of analysis throughout this paper.

Box 1. Summary of key concepts linked in section 2.1

 Ocean environment (studied by the field of oceanography): Describes the vast, body of water connecting smaller ocean basins and seas into one, inter-connected and three- dimensional environment covering 71 percent of the planet’s surface.  Ocean life within this environment (studied by the field of marine biology): 1 to 1.4 million species of life supported by this environment.  Ocean units for analyzing the interaction between the environment and life it supports (studied by the field of marine ecology): as a subset of marine biology, definition of functional, self-contained units within the global ocean for analysis. Common units of analysis include estuaries, coral reefs, continental shelves, continental slopes and oceanic surface waters.  Fished species within marine ecosystems: of the vast diversity of marine life within the ocean environment, humans hunt primarily three broad scientific categories of animals for food (i.e. fishing): mollusks, crustaceans, and vertebrate classes that include fishes. Common methods of this fishing include the use of traps, spears and gleaning; hooks and lines; stationary nets; and towed nets and dredges.  As a unit of analysis, a fishery is defined as a geographical place, activity, or unit that is involved in raising and/or harvesting fish. The focus of this research is on commercial fisheries, where fishing takes place for the purposes of generating a product to sell.  A fishery is best analyzed as a system, where human and ecological systems are coupled, such as through the Socio-Ecological System (SES) framework.  The human component of this system includes not just fishers and fishing fleets, but also their families and communities, and the processors, distributors, wholesalers, retailers and consumers.

2.2 Major Actors: the Diversity of Fisheries Systems that have Developed throughout the Ocean

Founded in 1943 at a meeting of 44 governments in Virginia as a permanent international organization for food and agriculture, FAO compiles and analyzes statistics globally on ocean fisheries systems and the volumes of fish they produce

(FAO, 2015a). All countries complete standardized questionnaires each year on ocean

32 fishery systems under their jurisdiction or in which fishing vessels registered in their state participate, and submit to FAO for compilation (FAO, 1990 – 2015). As such, each national fishery statistical program around the world functions as a component of an international dataset maintained at FAO (FAO, 1990 – 2015). From this dataset,

FAO calculates global fish production from the ocean (maintained in a database with production volumes from 1950 to 2013, named Fishstat), as well as the volume produced from various fishery systems and the origin of harvesters (as well as the location of harvesting) (FAO, 1990 – 2015). This database is the only global and publicly available data set on fish catch reported when vessels offload (i.e. ‘fishery landings’), containing information on 1,640 statistical taxonomic categories corresponding to the species, genus, family or higher taxonomic level (Garcia, 2009).

Aggregating statistics of the locations, timing and volumes of fish caught as well as the identity of the harvester, is not without challenges. Since 1954 FAO has agreed that fish catches would be recorded by the country where they are landed, and assigned to the country of the flag flown by the fishing vessel, or if not flying a flag, the country in which the vessel is registered (FAO, 1990 – 2015). The challenges that stem from organizing fish catch data by the flag states of fishing vessels and the location where they are landed, are that they do not necessarily reflect the catch levels from a given ecosystem, as a vessel may catch fish and then transfer it to another vessel, or catch and discard some fish that are never recorded upon landing, or catch fish in one ecosystem but then travel to a distant port to offload it (and hence be recorded as catch landed in

33 one country, even though the species may have been harvested from a completely different ecosystem), or some vessels may fly ‘flags of convenience’ that are issued by a country as a third party but indicate little of the origin of the vessel and its owner

(FAO, 1990 – 2015). These reporting parameters were established long before countries’ jurisdiction over the ocean extended to 200 nautical miles from the coastline, so countries’ reports on landings from vessels flying their flag do not distinguish where the fish was caught, but rather report the origin of the catch landed with reference to the

FAO Major Fishing Area (Garcia, 2009).

Location of commercial ocean harvests in 2012. For statistical purposes, FAO has drawn 19 ‘major fishing areas’ in the ocean as arbitrary areas (not based on ecological boundaries) where catch data is aggregated, indicating the location of the harvests

(FAO, 2014). Essentially, countries reported the fish catch offloaded or ‘landed’ at their ports, according the flag state of the vessel landing the catch. While this provides an aggregate proxy indicator for the ecosystem where the catch was harvested, it does not provide information at the level of ecosystem or even country (Garcia, 2009).

Ocean species caught commercially in 2012. For the most recent year in which data is available, 2012, FAO’s database shows a total of 79.7 million tons of fish caught commercially in the ocean, from almost 1,600 species (FAO, 2014). Of these 1,600 species, 23 alone represented some 40% of the catch (FAO, 2014). The top species and species groups FAO records as caught in 2012 are as follows:

34 Table 1. Top species and species groups recorded by FAO as caught commercially in 2012 (44% of total)

Species/species group (common Total 2012 Ocean Catch (million names) tons) Tuna and tuna-like species 7.0 Small pelagic species (anchovy, 16.3 herring, sardine, mackerel) o Peruvian anchoveta o 4.7 o Sardinella species o 3.3 o Atlantic herring o 1.9 o Chub mackerel o 1.6 o Japanese anchovy o 1.3 o European pilchard (sardine) o 1.0 o Atlantic mackerel o 0.9 o Gulf menhaden o 0.6 o European anchovy o 0.5 o Chilean jack mackerel o 0.5 o California pilchard o 0.4 Cephalopod species 4.0 Shrimp species 3.4 Alaska pollock 3.3 Atlantic cod 1.1 Total 35.1 million tons (44% of the total) Source: FAO (2014)

An important supplement to the above data, is the estimated 7.3 million tons of fish caught from ocean ecosystems each year but discarded at sea and hence never landed

(World Bank and FAO, 2009). Additionally, by definition fish caught illegally, or in unregulated ecosystems or simply unreported (IUU) are not captured in FAO’s data set, but have nonetheless been estimated very broadly as another 11 to 26 million tons per year (Agnew et al., 2009).

Origin of harvesting fleets in 2012. According to FAO (2014), 3.2 million fishing vessels operated in the ocean in 2012, 70% of which were motorized (and an estimated

35 64,000 of which were considered as ‘industrialized’ vessels longer than 24 meters, many of which originated from Europe, North America and the Pacific). Vessels registered to

18 countries harvested 76% of the species caught commercially that year, with 11 of the countries in Asia (FAO, 2014). FAO and World Bank (2009) cite gross revenues of the fish products harvested by these fleets on the order of $72 billion per year, with another

$140 billion in revenues from the post-harvest economy. Similarly, FAO (2012a) cites annual gross revenues of the first sale of fish landed from both ocean fishery systems and inland fishery systems on the order of $98.5 billion in 2010. Essentially, these fleets, and the ocean fishery systems in which they operate, support a significant seafood industry.

Destination of ocean fish products (markets). With over 1/3rd of total production exported, fish is one of the most traded food commodities worldwide, and fishery systems often span multiple countries, where fish is caught in the waters of one country, processed in a second and consumed in a third (World Bank & FAO, 2009; FAO, 2014).

Catch data for ocean fishery systems generally provides more detail in terms of species than fish consumption or trade data (World Bank, 2013). Overall, since FAO first began collecting fish trade statistics in 1976, the trend in ocean fishery systems has been for developing countries to produce high value fish products for export to developing countries, particularly as membership in the World Trade Organization has grown

(FAO, 2014). When inland fishery systems are aggregated with ocean fishery systems, some 80% of all fish produced is consumed by people as food (World Bank, 2013).

Table 2. Net producers and consumers of fish products in 2012*

Net Importers Net Exporters 1. European Union (23% of world fish imports Developing countries overall (54% of by value – almost $25 billion) world fish exports by value, over 60% by 2. United States (60% of fish supply is from quantity (live weight – with a trade imports) surplus, i.e. exports minus imports, of $35 3. Japan (54% of fish supply is from imports) billion) 4. China (consumes 34% of global food fish Asian developing countries supply) Africa Latin American and Caribbean countries * Imports and exports aggregated for all fish products, produced from ocean fishery systems and freshwater fishery systems, as well as aquaculture; Sources: FAO (2014); World Bank (2013)

Most high-value species are generally traded towards developed markets, while lower value species such as small pelagic species are traded in large quantities towards developing countries (FAO, 2014).

14 50

3 8

shrimp and prawns salmon (largely due to aquaculture) groundfish (e.g. cod, hake and pollock) tuna cephalopods other

Source: FAO (2014)

Figure 7. Percentage of total fish products by value in 2012

37 Additional efforts to measure ocean fisheries production. Given the challenges mentioned previously with FAO’s measurement of ocean fisheries production by flag state of the harvesting vessel and not the ecosystem where the catch is taken, experts at the University of British Columbia (UBC) have tried to determine the spatial distribution of ocean fishery production statistics by taking the ‘fish landings’ data reported to FAO as the foundation and supplementing or substituting it with data from regional organizations, national data sets, foreign fishing agreements, spatial distribution of species, and estimates from literature and other data sources (Watson et al., 2004). These estimates also try to correct for underestimates of catch due to lack of information on unreported ‘fish landings’, fish discarded at sea in specific fishery systems and hence never recorded at landing sites, and in some cases estimates of fish killed by ‘ghost’ fishing gear left in the ocean (e.g. drifting nets) or caught illegally

(Watson et al., 2004). This effort by UBC, as part of their ‘Sea Around Us’ project, resulted in a harmonized data set of ocean fish catches from specific areas of the ocean

(for example from countries’ national waters, or from large marine ecosystems), rather than the amounts landed in a given country and reported as such in national or FAO statistics (Watson et al., 2004).

Social benefits of ocean fisheries systems. Ocean fisheries systems provide food, livelihoods, economic growth, cultural and spiritual benefits to millions around the world (FAO, 2015b). Most of the protein in the world’s food supply is derived from either grain or animal sources, each of which provides roughly half the supply (Garcia,

38 2009). In 2010, products from ocean and inland fishery systems and aquaculture accounted for 16.7% of the global population’s intake of protein from animal sources and 6.5% of all protein consumed, providing an important and high quality source of amino acids (FAO, 2014). According to FAO (2014), fish contributes, or exceeds, 50% of total animal protein intake in some small island developing States, as well as in

Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka.

Fish provided 4.3 billion people with at least 15% of their intake of animal protein and more than 2.9 billion people with almost 20%, and an estimated 1.3 billion people with at least 25% of their intake of animal protein (estimated based on the fact that over 1.3 billion people live in countries where the level of animal protein consumption from fish exceeds 25%) (FAO, 2014; Waite et al., 2014). In terms of nutrition, a portion of 150 g of fish can provide about 50–60% of an adult’s daily protein requirements (FAO, 2014).

FAO (2012a, 2014) estimates that overall, fisheries and aquaculture assures the livelihoods of 10 to 12% of the world’s population (harvesting, processing, trade and marketing as well as in many ancillary services) or 600 to 850 million people, and more than 90% of those employed in these sectors live in developing countries.

The diversity of ocean fishery systems. While likely obvious from the above sections, ocean fishery systems are not monolithic, but are as diverse as the different types of ecosystems and fish stocks that support them (Kooiman et al., 2005). This diversity is a key feature of ocean fishery systems and should not be forgotten as products and outcomes from these systems are aggregated.

Box 2. Summary of Major Actors described in section 2.2

 FAO surveys national agencies to form the official international data set on production from ocean fishery systems, though the data is recorded by flag state of the harvesting vessel, not the ecosystem where the fish was caught.  This database includes some 1,600 fished species, though in 2012 only 23 species constituted some 40% of the 79.7 million tons harvested from the ocean (essentially tuna and tuna-like species, small pelagic species, shrimps, cephalopods, Pollock and cod).  Of the 3.2 million fishing vessels operating in 2012, China’s fleet was the largest producer, followed by Indonesia and the United States. The general trend is for high-value fish caught in the waters of developing countries to be exported to developed country markets or other developing countries, but not the reverse.  The social benefits of ocean fishery systems are significant, and combined with inland fishery systems provide 16.5% of the world population’s animal protein intake, and an estimated 10 to 12% of livelihoods.  The ocean fishery systems that provide these benefits are incredibly diverse, depending upon the coupling of specific ecological and social contexts.

2.3 Description of the Problem: the Current Status of many Ocean Fisheries Systems as Overfished

Returning to the simplified representation in Figure 6 of ocean fishery systems as coupled socio-ecological systems, it becomes readily apparent that assessments of the status or contribution of these systems by a range of different measures quickly becomes complex.

Consumer Sub-System Consumer preferences Fishing Effort Wholesale & Retail Sub-System Ecological Unit Distributors, groups, companies

Fish stock(s) Processing Sub-System Individuals, groups, companies Yield Harvest Sub-System Fishing Fleets, Families, Communities

Ecological System Social System

40 Traditionally scientists have studied the biological status of the fish stocks that provide a flow of benefits through the system, and in more recent decades expanding to consider the wider ecological units, as well as the social systems utilizing these natural resources

(Ommer et al., 2011). Such assessments of ocean fishery systems generally describe these three components of the system: (i) biological status of the fish stock(s), (ii) ecological status of the biophysical system, and (iii) economic status of the social system. This section briefly summarizes some of the current assessments of the status of these three components of ocean fishery systems, according to available data and indicators.

9.9 28.8

61.3

Over-fished Fully-fished Under-fished

Source: Ye and Cochrane, 2011; FAO, 2014

Figure 8. FAO status of ocean fish stocks in 2011

Biological status of the fish stocks supporting ocean fishery systems. FAO began to undertake periodic assessments of the fish stocks supporting a sample of commercial ocean fishery systems in 1973 in preparation for the United Nations Convention on the

41 Law of the Sea, and at the request of the global Committee on Fisheries (COFI), a subsidiary body of the FAO Council, updated the assessment for future meetings (as updates between 1974 and 1992, stand-alone reports until 1997, and subsequently as part of the State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture reports) (Ye and Cochrane, 2011).

Using a database compiling the results of ocean fish stock assessments of 234 stocks of

124 species (20% of the global catch), in 2011 FAO adopted a spectrum of methods to extend the coverage to 70% of the global catch – leaving the stocks supporting some

30% of global fish catch unassessed (Branch et al., 2011). On this basis, FAO classified the assessed stocks as either:

1.Non fully-exploited (9.9% of fish stocks);

2.Fully exploited: the abundance of fish in the stock, i.e. the biomass5, falls within a

set band around the level that could support a maximum sustainable harvest (61.3%

of fish stocks); or

3.Over-exploited: harvests or yields are lower than the biological and ecological

potential (28.8% of fish stocks) (Ye and Cochrane, 2011; FAO 2014).

Most of the ten most productive species that accounted for some 24% of ocean fish catches in 2011 are considered as biologically fully fished, while some are considered biologically overfished (FAO, 2014). Demersal (i.e. bottom-dwelling) species are often

5 Biomass is defined here as the aggregate weight of all of the individuals in the fish stock, used to measure the size of the stock.

42 larger and longer-lived and have been particularly overfished, with some 38% of assessed demersal stocks considered overfished, compared to 20% for pelagic species

(Ye and Cochrane, 2011). Of the top ten demersal species by production volume, some

43% were considered overfished, with production in 2009 only 51% of their peak level

(as an indication of the scale of production lost due to biological overfishing) (Ye and

Cochrane, 2011). Overall, the trend in catches has been declining since 1996 (although with large fluctuations) (FAO, 2014).

As FAO’s dataset has indicated, detailed assessments of the abundance or biomass of ocean fish stocks are expensive and in many cases unavailable (Kleisner et al., 2013).

To fill information gaps or supplement stock assessments summarized by FAO, a number of additional assessments have taken place in recent years, often based on extrapolations from trends in fish catch, and notably trends in the size of species caught and the relative ease with which they are caught (e.g. the catch per unit of fishing activity) (Kleisner et al., 2013). Perhaps most famously, in 2006 Worm et al. correlated the species richness of a number of large marine ecosystems with fisheries collapsed

(defined as an annual harvest less than 10 percent of the maximum recorded harvest), and found 27 percent of the world’s fisheries as collapsed in 2003 (and noted also that fishery systems in more biodiverse regions were less likely to be experience collapse at a given point in time). The authors extrapolated the trend into the future, and calculated that if the current rate of collapse in fish stocks remained constant, all ocean fishery systems would be collapsed by 2048 (Worm et al., 2006). This report was heavily

43 debated and a number experts emphasized that assessments based on trends in fish catch and landings can misrepresent the status of stocks in some cases where high catch rates reflect the distribution of stocks more than their abundance (Hilborn, 2010; CEA, 2012).

In 2009 Worm et al. revisited the work and published results from models of 10 large marine ecosystems where fish stock assessments were also available, a review of published ocean fish stock assessments from around the world, and research trawl surveys. For the 10 large marine ecosystems modeled, many of the stocks showed declines in abundance, though in some cases this trend had been slowed or reversed with regulations to reduce fishing – notably in the Iceland, Newfoundland-Labrador, the

Northeast U.S. Shelf, the Southeast Australian Shelf and the California Current ecosystems (Worm et al., 2009). The effort reviewed 166 ocean fish stocks worldwide and found that for almost two-thirds, the biomass of the stock had declined below levels that could sustain maximum harvests, and for about half of these fishing pressure continued at levels that would further the decline (Worm et al., 2009). Notably, the authors concluded that most stocks had the potential to recover to previous abundance levels with reductions in fishing pressure (Worm et al., 2009). For the research trawl surveys, which gave a picture of wider communities of fish species than single-stock assessments, the few that documented changes as far back as the beginning of large- scale industrialization of fishing in the 1950s showed a rapid decline in abundance within the first 15 to 20 years of such fishing, and then a stabilization (Worm et al.,

44 2009). Across all of the trawl surveys, a 32% decline in total biomass of species was documented (Worm et al., 2009).

At the same time, in an effort to develop an indicator of ocean fishery status at the country level, a number of experts have developed ‘stock-status plots’ in different forms based on FAO’s data set of fish landings and in some cases supplemented by biological characteristics of species (Kleisner et al., 2013). The effort was motivated by a conviction that FAO’s valuable efforts to monitor ocean fishery systems did not provide information at the ecosystem scale and fishery system scale (Garcia, 2009). Garcia and

Grainger (1996) analyzed landings of 200 major commercial fish stocks over multiple decades, classifying different phases of development in ocean fishery systems based on changes in growth rates in fish landings, and suggested that the proportion of global fisheries considered as ‘senescent’ was growing over the last 50 years.

Building further on this hypothesis that the long term trends in landing statistics reflect the development of the fishery system, Garcia (2009) classified five stages in the development of ocean fishery systems: (i) undeveloped, (ii) developing, (iii) mature,

(iv) senescent and (v) recovering, and classified a majority of the world’s ocean fishery systems as ‘senescent’ based on declining rates of growth in landings. At world level, the analysis showed that the level of average maximum landings of “Bottom Fishes” that could be produced under the prevailing conditions was being reached in 2009, while the landings of “Small Pelagic Fishes” was likely reached a decade earlier, and the

45 landings of “Other Marine Fishes” were also levelling off, while those of crustaceans and cephalopods were still growing (Garcia, 2009).

While the Worm et al (2009) summary relied heavily on existing assessments of a number of ocean fish stocks supporting fishery systems around the world, and in fact global seafood production is generated from a small number of large ocean fishery systems, in 2012 Costello et al. attempted to predict the status of a number of smaller, unassessed systems throughout the ocean. The team developed a regression approach to predict stock status for unassessed and often smaller fishery systems, building on

FAO datasets of landings from these fisheries, combined with their biological characteristics (Costello et al, 2012). This tool was applied to 1,793 unassessed ocean fishery systems, equivalent to 23% of fish landed from the ocean, and found that 64% had a fish stock size or biomass lower than capable of sustaining maximum harvest levels (analogous to the FAO definition of ‘fully fished’), and another 18% were low enough to be considered ‘collapsed’ or ‘over-fished’ (Costello et al., 2012). On average,

Costello et al. (2012) projected fish stock sizes lower than the average of assessed stocks in 2009, noting that small pelagic species such as herrings and sardines had relatively higher stock sizes than slower-growing and larger fishes. Lastly, Kleisner et al (2013) revisited Grainger and Garcia’s 1996 work based on trends in landing of catch, and refined and extended the estimates of stock status, finding a growing proportion of stocks considered as ‘collapsed’, as well as ‘overexploited’.

46 In summary, given the limitations of data, the biological status of the fish stocks underpinning ocean fishery systems has been the subject of a lively debate – essentially reflecting differences in methodology between reliance on data-rich stock assessments that are relatively expensive and limited to mostly developed-world fisheries, and extrapolations from more widely available data on historical trends in fish catch (CEA,

2012).

Ecological status of ocean fishery systems. As mentioned previously, the characteristics of ocean ecosystems determine the abundance and distribution of commercially targeted fish stocks, e.g. primary production, diversity of species, etc. (Pauly and Christensen,

1995). Within the complex SES framework of ocean fishery systems, ecosystems both determine the abundance and distribution of fish stocks, but are also affected by fishing activities on those stocks, often through reductions in the diversity of animal species present (e.g. through unintended ‘by-catch’ of additional species to those targeted, or impacts on species through predator-prey interactions affected by fishing) or changes to the structure of the system (e.g. through bottom-trawling operations that change the sea floor) (Murawski, 2000). There is generally no ‘optimum’ level of fishing activity in relation to an ecosystem, nor metric for global assessment (Hilborn, 2012). However, as Worm et al. (2009) found in models of 10 large marine ecosystems, fishing can have significant ecosystem-wide impacts through reductions in abundance of a range of species throughout the system.

47 At the same time, although not caused directly by fishing activity, ocean fish stocks and fishery systems can be affected by changes to human-driven changes to ecological attributes within a given system, notably significant changes in water quality and modification of habitats in recent decades such as:

(i) run-off of excess nitrogen in fertilizers for agriculture systems into rivers

and streams and eventually coastal waters, combined with other nutrients

introduced such as untreated sewage, resulting in algal blooms that consume

most of the oxygen so that most ocean life is unable to survive – i.e. ‘dead

zones’ – covering some 95,000 square miles of the ocean worldwide (Diaz

and Rosenberg, 2008);

(ii) loss of mangroves, often by from coastal urbanization, as an estimated 35%

of mangrove forests were lost or converted in the last several decades of the

20th century in countries where sufficient data exist (roughly half of the

global area) (MEA, 2005); and

(iii) loss of coral reefs, some 20% of which were destroyed globally over the last

several decades of the 20th century, with another 20% classified as

‘degraded’ (MEA, 2005).

Economic status of the world’s ocean fishery systems. Systematic assessments of the global costs and benefits to society of the world’s ocean fishery systems have not been undertaken with the structure and frequency of FAO’s biological assessments, but nonetheless indications began in in 1992 when FAO estimated the aggregate operating

48 deficit incurred by the world’s fishing fleets to be on the order of $54 billion per year in

1989 (World Bank and FAO, 2009). Subsequently in 1997 Garcia and Newton estimated that the world’s fishing capacity6 would need to be reduced by 25% for revenues to cover operating costs and by 53% for revenues to cover total costs. By

2003, Hilborn et al. (2003) wrote that many of the world’s ocean fisheries were characterized by economic overfishing. In 2009 the World Bank and FAO combined the world’s ocean fishery systems into one hypothetical and aggregate global fishery

(based on a single, global fish stock) for purposes of analysis, and compared current global profits (in the base year of 2004) to potential profits at the optimum level of fishing activity and catch considered possible by a constructed model, given both ecological and technological characteristics (i.e. parameters) of the systems. According to World Bank and FAO (2009), the world’s fishing fleet was unprofitable in 2004 by some $5 billion, and the difference between current and total estimated potential profitability of the world’s ocean fishery systems was some $50 billion per year – showing a net loss to society. Based on this loss, the real cumulative global loss of wealth from 1974 to 2004 was estimated at $2.2 trillion (World Bank and FAO, 2009;

Munro, 2010). The analysis suggested that to eventually recapture these lost profits – the ‘sunken billions’ – global ocean fishing effort would need to be reduced by 44 to

54%, leading fish biomass levels in the ocean to more than double at a minimum

6 Fishing capacity is the amount of fishing effort that can be produced in a given time by a fishing vessel or fleet under full utilization for a given fishery resource condition (FAO, 2000). Fishing effort is how much fishing actually takes place, given as Fishing Effort (E) = (number of vessels) x (catching power) x (intensity) x (days at sea) (Anderson and Seijo, 2010).

49 compared to the 2004 estimate, but also requiring a reduction in fish catch on the order of 4 million tons per year (World Bank and FAO, 2009).

Conclusion on the status of ocean fishery systems: significant levels of ‘overfishing’, by just about every definition. There is general scientific consensus that fishing activity is the single biggest determinant of the biological status of ocean fish stocks, rather than fluctuations in ecological characteristics (MEA, 2005; CEA, 2012). For the world’s ocean fish stocks that FAO has assessed since the 1950s, currently some 29% are considered as biologically ‘overfished’, where the stock abundance is less than 40% of the biomass that would be present in the absence of fishing (Ye et al., 2011; FAO, 2014).

Additionally, though not quantified in a metric as clear as biomass levels of fish stocks, entire ecosystems can be considered as ‘overfished’ as well, when cumulative impacts of fish catches (landings plus discards), non-harvest mortality, and habitat degradation result in one or more of the following conditions:

 biomasses of one or more important stocks fall below minimum biologically

acceptable limits;

 diversity of communities or populations declines significantly as a result of

fishing pressure applied sequentially to different stocks within the ecosystem,

selective harvesting of stocks within the ecosystem or other factors associated

with harvest rates or species selection;

50  the pattern of species selection and harvest rates leads to greater year-to-year

variation in populations or catches than would result from lower cumulative

harvest rates;

 changes in the composition of animal species in an ecosystem or population

demographics as a result of fishing significantly decrease the resilience of the

ecosystem to perturbations arising from non-biological factors;

 the pattern of harvest rates among interacting species results in lower cumulative

net economic or social benefits than would result from a less intense overall

fishing pattern or alternative species selection; or

 harvests of prey species or direct mortalities resulting from fishing operations

impair the long-term viability of species important to the specific ecosystem but

perhaps not targeted directly for human use (e.g. marine mammals, seabirds,

turtles, etc.) (Murawski, 2000).

Additionally, economic overfishing occurs when an ocean fishery system generates lower aggregate economic benefits than the potential, often due to more capital investment (e.g. fishing vessels, gear, etc.) than would be necessary to maximize the difference between aggregate revenues and costs from the harvesting component of the system (Anderson and Seijo, 2010). By this definition, the world’s ocean fishery systems in aggregate are overfished, with the difference between potential sustainable annual profits and current levels on the order of $50 billion per year (World Bank and

51 Box 3. Summary of the extent of the overfishing problem from section 2.3

Biological overfishing of the world’s commercial ocean fishery systems:  According to FAO, almost 29% of assessed ocean fish stocks that support commercial fishery systems have an abundance that has been reduced below 40% of what it would be in the absence of fishing – defined by FAO as biologically overfished.  Given constraints in the international data set available to FAO and the incomplete coverage of more detailed stock assessments, a number of experts have used different methods to try to fill knowledge gaps and estimate a fuller picture of the biological status of the ocean fish stocks supporting fishery systems. There have been methodological differences among them, but generally these additional assessments paint a similar picture or one of greater biological overfishing.

Ecological overfishing of the world’s commercial ocean fishery systems:  Ecological overfishing refers to a range of impacts of fishing activities on the broader ecosystems that support the fishery. In lieu of a definitive assessment of the ecological impacts of ocean fishing at the global scale, assessments such as conducted by Worm et al. (2009) indicate patterns of both ecological overfishing, and recovery where fishing activity has been reduced, in a number of large marine ecosystems.

Economic overfishing of the world’s commercial ocean fishery systems:  Economic overfishing refers to a fishery system where aggregate fishing activity exceeds the level where total profits would be maximized.  Experts have suggested since the 1990s that the world’s ocean fishery systems in aggregate were economically overfished, and in 2009 the World Bank and FAO estimated that this was indeed the case, to the extent of $50 billion per year in foregone profits.

In sum, there are a range of assessments that suggest a significant portion of the world’s ocean fishery systems have heavily reduced the abundance of fish stocks, with impacts on the wider ecosystems, and at a global economic cost of some $50 billion per year. Overfishing is occurring at a global scale, with adverse impacts on both natural and human systems.

FAO, 2009). Ideally, global solutions would be possible, but as mentioned previously ocean fishery systems are far too heterogenous, such that individual systems are often defined at sub-national, national or regional geographies (Charles, 2001). For this reason, solutions need to be defined at the local and regional level based on the specific

52 characteristics of the targeted systems, and then aggregated in order to constitute a global solution.

2.4 Historical Development of the Problem: the Increase in Overfishing in the Ocean since the 1950s

Initial growth in modern ocean fishery systems. Erlich and Holdren (1971) stated an equation I = PAT, to illustrate that human impacts on ecosystems (I) depends upon population (P), affluence (A) and technology (T). Certainly exponential growth in all three variables over the twentieth century and particularly since World War Two has driven major development of ocean fishery systems and accompanying changes in the ecosystems that underpin them, and eventually overfishing in some instances.

Numerous historical texts have been written about the development of ocean fishery systems (e.g. Roberts, 2007) for which there is not space to synthesize here, but rather to give a very brief overview to inform the subsequent analysis. Lackey (2005) provides a coherent summary that describes the role of fishing in human society for thousands of years (archeological records of fish spears date 90,000 years before present, and nets some 40,000 years ago. According to Lackey (2005), commercial fishing moved to a larger scale in the middle ages with the development of better fish preservation techniques (e.g. drying, smoking and salting), and boat design and constructed advanced as well, and eventually canning. Cod fishing off eastern North America famously began in earnest in the early 1500s, with whaling following suit in the 1600s (Lackey, 2005).

Fishing began to industrialize in the 1800s with the advent of steam-powered ships,

53 mechanized fishing techniques and refrigeration, and by the turn of the century a steady expansion of fishing activity around the globe began (Lackey, 2005). In 1850 global fish production is estimated to have been on the order of 2 million tons (WHAT, 2000).

By the end of World War Two (WW2) in 1945, this production level had increased to roughly 14 million tons, with most fish stocks considered as biologically healthy (owing in no small part to a near moratorium imposed by WW2) (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2007).

Post-World War Two boom in fishing activity and capacity. In the 1950s a post-war boom in ship-building expanded the global fleet several times over, increasingly diesel- powered and equipped with newly commercialized communication and navigation technologies developed during the war such as radar and acoustic fish finders (Wang,

1992; Lackey, 2005; FAO, 2014), and driven in no small part by centrally-planned economies aiming to capture protein to meet dietary goals for their citizens (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2007). The global fishing fleet continued to grow in the 1960s, and the end of the decade vessels from Soviet bloc countries like Poland, together with vessels from

Asian coastal nations such as Japan, China, the Philippines and Thailand, came to dominate production from ocean fishery systems (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2007). This period of the 1950s and 1960s also saw the development of the ‘factory freezer trawlers’

– vessels that could catch large volumes of fish in all types of weather and conditions, process the catch on board, freeze it into blocks and then store the processed raw product until return to port, a trip that often took months (Wang, 1992; Sanchirico and Wilen,

2007).

Limits to the ocean’s fish stocks to support this activity begin to show, even as the global fleet continues to expand. It was generally accepted by the late 1970s that a large fraction of the world’s most important ocean fishery systems were significantly overfished, both biologically and economically (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2007). The expansion in fishing capacity would continue if even at a slower rate, and in 1995 Garcia and Newton estimated that global fishing power increased 270% between 1965 and

1995, essentially with a 9% annual growth rate. The economic returns to this expansion diminished with declines in the ocean’s fish stocks. For example, although employment in both ocean and inland fishery systems grew faster than the rate of population growth, the average reported harvest per fisher declined from more than 5 tons annually in 1970 to only 3.1 tons in 2000 (World Bank and FAO, 2009). This aggregate global decline in harvest per fisher occurred despite continued advancements in fishing technology throughout this period, such as large-scale motorization of small-scale fishing fleets, expansion of trawling and purse seine fishing, improved fish-finding and navigation equipment, and greater tools of communication (World Bank and FAO, 2009).

In summary, the World Bank and FAO report in 2009 notes that global trends in declining fish stocks corresponding to increasing fishing pressure from growing fleets with greater catching capacity, yielded no growth in labor productivity during this period from 1970 to 2000, despite significant capital investment. FAO’s global assessments of ocean fishery systems follow this trend, with one of the first assessments

55 estimating 10% of the fisheries as biologically overfished, moving upwards to the most recent assessment of 28% (Ye et al., 2011). This trend in the growth of the global fishing fleet and fishing capacity active in the ocean has increased steadily over recent decades, even as global harvesting productivity declined on average by a factor of six (World

Bank and FAO, 2009).

The limits to global ocean fishery production are reached and overfishing becomes more prevalent. Thinking back to Erlich and Holdren’s equation (1971), these trends in fishing activity and their dramatic impact on ocean ecosystems should not have been a surprise. During this same time, the planet saw a rapid growth in population (growing

4.6-fold between 1850 and 2000) and thus demand for food fish relative to supply

(reflected in growing consumption rates from 7 kg per capita in 1950 to almost 16 kg per capita in the 1990s (WHAT, 2000; World Bank and FAO, 2009), together with a

20-fold increase in the global economy and nations’ buying power (MEA, 2005). The end result of this confluence of population growth, increasing affluence and newly- commercialized fishing technology was that the global fish catch expanded roughly 6% per year between 1945 and 1970, rising from some 14 million tons to 60 million tons, and then continued to rise until hitting a peak of 87.7 million tons in 1996, and modestly declining ever since (FAO, 2014).

The global trend in production from ocean fishery systems corresponds fairly well to

Garcia and Grainger’s (1996) estimate of a sustainable global maximum yield from the

56 ocean on the order of 100 million tons per year. As Garcia (2005) noted, there is widespread agreement that given the likely additional amount of fish caught but discarded at sea, the volume of fish caught illegally or unreported, and other shortcomings in the data on officially declared landings of catch, the estimated potential maximum yield the ocean can sustain was reached as early as the 1970s – and unlikely to change in the next 20 to 30 years (i.e. from 2005 to 2025 or 2035).

Where ocean fishery production limits have been reached, and overfishing is greatest.

Historically, ocean fishery production peaked first in the temperate waters of developed countries that early to industrialize, such those bordering the Northwest Atlantic (i.e.

Europe) in the 1960s, and subsequently those around the Northeast and Southeast

Atlantic in the mid-1970s – notably in North America (Srinivasan et al., 2010; Ye and

Cochrane, 2011). At the same time, many of these countries have been the first to reduce fishing activity via regulation and reverse this trend, such that stocks have started to rebuild – notably in the Iceland, Newfoundland-Labrador, the Northeast U.S. Shelf, the

Southeast Australian Shelf and the California Current ecosystems (Worm et al., 2009).

However, it is in the more recently developed fisheries of the tropics (i.e. the parallel of latitude 23°26ʹ north of the equator and south of the equator), where both fishing pressure and overfishing are growing, in a unique nexus with poverty (CEA, 2012). In these tropical latitudes the greatest diversity of fish species is generally found, meaning that the ocean fishery systems they support are even more complex than the temperate- water fishery systems predominantly based on single species (King, 2007). Overfishing

57 in these waters has occurred and even accelerated more recently, for example in Asian

waters in the 1990s, where the number of fishing vessels more than doubled between

1976 and 2000 (Srinivasan et al., 2010). Similarly, overfishing steadily increased in

African waters after the mid-1970s, particularly as distant-water fleets arrived

(Srinivasan et al., 2010). Currently, given patterns of coastal migration and

urbanization, and growing fleets, fishing pressure and overfishing is likely to be the

greatest in the tropics, largely in the waters of developing countries (CEA, 2012).

FAO Major Fishing Areas with >20% of assessed stocks overexploited 31 & 34: Western & Eastern Central Atlantic 47 & 41: Southeast & Southwest Atlantic 37: Mediterranean and Black Sea 27: Northeast Atlantic 51: Western Indian Ocean 87: Southeast Pacific 57: Eastern Indian Ocean

Source: Ye and Cochrane, 2011

Figure 9. Percentage of assessed fish stocks in FAO major fishing areas categorized as overexploited

58 2.5 The Rationale for Solutions: Reducing Overfishing often leads to a Recovery of Fish Stock

Although ocean fishery production limits have been reached and the abundance of fish stocks has declined significantly since the 1950s, the situation is not permanent. There is general scientific consensus that fishing activity is the single biggest determinant of the biological status of ocean fish stocks, rather than fluctuations in ecological characteristics (MEA, 2005; CEA, 2012, Ye et al., 2013). Worldwide, fishing activity has increased exponentially since the 1950s, causing overfishing and depletion of a significant number of fish stocks throughout the ocean (Beddington, 2007; Ye et al.,

2013). However, experiences since the early 20th century have shown that for many overfished stocks, a reduction in the mortality caused by fishing activity (i.e. fishing mortality) eventually allows for net population growth and overall stock recovery - with a number of caveats that include maintenance of ecosystem processes and a minimum stock size to allow for recovery in a given context (Longhurst, 2010). In their review of the global status of ocean fish stocks and fishery systems, Worm et al. (2009) concluded that most stocks had the potential to recover to previous abundance levels with reductions in fishing pressure. Thus, in general a reduction in fishing capacity and effort can help both reduce overfishing and rebuild overexploited stocks (Beddington et al.,

2007). To rebuild the 28% of ocean fish stocks that are overfished, and maintain the remainder, to levels that are capable of sustaining maximum harvests, two different global models have suggested that fishing effort would need to be cut almost in half: (i) a reduction of 44 to 54% translating to a reduction in fish catch on the order of 4 million

59 tons per year, leading fish biomass levels in the ocean to more than double compared to the 2004 estimate (World Bank and FAO, 2009), or (ii) a reduction of fishing effort by

36 to 43% from 2008 levels, leading to achievement of an estimated maximum sustainable yield from the ocean of some 96 million tons per year, providing an additional 16.5 million tons of fish harvested per year and an additional $37 billion in profits annually (Ye et al., 2013).

Box 4. Summary of Concepts and Descriptions from Chapter Two

Commercial ocean fisheries are best analyzed as complex systems. A geographical place, activity or unit that is involved in commercially harvesting fish from the ocean is best characterized and analyzed as a system – i.e. a Socio-Ecological System (SES) whereby human and ecological systems are coupled. The human component of this system includes not just fishers and fishing fleets, but also their families and communities, and the processors, distributors, wholesalers, retailers and consumers. The ecological component includes the one or more populations of targeted fish species or the portion of a population(s), categorized as a ‘stock’ about which predictions can be made, and the wider ecosystem upon which it depends.

The global social benefits of the world’s ocean fishery systems are significant. At least 1,600 species of animals in the ocean are fished, but in 2012 only 23 of them constituted some 40% of the total 79.7 million tons harvested from the ocean. Combined with inland fishery systems, these ocean fishery systems provide 16.5% of the world population’s animal protein intake, and an estimated 10 to 12% of livelihoods.

These social benefits have been threatened by reductions in abundance of the fish stocks supporting ocean fishery systems, due to overfishing. The ability or status of ocean fishery systems to sustain social benefits is generally assessed in terms of the: (i) biological status of the fish stock(s), (ii) ecological status of the biophysical system, and (iii) economic status of the social system. A range of assessments suggest that the abundance of fish stocks supporting at least 29% of the ocean’s fishery systems has been heavily reduced – categorized as biologically overfished, with impacts on the wider ecosystems, and at a global economic cost of some $50 billion per year. Essentially, biological overfishing is occurring at a global scale, with adverse impacts on both the natural and human systems that are coupled in ocean fishery systems.

The rise in overfishing throughout the ocean has been driven by exponential growth in fishing activity and pressure since the 1950s, which has in turn been driven by a great acceleration in human population, affluence and technology during this period. As fishing fleets have industrialized and grown, the global ocean fish catch expanded roughly 6% per year between 1945 and 1970, rising from some 14 million tons to 60 million tons, and then continued to rise until hitting a peak of 87.7 million tons in 1996, and modestly declining ever since.

Currently, the overfishing problem is likely greatest in tropical waters. This growth in fishing activity and overfishing began and subsequently peaked in the temperate waters of developed countries in Europe and North America, but more recently the waters of the tropics (i.e. the parallel of latitude 23°26ʹ north of the equator and south of the equator) have seen the biggest growth in fishing pressure and overfishing. For example in Asian waters the number of fishing vessels more than doubled between 1976 and 2000, while overfishing has steadily increased in African waters since the mid-1970s.

The world’s ocean overfishing problem – which is most prevalent in the tropics – can in most cases be solved by reducing and maintaining fishing activity to levels that will allow for fish stocks to recover or maintain an abundance sufficient to sustain maximum harvests. Although the abundance of ocean fish stocks has been significantly reduced by the growth in overfishing since the 1950s, the situation is not permanent. If overfishing is reduced, most fish stocks are expected to recover. To rebuild the 28% of ocean fish stocks that are overfished, and maintain the remainder, to levels that are capable of sustaining maximum harvests, fishing effort would need to be cut almost in half.

Chapter 3

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING OCEAN FISHERIES GOVERNANCE REFORM

As described in the previous chapter, 28% of the ocean’s assessed fish stocks are considered biologically overfished by FAO (2014), with another 61% fully fished, raising serious concerns about the capacity of these resources to sustain the current social benefits they provide, and certainly reducing their ability to provide the maximum potential benefits they could sustain. To solve the global overfishing problem, fishing effort and hence fishing pressure on the ocean’s fish stocks will need to be reduced by an estimated 36 to 43% from 2008 levels to allow stocks to recover where possible or to sustain current sizes.

The search for means of achieving the reductions in fishing activity needed to reduce fishing mortality and rebuild stocks has often focused on changing fisheries

‘governance’ (Ye et al., 2013). This concept of fisheries ‘governance’ has been defined by FAO (2001a) as a ‘systemic concept relating to the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority.’ Recognizing that fisheries are complex adaptive socio- ecological systems (see section 2.1), where social and ecological factors are equally important (Basurto and Nanedovic, 2012), governance can be considered as the filter by which the social system interacts with the ecological, regulating human influence

(Ommer et al., 2011). As such, the systemic concept of governance can actually be embedded in the SES framework as sub-system, as shown in Figure 10 below.

Consumer Sub-System Consumer preferences Fishing Effort Wholesale & Retail Sub-System Ecological Unit Distributors, groups, companies Governance Fish stock(s) Processing Sub-System Filter Individuals, groups, companies

Yield Harvest Sub-System Fishing Fleets, Families, Communities

Ecological System Social System

Figure 10. Simplified ocean fishery socio-ecological system (SES)

Figure 10 adapted from Ommer et al. (2011) is consistent with literature on fisheries governance, which often draws upon the SES framework to conceptualize the system to be governed (Kooiman and Bavinck, 2013). In fact, while the SES framework has been relatively well established as a representation of fishery systems, so too has the concept of governance been recognized as the link between the social and ecological sub- systems (Vitousek et al., 1997; Lui et al, 2007; Ostrom, 2009; Ommer et al., 2011;

Basurto and Nenadovic, 2012; Kooiman and Bavinck, 2013). Ostrom (2009) writes that in complex socio-ecological systems, the governance sub-system is separable but

63 interacts with the ecological and social sub-systems to produce system-wide outcomes

(which can in turn feed back to affect specific sub-systems and their components, as well as other larger or smaller SESs). These outcomes can be measured and empirically linked to governance, organized within the SES framework (Basurto and Nenadovic,

2012).

Taking the SES framework as a useful conceptual framework for organizing knowledge of fishery systems, with the concept of governance embedded as the filter between the sociological and ecological sub-systems, this chapter aims to modify and expand that filter further, as a step towards a more detailed classification system for fisheries governance reform at various spatial scales. In part, the chapter offers an incremental response to the question Basurto and Nenadovic (2012) asked of how we might start moving towards a systematic understanding of fisheries governance, based on a classification system capable of organizing knowledge and enabling knowledge accumulation and its eventual integration for faster learning. In general, such classificatory frameworks have been commonly used as analytical tools to help find order, patterns and understanding of a complex world, and are the basis of any science or worldview (Basurto and Nenadovic, 2012). Often entirely different frameworks, theories and models are used by different disciplines to analyze specific sub-systems, their components and characteristics in SESs, making a common, classificatory framework all the more necessary to help facilitate multi-disciplinary analysis of SESs

(Ostrom, 2009).

Building upon the decades of theoretical and empirical research on the performance of different governance regimes in complex social-ecological systems such as fisheries, pioneered at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University

(Ostrom, 2005; 2009), this chapter aims to modify and further refine a classification system for fisheries governance reform, embedded as a sub-system within the SES conceptual framework. The end result would be an updated analytical tool, i.e. a modified SES framework, for assessing fisheries governance reforms at a variety of spatial scales, linked to context-specific biophysical and socioeconomic measures of outcomes or performance. Of course such an effort does not begin here, as frameworks

(including sets of variables) to more systematically analyze fisheries governance have been under development for years (e.g. Kooiman, 2005; Basurto and Nenadovic, 2012;

Kooiman and Bavinck, 2013), but rather this chapter aims to further modify and update the tools to classify the different components of the governance concept in more specificity, drawing from the literature to add more detail about the components of the concept and their specific characteristics (and their various inter-relationships). As such, the chapter aims to provide an updated SES framework for ocean fisheries with a far more detailed governance filter, in order to support more precise study of the changes and improvements (i.e. reforms) to this filter, as measured by various and corresponding biophysical and socioeconomic indicators.

As a first step in this effort, the chapter synthesizes the historical development of the concept of fisheries governance, and subsequently deconstructs the concept into three components, each of which are described in detail based on a common set of characteristics drawn from a thorough review of fisheries governance literature, as well as a sample of case studies. To assist in describing the components of the fisheries governance concept, a set of matrices are proposed to classify the various characteristics, all of which is ultimately embedded into the wider SES framework.

Lastly, the temporal element is introduced, such that specific changes in the individual characteristics of components of fisheries governance can be correlated by the SES framework to ecological or socioeconomic outcomes, with positive changes described as reforms. As such, the chapter aims to provide a classificatory tool for governance reform embedded within a SES framework, or an updated ‘fisheries governance reform tool.’

3.1 Historical Development of the Governance Concept as a Response to the Overfishing Problem

Every concept has a history, so to understand why the concept of fisheries ‘governance’ is considered as essential to changing the outcomes in ocean fishery systems, this section first explores the types of problems that require collective action via governance

(including self-governance), notably those that involve the environment (such as fishery systems). The section defines the central role that institutions play in governance – with the perspective that institutions govern behavior (World Bank, 2003). The section then

66 aims to illustrate why overfishing is a type of problem requiring collective action via governance institutions in order to influence human behavior, within the SES framework. In sum, this section aims to provide an overview of the history of the concept of fisheries governance as a response to the problem of overfishing, and explain the concept in terms of institutions to encourage collective action (via both rewards and penalties, i.e. ‘carrots and sticks,’ as well as information or ‘sermons’), embedded within an SES framework.

Social problems or dilemmas. Social or shared problems, what social scientists have termed ‘social dilemmas,’ have been defined in various but similar formulations as situations where: (i) individuals receive greater benefits to their well-being from choices that are essentially non-cooperative, no matter what others do, yet all individuals would be better off if everyone cooperated; or (ii) everyone is tempted to take one action, but all will be better off if everyone (or most of them) take another action; or (iii) individual rationality leads collective irrationality, i.e. the pursuit of self-interest by each leads to a poor outcome for all (Olson, 1965; Dawes, 1980; Axelrod, 1984; Kollock, 1998;

Ostrom, 2005). Social dilemmas have been found in all walks of life throughout history, and have formed a core subject of study by social scientists of various disciplines

(Dawes, 1980). Many of the most challenging problems society faces, from the interpersonal to the international, are at their core social dilemmas (Kollock, 1998;

Ostrom, 2005).7 Despite the diversity of social dilemmas, the literature analyzing these situations has often summarized them as one of three metaphorical stories: (i) the

Prisoner’s Dilemma, (ii) the problem of providing Public Goods, and (iii) the Tragedy of the Commons (Kollock, 1998). The Prisoner’s Dilemma represents two-person dilemmas, where two prisoners are separately given the choice between testifying against the other or keeping silent, and the problem of providing Public Goods involves resources from which all may benefit regardless of whether they have helped provide them – hence the temptation to enjoy the good without contributing to its creation or maintenance, and the Commons Problem refers to the limits of shared resources such as fish stocks (Kollock, 1998).

Social dilemmas known as ‘commons problems’. Focusing on the commons problem, the tragedy of the commons is a metaphor for social dilemmas related to human impacts on the stream of benefits received from the use of natural resources and the environment, articulated by thinkers as long ago as Aristotle (Kollock, 1998). As population growth, technology and affluence increased around the world in the ‘great acceleration’ beginning in the 1950s (Erlich and Holdren, 1971), scientists increasingly began to point out social problems related to human impacts on the environment, as Garret Hardin

(1968) famously did using the metaphor of herders on a common pasture. In this

7 Kollock (1998) provides a useful overview of the literature describing different types of social dilemmas, published largely from 1980 to 1998.

metaphor, individuals in a group of herders with open access to shared grazing land pursue their own interest to put as many cows as possible onto the land, with each receiving private benefits from adding cows, while the damage to the common pasture

(from overgrazing) is shared by all (Hardin, 1968). Essentially, the shared grazing lands function as a common natural resource from which it is difficult to exclude others, but which can be degraded or reduced as more and more people use it – thereby serving as a metaphor for a planet with a growing population but limited carrying capacity

(Kollock, 1998).

Box 5. The interdisciplinary study of social dilemmas The motivations for human behavior contributing to social dilemmas have occupied the attention of great thinkers for millennia, including Aristotle, Hobbes and Hume among others (Ostrom, 2005). Clark (1948) notes that this original study of human behavior - the original social science - was termed political economy, derived from the Greek words ‘polis’ (meaning community or society) and in the case of economy ‘oikos’ (meaning household) and ‘nomos’ (meaning principle or law), i.e. principle of household management. Thinkers such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill focused on social dilemmas and behavior broadly, while in the latter half of the nineteenth century the field splintered into the range of social sciences that we know today in an effort to emulate the precision of natural sciences in analyzing human behavior: political science, economics, sociology, social history, psychology, etc. (Clark, 1948). Over the past few decades, research from fields as diverse as biology, cognitive science, primate behavior, social psychology and even experimental economics has painted a much more complex picture of humans as social beings (Gupta, 2010). Even with this broader range of tools, the techniques for studying human behavior contributing to social dilemmas are still limited and rely on assumptions about human nature, which are often defied by the complexity of the human mind (Gupta, 2010). There is of course not the time and space here to summarize the different fields of social science nor their perspectives and assessments of the motivations for human behavior that leads to social dilemmas, but rather to emphasize the interdisciplinary context for scientific inquiry into their analysis.

A number of social scientists have since disagreed with Hardin’s metaphor (see Berkes,

1989; Bromley, 1992; Berkes, 2009 for example), pointing out that groups have been able to manage commons through cooperation and that there is nothing inherent in commons that would lead to resource degradation. These scientists have focused rather on the ‘tragedy of open access’ to commons (Berkes, 1992). However, at the same time,

Ostrom is quoted as saying of Hardin’s essay, “it’s one of the most dramatic paragraphs,

I think, that has been written in Science,….it captures some truth…nothing that has had that impact would have existed that long if there were not some truth to what he said”

(Jensen, 2000). Throughout this paper, the ‘commons problem8’ refers to this qualification to Hardin’s metaphor, of the tragedy of open access. In terms of the common natural resources being accessed, and therefore at the heart of such commons problems, Ostrom (1990; 1999; 2005) defines them as ‘common pool resources’ (for example a grazing pasture, a lake, a fishing ground, a forest, an ocean, etc.), whose physical characteristics render it difficult and costly (though not impossible) to exclude people from using the resource once it is provided by nature (and particularly in the face of increasing technology), but from which the benefits of one person’s use are private while the costs are public, in that individual resource use can reduce the amount available to others (i.e. the resource is non-excludable but subtractable). Whenever users of a common pool resource are tempted to overuse the resource, a commons problem

8 Note that the discussion here focuses on natural commons, i.e. common pool resources provided by nature, although commons problems can similarly apply to human-produced resources with similar characteristics, e.g. the internet, etc.

70 emerges, as a particular and complex form of social dilemma increasingly facing humanity (Ostrom, 2005).

After the first United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development

(UNCED) in 1972, interest grew among social scientists from a range of disciplines in resolving commons problems resulting from population growth, pollution and natural resource depletion (Dawes, 1980). Ostrom (2005) highlights a number of books since that time which have been devoted to analyzing social dilemmas such as the commons problem – particularly given the challenges posed by human impacts on the environment, and notes that understanding how individuals act within such situations constitutes one of the major puzzles facing all contemporary social science disciplines.

This is because commons problems are a particularly challenging form of social dilemma, due to the complexity provided by the many variables of the biophysical world and the social systems that interact in a socio-ecological system (see Chapter 1)

(Ostrom, 2005).

The need for cooperation and collective action to solve social dilemmas like the commons problem. Thinkers and scientists from across a range of disciplines have studied social dilemmas such as the commons problem for centuries, and have generally agreed on the need for cooperation or collective action among individuals to find a solution (Dawes, 1980; Ostrom, 2005). The question of how to get people to cooperate is far more difficult than the question of when a social dilemma exists, as Olson (1965)

71 famously wrote that people assumed to behave in their own self-interests will often

‘free-ride’ off of the efforts of others in a group or collective action situation, rather than pursue their self-interests through the group’s objective. Olson suggested using selective incentives to encourage cooperation, essentially providing benefits directly to individuals as a reward for contributing towards a collective benefit or good (Olson,

1965). Following the stir created by Olson’s writings (Gupta, 2010), answers to the question of how to encourage cooperation to solve social dilemmas focused on a number of strategies, including enhancing communication (e.g. cooperation increases when individuals are given a chance to talk to each other), forming smaller group sizes (e.g. numerous studies have found that cooperation declines as group size increases), and encouraging public disclosure of choice and more frequent and identifiable interaction

(e.g. to enhance accountability within the group, and group identity) (Dawes, 1980;

Kollock, 1998). More frequently, answers have focused on changing the rewards and punishment for cooperative and defecting behavior respectively, via a range of responses from (i) the imposition of a Hobbesian dictatorship (leviathan), to (ii) ‘mutual coercion mutually agreed upon,’ to (iii) appeals to conscience (Dawes, 1980; Kollock,

1998). As Dawes (1980) notes, both reward and coercion (i.e. ‘carrots and sticks’) are very costly, particularly the larger the group of individuals becomes. Furthermore, these efforts face the common challenge that individuals perceive situations and social dilemmas differently, based on their different social value orientations (Kollock, 1998).

Institutions as structures to encourage cooperation and collective action. Because both incentives sufficient to reward cooperation or policing to deter defection are costly (i.e.

‘carrots and sticks’), societies have developed institutions to help reduce these costs and achieve cooperative solutions to social dilemmas (North, 1990). North (1990) defines institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ in a society or, more formally, as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction – whether such interaction is social, economic or political. Essentially institutions are the framework within which human interaction takes place and particularly the structure of the situation in a social dilemma, and define and limit the set of choices of individuals in that situation – thereby reducing uncertainty and creating order (North, 1990). Ostrom (2005) further defines the term institution, or the ‘rules of the game,’ as rules, norms and shared strategies:

(i) rules: ‘instructions’ or shared prescriptions that are mutually understood and

predictably enforced in particular situations by agents responsible for

monitoring conduct and for imposing sanctions;

(ii) norms: shared prescriptions that tend to be enforced by the participants

themselves through internally and externally imposed costs and inducements,

and

(iii) shared strategies: the regularized plans that individuals make within the

structure of incentives produced by rules, norms and expectations of the likely

behavior of others in a situation affected by relevant physical and material

conditions.

Ostrom (2005) writes that institutions are thus the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and governments at all scales. Such prescriptions are not the only element affecting human behavior in any particular situation in any given time and place – in fact no single cause exists for human behavior – but they do help structure the choices available and the consequences for each, and hence can help encourage or reinforce collective action to solve social dilemmas (Ostrom, 2005). Or as North (1990) notes, the rules of the game do not solve all problems, but they do simplify life. These rules of the game (i.e. rules, norms and shared strategies) can be formal or informal, with the latter building on social capital – for example governing exchanges of goods and services in rural areas in comparison to more formal institutions in cities or the laws that govern countries

(World Bank, 2003).

Organizations can be distinguished from the ‘rules of the game’: emerging from them and in turn acting in some cases as agents of change (North, 1990). Organizations are defined as groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives

– in contrast to the rules of the game in which organizations play/operate (North, 1990).

Essentially, organizations (like individuals) may be participants in a situation (or social dilemma) structured by rules (Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990). Organizations include political bodies (e.g. political parties, legislatures, local councils, regulatory agencies, etc.), economic bodies (e.g. firms, trade unions, cooperatives, etc.), social bodies (e.g.

74 churches, clubs, athletic associations, etc.) and educational bodies (e.g. schools, universities, vocational training centers, etc.), among others (e.g. military organizations)

(North, 1990). The ‘rules of the game’ provide the opportunities from which these organizations operate (North, 1990). Ostrom (2005) notes that many scholars have often confused these two terms, referring to an organizational entity such a branch of a government, a business firm, a political party or a family for example, as institutions.

Thirdly, in terms of shared strategies, although not mentioned explicitly by North or

Ostrom in relation to institutions, the term ‘policy’ is often used to describe the statements of objectives or principles of action adopted by organizations or individuals operating within or across organizations, often carried out via establishment or changes to rules over which they have jurisdiction. A field of study has emerged since the 1950s to analyze the design of ‘public’ policies - the articulated principles of action or objectives of a government or specific government body or agency (Gupta, 2010).

Essentially, ‘policies’ could be considered as ‘shared strategies’ and a form of institutions, but also given that institutions are nested within other institutions (e.g. a constitution creates a political body, i.e. organization, which in turn adopts a strategy, i.e. policy, to create rules establishing an agency which in turn articulates a strategy, etc., etc.), policies are often exogenous to institutions analyzed as shaping the set of choices in a given situation, as statements or objectives of organizations to change ‘the rules of the game.’

Across the different responses to various social dilemmas, at least three different but interacting categories of instititutions play a notable role in responding to commons problems (see Figure 11 below) – political, economic and social institutions:

 Political institutions represent ex ante agreements about cooperation among

politicians (North, 1990). Such institutions at the level of the nation state are

Governments – coordinating human behavior by operating a rulemaking process

through which rules can be changed more quickly in some cases than social

norms evolved over generations, and in some cases be still more forceful (World

Bank, 2003).

 Economic institutions, enhancing cooperation for exchange and wealth

maximization in the face of scarcity, include markets providing rule-governed,

competitive relationships among organizations/participants acting as buyers and

sellers through exchange (Keohane and Olmstead, 2007; Ostrom, 2005).

Essentially a market is an institution for allocating goods from those who

produce or own them to those who want to buy them, based on an exchange of

payments for goods and services, not a one-way allocation (Keohane and

Olmstead, 2007). Markets are linked to another economic institution – property

rights – which entail well-delimited and (not too limited) rights of use and

decision-making for an owner(s) (World Bank, 2003).

 Social institutions enhance cooperation throughout communities, i.e. people

sharing sufficiently similar values, traditions, and culture to create a sense of

belonging or group identity. Communities materialize gradually as individual

actions coalesce into cultural practices that are affirmed and nurtured because

they are perceived as valuable to the community. Communities enforce these

practices through institutions including parenting and schooling of young

members, cultural rituals and ceremonies, expressions of approbation, and

ostracism of deviants (Clark, 1948).

The political, economic and social institutions interact, each with unique structures for the development of rules and social norms that help coordinate human behavior by providing the set of choices available in a given situation (Clark, 1948). For example, communities (social institutions) discipline markets (economic institutions) by shaping values that affect patterns of consumption and production, while enabling them by creating a climate of trust that reduces transaction costs (Clark, 1948). Similarly, the relationship between political and economic institutions has been the subject of much debate and a wide body of literature, for example with Rodrik et al (2002) finding political institutions to be a far greater determinant of economic growth (i.e. the accumulation of capital) than geography (e.g. determining climate, endowment of natural resources, disease burden, transport costs and diffusion of knowledge and technology from other areas) or integration (or lack thereof) with markets, while Glaeser et al (2004) found economic growth to be a determinant of robust political institutions.

In 2014, Acemoglu et al. found a positive relationship between certain types of political institutions and economic growth – essentially where national political institutions have created and protected the types of economic institutions that led to growth. While not

77 possible to cover the breadth and depth of scholarship on this subject, the intention here is to highlight the interaction between these different types of institutions. The analogy of a three-legged table has been used, whereby analysis of only two of the three is like building a table with only two legs (Clark, 1948). Clark (1948) notes that a healthy society requires three mutually supportive institutional bases because humans have three essential modes of behavior: economically they act as autonomous individuals choosing between different actions based on calculations of personal advantage, politically they act as citizens to secure the kinds of laws and institutional structures they want governing their collective existence, and socially they derive meaning and purpose by fulfilling the functions of roles defined by their relations to others – with the balance between the institutions supporting these modes of behavior different among societies.

INSTITUTIONS

RULES SOCIAL CAPITAL ORGANIZATIONS

Informal Formal Government Agencies Trust

POLICIES Firms Rules Easy to Change Regulations

Civil Society Shared Values Organizations Networks

Laws Police

Norms Difficult to

Change Courts Religion Traditions Constitutions

Traditional, Modern, Formal Informal

Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2003 (‘Policies’ added)

Figure 11. Illustration of institutions for facilitating collective action

In sum, by facilitating or coordinating human behavior to enhance cooperation and take

collective action to solve social dilemmas, a range of institutions ‘govern’9 human

behavior. Essentially, governance is about institutional performance and the

relationships between political, economic and social institutions (Ahmed et al, 2006),

linking institutions to the behavior of individuals (Hanna, 1999). This is not to say that

9 For reference, Merriam-Webster defines the verb ‘to govern’ as “to have predominating influence” and “to exercise a directing or restraining influence over.” See: http://dictionary.reference.com/ accessed on October 17, 2015.

79 institutions are the only determinant of human behavior in any given situation (in fact

Ostrom (2005) notes there is no single explanation of human behavior), as a number of other social aspects influence decision-making in different contexts, such as cultural values, language uses, ethics and human psychological dimensions (Jones et al, 2014).

Institutional responses to the commons problem: ‘boundaries’ or tenure. The

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) emphasizes that institutions are essential to reversing or mitigating human-induced changes to the planet’s ecosystems (see Figure

12).

Social Dilemmas

Commons problem as a form of social dilemmas, Institutions and institutions for Govern human governance of human behavior to behavior to encourage enhance cooperative solutions. cooperation

Commons Problem

Figure 12. Illustration of the governance concept to solve social dilemmas

More specifically, although no two commons problems are exactly the same, the

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) reiterated the basic premise that some type of institutional response to regulate access and use of common pool resources

(essentially creating institutions that establish some form of ‘boundaries’ around access) represented in a SES framework, and indeed the environment more broadly, was

80 essential to reversing or mitigating human impacts upon the planet’s ecosystems in the face of growing use and technology. FAO (2012b) has defined these institutional responses or systems to create some form of ‘boundaries’ around the access to and use of common pool resources as ‘tenure’: “systems by which societies define and regulate how people, communities and others gain access to land, fisheries and forests. These tenure systems determine who can use which resources, for how long, and under what conditions (FAO, 2012b).”

Ostrom (2005) drew from a range of social sciences, such as political science, economics, anthropology, law, sociology, psychology, etc., to elaborate an ‘institutional approach to development’ (IAD) conceptual framework to illustrate how institutions affect the incentives confronting individuals and their resultant behavior in the use of common pool resources. The IAD framework emphasizes the importance of tenure institutions, by describing three clusters of exogenous variables that affect the choice set (notably the incentives) available to individuals acting in (i.e. using) a given common pool resource: (i) the rules (i.e. tenure); (ii) the biophysical attributes of the common pool resource (i.e. the degree of subtractability and excludability), and (iii) the structure of the more general community within which the decision take place. Hence, the decisions taken by participants (either individuals or corporate actors such as nations, private corporations, etc,) in an ‘action arena’ or given common pool resource, combine with the decisions taken by other actors in the same ‘action arena’ to produce aggregate outcomes (often assigned values in terms of costs and benefits) (Ostrom, 2005).

Focusing on the rules or institutions may prove more tractable to change in a given context, than the biophysical/material conditions or the attributes of the community(ies)

(Ostrom, 2005). The IAD framework provides a syntax or grammar for describing institutions as a basis for a more detailed classification system for fisheries governance, elements of which have been embedded in the SES framework (Basurto and Nanedovic,

2012).

Focusing on rules for tenure as one of these three clusters of exogenous variables affecting human behavior in common pool resources in Ostrom’s (2005) IAD framework, the question arises as to the origin of the rules exogenous to participants – essentially who makes them? Hardin (1968) proposed one of the oldest solutions to this institutional question regarding commons problems – a Hobbesian external authority that governs access to and use of the common pool resource, and thereby provides some measure of social order in exchange for a partial reduction in personal freedom

(Kollock, 1998). An alternative institutional solution to the commons problem that has been advanced is the privatization of common pool resources, i.e. to break up the resources into private parcels on the assumption that individuals will better conserve their own property than commons (presumably via the power of an external authority)

(Ostrom, 1990; Kollock, 1998). A ‘third way’ proposed by Ostrom (1990) was the local cooperation and self-regulation of use of commons, without reliance or need for an external authority. While such institutions for self-governance do not always emerge or succeed, Ostrom (1990) emphasized that in many different contexts they have, and that

82 it would be incorrect to assume that the only two types of institutional solutions to the commons problem are either some form of an external authority upon users or privatization. For example, cooperatives can control members and their fishing activity

(if they control access to the fishery), just as a private monopoloy could, or a government (World Bank, 2003). While no two commons problems are exactly the same, one of the great challenges of developing institutional responses is that by their very nature, tenure institutions for common pool resources are costly (e.g. monitoring fishing on the ocean) (Sterner and Correa, 2013).

As a simple illustration of the institutional responses to commons problems, Figure 12 has been slightly updated as follows:

INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO COMMONS PROBLEMS RULES: BOUNDARIES (i.e. TENURE) SOCIAL CAPITAL ORGANIZATIONS Policies Trust To Establish/Change Rules Government Agencies

Rules Easy to Change Regulations Firms

Shared Values Civil Society Networks Organizations Laws Police Norms

Religion Difficult Courts Traditions to Change Constitutions Modern, Traditional, Formal Informal

Proposed Institutional Solution 1: external authority imposes cooperation Proposed Institutional Solution 2: private ownership of commons Proposed Institutional Solution 3: self-governance by commons users *NOTE: this illustration does include policies as change agents to rules, customizing the World Bank (2003) illustration of institutions, for responses to commons problems

Figure 13. Illustration of institutions for facilitating collective action to solve commons problems*

Overfishing is a form of the commons problem, and hence the need for governance

institutions. Although dating back much earlier in specific cases, it was in the 1950s as

fisheries industrialized that the recognition became more common that fish stocks in the

ocean were not inexhaustible and were in fact subtractable resources, subject to scarcity

with increasing demand (Scott, 1955). Fishery science evolved considerably during this

time period to predict production levels from ocean fishery systems under different

84 scenarios of fishing activity, based on known population dynamics of the fished species, and sustainable yields for a given level of fishing activity (Pitcher and Hart, 1982).

Box 6. 1950s and the Growing Understanding of the Subtractability of Fish Stocks and Sustainable Limits of Fishing In 1954 Shaefer developed one (among many) such biological model (the Beverton-Holt model would soon follow in 1957), describing an ocean fishery system based on a single species. This basic model was foundational for many more complex models that would eventually incorporate multiple targeted species as well as ecological characteristics. In the Schaefer model the biomass for a given fish stock and time is determined by: the natural growth of the individuals in the stock, the recruitment of new individuals to the stock as a result of reproduction and development; and natural mortality (old age, predation and disease) – all within a fixed carrying capacity for the given ecosystem that sets an upper bound on the biomass. More specifically Schaefer’s model describes the growth of a fish stock (X) with the intrinsic growth rate (r – i.e. recruitment, natural growth and natural mortality) in a given period of time (t) and within a system carrying capacity (K), as dX/dt = G(X) = rXt(1-Xt/K). This logistic growth equation shows that a fish stock will grow at an increasing rate until a maximum growth rate is achieved, after which point growth will steadily decline until the total biomass reaches the carrying capacity of the system and growth is zero – producing an inverted U-shaped curve which shows the growth rate on the vertical axis and the total biomass on the horizontal axis. Thus the model illustrated the subtractability of finite fish stocks with increased fishing activity over time, as fishing adds another source of mortality which may or may not be greater than the natural growth rate, and subsequently allow continued growth or cause reduction in the overall biomass of the stock.

The Schaefer model gave rise to the ‘sustainable yield curve’, derived by setting the Schaefer growth function equal to a fish yield equation where the level of fish catch is defined as a function of the stock size and fishing effort (y = qXtE where y is the yield or fish catch, q is a catchability co-efficient reflecting the fishing technology used, Xt is the biomass of the fish stock at a given time, and E is the level of fishing effort). When the yield or fish catch is equivalent to the growth of the fish stock, the yield is considered sustainable, i.e. the total biomass of the fish stock remains the same and continues to generate a growth capable of sustaining the fish catch. This inverted U-shaped curve essentially tracks the growth of the fish stock, and shows that there is in theory a level of biomass of a given fish stock, and fishing effort, that will generate a maximum sustainable fishing yield, i.e. the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Increasing fishing effort beyond this point at the top of the inverted U- shaped curve results in progressively smaller sustainable yields, as total biomass is reduced and subsequently growth levels. This sustainable yield curve and the concept of MSY for a given fish stock and fishery, has been a fundamental model for describing ocean fishery systems. Source: Anderson and Seijo, 2010

At the same time that Schaefer (and subsequently others – notably Beverton and Holt) developed models to predict the trend in harvests from an ocean fishery system as a function of fishing effort or activity (see Box 6 above), vividly illustrating the subtractability of fish stocks via fishing, economists such as H. Scott Gordon in 1954

85 and Tony Scott in 1955 began to look at the economic causes and consequences of growing demand for food fish and subsequent increasing fishing effort in unregulated fishery systems – i.e. where users are not excluded (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955). Gordon

(1954) found that given growing levels of demand for a subtractable resource, without some form of exclusion via regulation of access to the fishery system, fishing activity will increase to levels that result in both biological and economic overfishing. Scott

(1955) suggested that such regulation could be achieved by the institutional response of introducing sole ownership.

The combination of biological responses of fish stocks to economic drivers of fishing behavior resulted in bio-economic models depicting the ‘maximum sustainable yield’ in a given ocean fishery system, which became the dominant paradigm in the understanding the subtractability (and any failures of exclusion) of these common pool resources by the late 1950s (Lackey, 2005; Sanchirico and Wilen, 2007). From this work flowed modern fisheries economics and bioeconomics, where the sustainable fish yield curve was translated into sustainable revenues (fish harvests multiplied by the price) as a function of fishing effort – essentially the combination of the logistic growth curve for one species and an economic model, often referred to as the Gordon-Schaefer production model (Sterner and Correa, 2013; Anderson and Seijo, 2010). Essentially, fisheries bioeconomics is a field that integrates characteristics of the ecological system

(i.e. the biology and ecology of the fish stocks) with the economics of fishing behavior

86 from the social system, considering space, time and uncertainty dimensions (Anderson and Seijo, 2010).

As with many depictions of complex systems, the sustainable yield curve is a very simple representation, first and foremost of the equilibria between fishing effort and fish stock size, and not a given point in time of fishing effort and biomass (i.e. the size of the biomass will take time to respond to a given level of fishing effort, which is dynamic in any event, before it comes into equilibrium with that effort and is represented as such on the curve) (Sterner and Correa, 2013; Anderson and Seijo, 2010). Secondly, the model represents a single species, and not the multiple species often targeted at one time by fishing methods and technology, nor the interactions and dependencies of these species on predators and prey, and indeed the wider ecosystem (Anderson and Seijo,

2010). Lastly, fishing effort and stock size are shown as aggregate variables in this model, when in reality the former is composed of a number of factors that determine the decisions of individual operators to fish, and the latter is composed of a wide range of age classes with specific growth characteristics and responses to fishing (Anderson and

Seijo, 2010). Nonetheless, with these caveats aside, the Schaefer growth function and the sustainable yield curve remain to this day a useful and fundamental way to describe the subtractable relationship between increasing fishing activity and fish stocks, as a basis for understanding these stocks as common pool resources and upon which more complex models can be built (Anderson and Seijo, 2010). The science used today to assess commercially targeted fish stocks is still dominated by these population models

87 developed in the 1950s (Beddington et al., 2007). The high data requirements of more complex, multi-parameterized multi-species models means that in most cases, attempts to capture wider ecosystem characteristics in stock assessments have manipulated these original single-species models (Beddington et al., 2007).

Although it serves now more as a metaphor than as a representation of reality (Smith,

2012), this simple model of a complex ocean fishery system nonetheless provides a powerful illustration of the commons problem inherent in commercial ocean fisheries facing rising demand. Combined with growing empirical evidence in the second half of the twentieth century, this model illustrated that ocean fishery systems are based on common pool resources – which are both subtractable and difficult to exclude users - often subject to the commons problem in the absence of effective governance.

Box 8. The commons problem in commercial ocean fishery systems As described in economics textbooks, where profit maximization is the primary goal motivating behavior in an ocean fishery system, and when access is open (i.e. rules, norms or traditions are not in place to govern access) and multiple fishers compete to catch fish from a given population, each fisher maximizes his net income by continuing to fish as long as the value of his catch exceeds the cost of catching it. In such open access fisheries, individual fishers would not see their profits decline even as additional (i.e. marginal) costs of fishing exceed marginal revenues. This is because the marginal costs resulting from more fishing by an individual do not reduce profits to that individual, but to the fishery as a whole – most of the decline in profit falls to the other fishers. Every time a fisher enters, he or she does not see the fact that this entry and subsequent fishing makes it more difficult for all of the others to catch fish – driving down the yield for everyone. The fisher only sees his or her costs of fishing and does not see the small increment of additional cost borne by all the incumbent fishers as a result of entry – so decisions are not made at the margin (i.e. individuals are not responsible for the full costs of their behavior). Rather, the average revenues for the fishery as a whole reveal that fishers have continued fishing until average revenues equal marginal costs – leading to a point in the fishery where total revenues equal total costs and catch rates are barely sufficient to cover the costs of fishing (i.e. the bio-economic equilibrium). Part of the cost not included in the calculations of fishers is the opportunity cost of leaving fish in the ocean to grow and reproduce – i.e. the cost of fishing now vs. in the future (i.e. if a fisher decides to leave some fish unharvested today in order that they will be available tomorrow, he or she has no guarantee that someone else will not take them instead, rather there exists an incentive to ‘use it or lose it’). This opportunity cost will vary from place to place, based on the relative value to fishers of the present vs. the future, i.e. their discount rate. In summary, the fishery as a whole is considered profitable right up until the bio-economic equilibrium where total sustainable revenues equal total costs, at which point all profits have been lost and everyone is worse off. The fish stock is then maintained at this level through biological processes of natural growth and reproduction. Thus, if the price: cost ratio is high, the bio- economic equilibrium will result in a low stock of fish, and hence a low annual catch level; two characteristic features of overfishing. This is essentially the commons problem at work in commercial ocean fishery systems, often called ‘the race to fish’, where rational individual decisions acting independently lead to irrational outcomes for the whole group. Given high investment costs in capital, harvesters will subsequently often need only to cover the marginal costs of operation in order to stay in business, meaning that the race can continue for some time, even extending past the bio-economic equilibrium in some cases.

The emergence of the commons problem for a given ocean fishery system may be summarized as follows. When a virgin stock is first exploited in an open-access fishery, the fishers at first experience high catch rates and high profits. This attracts more fishers to join them and those already in the fishery may commit more or improved gear, vessels or other capital equipment to the fishery. Fishers then tend to intensify their efforts to catch the dwindling stock – i.e. the ‘race to fish.’ If the catch is greater than the surplus growth of the stock, the stock will dwindle until a point is reached when the stock becomes depleted. Catch rates and profits fall to a point where most of the fishers just break even. If further fishing effort is committed to the fishery, it brings about losses and forces some of the fishers to leave the fishery and a break-even point for the fishery as a whole is attained. At this point all the profits potentially available in the fishery have been dissipated. Both natural and human capital have been wasted, and society is worse off even as individuals pursue private interests. Currently, many of the world’s ocean fishery systems are characterized by the ‘race to fish’ (Hilborn et al, 2005).

Sources: See for example Kolstad (2011), Anderson and Seijo (2010), Tietenburg and Lewis (2009), Beddington et al. (2007); World Bank (2003); WHAT (2000); OECD (2011)

The surplus production model and accompanying sustainable yield curve shown in Box

8 to illustrate the subtractability of ocean fish stocks as common pool resources, combined with the difficulty in excluding users from these resources if need be, often creates the open access conditions for a commons problem in many ocean fish stocks known as ‘the race to fish’ and described above in Box 9 – when demand for use of the resource exceeds the long-term supply (WHAT, 2000). Adding total fishing costs to the sustainable yield curve generated from the surplus production model, and multiplying yield by a fixed price to translate the yield curve into total sustainable revenues, the loss of economic benefits can be illustrated as function of increasing fishing effort and the commons problem.

In summary, the surplus production model and sustainable yield curve have defined (i) biological overfishing (stock sizes below those that could support MSY) (Ye et al.,

2011), and (ii) economic overfishing (stock sizes below those that could support MEY under current technology and fixed prices) (Anderson and Seijo, 2010). As mentioned in chapter one, in the face of growing demand for food fish and increasing technology to harvest them after World War Two, more and more ocean fishery systems around the world exhibited the characteristics of this commons problem and ultimately biological and/or economic overfishing (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2007). By the 1990s, the excessive number of fishing boat and levels of fishing activity relative to the (decreasing) size of the resource vividly illustrated the need to create or strengthen institutions capable of

90 erecting boundaries on the access to and use of ocean fish stocks in some form (WHAT,

2000).

Governance institutions as the independent variable and overfishing as the outcome.

Defining the extent to which such institutions affect human behavior is difficult – in fishery systems or even more broadly. Returning to Ostrom’s (2005) IAD framework defining three clusters of exogenous variables affecting the choice set available to individuals in a given common pool resource, fishing activity in a given ocean fishery system (as the determinant of overfishing) could be isolated as the dependent variable, rules (or more broadly tenure institutions) as the independent variable, and clusters of variables describing (i) the social system and (ii) the ecological system as the controlled variables. Hence, the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005) could be smoothed and embedded within the SES framework (Ommer et al., 2005), illustrating governance institutions as the independent variable, where fishing activity and hence the level of overfishing is the dependent variable, as follows:

Ecological Characteristics Institutions Social Characteristics

Fishing Activity

Outcomes: Impact on Overfishing

Figure 14. Isolation of institutions for governance as the independent variable for fishing activity

In conclusion, Figure 14 provides a conceptual illustration of FAO’s (2001b) statement that recent history has shown that common pool resources such as fish stocks are depleted in the absence of institutions for effective governance once demand outstrips the long-term capacity for supply. Those institutions that govern fishing activity, together with the organizations that emerge from them and the policies they articulate to change/implement them, are summarized here as the components of ‘fisheries governance’ – the filter between the social and ecological sub-systems and their characteristics, and independent variable, with the outcomes of overfishing levels as the dependent variable.

Governance as a concept dates back to Plato and the Greek verb kubernân, to pilot or steer, which gave rise to the Medieval Latin gubernare (Kjaer, 2004, in Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009). More recently, the concept of governance has its basis in social sciences, becoming widely used in the early 1990s when the World Bank introduced the norm of ‘good governance’ to international development (Kooiman et al, 2005).

However, definitions of this concept – and its application to ocean fishery systems - in the literature vary from narrow to broader: for example the World Bank (2004a) defined fisheries governance as an institutional framework including the policies, rules and organizations that provide a set of social prescriptions and procedures that control fishing activity (both formal and informal). Going beyond just what governments do,

Juda and Hennessey (2001) defined governance as the formal and informal arrangements, institutions and mores that structure how resources or an environment are

92 utilized, how problems and opportunities are evaluated and analyzed, what behavior is deemed acceptable or forbidden, and what rules and sanctions are applied to affect the pattern of use. Kooiman et al. (2005) defined governance as the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities, which includes the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them.

Here the concept is defined drawing both from narrower definitions such as FAO

(2001a), and more general definitions of governance (Kaufmann et al., 2010), to focus on institutions as the core component of governance, together with (but discrete) from the organizations that emerge from them, with a focus on the policies those organizations articulate as a discrete form of institutions. This provides for a broad definition of the fisheries governance concept, with institutions at the core, together with organizations and the policies that they articulate. Thus, fisheries governance is defined as “a systemic concept relating to the exercise of control or influence over fishing activity by political, economic and social institutions, and the organizations emerging from them and articulating policies to implement or change them or establish new rules.” Institutions are considered as the instruments through which the formation and execution of governance occurs (Kooiman et al, 2005), and are defined as the rules, norms and shared strategies that govern the behavior of fishers and their fishing activities in ocean fishery systems. Hence, Garcia (2005) wrote that “the degradation of marine fisheries resources has been extensively documented together with the problems

93 of governance as the origin of the problem.” Similarly, Cochrane (2009) wrote “the primary reasons [for the current levels of overfishing] all come down to a failure of fisheries governance in most countries;” while Grafton et al. (2008) state that “the key determinant of sustainability [in fisheries] is governance.

Table 3. Summary of historical development of the concept of governance as part of the solution to the overfishing problem

Concept Definition Sources Social A social dilemma is a social or shared problem characterized by a situation where individual Philosophy, a range of social sciences, dilemmas rationality leads to collective irrationality, i.e. the pursuit of self-interest by each leads to a poor including political science, economics, outcome for all. sociology, social history, psychology, anthropology Commons The commons problem is a metaphor for social dilemmas related to human impacts on the Social and physical sciences have problems and stream of benefits received from the use of natural resources and the environment. analyzed and described commons common pool problems, both theory and empirical resources Common pool resources have physical characteristics that make it difficult and costly to exclude knowledge, notably in environmental and people from using the resource once it is provided, but is subtractable – where each person’s use natural resource economics. can reduce the amount available to others. Common pool resources such as common natural resources (e.g. a grazing pasture, a lake, a fishing ground, a forest, an ocean, etc.) are at the heart of commons problems. Collective Collective action refers to cooperation among a group of individuals to find a solution to a social Sociology, economics, political science; 95 action dilemma such as the commons problem. notable works include Olson’s ‘The Logic of Collective Action’ in 1965, among others. Institutions Institutions are structures to provide incentives to reward cooperation or policing to defer Political Science, Political Economy, defection, in order to solve social dilemmas. Although not the only means to achieve cooperative Institutional Economics, Sociology, New solutions to social dilemmas, institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, Institutional Economics; notable works as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction – whether such interaction is include Douglass North’s ‘Institutions, social, economic or political. They provide the structure of the situation in a social dilemma, and Institutional Change, and Economic define and limit the set of choices of individuals in that situation – thereby reducing uncertainty Performance’ in 1990, among others. and creating order. Although distinct from the rules of the game, and both emerging from them and in turn influencing them, organizations – defined here as groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives – are also mentioned here as accompanying institutions. Lastly, in terms of strategies, although not mentioned explicitly by North or Ostrom in the definitions of institutions, the term ‘policy’ is often used to describe the statements of objectives or principles of action adopted by organizations or individuals as a strategy, carried out via establishment or changes to rules over which they have jurisdiction. As such, ‘policies’ are defined as a discrete form of institutions, and are often articulated at one level in order to change the rules at another. A field of study has emerged since the 1950s to analyze the design of public policies, as the articulated principles of action or objectives of a government or specific government body or agency (Gupta, 2010).

Institutions Institutional solutions to the commons problem have focused on governing access to, and use of Environmental and Natural Resource governing the the common pool resource – essentially erecting boundaries in some form that can introduce Economics; Political Economy, notably commons greater exclusion. The institutions regulating access to fish stocks (as well as forests and land) Elinor Ostrom’s ‘Governing the are categorized as ‘tenure,’ determining who can use which resources, for how long and under Commons’ in 1990, among others; what conditions. Political Science and Sociology; as well as empirical literature such as the World Bank and OECD work on governance.

Overfishing, Overfishing – both biological and economic – is a form of the commons problem, requiring Fisheries science, including fisheries collective some form of collective action to solve. This is because fish stocks are common pool resources biology, ecology and economics. action and (both difficult to exclude users and subtractable), which can be reduced below optimal levels for ocean a given society in the face of growing demand and in the absence of collective action to place FAO defines fisheries governance, and fisheries some form of ‘boundaries’ or tenure around the resources to exclude fishing activity. maintains a repository of related governance Measurement of this overfishing commons problems (biological and economic overfishing) rests documents and concepts. fundamentally on bio-economic models that predict sustainable fish harvests from a given stock as a function of fishing effort and the stock biomass, as well as maximum profit levels at a given Again, Ostrom’s work is notable, as is price and harvesting cost structure. These surplus production models have a number of caveats Charles’ ‘Sustainable Fishery Systems’ in and weaknesses, but remain a useful metaphor for the overfishing commons problem. 2001, among others.

96 This problem has emerged in a wide range of ocean fishery systems throughout the world in the

absence of collective action to find solutions (unless only one individual is fishing, no one person can remedy the situation). The result of such collective action is often the creation of governance institutions to address the limits of the common pool resources underpinning ocean fishery systems, whether self-organized, imposed externally by the state or a firm, or some combination of these. The development and maintenance of such governance institutions for common pool resources is a core component of the broader concept of governance: defined by FAO in relation to fisheries as a systemic concept relating to the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority.

Applying this concept to ocean fishery systems, and aiming to reflect the capacity of individuals to cooperate in a range of instances, and to self-govern in some cases, as well as the standard definition of the verb ‘to govern’, which is ‘to control or guide the actions of someone or something,’ the definition is slightly broadened here for use in ocean fishery systems as follows:

Ocean fisheries governance is a systemic concept relating to the exercise of control or influence over fishing activity by political, economic and social institutions, and the organizations emerging from them and articulating policies to implement or change them or establish new rules. Institutions are further defined as the rules, norms and strategies that govern the behavior of fishers and their fishing activities in ocean fishery systems.

Fishing Effort** Consumer Sub-System Consumer preferences

FISHERIES GOVERNANCE*

INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO COMMONS PROBLEM: BOUNDARIES or Wholesale & Retail Sub-System TENURE Ecological Unit SOCIAL CAPITAL ORGANIZATIONS Distributors, groups, companies

Trust Government Agencies

Rules Easy to Change Regulations Firms Processing Sub-System

Shared Values POLICIES Civil Society Individuals, groups, companies To Establish/Change Rules Organizations Network 97 Fish stock(s) s Laws Police Religion Norms Difficult Courts Harvest Sub-System to Change Fishing Fleets, Traditions Constitutions Families, Communities Modern, Traditional, Informal Formal

Ecological System Social System

Yield

* Independent Variable; ** Dependent Variable

Figure 15. Embedding the fisheries governance concept in a SES framework for ocean fishery systems

3.2 Description of the Concept of Ocean Fisheries Governance

The previous section briefly summarized the historical development of the concept of fisheries governance, as a response to the phenomenon of overfishing, building upon the following interlinked concepts:

 Overfishing is a particular form of social dilemma known as the commons

problem.

 Collective action is needed to solve the overfishing commons problem.

 Institutions are an important factor in helping to encourage collective action, and

are defined as the rules, norms and shared strategies structuring human behavior,

as distinct from the organizations emerging from them, with an emphasis on the

policies these entities articulate as a particular form of institution.

 Institutions encourage collective action to solve commons problems by

governing access to and use of resources they contain – essentially by defining

tenure to erect barriers to these resources in some form of fashion – through the

process of governance.

 Political, economic and social institutions exercise governance over human

activity in ocean fishery systems, together with the organizations emerging from

them, and highlighting the policies those organizations articulate.

 Collectively, they form ocean fisheries governance: a systemic concept relating

to the exercise of control or influence over fishing activity by political, economic

and social institutions, and the organizations emerging from them and

articulating policies to implement or change them or establish new rules.

Institutions are further defined as the rules, norms and shared strategies that

govern the behavior of fishers and their fishing activities in ocean fishery

systems represented in a SES framework.

Based on the historical development, this section describes the systemic concept of ocean fisheries governance in full detail, deconstructing the concept into three components which are described in detail through a group of common characteristics summarized in matrices, as a further step or refinement in a classification system for fisheries governance within the SES framework. As such, this description aims to make a complicated concept more understandable by reducing it to component parts (Miles and Huberman, 1994), as shown below as a simplified or smoothed version of the previous illustration:

Ocean Fisheries Governance Concept

Rules

Policies Organizations

Figure 16. 'Smoothed' illustration of the components of the concept of ocean fisheries governance

The above figure is proposed based on the current literature, in order to deconstruct the concept of fisheries governance into three component parts that include institutions and organizations, or more specifically the sets of policies (i.e. principles and objectives), rules and organizations used for the development and management of fisheries (noting the functioning and outcomes of this framework are influenced by the set of ideas, values, beliefs and assumptions under which the people concerned operate) (FAO,

2001a). These components are drawn from the broader literature on governance beyond fishery systems, showing for example that government bodies (i.e. organizations) design, formulate and implement policies, which in turn shape the rules of the game

(World Bank, 2003). Alternative definitions of governance institutions have used the term narrowly as synonymous with organizations, referring for example to governance as a framework of policies, laws and institutions (see for example FAO, 1995).

Similarly, Kooiman et al. (2005) emphasize the images (visions guiding governance), the instruments (link vision to action) and the actions (taken to put these instruments into effect), also analogous to policies, rules and organizations in terms of roles played.

Of course with the broader definition there is considerable overlap or even hybridization between the different components of the framework for governance, e.g. policies articulated at the national level by the state (i.e. public policy) may be stated together with some of the rules in one overarching or principal legal document, so that the policy statement is found together with the key rules for implementation, such as in Palau, the

Philippines and the United States (Kuemlangan, 2009). Similarly, different institutions

100 can interact and overlap, for example political institutions can help correct failures of economic rules, and likewise private institutions can help correct public policy failures

– although generally political rules will lead to economic rules, though the causality runs both ways (North, 1990; World Bank, 2003). Taking these differences into account, in order to further refine and develop the classification system for fisheries governance within a SES framework, each of these components of the ocean fisheries governance concept identified in Figure 16 is described separately and in more detail, through a group of common characteristics summarized in matrices.

Drawing from the fisheries governance and wider common pool resource governance literature, these common characteristics are grouped as ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ characteristics. Two key ‘vertical’ characteristics are used in the description, reflecting the level of authority (Ostrom, 2005):

1. The spatial scale, or the spatial dimension of the system to be governed

(Kooiman et al., 2005; Kooiman and Bavinck, 2013), which is typically

categorized as international (both regional and global), national and/or local

levels, often occurring at multiple spatial scales (Hilborn et al., 2005); and

2. the jurisdiction of origin, essentially who makes the rules (and the level of

formality to them) (Ostrom, 2005), which in the case of ocean fishery systems

is typically states articulating legally binding rules, such as national legislation

or international treaties, or self-governing groups developing customary social

arrangements (FAO, 2001a).

101

In terms of the first of these two ‘vertical’ characteristics, governance components operate at multiple spatial scales, from local (e.g. a village) to national, and from national to international (regional or global), and at the same time are often nested within a larger institution, which is nested within an even larger institution, etc. (World

Bank, 2003). For example, policies or strategies expressed by an organization at one level may lead to rules that change another organization(s) operating at a different level

- the policy of a country towards the use of the environment under its jurisdiction may change the laws governing that use, and subsequently the regulations a national environment agency issues, and within this broader context the regulations that a city government issues, and down to a village (Ostrom, 1990; World Bank, 2003). Likewise, a strategy expressed by a council of elders in a community to change the rules followed by community members in using the nearby coral reefs may have an impact on the norms followed by a group of fishers within the community using that reef, and by individual households within that group (World Bank, 2003).

One of the fundamental challenges in developing or changing institutions to govern the use of common pool resources is the mismatch in spatial scale between the ecological system and decision-making (Wilson, 2006). For example, some rules can only be made at the national scale that are necessary for governance at a local scale, and outcomes at a given spatial scale are often heavily influenced by interactions of ecological and social systems at other scales (MEA, 2005). Wilson (2006) notes that it is generally accepted

102 that building robust and effective governance institutions requires a close match with the spatial extent of the ecological system, otherwise for example decisions and rules may influence only a portion of the ecological system, without generating the intended biological response from a fish stock or achieving the policy objective (see for example

Ostrom, 1990; Berkes et al., 1998).

Ostrom (2005) emphasizes that governance institutions often reflect polycentric systems

– where people organize not just one but multiple governing authorities at different spatial scales, and each unit exercises considerable independence to make and enforce rules within a circumscribed domain of authority for a specific geographic area.

Ocean Fisheries Governance Concept

Rules

Rules Policy Policy Organizations Organizations

Figure 17. Illustration of polycentric components of the concept of ocean fisheries governance

The second common grouping of ‘vertical’ characteristics of the components of governance institutions utilized here is the jurisdiction of origin – essentially who is governing and making the rules (Kollock, 1998). Governance emanates from many different sources (Kooiman et al, 2005), and three distinct jurisdictions have often been

103 used in the literature as the origin of institutions for governance of common pool resources and particularly fish stocks:

1. the state, per Hardin’s (1968) proposal that an external authority govern access

and use;

2. private entities or corporations, for example as Scott (1955) proposed with a

private monopoly that would match economic incentives to ecological

characteristics of the resource;

3. self-governance by local groups, per Ostrom’s (1990) research, among others,

showing the success of such groups in a range of different contexts, and

reflecting that the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is often actually the ‘tragedy of

open access’, where local groups are no longer able to collectively govern

natural resource use (Bromley and Cernea, 1989); and

4. Additionally, partnerships of the above (or ‘co-governance’), where the origin

of jurisdiction is the state but some of the control is transferred to private entities

or local groups, through a process that has been labeled ‘co-governance or co-

management’ of the resources (Pinkerton, 1989; Kooiman et al., 2005). Such

partnerships reflect governance theory that given the complexity, diversity and

dynamism of common pool resources in the modern world, the state cannot

govern alone, but needs the active support of economic and social institutions

(Kooiman et al., 2005). In many places legal pluralism exists, where differing

legal ideas, principles and systems are applied to the same situation, and can

actually be accommodated through forms of co-governance partnerships (Jentoft

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et al., 2009). In ocean fishery systems, these co-management partnerships have

been defined as arrangements in which the state, the community of local

resource users, external agents (e.g. non-governmental organizations, research

institutions) and other resource stakeholders share the responsibility and

authority for decision-making (Berkes, 2009).

Box 10. Thought exercise to illustrate poly-centric ocean fisheries governance

A state organization (‘political entity’ such as a legislature) created by a set of rules (‘constitution’), articulates a national policy (‘fisheries law’) with principles to guide the ocean fishery systems under its jurisdiction and objectives for the use of these resources, as well as rules for the creation of another state organization (e.g. a ‘fisheries agency’) and details for how that agency would formulate rules for the fisheries, in order to achieve the objectives. That agency in turn formulates a policy (e.g. ‘fisheries management plan’) with operational objectives (precise and formulated in such a way as to be simultaneously achievable, e.g. targets for minimum fish stock size), that specifies rules for a given ocean fishery system (e.g. ‘management measures’).

A local group organization (e.g. a council of elders) in a community, articulates rules (unwritten) for use of an adjacent coral reef fishery system, which influences behavior of the different fishers in the system, and at the same time are recognized formally (in a written document) by the local organization of the state (e.g. district government) as rules enforceable by the state.

Finally, in addition to these two ‘vertical’ characteristics, for each of the three components of fisheries governance we can elaborate unique ‘horizontal’ characteristics based on its intention, as will be discussed in the remainder of this section.

Policies for governance of ocean fishery systems. As mentioned previously, a key component of any ocean fishery system is the overriding principles (i.e. values) and objectives of the governance institutions (FAO, 2001a), which are often articulated as discrete policy statements or in some cases as part of laws articulating rules written by

105 the state. In describing the substance of policies for fisheries governance, the following

(‘horizontal’) characteristics have been identified throughout the literature:

1. the overriding or guiding principles, and

2. the stated objectives, and in some cases the targeted outcomes (Gupta, 2010).

Because governance is based on a range of principles (Kooiman and Bavinck, 2013), policies originating from states (i.e. ‘public policies’) are often articulated with the intention of following principles and achieving objectives and outcomes that can be placed into four categories:

1. Security, including physical security, as well as protection of agreed rights and

entitlements, and protection from natural disasters;

2. Equity, or the eligibility of all individuals to agreed rights and protections, and

treatment under rules;

3. Liberty, or the protection of certain freedoms of individuals; and

4. Efficiency, or promotion of the most productive uses of society’s resources for

the greatest welfare (Gupta, 2010).

These types of principles and objectives are not always coherent, regardless of the scale or jurisdiction of origin, in that there are trade-offs between them in any given context, as illustrated below:

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Efficiency

Liberty Security

Equity Source: Gupta, 2010

Figure 18. Illustration of categories of policy principles and objectives, and their Trade-Offs

Utilizing these broad categories, some universal or common policy principles and objectives can be identified as common characteristics summarized within a fisheries governance classification system.

Beginning with the principles guiding ocean fisheries governance, the Millennium

Ecosystem Assessment (2005) emphasized that institutions should be guided by agreed universal values or principles, and provide the mechanism by which these principles govern the access to and use of common pool resources. The table below summarizes a group of policy statements of universally-agreed principles assessed here as relevant to the governance of ocean fishery systems at the international level, many of which have

107 been adopted at the national level by states and in some cases captured in legislation in the preamble or initial sections (Kuemlangan, 2009).

Table 4. Selected international policy statements of principles relevant to ocean fishery systems

Policy Statement (Document)* Organization Year

Universal Declaration on Human Rights United Nations General Assembly 1948

Declaration of the Conference on the United Nations Conference on the Human 1972 Human Environment Environment Declaration of the World Food Conference World Food Conference 1974

United Nations Convention on the Law of United Nations Convention on the Law of 1982 the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) the Sea Report of the World Commission on United Nations World Commission on 1987 Environment and Development: Our Environment and Development Common Future Rio Declaration on Environment and United Nations Conference on 1992 Development Environment and Development Vienna Declaration and Program of Action World Conference on Human Rights 1993

Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries FAO 1995

Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable World Summit on Sustainable 2002 Development Development The Future We Want Outcome Document United Nations Conference on Sustainable 2012 Development Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible FAO 2012 Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security Voluntary Guidelines for Securing FAO 2015 Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication * Additional international policy statements potentially relevant to ocean fishery systems include (Westlund, 2013): the 2005 FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security (Right to Food Guidelines); the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Covenant); and the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Indigenous Peoples Declaration).

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As shown in the table above, since the end of World War Two the United Nations (UN) has played an active role in defining these universal principles, beginning with the UN’s

Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 which may be considered the foundation for a number of principles guiding human interaction with the environment

(Sterner and Correa, 2013). In re-affirming the fundamental dignity of all human life, the Declaration emphasizes liberty, security and equity for all individuals (United

Nations, 1948). Of particular relevance to the interaction with ecological systems and the use of common pool resources, the Declaration states that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment…..or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control (United Nations, 1948).”

Following the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the UN hosted a Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, which highlighted the need for global cooperation and action to address environmental degradation, and resulted in 26 common principles aimed at inspiring and guiding the ‘preservation and enhancement of the human environment (UN, 1972).’ These principles broadened definitions of equity to include future generations, and the responsibility to maintain and safeguard the environment for both present and future generations (UN, 1972). Furthermore, these principles

109 emphasized the role of economic development in helping to remedy environmental degradation in lower income countries (UN, 1972).

Just afterwards in 1974, FAO hosted a first World Food Conference that issued a

Declaration stating that "every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop their physical and mental faculties," and set a goal for the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition within a decade (World Summit on Food Security, 2009). Subsequently, a number of World

Food Summits have been held, most recently in 2009 (World Summit on Food Security,

2009).

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) was signed in 1982, articulating for the first time common principles and rules for governance of access to and common uses of the ocean (Wang, 1992). While the treaty articulates rules for use of the ocean, a number of articles (notably articles 61 and 62) reflect key principles for ocean fishery systems, essentially revolving around equity to future generations as states are obligated to determine allowable harvests for fish stocks under their jurisdiction and to maintain or restore species harvested in waters under their jurisdiction or by their fleets to levels that can support MSY, considering also ecological impacts (e.g. species associated with or dependent upon harvested species) (UNCLOS,

1982). At the same time, the treaty reflects equity considerations to present generations, emphasizing opportunities for developing states and qualifications on harvest limits to

110 allow for the relevant environmental and social factors, including ensuring the needs of coastal communities and the special requirements of developing states (UNCLOS,

1982).

Subsequently, the UN General Assembly convened the World Commission on

Environment and Development (WCED) that produced a report in 1987 that fully defined the concept of sustainable development (WCED, 1987). Essentially, the concept reflects concerns for equity or fairness not just to present generations, but also future generations, carrying forward Rawls’ suggestion to place all peoples into an original position ‘behind a veil of ignorance’ that prevents them from knowing their future position in society (Rawls, 1971). In such a position, one could conceive of a hypothetical meeting between members of different generations behind the veil, and not knowing to which generation they would belong, proposing principles that would apply to all generations (Rawls, 1971). From this hypothetical meeting one could expect the concept of sustainable development to emerge as a universal principle, where future generations should be left no worse off than current generations (Rawls, 1971). The

WCED therefore defined the concept of sustainable development as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987). The concept of sustainable development was articulated to include environmental, economic and social dimensions, and to involve a progressive transformation of economy and society, recognizing ecological and economic interdependence and the need for governance institutions to adapt accordingly (WCED,

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1987). Essentially, the WCED redefined the principle of equity to continue to include present generations, but also future generations – noting that economic growth remained central to meeting needs of the present and its increasing population if shared widely

(WCED, 1987).

In 1992 the results of the WCED crystallized in the UN Conference on the Human

Environment (UNCED), with a statement of 27 principles reaffirming human beings at the center of sustainable development, and enshrined sustainability as a core principle, balancing equity to present generations (notably the right to development for low income countries) with future generations (UNCED, 1992). Furthermore, as part of sustainability, the declaration emphasized the pre-cautionary principle: “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation (UNCED, 1992).” The results of this conference and the internationally- agreed principles were significant: FAO (2001a) notes that more environmentally conscious, precautionary and participative forms of fishery governance emerged around the world from the UNCED process. The Conference also produced a global work program or action plan to put the 27 principles into practice and achieve global sustainable development: Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992).

Not long after, the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna issued a declaration reaffirming the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, stating that these rights

112 are universal, indivisible, and interdependent (World Conference on Human Rights,

1993). The Conference articulated a right to development, and balanced present and future equity by stating that it should be fulfilled so as to meet equitably the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations (World

Conference on Human Rights, 1993).

In 1991 FAO’s committee of country representatives, the Committee on Fisheries

(COFI), recommended that FAO articulate more fully the principles responsible and sustainable use of ocean fish stocks consistent with UNCLOS, a call that was supported at UNCED (1995, FAO). Building further on the outcomes of UNCED, the Code was agreed by states at a conference hosted by FAO in 1995, with 19 principles for application of the sustainable development concept to govern ocean fisheries in order to meet the basic needs of both present and future generations (FAO, 1995). The Code would subsequently be steered by four International Plans of Action, two strategies and

28 technical guidelines produced by FAO. The Code’s full 19 principles can be found in Article 6 (see FAO, 1995), but are summarized here as follows:

(i) Equity to present generations:

- States should States should appropriately protect the rights of fishers and fish

workers, particularly those engaged in subsistence, small-scale and artisanal

fisheries, to a secure and just livelihood, as well as preferential access, where

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appropriate, to traditional fishing grounds and resources in the waters under

their national jurisdiction.

(ii) Equity to both present and future generations (i.e. sustainable development

concept):

- The right to fish in any given institutional framework includes the duty or

obligation to conserve fish stocks and ensure that they are sufficient to meet

the needs of the present generation in the context of food security, poverty

alleviation and sustainable development. Towards this, overfishing should

be prevented in any governance framework, particularly the growth of

fishing fleets and capacity, and measures taken to rehabilitate overfished

stocks – using the best scientific information available and applying a pre-

cautionary approach.

- The right to fish in any given institutional framework includes the duty or

obligation to conserve not just the fish stocks targeted, but the ecosystems

upon which they depend, particularly by protecting critical habitats and

ensuring that fishing gear is selective and minimizes incidental catch of non-

targeted species. This principle would begin to become operationalized at a

subsequent international conference convened by FAO in Reykjavic in 2001,

on ‘responsible fisheries in the marine ecosystem’ (FAO, 2001c).

(iii)Process of ocean fisheries governance:

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- States should ensure that rules based on these principles are enforced,

including for fishing vessels they register.

- States should ensure that the process for policy formulation and for

decision-making on rules governing ocean fishery systems under their

jurisdiction is transparent, responsive and inclusive of all stakeholders.

- Stakeholders should collaborate at all levels – notably at the international

level (regional and global) – in order to ensure that these principles are

followed in ocean fishery systems and any disputes are resolved.

In 2002 the United Nations convened a World Conference on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in order to take stock of the progress made in implementing Agenda

21, and update the global work program to achieve the objective of sustainable development according to the Rio Principles – in the Johannesburg Plan of action, see

Table 7 below (United Nations, 2002).

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Table 5. Summary of fisheries objectives and targets in Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation

UNCED Rio 1992: Agenda 21 Plan of Action WSSD Johannesburg 2002: Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture

Areas under national jurisdiction: Fisheries  Promote enhanced collection and exchange  JPOI: Maintain or restore stocks to levels of data on fish stocks, as well as that can produce the maximum sustainable development of analytical tools and bio- yield with the aim of achieving these goals economic models for depleted stocks on an urgent basis and  Develop and promote the use of where possible not later than 2015. environmentally sound technology and  JPOI: Implement the FAO International fishing practices Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and  Implement strategies for sustainable use of Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and marine living resources, including through Unregulated (IUU) Fishing by 2004. legal and regulatory frameworks –  JPOI: Implement the relevant UN and, including small-scale artisanal fisheries. where appropriate, associated regional  Undertake capacity building for developing fisheries agreements, noting in particular the countries to conduct sustainable fisheries UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO and aquaculture through training, transfer of Compliance Agreement, and the 1995 Code technology, and multidisciplinary training of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. and research.  JPOI: Eliminate subsidies that contribute to  Provide support to local fishing illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing communities, in particular those that rely on and to overcapacity. fishing for subsistence, indigenous people  JPOI: Assist developing countries in and women. coordinating policies and programs at the  Establish sustainable aquaculture regional and sub-regional levels aimed at the development strategies. conservation and sustainable management of fishery resources and integrated coastal area Areas beyond national jurisdiction: management, including through the  Ensure cooperation and coordination promotion of sustainable coastal and small- between states and through global and scale fishing activities and the development regional intergovernmental fisheries bodies of related infrastructure. to ensure sustainable utilization of fisheries.  Convene an intergovernmental conference under United Nations auspices with a view to promoting effective implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.  States should take effective action to ensure that fishing vessels flying their flags on the high seas comply with applicable conservation and management rules of global and regional fisheries bodies.

Sources: UNCED, 1992; UN, 2002

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In 2012 states reconvened in Rio to renew international commitment to the principles of sustainable development articulated in 1992, emphasizing poverty and hunger eradication in the present generation as the priority for following these principles

(United Nations, 2012). Notably, the Declaration emphasizes the need for sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth in order to achieve sustainable development, and introduces the concept of policies to promote a ‘green economy’ that better aligns production and consumption patterns with ecosystem conservation, regeneration, restoration and resilience (United Nations, 2012). Additionally, the conference reaffirmed the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the responsibility of states to protect and promote human rights for all, notably the right to development and the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right to food

(United Nations, 2012). Finally, the conference emphasized principles for the process of governing human interactions with the environment at all levels, stating that governance institutions should be effective, transparent, accountable and democratic

(United Nations, 2012).

As a key element of informing the institutions governing ocean fishery systems, and more specifically the tenure of these fisheries, in 2012 FAO facilitated agreement of its member states on voluntary guidelines to states for tenure of land, forests and fisheries.

These guidelines included a number of principles focused on applying the higher principles in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights to governance of tenure, including the promotion of equitable tenure rights and access to fisheries for all women

117 and men, youth and vulnerable and traditionally marginalized people within the national context, and recognition and respect, safeguarding, promotion and facilitation of enjoyment of all legitimate tenure rights (FAO, 2012b). The guidelines include principles to actively work to prevent tenure disputes from arising, and providing accessible means for conflict resolution, and prompt and just compensation where tenure rights are taken for public purposes (FAO, 2012b). Lastly, the guidelines emphasize a number of principles around processes to protect legitimate tenure rights, through inclusive decision-making that ensures meaningful and informed participation of individuals and groups (FAO, 2012b).

Finally, following on the principles of equity in the governance of ocean fishery systems and particularly of tenure in ocean fishery systems, in 2015 FAO facilitated agreement of its member states on voluntary guidelines for governance of small-scale fisheries in support of the Code of Conduct. The guidelines emphasize the relevance for small-scale fisheries of a number of universally-agreed principles, including: (i) respect for human rights and dignity; (ii) equity to the present generation in ocean fishery systems, including respect of cultures, non-discrimination, gender equality and equity, and social responsibility; (iii) equity to future generations by emphasizing sustainable development; and (iv) inclusive, sustainable and fair governance processes, including consultation and participation, rule of law, transparency, accountability, holistic and integrated approaches (FAO, 2015b). Essentially, the guidelines promote an approach to governance of ocean fishery systems focused on small-scale fishers that keeps the

118 principle of respect for human rights at the forefront, and particularly poverty eradication and food security (FAO, 2015b).

Throughout these policy statements, a number of different principles have received universal agreement that are applicable to guiding the governance of ocean fishery systems, which might be organized into a classification system according to the broad categories mentioned earlier, together with the addition of principles and objectives for process, as follows:

- Security or protection of universal human rights and dignity – including

eradication of poverty and hunger to ensure that everyone has a standard of

living adequate for health and well-being, as well as protection of legitimate

tenure rights (these principles could also be considered as part of equity, in that

all are eligible for protections of universal rights and dignity);

- Equity to present generations, with a focus on subsistence, small-scale and

artisanal fishers, and including respect of cultures, non-discrimination, gender

equality and equity, and social responsibility;

- Equity to future generations based on the concept of sustainable development –

meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future

generations to meet their own needs – thus redefining equity to also include

future generations and in the case of ocean fishery systems ensuring that fish

stocks were maintained or restored to levels at least capable of supporting the

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maximum sustainable yield while duly conserving wider ecological units and

protecting natural habitats;

- Efficiency in the use of fish stocks to promote economic growth to help meet the

needs of present generations and the increasing population; and

- Processes of governance according to these principles, including transparency,

accountability, rule of law and inclusion.

The fisheries governance literature review suggests that categories of objectives and targeted outcomes for ocean fishery governance are often consistent across statements of policy at various levels and origin of jurisdiction. The principles summarized from international statements have often been translated into various objectives for fisheries at different levels and specific measures of success or outcomes, described in three broad categories:

1. Conservation (i.e. resource maintenance or ‘environmental’ objective) for

future generations, including:

a. A biological objective to maintain stock size to a minimum level;

b. An ecological objective to minimize the impacts of fishing on the

physical environment and on non-targeted (i.e. ‘by-catch’), associated

and dependent species;

2. Efficiency (i.e. economic productivity objective) for present generations; and

3. Equity to present generations, (i.e. ‘social’ objective), notably coastal

community welfare, for example maximizing employment opportunities for

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those dependent on the fishery for their livelihoods (Charles, 2001; Cochrane,

2000; Hilborn, 2007; Cochrane, 2009).

While it is impossible to maximize all three objectives simultaneously, the Code of

Conduct notes that states’ objectives are often some form of ‘optimum utilization’ of the fish stock(s) (FAO, 1995), whereby the right combination of the above three objectives is found to maximize the net benefits to social welfare in the present, without compromising principles of equity to future generations (i.e. sustainable development).

Indeed ocean fishery systems are often characterized in the literature by the pursuit of these multiple objectives simultaneously, which will come together through institutions in a different mix depending on the context (Gulland, 1977; Charles, 2001). Sometimes they are compatible, sometimes in conflict (Hilborn, 2007). For example, meeting the objective for increasing equity to present generations has the benefit of reducing conflict among fishers over finite and often scarce fish resources, while achieving the objective to increase efficiency allows for more fish to be caught at lower cost, and thus at greater net economic benefit to fishers (as one measure of welfare). Conversely, the failure to develop effective institutions to promote collective action to govern ocean fishery systems can lead to both inequity and inefficiency: in terms of deterioration of the resources (inequity to future generations), increasing and unresolved conflicts (inequity to current generation, as the available resources decrease) and declining economic returns (inefficiency) (Ostrom, 1990).

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Governance of ocean fishery systems in order to meet the locally appropriate mix of these objectives of equity (to both present and future generations) and efficiency, could be termed ‘fisheries management’. The term is widely used, for example a Google search on ‘fisheries and management’ yielded 8.43 million results on August 28, 2011

(Davis and Ruddle, 2012), and 17.1 million results on December 7, 2015. However, there is no clear and generally accepted definition of ‘fisheries management’ (Cochrane,

2009). According to FAO’s Technical Guidelines, fisheries management is an

“integrated process of information gathering, analysis, planning, consultation, decision- making, allocation of resources and formulation and implementation, with enforcement as necessary, of regulations and rules which govern fisheries activities in order to ensure the continued productivity of the resources and the accomplishment of other fisheries objectives (FAO, 1997).”10 While there is a great deal of overlap between the terms fisheries governance and fisheries management (World Bank, 2004), the latter is defined here within the context of ocean fisheries governance: as the process of developing and enforcing rules to govern fisheries in order to meet the objective of equity to future generations alongside the context-specific objectives of present generations (i.e. the locally-appropriate mix of equity – to both present and future generations – and efficiency objectives). For example, Grafton et al. (2008) describe fisheries governance as the sum of the legal, social, economic and political arrangements used to manage

10 FAO (1997) also uses the term ‘fisheries management’ in a far more specific reference to regulating fishing effort in a given ocean fishery system in order to maintain a fish stock to certain levels by controlling fishing mortality.

122 fisheries. Hence, while the term ocean fisheries governance is used more broadly to define the systemic concept of the institutions and organizations that control or influence fishing activities, the term fisheries management is defined as the process of carrying out this governance towards the objective of ensuring the long-term sustainable use of the resources (per the FAO Code of Conduct, paragraph 7.2.1). Others assert that governance is a more ‘inclusive and ambitious’ term than management, generally involving other actors in addition to governments (Chuenpagdee and Sumaila, 2010).

In this sense, governance is broader than management, the latter being functionally defined and perceived as a technical exercise of employing means to achieve given objectives, in comparison to governance which includes the deliberation and determination of basic principles that should underpin institutions and organizations

(Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009). Alternatively, fisheries management could be said to be the process of fisheries governance for the objective of sustainable use. Additionally, the Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines emphasize that achieving this objective of long- term sustainable use of fisheries helps secure the ecological foundation for food production (FAO, 2015b).

The Code of Conduct recommends a number of sub-objectives towards the overriding objective of long-term sustainable use:

a. excess fishing capacity is avoided and exploitation of the stocks remains

economically viable;

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b. the economic conditions under which fishing industries operate promote

responsible fisheries;

c. the interests of fishers, including those engaged in subsistence, small-scale and

artisanal fisheries, are taken into account;

d. biodiversity of aquatic habitats and ecosystems is conserved and endangered

species are protected;

e. depleted stocks are allowed to recover or, where appropriate, are actively

restored;

f. adverse environmental impacts on the resources from human activities are

assessed and, where appropriate, corrected; and

g. pollution, waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, catch of non-target

species, both fish and non- fish species, and impacts on associated or dependent

species are minimized, through measures including, to the extent practicable, the

development and use of selective, environmentally safe and cost-effective

fishing gear and techniques (FAO, 1995).

The process of fisheries governance to meet the objective of long-term sustainable use of the resources (i.e. the locally-appropriate mix of equity – to both present and future generations – and efficiency objectives) will involve trade-offs, as illustrated in the depiction of the sustainable fishing yield curve (Hanna, 1999; Hilborn, 2007). In the example below, the results of ‘traditional management’ efforts are shown to have reflected an emphasis on equity to present generations, in terms of maximum yields and

124 employment, and more ‘recent’ efforts or the ‘new consensus’ is said to reflect lower yields, higher profits and larger fish stocks (Hilborn, 2007).

In terms of measuring the targeted outcomes from each of these objectives, a review of policies suggests that they have commonly employed a number of different indicators:

1. Conservation (i.e. resource maintenance or ‘environmental’ objective) for future generations, including maintaining the resources at present capabilities for potential use of future generations, in terms of:

 A biological objective to maintain stock size to a minimum level, which has

traditionally been measured as the biomass (B) capable of supporting the MSY

– i.e. Bmsy (Hilborn, 2007). This measure of the biological objective for fish

stocks is specified in UNCLOS, as well as the Code of Conduct, as qualified by

relevant environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements

of developing countries (FAO, 1995). However, there is little guidance as to how

to qualify this objective and measure by environmental and economic factors

(Hilborn, 2007). The measure has now been agreed as part of the new

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed by the UN General Assembly in

2015, which includes as a measure of the ocean conservation objective, “by

2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported

and unregulated fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement

science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest

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time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as

determined by their biological characteristics (UN, 2015).”

 An ecological objective to minimize the impacts of fishing on the physical

environment, often with an emphasis on measures of harvest for non-targeted

species (‘by-catch’), as well as wider ecosystem considerations in access and

use rules – the ‘ecosystem-approach to fisheries’ (Hilborn, 2007).

2. Efficiency (i.e. economic productivity objective) for present generations. The concept of economic efficiency as a measure of benefits from ocean fishery systems has been the source of considerable confusion in policy discussions, and significant study and analysis (Charles, 2001). Essentially, efficiency is one measure of outcomes or the contribution from an ocean fishery system to ‘social welfare.’ The term ‘social welfare’ is frequently used to encompass the multiple constituents of human well-being, including the basic materials for a good life, freedom of choice and action, health, good social relations, and security, any one of which can be affected by changes in ocean fishery systems (MEA, 2005; World Bank, 2015b).

Defining and measuring an increase in social welfare as a result of an ocean fishery system is difficult, and indeed measurements of the term have been elusive even after centuries of effort (Gupta, 2010). Since the 19th century utilitarians defined social welfare in terms of the total ‘utility’ in society (synonymous for well-being), where utility is a summary measure of all the net values to the individuals of all the benefits

126 and costs of achieving a particular outcome, and used ‘marginal utility’ as a measure of changes in social welfare – e.g. the marginal utility of a dollar given to someone (Gupta,

2010; Ostrom, 2005). The challenge was that interpersonal utilities are not measurable, as personal feelings cannot be quantified (e.g. if a dollar is taken from a miserly rich person and given to a happy go lucky poor person, the redistribution of income may not affect the total utility of society at all) (Gupta, 2010).

Economics – known as the ‘science of scarcity’ – has arisen to provide a quantitative measure of changes in utility (and hence social welfare – i.e. ‘welfare economics’), based on observations of the preferences that people express in a world of limited resources (i.e. scarcity), via inter-personal exchanges and transactions (Tietenburg and

Lewis, 2009). Each individual’s preferences are represented by a utility function, which they will try to maximize in the face of scarcity when making choices (Kolstad, 2011).

Such utility functions measure preferences based on economic costs or benefits associated with an outcome, and not intrinsic values such as joy, shame, regret and guilt for example – all of which are extremely challenging to measure (Ostrom, 2005). A social utility function is the aggregate of the utility functions of each individual in a group or society, and aims to represent the total utility (or social welfare) for one alternative compared to the other, where a decision exists about the use of scarce resources (Kolstad, 2009). As such, society would be concerned with the total amount of utility from a given resource, such as the ecological system of an ocean fishery system

(Kolstad, 2009).

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The challenge is moving from measures of individual preferences which can be observed in exchanges or transactions, to measures of group preferences (Kolstad,

2009). Voting is one method for translating individual preferences into a societal ranking, as a measure of outcomes and a group preference for one option over the other

(Kolstad, 2009). However, Arrow (in Kolstad, 2009) famously defined the six basic requirements for a measure of social outcomes to inform such choices:

1. Completeness: we should be able to compare all social alternatives

2. Unanimity: if everyone in society prefers A to B, then society should prefer A

3. Non-dictatorship: No one should always get their way, i.e. no one’s preferences

should be exactly the same as society’s

4. Universality: any possible individual rankings of alternatives is permissable

5. Transitivity: If A is socially preferred to B, and B is socially preferred to C, than

A should be socially preferred to C

6. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: society’s choice between alternatives A

and B should depend only on how individuals rank A and B, without regard to

other alternatives.

However, there is no rule satisfying all 6 of these axioms for converting individual preferences into societal preference ordering, and hence no one single measure of outcomes from social choices and solutions to social problems (Kolstad, 2009).

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For this reason, Pareto proposed a principle that the only measure of an increase in social welfare or utility is that at least one person is made better off by an action or change, and no person is made worse off (hence no judgment is made about the equity of the initial distribution of wealth). A Pareto-preferred or improved choice suggested that if the benefits of an action or change were sufficiently large that the beneficiaries could compensate those losing from the change via side payments such that the latter were no worse off, while the beneficiaries still remained better off than before payment of compensation, than social welfare would be increased (Kolstad, 2009; Gupta, 2010).

However, given the logistical challenges posed by applying this principle in many cases, for example those losing cannot be identified, nor their losses adequately measured given that they are spread out over society, Kaldor and Hicks argued that compensation need not actually be paid – as long as the total benefits of the action outweighed the costs, net social welfare would be increased (Kolstad, 2009). The maximum allocation of society’s resources – where no alternative allocation is possible that could make at least one person better off without making anyone worse off (i.e. a Pareto improvement), allowing for Kaldor-Hicks theoretical compensation or ‘side payments’ from winners or losers such that it is the net benefit that is positive – is said to be economically

‘efficient’ (Boardman et al, 2011).

In order to measure efficiency, changes to individuals’ utility are monetized based on the preferences (or ‘willingness-to-pay) they express in transactions or exchanges, and aggregated into quantitative terms for comparison (Boardman et al, 2011). Using the

129 monetization of changes to utility (or benefits or losses), the outcome of an action or change can be measured as efficient (i.e. a Pareto improvement) if the difference between the value of the inputs (in terms of the monetary opportunity cost of using that input as proposed, rather than its’ the best alternative use) and the value of the outputs

(in terms of society’s willingness-to-pay money for them) in a given situation is positive

(Boardman et al, 2011). This calculation is known as ‘cost-benefit analysis’, an economic method of measuring efficiency (and only efficiency – not other objectives such as equity) (Boardman et al, 2011). The first theorem of welfare economics is that efficiency will be maximized at a competitive equilibrium, i.e. a well-functioning, perfectly competitive marketplace (thus only in the presence of some failure of the market is there a social problem requiring cooperation and in some cases institutional responses) (Boardman et al, 2011).

In summary, the economic measures of efficiency are the magnitude of the change in the flow of the net benefits (or wealth) associated with an allocation or reallocation of resources (Ostrom, 2011), based on expected utility theory as discussed previously, and forms the basis of neoclassical economics (North, 1990). Essentially, efficiency is a condition where the existing set of constraints will produce economic growth (North,

1990), which is the accumulation of wealth or capital (i.e. assets that have value),

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Box 11. Monetary measure of efficiency based on transactions in a marketplace

Neoclassical economic analysis measures changes in a person’s utility due to shifting allocations of limited resources, by looking at the preferences that they express in transactions. Imagine two people start out with initial endowments, A and B respectively, and each derives a utility from those endowments that can be expressed as an ‘indifference curve’ between A and B (i.e. concave upward curves that show a mixture between A and B – how much of B would be needed to offset a given loss of A for each person and vice versa). With an exchange, people can trade among them, so that instead of being stuck with their initial endowments, they can adjust their allocations to maximize their utility. Essentially, each individual starts with their indifference curve, i.e. their preferences, and an initial endowment, and can find a place where the slope of their indifference curve is tangent to the slope of someone else’s – for a given total allocation of resources to choose from, such that the two would be willing to exchange to this point. This is essentially their contract curve. Places along the contract curve, where the exchanges allow a mixture of resources that increase utility for both, are said to be more efficient – i.e. they have increased total efficiency or utility by exchanging – until they will eventually reach a Pareto optimal allocation of the total resources between them – i.e. efficiency. As such, the place along the contract curve where utility is maximized will become the market equilibrium, within the maximum resource allocation between the two people. Essentially, the price will stabilize, i.e. market equilibrium, at the Pareto optimal allocation of the initial endowment of resources among the participants, where their indifference curves or utility curves are highest and are tangent. The marginal rate of substitution between the two commodities, on the contract curve where the indifference curves of the two individuals are tangent, is a line with a slope equal to the price ration between the two commodities. The ability to exchange allowed this to happen, such that efficiency is achieved, or maximum utility.

Indifference curves (measures of utility expressed in transactions) form the basis for perhaps the most well- known illustration in social sciences, the supply and demand curve (Gupta, 2010). A demand curve shows the quantity of a good that is demanded as a function of its price (i.e. for any price, how much will be demanded), essentially a relationship between quantity and the marginal willingness to pay. A supply curve represents the quantity of the good that will be produced as a function of price. Market equilibrium is the point where the two curves cross – i.e. the Pareto optimal point – efficiency. At this point, social surplus (consumer plus producer surplus) or net benefits to society are maximized.

Essentially, this is the basic measure of utility subject to limited resources, which ultimately generates a demand curve. The overall social welfare gain is in monetary terms, since utility is not directly measurable.

Source: Kolstad (2011)

available for increased standards of living and enhanced (at least components of) human well-being and societal welfare.

Measures of economic efficiency from the fishing activity in ocean fishery systems are based on the net economic benefits or wealth created by fishing, defined as ‘resource

131 rent’ (Charles, 2001; Hilborn, 2007; World Bank and FAO, 2009). The concept of resource rent is based on Ricardo’s 1809 theory of rents, where a factor in the production process (e.g. land) is in fixed supply at a point in time and indestructible and non- augmentable, and therefore the corresponding supply would be forthcoming even if the market price were zero (FAO, 2005; World Bank and FAO, 2009). As such, any payment received by the owner for permitting use of the land can be regarded as surplus to that unit of land (i.e. quantity of the factor of production) – essentially this market price for use of the land is rental income to the owner and constitutes pure profits since the resource (i.e. the land) is already owned and no additional investments need be made

(World Bank and FAO, 2009). Building upon the work of Gordon (1954) and Scott

(1955), Clark and Munro (1975) extended this concept to ocean fishery systems, defining efficiency of harvesting (and thus social utility or welfare) as maximizing the resource rent, given that the supply of fish is fixed and already endowed by nature, such that any revenues above and beyond the normal profits in the economy are considered as equivalent to the rent on access to the resource (World Bank and FAO, 2009). The rent is thus best considered to be the surplus value accruing to the user of an asset calculated after all costs and normal returns have been taken into account (UN, 2014).

Resource rent from fish harvesting is generally defined as the difference between total revenues (TR) from the first sale of the yield (Y) of fish, and total costs of the effort (e) to catch the fish (TCe), including the costs of employing the various factors of production (estimated at their opportunity costs given that they may have other uses in

132 the economy), together with what is considered to be a reasonable return on capital based on the risk in a given context (i.e. a ‘normal profit’) (WHAT, 2000; FAO, 2005).

Essentially, the resource rent or rent in a given ocean fishery system is the ‘super- profits’ above and beyond a normal rate of return on capital (Lange, 2003; Anderson and Seijo, 2010; UN, 2014) as follows:

Resource rent = TR – TCe; where:

 Total revenues = PY, where:

 P= Price of fish at first sale, and Y = yield of fish

 TCe = intermediate consumption + compensation of employees + consumption

of fixed capital + normal profit, where:

 Intermediate consumption = input costs of goods and services at purchasers’

prices, including taxes on products; and

 Normal profit = opportunity cost of capital, normally the average return on

capital in an economy, or the average cost of borrowing capital, multiplied by

the value of fixed capital stock in the fishery.

Other definitions of efficiency in the harvesting sub-sector of an ocean fishery system have suggested that rent is not the sum total of the economic benefits, but should also be added to the consumer surplus (i.e. the positive difference between the price paid for the fish and the buyer’s willingness to pay for the fish) (World Bank and FAO, 2009).

Whether or not this consumer surplus is added to it, resource rent is generally considered as a measure of the level of static efficiency in the harvesting sub-sector of an ocean

133 fishery system, or the optimal use of the resources and the inputs used to harvest them at a given point in time, in order to enhance social utility (Anderson and Seijo, 2010).

The point in time for a fishery where resource rent is maximized, i.e. the level of fishing effort under fixed methods of fishing on a given stock where the difference between total revenues and total costs is greatest, is considered the static maximum economic yield (MEY) – or efficiency in a static sense (WHAT, 2000; World Bank and FAO,

2009; Tietenburg and Lewis, 2009). At this point, the cost of additional fishing effort

(MCe) will be equal to the revenues of that additional fishing effort (MRe), similar to a market equilibrium, where there are no further profits or economic benefits to gain from additional fishing – such that the incremental economic benefit from additional fishing will be less than the incremental economic cost generated (Anderson and Seijo, 2010).

As mentioned previously, the social sub-system of an ocean fishery SES contains a number of segments, of which harvesting is but one. While this is the only segment of the social sub-system interacting directly with the ecological sub-system to create a resource rent, experts have noted that harvesting at economically efficient levels in ocean fishery systems can drive downstream efficiencies in the system, for example in the processing segment (World Bank and FAO, 2009). The reasoning is that in order operate at efficient levels, the harvesting segment of the social sub-system will adjust the quantity, quality and timing of fish catch and landings to match the demand of downstream segments and generate increased profits in these segments (World Bank and FAO, 2009). Hence, the resource rent reflects the economic efficiency and thus net

134 economic benefits to society from the harvesting segment of the social sub-system of the ocean fishery SES only (using revenues at point of first sale when the fish catch is landed), except in instances where there is a high degree of vertical integration and hence the first sale is much farther up the supply chain (e.g. with freezer trawlers where it is difficult to separate harvesting activities from processing) (World Bank and FAO,

2009).

For reference, the role of resource rent in the final value of a given fish product can be illustrated as follows:

 Final value of a fish at consumption (retail price) = Value added at all stages of

production (wages, salaries, interest, depreciation, resource rent, taxes and

normal profits) + Costs of production (harvesting costs + processing, wholesale

and retail costs), where:

o Harvesting costs = fuel/oil, ice, crew groceries, dockage charges, vessel

and gear repair, accounting fees, bait, insurance and unloading, and

miscellaneous purchases such as gloves, rain gear, etc.; and

o Processing, wholesale and retail costs = containers and packaging

materials, various supplies, ingredients and other materials, fuel and

electric energy, transportation, insurance, repair and maintenance, and

miscellaneous service costs (NOAA, 2015).

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Box 12. Trends in the debate on equity vs. efficiency in poverty reduction An influential book published by the World Bank, Redistribution with Growth, by Chenery and others (1974), set in motion an active academic and policy debate on how best to measure such a concept. The authors argue that overall economic growth (measured by growth in gross national product [GNP]) is too narrow and cannot adequately be used as a social welfare indicator. By showing how growth in GNP can be decomposed into the growth of the incomes of socioeconomic groups with weights proportional to the groups’ existing share in the national product, the book presents a policy dilemma: in the process of maximizing overall growth, the best strategy would be to focus on those groups whose original share of GNP was the largest (in other words, the richest). As an alternative, the authors propose looking at the income growth performance of the poor to address the concern of maximizing social well-being. In this way, the concept of the growth performance of the bottom 40 percent and the goal of inclusive growth were introduced, although not widely used, as concrete measures emerging from this work. By the 1980s, a new strand of the literature emerged that contributed to the broadening of the goals of development and, as a consequence, the measurement of these goals. Led by the writings of Amartya Sen and consistent with Rawlsian concepts, these pieces argue that access to or ownership of material goods should not be the goal of development (Sen 1983, 1985, 1999). Instead, development and progress should be seen in terms of functioning (what a person manages to do) and capability (what a person is able to do). Sen points out that this approach goes back to the work of Adam Smith and Karl Marx, but it was lost in the increasing effort to measure the progress of nations by their incomes. A direct consequence of this work was the emergence of a broad range of non-monetary measures of living standards, such as the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index or, more recently, the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative’s multidimensional poverty index and the World Bank’s Human Opportunity Index This perspective was also implicit in the “broad-based growth” discussions that pervaded the 1990 World Development Report (World Bank 1990) and the focus over the past few decades on measuring development progress on the basis of a broader set of indicators related to human development (not just income).

Following concerns about the unequal impacts of growth and in the context of explicit global commitments to poverty reduction in the Millennium Development Goals, a new strand of work in the 2000s re-catalyzed the discussion on who should benefit from growth. An academic debate on the conceptualization and operationalization of pro-poor growth emerged, with various prevailing views. The “absolute approach,” suggested by Ravallion and Chen (2003) and Kraay (2006), defines any poverty-reducing episode as being pro-poor. The “relative view,” held by Kakwani and Pernia (2000), Son (2004), Klasen (2004, 2008), Essama- Nssah and Lambert (2009), and Negre (2010), requires the poor to benefit disproportionately from growth. In another strand of work, Subramanian (2011) points to the notion of “egalitarian growth,” which requires that at least 40 percent of increases in GDP accrue to the bottom 40 percent. Depending on initial inequality, pro- poor growth could require the growth in incomes of the bottom 40 percent to exceed dramatically the growth in incomes of the overall population. These concepts gave rise to several indicators and measures, with no overall agreement on how to balance the trade-offs in adopting a single measure. Basu (2001, 2006) takes a step further by providing some practical suggestions on how to go about measuring an inclusive growth concept in a systematic way at the global level. He argues that development goals that go beyond income growth to broader objectives—a better quality of life, increased education, and a more equitable distribution of goods and services—are indeed desirable. Basu notes that a meaningful summary measure that would capture these multiple objectives is urgently needed. For this reason, in 2015 the World Bank created a new Commission on Global Poverty to find new, multi-dimensional measures of poverty.

Source: World Bank (2015b, 2015c) 3. Equity to present generations, (i.e. ‘social’ objective). Alternative to efficiency

measures of social welfare (essentially growing the size of benefits available to society)

136 in ocean fishery systems (SESs), social objectives are harder to define, for example in

OECD countries often revolving around employment opportunities, income distribution, regional development, food security and community resilience (OECD,

2011). Rawls (1971) famously focused on the distribution and the absolute level of well- being of the poorest individuals in a society, as the basis for an emphasis on equity measures of redistribution (Gupta, 2010; Ostrom, 2005). Following internationally- agreed guidelines, indigenous peoples and small-scale fishers have been recognized as a priority for distribution of benefits generated from ocean fishery systems, and more broadly the distribution of benefits to the poorest in a society. However, measuring poverty in a given society, and the contribution of ocean fishery systems towards its reduction, is extremely difficult. Poverty is indeed a multi-dimensional concept that reflects multiple deprivations in various aspects of well-being, and as such there is no consensus on the best way to measure these deprivations (World Bank, 2015b). Most commonly poverty is measured by household surveys in terms of aggregate consumption or income (with extreme poverty defined as less $1.25/day or less in income in purchasing power parity – i.e. the ‘poverty line’) as a measure of living standards, but questions have arisen if an effort should be made to measure the different dimensions of the concept and aggregate these measures into one, multi-dimensional measure of welfare that goes beyond the money metric (and if this is possible in a way that is both conceptually sound and readily interpretable) (World Bank, 2015b).

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Currently, aggregate consumption at the household level is the starting point for measures of poverty, given that this reflects different dimensions such as consumption of food, clothing transportation, etc. – though households’ observed expenditure choices may not be their preferred ones in the face of market failures, nor does it reflect dimensions of well-being for which it is difficult to assign prices and consumption values (World Bank, 2015b). The World Bank (2015b) emphasizes that a single indicator for poverty may not be necessary, but rather the different dimensions of poverty can be analyzed alongside one another (e.g. economic well-being and subjective assessments of welfare). For example, the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) featured in the United Nations’ Human Development Report since 2010 aims to bring together the different dimensions of poverty, based on three equally weighted poverty dimensions—health, education, and living standards—captured by a total of 10 indicators (World Bank, 2015b). Yet, despite such examples, there is still no consensus on whether it is even useful to aggregate across dimensions to construct a multidimensional measure of welfare and, if so, how to do so in a way that is conceptually sound (World Bank, 2015b). Returning specifically to ocean fishery systems, where equity considerations have been articulated in policy objectives, they have often been specified in terms of employment, food production and/or maintenance of traditional fishing communities – but again consensus on a single measure remains elusive (Hilborn, 2007).

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For indicative purposes, Berkes (2009) adapts a number of specific objectives, or sub- objectives found by Clark (1985), including:

Equity to future generations

 Conserve fish stocks

 Stabilize stock levels

 Maintain a healthy ecosystem

Efficiency:

 Maximize catches

 Maximize profit

 Stabilize catch rates

 Prevent waste of fish

 Increase cost-effectiveness

 Exploit under-utilized stocks

 Increase fish exports

 Improve foreign relations

 Increase foreign exchange

 Provide government revenue

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Equity to present generations

 Provide employment

 Increase fishers’ incomes

 Reduce conflict among fisher groups or with non-fishery stakeholders

 Maintain low consumer prices

 Increase women’s participation

 Reserve resources for local fishers

Coherence between policy objectives and outcomes. Different policy objectives within a given SES such as an ocean fishery, may not always be coherent or in some cases actually be contradictory, with mutually reinforcing effects reflected in the outcomes

(OECD, 2012). Some form of implicit or explicit contradiction or trade-off between equity and efficiency objectives has generally characterized much of public policy development around the world (Gupta, 2010), and ocean fishery systems have been no different – with many societies not actually taking formal decisions regarding objectives

(Hilborn, 2007; OECD, 2012). More specifically, these questions of equity versus efficiency in ocean fishery systems might be characterized as: (i) efficiency versus equity to future generations (whereby benefits are increased in the present at the expense of the system’s capacity to generate future benefits), or (ii) efficiency versus equity to present generations (whereby benefits in the present are increased in the aggregate but actually decreased for some individuals or segments of the population). Examination of

140 the measures of outcomes in ocean fishery systems found in the literature review illustrates the competition or incoherence that may arise between these different objectives.

In terms of (i): measures of outcomes from ocean fishery systems that reflect coherence between objectives of efficiency and equity to future generations, Hartwick (1977) proposed a rule that a constant level of consumption could be maintained perpetually from an environmental endowment such as fish stocks if all of the resource rent (i.e. the measure of efficiency in fishing – see previous discussion) derived from use were invested in capital – hence ensuring that the value of society’s total capital stock would not decline (World Bank, 2006). However, this might simply mean substitution of one form of capital for another – i.e. drawing down natural endowments or capital for re- investment in physical capital (Tietenburg and Lewis, 2009). For this reason, a measure of outcomes that reconciles objectives of efficiency and equity to future generations (i.e. adhering to the principle of sustainable development), would be to measure the value of the principal over time – i.e. the value of the natural capital stock remains intact and societies utilize the flow of benefits it provides along a ‘development path’ (World

Bank, 2006).

Such measures have been proposed for fisheries for decades, for example by Clark and

Munro (1975) who suggested using capital theory to measure benefits from an ocean fishery system over time, thereby linking the present efficiency measures to longer-term

141 sustainability. Since that time, such economic measures to reconcile the objectives of efficiency and future equity have been widely recognized, and for example recently approved by the UN Statistical Commission in the 2012 System of Environmental and

Economics Accounts (UN, 2014). Essentially, the net present value (NPV) of the flow of benefits from the resource is calculated in order to reflect wealth (i.e. social welfare) from the fish stocks, including their future status, by:

(i) estimating the current resource rent,

(ii) based on the population dynamics and any expected changes in stock sizes

under continuation of current levels of fishing effort, projecting the time series

of future expected rents (and discounting them to reflect the value that a buyer

in the given context would be prepared to pay for the asset in the current period)

– assuming that current levels of willingness to pay can be used to predict future

values (Boardman et al, 2011), and

(iii) adding the current and future stream of expected rents together in order to

generate a single number as the NPV from the fishery system at that point in

time (World Bank, 2006; UN, 2014).

Efficiency is reached in an ocean fishery system when the NPV of fishing is maximized, essentially the maximum economic yield or MEY (Anderson and Seijo, 2010). This measure implies consideration of utilization of the resource over time, and the various combinations of fishing activity and stock size that will maximize the NPV (Anderson and Seijo, 2010). In considerations of the time path, the discount rate used to calculate

142 the NPV of resource rents in the above steps is critical, and can be interpreted as an expected rate of return on the non-produced assets, which under conditions of perfect competition would be expected to equal the normal rate of return (UN, 2014). A discount rate estimated based on the market differs from a ‘social discount rate’, the latter being where the asset is valued for society as a whole rather than the present-day user, and thus generally lower than a market-based discount rate (thereby placing higher relative importance on income earned by future generations) (UN, 2014). Since it expresses a time preference of the owner of the asset to receive income now rather than in the future, the choice of the discount rate to use is essential in calculating the NPV

(UN, 2014).

Generally under ‘reasonable’ discount rates (e.g. 5%), fishing costs and prices, the biomass of targeted fish stocks in a given ocean fishery system will be greater at the

MEY than the MSY, suggesting a ‘win-win’ between the objective of equity to future generations and efficiency (Grafton et al, 2007). Grafton et al. (2007) modeled four fisheries with a range of distinct ecological characteristics, and found the biomass of the stock(s) to be larger at levels that would support the MEY (where the NPV of resource rents is maximized) than the biomass that would be needed to support the MSY. This

‘win-win’ between objectives of efficiency and equity to future generations could theoretically be illustrated by the relationship between total sustainable revenues (TSR) in an ocean fishery system and the biomass of the targeted stock (X) – where TSR as a function of X is simply the sustainable yield multiplied by the price (p), and where

143 sustainable yield is given by the Schaefer logistic growth curve, rX(1-X/K) with r as the intrinsic growth rate of the stock and K as the ecological carrying capacity: TSRx =

PrX(1-X/K) (Anderson and Seijo, 2010). More specifically, if biomass of the targeted fish stock is taken as the indicator for equity to future generations (i.e. a biological indicator), and resource rent is taken as the indicator for efficiency, the relationship between efficiency and equity to future generations might be illustrated as follows:

TCx

MSY

MEY BE

in dollars) in Max.

efficiency

TSRx

evenues

Economic benefits Economic (R

Equity to Future Generations (Biomass targeted stock) Note: BE = bio-economic equilibrium; TCx = total cost of fishing as a function of X

Figure 19. Theoretical illustration of relationship between efficiency and equity to future generations

It should be noted that as with many indicators there are exceptions, notably where the biological growth rate of stocks is below the prevailing interest rate, such that the return to financial capital is greater than the return to natural capital and an incentive is created to ‘liquidate’ the natural capital and invest the proceeds (Clark, 1973). Costello et al.

(2008) subsequently suggested that in reality such exceptions were rare. In 2010 Clark

144 et al. responded to Grafton et al. (2007) by reiterating the point, and illustrating that for some stocks with slow enough growth rates, where discount rates or fishing costs may decline, it may be economically optimal to fish the stock to extinction.

Additionally, while MEY may reconcile measures of targeted fish stock biomass that both maximizes efficiency and surpasses the accepted biological measure of equity to future generations (MSY), it does not capture considerations of the sustainability of the ecosystem supporting the stocks in a given fishery system, notably the impact of fishing on the diversity of animal species present in the system (e.g. through unintended ‘by- catch’ of additional species to those targeted, or impacts on species through predator- prey interactions affected by fishing) or changes to the ecological structure of the system

(e.g. through bottom-trawling operations that change the sea floor) (Murawski, 2000).

In terms of measures of (ii) outcomes from ocean fishery systems that reflect objectives of efficiency versus equity to present generations, ‘win-wins’ have been more difficult to identify in the literature reviewed, largely due to the challenges for efficiency measures such as resource rent to accommodate universally-recognized equity principles, and for the lack of consensus surrounding measures of present-day equity.

For efficiency measures, Boardman et al. (2011) summarize the challenges of neoclassical economics that form the basis of these measures, to accommodate present-day equity objectives, as follows:

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 Monetizing the benefits from use of the ocean fishery system as individuals’

willingness-to-pay (WTP) in order to measure efficiency, does not capture those

benefits without prices in the marketplace, i.e. other aspects of welfare (as

Ostrom (2005) notes, assuming that individuals are self-interested utility

maximizers only partially explains observed human behavior in the realm of

social dilemmas such as overfishing, and increasingly social scientists tend to

follow Amartya Sen’s famous advice to stop assuming that all individuals are

‘rational fools’ or ‘homo economicus’ - for example Sterner and Correa (2013)

call the assumption of the utility-maximizing individual as a gross simplification

given psychological research showing that individuals may have difficulty

perceiving the relevant parameters of a complicated situation and/or may

interpret the probabilities subjectively);

 Aggregate WTP is highly dependent on the current or initial distribution of

wealth in society, and where that distribution is unequal, different people may

have a different marginal utility of money (a low-wealth person may have a

higher marginal utility of money than a high-wealth person), such that WTP as

measured by prices in the market and aggregated into a demand function may

not accurately represent social utility (e.g. a person with only $1 might gladly

pay $5 in the market for a fish if he or she had it); and

 Assuming that net economic benefits based on aggregate WTP can measure

social utility, the Kaldor-Hicks modification to the Pareto principle essentially

decouples efficiency from equity, by stating not only can individual utilities be

146

summed and potentially maximized, but that it is possible to trade off utility

gains for some individuals against losses for others. Essentially, as long as it is

possible that the ‘winners’ could compensate the ‘losers’ in terms of a change in

utility as measured by WTP, than the outcome is a net benefit to society and

such compensation need not actually take place (Boardman et al, 2011; Kolstad,

2011). Thus, the use of efficiency as a measure of outcomes, given the Kaldor-

Hicks modification to the Pareto principle, does not address the concerns of

those who might ‘lose’ from a given outcome – i.e. does not accommodate

objectives of equity to present generations (Gupta, 2010).

Based on the above, efficiency measures such as the net economic benefits, or even the

NPV of the resource rents, does not necessarily accommodate objectives for equity to present generations (Charles, 2000), and could be met even in circumstances where the

‘loss’ to some is greater than the ‘gain’ to others. In fact, despite centuries of intensive searching (for example Rawls’ (1971) focus on the absolute level of well-being of the poorest individuals in society as a measure of outcomes), no adequate definition of social welfare has been found that accommodates objectives for both efficiency and equity to present generations (Gupta, 2010). With the Rawlsian criterion for equity focused on the poorest in society, and the universally-agreed principles mentioned previously that focus on poverty reduction and the ability to meet minimum basic needs, efforts have unsuccessfully been made to expand measures of social welfare to accommodate these equity concerns (Boardman et al, 2011). These efforts have aimed

147 to formulate a social welfare function that maps the utility, wealth or consumption of all individuals in society into an index that ranks alternative distribution of goods and aims to maximize the value of the function (Boardman et al, 2011). Such attempts have often taken the form of multi-goal analysis, where efficiency measures are distributionally weighted to capture society preferences over how income is distributed across individuals in a society (Boardman et al, 2011; World Bank, 2015b). However, in addition to practical challenges in obtaining the needed information to construct such indices, there is as of yet little agreement subjectively on the formulation of such a function, since equations for net benefits would be altered by introducing welfare weights to various groups, and the issue of how such weights are chosen is subjective

(Boardman et al, 2011).

Essentially, attempts to force a combined measure of efficiency and equity to present generations have not yielded a consensus (Boardman et al, 2011). Even efforts to measure equity to present generations, in terms of reduction of poverty, have met with challenges give the multiple dimensions of deprivation that defy a single indicator

(though household consumption has been a typical proxy) (World Bank, 2015b). As mentioned in Box 13, a meaningful summary measure that incorporates the multiple dimensions of poverty has not yet been agreed, and for this reason in 2015 the World

Bank created a new Commission on Global Poverty to find new, multi-dimensional measures of poverty (World Bank, 2015c).

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The fact that single measures of poverty or coherence between objectives for efficiency and present-day equity have not been found, should not be interpreted to suggest that there are no linkages between the two. When conditions of unchanging inequality and constant economic growth are assumed, in fact there exists a virtually mechanical relationship between growth and poverty reduction. Economic growth is an engine of poverty reduction (Dollar et al., 2014; World Bank, 2015b), but it is an uneven process where pockets of poverty often exist and certain parts of the population appear not to be participating to the same extent as others in the broader development process. To put it simply, there are declining returns for poverty reduction from economic growth, because after initial growth and poverty reduction for the majority of people concentrated in the middle of the distribution of household consumption (as a measure of the ability of a person to satisfy basic needs and avoid poverty), poverty reduction will increasingly reach fewer people, even if the pace of growth remains unchanged

(World Bank, 2015b). Hence as overall economic growth generates employment and lifts the bulk of the population out of poverty, a core subset may remain poor and constrained in its ability to benefit from growth (i.e. efficiency gains) (World Bank,

2015b). For this reason, although there is a positive relationship between efficiency gains and poverty reduction (as a measure of increased equity to present generations), it is by no means complete, and pockets of the population may not benefit from efficiency gains (or indeed where fishing activity and hence employment are reduced in order to enhance efficiency, may even lose). That said, the World Bank (2015b) notes that if inequality falls in concert with efficiency gains, notably in terms of the relative

149 position of the poor in the income distribution, then the rate of progress in poverty reduction might hold steady or even accelerate as overall poverty approaches zero.

Nonetheless, in the absence of agreed social welfare functions there remains a lack of consensus on measures of poverty that fully capture its multiple dimensions, much less measures that can simultaneously address efficiency and present-day equity objectives such as poverty reduction or Rawlsian criteria. Given that any changes to fisheries governance that attempt to address the overfishing problem will affect the distribution of wealth among the present generation and allocation of resources in some way

(Christy, 2000; Ahmed et al., 2006), the conflict between the two objectives seems unavoidable. Essentially, this conflict has been summarized as those between efficiency objectives that essentially increase overall wealth from the fishery system or the ‘size of the pie’, and objectives of equity for present generations to broadly share in this increase or ‘how the pie is sliced’ (Charles, 2001). To help address such conflicts, policy analysts have recommended inclusive governance, through partnerships between the state and resource users, but in a way that does not just further empower local elites and indirectly reduce the access of the poor to the resources (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999).

Additionally, policy measures may wish to consider exclusion of socially unacceptable preferences that individuals may have, for example for efficiency gains that are not consistent with universally-agreed human rights or equity principles (see Table 8 below).

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In summary, efforts to find outcome measures that can help achieve greater coherence among different objectives for ocean fishery systems, remain incomplete in the literature reviewed, as follows:

 Coherence between efficiency and equity to future generations: maintaining fish

stocks at biomass levels that can support MEY could theoretically reconcile

these two (where Bmsy is the measure for equity to future generations), but with

the caveat that this may not hold for certain slow-growing stocks under certain

economic conditions, nor does it reflect sustainability of broader measures of

the ecosystems upon which the stocks depend;

Coherence between efficiency and equity to present generations: while resource rent measures efficient outcomes in a static sense, this is not necessarily or fully consistent with objectives of equity to present generations, notably in terms of poverty reduction, though agreed measures that fully capture the latter are lacking (with aggregate household consumption the most currently accepted measure). Given universally- agreed principles of equity and human rights, Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficient outcomes (i.e. maximizing the flow of resource rents on the assumption that as long as compensation from winners to losers could take place, the outcome is socially acceptable – even if these transfers do not happen) may lead to net gains for society at the expense of losses for poorer segments. In the absence of an agreed social welfare function that reconciles these two objectives, measures of both the efficiency and the

151 equity may be needed – e.g. both the size and distribution of the wealth generated from the ocean fishery system (World Bank and FAO, 2009).

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Table 6. Summary matrix of common horizontal characteristics of policies for governance of ocean fishery systems

Policy Statement Principles Objectives Targeted Outcomes Coherent Measures of (Vertical levels: international scale, state(s) Outcomes across Objectives jurisdiction) Universal Declaration on Human Rights Security or Equity to present Consensus does not exist on a Equity to present generations protection of generations, (i.e. ‘social’ multi-dimensional indicator of & Efficiency: Declaration of the World Food Conference universal human objective), notably coastal poverty to ensure equitable rights and dignity, community welfare, for distribution by Rawlsian 1. Efficiency: resource rents Vienna Declaration and Program of Action notably eradication example maximizing criteria. from the system (wealth) of poverty and employment opportunities 2. Equity: Distribution of hunger for those dependent on the Examples in fisheries include: rents among households in Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Equity to present fishery for their  Employment in the fishery the system (distribution) Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and generations, with a livelihoods system Forests in the Context of National Food Security focus on  Food production * Does not include multi- subsistence, small-  Maintenance of traditional dimensional measure of Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable scale and artisanal fishing communities poverty, but rather distribution Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food fishers of wealth Security and Poverty Eradication Declaration of the Conference on the Human Equity to future Conservation (i.e. Biological = Bmsy of targeted Equity to future generations & Environment generations based resource maintenance or species Efficiency:

153 on the concept of ‘environmental’

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sustainable objective) for future Examples of ecological  MEY: maximizes the NPV Treaty (UNCLOS) development generations outcomes: of resource rents to satisfy  Diversity of animal species efficiency criterion, and Report of the World Commission on Environment maintained meets biological and Development: Our Common Future  Ecological structure sustainability with a stock maintained size greater than Bmsy Rio Declaration on Environment and Development * Does not always hold, for Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries slow-growing species under certain economic conditions Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development ** Does not measure ecological sustainability The Future We Want Outcome Document Economic efficiency Efficiency (i.e. economic Resource rent from the The Future We Want Outcome Document in the use of fish productivity objective) for harvesting segment of an ocean stocks present generations fishery system Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Sound governance processes to put these principles into effect

In light of the challenges to finding one aggregate measure of outcomes from ocean fishery SESs that achieves coherence across the multiple objectives, a number of efforts have been proposed to create indices or multi-criteria measures. For example Charles

(2001) introduced a ‘sustainability checklist’ focusing on the trade-offs between efficiency and equity to future generations, considering ecosystems, social systems, etc., but acknowledged the challenge in arriving at an overall fishery sustainability index: weighing trade-offs between indicators is impossible without a common denominator

(Charles, 2000). Similarly, the World Bank and FAO (2009) suggested measuring outcomes along axes of ‘sustainability, productivity and equity’ – i.e. equity to future generations, efficiency and equity to present generations. Measures of equity to future generations would focus on maintain ecosystem integrity, measures of efficiency on resource rents and equity to present generations more generally by ‘addressing the social dimension of resource allocation and benefit flows’ (World Bank and FAO, 2009).

While MEY may reconcile equity to future generations and efficiency, in terms of equity the World Bank and FAO (2009) suggest that some efficiency may need to be sacrificed, for example to maintain the use of ocean fishery systems as a social safety net.

More recently, Anderson et al. (2015) developed the ‘fisheries performance indicators’

(FPIs) as a rapid assessment tool to provide an aggregate measure of outcomes from ocean fishery systems, following the three dimensions of the sustainable development concept: ecological sustainability, economic sustainability and social sustainability. The

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FPIs include 68 different measures of outcomes across these three components or dimensions of sustainable development, including:

 Ecological outcomes, such as stock status, by-catch of other species and

protection of critical habitats;

 Economic outcomes, such as trends in harvest volumes and values, levels of risk

(volatility of harvests and revenues), returns along the value chain and total

wealth; and

 Social outcomes, such as returns to labor, health care and education access and

facilities for workers and the percentage of assets locally owned (Anderson et

al., 2015).

The authors note that the indicators are aggregated among the three dimensions, but not across them, and have now been tested in 61 ocean fishery systems around the world as case studies that build an empirical body of knowledge (Anderson et al., 2015).

Rules for governance of ocean fishery systems. As mentioned previously, each of the three components of fisheries governance - policies, rules and organizations – can be described in terms of the groups of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ characteristics, for purposes of classification.

The ‘vertical characteristics’ of rules can be considered to reflect the level of authority behind them (North, 1990; Ostrom, 2005), and have included a range of different

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characteristics (i.e. variables) in the literature, aggregated here as the (i) scale, (ii) jurisdiction of origin, and (iii) level.

The scale of rules refers to the area covered, for example international, national or local.

At the international scale, rules take the form of treaties, both multilateral and bilateral, and other non-binding instruments used by states (FAO, 2005). These rules are based upon the legal regime established by UNCLOS to govern ocean fishery systems, together with its implementing agreement, the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks

Agreement, and the guidance provided to utilize the UNCLOS regime by the non- binding Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Cochrane, 2009). Each of these three instruments of international policy merits some further description in order to provide the context for the classification of modern rules formulated to help govern ocean fishery systems.

As the ‘Constitution for the Sea’ (Wang, 1992), UNCLOS provides ‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources’ to coastal states for the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) out to 200 nautical miles from the coast (UNCLOS, 1982). Accompanying this right of enclosure to significant areas of the ocean, UNCLOS obligates countries to purse the objective of optimum utilization of fish stocks, by maintaining or restoring the stocks to levels that can support MSY, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements of developing countries (UNCLOS, 1982). Towards

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this objective, UNCLOS obliges countries to determine allowable harvests for fish stocks within their EEZ based on the best available scientific evidence, and states that rules fixed at the national level by countries for the fish stocks within EEZs “shall be consistent with the Treaty and may relate, inter alia, to the following:

 licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment, including payment of fees

and other forms of remuneration, which, in the case of developing coastal States,

may consist of adequate compensation in the field of financing, equipment and

technology relating to the fishing industry;

 determining the species which may be caught, and fixing quotas of catch,

whether in relation to particular stocks or groups of stocks or catch per vessel

over a period of time or to the catch by nationals of any State during a specified

period;

 regulating seasons and areas of fishing, the types, sizes and amount of gear, and

the types, sizes and number of fishing vessels that may be used;

 fixing the age and size of fish and other species that may be caught;

 specifying information required of fishing vessels, including catch and effort

statistics and vessel position reports;

 requiring, under the authorization and control of the coastal State, the conduct

of specified fisheries research programs and regulating the conduct of such

research, including the sampling of catches, disposition of samples and reporting

of associated scientific data;

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 the placing of observers or trainees on board such vessels by the coastal State;

 the landing of all or any part of the catch by such vessels in the ports of the

coastal State;

 terms and conditions relating to joint ventures or other cooperative

arrangements;

 requirements for the training of personnel and the transfer of fisheries

technology, including enhancement of the coastal State's capability of

undertaking fisheries research; and

 enforcement procedures” (UNCLOS, 1982).

In 1995 an international agreement for the implementation of UNCLOS was completed, the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, often abbreviated as the ‘UN Fish Stocks Agreement’ (Kuemlangan, 2009). The UN Fish

Stocks Agreement expanded upon the legal regime created by UNCLOS for ‘highly migratory’ fish stocks that occur solely in areas beyond EEZs, or ‘straddling’ stocks that occur both within countries’ EEZs and in the adjacent waters (i.e. ‘high seas’) (United

Nations, 1995). The Agreement designates ‘regional fisheries management organizations’ as the primary vehicle for cooperation between states to formulate rules for access to and use of such highly migratory or straddling fish stocks (United Nations,

1995).

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At the same time, FAO led the development of the voluntary Code of Conduct to provide internationally-agreed guidance to support formulation and enforcement of rules consistent with UNCLOS and UNFSA. For example, as a starting point the Code emphasizes that effective rules for ocean fishery systems should cover the entire ecological sub-system concerned, i.e. the “whole [fish] stock unit over its entire area of distribution…and the area through which it migrates during its life cycle” (FAO, 1995).

For such units, the Code states that entities and organizations should utilize the best available scientific evidence in order to determine stock-specific target reference points and the action to be taken if they are exceeded, and likewise the limit reference points and actions to be taken to ensure that they are not exceeded (FAO, 1995). As such, the

Code suggests that the rules helping to govern ocean fishery systems should:

 “ensure that the level of fishing permitted is commensurate with the state of

fisheries resources; and

 ensure that no vessel be allowed to fish unless so authorized, in a manner

consistent with international law for the high seas or in conformity with national

legislation within areas of national jurisdiction.

 Where excess fishing capacity exists, mechanisms should be established to

reduce capacity to levels commensurate with the sustainable use of fisheries

resources so as to ensure that fishers operate under economic conditions that

promote responsible fisheries. Such mechanisms should include monitoring the

capacity of fishing fleets.

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 The performance of all existing fishing gear, methods and practices should be

examined and measures taken to ensure that fishing gear, methods and practices

which are not consistent with responsible fishing are phased out and replaced

with more acceptable alternatives. In this process, particular attention should be

given to the impact of such measures on fishing communities, including their

ability to exploit the resource.

 States and fisheries management organizations and arrangements should

regulate fishing in such a way as to avoid the risk of conflict among fishers using

different vessels, gear and fishing methods.

 When deciding on the use, conservation and management of fisheries resources,

due recognition should be given, as appropriate, in accordance with national

laws and regulations, to the traditional practices, needs and interests of

indigenous people and local fishing communities which are highly dependent on

fishery resources for their livelihood.

 In the evaluation of alternative conservation and management measures, their

cost-effectiveness and social impact should be considered.

 The efficacy of conservation and management measures and their possible

interactions should be kept under continuous review. Such measures should, as

appropriate, be revised or abolished in the light of new information.

 States should take appropriate measures to minimize waste, discards, catch by

lost or abandoned gear, catch of non-target species, both fish and non-fish

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species, and negative impacts on associated or dependent species, in particular

endangered species. Where appropriate, such measures may include technical

measures related to fish size, mesh size or gear, discards, closed seasons and

areas and zones reserved for selected fisheries, particularly artisanal fisheries.

Such measures should be applied, where appropriate, to protect juveniles and

spawners. States and sub-regional or regional fisheries management

organizations and arrangements should promote, to the extent practicable, the

development and use of selective, environmentally safe and cost effective gear

and techniques.

 States and sub-regional and regional fisheries management organizations and

arrangements, in the framework of their respective competences, should

introduce measures for depleted resources and those resources threatened with

depletion that facilitate the sustained recovery of such stocks. They should make

every effort to ensure that resources and habitats critical to the well-being of

such resources which have been adversely affected by fishing or other human

activities are restored.”

At the national scale, states have formulated fisheries laws unique to the country or territorial sub-division (a federated authority of the state, e.g. a region or province) within which they apply (Kuemlangan, 2009). While the rules formulated by the state to help govern the fisheries within its EEZ are not necessarily found in one piece of legislation, in many cases there is an identifiable overarching or principal fisheries law

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in the form of an ‘act’ or ‘code’ (Kuemlangan, 2009). Such principal fisheries legislation often defines the process for the formulation of implementing or subsidiary rules for individual fishery systems with varying names such as regulations, decrees, by-laws or administrative orders (Cochrane, 2009; Kuemlangan, 2009).

At the local scale, traditional and customary rules have often been formulated that may or may not be written, and are not necessarily recognized by the state, yet instrumental in shaping fishing behavior (Ostrom, 2005). There is a continuum from formal to informal rules, and potential of one to complement the other – while ignoring informal

(i.e. not recognized by the state) rules overlooks part of the mixture of rules that define the choice set and results in outcomes (North, 1990). As mentioned previously, in practice rules are often nested within other rules at larger scales, such that they form poly-centric systems of authority and interaction (World Bank, 2003; Ostrom, 2005).

The second ‘vertical’ characteristic to describe rules helping to govern ocean fishery systems is the jurisdiction of origin, essentially who is making the rules (Kollock, 1998), i.e. the state, private entities, self-governance by local groups or partnerships among the previous. Based upon the sovereignty recognized by UNCLOS, since 1982 the state is the entity that has jurisdiction for the creation and enforcement of rules helping to govern ocean fishery systems within the EEZ (UNCLOS, 1982; Feral, 2009). Although not common, per the proposal made by Scott (1955), private entities or corporations could theoretically be given a monopoly over an ocean fishery system by the state, in

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order to create the rules. Much more commonly, local groups have self-governed ocean fishery systems, as demonstrated by Ostrom’s (1990) research (among many others). In this research, Ostrom (2005) found that successful self-governance associations are most likely to emerge and formulate rules that provide positive outcomes, where (i) improvement of the resources is still possible, reliable indicators of ecological status are frequently available at low cost, the flow of resource yields is relatively predictable, and the system is sufficiently small given the transportation and communications technology that users can develop accurate knowledge of external boundaries; and (ii) users depend heavily on the resources, share a common understanding of the system, use a relatively low discount rate, exhibit trust and reciprocity, have the autonomy from external authorities to determine access and harvesting rules, and have prior organizational experience and local leadership. Elaborating on such partnerships, where the origin of jurisdiction is the state but some authority to formulate or enforce rules has been transferred to private entities or local groups through a process often labelled co- management of the resources (Pinkerton, 1989), the success of self-governance is enhanced when external authorities provide local groups with accurate information about the fishery systems, provide arenas for conflict-resolution, recognize autonomy in decision-making and provide mechanisms to support local monitoring and enforcement efforts (Ostrom, 2005).

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The third and final ‘vertical’ characteristic summarized here in order to describe the rules in ocean fishery systems is the level of the rule, as categorized by Ostrom (1990,

2005) to include:

a. operational rules that directly affect day-to-day decisions made by resource

users and can be changed relatively rapidly,

b. collective choice rules that affect operational activities and results by

determining who is eligible to use the resource and the specific rules to be used

in changing operational rules – (essentially how operational rules are made)

these change at a much slower pace such as statutes and common laws, and

c. constitutional choice rules that affect collective choice activities by determining

who is eligible to be a resource user and create the rules for creating collective

choice rules – these change at the slowest pace (essentially who can make which

decisions).

These levels are analogous to those that Kooiman et al (2005) describe for governance more broadly: first-order governance (day-to-day); second-order governance

(institutions within which first order governance takes place); and third-order or meta- governance (core principles upon which governance in a society takes place).

The ‘horizontal’ characteristics of rules for common pool resource use have also been classified by Ostrom (2005) in terms of their intention or aim. The aim or intention is one of the five components of a rule, as follows: (i) attribute (any value of a participant- level variable that distinguishes to whom the institutional statement applies – establishes

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the subset of the participants affected by a particular statement – i.e. who the rules apply to), (ii) deontic (holder for three modal verbs – ‘may’ (permitted), ‘must’ (obliged), and

‘must not’ (forbidden) – assign operators to outcomes, (iii) aim (particular actions or outcomes in the action situation to which the deontic is assigned – an aim may include a formula specifying an amount of action or outcome or a description of the process for an action), (iv) conditions (variables that define when or where an action or outcome is permitted, obligatory, or forbidden), and (v) ‘or else’ (holder for institutionally assigned consequence for not following a rule) (Ostrom, 2005). Of note, while rules contain all five components, norms only contain the first four, and shared strategies the first three

(Ostrom, 2005).

The horizontal characteristics of rules are classified based on the third component above, the ‘aim’ or intention, by Ostrom (2005) as follows:

1. Position rules create ‘positions’ in a given situation with various kinds of

authority – e.g. ‘authorized user’, monitors, etc.

2. Boundary rules, or ‘entry and exit’ rules, define who is eligible to enter a

position, the process that determines which eligible participants may enter or

must enter positions, and how an individual may leave or must leave a position.

Boundary rules define who has a right to enter and use a resource as an

‘authorized appropriator’, generally on the basis of attributes such as residency

or membership, personal characteristics (e.g. ascribed characteristics such as

age, caste, class, clan, ethnicity, gender and race, and acquitted characteristics

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such as education level or skill test) and on conditions for relationship with

resource, such as use of specific technology, continued use of resource, long-

term rights (e.g. ownership of a proportion of annual flow of resources, of land,

of a non-land asset like a berth, of shares in a private organization, of a share of

the resource system) or temporary use rights (e.g. acquired through auction, per

use fee, licenses, lottery, registration, seasonal fees, etc.).

3. Choice rules, specifying the options available to a position, in terms of what a

participant must, must not or may do at a particular point in a decision process

in light of conditions that have or have not been met at that point. Affects the

basic rights, duties, liberties and exposures of members and the relative

distribution of these to all. Most choice rules have two components: an

allocation formula and the assets on which the formula is based (e.g. percentage

of total available resource units per period, quantity of resource units per period,

use only in a specific location, use only in a specific time slot, rotate use in time

or space, use only during open seasons, and only use resources meeting certain

criteria, or use whenever and wherever).

4. Aggregation rules, clarifying ‘who is to decide’ where choice rules have

assigned partial control over the same set of variables to multiple positions,

including how much weight each participant will have in the choice relative to

others – including non-symmetric aggregation rules (where participants in a

situation are treated differently, e.g. dictator, oligarchy, committee, etc.),

symmetric aggregation rules (assign joint control over an action to multiple

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participants so that all are treated alike), and lack of agreement rules (formula

for determining a joint decision) also include a ‘no agreement’ condition stating

what decision will happen if no agreement is reached under a rule.

5. Information rules, affecting the level of information available in a situation

about actions, including establishing communication channels connecting

participants, specifying which communication channels may exist and

regulating the frequency of exchange of information. Where resources are very

valuable and the size of the user group is larger, more and more requirements

are added regarding the information that must be kept by users or their officials.

6. Payoff rules, affecting the benefits and costs assigned to outcomes given the

actions chosen – assigning external rewards or sanctions to particular actions

that have been taken (e.g. adding a penalty to actions that are prohibited).

Common types of payoff rules include: the imposition of a fine, the loss of use

rights, and incarceration.

7. Scope rules, affecting which outcomes must, must not, or may be affected within

a domain, for example specifying the desired level of performance through

‘performance targets.’

All seven generic types of rules include deontics that translate into payoffs/incentives and ‘or elses’ that generally have payoff consequences – affecting net costs and benefits in a situation (Ostrom, 2005). From a review of self-governance systems for common pool resources, Ostrom (2005) did not find any particular type of rule that had a

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statistically positive relationship to performance across different types of resources, ecological zones and communities, but the absence of any boundary or choice rule was consistently associated with poor performance, as was reliance on a single type of rule for an entire common pool resource.

Table 7. Summary of Ostrom's classification of rules based on the 'intention or aim'

Type of Rule Impact on Actions Position Creates recognized ‘positions’ Boundary Defines who may enter/exit a position Choice Specifies the options available to a position Aggregation Clarifies who will decide when multiple participants have some control Information Affects level of information available for an action Payoff Assigns costs and benefits to an action Scope Specifies outcomes or performance

Source: Ostrom (2005)

All of the above types of rules described in Ostrom’s classification system can be found in different segments of the social sub-system of an ocean fishery SES, and could certainly affect behavior (e.g. information rules requiring certain information on fish harvest to be available to consumers). As mentioned previously, the social sub-system within an ocean fishery SES consists of the interconnected segments of harvesting, processing and marketing segments, among others (Orbach, 1980), all with rules and activities that affect performance and outcomes within another segment (Anderson et

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al, 2015). Similarly, rules exogenous to ocean fishery systems altogether may affect the social sub-system, as fishing communities depend upon rules governing access to housing, markets, financial resources, information, legal systems, social services (e.g. education, health care, sanitation) and land for access to processing and marketing activities (FAO, 2015b). However, given that fishing effort is the dependent variable for outcomes in the ocean fishery SES framework shown in Figure 23, the sub-set of rules characterized as ‘tenure’ (generally boundary and/or choice rules within the above table) are the focus here of horizontal characteristics of fisheries governance rules: those rules that help govern how people, communities and others gain access to the resources

(i.e. determining who can use the resources, for how long and under what conditions)

(FAO, 2012b). For this reason, the Code of Conduct states calls for rules that regulate access to the fish resources underpinning ocean fishery systems (FAO, 1995).

FAO has classified the rules most frequently used to help govern tenure in ocean fishery systems, as part of guidelines and a guidance book to support the implementation of the

Code of Conduct (Cochrane, 2009). These ‘horizontal’ characteristics of the rules for fisheries tenure, many of which are found in use together, include:

(i) Technical measures, regulating technology, such as eligible fishing gears (e.g.

the size of the mesh in fishing nets or the size of hooks), size limits for a fish

caught, establishment of closed areas (i.e. areas of the ocean closed to fishing

on a permanent, temporary or seasonal basis) and establishment of closed

seasons;

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(ii) Input (i.e. fishing effort) controls, regulating what fishers bring into harvesting,

in terms of how much fishing takes place, such as a limit on the number of

fishing vessels allowed access to the fishery system (e.g. through licensing), the

average potential catching power of a vessel in the fleet (e.g. typical size of a

vessel), the average time at sea for a vessel in the fleet (e.g. the number days

that vessels can fish) and the average intensity of operation of a vessel per

increment of time at sea;

(iii) Output (i.e. fish catch) controls, regulating the yield from a fishery system, such

as establishment of a limit on the total volume of catch allowed (total allowable

catch); and

(iv) Rights established around controls, including (a) management rights and (b)

use rights. Management rights often begin with the state and are delegated to

allow others to help make the rules for tenure (essentially who can make the

rules), consistent with the Code of Conduct’s call to ‘facilitate consultation and

effective participation of industry, fish workers, environmental and other

interested organizations in decision-making with respect to the development of

laws and policies related to fisheries management (Charles, 2009).’ Use rights

– defined as the right to use, not ownership of the resource itself – imply key

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questions of the allocation mechanism, durability and transferability of the rights, and often include (per Charles, 2009):

Access rights:

a. Limited entry access rights (e.g. permits), where the government issues

a limited number of licenses to fish, but of note a lack of quantitative

withdrawal rights (see below) can still support a ‘race to fish’ in some

cases (Anderson and Seijo, 2010), and of course such rules are easier to

enact as a preventative measure rather than to reduce fishing capacity

(Charles, 2009). Additionally, the categorization of these rules overlaps

with input controls, but the distinction made here is in terms of duration

and transferability – i.e. those limited entry access rights that are longer

in duration (e.g. beyond one year) or are transferable, are categorized as

an access right rather than an input control, though the distinction is

blurry.

b. Territorial use right fisheries (TURFs) and customary marine tenure,

building upon the classic reference work of Christy (1982, in Charles,

2009), where a group is allocated the exclusive right to fish in a given

location, and to make the rules for that location, often based on long-

standing tradition (i.e. customary marine tenure).

Quantitative withdrawal rights to take a specific amount of fishing effort or catch:

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c. Input/effort rights (time/area rights, gear rights), which place limits on

fishing effort and translate these into ‘individual effort quotas’, although

such rules can face the challenge of ‘technology creep’, as vessels

increase productivity per increment of effort, and hence can decline

below targets for stock size; and

d. Output/catch rights (annual quotas, trip limits), where the total allowable

catch (TAC) limit is sub-divided into quotas allocated to: sectors of the

fishery (through a suitable organization within that sector), individual

fishers (allocated as catch limits per trip with a maximum number of

trips, or as quotas of the TAC such as individual transferable quotas

(ITQs) or individual non-transferable quotas), or communities (as

community quotas, whereby fishers in a community regulate themselves

and divide up quota) (i.e. ‘shares of the total catch, or catch shares’)

(Charles, 2009).

All of the above rules for tenure create some form of ‘property rights’ and ‘duties’ in response to scarcity (Charles, 2009), the aggregate of which characterize the relationship of individuals to one another with respect to the fishery resource (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Property rights have been defined as a claim to a benefit stream that some higher body – usually the state – will agree to protect through the assignment of duties to others who may covet, or somehow interfere with, the benefit stream (Bromley,

1992). Property rights determine the opportunities for efficiency in productive activities,

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and therefore generation of wealth or net economic benefits (North, 1990). Property rights are the product of rules, and as mentioned previously are also the corollary of duties, because one participant has an interest protected by a right only when all others have a duty to respect it (Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Ostrom and Schlager, 1996;

Ostrom, 2005). Because the quality or definition of property rights in the fish harvesting segment is one of the key economic institutions driving fishing behavior and effort, where profit maximization is the/a primary goal (Anderson and Seijo, 2010), governance of ocean fishery systems is often characterized as a common pool resource management problem solvable by well-specified property rights regimes – whether they be state, private or common property regimes (Hanna, 1999). For this reason, a wide body of literature has emerged in the past two decades on the different forms of property rights that the types of rules for fisheries tenure summarized in the previous paragraph produce in a given SES (Edwards, 2003; Charles, 2009; Charles, 2011). While it would be impossible to summarize all of the work on the topic, FAO provides a number of useful overviews (see for example Shotton, 2005; Charles, 2009). Of note, Bromley and

Cernea (1989) state that “it is essential to understand that property is not an object [such as a fish in the water], but it is rather a right to a benefit stream that is only as secure as the duty of all others to respect the conditions that protect that stream.” Such property rights determine where decisions are made (Anderson and Seijo, 2010) and are only created or recognized in EEZs (Shotton, 2005). That said, such property rights have existed in traditional community fishing communities long before UNCLOS, for example in Pacific Island communities where common property over defined resources

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was exercised and use rights allocated within the group of eligible users, and/or technical measures fixed (Johannes, 1978; Ruddle, 1988).

In all forms these property rights are actually bundles of different rights or entitlements

(Ostrom and Schlager, 1996). Schlager and Ostrom (1992, 1996) described five classes of property rights in common pool resources, which could form the bundle of rights available within the fish harvesting sub-system:

1. Access right: the right to enter a defined area and enjoy a non-rival or non-

subtractive benefit (e.g. hiking);

2. Withdrawal right: the right to obtain the resource units or products of a resource

(e.g. catch fish);

3. Management right: the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the

resource by making improvements;

4. Exclusion: the right to determine who will have an access right, and how that

right might be transferred; and

5. Alienation: the right to sell or lease either the management right or the exclusion

right or both.

Each of the above 5 is independent of the other, but are frequently held in a cumulative manner, i.e. ‘bundles’ of rights (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Ostrom and Schlager,

1996). The more rights held in the bundle, the better defined the ‘property’ the rights are – i.e. someone who holds all five rights would be considered an owner, while

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someone who only holds the first right an authorized entrant (Schlager and Ostrom,

1992). The more ‘sticks’ in the bundle, the greater the incentives for efficient use over time, i.e. coherence between both efficiency and equity to future generations.

Conversely, the less defined the property right is for users, the weaker the incentives – as no incentive to conserve exists without the assurance that resource units saved today will be available for use at a later time by one who conserves (Ostrom and Schlager,

1996). A number of empirical studies of common pool resource users found that those who had management and exclusion rights as well as access and withdrawal rights, had developed rules that enhanced cooperation and helped to solve the commons problem

(Ostrom and Schlager, 1996). For analytical purposes, these rights can be considered in a continuum from the most minimal, access, to the most comprehensive, alienation, which includes all the other rights (see Figure 20 below) (Kishor et al., in preparation).

ACCESS WITHDRAWAL MANAGEMENT EXCLUSION ALIENATION

Source: Kishor et al, in preparation

Figure 20. Continuum of property rights relating to fish harvesting

Similarly, Scott (2000) describes four independent characteristics of property rights in ocean fishery systems, where the incentives for efficient use provided by the property rights over time are stronger the more characteristics or bundles of entitlements are aggregated in the right:

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1. Exclusivity, the ability to keep others from using the right - every kind of

property right has some exclusivity, but none is completely exclusive.

2. Duration, or the length of time of the property right – a right can be exclusive

but with a short duration (e.g. a three-month rental contract for property);

3. Security, or how likely it is that the owner of the right can hold onto it; and

4. Transferability, and the extent to which the right can be divided and traded to

others (Scott, 2000).

Because property rights are recognized to be important to governance, arguments are sometimes made that a particular type of property rights regime, e.g. private property or common property, is superior in performing these functions (Hanna, 1999). Hanna

(1999) notes that the empirical evidence suggests, however, that any number of types of property rights regimes can perform well – and be held by many different entities, depending on the cultural, economic and biophysical context (Ostrom, 1990; Hanna et al., 1995; in Hanna, 1999). Because the combinations of entitlements, privileges, and responsibilities can be very diverse, it has been said that "property rights, like the dorsal fins on different fishes, come in many different shapes and sizes" (Shotton, 2005). For example, some types of rules may not be well-suited to the ecological system, such as the application of rules to create quantitative withdrawal rights in a tropical marine ecosystem, which supports harvests consisting of multiple species. Squires et al. (2003) gave the example of the Java sea fisheries in Indonesia, where the rules in place did not prevent a situation of open access and the commons problem, with biological and

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economic overfishing taking place. However, the authors’ analysis suggested that establishing rules to create ITQs or some similar type of quantitative withdrawal right would be infeasible for a number of operational reasons: (i) the multi-species harvests

(including species with naturally high fluctuations in biomass) would make setting a total allowable catch difficult; (ii) the large number of small-scale fishers would render the identification of an equitable allocation process difficult in the absence of prior monitoring of catch; and (iii) limited organizational resources were available to monitor harvests sufficiently to enforce compliance (Squires et al, 2003).

In reaction to the growing body of theory and practice on the forms of property rights created by rules for tenure in ocean fishery systems, a body of literature has developed on the impact of these rules on universally-agreed human rights and principles of equity

(Metzner, 2005). As with the literature on property rights in common pool resources, it would be impossible to summarize the full scope of research on the topic here, but rather a number of syntheses to illustrate some of the issues raised. For example, some experts have noted that rules enacted to strengthen individual property rights for fish harvesting have ‘enclosed the commons’ for a few to gain the wealth of the fishery system, while many more are excluded (Kearney, 2007). For example concerns have been raised that establishment of ITQs has led to the concentration of wealth from an ocean fishery system, increased discards of fish, loss of social characteristics of fishing communities under transfers and fleet reductions, and reduced employment for crew as fleets sizes were reduced (Copes and Charles, 2004; Kumar, 2007). More specifically, Kearney

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(2007) suggests that efforts to strengthen property rights in ocean fishery systems have focused solely on the objective of efficiency, and neglected equity to present generations, and notably the principles of human rights. Kearney (2007) continues by suggesting a translation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights into fishery- specific rights as principles that should guide rules for tenure:

1. The right to fish for food,

2. The right to fish for a livelihood,

3. The right to healthy households, communities and cultures,

4. The right to live and work in a healthy ecosystem that will support future

generations of fishers, and

5. The right to participate in decisions affecting fishing.

Allison et al. (2012) note that for many communities in tropical developing countries, these rights are not protected, and combined with lack of secure tenure to land, access to political and justice systems, primary health care and education services, among others, leave fishers particularly vulnerable. In such situations, fishing behavior is not as amenable to the incentive to conserve or maximize profits as for those whose human rights were secure, i.e. “vulnerable people whose human rights are routinely violated don’t make effective guardians of fishing rights or motivated resource stewards”

(Allison et al., 2012; Ratner et al., 2014). Similarly, state-community partnerships for governance of ocean fishery systems are less likely to succeed in contexts where the state is not protecting human rights, hence strengthening protection of human rights

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becomes an integral element of the rules for governance of ocean fishery systems and notably for tenure (Ratner et al., 2014). Additionally, rules for tenure that limit access to the resources in coastal communities where ocean fishery systems serve a ‘welfare function’ by providing employment and income as needed (Kurien and Willmann,

2009), could undermine the social safety net and thus protection of human rights (Bene et al, 2010). As such, a ‘human rights-based approach’ to the formulation of rules for tenure in ocean fishery systems would ensure that the objectives of equity to present generations are coupled with objectives for efficiency (Allison, 2011). Allison et al

(2012) propose a number of principles to guide fisheries governance in such contexts, summarized as:

 Address overfishing that threatens resource sustainability and the flow of

benefits from the ocean fishery system to the wider economy as the priority

policy objective – balancing efficiency and equity to future generations.

Building the value of the resources should be an explicit objective of fisheries

management in the small-scale sub-sector, which in most places requires a

reduction in fishing capacity and capitalization.

 Support empowerment of fishing communities, both through their social

inclusion and building their capabilities, such that partnerships between the state

and local groups are transparent and based on mutual trust and accountability.

 Integrate broader human rights of fishers to an adequate livelihood as part of any

efforts to strengthen property rights in ocean fishery systems, such that poverty

reduction is a key component of decisions over equitable allocation of rights.

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This includes supporting opportunities for small-scale fishers to increase the

benefits of harvests without increasing the volume of the catch, through

increased value additions in the supply chain, as well as increased access for

small-scale fishers to basic social services.

 Support improvements in the broader governance context, notably access to

justice systems and conflict resolution mechanisms for small-scale fishers.

 Integrate responsible fisheries policies with wider poverty reduction policies in

coastal developing countries.

Additionally, anthropologists have raised concerns with the promotion of the above

‘human rights approaches’ as a ‘western’ conception, and asserted that the emphasis on co-governance or co-management partnerships between the state and fishing communities is a ‘betrayal’ of these communities, because they feel that many states do not recognize cultural, social and historical characteristics of communities and indeed perpetuate the local inequalities they consider to be at the root of poverty in fishing communities (Davis and Ruddle, 2012).

In conclusion, the group of common characteristics defined here from the literature to help classify the rules that help govern tenure in ocean fishery systems have profound implications not just for reducing overfishing, but also for both human rights and property rights in a number of contexts, as well as social and cultural aspects of fishing communities.

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Table 8. Summary matrix of the common characteristics of rules for tenure in ocean fishery systems

Vertical Characteristics Horizontal Characteristics (Intention of the Rule) (Authority behind the Rule) Scale Jurisdiction Level Technical Input Controls Output Rights Established Around Controls* of Origin Measures Controls Management Rights Use Rights Internationa State Constitutiona Regulating Through licensing: Total Often state delegates Access rights: l l Choice technology (e.g. allowable authority to allow - Limited entry access fishing gears, size Limits on the number catch others to help make rights, where a fixed limits of fish of fishing vessels the rules for tenure in number of entry caught) a defined area or permits or licenses are National Partnership Collective Limits on average ocean fishery system issued s between Choice Closed areas to potential fish catching - TURFs and customary State & fishing power of a vessel (e.g. marine tenure Local size)

181 Groups Closed seasons Quantitative withdrawal

Local Operational Limits on the average rights time at sea for a vessel - Input/effort rights (e.g. number of - Output/catch rights fishing days) Self – Governance Limits on intensity of operation of a vessel per increment of time at sea Private Property Rights Created by the Horizontal Characteristics of Rules Entity(ies)

ACCESS WITHDRAWAL MANAGEMENT EXCLUSION ALIENATION

Human Rights Potentially Impacted by the Horizontal Characteristics of Rules 1. The right to fish for food, 2. The right to fish for a livelihood, 3. The right to healthy households, communities and cultures, 4. The right to live and work in a healthy ecosystem that will support future generations of fishers, and

5. The right to participate in decisions affecting fishing. *There is some overlap between this category and input and output controls, and the horizontal characteristics should be placed on a spectrum. Sources: North (1990), Ostrom (2005), Cochrane (2009), Kishor et al (in draft), Kearney (2007)

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Organizations in ocean fisheries governance systems. Numerous organizations have been established to implement the rules governing ocean fishery systems (FAO, 2001a).

These organizations are created by the institutions of fisheries governance, and as they evolve, in turn alter those institutions (North, 1990). As with the other components of the fisheries governance concept presented here, these organizations can be described in terms of their common ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ characteristics.

In terms of the common ‘vertical’ characteristics of fisheries governance organizations, the characteristics of spatial scale (international, national or local) and jurisdiction of origin (state, self-governing groups, partnerships or private entities) are suggested here to apply. At the international scale, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea

(ITLOS) has been established to resolve conflict between states within the framework of

UNCLOS, and FAO has the mandate for articulating global fisheries policy, through its

Committee on Fisheries (COFI) (FAO, 2001a). At the regional scale, a number of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) are recognized under the framework of the UNFSA to govern ocean fishery systems wholly or partially in areas beyond national jurisdiction, or shared between the waters of different states (FAO,

2001a). At the national scale, specialized government agencies have often been established to formulate operational level rules and support overall public policy objectives and monitoring (FAO, 2001a). Hilborn et al. (2005) writes that the British

Parliamentary system left a legacy of ‘Ministries of Fisheries’ in many parts of the world with relative centralized decision-making authority over access to the resources.

Additionally, there is a wide diversity of organizations that have developed around

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specific ocean fishery systems, communities, user groups, etc. At the local scale, throughout history fishing populations world-wide have developed diverse organizational arrangements to administer and enforce various rules for fishing, and particularly to reduce conflict in the use of common pool resources (Kooiman et al.,

2005). These arrangements have been neither infallible nor free from difficulties, and in many areas of the world the advances of technology and industrialization of fishing have outpaced the capacity of local organizations to respond, as well as the institutions that they support (Kooiman et al., 2005).

At different jurisdictions of origin, a review of available literature shows a wide diversity of organizations that have developed in different contexts to support fisheries governance. States for example have created numerous specialized organs to support fisheries governance, including scientific institutes, management agencies, fishing committees, maritime chambers, etc., many of which have traditionally been complex and often centralized (Feral, 2009). Similarly, self-organization has emerged in many ocean fishery systems, and fishing communities have long been used as ‘laboratories’ for investing self-organizing capabilities (Berkes, 2009). Private entities have also created a diversity of organizations to enhance cooperation for governance, including consortia, professional unions, cooperatives and various professional or specialized associations

(Feral, 2009). In terms of partnerships or co-governance, numerous hybrid organizations have been created at different spatial scales, to which management rights have been delegated (Feral, 2009).

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In terms of the common ‘horizontal characteristics’ of fisheries governance organizations, Kuemlangan (2009) writes that the organizations created by the rules for ocean fishery systems can be classified in terms of the decision-making and operational functions that they perform. More specifically, organizations often perform a range of functions to support administration and enforcement of rules governing the ocean fishery systems, including: (i) administering the rules governing tenure in the ocean fishery systems (including definition and allocation of rights created by the rules, setting total allowable catch levels for species for example (Garcia, 2005), (ii) gathering information, assessment and monitoring progress towards policy objectives and pursuing adjustments in behavior as needed (notably the Code of Conduct states that rules should be administered and decisions made on the basis of the best scientific information available), and (iii) enforcement of compliance with the rules – including monitoring fishing activity and performance, e.g. through observer programs, fishing vessel inspection programs and satellite-based vessel monitoring systems (World Bank, 2004; Cochrane, 2009). The last function is particularly critical, as institutions will fail if the rules developed are poorly enforced (Kooiman et al., 2005), and hence Ostrom (2005) makes the distinction between rules in form that are not known to participants and do not alter behavior, and rules in use (pointing out that if the risk of being monitored and sanctioned for breaking a rule is low, then considerable differences between predicted and actual behavior are likely to be observed). Enforcement is costly, and rules are generally derived with compliance costs in mind, such that in many cases if the costs to individuals and organizations to monitor behavior and compliance exceed the gains to society, the rules are never devised (North,

1990). At the same time, perceived legitimacy of rules can affect compliance, and

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particularly voluntary compliance, without which organizations can rarely afford the continuing costs of monitoring and enforcing compliance (Ostrom, 2005).

Additionally, though not specific to fisheries governance, the general literature on governance also emphasizes common characteristics of ‘good governance’ organizations. For example, the World Bank (1994) states that good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and evidence-based policymaking by state organizations; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs – all behaving under the rule of law. Competent organizations are capable of picking up signals about problems and understanding their causes, balancing interests fairly and efficiently in formulating policies, and executing policies in an accountable manner (World Bank, 2003). Many of these characterstics have since been translated into worldwide governance indicators and tracked across countries by the World Bank

(Kaufmann et al., 2010; World Bank, 2015d). These indicators consist of six composite indicators of broad dimensions of governance, but include characteristics particularly relevant for state organizations, such as:

1. Government effectiveness: capturing perceptions of the quality of public services,

the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political

pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility

of the government's commitment to such policies;

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2. Regulatory quality: capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to

formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote

private sector development;

3. Rule of law: capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in

and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract

enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of

crime and violence; and

4. Control of corruption: capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is

exercised for private gain, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private

interests (World Bank, 2015d).

Table 9. Summary matrix of the common characteristics of governance organizations in ocean fishery systems

Vertical Horizontal Characteristics (Functions) Characteristics Scale Jurisdiction Administration of Research, Assessment & Enforcement of Origin Rules for Tenure Monitoring International State For example: For example: For example:  Administration  Monitoring fisheries-  Monitoring of rules for dependent & independent fishery Partnerships tenure variables of ecological system activity and National between State &  Allocation of  Tracking progress towards compliance Local any rights policy objectives  Administering Groups created by rules  Recommending sanctions for  Establishment changes/adaptations to rules non- Local of TACs where as needed compliance appropriate Self – Worldwide Governance Indicators (for state organizations) Governance 1. Governance effectiveness: quality of public services, quality of civil service and degree of independence from political pressures Private 2. Regulatory quality: ability of government to formulate and implement sound Entity(ies) policies and regulations 3. Rule of law: extent to which agents abide by the rules of society, e.g. quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts 4. Control of corruption: extent to which public power is exercised for private gain

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In conclusion, with matrices of common characteristics to describe each of the three components of the concept of fisheries governance, an updated (albeit rudimentary) classification system for fisheries governance can be embedded in the SES conceptual framework, as a tool to more precisely identify, define and categorize different aspects of governance sub-systems within a given ocean fishery socio-ecological system.

Embedded within the SES framework given previously, the following Figure 21 proposes an updated and expanded classification system for fisheries governance (referencing the matrices which supply the information) – with a focus on tenure in the harvesting segment, as a tool for organizing and comparing information across different systems.

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Fishing Effort** Consumer Sub-System Consumer preferences Rules See Table 9

Rules Policy See Table 7 Organizations Wholesale & Retail Sub-System Policy See Table 10 Distributors, groups, companies Ecological Unit Organizations

Processing Sub-System Individuals, groups, companies FISHERIES

Fish stock(s) GOVERNANCE* Harvest Sub-System Fishing Fleets, INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO COMMONS PROBLEM: BOUNDARIES or Families, Communities TENURE

Ecological System Social System Outcome Measures: Outcome Measures:  Biological = Bmsy of targeted species Yield  Efficiency = PV of resource rent  Ecological = e.g. diversity of animal species  Equity to present = No consensus on a multi- maintained; ecological structures maintained dimensional indicator of poverty

* Independent Variable; ** Dependent Variable

Figure 21. Conceptual framework for ocean fisheries governance, focusing on tenure in the harvesting segment

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3.3 Introducing Dynamism to the Ocean Fisheries Governance Concept: Reform

In their global review of ocean fishery systems, based on a number of successful examples Worm et al. (2009) express optimism that despite decades of overfishing, ecological systems can still recover if harvesting effort is reduced, for example through application of a number of the different types of rules discussed previously (all of which have shown varying degrees of success in different contexts and combinations).

Recovery of overfished stocks is still a poorly understood process, particularly for demersal species, and is potentially constrained by the magnitude of previous decline, the loss of biodiversity, species life histories, species interactions, and climate (Worm et al., 2009). Even without fishing, a stock takes time to rebuild itself, and the length of time required to rebuild a stock after overfishing will depend on its specific biological characteristics (Anderson and Seijo, 2010). Given this potential, the process of changing the institutions that govern ocean fishery systems becomes critical to achieving rebuilding objectives.

As with the ocean fishery systems themselves, the governance systems for fish harvesting are invariably context-specific, reflecting the unique mix of the ecological and social systems in a given space. The same may be asserted for processes of change in various components of ocean fisheries governance, and the outcomes from that change. Changes to some component(s) of ocean fisheries governance that can be linked to improved outcomes from the system according to measures of targeted objectives (and consistent with universally-agreed principles), are defined here as

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‘fisheries governance reform’. Before summarizing some general descriptions of fisheries governance change processes that have improved outcomes – i.e. reform –

Ostrom’s (2005) warning is useful to repeat: “No one can undertake a complete analysis of all the potential rules that they might use, and analytically determine which set of rules will be optimal for the outcomes that they value in a particular ecological, economic, social and political setting. One must recognize that policies involving rule changes must be viewed as experiments. Officials and policy analysts who presume that they have the right design can be dangerous. They are likely to assume that citizens are short-sighted and motivated only by extrinsic benefits and costs. Continuing to presume that complex policy problems are simple problems that can be solved through the adoption of simple designs that are given general names, such as private property, government ownership, or community organization, is a dangerous academic approach.” In summary, there are no ‘blueprints’ for ocean fisheries governance institutions (Ostrom, 2005). At best, experts have recommended some common features from the body of experiences to date – generally in developed countries and temperate climates, that include: (i) limited and well-defined rights around controls, (ii) a sound scientific basis for decisions of fish catch and effort levels, (iii) effective enforcement, and (iv) stakeholder involvement in decision-making (OECD, 2011).

With Ostrom’s (2005) cautionary note in mind, the intention here is to add the element of time into the fisheries governance classification system proposed within an ocean fisheries SES in Figure 21, so that it can serve as a tool to study actual or proposed reforms in different contexts. Such a tool would allow decision-makers to identify

191 possible entry points or pathways of institutional change across different contexts.

Within this tool or conceptual framework, two aspects are critical for the element of time:

 The common horizontal characteristics describe the ‘substance’ of institutions

and organizations that act as independent variables affecting the dependent

variable of fishing effort; and

 The vertical characteristics describe the entry point by which the horizontal

characteristics may be changed.

Although institutions are endogenous to a state (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), changes to institutions occur across different levels (Ostrom, 2005), hence changes at one level – e.g. a policy change at the collective choice level, may be exogenous to another level, e.g. the rules at the operational level. At each level, the role of organizations as entry points for institutional change is critical. Pathways of institutional change are shaped in part by the relationship between organizations and institutions that has evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by these institutions (North, 1990).

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Table 10. Summary of the common vertical and horizontal characteristics frequently used to describe the three components of ocean fishery governance

Vertical Characteristics Horizontal Characteristics Spatial Jurisdiction Level Policies Rules Organizations Scale of Origin International State Constitutional Principles Technical Administration Choice Measures of rules for National Partnerships Objectives tenure Collective Input Controls Local Self- Choice Targeted Research, Governance Outcomes Output Controls assessment and Operational monitoring Private entities Coherence Rights established Enforcement around controls

For example, changes in institutions and organizations of the state have been studied across disciplines and captured in a large body of literature, often noting the difficulty of changing state institutions at the level of constitutional choice and certainly at the international scale between states. Box 13. A Political Economy Framework In broad terms, a political economy framework describes how citizens or stakeholder groups and Notable among these disciplines, government interact in a hypothetical political market in a democratic system. Citizens (or stakeholders political economy is the methodology groups) signal their policy demand or preferences through various channels such as lobbying or voting choices. Institutions will determine the limits and of economics applied to the analysis effectiveness of stakeholder in achieving their objectives, with equilibrium found at the intersection of political behavior and institutions of supply and demand for a policy concession or rule change. Well-organized and cohesive pressure groups in states, which has developed as a are usually more successful in translating their preferences into demands than unorganized individuals. field of inquiry for institutional Source: OECD (2011) change in recent decades (Weingast and Wittman, 2006). Similarly, a growing body of empirical research has developed on the evolution of institutions for self- governance, most notably (but certainly not solely) perhaps with the work of Ostrom

(National Research Council, 2002). Additionally, since the 1980s a significant body of

193 literature has emerged on the development in partnerships for co-governance (see for example Berkes, Pinkerton and Pomeroy).

A key feature of changes to governance institutions at all levels, despite the level of complexity, is the relatively simple cost-benefit calculus actors make of the economic costs of the change, as compared to the alternatives under the status quo (North, 1990).

These economic costs include transaction costs in the political market and subjective perceptions of the actors involved, which may affect the incentives of organizations to change rules (North, 1990). When the expected economic costs of changing rules are higher than the benefits, the status quo remains – an equilibrium, or individuals may devise their own de facto rules outside of formal channels that they enforce themselves

(Ostrom, 2005). Individual perceptions of the benefits are critical and reflect communication channels, but are also difficult to measure externally (Ostrom, 2005).

Yet in the end, the political economy of reaching consensus among decision-makers on changes to institutions is one of the biggest challenges to ocean fisheries governance reform (World Bank, 2004).

In considering the cost-benefit calculus actors make of the economic costs of governance changes, as compared to the alternatives under the status quo, these costs can be summarized as the actual costs of changing the various components of governance, as well as foregone resource rent as a result of changes in fishing effort and yield (assuming constant prices). More specifically, these are summarized in the table below:

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Table 11. Summary of the types of economic costs associated with ocean fisheries governance reform

Economic Cost Costs Category Costs of formulating and Policy formulation/reform enacting changes to institutions and organizations Development and enactment of rule changes or new rules (Ci) Organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce rules changes

Costs of changes in fishing Resource rent foregone effort and subsequently yield

Connecting changes in ocean fisheries governance to changes in outcomes, the measure or indicator for efficiency would change based on the above economic costs, via analysis of costs and benefits (i.e. cost-benefit analysis) as follows (Anderson and

Seijo, 2010):

Net present value (NPV) of the resource rents (R) after ocean fishery governance reform

NPV (d, N) = ∑ {Rt/(1+d)^t} – Ci 3.1 where:

R = TR – TCe; where:

 Total revenues = PY, where:

 P= Price of fish at first sale, and Y = yield of fish

 TCe = intermediate consumption + compensation of employees + consumption

of fixed capital + normal profit, where:

 Intermediate consumption = input costs of goods and services at purchasers’

prices, including taxes on products; and

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 Normal profit = opportunity cost of capital, normally the average return on

capital in an economy, or the average cost of borrowing capital, multiplied by

the value of fixed capital stock in the fishery

d = Discount Rate t = Number of time periods

Ci = Costs of institutional and organizational change (i.e. policy formulation/reform, development and enactment of rule changes or new rules, and organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce rules changes)

The above equation calculates the net present value of the stream of economic benefits from an ocean fishery system, after including reductions in revenue as a result of changes in fishing effort and yield due to governance changes, and the economic cost of introducing and sustaining these changes. This NPV from the system can be compared to the expected NPV if the status quo is maintained and governance changes not introduced.

Calculating the NPV measures the flow of economic benefits over time, linking the present efficiency measure to longer-term sustainability, by summing the projected time series of future expected rents as a result of the changes in governance and subsequently fishing effort and yield. This time path of benefits is not uniform, and so a stream of rents might be negative for the first few years after a governance change as

196 fishing effort is reduced and stock rebuilds, until slowly turning and staying positive.11

This may best be illustrated by the following hypothetical example:

Hypothetical Tropical Ocean Fishery System Rebuilding Path

Characteristics of the hypothetical ocean fishery system:

 A tropical, multi-species coastal demersal fishery above the continental shelf,

contained within one EEZ but extending spatially at the national scale – where

the stocks supporting the catch composition are not collapsed beyond recovery,

but are exploited beyond the levels that would support maximum yield, but

substitutability between species is high, and recovery rates for many stocks to

start to increase in the face of reduced fishing pressure is on the order of 3 to 5

years

 The resources are exploited by three different groups of harvesters: a non-

motorized canoe fleet (operating commercially), a motorized canoe fleet, and

an industrial trawl fleet

 The non-motorized canoe fleet includes 3,000 vessels, with a constant total fleet

size but declining landings and generating practically no resource rent

11 For more detail on calculation of the time path to a desired fish stock size from the present, based on effort reductions that allow a stock to rebuild given its biological characteristics, see Anderson and Seijo (2010), ppg 59 – 70 and the discussion of the ‘golden rule’ and formal analysis of dynamic optimal utilization.

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 The motorized canoe fleet includes 7,000 vessels, with an increasing fleet size

but constant total landings of fish (with the catch rate per vessel declining), and

generating practically no resource rent

 The industrial trawl fleet includes 150 vessels, with a constant fleet size and

declining catch rates and total landings, with a positive though declining

resource rent

 Labor is considered as part of Ce in calculating the resoruce rent, but given that

society is not at full employment and the probability of obtaining employment

at similar income levels is estimated at 50%, the wages paid to labor are reduced

by 50% before being added to the costs (with the other 50% of wages

considered as part of the rent, i.e. the stream of benefits)

Proposed governance changes:

 Fishery operates under de facto open access, canoes are not regulated and

trawlers pay an annual fee for entry equivalent to 2% of the first sale value of

the catch

 New rules introduced at the collective choice level by the state to limit access

to the motorized canoe fleet (but not the non-motorized fleet), capped at current

levels, and to fully phase out the trawl fleet within two years

 With the trawl fleet removed after two years and the motorized canoe fleet

capped, several stocks within the system start to rebuild, and catch rates

increase, as does rent – in comparison to the status quo alternative scenario

where no action is taken and trends continue as before

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 Even with a slightly higher than average discount rate, after five years the net

benefits are positive and continue to climb annually after year five, in

comparison to the status quo alternative scenario

Summary of trends in resource rent from the ocean fishery system:

US$ 3,000,000.00 2,500,000.00 2,000,000.00 1,500,000.00 1,000,000.00 500,000.00 - (500,000.00) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (1,000,000.00) (1,500,000.00)

Motorized canoes Non-motorized canoes Trawl vessels Total

Source: Case adapted from World Bank, 2011

Figure 22. Change in resource rents due to rule change over 10 years - in comparison to status quo alternative scenario

The above hypothetical exercise attempts to illustrate that even where net economic

benefits are increased over a given time period as a result of a governance reform (and

as measured by changes in resource rent), the benefits are not distributed evenly over

time. Rather in this hypothetical case, the total benefits are negative for the first five

years, and then increasing subsequently. The governance reform leads to a net

economic benefit for society from the ocean fishery system, as well as bigger fish

stocks and hence greater potential benefits to future generations, but only after a short-

term loss. This short-term loss is the cost desccribed previously as ‘foregone resource

rent’ due to changes in fishing effort and fishing yield, and while less than the benefits 199 over time, may be significant for societies in the short term – and figure prominently into stakeholder perceptions of the economic costs and benefits of the reform when proposed. Note that the total rent gain in Figure 34 does not include the costs of the governance reform (Ci), which in this case would include, among others: (i) significant costs of communication and consensus-building to formulate and enact the reform, (ii) increased costs to organizations to administer the limited access program for motorized canoes, and (iii) increased costs to organizations for surveillance and enforcement of limited access across 7,000 motorized canoes.

The above discussion may illustrate the sum (i.e. the size) of the potential costs and benefits, and hence efficiency gains, over a time period from a hypothetical change in governance of an ocean fishery system, and may include concerns for equity to future generations by considering the stream of benefits over time (based on increasing stock sizes that provide for a greater underlying natural capital asset). However, the size of the costs and benefits alone does not fully explain changes in governance, particularly given that economic institutions (which are created by political institutions) lead to different distributions of resources, and so will not necessarily be preferred uniformly by all groups and actors in a society (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Essentially, cost- benefit analysis of the NPV of changes to resource rent from an ocean fishery SES as a result of proposed governance changes at a given ‘vertical’ entry point within the proposed fisheries governance classification system may indicate the size of potential efficiency gains to present and future generations, but it does not necessarily indicate

200 how these gains are distributed within the social sub-system (Boardman et al, 2011) – and thus how they might be perceived by groups and actors.

Yet as groups compare expected benefit streams under a proposed governance change with the status quo, the key to consensus and collective action is actually the distribution and who will bear the costs (Libecap, 1994). At a more general level, resistance to change is reflected in a tendency toward favoring the status quo and can be ascribed to a number of factors: perceived unequal distribution in the potential gains and losses from proposed changes; the differential organizational ability between groups; the timing of cost and benefits of the proposed change; and uncertainty regarding the gains and losses from the change (OECD, 2011). This unequal distribution of gains and losses from change serves to prevent the adoption of reform and reinforce the status quo (OECD, 2011).

Political science has studied the process by which consensus is reached on proposed governance reforms at the jurisdiction of the state (‘agenda setting’), and emphasizes the importance of the distribution of potential economic costs and benefits, i.e. those would ‘win’ or ‘lose’ from the reform (Gupta, 2010), which can form additional

‘hidden costs’ in the introduction of reforms:

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Table 12. Simple illustration of likelihood of achieving consensus on proposed ocean fisheries governance reforms, based on the distribution of potential economic costs and benefits

Costs (those who might Benefits (those who might ‘gain’) ‘lose’) Diffuse Concentrated Diffuse Inaction Consensus likely reached Concentrated Consensus likely rejected Conflict Source: adapted from Gupta (2010)

A number of political economy models have developed to try to better assess the likelihood of reaching consensus around proposed governance reforms in a society, i.e. the ‘political feasibility’, building off of the basic consideration of the distribution of economic costs and benefits illustrated in the table above. One relatively simple model is the feasibility assessment technique, which includes the following steps:

1. Identify and categorize the different stakeholder groups or actors (e.g. local

fishers, foreign fleets, processors, village elders, local government officials,

national fishery agencies, etc.),

2. Estimate the position of each group on the proposed reform subjectively, as a

measure of probable support on a scale between +1 and -1, with the former as

certain support, the latter as certain rejection, and 0 as neutral,

3. Estimate the resource available to each group to push for their position, e.g.

prestige, legitimacy, money, time, administrative capability, communication

capability, on a scale between 0 and 1,

4. Multiply the position ranking by the ranking of resources available for each

group, in order to calculate the estimated potential for influence,

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5. Estimate the commitment factor, or percentage of its resources that each group

would actually be willing to commit in order towards adoption of its position

on the proposed reform, on a scale of 0 to 1,

6. Multiply the potential for influence by the commitment factor for each group,

and sum the total – if it is positive the reform is ‘politically feasible’, if negative

it is not (see Table 13 below) (Gupta, 2010).

Table 13. Illustration of simple assessment of political feasibility of a hypothetical proposed governance reform from Figure 21

Group Potential for Commitment Feasibility Influence* Factor Score Trawl owners’ association - 0.9 0.90 - 0.81 Fishing communities 0.12 0.60 0.072 Canoe association 0.01 0.30 0.003 Local fish buyers 0.10 0.10 0.01 Local government officials 0.20 0.10 0.02

Total - 0.705 * Ranking of position on reform multiplied by resources available to pursue adoption

Table 13 is a very simple illustration of hypothetical levels of support among stakeholder groups in the fictitious example given in Figure 21, where rule changes are proposed in order to limit access to a motorized canoe fleet, maintain open access to the non-motorized canoe fleet, and phase out the industrial trawl fleet over two years.

The intention of the example is to illustrate that even where the net economic benefits to society may be increased from a proposed governance reform, where the distribution of those costs and benefits is uneven and in some cases highly concentrated, strong opposition may reduce the political feasibility of the reform at a given vertical entry point. Of course, the above table represents a simple and subjective model relatively

203 easy to develop in given situations, whereas economic game theory and expected utility theory have been applied in far more complex models of potential choices and payoffs to actors or groups in the formation of governance reforms (see for example Bueno de

Mesquita, 2011). Nonetheless, Table 13 illustrates a key finding across a number of common pool resources: where bargaining parties are heterogeneous, the challenge of reaching consensus on collective action becomes much greater (Libecap, 1994). This is frequently the case with ocean fisheries governance reforms, where the costs are generally highly concentrated in specific groups while the benefits are diffused across the community as a whole (OECD, 2011).

In summary, the perceived economic costs and benefits of potential governance reforms in a given ocean fishery SES is a key feature in determining whether and how changes to institutions and organizations occur (North, 1990), but cost-benefit analysis of the size of the net gains to society from these changes do not indicate their distribution, which can significantly influence the political feasibility of such reforms

(Libecap, 1994; Gupta, 2010). Given these distributional issues, Hilborn (2007) expressed some skepticism that consensus on the governance reforms needed to reduce various forms of overfishing will be attainable in many SESs, and suggested instead that actors focus on minimum reforms to ensure limited access while simultaneously working to enhance inclusion in governance institutions – in order to allow stakeholders to work through the governance process to find mutually agreed solutions over time. Grafton et al. (2007) also note reforms may be particularly difficult in ocean fishery systems dependent on stocks of slow-growing species that will take longer to

204 rebuild, where the transition costs of reduced yields in the short-term may generate sufficient opposition to prevent changes.

Applying the ocean fisheries governance classification system to a brief sample of experiences. The above discussion on the economic costs and benefits of ocean fisheries governance reform at some of the various vertical entry points summarized in the proposed fisheries governance classification system, their distribution and political feasibility, can perhaps be better illustrated by a short history of reform at the international scale, and a sample of empirical information or experiences. This is because institutions are not static but rather evolving, typically in an incremental fashion (North, 1990), and can be viewed as the result of different pathways of historical development (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).

In the case of ocean fishery systems, much of the ocean’s waters were relatively open to all uses and forms of fishing until the mid-20th century, with the exception of the narrow (often 3 miles wide) strip of water along the coast placed under the jurisdiction of the coastal state (Garcia and Hayashi, 2000). U.S. President Truman’s 1945

Proclamation claiming the waters off the coast of the United States as sovereign began a profound reform of ocean governance, whereby states began ‘enclosing’ neighboring seas in a process that mirrored the land allocation process (notably in Europe) after the

Middle Ages (Garcia and Hayashi, 2000).

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This coincided with the decades of explosive growth in fishing around the globe, and the rise of overfishing. In response, ocean fisheries governance was expected to improve substantially in the 1980s after the widespread establishment of EEZs in the

1970s and the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982 (FAO, 1995; Doulman, 2005). However, the continued growth in fishing capacity in the 1980s and 1990s suggested to weaknesses to many in the ability of states to effectively govern the ocean fishery systems within their waters (Garcia and Hayashi, 2000).

At the same time, the combination of technology growth in fishing fleets, access to global markets and the effective nationalization of ocean fishery systems led to the break-down of many customary tenure regimes for coastal fishery systems, as the institutional arrangements devised by communities lost legal standing (Kumar, 2007;

Ostrom, 2005). Many government agencies were unable to fill the void in administering de jure state governance, leading to de facto open access (Ostrom, 2005).

Similarly, experience in many countries has shown that developing effective governance institutions for EEZs is a long process even in the most favorable circumstances, taking some 20 to 40 years of continuous effort and adjustment in a number of successful cases (Doulman, 2005). Yet in many countries, ocean fisheries governance has continued to languish for a variety of reasons, including a scarcity of the human, institutional and financial resources required to devise and implement management programs; a lack of understanding, by both governments and fisheries participants, of the potential benefits that good management can generate; and the reluctance of governments to make unpopular decisions (Doulman, 2005).

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Over this time period, Sanchirico and Wilen (2007) have suggested that governance seemed to evolve through four distinct stages in many countries, as the resources became more valuable in the face of rising demand: (i) pure open access, such existed in many waters during the global fleet build-up between 1945 and 1976 that led to initial overcapacity and overfishing; (ii) introduction of more widespread rules for fishing in national waters together with the establishment of EEZs, generally in the form of technical measures, or what Sanchirico and Wilen describe as ‘regulated open access,’ enforced by national-scale state agencies or authorities; (iii) change of rules to input and/or output controls (what Sanchirico and Wilen term ‘regulated restricted access’); and finally (iv) the development in some countries in the 1980s of rules creating rights around input and/or output controls, including individual fishing quotas

(IFQs), individual transferable quotas (ITQs), territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs), cooperatively-managed fisheries and community development quotas (CDQs).

Sanchirico and Wilen (2007) suggest that many ocean fishery systems – notably in tropical developing countries - are still governed under tenure institutions comparable to the second stage, of ‘regulated open access’, where they note that the commons problem is often evident in biological, economic and ecological overfishing and overcapacity from the ‘race to fish.’ At the national scale, many fishery systems that have moved to the third stage, ‘regulated restricted access’, where the ‘race to fish’ still occurs but within a closed group of participants (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2007). Notable examples of national-scale reforms to rules that create rights around inputs and/or output controls included Australia, Canada, Iceland, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway and some fishery systems within the waters of the U.S. – each of which has a significant

207 body of literature describing the experiences (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2007). Sanchirico and Wilen (2007) note that in almost all of these cases, economic and often biological overfishing has been reduced, as they promoted a ‘race to value’ rather than a ‘race to fish’.

Given the phases of ocean fisheries governance development described above, and the reforms in a number of developed countries with temperate waters that began to manifest positive outcomes by the late 1990s, in the early 2000s a number of researchers and organizations began to compile empirical data sets on examples of successful reform. As mentioned previously, it would be impossible to attempt to fully summarize the wide literature of case studies of ‘successful’ ocean fisheries governance reform, but a sample of cases and meta-analyses are summarized here, to help add the element of time to the updated fisheries governance classification system proposed in the previous section.

In 2000 FAO convened a conference on the subject of transferable rights around inputs and/or outputs, and produced Fisheries Technical Papers Nos. 411 and 412 summarizing 23 case studies in reform, including two from the European Union,

Iceland, three from Canada, four for the U.S., nine for Australia, Chile, New Zealand,

South Africa and the Pacific Halibut. In these industrial fisheries in developed countries with temperate and often high-value, single-species fisheries, the cases focused particularly on lessons from allocation processes of quota and effects on concentration of fleet ownership, noting in some instances the loss of labor as quota was allocated to

208 vessel owners who often sold, exchanged and consolidated fleets (FAO, 2000a and

2000b). A common result was enhanced efficiency, and in many cases rehabilitation of overfished stocks (FAO, 2000a and 2000b).

Similarly, in 2008 Costello et al. assembled a global database of 11,135 commercial fishery systems and determined from literature, government reports and expert interviews that 121 of these had introduced individual or group quotas (most commonly

ITQs) between 1950 and 2003, and then matched the results to Worm et al.’s (2006) database of whether or not these fisheries were considered as collapsed. The study found that by 2003 the fraction of ocean fishery systems governed by quotas that were collapsed was roughly half the fraction of non-quota governed systems, noting that adoption of quotas accelerated in the late 1970s particularly in Australia, Iceland, New

Zealand and the U.S. (Alaska), and that introduction of quota reforms reduced probability of collapse by 13.7 percent (Costello et al., 2008).

In contrast, and partially in response to FAO’s conference, the journal of Samudra published a series of papers and several case studies in 2007 considering the potential equity impacts on small-scale fishing communities from quota reforms, suggesting among others that in terms of small-scale fisheries, efforts should focus not on transferable rights but on assertion of legal claims to common property rights, and that co-governance or co-management partnerships are more effective where such rights are well-defined for communities (Kumar, 2007). Here perhaps the most notable case is South Africa, where the state launched a policy change in 1994 to increase equity to

209 present generations, based on an existing distribution of wealth that favored on a few white-owned companies (Hersoug and Holm, 2000). Policy recommendations were translated into a new law, establishing a modified ITQ system, which resulted largely in entrenching the previous distribution of wealth (Hersoug and Holm, 2000). The nature of both the quotas and the allocation process left many past users excluded from the new system, and eventually many took the state agency to court (Isaacs, 2011).

Many traditional users did not speak the language of the rules, nor have access to the resources needed to qualify for allocations (e.g. forming companies and competing with established companies) (Isaacs, 2011). Essentially, many traditional users were excluded from the process and resorted to becoming contractors for companies with access, while others were allocated unviable rights that they soon sold (Isaacs, 2011).

Following FAO’s set of case studies on ITQs, in 2005 Cunningham et al. (2005) summarized a number of case studies of reform across different types of ocean fishery systems, a sample of which have been classified in the following table according to the matrices developed in the previous section, for indicative purposes:

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Table 14. Indicative classification of a sample of case studies in ocean fisheries governance reform from Cunningham et al (2005)

Ocean Vertical Entry Points Change in Horizontal Outcomes Fishery Characteristics (if available) System Scale Jurisdicti Level Policy Rules Organizations on of Origin Pacific International State Collectiv - Transition - Landings halibut e Choice to stabilized, fishery individual indication of (Canada, quotas stock U.S.) recovery, rent increase Shetland Local State Collectiv - Transition - N/A sandeel e Choice to local fishery manageme (U.K.) nt rights Kayar Local Self- Collectiv - Transition - Increased coastal governed e Choice to landings demersal individual over time, fishery quotas increased (Senegal) (boxes of rent fish) Hake National State Collectiv - Transition - Increased fishery e Choice to ITQs rents and full (Namibia) (with cost- reduced recovery for fees for operations of local public investment organization in s processing) Northern Local State Collectiv - Transition - Reduction in prawn e Choice to overcapacity fishery individual , slow (Australia transferable increase in ) effort (ITE) rent units Source: Cunningham et al (2005)

Similar to Cunningham et al. (2005), the OECD (2011) aimed to summarize a number of case studies of fisheries governance reform that had achieved successful outcomes in SESs at the national scale in Iceland, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand and Norway. In these cases, while the reforms were different, the common features included long time- frames and the need for a trigger – generally an economic crisis rather than an environmental one, such as low or declining resource rent earned by participants

(OECD, 2011). Additionally, the OECD (2011) noted that compensating transfers in

211 order to address unequal distribution of costs were critical to obtaining consensus around many of the reforms, consistent with political economy models (i.e. turning a

‘potential pareto improvement’ into an ‘actual pareto improvement’).

Hilborn et al (2005) also aimed to summarize a number of examples of successful fisheries governance reforms at multiple spatial scales, noting that despite the generally negative reporting on the status of ocean fishery systems, successes existed. In particular, Hilborn et al. (2005) highlighted the national-scale case of the shellfish fishery in Chile, where a law was passed in 1991 to introduce TURFs for fishing associations meeting minimum criteria for resource management planning, to be exercised in partnership with state agencies, with wide adoption in 1998 after initial successes. The transition resulted in higher landings and resource rents, as well as improvements to marketing and post-harvest value addition (Hilborn et al, 2005), and was continuing to generate positive outcomes as of 2010 (Gelcich et al., 2010). This example in Chile actually draws upon centuries of success with TURFs in other ocean fishery systems (Hilborn et al., 2005), notably the coastal demersal fisheries of Japan where cooperatives developed rules evaluated and recognized at the level of local government (Ruddle, 1987). Such rules were also in use for centuries throughout the

Pacific Islands as part of customary marine tenure (Berkes, 1989), and publicized more widely by Christy in 1982. Over the last 15 years external partners and state agencies have supported 500 communities in 15 Pacific Island countries and territories to exercise management rights over ‘locally-managed marine areas’ (LMMAs), that have since been connected via local, national and regional social networks and have

212 introduced closed areas covering some 1,000 square kilometers with generally positive outcomes observed to date (Govan, 2009).

In addition to such national-scale reforms, a number of local-scale reforms have been studied, including for example:

 State recognition of community management rights in Nova Scotia, via the

creation of community boards in each community (Copes and Charles, 2004);

 Efforts to lobby the state to recognize informal tenure over the beach seine

fishery in Grenada as coastal development eroded customary practices, where

15 traditional tenure rules were documented and written for the first time

(Finlay and McConney, 2011); and

 Co-governance partnerships between the state, industrial fishing operators and

local fishing communities in the Ramnad district of India, to create a system of

rotating zones between small-scale fishing and industrial trawling (Jentoft et

al., 2009).

In 2011, Guiterrez et al. published a broad comparative analysis of case studies specifically where co-governance or co-management partnerships existed around the world, studying published literature and reports as well as conducting interviews, for

130 fisheries at various spatial scales in 44 countries. The authors assessed 19 variables that were grouped by ecological, environmental or economic outcomes, and then summed them on a common score in order to define success and correlate outcomes to various contributing factors reflecting both governance characteristics and attributes of

213 resource users (without the benefit of random treatments and control groups) (Guiterrez et al., 2011). The study found that co-governance or co-management partnerships were most successful when scaled to benthic and demersal fish resources, particularly when accompanied by technical measures to close certain areas to fishing, TURFs and rights around inputs or outputs for communities and individuals (Guiterrez et al., 2011). In contrast, the study found less success where the spatial scale of institutions was not effectively matched to the distribution of resources (Guiterrez et al., 2011), reflecting a fundamental recommendation of the Code of Conduct (paragraph 7.3.1) that rules

‘should be concerned with the whole stock over its entire area of distribution’, as well as a range of empirical studies and literature (see for example Hilborn et al., 2005;

Wilson, 2006; Ostrom, 2005). Guiterrez et al. (2011) identified the most important contributing factors to successful outcomes of co-governance or co-management partnerships to be the presence of community leaders (i.e. presence of at least one singular individual with entrepreneurial skills, high motivation, widespread respect and strong commitment to co-governance), strong social cohesion (founded on norms, trust, communication and connectedness in networks and groups), individual or community quotas and community-based closed areas, with additional contributing factors including enforcement mechanisms, long-term policies and the influence of users in the local markets. The authors suggest that findings reinforce the SES framework for describing ocean fishery systems, whereby sociological characteristics of resource users are equally relevant to the biophysical characteristics of ecological units they are utilizing (Guiterrez et al., 2011).

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In reviewing the case study literature on fisheries governance reform, it is perhaps not surprising that many of the reforms that have been documented at the national scale have occurred in developed countries and often in temperate waters, as these were some of the first to industrialize fishing and now first to rebuild fish stocks – notably in the

Iceland, Newfoundland-Labrador, the Northeast U.S. Shelf, the Southeast Australian

Shelf and the California Current ecosystems (Worm et al., 2009). However, fewer examples of large-scale governance reform can be found in the more recently developed fisheries of the tropics (CEA, 2012).

Nonetheless, on the basis of the literature reviewed on theory, and the available case studies in reform, the updated ocean fisheries governance classification system proposed in the previous section has been adapted to accommodate the element of time as shown in Figure 23, and hence to classify and organize information on the types of governance ‘reforms’, so that these can be better linked to changes in indicators of system outcomes.

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Fishing Effort** Consumer Sub-System Consumer preferences Tenure Rules Classify per Table 8

Rules Policy Classify per Table 6 Organizations Wholesale & Retail Sub-System Classify per Table 9 Policy Distributors, groups, companies Ecological Unit Organizations

Processing Sub-System Individuals, groups, companies Vertical Change in Horizontal Characteristics Entry Points Policies Rules Organizations

Fish stock(s) Describe Describe identified Describe identified identified changes in rules here, changes in Scale Harvest Sub-System changes in e.g. technical measures, administration of rules Jurisdiction of policy objectives input and/or output for tenure; research, Fishing Fleets, Origin and/or targeted controls, and rights assessment and outcomes here around input and output monitoring; Families, Communities Level controls enforcement

Summary of Governance Reforms*

Social System Ecolo gical System

Outcome Measures: Yield Outcome Measures:  Biological = Bmsy of targeted species  Efficiency = PV of resource rent  Ecological = e.g. diversity of animal species  Equity to present = No consensus on a multi- maintained; ecological structures maintained dimensional indicator of poverty

* Independent Variable; ** Dependent Variable

Figure 23. Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms: i.e. an updated/modified classification system for ocean fisheries governance, embedded within a SES framework

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Building from the wide body of theoretical and empirical literature on governance of common pool resources and also on SES frameworks, and more specifically a literature review of theory and practice in ocean fisheries governance reform, the above diagram suggests a conceptual framework that includes (i) an updated and modified fisheries governance reform classification system to identify the types of governance reforms undertaken or proposed at various vertical entry points in the sub-system (by using the matrices developed in Tables 6, 8 and 9 as tools), embedded within (ii) an SES framework to illustrate the linkages between changes in various components of governance over tenure in the harvesting segment, and the other segments or sub- systems present in the wider socio-ecological system, and ultimately changes in outcomes from the system. In aggregate, the addition of this updated fisheries governance reform classification system to a SES framework provides a modified conceptual framework for fisheries governance reform that is intended as a complement to the longstanding field of fisheries bio-economics, to help identify and classify various governance reforms whose impacts upon the larger SES could then be modelled based on the bio-ecological characteristics known, and the economic characteristics of the social sub-system. The results of corresponding such modelling to the governance changes identified through this tool, would be to link them to changes in the measure of outcomes that are both efficient and equitable to future generations. Essentially, this modified framework provides an additional tool to identify past, current or proposed fisheries governance reforms in a given context and at different spatial scales, as a basis for modeling or evaluation to correspond them to changes in outcome measures for efficiency and equity to future generations.

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The specific characteristics or indicators, and therefore the variables to be measured in a SES framework with this modified governance reform classification system, are drawn from the existing body of literature on SES frameworks (e.g. Ostrom, 2009;

Basurto and Ostrom, 2009; Basurto and Nenadovic, 2012; and Leslie et al., 2015). In theory and increasingly in practice, the SES framework has been applied by categorizing four ‘first-tier’ variables: the resource system, the resource users, the governance system and actors – as well as variables for social, economic and political settings, and interactions and outcomes; in each case under which a range of ‘second- tier’ variables or indicators can be used (see Table below) depending upon the specific context (Leslie et al., 2015).

Table 15. ‘Second-Tier’ Variables or Indicators used in SES Frameworks

Actors Resource System Resource Units Governance System Number of actors Sector (e.g. water, Resource unit Government forests, pasture, fish) mobility organizations Socio-economic Clarity of system Growth or Non-government attributes of actors boundaries replacement rate organizations History of use Size of resource Interaction among Network structure system resource units Location Human-constructed Economic value Property rights facilities systems Leadership/ Productivity of Size Operational rules entrepreneurship system Norms/social capital Equilibrium Distinctive Collective choice properties markings rules Knowledge of Predictability of Spatial and Constitutional rules SES/mental models system dynamics temporal distribution Dependence on Storage Monitoring and resource characteristics sanctioning processes Technology used Location

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Social, Economic and Political Settings  Economic development  Demographic trends  Political stability  Government resource policies  Market incentives  Media organization Interactions  Harvesting levels of diverse users  Information sharing among users  Deliberation processes  Conflicts among users  Investment activities  Lobbying activities Outcomes  Social performance measures (e.g. efficiency, equity, accountability)  Ecological performance measures (e.g. overharvested, resilience, diversity)  Externalities to other SESs Sources: Basurto and Nenadovic, 2012; Leslie et al., 2015

Specific to governance reform of ocean fishery SESs, a smaller number of indicators have been selected here to measure the components and characteristics in Figure 23, including from those summarized in the matrices in section 3.2. These are proposed in the Table below, grouped by each of the three sub-systems in Figure 23.

Table 16. Variables for Indicators for the Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms

Ecological Sub-System Governance Sub-System Social Sub-System  Clarity and size of  Number of fishers system boundaries Policies  Number and type of (based on spatial  Changes in policy objectives fishing vessels (fleets) distribution of  Changes in targeted outcomes  Fishing gear type used targeted fish Rules  Socio-economic stocks)  Changes in level (operational, attributes of fishers  Productivity collective choice or  History of use  Number and constitutional)  Dependence on diversity of  Changes in intention (technical resource targeted fish stocks measures, inputs controls, output  Leadership/ controls, rights around controls) entrepreneurship

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 Growth rate(s) of  Norms/social capital targeted fish Organizations  Location stock(s)  Changes in administration of rules for tenure  Changes in research, assessment and monitoring  Changes in enforcement

Costs over time of formulating and enacting changes to institutions and organizations  Policy formulation/reform  Development and enactment of rule changes or new rules  Organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce rules changes

Interactions  Fishing effort (by fleet)  Fish catch (by targeted stocks)

Outcomes  Ecological: biomass of targeted stock(s)  Ecological: diversity of animal species and ecological structures  Social: efficiency of harvesting operations as measured by the PV of resource rent  Social: equity measure not yet defined (distribution of changes to the PV of resource rent?)

Table 16 provides indicators or variables to help measure changes in various components of the three sub-systems given for an ocean fisheries SES, drawing from the literature for the social and ecological sub-systems and the interactions, but updating or modifying the indicators for the governance sub-system, based on the classification system for reform proposed in section 3.2.

The proposed indicators for the conceptual framework for analyzing ocean fisheries governance reform should be measured over time, with outcome indicators reflecting expected future measurements (e.g. PV of resource rent). Governance reforms can be enacted on a range of time paths that would influence the indicators differently over

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time – e.g. changes in fleet sizes, gears, biomass of targeted stocks, etc. – as well as outcome measures. Essentially, measures of these indicators before (i.e. baseline) and after the introduction of governance reforms can give an indication of the change in the outcomes as a result of the reforms, or impact. As such, data for these indicators should be collected more systematically for governance reform efforts, particularly throughout the tropics. However, for such an indication to be meaningful, the analysis requires a counterfactual of what the outcomes would have been in the absence of the reforms

(Baker, 2000). For this reason, in order to apply the conceptual framework to measure the impact of fisheries governance reforms in a given SES, a counterfactual would be required, for example through bio-economic modelling of the fish stock under the status quo.

An important point to reiterate is that the outcome indicator for efficiency reflects the net benefits to society from the harvesting segment of the system only, except in instances where there is a high degree of vertical integration and hence the first sale and resource rent capture is much farther up the supply chain (World Bank and FAO,

2009). This essentially reflects the wealth generated by the fishery system, while additional segments of the system, e.g. processing, distribution, marketing, etc. are expected to generate normal rates of return to capital (Anderson and Seijo, 2010). The key assumption here is that the SES exists in an economy near full employment, where there is full opportunity cost to labor throughout the supply chain (and hence labor is given as a cost in the equation for resource rent, but measured in terms of the opportunity cost, i.e. the next highest alternative wages available) (IFC, 2000). The

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difference between the wages paid to fishers (and to labor in general throughout the system) and the opportunity cost of labor or the next highest level of wages available and attainable, can be considered part of the resource rent and wealth generated by the fishery system, thereby incorporating employment objectives into the measure of efficiency (World Bank, 2011). As such, in countries with economies below full employment, and where much of the resource rent from a fishery system in that country’s waters is captured by foreign operators, countries may employ strategies to capture more of the rent via increased domestic employment and local value added by ensuring more of the foreign-caught fish is landed and processed locally (IFC, 2000).

The critical gap in proposed indicators for the conceptual framework is the absence of a uniform measure that incorporates objectives for efficiency, equity to current generations, and equity to present generations – notably to the poorest. Reforms that enhance efficiency at the expense of equity to present generations and to the poorest, actually contradict universally-agreed principles, and run counter to the very first

Sustainable Development Goal – to end poverty (Allison et al., 2012).

In the absence of an agreed metric or indicator to measure poverty and poverty reduction, or equity to present generations, a filter on proposed reforms is often used, by comparing them for consistency with the universally-agreed principles for equity – prior to considering their potential efficiency gains and enhanced equity to future generations (Gupta, 2010). While not exhaustive, this chapter has referenced some of

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the policy statements of universally-agreed principles of equity to present generations, including for example the:

 Universal Declaration on Human Rights,

 Declaration of the World Food Conference,

 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development,

 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action,

 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and

 Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines.

These statements emphasize Box 14. The Lisbon Principles for Ocean Governance Costanza et al (2007) proposed a set of principles to guide governance of ocean use more broadly, but with an emphasis on principles of universal fishery systems:  Principle 1: Responsibility. Access to environmental resources carries human rights and dignity, attendant responsibilities to use them in an ecologically sustainable, economically efficient, and socially fair manner. Individual and corporate responsibilities and incentives should be aligned with each requiring states to ensure other and with broad social and ecological goals.  Principle 2: Scale-matching. Ecological problems are rarely confined to a single scale. Decision-making on environmental resources should that everyone has a standard (i) be assigned to institutional levels that maximize ecological input, (ii) ensure the flow of ecological information between institutional of living adequate for health levels, (iii) take ownership and actors into account, and (iv) internalize costs and benefits. Appropriate scales of governance will be those that have the most relevant information, can respond quickly and and well-being, as well as efficiently, and are able to integrate across scale boundaries.  Principle 3: Precaution. In the face of uncertainty about potentially irreversible environmental impacts, decisions concerning their use protection of legitimate should err on the side of caution. The burden of proof should shift to those whose activities potentially damage the environment. tenure rights. An attempt to  Principle 4: Adaptive management. Given that some level of uncertainty always exists in environmental resource management, decision-makers should continuously gather and integrate appropriate synthesize these principles, ecological, social, and economic information with the goal of adaptive improvement. drawing from the Code of  Principle 5: Full cost allocation. All of the internal and external costs and benefits, including social and ecological, of alternative decisions concerning the use of environmental resources should be identified and Conduct, could emphasize allocated. When appropriate, markets should be adjusted to reflect full costs.  Principle 6: Participation. All stakeholders should be engaged in the that: formulation and implementation of decisions concerning environmental resources. Full stakeholder awareness and participation contributes to credible, accepted rules that identify and assign the corresponding responsibilities appropriately. Source: Costanza et al (2007)

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 States should appropriately protect the rights of fishers and fish workers,

particularly those engaged in subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fisheries, to

a secure and just livelihood, as well as preferential access, where appropriate,

to traditional fishing grounds and resources in the waters under their national

jurisdiction; and

 The right to fish in any given institutional framework includes the duty or

obligation to conserve fish stocks and ensure that they are sufficient to meet the

needs of the present generation in the context of food security, poverty

alleviation and sustainable development. Towards this, overfishing should be

prevented in any governance framework, particularly the growth of fishing

fleets and capacity, and measures taken to rehabilitate overfished stocks – using

the best scientific information available and applying a pre-cautionary

approach.

As mentioned earlier, Kearney (2007) suggested translating or operationalizing these principles into fishery-specific rights that should guide any governance reforms:

1. The right to fish for food,

2. The right to fish for a livelihood,

3. The right to healthy households, communities and cultures,

4. The right to live and work in a healthy ecosystem that will support future

generations of fishers, and

5. The right to participate in decisions affecting fishing.

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Additionally, as part of the design of the Global Partnership for Oceans, the World

Bank commissioned a ‘blue ribbon panel’ of experts to propose the following set of principles to guide future investments supporting reforms to governance of ocean uses more broadly:

1. Sustainable livelihoods, social equity, and food security, emphasizing the

importance of marine ecosystems in delivering essential goods and services that

underpin millions of livelihoods, social equity, and food security;

2. Healthy ocean and sustainable use of marine and coastal resources, ensuring

investments contribute to the maintenance, restoration, and enhancement of

marine and coastal ecosystems, while recognizing that people are an essential

part of the global ecosystem;

3. Effective governance systems, supporting innovative systems that provide

incentives to private and public sector leaders at all levels to engage and support

a healthy ocean and community well-being;

4. Long-term viability, making investments that are economically viable and

socio-ecologically sustainable and that promote positive, self-sustaining

outcomes, especially when transitional funding or other GPO assistance ends;

and

5. Capacity building and innovation, aiming to build on local knowledge and

develop innovative solutions, human resource capacity, educational tools, and

operating strategies, as well as new finance and policy vehicles (Blue Ribbon

Panel, 2013).

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After reviewing proposed governance reforms for consistency with universally-agreed principles for equity to present generations, the past, current or potential economic costs can be extracted from the framework in Figure 36 and categorized as: (i) costs of formulating and enacting changes to institutions and organizations (i.e. costs which are also financial), including the costs of policy formulation/reform, development and enactment of rule changes or new rules, and organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce rule changes; and (ii) costs of changes in fishing effort and subsequently yield, measured as the foregone resource rent during the period of transition.

Table 17. Categories of economic costs of fisheries governance reform

Economic Cost Category Costs Costs of formulating and Policy formulation/reform enacting changes to institutions and Development and enactment of rule changes or new rules organizations (Ci) Organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce rules changes

Resource rent foregone Costs of changes in fishing effort and subsequently yield

Lastly, with size of the potential economic costs identified, a feasibility assessment (or

‘reality check’) can be conducted for the political feasibility of any proposed governance reforms, i.e. of reaching consensus, based on the expected distribution of the perceived economic costs and ultimately the benefits, for example using a simple rapid assessment tool such as illustrated in the Table above, or more detailed economic game theory and expected utility theory models. Additional feasibility assessments could be conducted, for example of the ecological feasibility, as recent studies have

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begun to show that even small differences in ecological factors can affect communities’ ability to create or sustain collective action over time (Basurto and Coleman, 2009).

A number of social scientists have recently suggested a reality check on the

‘governability’ of different ocean fishery systems (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009).

Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2009) suggest it could be argued that ocean fisheries governance is what Rittel and Webber (1973) called a “wicked problem”, that is, a problem that is inherently indeterminate, possibly because it is always a part, or a symptom, of a bigger societal problem where there is no right or wrong answer but only good or bad one. They note that in practice, the policy objectives of a given governance framework are rarely fully attainable, arguing for realism of what can be achieved in a given context (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009). They assess the governability, i.e. the overall capacity for governance, of an ocean fishery system based on a series of questions to be asked about four characteristics or dimensions of the social subsystem, the ecological subsystem, and then governance filter between them

(broken down into ‘governance system’ and ‘governance interactions’): the level of (i) diversity, (ii) complexity, (iii) dynamics, and (iv) scale – see the Table below

(Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009). Based on answers to these questions, the governability of an inherently diverse, dynamic and complex ocean fishery system is considered high or low, with an emphasis on the achievable in a given context rather than the idea, or aiming for ‘good enough’ (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009).

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Table 18. Ocean fisheries governability assessment matrix

Ecological Social Sub- Governance Sub-System System Governance Governing system interactions Diversity What is the level of Who are the What is the governing What are the existing biodiversity: stakeholders: mode: top down, co- forms of interactions: species, types of demographics, management or bottom- communication, ecosystems or organization, up, and the formal and participation, habitats, and the interests, uses, norms informal institutions, representation, etc.? relative abundance and values, etc., and mechanisms and and health? their quality of life? measures? Complexity How are species, How do stakeholders How do the How do the forms of habitats and interact: conflicting, goals/visions of the interactions add up and ecosystems inter- collaborating, governing institutions relate: mutually linked, the system communicating, relate: differ, compete supportive, consistent or productivity, and integrating, or co-operate? incomplete? external pressure? specializing, complying, etc.? Dynamics What are the What is the change in Have there been any How adaptive are the biological and the stakeholder changes in the forms of interactions? Do physical changes composition, values governing institutions, they actually transmit that take place over and attitudes over mechanisms and information, raising time: long-term, time; main drivers measures; main drivers demands and exercising short-term, and consequences? and consequences? influence? seasonal; main nternal and external drivers? Scale What is the size and What is the size and What is the size and How are interactions geographical range geographical range of geographical range of channeled within and of the ecosystem; the social system; institutions: local, across scales; from natural boundaries, social boundary, national, regional; national, regional to system uniqueness ethnic and class political boundaries, local—and vice versa? and functions? division, mobility, history, uniqueness and uniqueness and functions? functions? Source: adapted from Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2009)

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Chapter 4

EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF CASE STUDIES IN LARGE-SCALE TROPICAL FISHERIES GOVERNANCE REFORM

With the modified and updated SES conceptual framework for ocean fishery governance reform described in Chapter Three, several cases in tropical fisheries governance reform attempts at a large scale are summarized here, utilizing the lens provided by the framework. Given that many case studies in fisheries governance reform have in the past focused on large-scale efforts in developed countries and generally temperate waters, or only at a much smaller scale in developing countries with tropical waters, the World Bank’s portfolio of public investments over the last 10 years provides a relatively unique body of data on large-scale fisheries governance reform efforts, which has yet to be fully analyzed. Focused almost entirely in tropical developing countries, this portfolio provides a large group of documented cases for analysis as the types of fisheries governance reforms being attempted at a large spatial scale in the tropics, and associations with targeted outcomes locally as well as globally towards the SDG.

4.1 A General Empirical Review of the World Bank’s Portfolio of Investments in Tropical Fisheries Governance Reform

In 2004 the World Bank began to systematically invest in fisheries governance reform in response to government requests (World Bank, 2004), building a portfolio of both fisheries and aquaculture projects totaling some $1 billion by 2015 (World Bank,

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2015). Focused almost entirely in tropical developing countries, this portfolio provides a large and relatively new body of documented cases for analysis. This first analysis of the portfolio includes the following aspects:

o Description of the historical context; and

o Using the modified SES framework developed in Chapter Three, analysis of the

components of governance reforms and to the extent possible the variables

available (drawing from Chapter Three), and explanation of outcome measures

that can be associated with governance reforms.

Description of the historical context for the World Bank’s portfolio of investments in fisheries governance reform. Kishor et al (in preparation) identify four distinct eras of

World Bank support to the fisheries of developing countries, as follows:

 1960s to 1980s: A focus on fisheries development and expansion. The initial era

of Bank support to fisheries began during the global boom for ocean fisheries,

with investment in new technologies, infrastructure and skills to capture and

process more fish products (Kishor et al, in preparation). Nearly 60 percent of

all loans made by the Bank to the fisheries sector before the early 1980s were

used for large-scale fishery development, such as the building of large vessels

and fishery service facilities, where governance was a limited consideration

(World Bank, 2004).

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 Mid-1980s to early 1990s: Increased awareness of the limits of the resource

base, greater fisheries research – beginning of World Bank dis-engagement

from the fisheries sector. Not long after the adoption of UNCLOS and the

growing recognition that many of the world’s ocean fishery systems were

reaching their limits, the level of support for fisheries development and

expansion was reduced at the Bank – shifting rather towards research to assess

the status of fish stocks (World Bank, 2004). As the global expansion of ocean

fisheries slowed, the performance of Bank fisheries investments lagged

considerably behind average performance of other sectors according to

independent evaluations, in terms of outcomes and sustainability among others

(World Bank, 2004). Reasons for this included the complexity of the sector,

particularly fisheries governance, which had often not been factored into project

design (World Bank, 2004). Early projects had generally been more successful

because of simpler design, involving the clear objectives of construction of

infrastructure, such as ports and harbors (World Bank, 2004). However this

development and expansion was no longer successful as fish catching capacity

had expanded to the point that it began to bump up against resource limits in

the late 1980s (Kishor et al, in preparation).

 Early 1990s to early 2000s: World Bank dis-engagement from fisheries sector,

focused largely on coastal zone management and aquaculture. With the

articulation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in 1995 the focus

shifted globally from fisheries development and expansion to fisheries

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management in the 1990s, the Bank increasingly focused on aquaculture

operations and coastal zone management projects, with very little attention to

sustainable fisheries and governance – essentially the organization dis-engaged

after the late 1980s (World Bank, 2004; Kishor et al, in preparation). As of

2003, the Bank had an active fisheries and aquaculture portfolio of some $412

million, over half of which was targeted to aquaculture and included the $200

million Sustainable Coastal Resources Development Project in China focused

largely on coastal zone management and aquaculture (World Bank, 2004). Also

of note during this period was the approval in 1998 of the Indonesia Coral Reef

Rehabilitation and Management Program (COREMAP) as a multi-phase

program of support to coral reef conservation and restoration over twelve years

(Kishor et al, in preparation). This program was one of the first in the Bank to

provide support to address the growing issues around fisheries governance

(Kishor et al, in preparation).

 2004 to present: World Bank re-engages in the fisheries sector, with a focus on

strengthening fisheries management to increase sector returns for countries.

By the early 2000s, both inside and outside of the World Bank a growing body

of experience was developing on governance reform, and externally a number

of cases in the fisheries sector (Kishor et al, in preparation). Within the World

Bank, a growing body of analytical work was accumulating since the late 1990s,

including in Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, Peru and Senegal, to provide the

basis for possible investment in reforming fisheries governance (Kishor et al,

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in preparation). Building off of this growing body of technical work, in 2004 the World Bank completed a paper for a new approach in the fisheries sector,

‘Saving Fish and Fishers: Towards Sustainable and Equitable Governance of the Global Fishing Sector’, focused on supporting countries to reform governance. The recommendations of the paper were endorsed by the

Managing Director and the Bank formally re-engaged in the fisheries sector with a new focus on supporting sector governance reforms (Kishor et al, in preparation). A senior fisheries and aquaculture specialist was recruited to the

World Bank’s Agriculture and Rural Development Department, and a new

Global Program for Fisheries (PROFISH) established with a multi-donor trust fund to support the upstream policy analysis needed to identify opportunities to finance reform – drawing from the model established earlier by the Global

Program for Forests (PROFOR) (Kishor et al, in preparation).

With the World Bank’s re-engagement in the sector in 2004 and the establishment of PROFISH, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) provided further momentum to build a new generation of investment with the establishment in 2005 of a pre-approved line of up to $60 million in grant funding to co-finance future Bank fisheries management projects in Africa that would by definition include support for tenure reform – the Strategic

Partnership for a Sustainable Fisheries Investment Fund in Sub-Saharan Africa

(Kishor et al, in preparation). Initial investments in fisheries management were made at this time, many on a pilot basis, notably in Tanzania through the Marine

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and Coastal Environmental Management Project (MACEMP), Senegal through the Integrated Coastal and Maritime Resource Management Project (GIRMaC), and Guinea-Bissau as a component of the Coastal Biodiversity Management

Project (CBMP) (Kishor et al, in preparation). At the same time, the second phase of the COREMAP program was approved in Indonesia, with a focus on coral reef fisheries management. All of these investments included support for some form of fisheries governance reform, largely on a pilot basis (Kishor et al, in preparation).

As these initial investments and pilots began, the World Bank further developed the economic case for investment in fisheries governance, broadly in terms of the value of natural capital in the 2006 publication ‘Where is the Wealth of

Nations?’, and specifically in terms of annual losses to the global economy from fisheries mismanagement in the 2009 report issued with FAO entitled The

‘Sunken Billions: the Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform’ (World

Bank and FAO, 2009). Building on the initial investments and pilots, as well as articulation of an economic rationale for investment, the World Bank significantly expanded its fisheries portfolio in the following years, often with a focus on investments at the regional or multi-country spatial scale in order to reflect the transboundary nature of the resource in many cases (Kishor et al, in preparation). Notable investment programs included the West Africa Regional

Fisheries Program (supporting coastal countries from Mauritania down to

Ghana) in 2009, the GEF-funded Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Project that

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would serve as the basis for a regional World Bank investment program

approved in 2015, the 2011 Vietnam Coastal Sustainable Resource

Development Project, the third phase of Indonesia’s COREMAP program

approved in 2014, and the 2014 Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program,

among others (Kishor et al, in preparation).

Based on a review of the World Bank’s portfolio, 19 fisheries projects were identified as having been approved by the Board of Executive Directors since 2004, 15 of which included at least a component of financing to support ocean fisheries governance reform efforts in developing countries, as shown in the Table below (Kishor et al, in preparation).

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Table 19. World Bank fisheries portfolio reviewed

Country Project Name Total Amount Start End ICR** Committed ($)* Date Date Rating Indonesia Coral Reef Rehabilitation and 11.0 million 1998 2004 Satisfactory Management (COREMAP), Phase I Indonesia COREMAP Phase II 63.7 million 2004 2009 Moderately Satisfactory Guinea-Bissau Coastal Biodiversity 6.0 million 2005 2011 Moderately Management Project Satisfactory Senegal Integrated Marine and Coastal 15.0 million 2005 2012 Moderately Resources Satisfactory Tanzania Marine and Coastal 61.0 million 2005 2013 Moderately Environmental Management Unsatisfactory Kenya Southwest Indian Ocean 12.0 million 2008 2013 Moderately Comoros Fisheries Project Satisfactory Madagascar Mauritius Mozambique Seychelles South Africa Tanzania Senegal Sustainable Management of 9.5 million 2009 2012 Unsatisfactory Fish Resources Project Cape Verde West Africa Regional 118.8 million 2009 2017 N/A Ghana Fisheries Program Guinea-Bissau Liberia Senegal Sierra Leone Peru Third Programmatic 75.0 million 2010 2013 N/A Environmental Development Policy Loan India Integrated Coastal Zone 221.0 million 2010 2015 N/A Management Project Kenya Coastal Development Project 35.0 million 2010 2016 N/A Viet Nam Coastal Resources for 100.0 million 2013 2018 N/A Sustainable Development Indonesia COREMAP Phase III 57.4 million 2014 2019 N/A Brazil Marine Protected Areas 18.2 million 2014 2019 N/A Project Pacific Islands Pacific Islands Regional 39.3 million 2015 2020 N/A Oceanscape Project * Includes grants from the Global Environment Facility implemented by the World Bank, and in some cases aquaculture components ** ICR = Implementation Completion Report, rating given as to whether or not the project achieved its objectives Source: Kishor et al, in preparation; www.worldbank.org

Per the Figure below, the size of this portfolio, in terms of the active (not annual) commitments of funds, steadily increased after the 2004 re-engagement, to some $665 million in 2014 supporting (at least partially) ocean fisheries governance reform in tropical developing countries.

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664.7 616 621.8

552.3 546.3

285

144.7 144.7 144.7 156.7 63.7

FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14

Amounts in US$ millions; Amount given is total active invest for that year, not new commitments per year

Figure 24. Growth in the World Bank's portfolio of investments in fisheries

Analysis of concepts and their variables or structures present in the cases using the modified SES framework from Chapter Three, and explanation of outcome measures that can be associated with governance reforms. Drawing upon the classificatory framework for governance reform embedded in the ocean fishery SES conceptual framework proposed in Chapter Three, the projects in this portfolio have been analyzed according to the vertical and horizontal characteristics of each of the three components of governance.

Vertical Characteristics of Governance Components. In terms of the vertical characteristics of scale and jurisdiction of origin (and in the case of rules, the level), a majority of the projects in the World Bank’s portfolio supported reforms at the local spatial scale, generally for a range of different coastal fishery systems, e.g. reef

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fisheries, demersal shelf fisheries, etc. that are used partially or predominantly by small-scale fishers, as shown in Figure 25 below.

Operational Level

Collective Choice

Local

National Spatial

Regional Scale

Co-Governance Jurisdiction of Origin

State

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Number of Projects

Figure 25. Vertical characteristics or entry points for World Bank

Of note, though perhaps implicit, the entry point at the jurisdiction of origin for the majority of the projects is the state, followed closely by co-governance partnerships with communities, but with these originating from the state. Again, this may be implicit given that the World Bank provides financing to governments and hence the state is by default the entry point for projects, meaning that by definition all of these reform efforts have begun with the state (there are no projects where community or local groups are being supported for self-governance in the absence of the state).

The Horizontal Characteristics of Governance Components (i.e. the specific governance reforms) at various vertical ‘entry points.’ The project appraisal documents for each of the 15 projects have been reviewed to identify and classify the horizontal characteristics of the changes in components of governance supported in

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each case, categorized according to their vertical characteristics or ‘entry points’ for reform, as shown in the Table below.

Table 20. Summary of the types of fisheries governance reforms supported in the portfolio

Country/ Vertical Characteristics or ‘Entry Change in Horizontal Characteristics Project Points for Reform’ Name Scale Jurisdictio Level Policy Rules Organization n of Origin s Brazil Marine Nationa State Operationa N/A Technical Enhanced Protected l l measures – monitoring, Areas Project closed areas assessment

Enhanced surveillance & enforcement Guinea- Nationa State N/A N/A N/A Enhanced Bissau l surveillance Coastal & & Biodiversity enforcement Management Local Co- Collective N/A Community Extension by Project Governanc Choice management national e rights fisheries agency India Coastal Local State Operationa Changed Technical Enhanced Zone l objectives measures – research, Management for closed areas, monitoring & Project ecosystem restoration assessment conservatio n – equity to future generations Indonesia Local State Collective N/A Technical Enhanced COREMAP I Choice measures – research, closed areas monitoring & assessment Indonesia Local Co- Collective Policy Community Enhanced COREMAP Governanc Choice statement management extension by II e articulated rights national and for regional increased public equity to agencies present generations Enhanced in coral reef research, communitie monitoring s and assessment

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Indonesia Nationa State Collective Policy Technical Enhanced COREMAP l Choice objective measures – research, III for closed areas monitoring enhanced and equity to assessment future generations Enhanced surveillance & enforcement Local Co- Collective N/A Community Enhanced Governanc Choice management extension by e rights regional public agencies Kenya Nationa State N/A Review of N/A N/A Coastal l policies Development Nationa State N/A N/A N/A Enhanced Project l research, assessment & monitoring

Enhanced surveillance & enforcement Pacific Regiona State N/A N/A N/A Enhanced Islands l admin. of Regional tenure Oceanscape Program Enhanced monitoring & surveillance Local Co- Operationa N/A Management Increased Governanc l rights extension by e national agencies Peru Nationa State Collective N/A ITQs for N/A Environment l Choice anchoveta al Development Program Senegal Local Co- Collective Pilot a Management Increased Integrated Governance Choice change in Rights to extension by Coastal and strategy community the Marine Marine towards fishing Fisheries inclusion associations Department Resources

Management Formation of Project community Senegal fishing Sustainable associations Management of Fish Resources Project

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Southwest Regiona State N/A Assessment N/A N/A Indian Ocean l for regional Fisheries agreement Project on shared governance N/A N/A N/A Increased research and assessment Tanzania Nationa State Collective Articulation Establishme Enhanced Marine and l Choice of policy nt of input admin. of Coastal objectives controls for tenure Environment for deep sea deep sea al fishery fishery Enhanced Management research, Project monitoring and assessment

Establishmen t of surveillance and enforcement Local Co- Collective N/A Community Extension by Governanc Choice management national e rights agencies Vietnam Local Co- Collective N/A Community Extension by Coastal Governanc Choice management state Resources for e rights agencies Sustainable Development Enhanced Project surveillance & enforcement West Africa Nationa State N/A N/A N/A Enhanced Regional l surveillance Fisheries & Program enforcement Nationa State N/A Articulation N/A N/A l of new policy vision statements Nationa State Operationa N/A Input Registration l l controls of all fishing vessels Local Co- Collective N/A Management Extension by Governanc choice rights national e agencies Source: www.worldbank.org

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No. Projects 10 8 6 4 2 0 Technical Input Controls Community Individual Measures - Management Transferable closed areas Rights Quotas

Figure 26. Horizontal characteristics: types of rule changes supported

Based on the review of the portfolio of 15 projects and classification, 11 supported governance reforms at the local spatial scale within the countries, often via enhanced extension by national or local state agencies to establish co-governance partnerships with small-scale fishing communities and recognize and support their management rights over adjacent coastal fisheries. Almost half supported reforms at the national scale, including establishment of large closed areas in some cases, as well as processes for reviewing policy objectives and targeted outcomes. Two projects supported reforms at the regional or multi-country scale, in both cases targeting offshore migratory fishery systems. Most commonly, all but one project supported reforms or enhancements to the capacity of state agencies to support institutions and deliver services, with 8 projects supporting enhanced capability for surveillance and enforcement of compliance with rules.

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Summary of expected economic costs of governance reforms. Although not fully representative of the economic costs of the reforms undertaken, the Table below provides a break-down of the financial costs (i.e. those costs actually financed by the

World Bank) of reform in five of the above projects, drawing upon the conceptual framework in Chapter Three.

Table 21. Break-down of financial costs of ocean fisheries governance reform in 5 World Bank projects*

Indonesia Tanzania Senegal Southwest Vietnam TOTAL COREMAP II MACEMP GIRMAC Indian Ocean CRSD SWIOFP Costs of formulating and enacting changes to institutions and organizations Policy N/A 6.0 2.6 9.5 5.3 23.4 formulation/ reform Development 38.7 27.9 4.3 2.5 20.2 93.6 and enactment of rule changes or new rules Organizational 14.3 15.6 8.1 N/A 12.3 50.3 costs to administer, monitor and enforce rule changes Costs of changes in fishing effort and subsequently yield Compensation 10.7 11.5 N/A N/A N/A 22.2 for resource rent foregone TOTAL 63.7 61.0 15.0 12.0 37.8 189.5 * Amounts given in US$ millions, as total costs over the duration of the project; break-down unavailable for Peru Third Environmental Development Policy Operation, because the modality was a transfer of funds to the state budget (i.e. ‘budget support’), without a distinction on amounts targeted to specific costs Sources: World Bank, 2004b; World Bank, 2004c; World Bank, 2005; World Bank, 2007; World Bank, 2012

As shown in the Figure below, the majority of the financial costs related to the transaction costs of extension by state agencies to establish and support co-governance partnerships with coastal (and often rural) communities, followed by the costs to agencies to provide monitoring and surveillance support. In these five projects, the

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SWIOFP is somewhat of an outlier, given its focus almost solely on research and assessment to support policy formulation. For the other four projects, focused largely on supporting co-governance partnerships between the state and coastal communities for management rights over defined coastal fishery systems and areas, the majority of funds were allocated to these previous categories, and far less so to providing compensation for foregone resource rents subsequent to the introduction of community technical measures.

Compensation for Policy resource rent formulation/ foregone reform Organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce rule changes Development and enactment of rule changes or new rules

Associated changes in the outcome measures for the targeted ocean fishery SESs.

Figure 27. Break-down of financial costs of reform

Evaluation of the impacts of the reforms classified in Table 21 would require treatment with controls and levels of data collection that in most projects have simply not taken place (Baker, 2000). Similarly, bio-economic models to simulate outcomes in the absence of the reforms financed by the projects are also not available in most cases.

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That said, to provide an indication of the changes in measures of outcomes observed in conjunction with these reforms, eight projects have been described in more detail, and where post evaluations have been conducted by the World Bank, the results summarized, in order to give an indication of changes in outcome measures.

These eight projects were selected, based on their focus on fisheries governance as the majority of project financing and the range of different types of governance reforms supported:

1. The Indonesia Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Program (COREMAP)

2. The Senegal Integrated Coastal and Maritime Resource Management Project

(GIRMaC)

3. The Tanzania Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project (MACEMP)

4. The Peru Third Programmatic Environmental Development Policy Loan (DPL)

5. The Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Project (SWIOFP)

6. The West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (WARFP)

7. The Vietnam Coastal Resources for Sustainable Development Project (CRSD)

8. The Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program (PROP)

From these eight projects, the Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program and the

West Africa Regional Fisheries Program are described as much more detailed case studies in sections 4.2 and 4.3 of this chapter. For the remaining six projects, additional details about the types of governance reforms financed are described, as well as any information available from the World Bank’s evaluation reports on changes in outcome measures observed.

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The six projects can be described in more detail based on (i) the context, (ii) classification of the types of reforms introduced based on the modified conceptual framework from Chapter Three, (iii) the evidence available (if any) of changes in outcome indicators associated with introduction of these reforms, and (iv) conclusions.

Indonesia Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Program (COREMAP). The first of the current era of World Bank investments in fisheries governance actually happened prior to 2004, based on a growing concern for the health of Indonesia’s globally significant coral reef ecosystems (Kishor et al, in preparation). Beginning in

1998, a series of three fisheries projects in Indonesia, known as the Coral Reef

Rehabilitation and Management Program (COREMAP), have supported recognition of communities’ management rights for adjacent coral reef fisheries and habitats (Kishor et al, in preparation). More specifically, following Indonesia’s national shift to decentralize state governance, the projects financed the costs of local government agencies to provide ‘facilitators’ to work with communities throughout a number of coastal districts, to support the preparation of ‘co-management plans’ for defined reef fisheries, that would subsequently be recognized as local government regulations

(Kishor et al, in preparation). Additionally, projects have financed transaction costs for the development of national policy statements by government agencies to articulate the state’s strategy of inclusion and decentralization of rule-making for reef fisheries to communities (Kishor et al, in preparation). The current project supports agency costs at local and national scales to ensure consistency of community regulations over reef

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areas with planning and regulations for the wider coastal economy, through marine spatial planning and zoning, as well as enhanced research, monitoring and assessment

(Kishor et al, in preparation). Finally, the projects have supported the marginal costs of enhanced surveillance and enforcement by local government agencies, as well as for maintenance of national-scale closed areas (e.g. parks) (Kishor et al, in preparation).

COREMAP Phase III is currently underway, but the World Bank’s post-evaluation of

Phase II (i.e. ‘implementation completion report’) notes that rigorous examination of outcomes was not possible because of the lack of controls (World Bank, 2012a). In terms of physical outputs from the reforms, by the end of Phase II COREMAP financed efforts in 385 villages with over 10,000 people to reform governance over 1 million hectares of coral reefs in 7 coastal districts, and developed a coral reef education curriculum that is now part of all coastal village school instruction across Indonesia

(World Bank, 2012a). According to the implementation completion report, both project beneficiaries and the general population experienced an increased awareness of the importance of coral reefs, including behavioral change among fishers towards more sustainable fishing practices, while 71 percent of coral reef sites sampled in project areas showed signs of ecological improvement by the end of Phase II (World Bank,

2012a). Finally, an overwhelming majority of fishers in targeted communities reported that the project had been beneficial to them and the total income of project beneficiary group members increased by 21 percent, with all project areas above poverty levels

(World Bank, 2012a). The program has continued to grow as a major Government investment program in the country’s coral reef fishing communities (Kishor et al, in

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preparation). The enhanced operating costs for local government agencies to support coastal communities in a co-governance partnership have been incorporated into annual state budgets in all seven districts subsequent to COREMAP II (Kishor et al, in preparation).

In terms of changes in outcome measures, an ecological outcome or SES performance measure might reflect the change or maintenance of fish habitat. The implementation completion report of COREMAP II found a 60 percent decrease in destructive fishing practices over the 6-year period (defined as the use of dynamite to catch fish over or near coral reefs) (World Bank, 2012a). In conclusion, the COREMAP projects to date have supported the costs of conceptualizing, drafting and disseminating a number of operational rules by state agencies, as well as collective choice rules by communities, for fishing in coral areas (Kishor et al, in preparation). The projects have financed marginal costs of increased support to communities by local government agencies as part of co-governance partnerships, including surveillance and enforcement, and currently COREMAP III is supporting incorporation of communities’ rules into wider coastal economic development plans and regulations (Kishor et al, in preparation). Of note, communities’ management rights do not include exclusion, but rather articulation of the rules that will apply to any users who may fish in the defined areas of the ocean

(Kishor et al, in preparation).

Tanzania Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Program. Following on the first COREMAP project, in 2004 the Tanzania Marine and Coastal Environment

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Management Project (MACEMP) was approved (Kishor et al, in preparation).

Considered a pilot in the organization’s re-engagement on fisheries, the project aimed to improve governance of the fisheries in the country’s waters and to develop an ecologically representative and institutionally and financially sustainable network of closed or protected areas, including specific effort to enhance organizational capacity to monitor and assess offshore stock (Kishor et al, in preparation).

In terms of the types of reforms supported, the project financed the establishment and implementation of a national-scale policy and collective choice-level law to govern use of the country’s deep sea fisheries, establishing a new agency to develop and support regulations, as well as providing state agency extension to support recognition of community management rights over coastal fisheries (Kishor et al, in preparation).

According to the World Bank’s post-evaluation of outputs, the reforms supported by the project led to outputs that included the establishment of 170 new community-scale organizations (entitled ‘beach management units’) in the mainland and 136 such organizations in Zanzibar, covering a total of 10 percent of the country’s waters (Kishor et al, in preparation). The project also financed small grants from the state to help start businesses in communities exercising management rights over coastal fisheries, via a

Coastal Village Fund, and reported an increase in incomes in these communities

(Kishor et al, in preparation). Lastly, the establishment of a collective choice law to govern access to the deep sea fisheries in the country’s waters, via a new authority, resulted in collection of resource rents from foreign vessels for the first time (Kishor et al, in preparation).

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In conclusion, despite the outputs described above, the project did not meet its

‘ambitious’ objectives for quantifiably improving outcomes measures of coastal fisheries productivity and benefits, according to the implementation completion report

(Kishor et al, in preparation). The key challenge cited was the complexity of the reform effort, at a national scale with a large number of resource users dispersed across a wide range of coastal communities, stretching the capacity of ‘underfunded’ state agencies to deliver the support needed to ‘re-transfer’ the jurisdiction awarded under UNCLOS to the communities, as well as to conceptualize the resource units in terms of their ecology (i.e. the wider ecosystem supporting the fish stocks) rather than just the stocks themselves (Kishor et al, in preparation).

Senegal Integrated Marine and Coastal Resources Management Project. At the same time that the MACEMP was approved for funding by the World Bank’s Board of

Executive Directors, on the west coast of Africa the Senegal Integrated Marine and

Coastal Resources Management Project (GIRMaC) was approved as a pilot to introduce co-governance of coastal and marine resources by communities and the state, as well as to support the state’s efforts to protect and conserve more of the country’s coastal and marine environment – reflecting the national agency’s shift in policy objectives from a sole focus on efficiency and equity to present generations (essentially

‘development’ of the resources), towards inclusion of equity to future generations and a focus on ‘management’ for sustainability (Kishor et al, in preparation).

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In terms of the types of reforms supported, the project provided operational-level support to the national fisheries agency to register all fishing canoes for the first time, as a pre-cursor to national-scale limited access, as well as extension via facilitators to communities in four pilot sites (Ngaparou, Betenti, Ouakam and Foundiougne) supported the introduction of management rights to defined coastal fishery systems and/or areas for newly-formed associations of resource users (Kishor et al, in preparation). These associations were constituted with support of national agency facilitators and recognized by the state as private entities, further supported to develop rules via management plans for targeted coastal fishery systems or areas (e.g. coastal demersal finfish, shrimp and lobsters, among others) (Kishor et al, in preparation). The state recognized the rules developed by the fishers’ associations in pilot sites, via a review by the national fisheries agency for consistency with state laws, and then signed into regulation by the Minister of Fisheries and Maritime Economy acting on behalf of the state (Kishor et al, in preparation).

The World Bank’s implementation completion report notes a wide range of project activities, including a group of activities focused on national parks and protected areas with an entirely different state agency (the Ministry of Environment), leading to a complex effort that stretched the delivery capacity of the agencies involved and led to a number of delays and in some cases incompletion (Kishor et al, in preparation).

However, the reform efforts focused on creating management rights for associations of resource users in the communities in pilot areas were assessed as successful (Kishor et al, in preparation). According to the implementation completion report, “although co-

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management did exist before the project began, it was not successful; the Senegalese court ruled against it on a couple of occasions because the local community members took the law into their own hands to settle issues. With the building of partnerships through participatory approaches, these incidents have decreased significantly. The project was also successful in changing the perception of some of the fishing population where the fishermen met the proposals with skepticism, fearful that the initiatives would limit access to fishing grounds, lead to loss of land territory or lead to additional taxation” (World Bank, 2012b). The implementation completion report summarizes outcomes measures of a reduction in overfishing in the pilot sites (based on measurements of trends in catch rates as a proxy for changes in fish stock biomass) and attributes it to the co-governance reforms introduced (e.g. associations introduced technical measures to restrict destructive fishing gears, introduce closed areas and seasons, among others) (Kishor et al, in preparation).

In conclusion, the project supported reforms to state governance of the coastal fisheries, whereby associations of user groups established management rights over defined systems or areas that were recognized and actively supported by the state (Kishor et al, in preparation). These rights included management, but not exclusion, and the implementation completion report notes that the success of rules introduced by the associations in enhancing catch rates has in some cases attracted users from neighboring communities and fishing grounds, increasing pressure on the resources and conflicts (World Bank, 2012b).

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The Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Project. Unlike the Indonesia COREMAP

Program, the Tanzania MACEMP and Senegal GIRMaC, the Southwest Indian Ocean

Fisheries Project (SWIOFP) in Kenya, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius,

Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa, and Tanzania focused on the offshore fisheries that were more heavily industrialized (Kishor et al, in preparation). In terms of the types of reforms supported, the project funded the research and transaction costs to assess the potential for a constitutional choice level agreement between multiple states for the governance of migratory offshore fish stocks in the region, including training to support enhanced operations of state agencies (Kishor et al, in preparation). In terms of outputs, the project supported the costs for state agencies to develop shared policy objectives for the migratory, offshore fisheries, and their reflection in national-scale policy statements in Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Tanzania (Kishor et al, in preparation). In conclusion, the project focused largely on supporting enhanced operations and cooperation by state agencies to assess and monitor the offshore fish resources, which according to the implementation completion report resulted in a new understanding of these stocks (Kishor et al, in preparation). For example, the additional research that, in contrast to commonly held assumptions, few non-tuna-like fisheries in the region are shared between national waters and very few of the fisheries identified as ‘transboundary’ were governed through inter-state cooperation (Kishor et al, in preparation). The results of the research on the biological status of a number of relatively unassessed offshore stocks illustrated the importance of agency resource assessments and surveys in some cases to generate the information needed to strengthen

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or reform tenure governance appropriate to the scale of the resource (Kishor et al, in preparation).

The Peru Third Programmatic Environmental Development Policy Operation. This project was the third in a series investing general funds to the state budget provided that agreed targets for enhanced environmental governance were met, notably in a number of natural resource-dependent economic sectors such as ocean fisheries and mining (Kishor et al, in preparation). Agreed targets for the ocean fisheries related to the introduction of ITQs for the anchoveta fishery (the world’s largest fishery by volume) to reduce the size of the industrial fishing fleet, and the capability of the state agency to administer these rights (Kishor et al, in preparation). In terms of outputs, while ITQs did not exist at the beginning of the project, by June 2012 before the project

‘closed’ (i.e. the last transfer of funds completed), the government introduced ITQs to govern 100 percent of industrial fishing for anchoveta in the country’s waters (Kishor et al, in preparation). To ensure that the introduction of these new rules and possible reductions in the size of the industrial fishing fleet occurred in a manner consistent with universally-agreed principles for equity to present generations, the project included funding for a social compensation fund to support early retirement of fishers and start- up grants for new livelihoods for fishers who voluntarily left the sector, including training and skills conversion (Kishor et al, in preparation). By June 2012, 2,125 fishermen had taken advantage of economic incentives offered by the project to leave the fisheries sector and retire, according to the project’s most recent Implementation

Status and Results Report (Kishor et al, in preparation).

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The Vietnam Coastal Resources for Sustainable Development Project. This project aims to finance reforms in the governance of coastal fisheries in selected provinces, through the establishment of co-governance partnerships between the state and communities, building upon a number of past efforts and pilots (Kishor et al, in preparation). In 2010, the national government issued a decree (i.e. regulation) assigning jurisdiction over coastal fisheries to co-governance partnerships between local government agencies and fishing communities (Kishor et al, in preparation).

Within this context, the project provides financing for the transaction costs of the state introducing/proposing co-governance partnerships in roughly 140 selected communes, with the intention to build upon local experience from existing co-governance arrangements (Kishor et al, in preparation). The intention is to finance local government extension to work with communities to establish organizations of user groups that would be given management rights over defined coastal fishery systems and areas, together with enhanced surveillance and enforcement efforts by local government agencies – including establishment and operation of roughly 30 surveillance field stations (Kishor et al, in preparation). Lastly, the project provides funding for the marginal costs of expanding state efforts to limit access for small-scale vessels, through registration and eventual licensing programs (Kishor et al, in preparation). The project is currently underway, hence post-evaluations have not yet been conducted to assess outputs or outcomes.

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Table 22. Synthesis of Governance Reform efforts in 8 World Bank Projects

Project Objectives and Logic Specific Reforms Outputs 1. Indonesia Coral Aimed to strengthen management The program supported the introduction of By the end of Phase II, the project supported the Reef Rehabilitation and conservation of Indonesia’s community management rights for adjacent introduction of community management rights for 1 and Management globally significant coral reef or nearby coral reef areas, through state million hectares of coral reefs in 7 coastal districts, Program Phase II ecosystems, largely by supporting recognition of community management with a 60 percent decrease in destructive fishing recognition of communities’ plans for defined reef fisheries, together practices in these areas over the 6-year period of management rights of coral reef with training and support to communities phase two. Although a lack of controls made fisheries and ecosystems and a decentralized architecture for coral interpretation of project outcomes difficult, 71 reef administration; coupled with national percent of coral reef sites sampled in project areas scale regulations to support community- showed signs of ecological improvement by the end managed areas of Phase II. A majority of fishers in targeted communities reported that the project had been beneficial to them and the total income of project beneficiary group members increased by 21 percent, with all project areas above poverty levels.

256 2. Senegal Integrated Aimed to serve as a pilot for The project supported the introduction of The co-management approach was credited in the 4 Coastal and partnerships in co-governance of community management rights in 4 pilot pilot sites with reducing overfishing, eliminating Maritime Resource coastal and marine resources by both sites, where private associations of fishers unsustainable and harmful fishing gear and methods Management Project communities and the Government, as formed in each community, and were and promoting sustainable resource management well as to secure protection Senegal’s supported by the state agency to develop through local enforcement and compliance. coastal and marine ecosystems. The management plans with rules for targeted project was designed to support the coastal fisheries, which were then reviewed Government of Senegal’s strategy to for consistency with national law and shift from sector development signed into regulation by the Minister of towards sustainable fisheries Fisheries and Maritime Economy, as part of management. a partnership agreement. 3. Tanzania Marine Aimed to improve sustainable At the national scale, the project supported At the local scale the project supported establishment and Coastal management and use of Tanzania’s the establishment and implementation of a of 170 beach management units in the mainland and Environmental Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), common governance regime for Tanzania’s 136 village fishery committees in Zanzibar with Management Project territorial seas, and coastal resources; EEZ, including policy, regulatory and management rights over defined coastal fisheries, to develop an ecologically institutional reform and the establishment of covering a space equivalent to over 10% of the representative and institutionally and the EEZ authority and Marine Legacy Fund. country’s waters. Incomes increased in targeted financially sustainable network of At the local scale, the project supported the communities in conjunction with small grants and marine protected areas; and to build introduction of community management social projects from a Coastal Village Fund. At the rights national scale, a new regulatory authority for

capacity to measure and manage management of the deep sea fishery was established, transboundary fish stocks and the corresponding increase in public revenues via rents on access. 4. Peru Third Aimed to support the Government of The project supported the introduction of an By June 2012, 2,125 fishermen had taken advantage Programmatic Peru’s efforts to improve the individual quota system for the anchoveta of economic incentives offered by the project to leave Environmental efficiency and effectiveness of its fishery, as well as support for a social the fisheries sector and retire. Development Policy environmental governance and compensation fund that provided financing Loan institutions and to mainstream to support early retirement for fishers, environmental sustainability into the economic incentives to shift to new development agenda of key sectors, economic activities for fishers who such as fisheries, mining, and urban voluntarily left the sector, and a training and transport skills conversion program. 5. Southwest Indian The project’s stated objective was to The project supported cooperation in policy The project supported development of a harmonized Ocean Fisheries promote the environmentally formulation among states, as well as an policy strategy for ecosystem-based management for Project sustainable use of the region’s assessment of the current status of offshore shared fish stocks endorsed by a regional committee offshore fish resources through fisheries within the 200 mile EEZ of coastal and adopted by at least one country, as well as adoption of an ecosystem-based states in the Southwest Indian Ocean. supporting the preparation of national policies by all approach to fisheries management. nine participating countries for a specific demersal,

257 pelagic, or crustacean fishery, including adoption of

the policies by the governments of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Tanzania. 6. Vietnam Coastal Aims to improve the governance of Supports the development and The project is still ongoing and relatively recent, so Resources for coastal fisheries in selected project implementation of co-governance no evaluations have been conducted to measure Sustainable provinces, including through a co- partnerships between the state and outputs or outcomes. Development Project management approach communities in some 140 selected communes by: building on local experience of existing co-management arrangements, helping to establish fisher organizations to assume new collective rights and responsibilities, supporting these organizations to prepare and implement co- management plans with new rules, and financing state surveillance support for compliance. At the national scale he project also aims to support state agencies to strengthen boat registration and licensing systems, such as working with the local

governments to limit the entry of new small boats. 7. West Africa Aimed to enhanced countries’ The program supported enhanced By the end of Phase One, three of the four countries Regional Fisheries capacity for governance of coastal enforcement of existing rules for the had met or almost met the target for reductions in Program demersal fishery systems, in order to industrial trawl fleets in Liberia and Sierra illegal fishing in the coastal demersal fishery simultaneously restore fish stocks Leone; systems; 100% of the canoe fleet was registered (with and increase the economic benefits the exception of foreign-based Senegalese fleets); captured from them by West Africa Increased agencies’ capability to develop and two of the four countries had recognized input controls for the canoe fleets by community management rights in the pilot sites. completing vessel registration; and

Introduced state recognition of community management rights for coastal fishery systems and/or areas 8. Western Pacific Aimed to enhance management of Created a limited set of effort rights for From 2010 to 2015, the portion of the resource rent Purse Seine Fishery purse seine fishing vessel effort in access to PNA waters for purse seining; in the WCPO purse seine fishery captured by PICs in & Pacific Islands PNA waters by encouraging the form of access fees, increased from less than Regional Oceanscape collaboration between them, and (i) Linked access to PNA waters to non-fishing $100 million to an estimated $400 million.

258 Program promoting optimal utilization and or closed areas for high seas

conservation of tuna resources, (ii) maximizing economic returns, Created PNAO to maintain VDS registry employment generation and export and monitor fishing effort earnings from sustainable harvesting of tuna resources, (iii) supporting the development of domestic locally- based purse seine fishing industries, and (iv) promoting effective and efficient administration, management and compliance. Sources: Kishor et al, in preparation;

Based on the efforts described above, 5 of the cases have been synthesized in the Table below according to indicators of governance reform within an ocean fishery SES framework as proposed in Chapter Three (the two cases of West Africa and the Pacific

Islands are described in much more detail in sections 4.2 and 4.3).

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Table 23. Comparison of Indicators for Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms Supported in Five World Bank Projects

Project Ecological Sub-System Governance Reforms Social Sub-System Interactions Outcomes Measured Indonesia Coral Clarity and size of Policies: Policy statement Number of fishers: Varies, in Fishing effort (by Ecological - diversity of Reef system boundaries: articulated for increased equity to some cases relatively small by fleet): Though animal species and Rehabilitation and clearly-defined present generations in coral reef village and reef targeted, fishing ecological structures: Management nearshore reef fisheries communities effort measures Impact on structures as Program Phase II in 6 coastal districts in Number and type of fishing were not a result of a 60% Eastern Indonesia Rules: Introduction of community vessels (fleets): relatively collected decrease in the use of management rights homogenous fleet for reef systematically by dynamite to catch fish Number and diversity of fisheries, modest number vaillage or near coral reefs targeted fish stocks: Organizations: Enhanced district. High, multi-species reef extension by national and Fishing gear type used: hook fishery regional public agencies; and line generally, but also Fish catch (by Enhanced research, monitoring destructive types reported such targeted stocks): Growth rate(s) of and assessment as dynamite, cyanide N/A targeted fish stock(s):

260 extremely variable, Costs over time of formulating Socio-economic attributes of though key species such and enacting changes to fishers: high variability as grouper and snapper institutions and organizations: between and within the 6 have relatively slow Development and enactment of targeted districts rates rule changes or new rules ($38.7 million over 5 years); History of use: long traditions Organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce Dependence on resource: high rules changes ($14.3 million over 5 years)

Tanzania Marine Clarity and size of Rules: Introduction of community Number of fishers: Collectively Fishing effort (by N/A and Coastal system boundaries: not management rights for 170 new large, but varies by weight fleet): Not Environmental clearly defined, coastal community-scale organizations in measured Management fisheries with exchange the mainland and 136 such Number and type of fishing Project between villages organizations in Zanzibar, vessels (fleets): variable large Fish catch (by covering a total of 10% of the number of vessels targeted stocks): Number and diversity of country’s waters N/A targeted fish stocks: Fishing gear type used: mixed

High, multi-species Organizations: Extension by Socio-economic attributes of fishery national agencies fishers: low-income

Growth rate(s) of Costs over time of formulating Dependence on resource: high targeted fish stock(s): and enacting changes to variable, relatively slow institutions and organizations: growth rates Development and enactment of rule changes or new rules ($27.9 million over 5 years); Organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce rules changes ($15.6 million) Senegal Integrated Clarity and size of Policies: Pilot a change in Number of fishers: High Fishing effort (by Social - efficiency of Coastal and system boundaries: not strategy towards inclusion fleet): Reduced in harvesting operations as Maritime Resource clearly defined, coastal Number and type of fishing the pilots measured by the PV of Management demersal species on the Rules: Management Rights to vessels (fleets): Large fleet of resource rent: rent Project shelf community fishing associations motorized canoes Fish catch (by measures unavailable, targeted stocks): but catch rates per

261 Number and diversity of Organizations:Increased Fishing gear type used: hook Aggregate vessel increased in

targeted fish stocks: extension by the Marine Fisheries and line, gill nets reduction where several pilots High, multi-species Department; Formation of measured coastal fishery community fishing associations Socio-economic attributes of fishers: low income Growth rate(s) of Costs over time of formulating targeted fish stock(s): and enacting changes to History of use: long traditions extremely variable, institutions and organizations: though key species such Policy formulation ($2.6 million); Dependence on resource: high as grouper and snapper Development and enactment of have relatively slow rule changes or new rules ($4.3 rates million over 5 years); Organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce rules changes ($8.1 million over 5 years) Southwest Indian Clarity and size of Policies: Assessment for regional Number of fishers: Low N/A N/A Ocean Fisheries system boundaries: agreement on shared governance Project

clearly defined Organizations: Increased Number and type of fishing deepwater fishery research and assessment vessels (fleets): Smaller # of industrial offshore vessels Number and diversity of Costs over time of formulating targeted fish stocks: and enacting changes to Fishing gear type used: purse Low, offshore migratory institutions and organizations: seine, longline stocks Policy formulation ($9.5 million); Development and enactment of Socio-economic attributes of Growth rate(s) of rule changes or new rules ($2.5 fishers: foreign fleets, from targeted fish stock(s): million) high income countries relatively slow growth History of use: relatively new fishery

Dependence on resource: low Peru Third Clarity and size of Rules: individual transferable Number of fishers: High Fishing effort (by Social - efficiency of Programmatic system boundaries: quotas (ITQs) fleet): Reduced harvesting operations as Environmental clearly defined Number and type of fishing measured by the PV of

262 Development boundaries over a large vessels (fleets): High, including Fish catch (by resource rent: rent

Policy Operation area both industrial vessels and targeted stocks): measures unavailable, semi-industrial (viking vessels) Aggregate but catch rates per Number and diversity of reduction vessel increased where targeted fish stocks: Fishing gear type used: mid- ITQs introduced Low, anchoveta fishery water trawl

Growth rate(s) of Socio-economic attributes of targeted fish stock(s): fishers: variable High History of use: growing fleet over decades

Dependence on resource: high

As Table 23 indicates, the ocean fishery SESs targeted for reforms were extremely varied across the five projects throughout the tropics, covering a large spatial scale.

While the classificatory system proposed for fisheries governance reforms allows for a more specific description of changes, in most cases little information is available on the interactions between the ecological and social sub-systems, and even less on the measures of outcomes from these interactions. In many cases the ecological boundaries where not clearly defined, nor did governments invest in systematically measuring the interactions or outcomes. Additionally, a counterfactual would be required in order to associate changes in outcome measures to governance reforms.

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4.2 Empirical Review of Governance Reforms Financed by the First Phase of the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program

In 2009 the World Bank’s Board of Directors approved the first phase of a series of projects to finance ocean fisheries governance reforms in West Africa, entitled the

‘West Africa Regional Fisheries Program’ (World Bank, 2009). This section provides empirical review of the reforms introduced in this program as a more detailed case study, drawing heavily from World trip reports prepared between 2009 and 2015, as well as project monitoring and data collected by the Sub-Regional Fisheries

Commission. In particular, this section provides a (i) description of the historical context for the reforms introduced with support from the West Africa Regional

Fisheries Program; and (ii) using the modified SES framework developed in Chapter

Three, analysis of the components of governance reforms and to the extent possible the variables available (drawing from Chapter Three), and explanation of outcome measures that can be associated with governance reforms.

Description of the historical context for the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program

(WARFP). The northwest coast of Africa includes two large marine ecosystems

(LMEs), the Canary Current LME beginning from the northern boundary of Morocco and extending down to Guinea-Bissau, and then the Guinea Current LME extending from this northern boundary down to the northern boundary of Angola (Sherman,

1993). However, the boundaries of the institutions developed to govern the fisheries supported by these ecosystems do not correspond directly to the boundaries of the

LMEs, and given the expressed demand to the World Bank for financial support from coastal countries, the geographic scope of the WARFP was defined from the waters of

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Mauritania down to the waters of Ghana, rather than in direct correspondence to ecological boundaries (World Bank, 2009). Thus, the term ‘West Africa’ was used by the World Bank to refer to the ocean fishery systems under the jurisdiction of coastal countries from Mauritania down to Ghana, inclusive.

As described by Pauly and Christensen (1995), primary production in marine ecosystems can be related to the carrying capacity of an ecosystem for supporting fish resources. The marine ecosystems encompassed in the national waters of a number of coastal countries in West Africa, most notably Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia and

Guinea-Bissau, have relatively high levels of productivity (greater than 300g C per square meter per year), due in large part to a seasonal upwelling (i.e. ocean current) that brings cold and nutrient-rich waters from depths of the Atlantic to the surface

(Heileman and Tandstad). In addition, a number of countries feature numerous estuaries and freshwater inputs that also supply nutrients to waters over wide continental shelves, which combine with the upwelling currents to make West African waters extremely productive for fisheries (Heileman and Tandstad).

While there is a large range of fish species (including mollusks and crustaceans) harvested in the national waters of coastal West African countries, the following species groups are most commonly harvested for commercial fisheries (Heileman and

Tandstad):

 Tuna (Katsuwonis pelamis, Thunnus albacares, Thunnus obesus)

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 Small pelagics, such as:

o Sardine (Sardina pilchardus)

o Sardinella (Sardinella aurita, Sardinella maderensis)

o Anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus)

o Chub mackerel (Scomber japonicas)

o Horse mackerel (Trachus spp.)

o Bonga shad (Ethmalosa fimbriata)

 Coastal migratory pelagic finfish such as hakes (Merluccius merluccius, M.

senegalensis, M. poli)

 Demersal finfish (incl. Pagellus belloti, Pseudotolithus spp., Dentex

canariensis, Galeoides decadactylus, Brachydeuteris auritus, Lutjanus fulgus,

etc.)

 Cephalopods (Octopus vulgaris, Sepia spp., Loligo vulgaris)

 Shrimps (Parapenaeus longirostris, Penaeus notalis)

The above species, within the LMEs, support a number of discrete fishery systems and sub-systems. While tuna, shrimp and demersal finfish are the most valuable fish products per kilogram produced from West Africa’s fisheries, most of the volume of catches are small pelagics (43 percent of the FAO Eastern Central Atlantic major fishing area catch in 2009 – from Gibraltar Strait to the mouth of the Congo River)

(FAO, 2011). Many of the ocean fisheries resources in the region are shared between countries (World Bank, 2009). The type of fishing vessels active in the fishery systems are diverse: ranging from small dugout canoes, to larger motorized canoes and coastal

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fleets, to large industrial fleets of national or distant-water origin – mostly from Asia and Europe (FAO, 2011).

World Bank documents note that the characteristics of the harvesting sub-systems in these fisheries was difficult to assess at the time of the baseline (considered the date for

‘appraisal’ of the proposed project, conducted in June 2009), due to a dearth of data available (World Bank, 2009).

1,400,000

1,200,000

1,000,000

800,000

600,000

400,000

200,000

1986 1988 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Cape Verde Cote d'Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mauritania Senegal Sierra Leone

*Note: Does not include FAO categories of 'diadromous fishes' and 'miscellaneous aquatic animals' Source: FAO Fishery Statistical Collections: Global Capture Production. http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-capture- production/en

Figure 28. FAO data on West Africa's ocean fisheries production in 2009, by location of catch

In 2009 FAO data revealed a growing trend in fisheries production in West Africa since

1950, and given that the statistics were recorded by country where the fish was landed, according to the national flag on the vessel, this reflects largely domestic fisheries (and

267

particularly small-scale fisheries in Ghana and Senegal). However, foreign fleets have been active in the region’s waters over the years as well, and a number of West African countries signed fishing access agreements with foreign fleets and nations (World

Bank, 2009), and foreign catch may not have been captured in the FAO data in Figure

40 (Zeller and Pauly, 2015). For this reason, the University of British Columbia’s Sea

Around Us Project attempts to measure all of the catches in a country’s national waters

(Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ) by building off of the FAO data and including additional data sets from national and regional agencies, as well as estimates or literature on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (Zeller and Pauly, 2015). As shown in Figure 29, these estimates are almost an order of magnitude higher, reflecting in particular the estimates of catches by foreign fleets in West African waters (Sea

Around Us Project, 2015).

10,000,000.00

8,000,000.00

6,000,000.00

4,000,000.00

2,000,000.00

1968 1971 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007

Cape Verde Cote d'Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mauritania Senegal Sierra Leone

Source: http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez

Figure 29. Sea Around Us Project data for West Africa's ocean fisheries production, by location of catch

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To supplement this aggregated data, the World Bank relied upon a number of country- level reports carried out in the preceding years, including:

- Guinea-Bissau (2003),

- Senegal (2005),

- Ghana (2005),

- Cape Verde (2007),

- Liberia (2007),

- Sierra Leone (led by DfID; 2007),

- Mauritania (2008), and

- West Africa fisheries governance study (FAO, 2009).

On the basis of this body of work and what was considered the best-available information at the time, West Africa’s fishery systems were characterized at the national scale as follows:

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Table 24. Aggregated data for benefits from West Africa's ocean fishery systems in 2009, by country

Country Annual Contribution Employment Contribution Contribution Contribution Reported to GDP (%) (direct & to Gov. to Total to Animal Fish Catch indirect) Revenues Export Protein (tons) (%) Revenues Intake (%) (%) Mauritania 680,000 6.0 39,000 27 33 N/A Senegal 368,000 4.9 600,000 N/A 37 70 Gambia 33,000 4.0 6,000 7 N/A 40 – 50 Guinea- N/A 7 – 10 15,000 40 N/A N/A Bissau Guinea 94,000 6.0 112,000 N/A 10 - 30 40 Cape Verde 10,000 4.0 18,000 N/A N/A N/A Sierra 134,000 9.4 230,000 N/A N/A 80 Leone Liberia 15,000 3.2 33,000 N/A N/A N/A Ghana 290,000 4.5 2,200,000 N/A N/A 60 TOTAL 1,624,000 3,253,000 Sources: World Bank (2009)

In lieu of aggregated estimates of the resource rent generated by the region’s ocean fishery systems, in 2009 the World Bank estimated that the wholesale value of the annual production shown in Table 25 to be on the order of $2.5 billion (World Bank,

2009).

According to the program appraisal document (World Bank, 2009), the World Bank identified a number of key constraints in West Africa’s ocean fishery systems, building upon the national reports prepared in preceding years. These included:

 A complex and diverse set of fisheries, where the resources are often shared

across borders, targeted jointly by large industrialized foreign fleets (some of

whom were fishing under explicit foreign access agreements with West African

Governments) and thousands of small-scale vessels (canoes with outboard

motors and ice boxes) from countries such as Ghana and Senegal, traveling long

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distances up and down the coast and generally targeting multiple species at a

time.

 Lack of information on the resources, biologically from fisheries-dependent and

independent measures, ecologically in terms of the natural factors contributing

to resource productivity, and economically as to the benefits provided from the

fisheries, among others. In particular, estimates of sustainable yields from

commercially valuable fish stocks were outdated at best, as well as fisheries-

independent assessments of stock abundance (compared to unfished states).

 Weak or poorly defined governance institutions for harvesting at almost all

levels and jurisdictions, together with organizations incapacitated to act as

agents for the state, particularly to monitor the fisheries and enforce compliance

with existing rules. Tenure arrangements for industrial vessels were considered

as poorly defined, and/or ‘open access’ for small-scale vessels where customary

marine tenure had eroded – often with both targeting the same resources or

operating in the same physical space. The scale of illegal fishing underway at

the time was estimated to be at a volume almost as high as the amount of fish

caught legally in some countries (in some cases by domestic small-scale fleets

fishing in neighboring waters), for example in Guinea (and likely Liberia,

although no data existed). Similarly, the illegal catch in Guinea-Bissau was

estimated to be equivalent to roughly 40 percent of the legal catch, and 35

percent in Sierra Leone. Estimates vary, but the costs of this illegal fishing to

West Africa were estimated on the order of US$100 million or more annually,

in lost revenue and local value added. In some cases this led to direct conflicts,

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such as in nearshore waters (often defined as those less than 6 miles from the

coast) where industrial trawling was prohibited yet frequently occurring –

together with small-scale fishing vessels. The foreign fleets of industrial

trawlers often had weak linkages to any one port or company, and so were able

to move freely along the coasts of different countries, transshipping their catch

via carrier vessels to foreign ports for processing and consumption in external

markets. In this context, fleets moved like ‘roving bandits’ (Olson, 1993),

capable of leaving one country’s waters for the next as conditions changed.

 Many countries lacked the basic fish landing and food safety control

infrastructure and investment climate needed to attract local investment in fish

processing, wholesaling and retailing activities, or to be competitive with

equally accessible destinations such as Las Palmas. For example, Guinea-

Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia all lacked the basic port infrastructure

to support significant industrial vessels to land their fish, and almost all

countries in the region lacked the adequate infrastructure to provide the

necessary support to small-scale fish landings (either to process landed fish for

local consumption or for exports). Furthermore, at least one third of the nine

participating countries did not have a sanitary authority certified to export to

the European markets in 2009 (World Bank, 2009). The Bank hypothesized at

the time that the weakness in governance institutions likely constrained private

investment in local value addition in a number of countries – and the

International Finance Corporation indicated at the time that the risk was too

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high in order to invest due in part to concerns over sustainability of supply in

the current context (World Bank, 2009).

In the context of these challenges to governance that could prevent overfishing, global and local drivers of increased fishing pressure (e.g. increased demand for seafood products, technological innovation and diffusion, declining employment opportunities in other sectors such as agriculture, etc.) were considered as contributing factors to increased fishing effort and pressure on the stocks (as reflected in rising production levels), while limited data available on profit margins and the abundance of fish stocks both suggested declines (World Bank, 2009).

Despite rising production levels, in 2009 most of the commercially important stocks in

West Africa were considered as fully fished or biologically overfished, with the demersal fish in the northern countries the most severely overexploited (World Bank,

2009). For example, according to studies by the University of British Columbia, fishing activity along the West African coast tripled between the mid-1970s and mid-2000s, and by 2002 the high-value coastal sedentary stocks in the region had been reduced to a quarter of their levels in 1950 (World Bank, 2009). This was subsequently confirmed at a series of FAO working groups from 2008 to 2011 to assess the state of the region’s major fish resources (FAO, 2011). Even the fast-growing sardine stock in the northern countries was considered biologically overfished (FAO, 2011). Similarly, a number of

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fully exploited stocks were at risk of overfishing, given the trends in increasing production.

Box 15. Ex. of Overcapacity: Trends in Senegal’s Ocean Fishery Systems from 1960- 2000 1960s Small-scale fleet supplies local and regional market First industrial shrimp trawlers start to operate 1970s Industrial fleet focuses on low value small pelagics; first industrial trawlers arrive and target cephalopods. The adoption of new techniques allows small-scale fisheries to target small pelagics. 1980s Industrial fisheries abandon small pelagics and starts exploiting high value demersal fish. Large numbers of trawlers of Korean origin start fishing for octopus (Octopus vulgaris), after local stocks expand. Export market surges following appearance of refrigerated containers. Small-scale fisheries recaptures market for small pelagics. 1990s Foreign fisheries operate under cover of fisheries agreements. Artisanal fisheries gradually increase efforts on coastal demersal fish for export. Overall catches of demersal fish – increasingly caught in waters of neighboring countries - surged until 1997, but decreased since then. Source: World Bank, 2004d

In terms of the economic benefits from the fisheries, the national reports prepared by the Bank showed a consistent pattern of increasing fleets and costs, even as many of the stocks were biologically fully or overfished (World Bank, 2009). More detailed economic analysis of costs and revenues for domestic small-scale fleets in Senegal for example, showed declining profit margins and many fleets operating at the ‘break- even’ point, suggesting fisheries at the bio-economic equilibrium (World Bank, 2009).

Although detailed value chain analyses were not conducted, the Bank estimated that over 60 percent of the $2.5 billion in fish caught annually was taken by foreign industrial vessels that were generally landing the catch in overseas ports for value addition outside the region, such that the West Africa’s fisheries was considered as

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largely an ‘offshore economy’ (see Table 25 below). A key feature of this offshore economy was the high level of illegal fishing estimated to be taking place (FAO, 2011), with some countries seeing catch taken from their waters illegally on the order of 30 percent of the value of the legal catch (World Bank, 2009).

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Table 25. Local value added from West African fisheries in 2009

Annual Fish Annual Annual Annual Value Caught in West Landed Value Wholesale Value Added to W. African Waters (US$ M) (US$ M) Africa (US$ M) (tons) Illegal or ‘pirate’ 277,000* 141** 457 47*** vessels Legal foreign 923,000 442 1,408 134**** industrial vessels Legal local 264,000 154 525 52 industrial vessels Local small-scale 352,000 189 607 338***** vessels Total 1,816,000****** 926 2,997 571 Source: World Bank estimates in 2009 * Estimated illegal catch based on 2005 MRAG study on illegal fishing in West Africa that estimated a rate of 18 percent of the total capture and value of the fish caught in West Africa waters as illegal. Thus, the total catch of each of the three categories of legal fisheries (foreign industrial, local industrial and local small-scale) was multiplied by 18 percent to arrive at the sum of illegal catch in addition to the 1,539,000 tons of legally reported catch. ** The sum of 18 percent of the landed value of legal foreign industrial, legal local industrial and local small-scale vessels. *** Estimate based on the fact that a small percentage of the illegal catch is taken by small-scale vessels and landed in West Africa. **** Assumes 0 percent of catch by legal foreign industrial vessels landed in the region and thus no value added. The 134 million represents compensation from annual foreign fishing agreements. ***** Value added estimates based on FAO estimates of techno-performance of fisheries and different fishing vessels. ****** Catches were based on FAO 2002 CECAF catch records.

Table 26. Examples of the contribution of small-scale fisheries to West Africa's economy in 2010

Country Fishers & Dependents as a % of the Labor Force Contribution to GDP (%) (%) Cape Verde <1 24 Gambia <1 20 Ghana 39 3 Liberia 3 10 Mauritania 8 12 Senegal 9 3 Sierra Leone 9 38 Source: Belhabib et al, 2015

Within this broader context throughout the region, the seven countries from Mauritania to Sierra Leone increased collaboration through a Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission

(SRFC), formed by treaty in 1985 to support harmonized policies across the countries’ waters, governed by a board of the Ministers of Fisheries from each member (World

Bank, 2009). The SRFC had already adopted a Strategic Action Plan for 2002 – 2010

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focused on increased collaboration between members for surveillance and enforcement of compliance with countries’ fishing regulations (World Bank, 2009). At meetings in

October 2007 and December 2008 of the Conference of the Ministers of Fisheries of the SRFC, member states endorsed a financing program to help implement this policy: the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (World Bank, 2009). Subsequently, as observers to the SRFC, both Liberia and Ghana expressed interest to participate in the program, notably given the presence of some of the same industrial trawl fleets in their waters (World Bank, 2009).

With program financing available on a sequential basis to countries upon interest, Cape

Verde, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone confirmed interest to begin in 2009. These four countries faced both shared and distinct constraints on the governance of their fisheries at this time of appraisal, in June 2009 (World Bank, 2009). A summary of key features of their coastal fishery systems highlighted by the World Bank’s analytical work included (see World Bank, 2009):

 In Cape Verde, where over 99 percent of the national territory is ocean,

overoptimistic estimates of fisheries potential had led to years of public

overinvestment in subsidizing both fish harvesting and processing capacity, while

unregulated small scale fleets had outgrown the resource potential together with

population growth and limited employment alternatives. Particularly for the coastal

sedentary fisheries on the relatively narrow continental shelf, the small-scale fleet

was growing while catch rates declined.

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 In Liberia, relatively unknown numbers of industrial trawl vessels were fishing in

the waters above the continental shelf, many within miles of the coast, while foreign

small-scale fleets fished informally, and the de facto institutional framework for

most of the fisheries was open access.

 In Senegal, the aging and largely unprofitable coastal industrial trawl fleet was

active but fishing less and less, while the small-scale fleet had grown several times

over in the previous ten to fifteen years, aided by subsidized fuel and gear. High-

value coastal sedentary species were declining, even as the unregulated small-scale

fleet grew (and continued to expand beyond national borders). Community

management rights exercised over defined fishing areas had shown some promising

returns (see previous section 4.1), while efforts to register the entire small-scale

fleet remained incomplete.

 In Sierra Leone, foreign industrial trawl vessels fished in the waters above the

continental shelf, often reportedly within 6 miles of the shoreline (in contravention

of national law), while the small-scale fleet fished under essentially de facto open

access conditions.

In this context, the World Bank’s assessment of the potential economic benefits from these countries’ ocean fishery systems was drawn heavily from the concepts of natural capital accounting (World Bank, 2009), which described stocks of natural resources as part of a country’s portfolio of assets, notably in the publication entitled ‘Where is the wealth of nations?’ (World Bank, 2006). Through this conceptual lens, a country’s stocks of natural resources (e.g. energy, forests, fish, land, minerals, etc.) could be

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considered as a piece of capital or asset, i.e. an item of economic value or able to produce a flow of benefits such as income (World Bank, 2006). A country’s total wealth was considered as comprised of three types of assets: (i) natural capital such as fish stocks in the ocean, (ii) produced capital (machinery and structures, urban land), and (iii) intangible capital (skills, expertise, etc. with which labor is applied) (World

Bank, 2006). A country’s gross domestic product (GDP) was considered as essentially the economic returns on its total capital or wealth, which could be measured as the present value of future consumption, and economic growth would be achieved by increasing a country’s total wealth, i.e. the total value of its different assets (i.e. by investing the surplus benefits from a country’s assets into growing the future value of those or other assets – saving and investing) (World Bank, 2006). Shared economic growth in a country, where the increasing flow of benefits from the assets is shared widely among the population, was then considered the most successful way to reduce poverty (World Bank, 2006).

With this conceptual framework, the Bank assessed West African countries’ marine fish stocks as a natural capital asset, which was underperforming for shared economic growth and hence poverty reduction (World Bank, 2009). Essentially, investments in maintaining or rebuilding West Africa’s ocean fish stocks to levels that could sustain an increased stream of resource rents was considered the pathway to enhancing the contribution of the fisheries to economic growth and poverty reduction, together with infrastructure investments to allow the countries to capture a greater portion of those rents from the value chain (World Bank, 2009). Such investments to reduce fishing

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effort were considered a ‘win-win’ between objectives for efficiency (economic returns) and equity to future generations (abundance of fish stocks), drawing upon work showing generally larger biomass for fish stocks at levels that could support MEY compared to those that could support MSY (Grafton et al., 2007, cited in World Bank,

2009). This ‘win-win’ was illustrated at the global scale in a study conducted jointly by the World Bank and FAO entitled ‘The Sunken Billions: the Economic Justification for Fishing Reform’ (World Bank and FAO, 2009), which showed significant efficiency gains to reducing fishing effort and restoring biomass levels. The economic justification for investment in West Africa’s ocean fisheries rested on the need for financing of transition costs of governance reforms to reduce fishing effort and rebuild fish stocks (and the stream of benefits from harvesting them) (World Bank, 2009).

Based on characterization of the region’s ocean fishery systems drawn from Where is the Wealth of Nations (World Bank, 2006) and The Sunken Billions (World Bank and

FAO, 2009), the project document links the opportunity for West Africa’s fisheries to generate greater economic returns for the region to reducing or maintaining fishing effort to levels that would support MSY or even MEY in some cases (World Bank,

2009). As such, the project document emphasizes strengthened or reformed governance institutions as the key to capturing the economic opportunity in the region’s ocean fishery systems, and notably the capacity of state agencies to enforce compliance with harvesting rules and reduce reportedly high levels of illegal fishing (World Bank,

2009).

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As indicated in section 4.1, during the preparation of the WARFP in advance of approval in late 2009, the World Bank had little experience financing countries’ efforts to reform fisheries governance, as the Senegal and Tanzania projects were still underway at the time, and the Indonesia program had shifted significantly in 2004 with the second phase, so there was not a wealth of case literature from the organization’s portfolio as to how to support fisheries governance reform. The cases summarized in the organization’s approach paper, ‘Saving Fish and Fishers’, were from vastly different contexts in the developed world, such as in Iceland, New Zealand, Norway or the United States, and all indicated that fisheries governance reform was a long-term process (World Bank, 2004). Reforming governance institutions, in order to then effect user choices and subsequently behavior, and finally to measure a response from the ecological sub-system to these behavior changes, was considered to take significant time – on the order of 10 to 20 years (World Bank, 2004). As such, the program was designed to leverage long-term financing via an ‘adaptable program loan’ which

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allowed for multiple phases of investment over a period of 10 or more years (similar to the COREMAP program in Indonesia) (World Bank, 2009).

External industrial

Source: MRAG (2009) Figure 30. Flow of illegal fishing in West Africa

With a long-term commitment possible, the discussions with state agents during the preparation period, focused initially on loss of economic value due to high levels of illegal fishing and insufficient government resources to conduct surveillance operations

(World Bank, 2009). Prior to this period, a study (MRAG, 2005) indicated that fish with an estimated wholesale value of some $450 million were harvested each year from

West Africa’s waters via illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing activity. During the

WARFP preparation period, the World Bank funded an updated assessment of illegal

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fishing in West Africa estimating consistently high losses due to illegal fishing in a number of countries, notably Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Sierra Leone, among others

(MRAG, 2009). Given that many of the users and likely illegal fishers were foreign fleets migrating across national boundaries (analogous to Olson’s (1993) as ‘roving bandits’), from initial discussions with individual governments the preparation process shifted from support of multiple, national-scale investments into one, coordinated regional program of investments towards common objectives, in collaboration with the

SRFC (World Bank, 2009). As such, the adaptable program loan finance instrument was modified to allow for additional investments in countries upon demand and on a rolling basis, towards the objective of providing any support needed to all 9 countries from Mauritania south to Ghana (World Bank, 2009). This financing instrument also had the benefit of allowing West African governments with relatively small allocations of concessionary pools of finance from the World Bank, to access an additional

‘window’ of concessionary lending available only for such regional programs as an incentive for multi-country cooperation and integration (World Bank, 2009).

In addition to identification of financing needs to enhance surveillance operations by state agencies to reduce illegal fishing, during the preparation of the WARFP FAO

(2009) prepared a study on fisheries governance to propose institutional reforms at the scale of the coastal fishery systems in the waters above the shelf in the countries.

According to the project document, institutions that could strengthen property for access and use in the fisheries, might be customized by states to their specific contexts, together with investments to enhance agencies’ capacity to deliver and support such

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reforms (World Bank, 2009). Where such reforms might be expected to lead to foregone resource rents during a transition phase for stocks to recover, the World Bank noted the need to finance compensation or mechanisms to ensure that alternative livelihood opportunities were available – in line with the organization’s social safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement (World Bank, 2009). Finally, governments were eager to capitalize on the perceived benefits of governance reforms and expected stock recovery, by investing in fish landing infrastructure and local skills development in order to encourage more processing in West Africa of the fish caught in the region’s waters, and thereby increase resource rents and local employment along the value chain (World Bank, 2009).

In conclusion, through the analyses, discussions and collaborations with government agencies in West Africa, the preparation phase of the WARFP produced what was essentially a ‘clear-hold-build’ approach to fisheries governance reform for the region’s coastal fishery systems:

(i) Clear out illegal fishing by providing immediate support to West African

countries to eliminate illegal fishing activities in their waters, stop the loss of

products and rents as well as its contribution to overfishing;

(ii) Hold these gains through institutional reforms to reduce fishing effort to levels

sufficient to allow the stocks to recover to sizes capable of supporting MSY or

even MEY; and

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(iii)Build the infrastructure necessary to capture the benefits of reform locally

through increased the domestic value added to the fish captured in the region’s

waters at the processing, wholesaling and retail stages (World Bank, 2009).

Analysis of concepts and their variables or structures present, using the modified

SES framework from Chapter Three, and explanation of outcome measures that can be associated with governance reforms. Drawing upon the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter Three, the project-supported reforms been classified the vertical and horizontal characteristics of their components.

Vertical Characteristics of Governance Components. In terms of the spatial scale of the reforms introduced by the governments of Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra

Leone with financing from the WARFP, policy, rule and organizational changes were targeted to the coastal demersal (i.e. relatively sedentary) fishery systems in the waters above the continental shelf (World Bank, 2009). The stated objective of the sum of investments throughout the series of projects over a 10-year time period is “to sustainably increase the overall wealth generated by the exploitation of the marine fisheries resources of West Africa, and the proportion of that wealth captured by West

African countries” (World Bank, 2009). The first phase aimed “to strengthen the capacity of Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone to govern and manage targeted fisheries, reduce illegal fishing and increase local value added to fish products,” with the focus on the coastal demersal fishery systems (World Bank, 2009).

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In phase one every country introduced governance reforms at essentially two common vertical entry points:

a) at the national scale by the state (and in cases of changes to rules, which were

generally new or enhanced input controls for industrial vessels), in order to

develop or articulate new policy principles and objectives, and/or to

significantly enhance the capacity of organizations to support existing

institutions (e.g. enhanced surveillance and enforcement of existing rules such

as the ban on trawling within 6 miles of the coast, or increased registration of

fishing canoes, new resource assessments, etc.); and/or

b) at the local scale through establishment of co-governance partnerships to create

community management rights over defined ocean areas, together with ongoing

support from state agencies and surveillance and enforcement of new rules

formulated by communities.

Horizontal characteristics of governance components. In terms of the horizontal characteristics of common governance reforms, several national governments articulated new statements of policy objectives on behalf of the state, which included a restatement or confirmation of the principles guiding use of the resources, and the reforms to be introduced. In addition, financing for implementation of reforms was also guided by the World Bank’s policies and principles, notably to ensure that changes are consistent with universally-agreed principles of equity to present generations. To ensure this consistency, the project document states that review and compliance with the World Bank’s involuntary resettlement policy (Operational Policy 4.12) would be required, given “the potential for involuntary restrictions on access to the fish resources as a result of …[the] transition away from open access to more regulated fisheries” 286

(World Bank, 2009). The document notes that activities associated with project- financed reforms would be required to follow an inclusive and consultative process in the development of new rules for fishing, as well as provide compensation for any restrictions on resource access (World Bank, 2009). A review of the World Bank documentation during project implementation did not indicate any formal reports of an involuntary loss of access by small-scale fishers as a result of community management rights, though only in Senegal and Sierra Leone did communities exercise these rights to articulate new rules formally recognized by the state. In Senegal a mechanism for compensation was established and utilized in order to ensure consistency with this principle, though not in Sierra Leone. Additionally, a voluntary compensation mechanism was established in Cape Verde for the canoe fleet.

The types of rule changes introduced included state recognition of management rights over adjacent coastal demersal species for communities, and input controls for industrial trawl fleets operating on the continental shelf (World Bank, 2009). A significant focus of program financing was to enhance the capacity and activities of national agencies to administer rules for tenure, including enhanced transparency in the licensing of acess for industrial vessels, increased communication and dialogue with resource users and communities, and increased registration of fishing vessels (World

Bank, 2009). Additionally, organizational changes included: (i) increased fisheries, research, assessment and monitoring in order to expand the information base required for reform, including stock assessments for coastal demersal species; (ii) enhanced national agency surveillance and enforcement of existing rules (including expanded sea

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and aerial patrols, increased training and construction of surveillance outputs); and (iii) extension efforts by national fisheries agencies, linked to surveillance support (World

Bank, 2009).

Table 27 below summarizes the vertical and horizontal characteristics of the specific governance reforms agreed in the project document and approved by the Governments and the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors.

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Table 27. Summary of the types of fisheries governance reforms supported in WARFP Phase I

Country Vertical Entry Points Change in Horizontal Characteristics Scale Jurisdiction Level Policy Rules Organizations of Origin Cape National State N/A Articulation of N/A Enhanced national Verde a new national agency capacity and policy activities for statement for administration of ocean fishery rules for tenure, systems, including enhanced specifically a transparency in the mid-term licensing of access evaluation of for industrial the vessels, increased implementation communication and of the Fisheries dialogue with Sector resource users and Management communities, Plan 2004 – increased 2014, and then registration of development of fishing vessels any necessary revisions to the Increased research, Plan assessment and monitoring in order to expand the information base required for reform, including stock assessments for coastal demersal species

Enhanced national agency surveillance and enforcement of existing rules (including expanded sea and aerial patrols, increased training, construction of two surveillance outposts) Local Co- Collective N/A Community Extension by Governance Choice management national fisheries rights over agency adjacent areas of the sea (resulting in the introduction of a range of technical measures, including gear restrictions, closed areas,

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etc.) in two pilot areas Liberia National State Collective Articulation of Input Enhanced national choice a new national controls for agency capacity and policy industrial activities for statement for vessels administration of ocean fishery rules for tenure, systems, including enhanced together with a transparency in the new law to licensing of access formalize for industrial principles and vessels, increased objectives communication and dialogue with Development resource users and of new policy communities, objectives for increased the coastal registration of demersal fishing vessels fisheries Increased research, assessment and monitoring in order to expand the information base required for reform, including working with a university to build a research program and conduct resource assessments

Enhanced national agency surveillance and enforcement of existing rules (including expanded sea and aerial patrols, increased training, observers on industrial vessels, establishment of a satellite-based fishing vessel monitoring system, linked to a fisheries monitoring center, two surveillance stations) Co- Collective N/A Community Extension by Governance Choice management national fisheries rights over agency, linkage to adjacent national surveillance areas of the support sea in 1 to 2 pilot areas (resulting in the introduction of a range of tech.

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measures, including gear restrictions, closed areas, etc.) Senegal National State N/A Development N/A Enhanced national of new policy agency capacity and objectives (and activities for accompanying administration of regulations) for rules for tenure, coastal including enhanced demersal fish transparency in the stocks licensing of access for industrial vessels, increased communication and dialogue with resource users and communities, increased registration of fishing vessels

Increased research, assessment and monitoring in order to expand the information base required for reform, including working with the oceanic research center (CRODT) to synthesize data on stock status

Enhanced national agency surveillance and enforcement of existing rules (coastal surveillance stations) Local Co- Collective N/A Community National agency Governance Choice management extension rights over adjacent Local government areas of the surveillance support sea (resulting to communities in the introduction of a range of technical measures, including gear restrictions, closed areas, etc.) in 12 pilot sites National State Operational Finalize Development Enhanced national articulation of a of agency capacity and

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Sierra national policy regulations activities for Leone review for input administration of controls for rules for tenure, industrial including enhanced trawl transparency in the fisheries licensing of access (outsides the for industrial 6-mile vessels, increased coastal zone) communication and dialogue with resource users and communities, increased registration of fishing vessels

Increased research, assessment and monitoring in order to expand the information base required for reform, including training and technical assistance in analysis of key fisheries statistics

Enhanced national agency surveillance and enforcement of existing rules (including expanded sea and aerial patrols, increased training, observers on industrial vessels, establishment of a satellite-based fishing vessel monitoring system, linked to a fisheries monitoring center, two surveillance stations) Local Co- Collective N/A Community National agency Governance Choice management extension rights in four pilot areas

Summary of expected economic costs of governance reforms. Although not fully representative of the economic costs of the reforms undertaken, Table 28 provides a break-down of the financial costs (i.e. those costs actually financed by the World Bank)

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of reform in the four countries, drawing upon the conceptual framework in Chapter

Three.

Table 28. Break-down of financial costs of ocean fisheries governance reform in Phase One of the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program*

Cape Verde Liberia Senegal Sierra Leone TOTAL Costs of formulating and enacting changes to institutions and organizations Policy formulation/ 0.4 0.5 N/A 0.3 1.2 reform Development and 0.5 0.8 2.3 1.4 5.0 enactment of rule changes or new rules Organizational costs 2.6 8.1 5.5 10.8 27.0 to administer, monitor and enforce rule changes Costs of changes in fishing effort and subsequently yield Compensation for 2.1 N/A 4.5 1.4 8.0 resource rent foregone TOTAL 5.6 9.4 12.3 13.9 41.2 * Amounts given in US$ millions, as total costs over the duration of the project; Source: World Bank, 2009

As shown in the Figure below, some 66 percent of the costs were incurred in order enhance the capacity of state organizations to enforce compliance with harvesting rules, and administer those rules and monitor progress in the fishery systems towards agreed policy objectives. This certainly reflects the focus and high costs of enforcement in

Liberia and Sierra Leone, and potentially also the relatively low baselines from which many organizations began in 2009. Similarly, despite significant transaction costs in efforts by the state to establish co-governance partnerships with fishing communities, total costs were relatively low, reflecting a limited number of pilot sites included, as well as previous investments by the government and the World Bank in Senegal prior to the baseline.

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Policy formulation/ reform Development and enactment of rule Compensation for changes or new rules resource rent foregone

Organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce rule changes

Figure 31. Break-down of financial costs of reform in WARFP Phase One

Associated changes in the outcome measures for the targeted ocean fishery SESs.

While Table 27 provides a summary the types of governance reforms supported by

Phase One of the WARFP, breaking reforms down into their component parts per the classification system embedded in the SES framework in Chapter Three, it is a static representation of the aspirations of the governments at the beginning of the project.

Based on reviews of World Bank staff trip reports and interim supervision reports, the following paragraphs provide a historical description of the series of events documented to record progress in reforms based on outputs produced in each country, towards changing outcome measures in the targeted ocean fishery SESs.

Cape Verde. Project-financed activities actually began in Cape Verde in April 2010

(World Bank and CSRP, 2011a). At the time, while illegal fishing was considered a

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constraint on the benefits from the fisheries given the large area of the country’s waters, the key challenge for the coastal demersal fishery system was the expanding small- scale fleet and accompanying decline of sedentary coastal fish resources on the relatively narrow shelf area (World Bank, 2009). However, the first year of reform implementation began slowly and soon fell behind schedule (World Bank and CSRP,

2011a). Subsequently, a World Bank team noted considerable delays in December

2012, and during the March 2013 mid-term review, the project was ‘restructured,’ whereby the government and the World Bank agreed to change the terms of the financing to add, change or reduce planned activities and objectives (World Bank,

2014a). The restructuring focused project financing on those activities where objectives were considered as most likely to be achieved by the end of the project in

2015, with a reduction in the funding of activities considered as unlikely to reach their goal (e.g. small grants and training for diversified livelihoods in fishing communities in order to compensate for foregone resource rent resulting from changes in harvesting rules) (World Bank, 2014a).

In terms of national-scale efforts to change articulated policy statements for the fishery systems, after a slower than expected start in year one, the Fisheries Department (DGP) began to work with international experts to conduct bio-economic modeling and assessments of the fishery systems in order to prepare a new policy for the sector

(World Bank and CSRP, 2011a). The policy statement was drafted in 2012, entitled the ‘Strategic Fisheries Development Plan,’ and further revised in 2013 as a government ‘letter of sector policy), before being adopted by the Government in 2014

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and further analysis begun in order to implement the policy’, including drafting of revisions to national regulations (World Bank and CSRP, 2015b).

To enhance national agency capacity to administer harvesting rules, the project included support for the Fisheries Department (DGP) to complete a full registration of the canoe fleet (World Bank, 2009). The registration program implemented by DGP was considered a model for the region by the World Bank, and achieved 100% registration of canoes by December 2013, with a full database of the fleet accessible by smart phone (World Bank, 2014a). Additionally to support policy objectives and administration of harvesting rules, the biological status of key fish stocks in the country’s waters was assessed, beginning with a survey of small pelagics in 2010 and continuing in 2012, leading DGP to propose new input control rules to freeze the registration of new small-scale vessels in March 2015, with the objective of transitioning to an output control rule based on establishment of a total allowable catch limit for small pelagic species towards the end of 2015 (World Bank and CSRP,

2015b).

Two pilot projects were envisaged for introduction of state recognition of community management rights over defined coastal fisheries, though the sites were not selected until 2011 (World Bank and CSRP, 2011a). As of early 2013, the World Bank reported that progress remained slow, and DGP had approached the Government of Senegal to facilitate an exchange of expertise and learning based on the latter’s experiences in co- management (World Bank, 2014a). Funding for this activity was increased as a result

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of the restructuring, and progress reported as subsequently accelerated (World Bank,

2014a). As of 2015, the two sites (Sal and Maio) each had four fishers’ associations formed, with a facilitator from DGP supporting each (World Bank and CSRP, 2015b).

Each association had reportedly worked with the facilitators to conduct a rapid assessment of the coastal sedentary fisheries, and are developing new rules for state recognition (World Bank and CSRP, 2015b). The associations were expected to be legally established and their rules recognized by the state as regulations, in September

2015 (World Bank and CSRP, 2015b).

Additionally, although delayed and funding reduced compared to the project document at the baseline, the project has financed small-scale fishers interested to exit the small pelagic fishery system, after passage of the rule freezing registration of new vessels.

With the rule in place, DGP considered the funding for incentives to diversify out of fisheries to be more likely to reduce overall fishing effort in the small pelagic system.

As of 2015, some 69 fishers had received grants or subsidized loans in order to start new enterprises outside of the fisheries sector (World Bank and CSRP, 2015b).

In terms of enhancing agency capacity for surveillance and enforcement of harvesting rules, DGP and the country’s Coastal and Marine Secretariat (COSMAR) signed an agreement to collaborate, the latter being established with United States Government support (World Bank, 2014a). The project supported construction of two fisheries control stations on the islands of Sal and Maio, where 10 of 27 trained fisheries inspectors would be deployed (World Bank, 2014a). A satellite-based vessel

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monitoring system was installed early in the project, and subsequently a national fisheries surveillance plan completed in 2012 (World Bank, 2014a). By May 2015 approximately 60% of licensed industrial fishing vessels had transponders sending signals to a vessel monitoring system used by the state (World Bank and CSRP, 2015b).

In addition a fisheries observer program was instituted, in order to record fish catches on industrial vessels (World Bank, 2014a). An EU review of the country’s efforts to fight illegal fishing was considered positive, ensuring continued access to EU markets for Cape Verde fish products (World Bank, 2014a). Additionally, DGP linked the registry of small-scale vessels and the satellite-based vessel monitoring system of industrial vessels, to smart phones of fisheries inspectors, in order to enhance the efficiency of fisheries surveillance (World Bank and CSRP, 2015b).

Liberia. Project-financed activities actually began in Liberia in April 2010, and the coordinator arrived in May to begin work at the Bureau for National Fisheries (BNF)

(World Bank, 2012a). At that time operations by the national fisheries agency (i.e.

BNF) were considered to be fairly limited, and coastal trawling activity in the coastal demersal fishery system included an estimated 42 licensed vessels providing a total of

$88,000 in public revenues to the state in 2008, and many more vessels observed fishing illegally without licenses (World Bank and CSRP, 2015b). This coastal trawling resulted in many reported incidents of conflict with Liberian artisanal fishermen, high rates of artisanal fishing gear losses and risks of collision with industrial trawl vessels, and low artisanal catch rates (World Bank, 2012c). Indeed, during preparation of the project, members of fishing communities near Robertsport had stated that reducing

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coastal trawling was a precondition for any co-governance partnership with the state

(World Bank and CSRP, 2015c).

As a first step to allow for regulation of fishing effort in the country’s waters, a new national fisheries regulation was enacted by BNF in 2010 – the first in almost fifty years – while the government began to prepare a new long-term policy vision for the sector and a new fisheries act to help implement that vision (World Bank, 2012c).

These regulations included a prohibition on bottom trawling within 6 miles of the coast to avoid damaging essential fish habitats, as well as higher fines for illegal fishing activity (World Bank and CSRP, 2015c). A ‘stock-take’ was conducted in 2010 of the status of key commercial fisheries, and input controls for a fixed number of licenses for industrial vessels introduced (World Bank, 2012c). For the first time, these licenses were made public as an annex to an August 2011 trip ‘Aide Memoire’, i.e. trip report, from the World Bank (World Bank and CSRP, 2011b). That disclosure led to the discovery of previously unreported industrial tuna fishing in the country’s waters, when representatives of the foreign companies contacted the government to ask why their vessels were not listed, leading to a government investigation revealing that past payments by the foreign companies to their local agents for fishing licenses had never been received by the government, and subsequently retroactive payments and fines of over $3 million were paid by the companies to the treasury by the end of 2012 (World

Bank, 2012c). By 2015, the level of transparency in fisheries governance had reportedly improved to the point that the list of licensed fishing vessels and revenue generated

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were periodically published on BNF’s website, together with frequent radio discussion programs (World Bank and CSRP, 2015c).

To enhance BNF’s capacity to administer harvesting rules, in 2011 and 2012 the project financed a first registration of the country’s canoes, including marking and registering

3,262 canoes into a database (World Bank, 2012c). This register was maintained and expanded in the subsequent years, with BNF collaborating with the Liberia Artisanal

Fishermen’s Association (LAFA) (World Bank and CSRP, 2014a). By 2015 some

3,500 canoes were embossed with the registration number (World Bank and CSRP,

2015c).

In 2011 BNF began to develop a new policy vision for the country’s fisheries, which was completed and in 2015 submitted to the Cabinet for approval, while a new Fisheries

Act and accompanying regulations were drafted to implement the policy (World Bank and CSRP, 2014a). In May 2015 the government concluded an access agreement with the EU, providing access for 34 European tuna vessels (28 purse seiners and 6 long- line vessels), in return for 650,000 euros per year to the state for the next five years – half of which will be earmarked to support fisheries management costs (European

Commission, 2015).

Investment in a new headquarters for BNF was postponed until the policy statement influencing the future functions of the agency was completed, and eventually the project would opt for an interim solution of a pre-fabricated building in 2014, as the

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full cost of a new building was under-budgeted during preparation (World Bank and

CSRP, 2014a). The uncertainty regarding a facility for BNF staff, and temporary solutions that resulted in scattering BNF staff and particularly project contractors across different locations, were considered a continuing constraint to reform throughout the project (World Bank and CSRP, 2014a). State resources for BNF operations were reported to be $44,000 per year, sufficient to pay the salaries of the 30 staff and 18 contractors but with little provision for operating costs (World Bank, 2012c). A number of BNF functions, including surveillance operations, were financed largely by the

World Bank during the project, but were considered to be significantly reduced in the absence of this source of financing (World Bank and CSRP, 2015c).

With assistance from BNF facilitators financed by the project, a number of communities around Robertsport collectively informally established a Co-Management

Association (CMA) with draft by-laws as a pilot for community management rights in the coastal demersal fishery system. In 2013, the CMU created a sub-committee of members on fisheries surveillance, to partner with state in order to reduce illegal fishing in the coastal waters (World Bank and CSRP, 2014a). An independent review of the

Robertsport CMA process in November 2013 concluded that the CMA’s constitution and by-laws needed to be clarified and formally recognized by the state, the CMA’s work plan needed to be strengthened together with a budget, a stronger information basis for the CMA to exercise management rights was needed, and the question of the distribution of benefits from anticipated government-financed construction of a fish landing site was raised (World Bank and CSRP, 2014a). By mid-2014, the Ministry of

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Agriculture recognized the Roberstport CMA as an autonomous entity authorized to manage coastal fisheries (World Bank and CSRP, 2014a). In early 2015 the Bank assessed that the CMA was “a young yet functioning organization,” acknowledged by at least some local communities as helping to reduce illegal trawling (World Bank and

CSRP, 2015c). At the same time, the World Bank reviews suggested that the by-laws needed to be simplified and better communicated (e.g. the voting rules and governing structure), particularly reports that the CMA was exercising exclusion rights not yet formalized or transparent (World Bank and CSRP, 2015c). As of early 2015, concerns were raised in World Bank reports about the representation of the CMA, as membership is mixed with government representatives, and decision-making was perceived by community representatives as being influenced by board members picked by the national agency (World Bank and CSRP, 2015c).

In terms of enhanced agency capacity to enforce harvesting rules, incidence of illegal fishing was estimated to be at 83 percent in the coastal fisheries at the beginning of the project (World Bank, 2009).12 As a first step in 2010, an inter-agency fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance coordinating committee (MCSCC) was established by memorandum of understanding, and a functioning fisheries monitoring center opened at the Liberia Maritime Agency (one of the MCSCC members), with staff recruited and trained, and equipped with radio and computer communications and

12 This percentage represents the estimated percentage of total fishing vessels that were unlicensed. In 2007, there were 50 licensed vessels, and close to 250 different vessels were observed fishing without a license by UNMIL flights, in the coastal zone. Total known industrial fishing vessels was thus 300, at least 250 of which were fishing without a license, for a minimum value of 83% serious infractions observed per every known industrial fishing vessel (inclusion of infraction to the Inshore Exclusion Zone would increase this value).

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a satellite-based fishing vessel monitoring system (VMS) receiving reports from the licensed industrial vessels equipped with transponders (World Bank, 2012c). Under direction from staff at this monitoring center, the Liberian Coast Guard began to launch sea patrols in the coastal waters together with officers of BNF with support from the

United States Coast Guard, as well as aerial patrols through collaboration with the

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (World Bank, 2012c). These efforts resulted in the arrest of five trawl vessels for non-compliance with the new regulation, as well as collaboration with the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) in Sierra Leone to arrest a Portuguese-flagged vessel in Freetown for violations of harvesting rules in Liberia’s waters (World Bank, 2012c). By the end of 2012, BNF would prosecute infractions by 39 industrial vessels, resulting in $3.7 million in fines

(World Bank, 2014a). The U.S. government’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) provided training to a team of fisheries observers recruited by

BNF through the project, to begin to record fish catch data on all licensed industrial vessels, for entry in a newly-established database for licenses, revenues and fishing catch and effort at BNF (World Bank, 2012c).

By October 2012 the World Bank reported that illegal trawling in coastal waters (within

6 miles of the coast) had been significantly reduced, with the exception of some incursions by unlicensed vessels in the far south near Harper (World Bank, 2012c).

According to the report (World Bank, 2012c), “with this illegal trawling removed from the inshore waters, local artisanal fishers no longer compete with industrial trawl vessels, and environmental externalities on the habitats supporting healthier fish stocks

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have been reduced. Stock recovery among all coastal demersal species in these inshore waters, and particularly the valuable shrimp fishery, can be expected as a result, although data collection to verify this has not been completed. Anecdotal claims by communities suggest fish landings are increasing.” By 2013 coastal communities at

West Point and Robertsport reported increased level of coastal demersal catches, which the World Bank report suggests could be at least partially attributed to the reduction in illegal fishing (World Bank and CSRP, 2014a). These enhanced surveillance operations continued throughout 2013, when 103 patrol days were conducted (88 sea patrol and

15 aerial patrols) (World Bank and CSRP, 2014a). By the end of 2013, the occurrence of illegal fishing in Liberia’s coastal waters was reported to have been reduced from the 83% baseline to 57% (World Bank and CSRP, 2014a). Throughout this period, the project actively invested in strengthening the fisheries monitoring center, with ongoing international technical assistance provided to the staff (World Bank and CSRP, 2014a).

By 2015, the project’s support for enhanced surveillance and enforcement, including through introduction of a satellite-based VMS and on-board observers, had resulted in several arrests and fines that were reported in the media13 and considered to have galvanized significant public attention and critical support (World Bank and CSRP,

2015c). In parallel, public disclosure of fishing licenses beginning in late 2011 reportedly deterred national agents and boat owners from trading forged licenses

13 http://www.stopillegalfishing.com/sifnews_article.php?ID=71 accessed on December 14, 2015.

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(World Bank and CSRP, 2015c). Total arrests and fines over the life of the project by the government reached over $6.4 million (World Bank and CSRP, 2015c).

Table 29. Liberia fisheries judicial and administrative penalties imposed from 2010 - 2013

Year Vessel Name(s) (Flag State) Company / Violations Penalty / Association Compensation Imposed US$ 2011 F/V SETA 70 (South Korea) Inter-Burgo Various (fishing in the USD 125,000 Industrial Co. IEZ, others) F/V LIAO ZHUANG-YU 15011 Various (Fishing USD 60,000 (USD (China) without a license, 15,000 per vessel) F/V LIAO ZHUANG-YU 15012 fishing in the IEZ, pair (China) trawling) F/V LIAO ZHUANG-YU 15031 (China) F/V LIAO ZHUANG-YU 15032 (China) F/V SETA 70 (South Korea) Inter-Burgo Failure to carry an USD 25,000 Industrial Co. observer, failure to report F/V SETA 70 (South Korea) Inter-Burgo Various (fishing in the USD 150,000 + 6 Industrial Co. IEZ, others) month license suspension 2012 F/V DONIENE (Spain) ANABAC Licensing USD 350,000 + 1 Irregularities, year license ban Unreported fishing activities F/V TXORI URDIN (Spain) ANABAC Licensing USD 150,000 F/V EGALUZE (Spain) Irregularities, USD 150,000 F/V ALBONIGA (Spain) Unreported fishing USD 150,000 F/V JUAN RAMON EGANA activities USD 150,000 (Spain) USD 150,000 F/V TXIRINNE (Spain) USD 150,000 F/V PLAYA DE AZKORRI (Belize) F/V AVEL VOR (France) ORTHONGEL Licensing USD 150,000 F/V CAP BOJADOR (France) Irregularities, USD 150,000 F/V GUERIDEN (France) Unreported fishing USD 150,000 F/V VIA EUROS(France) activities USD 150,000 F/V VIA HARMATTAN USD 150,000 (France) F/V GALERNA (Panama) OPAGAC Licensing USD 150,000 F/V KURTZIO (Spain) Irregularities, USD 50,000 F/V MATXI KORTA (Spain) Unreported fishing USD 50,000 F/V MAR DE SERGIO (Spain) activities USD 50,000 F/V ALBACORA QUINCE USD 50,000 (Panama) USD 50,000 F/V MONTECELO (St. Vincent USD 50,000 and the Grenadines) USD 50,000 F/V MONTEFRISA NUEVE USD 50,000 F/V ALBACORA NUEVE USD 50,000 (Curacao) USD 50,000 USD 50,000

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F/V ALBACORA CARIBE (Panama) F/V ALBACORA DIEZ (Panama) F/V KOOSHA II (now ALBACORA SEIS) F/V SANT YAGO UNO (Guatemala) F/V CAP FINISTERE MW Brands Licensing USD 150,000 F/V CAP VERGA Irregularities, USD 150,000 F/V CAP COZ Unreported fishing USD 150,000 activities F/V ZUBEROA (Spain) ANABAC Fishing without a Two year licensing license ban (2013 & 2014) F/V PANOFI DISCOVERER Panofi Fisheries Various (Fishing USD 300,000 (Ghana) Co. without a license, USD 100,000 M/V VOLTA VICTORY illegal transhipment at USD 100,000 (Ghana) sea. Others) M/V VOLTA GLORY (Ghana) 2013 F/V PREMIER (South Korea) Dongwon Various (Fishing USD 1,000,000 F/V SOLEVANT (Ivory Coast) Industries without a license, USD 1,000,000 forged license, others) F/V SETA 60 (South Korea ) Inter-Burgo Various (Fishing Case charged but F/V SETA 62 (South Korea) Industries Co. without a license, not yet settled F/V SETA 70 (South Korea) illegal transhipment at M/V SETA No.73 (Panama) sea, forged licenses, others) HAE JEONG 3 (South Korea) HaeJeong Co. Fishing inside the USD 100,000 HAE JEONG 7 (South Korea) Ltd. Inshore Exclusion USD 100,000 HaeJeong Co. Zone Ltd. 2014 M/V JINYUN Reefer failure to get USD 3000 authorisation to land fish M/V GABU REEFER Reefer failure to get USD 2000 authorisation to land fish Total Fines USD 6,215,000 Source: World Bank and CSRP, 2014a

Senegal. Project-financed activities actually began in June 2010, in addition to ongoing

World Bank-financed activities by the government to articulate a new policy statement and national law, to register all fishing canoes, and to support pilots in community management rights for coastal demersal fisheries, in the Integrated Management of

Coastal and Maritime Resources Project (GIRMaC) and the Sustainable Management of Fish Resources Project (GDRH) (World Bank, 2012d). Progress in completing these reforms was reported to have been affected early by weak administration of the project,

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as a number of expenses deemed ineligible for World Bank financing according to the terms of the agreement with the government were incurred by the Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy (MPEM) for all three Bank-financed projects in the sector: the

GIRMaC, GDRH and WARFP, starting in August 2011 (World Bank, 2012d). At the same time, implementation progress was reported to have decreased markedly (World

Bank, 2012d). In April 2012 a new government was elected and the staffing of MPEM changed, with a new coordinator responsible for administering the WARFP financing named in June, 2012 (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d). Subsequently, the WARFP project was restructured by December 2012 to reduce the scope of activities focused on constructing fish landing infrastructure at Kafountine, and to continue financing the costs of state support to the community management pilots begun under the GIRMaC and GDRH (which had ended) (World Bank, 2012d). The stated objective of the project restructuring was to sharpen the focus to support the government’s policy objective of rebuilding the coastal demersal resource base for increased economic benefits (World

Bank, 2012d).

Project finance to support governance reforms included: development of input controls for all canoes fishing in the EEZ via registration and licensing; compensation for foregone rents by industrial trawl vessels via a proposed ‘buy-back’ of vessels and re- training programs for crew; expansion of pilots for community management rights in defined coastal demersal fisheries; enhanced administration of rules for tenure via increased transparency in state issuance of fishing licenses and research and assessment of fish resources (World Bank and CSRP, 2011c). Progress in the financing and

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implementation of these reforms reportedly slowed considerably beginning in late 2011 as a result of reviews of possible ineligible expenditures with World Bank funds, the turnover of staff in MPEM in early 2012 and the project restructuring process completed in late 2012 (World Bank, 2014a). By mid-2014, state recognition of community management rights at the collective choice level (via a new law) was in preparation, and the canoe registration program had identified 21,693 canoes, 77% of whom had been physically marked (World Bank, 2014a). The growth in the canoe fleet over the recent decades has been exponential – in 2004 estimated suggested

12,000 canoes operating (World Bank, 2004b), whereas by mid-2014 the registration suggested over 21,000 (World Bank, 2014b). Going forward, MPEM was reportedly considering a national regulation requiring registration of fishing canoes and possession of a fishing license in order to obtain the registration card for government fuel subsidies for fishing canoes (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d).

In terms of project financing for the government to ‘buy back’ industrial trawl vessels and reduce the size of the fleet (and overall fishing effort), this activity failed to materialize (World Bank, 2014a). Since 2006 the Government has maintained a freeze on new licenses for industrial trawl vessels, resulting in a 35% reduction in the fleet through attrition by 2014 (World Bank, 2014a). However, the buy-out program only began in 2013, and ultimately failed to purchase any vessels, as incentives were not considered sufficient to elicit participants (World Bank, 2014a).

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At the local scale, the project continued to support the four pilots in community management rights for coastal fisheries that were initiated through the GIRMaC project, as well as another eight that were initiated under the GDRH (World Bank,

2014a). The communities and the coastal demeral fishery systems identified for management rights are as follows (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d):

Saloum river delta:

 Betenty: coastal shrimp (Penaeus notialis)

 Foundiougne: coastal shrimp (Penaeus notialis)

 Fimela: coastal shrimp (Penaeus notialis)

The ‘petite-cote’:

 Ngaparou: lobster (Panilurus regius) and other sedentary species (notably

Cymbium and octopus)

 Mballing: lobster (Panilurus regius) and other sedentary species (notably

Cymbium and octopus)

 Nianing: lobster (Panilurus regius) and other sedentary species (notably

Cymbium and octopus)

 Point Sarene: lobster (Panilurus regius) and other sedentary species (notably

Cymbium and octopus)

 Mbodienne: lobster (Panilurus regius) and other sedentary species (notably

Cymbium and octopus)

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Cap Vert Peninsula:

 Yenne: lobster (Panilurus regius) and other sedentary species (notably

groupers)

 Bargny: lobster (Panilurus regius) and other sedentary species (notably

groupers)

 Soumbedioune: lobster (Panilurus regius) and other sedentary species (notably

groupers)

 Oukam: lobster (Panilurus regius) and other sedentary species (notably

groupers)

According to World Bank trip reports the rules introduced by the fishing assocation in

Ngaparou have likely yielded the biggest changes to date, with the introduction of technical measures in the adjacent sea area 3 kilometers wide and 12 kilometers long, which included introducing a closed area over roughly one third of the total managed area, gear restrictions and closed seasons in another roughly one third of the total managed area, and open access maintained in the remaining one third of the area

(World Bank and CSRP, 2015d). From 2005 when this effort began in Ngaparou to

2010, the average weight of lobsters caught in the managed area increased 72%, from

295 grams to 420 grams, with catch rates more than doubling from 1.5 kilograms per trip in 2006 to 3.5 kilograms in 2010 (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d). Demersal fish species (and overall species diversity and abundance) are reported by fishers and government staff to have gradually reappeared in the area, though sampling or structured data collection has not occurred (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d). At the same time, despite voluntary surveillance patrols by association members, conflict has

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reportedly increased as the growing catch rates in the area have attracted new entrants from neighboring communities and waters (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d). In total, fishers’ associations in 8 of the 12 sites had been legally recognized by the state as of mid-2015, (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d).

In conjunction with the introduction of community management rights, after restructuring the project increasingly supported commercial micro-finance for fishers in targeted communities to undertake alternative livelihoods to fishing, via directed lines of commercial micro-finance (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d). Through this model, MPEM provided a guarantee with project financing to a local micro-finance institution (Credit Mutuelle Senegal - CMS), to establish a commercial line of credit for fishers (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d). The micro-loans issued by 2015 reportedly had a repayment rate of 97% and 94% of the activities showing profitability (World

Bank and CSRP, 2015d). MPEM’s consultations with recipients indicated a positive link with a reduction in fishing activity (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d). However the

World Bank’s June 2015 trip reported noted that broader implementation of this mechanism in advance of limited access for the canoe fleet at the national scale could be less effective in reducing overall fishing effort beyond the scale of the targeted communities (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d). The report highlighted another challenge that the required repayment period of 3 years was considered too short to satisfy the demand of all the fishers (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d).

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The project’s support for enhanced fisheries surveillance operations by state agencies aimed to build upon existing efforts and capacity in place with MPEM (World Bank,

2009). After the restructuring, progress in implementing these activities reportedly accelerated, particularly surveillance of operations by coastal industrial fishing vessels

(World Bank, 2014a). The project supported the rehabilitation, equipping and furnishing of coastal surveillance stations, leading to inspections of 423 industrial vessels and 3,711 canoes in 2013 (World Bank, 2014a). That same year a national strategy to combat illegal fishing was developed by MPEM (World Bank, 2014a).

Sierra Leone. Project-financed activities actually began in Sierra Leone towards the end of 2010, providing support the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources

(MFMR) to articulate a new policy vision (5-year plan) and any accompanying law and regulations (World Bank and CSRP, 2015a). By March 2014 the policy statement was not completed and considered behind schedule (World Bank and CSRP, 2015a), and since that time a draft (including a range of background papers) has been prepared, but not yet agreed by the government (World Bank and CSRP, 2015a). In addition, the project included financing to support the government to articulate policy objectives and new harvest rules for industrial vessels operating in specific coastal demersal fisheries, such as the shrimp fishery (World Bank, 2009). This was delayed until completion of the updated policy statement, though in 2013 and 2014 the project financed the costs to MFMR to synthesize the information on fish stocks available and to inform potential input controls (World Bank and CSRP, 2015a). At the same time, the government completed registration of 100 percent of the canoe fleet with project financing by

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March 2014, (though World Bank reports note that the painted used by MFMR to mark the canoes was not durable, so a transition to using metal registration plates was undertaken) (World Bank and CSRP, 2015a).

The project included finance for the introduction of management rights for defined ocean areas adjacent to the coast, in four pilot sites where co-management associations

(CMAs) of fishers were envisaged to be established (World Bank, 2009). In 2011

MFMR staff (i.e. extension agents) began working with communities around these four areas to form CMAs, and identify new harvesting rules (World Bank and CSRP,

2014b). By the end of 2013, 31 CMAs had been established and 15 legally recognized by the state (i.e. registered with District Councils) (World Bank and CSRP, 2014b). At this time, an independent analysis of progress was carried out by MFMR via project financing, via interviews with the extension agents and with community focus groups

(World Bank and CSRP, 2014b). According to that assessment, the creation of four zones where communities through CMAs could exercise management rights had given greater voice to residents and shown ‘encouraging trends’ for the governance of these fisheries (World Bank and CSRP, 2014b). The report cited one case in Bonthe as an example, where a CMA proposed a gear restriction, i.e. a minimum mesh size for fishing nets allowed for use in the waters under CMA management, resulting in the confiscation and destruction of illegal nets (World Bank and CSRP, 2014b). At the same time, in early 2014 the demarcation of the zones for CMA management was not yet agreed with all communities and completed (World Bank and CSRP, 2014b).

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In terms of efforts to enhance agency capacity for surveillance and enforcement, project-financed activities focused on compliance with the rule in the 1994 Fisheries

Act prohibiting trawling in the coastal waters within 6 miles of the coast (World Bank,

2009). During preparation, the Government introduced a new organizational structure to deliver surveillance operations for the fisheries, an inter-agency committee formed via a memorandum of understanding, the Joint Maritime Committee (JMC), which included MFMR, the Maritime Wing and the President’s Office of National Security, among others (World Bank, 2009). In late 2010 after project funds started to flow, the

JMC helped coordinate increased sea patrols using existing equipment, and began to record a number of arrests, reporting a drop in illegal trawling in the coastal zone

(World Bank and CSRP, 2014b). According to World Bank reports, in the second half of 2011 the JMC conducted 10 patrols leading to 5 arrests for a total of $383,000 in fines paid to the Government (World Bank and CSRP, 2012).14

In early 2012 the Government of the Isle of Man donated a patrol vessel to the government’s Maritime Wing to support JMC fisheries surveillance operations (World

Bank and CSRP, 2014b). The Government of the Isle of Man also supported MFMR to subsidize the purchase of 60 satellite transponders for all licensed industrial vessels, so that a functioning, satellite-based vessel monitoring system (VMS) was in place for all industrial vessels, and tracked at the JMC (World Bank and CSRP, 2014b). By the mid-term review in early 2013, the World Bank documented reports of increased

14 $80,000 from US Coast Guard arrests, $125,000 Ocean 3, $10,000 from Poyu 616, $158,000 Marampa

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artisanal fish catch and fishing effort in the communities of Goderich, Konakree dee and Tombo, and suggested a causal connection with the reduction in illegal trawling in the coastal fishing grounds (World Bank and CSRP, 2013). The World Bank trip reports record discussions held with community members stating that they no longer feared damage to fishing nets and gear as a result of collisions with industrial trawl vessels in the coastal waters, and that they had seen an increase in their fish catch

(World Bank and CSRP, 2013).

At the same time, although the Government of the United Kingdom provided hands-on training to JMC staff early in the project, training needs continued throughout the project and in some cases were reportedly not filled (World Bank and CSRP, 2014b).

The project continued to finance investments to enhance the JMC’s fisheries monitoring center, for example in expanded internet access (World Bank and CSRP,

2014b). In July 2014, reports indicated that MFMR had issued six licenses permitting trawling in the prohibited coastal zone, in contradiction to the 1994 Act (CSRP, 2015).

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(Source: CSRP, 2015)

Figure 32. % of known industrial fishing vessels operating in Liberia and Sierra Leone's waters, sighted as committing a rule infraction (trawling < 6 miles from shore)

Outputs. Table 30 summarizes the outputs from project investments in reform, assumed to lead to changes in fishing effort, and subsequently changes in biomass of the stocks and eventually catch rates and resource rent (per the conceptual framework in Chapter

Three). According to the key indicators of success in the project document, the objective of phase one has been partially achieved, notably the indicators for enhanced surveillance and enforcement of harvesting rules (CSRP, 2015). In three of the four countries, the project led to the establishment of inter-agency collaboration for enhanced fisheries surveillance, and in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone formal committees based on a memorandum of understanding and operating from functioning fisheries monitoring centers (CSRP, 2015). Across the program, industrial fishing fleets in coastal fishery systems were incorporated into a satellite-based vessel

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monitoring system (VMS) for the first time, linked even to smart phones in the case of

Cape Verde, or with pilots in smart phone applications to photograph illegal trawling in Liberia (CSRP, 2015). Although only one of the four countries hit the final targets for increased annual sea and aerial surveillance patrols, Cape Verde is on an upwards trend and expected to so by the end of the project, while Liberia significantly increased patrolling from the baseline (from 0 in 2009 to over 100 patrols per annum in 2013), though this decreased significantly in 2014 with the ebola outbreak (CSRP, 2015). The results of these efforts, as measured by the key performance indicator for reducing the rate of coastal illegal fishing, are: three of the four countries have fully or almost met the target (e.g. Cape Verde at 25% instead of 20%) (CSRP, 2015). The final measurement for Liberia at 90 percent could be an outlier, and reflects challenges in selecting an indicator for reductions in illegal fishing which by nature is difficult to detect - where the percentage of infractions among the known (i.e. observed) fleet may be high, even though the absolute value of infractions in the country’s waters has significantly decreased (i.e. from 250 at the baseline in Liberia, to 1 in 2012 and 9 in

2014) (CSRP, 2015).

For example in Liberia, over the life of the project the Government arrested or fined 48 fishing vessels for a total of over $6.2 million, while the indicator on the rate of illegal coastal fishing dropped from 83% at baseline to 20% in 2012, before rising again in

2014 per the previous paragraph (World Bank and CSRP, 2014b). In parallel to similar efforts in Sierra Leone, large fishing communities such as Tombo reported a 42% increase in landings (World Bank, 2014a). Similarly, World Bank reports noted that beginning in 2011, Liberian coastal communities experienced a change in fish

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availability with the sizes of all fish landed increasing and the overall volumes of fish caught more than double the levels in 2009 when the project began, according to sampling on fish landings carried out by the Community Sciences Program15 (World

Bank and CSRP, 2015a). A World Bank trip report records a statement by representatives of the Co-Management Association in Robertsport that there were far fewer incidents of illegal coastal trawling, and fish catch and revenues were increasing

(World Bank and CSRP, 2015c). The report noted that some incursions by trawl vessels into the prohibited coastal zone were still occurring at the borders, near the southern border at the town of Harper and the northern border at the town of Taylor (World Bank and CSRP, 2015c).

Additionally, in Cape Verde and Liberia a new policy statement was adopted by the government in 2014 and 2015 respectively (World Bank and CSRP, 2015b; World

Bank and CSRP, 2015b). In all four countries the governments met the targets for registration of 100 percent of fishing canoes (with the exception of a fraction of the

Senegalese fleet fishing outside the country’s waters), registering a total of over 37,000 canoes across the four countries (CSRP, 2015). After restructuring, additional intermediate outcome targets were set in Senegal for national input controls on the registered canoe fleet via fishing licenses, but these targets had not been met and allocation of licenses reportedly scheduled for 2016 (CSRP, 2015). Lastly, a regional

‘dashboard’ for public disclosure of information on fishing licenses and public

15 See: http://www.communitysciences.org/

318

revenues is under construction and expected to be completed by the close of the project

(CSRP, 2015).

The project’s targets for reduced fishing vessels (as a proxy for effort) via project- financed Government compensation in Cape Verde and Senegal, were not achieved

(CSRP, 2015). Such reductions were not introduced until a new input control was formalized freezing the size of the fleet in 2014 in Cape Verde, after which some 69 fishers received grants or subsidized loans in order to start new enterprises outside of the fisheries sector (World Bank and CSRP, 2015b). In Senegal, a rule freezing access to new industrial trawl vessels was in place at the start of the project, however no public

‘buy-backs’ of vessels occurred (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d).

In terms of community management rights, the state in Senegal has recognized such rights in 9 communities (out of the 15 targeted), while Cape Verde is expected to meet the target by the end of 2016 and recognize two communities (CSRP, 2015). In all of these cases, stakeholders have been recognized with resource management rights by the state, though not the right of exclusion. In Senegal where these rights have been exercised over the longest time period, communities have reported a 133% increase in catch efficiency (World Bank, 2012b). Additionally, in conjunction with support for community management rights in Senegal, after restructuring the project supported commercial micro-finance specifically for fishers in targeted communities to undertake alternative livelihoods (World Bank and CSRP, 2015d). This intermediate outcome

319

target has been met, with a repayment rate of 97% to date (World Bank and CSRP,

2015d).

320

Table 30. Summary of WARFP-financed outputs recorded vs. targets

Target vs. Actual Values

Indicators Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 from 2009 Project Baseli Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Targe Actual Document ne t

Territorial Use Cape 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 At 016 Rights Verde least 2 Fisheries 321 (TURFs) Liberia 0 0 1 1 At 117 legally least 1 established for coastal Senegal 8 4 8 4 At 818 fisheries least 8 (number)

Sierra 0 0 0 0 At 019 Leone least 4

16 Four pilot communities have been identified in Sal and Miao Islands; Diagnostic analysis of the communities has been conducted and validated by the communities; Co-management structures that constitute the leaders are being formed; and stakeholders in Maio and Sal are being trained on co-management. The process is expected to be close to legal establishment by end of 2015. 17 One TURF has been established constituting a cluster of 15 coastal communities in the Cape Mount County; Implementation was derailed due to the Ebola crisis. CMA Work plan and budget for 2014/2015 has been approved by the National Assembly of the Robertsport CMA; The Robertsport CMA now collects registration and licence fees from the fishermen onbehalf of the BNF; BNF has acquired legal fishing netting material for the net exchange program; the exchange is scheduled in some time in 2015. 18 By end of 2014/early 2015 TURF management has been legally established in eight (8) co-management sites by Ministrial Orders and their management areas have been demarcated (Ouakam, Ngaparu, Foundioune, Betenty, Soumbédioune, Bargny, Yenne and Fimela); Implementation of Co-management work plans or strategy to render these communities an effective and sustainable TURFs is underway. 19 Four sites (Yawry Bay, Sherbro River, Scarcies Rivers and Sierra Leone River) have been declared in 2012 as ‘marine protected areas’ by the state; No TURF has been established, however, 14 Co- management Associations (9 in the Sherbro River Estuary and 5 in the Yawry Bay) have been legally registered with local and central government and co-management areas demarcated; CMA members with MFMR outstation personnel have conducted study tour in co-management sites in Senegal for experience sharing;

Fishing Cape 42%20 42 42 42 14%21 30%, but 4%22 25 35% 20 25% total: vessels Verde baseline (Semi- 3% (Semi- observed by measurement indust) industrial), aerial/surface is and 65% 29% patrol or by confirmed/refi (for (Canoes)24 radar and ned canoes) satellite 23

322 monitoring, Liberia 83%25 83% 45.4%26 83% 50%27 66%, but 20%28 50% 57%29 33% 90%30 that are baseline

committing a (% of all measurement serious known is confirmed/ infraction (% industrial refined of total vessels number of targeting vessels the known/observ coastal ed) demersal

20 Using 2000 EU reporting data. 21 For available data in 2011, three industrial vessels targeting coastal species were observed committing infraction. 21 vessels out of 109 vessels were licensed to target coastal species 22 Based on the available data for 2012, 5 industrial fishing vessels that committed infractions were recorded; a total of 126 fishing vessels were licensed; the surveillance record needs to be further confirmed. 23 For 2013, 31 Semi-industrials vessels committed infraction out of 103 registered; 1014 canoes were found committing infraction out of 1539 canoes registered. 24 12 Semi-industrials vessels committed infraction out of 403 registered; 543 canoes were found committing infraction out of 1862 canoes registered; Two coastal surveillance stations have been constructed and equipped with communication devices in Maio and Sal Islands. 25 For last data year available, 2007, there were 50 licensed vessels, and close to 250 different vessels were observed fishing without a license by UNMIL flights, in the coastal zone. Total known industrial fishing vessels was thus 300, at least 250 of which were fishing without a license, for a minimum value of 83% serious infractions observed per every known industrial fishing vessel (inclusion of infraction to the Inshore Exclusion Zone would increase this value). 26 From February to July 2011, 5 vessels without license were sighted during UNMIL flights. Total number of licensed vessels for 2011 is 6 as of August 2011. 27 From February to December 2011, 7 vessels without a license were sighted during UNMIL flights. Total number of licensed vessels as of December 2011 was 7, but 1 vessel was expelled. 28 For the year 2012, one industrial fishing vessel targeting coastal demersal was found committing infraction with a total of 4 licensed industrial fishing vessels; however, based on international intelligence on illegal fishing in Liberia, a total of 40 tuna vessels were sighted fishing illegally. The Government of Liberia has received 3.5 million US$ as fine for 33 tuna vessels out of the group. 29 For 2013, 7 vessels were sighted committing serious fishing infractions, 4 industrial fishing vessels had a license. 30 In 2014, Nine (9) fishing vessels were sighted via AIS live and VMS exhibiting activities consistent with illegal fishing in the EEZ of Liberia; there was only one licensed industrial vessel during this period. The Ebola crisis in the country might have largely contributed to this increase. However, it should be noted that the overall illegal fishing activities in the inshore waters (6 miles) of Liberia has drastically reduced as compared to before the project when industrial trawlers were constantly trawling in the inshore waters. Limited fisheries sea borne patrols and aerial patrols were conducted; this was complemented by the VMS and AIS monitoring. A sub-committee on MCs has been established as part of the mandate of CMA in Robsport to support community surveillance along the north west zone.

& shrimp fisheries observed fishing without a license)

Senegal 30% 30% 30% 70% 31 65% 33% 32 65% 86%33 95% 60%34

(% of all

323 known small-

scale vessels that have a permit)

Sierra 88%35 88% 88% 24%36 66%, but 33% 37 66% 24%38 44% N/A39 Leone baseline measurement (% of all is confirmed/ licensed refined industrial

31 In December 2011, 84% of all small-scale vessels were known to be registered; information on the number of canoes with permits was not available. 32 Based on the available data for 2012, 7 industrial fishing vessels were arrested for committing infractions; 33 VMS violations (Vessels that put-off their transponders for 24 hours) were recorded with a total of 120 licensed industrial vessels. 33 For 2013 available data, total of 21,806 canoes have been identified, with 487 canoes operating in neighboring countries (Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Guinea); therefore out of the 21,319 canoes that operated in Senegal’s EEZ only 3,166 canoes had permit to fish. 34 As at May 2015, only 25% of small-scale vessels have taken license for 2015. A total of 251 patrol days have been conducted in the coastal waters as at May 31, 2015, 35 For last year data available, 2001, there were 35 zone infractions recorded, with a total of 40 licensed industrial vessels. 36For year 2011, there were 23 physical zone refractions recorded, with a total of 95 licensed industrial vessels. The baseline data ( 2009) needs to be clarified, surveillance data for 2009 indicated that 17 vessels were arrested with 92 vessels having licenses 37 Based on the available data for 2012, 7 industrial fishing vessels were arrested for committing infractions; 33 VMS violations (Vessels that put-off their transponders for 24 hours) were recorded with a total of 120 licensed industrial vessels. 38 Based on 2013 surveillance report from JMC, 16 IEZ infractions were recorded, with a total of 68 licensed industrial vessels targeting demersal resources 39 In July 2014, the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources authorized six industrial fishing vessels to fish in the inshore zone prohibited for trawling, and data was not collected.

vessels observed fishing within 6- mile IEZ)

Cape 0 0 0 0 0 Draft Policies 0 Draft 0 Polici Yes: Policy Clear Verde completed and Policies es approved; principles and under completed adopte Legal policies are consultations and under d in framework established to consultatio each under increase the ns countr revision40 wealth from y fisheries Liberia New New New Draft Yes: Policy 324 through regulatio regulatio regulatio policy developed ns ns ns prepared and

strengthened rights and enacted enacted enacted approved41 equitable Senegal 0 0 0 Draft Yes: allocation of under Fisheries these rights consultati Code passed which on by General balances Assembly economic into Law efficiency and Sierra 0 0 0 Draft No: Draft social Leone document documents benefits. (Yes s prepared under / No)

40 Policy has been approved; Key fish stocks of small pelagic, demersal and red lobsters have been evaluated in 2012 and updated in 2014. Key fish stock have also been evaluated using bioeconomic model in 2015; Fisheries management plan (2004 - 2014) has been revised, the Plan for 2016-2020 is under preparation and it is due to complete by Sept. 2015; Strategic Development Plan for the fisheries sector has been developed, approved and its implementation is underway; The Legal, Management and Institutional frameworks is under review and it is scheduled to complete in Sept. 2015. The Legislation will take into account co-management and right fishing. 41 The Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy has been developed, awaiting approval by the Cabinet in June sitting; Draft Fisheries Act has been prepared and reviewed by the Bank, BNF/WARFP and the Law reform Commission. NFDS consultancy to complete the draft Act by July 2015. MRAG is conducting stock assessment of key fish stocks in Liberia. A second round of data collection on catch and effort, length frequency was completed in August 2014. Analysis is on going by MRAG.

consultation 42 Cape 50% 50% 0% 50% 0% 75% 80% 75% 100% 100% 100%43 Small-scale Verde fishing vessels in targeted fisheries that Liberia 0% 0% 0% 80% 50% 100% 75% 100% 100% 100%44 are registered (% of total) Senegal 60% 90% 100% 88% 100% 85% 100% 88% 100% 88%45

Sierra 0% 0% 0 0% 0 50% 80% 75% 85% 100% 100%46 Leone

325

Registered Senegal N/A 30% N/A N/A N/A 60% 35% 100% 35% 100% 40% small-scale fishing vessels that are allocated and enforced with current general fishing permit

42 Management and Functional Review (MFR) has been approved by Cabinet; The Ministry (MFMR) technical committee has aligned the draft Fisheries and Aquaculture Bill with the MFR recommendations; The Fisheries Policy and Strategy documents produced by a consultancy firm, IDDRA, has been updated and submitted to NEPAD Governance working group to finalize; Fisheries Regulation revised waiting to be enacted; Technical report of MFMR on the Fisheries Bill has been submitted to IDDRA to finalize it. 43 Registration and marking of all industrial/semi-industrial vessels and small-scale fishing canoes has been completed and records stored in a Web-based Database (Registry). A total of 1,588 small scale canoes and 146 semi industrial vessels have been recorded in the database . It should be noted that this figures have increased by 34% since 2013 when the total registered vessels was 1,136 small canoes and 80 semi-industrial. 44 All artisanal and semi-industrial fishing vessels have been registered and embossed (4,073) and data stored in the National Registry (Database for Vessel Registration Database). Liberia Artisanal Fishermen Association (LAFA) participated in the embossement exercise of registered vessels in some communities. 45 90% of all small-scale fishing vessels identified have been registered as of 2015; and records stored in the National Database for Vessel Registration (PNI). 61% of registered canoes have been marked. The reliability of the PNI has been questioned; hence records on the exact number of fishing canoes operating is not known at this moment. Inconsistency exists between the PNI record (21, 910 canoes) and Records from regional stations (15, 271 canoes). The DPM is currently using the regional records on registered vessels . 46 All small-scale vessels (10,500) have been registered and records stored in the database for vessel registration; A total 22,000 plastic number plates have been procured to mark the vessel. The marking exercise did not go ahead due to the Ebola crisis.

(% of total) 47 Registered Senegal N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 50% 0%49 small-scale fishing vessels that are allocated and enforced with defined and specified individual fishing/access

326 rights (specified and

legally recognized fishing license for small- scale fisheries) (% of total) 48 Communities Cape 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 050 that are Verde allocated

47 Added at restructuring. As of 2012 baseline, the Government had allocated fishing permits to small-scale fishermen but without any specification about the targeted species, fishing area, and fishing period. So the first step towards the allocation of clear fishing rights (via specified fishing license) was considered to be to allocate the current fishing permits to all the fishermen in the fleet and then the next step was considered to be the replacement of this permits with the introduction and allocation of specified and legally recognized fishing license for small-scale fisheries as form of clear fishing rights. The objective was to allocate clear, specified, long-term fishing rights through this more specified fishing license to limit the access to the fisheries. 48 As per footnote above, this indicator was added at restructuring, to record if specified and legally recognized fishing licenses had been substituted for the current fishing permits in order to allocate clear fishing rights to fishermen/communities. 49 New proposal for a new fishing license is under stakeholder consultations. The final approval of the new license will be done by end of 2015 so that it will be implemented in 2016. 50 Four pilot communities have been identified in Sal and Miao Islands and diagnostic analysis has been conducted; Co-management Associations have officially been created, and community members in Sal and Maio Islands have conducted a study tour to co-management sites in Dakar to share experience; Community leaders have been identified and trained on co-mangement concept. With the guidiance of the consultant, the community animators and the community leaders have embarked on massive community sensitization on co-management processes; Preparation of Co- management Agreements for the pilot communities is scheduled for Sept/Oct. 2015.

fishing rights Liberia 0 2 0 2 151 (number) Senegal 4 4 4 12 453 52

Sierra 0 10 0 15 10?54 Leone

Cape 0 0 0 25 0 25 0 50 0 50 056 327 Vessels Verde reduced in

targeted fisheries that (small- are scale overexploited vessels – (number per or year) reduction in number of fishers equivale nt to

51 A Co-Management Association (CMA) has been established in Robertsport that comprises a cluster of 15 fishing villages; The Robertsport CMA has signed Co-Management Agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture to operate right-based fishing management. The CMA has collected an amount of LD$323,250 onbehalf of BNF as registration and licensing fees for semi-industrial and artisanal fishing canoes. The CMAs General Assembly has approved the 2014/2015 Work Plan and Budget. Legal fishing nets and accessories have been procured and delivered to Robertsport for the CMA net exchange program. The construction of the Robertsport Community Fisheries Centre is more than 30% complete now. This activity was significantly delayed by the Ebola crisis, as contractors left the site for few months. 52 Targets revised at restructuring. 53 A local fisher committee has been legally established in eight (8) Co-management sites (Ouakam, Ngaparu, Foundiougne, Bétenty, Soumbédioune, Bargny, Yenne, Fimela-Ndangane); the State has allocated management rights to these associations for defined management areas; Strategic plans to implement the TURF in order to render the management effective and sustainable are underway; Four new sites have identified (Mballing, Nianing, Pointe-Sarène and Mbodiène), and the process to confer management rights to them is underway. 54 Four (4) MPA sites (Yawry Bay, sherbro River, Scarcies Rivers and Sierra Leone River) have been declared in 2012. 31 CMAs with elected executives have been established, 15 of the CMAs have constitutions and byelaws and have legally registered with their Local Councils; Some CMAs have legally registered with Ministry of Social Welfare. GIS experts has delineated the co-management areas in the MPA sites;Capacity building of stakeholders on co-management concept is ongoing. Members of CMAs and Outstation Fisheries Officers has conducted study tour to Co-management sites in Senegal. 56 A Ministrial Order was issued in January 2015 to regulate the number of authorized vessels to be registered according to type of fishing gear and per island ; it is being implemented since March 2015; 23 fishing units constituting 60 fishermen from Sal and Maio fishing communities have opted to leave fishing for alternative activities outside the fisheries sector; With technical assistance from the national enterprise, SIDEL Consulting, 23 micro-projects have been submitted by owners of small-scale boats in Sal and Maio; With No Objection from the World Bank, a total of US$300,000 Micro-Credit Fund will be in effect from June 2015 to finance the 23 projects. Professional training program that was previously developed will be implemented in June 2015.

targets for vessels) 55

Liberia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Senegal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 058

(licensed industrial trawlers) 57

328 Sierra N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Leone

Percentage of Senegal N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 25% 0 40% >55%60 alternative livelihoods undertaken by artisanal fishers and members of crew from industrial vessel receiving micro finance

55 Based on estimates of roughly 3 fishers per small-scale vessel, i.e. a total of 4,000 small-scale fishers and roughly 1,250 small-scale vessels for most recent data available. 57 Targets revised at restructuring. 58 By 2014, ten industrial vessels should have moved out from the fisheries. No fishing vessel has left the targeted fisheries. Independent auditors identified two fishing vessels in 2013 and the negotiation for buy-back was faced with some roadblock, as the proposed cost for the two vessels is much higher than the current values of the vessels. The vessels are dilapidated/write-off. 60 In 2015, the measurement is 95%. The Government of Senegal had issued a Directives to freeze the registration of new fishing canoes for marine fisheries in August, 2012. A Strategy document to implement the Directive has been adopted in October 2014. Implementation of the strategy is underway; A Micro-credit Institute, CMS has financed 304 micro-projects out of 556 micro-projects received, which includes 16% of reconversion and 84% of women’s entrepreneurial micro-projects; Rate of repayment of credit estimated as 97%.

access and small- enterprise training from the project, sustained profitably59 Total patrol Cape 70 70 70 62 sea 100 4 aerial 100 41 150 6361 days at sea per Verde patrols patrol; year in 47 sea targeted patrol fisheries Liberia 0 0 4 flight 0 45 patrol 50 48 patrol 50 103 100 30 patrol (number of patrol days (24 days (27 patrol days (17 sea

329 total patrol days62 aerial, 21 aerial, 21 days (88 patrol days days/year) at sea) at sea) sea and 13 patrol aerial days and patrols) 15 aerial patrol days) Senegal 200 200 200 178 sea 275 275 616 sea 400 452 patrol patrol patrol days65 (# total days days64, 1 patrol aerial days/yr patrol in coastal

59 Indicator added at Restructuring. 61 Although total patrol days are still below the target values, they are expected to be increased shortly when the 2 vessels (‘vedettes’) become fully operational at the two coastal stations. A team constituting a fisher from the co-management association and a fisheries Inspector from the Directorate General for Maritime Resources, have been assigned to the vedettes to be trained by the Coast Guard. A project total of 129 land patrol days were conducted as of end of May 2015. 62 Flight patrols from March to July 2011. 64 For 2013, the Department of fisheries protection’s surveillance boat conducted 296 sea patrol days and the local community brigade conducted 320 participatory sea patrol days. 65 In 2015, a total of 251 patrol days have been conducted as at end of May (56 MCS patrols and 195 Participative patrols); 117 industrial fishing vessels were inspected with one arrested; 2,534 canoes were inspected and 166 canoes were arrested.

waters63 )

Sierra 348 348 180 days 348 228 sea 500 233 sea 500 309 sea 696 200 sea Leone patrol patrol patrol patrol days days days days66 A satellite- Cape No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes67 based fishing Verde vessel monitoring Liberia No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes68 system (VMS) is in place and 330 Senegal Yes, Yes, but Yes with Yes, but Yes with Yes Yes with Yes Yes with Yes Yes with no functioning but without no link without no link no link no link to link to

(Yes / No) withou link to to AIS link to to AIS to AIS AIS AIS70 t link Automatic Automatic to Identificati Identificati AIS69 on System on System (AIS) (AIS) Sierra No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes71 Leone

63 Includes surveillance of both industrial and small-scale fisheries. 66 Limited sea patrols were conducted at the forward operating bases (FOB); Community surveillance has not started yet Construction of new fisheries patrol boat has been completed awaiting to be delivered. 67 VMS system has been established and operational with 80% coverage (60 industrial vessels now have VMS transponders); the Coastal surveillance stations in Maio and Sal Islands have been completed, and operational, including two speed boats that will be used for participatory surveillance in the co-management sites; National partners such as the Coastguard, Institute of Maritime Ports are committed and better equipped now through WARFP support for fisheries surveillance. 68 The MCS center is established, equipped with communication gadgets including VMS and AIS. 69 Automatic Identification System 70 The VMS and the AIS are functioning well now. 71 The MCS center is established, equipped with communication instruments; VMS transponders installed on all licensed industrial fishing vessels.

Regional CSRP No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No72 database and ‘dashboard’ of key environmental , economic and social fisheries statistics established at CSRP (Yes/No) Community All No No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No73 monitoring of local site 331 conditions (environmenta l conditions, in-shore hygiene, water quality and possible climate change assessments) underway in TURFs (Yes / No) Source: CSRP, 2015

72 The firm recruited by the CSRP to prepare the ‘dashboard’ has visited participating countries to review their database and validate the indicators they approved in 2013; The countries have validated the indicators and the proposed architecture of the Dasboard in a regional meeting held Dakar, Senegal in February, 2015. The firm is now validating national dashboards and reporting formats with countries; The CSRP has acquired licences from the IBM for an application, Cognos to be used in the Dashboard; The firm has submitted to the CSRP the list of equipment needed in each country with specifications and a quality assurance plan, which the CSRP has validated; 73 The Robertsport CMA in Liberia is conducting community monitoring of local sites through a community science program; The other participating countries are now begining to the monitoring program.

Associated outcomes. The ex ante cost-benefit analysis of the expected changes in

NPV of resource rents generated from the coastal demersal fishery systems as a result of envisaged governance reforms are shown in Table 33 below.

Table 31. Estimated NPV of changes in resource rent between 2010 and 2015 as a result of governance reforms (US$ millions)

Cape Verde Liberia Senegal Sierra Leone Total NPV of resource rent* 5.0*** 13.4 8.6 28.8 55.8 NPV of resource rent** 2.8 9.0 8.3 18.5 38.6 Total 2.8 – 5.0 9.0 – 13.4 8.3 – 8.6 18.5 – 28.8 38.6 – 55.8 * Considers no opportunity cost to labor, wages fully included in rent; ** Considers wages to labor as a cost, not included in rent; *** Includes rent from small pelagic systems; Source: World Bank (2009); Assumptions:  Does not include transfers for compensation of foregone resource rents  Measured at first sale after landing fish catch, do not include enhanced benefits throughout the entire value chain  The baseline rents estimated for coastal demersal fisheries systems were negative in Cape Verde and Senegal, just above zero in Liberia, and positive in Sierra Leone (at roughly 5% of gross revenues from first sale) (World Bank, 2009).  Ex-ante estimates assumed: (i) a 33% reduction in small-scale fishing effort in Cape Verde; (ii) a full reduction in trawling within 6 miles of the coast in Liberia and Sierra Leone (in the latter case coupled with a one to two-year closure of the shrimp fishery); and (iii) in Senegal a 50% reduction in coastal trawling activity and a freeze on small- scale coastal demersal fishing effort.

To date, the project has been extended in the countries until the end of 2015 and data have not yet been collected on current costs, yields and estimated rents for the fleets operating in the coastal demersal fishery systems of each of the four countries. Landing data from the canoe fishery is available for the community of Tombo (one of the largest landing sites for small-scale vessels in Sierra Leone) for 2008 and a period of three months in 2013, while trends in the number of vessels and total catch are available in the industrial fisheries. However, data was not systematically collected on outcome measures from each of the targeted SESs. This is illustrated in Table 32 below, which uses the the fisheries governance classification system proposed in Chapter Three in order to provides a summary of available information on proposed indicators for these

332

SESs, including for governance reforms – where data on a number of outcome measures is missing:

333

Table 32. Summary of Indicators for Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms Supported in the WARFP

Cape Verde Liberia Senegal Sierra Leone Ecological Sub-System Narrow continental shelf, with a Liberia has a coastline of some Coastal demersal fishing takes Coastal demersal fishing takes Clarity and size of system total estimated area of only 5,394 590km, a relatively narrow shelf places in the waters above the place over the shelf area of some km2 (down to depths of 200m), with an average width of 31km, relatively narrow area of shallow 27,000 square kilometers, with boundaries but the eastern islands Sal, and total Economic Exclusion continental shelf (approximately the shelf somewhat wider in the Boavista, and Maio, form a more Zone (EEZ) of around half of the 27,600 square north. extensive continental shelf 18,400km2. The shelf is slightly kilometers of continental shelf system. No true coral reefs exist narrower in northern waters and are at depths greater than 100 in the Cape Verde Archipelago, rather broader in the south, meters), along the country’s but there are a number of sites where it virtually provides the roughly 1,300 kilometers of with rich coral communities. starting point for the Gulf of coastline. Shelf conditions are Guinea. Unlike the coastal characterized by predominantly regions to the north such as sandy bottoms with rocky Sierra Leone and Guinea, outcrops of volcanic rock. Liberia is not affected by the Waters around the Cape Verde upwelling effects of the Canary 334 Islands are generally Current, which therefore limits

characterized by a much lower its productivity, although it does primary productivity compared receive heavy seasonal to the upwelling areas of the discharges from the numerous West African coast. rivers and their estuaries; these provide productive conditions for penaeid shrimp fisheries.

Number and diversity of Over 30% of harvests were a Coastal demersal fisheries target Multi-species harvests of some Coastal demersal fisheries target targeted fish stocks grouper species (Cephalopholis multiple species, including from 100 individual stocks of shrimp, multiples species, including from taeniops), also coastal and deep stocks of Grunts (Haemulidae), cuttlefish, octopus, croakers, stocks of croakers, sea breams, sea lobsters Croakers, Seabreams such as breams, groupers, threadfins, groupers and snappers, and Dentex congoensis (Congo soles from the ecological sub- shrimp, among others. dentex) and Dentex angolensis system, usually harvested at (Angolan dentex), Groupers and depths between 30 to 60 meters – Snappers, and shrimp, among most do not migrate and spend others their life cycle within Senegalese waters. Growth rates of targeted fish Extremely variable, though key Extremely variable, though key Extremely variable, though key Extremely variable, though key stock(s) species have relatively slow species have relatively slow species have relatively slow species have relatively slow rates rates rates rates Governance Reforms Articulation of a new national Articulation of a new national Development of new policy Finalize articulation of a Policies policy statement for ocean policy statement for ocean objectives (and accompanying national policy review fishery systems, specifically a fishery systems, together with a regulations) for coastal demersal mid-term evaluation of the new law to formalize principles fish stocks implementation of the Fisheries and objectives Sector Management Plan 2004 –

335 2014, and then development of Development of new policy

any necessary revisions to the objectives for the coastal Plan demersal fisheries Rules Community management rights Input controls for industrial Community management rights Development of regulations for over adjacent areas of the sea vessels over adjacent areas of the sea input controls for industrial (resulting in the introduction of (resulting in the introduction of a trawl fisheries (outsides the 6- a range of technical measures, Community management rights range of technical measures, mile coastal zone) including gear restrictions, over adjacent areas of the sea in including gear restrictions, closed areas, etc.) in two pilot one to two pilot areas (resulting closed areas, etc.) in 12 pilot sites Community management rights areas in the introduction of a range of in four pilot areas technical measures, including gear restrictions, closed areas, etc.)

Organizations Enhanced national agency Enhanced national agency Enhanced national agency Enhanced national agency capacity and activities for capacity and activities for capacity and activities for capacity and activities for administration of rules for administration of rules for administration of rules for administration of rules for tenure, including enhanced tenure, including enhanced tenure, including enhanced tenure, including enhanced transparency in the licensing of transparency in the licensing of transparency in the licensing of transparency in the licensing of access for industrial vessels, access for industrial vessels, access for industrial vessels, access for industrial vessels, increased communication and increased communication and increased communication and increased communication and dialogue with resource users and dialogue with resource users and dialogue with resource users and dialogue with resource users and communities, increased communities, increased communities, increased communities, increased registration of fishing vessels registration of fishing vessels registration of fishing vessels registration of fishing vessels

Increased research, assessment Increased research, assessment Increased research, assessment Increased research, assessment and monitoring in order to and monitoring in order to and monitoring in order to and monitoring in order to expand the information base expand the information base expand the information base expand the information base required for reform, including required for reform, including required for reform, including required for reform, including stock assessments for coastal working with a university to working with the oceanic training and technical assistance demersal species build a research program and research center (CRODT) to in analysis of key fisheries conduct resource assessments synthesize data on stock status statistics Enhanced national agency

336 surveillance and enforcement of Enhanced national agency Enhanced national agency Enhanced national agency

existing rules (including surveillance and enforcement of surveillance and enforcement of surveillance and enforcement of expanded sea and aerial patrols, existing rules (including existing rules (coastal existing rules (including increased training, construction expanded sea and aerial patrols, surveillance stations) expanded sea and aerial patrols, of two surveillance outposts) increased training, observers on increased training, observers on industrial vessels, establishment National agency extension industrial vessels, establishment Extension by national fisheries of a satellite-based fishing of a satellite-based fishing agency vessel monitoring system, linked Local government surveillance vessel monitoring system, linked to a fisheries monitoring center, support to communities to a fisheries monitoring center, two surveillance stations) two surveillance stations)

Extension by national fisheries National agency extension agency, linkage to national surveillance support

Costs over 5 years of Policy formulation/ reform ($0.4 Policy formulation/ reform ($0.5 Development and enactment of Policy formulation/ reform ($0.3 formulating and enacting m) m) rule changes or new rules ($2.3 m) changes to institutions and m) organizations: Development and enactment of Development and enactment of Development and enactment of rule changes or new rules ($0.5 rule changes or new rules ($0.8 Organizational costs to rule changes or new rules ($1.4 m) m) administer, monitor and enforce m) rule changes ($5.5 m) Organizational costs to Organizational costs to Organizational costs to administer, monitor and enforce administer, monitor and enforce administer, monitor and enforce rule changes ($2.6 m) rule changes ($8.1 m) rule changes ($10.8 m) Social Sub-System N/A N/A N/A – large and migratory fleet N/A – large canoe fleet Number of fishers Number and type of fishing N/A N/A Est. 11,000 vessels at baseline, N/A vessels (fleets) number confirmed at over 18,000 before close of project Fishing gear type used Small-scale hook and line, gill Small-scale hook and line, gill Small-scale hook and line, gill Small-scale hook and line, gill nets nets; industrial bottom trawl nets nets; industrial bottom trawl Socio-economic attributes of Varies heavily by island Fishing communities of migrant Coastal fishing communities Coastal communities often with 337 fishers fishers from Ghana, traditional with long history of fishing, but little road access to connect to Kru fishing communities growing urbanization cities towns

Industrial trawl fleets were largely made up of foreign vessels operating as joint ventures with local companies are purchasing access through local agents History of use Fleet growing Migrant small-scale fleets from Senegal is one of the oldest Sierra Leone has a long tradition Ghana fishing for decades, all fishing nations in West Africa, of fishing, and its fishers can be industrial fishing interrupted by and its coastal communities found off the coasts of many conflict and only beginning to have been fishing for centuries, neighboring countries, resume developing a strong culture particularly in Guinea – with the around the activity and at the civil war only reinforcing the time of appraisal contributing as tendency to operate outside the much as 17 percent of the labor country force Dependence on resource Variable, depending upon island High, particularly with high High in coastal communities High in coastal communities unemployment after the conflict

Interactions N/A N/A N/A N/A Fishing effort (by fleet) Fish catch (by targeted Baseline: small-scale – 1,222 Baseline: 4,500 from small-scale Baseline: small-scale – 100,300; Baseline: small-scale – 107,000; stocks) (mt/year) and industrial trawl fleets industrial trawl – 35,000 industrial trawl – 9,000; Est. Potential: industrial shrimp trawl – 1,400 Sandy bottom: 700 – 2,800; Rock Est. aggregate potential: bottoms: 3,000 – 6,500; 130,000 Lobsters: 90 – 115 Outcomes Measured Biomass estimates for individual Biomass estimates for individual Trend had been declining, as Biomass estimates for individual Ecological: biomass of stocks or aggregate unavailable stocks or aggregate unavailable World Bank (2004) reported that stocks or aggregate unavailable. at close of project in 2015. the total biomass of 5 of the targeted stock(s) Most recent measure available most commercially valuable comes from a Fridjtof Nansen species Pandoras (Pagellus survey in 2007 which estimated bellottii), White groupers a biomass of roughly 13,000 (Epinephelus aeneus), Sea tons of demersal finfish and breams (Pagrus cephalopods (shrimp not caeruleostictus), Goatfishes included) (Pseudupeneus prayensis) and

338 Lesser African Threadfins (Galeoides decadactylus)) declined by roughly 75% from 1983 to 1998. Ecological: diversity of N/A N/A N/A N/A animal species and ecological structures Social: efficiency of N/A Baseline: $2.9 m/yr from small- Baseline: $-3.4 m/yr Baseline: $69.7 m annual rent harvesting operations as scale and industrial trawl from small-scale and industrial measured by the PV of trawl; $1.9 m from industrial resource rent shrimp fishery Social: equity measure not N/A N/A N/A N/A yet defined (distribution of changes to the PV of resource rent?) Sources: World Bank, 2004; World Bank, 2007a; World Bank, 2007b; World Bank, 2009; Sea Around Us Project, 2015

Table 32 above illustrates that while this effort to apply a classificatory system for fisheries governance reforms as proposed in Chapter Three is feasible in West Africa, the indicators for the social sub-systems are data poor (e.g. fishing fleets, numbers of fishers, etc.), as well as their interactions with the ecological sub-systems (e.g. fishing effort and catch) and perhaps most importantly system outcome measures (e.g. biomass of targeted stocks, diversity of species and and maintenance of ecological structures,

PV of resource rents, etc.). Incorporating monitoring and measurement of these indicators in future reform efforts would allow the conceptual framework from Chapter

Three to be applied fully in order to associate fisheries governance reforms with changes in ocean fishery SES outcome measures (compared with the counter-factual).

To visualize these reforms graphically in the conceptual framework from Chapter

Three, an example from West Africa is provided in Figure 33 below, specifically the introduction of community management rights in the Senegalese coastal demersal fishery system at Ngaparou.

Figure 33 serves to illustrate the classification of governance reforms and their correlation to changes in fishing effort and outcome measures such as changes in resource rent. While the classificatory system for governance reforms requires relatively little investment in data collection, in the future much more effort will be needed to invest in collection of data on fishing effort changes (e.g. catch per unit of fishing effort in a given SES), and in the changes in resource rent generated (based on

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cost data for fishing fleets and price/revenue data). The aim would be to correlate governance reforms to changes in fishing effort and ecological and social outcomes.

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Fishing Effort** (Shifts in gear, area & Consumer Sub-System timing) Consumer preferences Organization (Dakar, Europe) MPEM Extension begins Policy CLP Rules Technical 2008 Letter of Policy CLP Measures Wholesale & Retail Sub-System Ecological Unit CLP Develops Policy Constituted in Ngaparou Distributors via air freight on Adjacent ocean area ice, groups, companies 3km by 12 km

Processing Sub-System Vertical Change in Horizontal Characteristics Individuals, groups in Dakar Entry Points Policies Rules Organizations MPEM 2008 Technical Measures: Fishers’ Association Lobster stock(s) Local Scale Letter of Sector - 1/3rd area closed (CLP) formed with 341 Policy: objective - 1/3rd area fished assistance of Co-Governance of inclusion of under gear facilitator, legally

Harvest Sub-System communities in restrictions, closed recognized by state, to Collective Choice governance season make rules for fishing Ngaparou Community rd - 1/3 area open in defined ocean area CLP Fleet

Summary of Governance Reforms*

Ecological System Social System

Outcome Measures: Yield Outcome Measures: 2006 baseline: CPUE 1.5 kg/trip  Biological = Bmsy of lobster stock (N/A)  Efficiency = PV of change in resource rent  Ecological = abundance and diversity of 2010 post reform: CPUE 3.5 (N/A) demersal fish species reported to increased kg/trip  Equity to present = No consensus on a multi- dimensional indicator of poverty * Independent Variable; ** Dependent Variable

Figure 33. Example of the conceptual framework for ocean fisheries governance reform in Senegal: introduction of management rights for coastal demersal fisheries in Ngaparou (2005 - 2010)

4.3 Empirical Review of Governance Reforms Undertaken in the Western and Central Pacific Islands

In December 2014 the World Bank’s Board of Directors approved the first of a series of projects to finance ocean fisheries governance reforms in the western and central

Pacific Islands, entitled the ‘Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program’ (World

Bank, 2014b). The Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program (PROP) provides financing for continued investment in governance reforms for the portions of the regional tuna fishery system within countries’ waters (World Bank, 2014b). This section summarizes empirical review of the reforms introduced in the western and central Pacific ocean, in order to further apply the classification system embedded within the conceptual framework described in Chapter Three, and drawing heavily from data available from the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), as well technical reports from the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and materials prepared for the Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program. As with the case in

West Africa, this section provides a (i) description of the historical context for the reforms to be supported from the Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program; and

(ii) using the modified SES framework developed in Chapter Three, analysis of the components of governance reforms and to the extent possible the variables available

(drawing from Chapter Three), and explanation of outcome measures that can be associated with governance reforms.

Description of the historical context for the reforms to be supported by the Pacific

Islands Regional Oceanscape Program (PROP). The Pacific Ocean is endowed with

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some of the world’s largest tuna stocks (ISSF, 2015). As units of analysis, the entire

Pacific Ocean is divided into either (i) the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO)

- covering over 8 percent of the global ocean, or (ii) the Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO), where each contains separate stocks of tuna whose interactions are relatively limited

(Hampton et al., 1999). Tuna is a general term referring to several species of fish, and scientists often categorize some 61 species as ‘tuna and tuna-like fish’, 14 of which are considered ‘true tuna’ (SPC).

The WCPO region contains stocks of four tuna species commercially harvested:

 albacore (Thunnus alalunga), separated into two discrete stocks by the

equatorial area (where they are rare): a northern and a southern component,

long-lived and often caught between 1.5 and 10 years old at a length of 45 to

50 cm, generally in deeper waters with long-lines;

 bigeye (Thunnus obesus), long-lived and among the largest of the world’s tuna

species, bigeye are broadly distributed in the WCPO both horizontally and

vertically in the water column, typically caught either as juveniles (3 months to

1.7 years old) at a length between 20 to 75 cm or between 100 and 180 cm (2

to 10 years old) the latter by long-line;

 skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis), fast-growing and short-lived species (few live

longer than three to four years), surface-schooling species distributed year-

round in warmer, tropical waters, with seasonal expansion into northern and

southern sub-tropical waters, typically caught at a length between 40 to 70 cm;

and

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 yellowfin (Thunnus albacares), fast-growing species distributed throughout

WCPO tropical and sub-equatorial waters, typically spending most of their time

in warmer mixed surface waters and caught either as juveniles (3 months to 1.5

years old) at a length between 20 to 70 cm or between 90 to 160 cm (1.5 and 6

– 7 years old) (SPC, 2015).

These tuna resources of the western and central Pacific collectively form the basis of one of the world’s largest and most valuable fisheries (SPC, 2015). Their movements cover a massive area of the Pacific Ocean, and the fleets that hunt them travel thousands of kilometers to do so.

Much of the western and central Pacific Ocean is under the jurisdiction of low-income

Pacific Island countries who are members of the World Bank, as shown in the Table below.

Table 33. Pacific Ocean under the jurisdiction of World Bank member countries

Country Land Area (sq. km.)* EEZ (sq. km.)** Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) 702 2,992,597 Fiji 18,274 1,281,122 Kiribati 811 3,437,345 Palau 459 604,289 Papua New Guinea (PNG) 462,840 2,396,575 Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) 181 1,992,232 Samoa 2,821 131,812 Solomon Islands 27,986 1,597,492 Tonga 717 664,853 Tuvalu 26 751,797 Vanuatu 12,189 827,891 TOTAL 527,006 16,678,005 * CIA World Factbook; ** Claus et al, 2014; via www.seaaroundus.org

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The economies of these Pacific Island countries (PICs) are significantly influenced by the geography indicated in Table 33 (World Bank, 2014b). Essentially some 9 million people live on thousands of islands covering roughly 40 million square kilometers of the earth’s surface, characterized by remoteness and in many cases classified as ‘fragile states’ (World Bank, 2014b). The percentage of the population living in poverty throughout the region is approximately 20 percent, through the region is diverse: the context in larger Melanesian countries such as Papua New Guinea (PNG), with 6 million people, is very different from that of the more remote Micronesian and

Polynesian countries, which in some cases have populations of less than 10,000 people

(World Bank, 2014b).

Traditional tuna fisheries have provided an important source of food for these populations for centuries (SPC, 2015). However, the region’s modern tuna fisheries date back to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, when Japan gained control of many

German colonial territories in the region (including what is now Palau, FSM, RMI and the Northern Mariana Islands) and began to invest in food production systems (Gillett,

2007). By the 1930s industrial tuna fishing accelerated with 116 pole-and-line vessels based in Japanese territories in the region, and increasingly Japanese long-line vessels fishing in the area (Barclay, 2010). After a pause during World War Two, this activity recommenced in 1952 with Japanese public investment in both distant-water pole-and- line and long-line fleets to enhance food production, generally in Fiji, American Samoa,

Vanuatu, New Caledonia and French Polynesia (Barclay, 2010). The long-line vessels mostly caught albacore for export to canneries in Hawaii and the U.S. mainland during

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this period, while technology continued to develop rapidly (Gillett, 2007). Similarly, the U.S. followed suit with canneries first established in Pago Pago in 1953 (Barclay,

2010). While initially the Japanese pole-and-line operations were limited by the distance achievable from a shore base with live bait, the technology improved and by the 1970s they were fishing as far south as Fiji, and bases were established in PNG

(1970), the Solomon Islands (1971), and Fiji (1976) – many in local joint ventures

(Barclay, 2010). Total production from the pole-and-line fishery would eventually peak in the mid-1980s, just after the onset of the biggest development in industrial tuna fishing: purse seining.

Purse seining was a ‘revolution’ in tuna fishing in the western and central Pacific

(Gillett, 2014). This development began when the California pole-and-line fishery started to re-orient towards purse seine fishing in the 1950s, in response to competition from Japanese fleets (Barclay, 2010). Fueled by public support, new technology and innovation allowed purse seining to be adapted to tropical waters, and by the 1970s efforts were increasing to encourage U.S. purse seining in the region in order to supply the canneries in Pago Pago (Barclay, 2010). However, in the early 1980s a confluence of factors drew more U.S. purse seine vessels to the region, including early successes, difficulties in Mexico and Costa Rica, a new agreement with U.S. trust territories in the region, a strong El Nino event in 1982-83 that reduced catch in the Eastern Pacific, and a public outcry against by-catch of marine mammals in tuna harvests in the Eastern

Pacific, among others (Barclay, 2010). At the same time, Japanese fleets began to transition from pole-and-line to purse seine methods, which could generate much

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greater volumes (Barclay, 2010). The results have been dramatic: purse seine fishing caught some 100,000 metric tons in the region in 1980, growing to over 1.8 million metric tons per year in 2013 and now an estimated 2 million metric tons in 2014 (SPC,

2015; Williams and Terawasi, 2015).

To summarize these various fishing methods and gears used in the WCPO tuna fishery’s social sub-system, the four stocks of tuna are hunted by industrial fishing vessels with sophisticated technology, which include:

 Industrial purse-seine operations capturing multiple species but largely

targeting skipjack (70 – 85 percent of total catch) and yellowfin (15 – 30

percent), where a fishing vessel sets a net in a circle around a school of tuna by

first releasing one end attached to a buoy or skiff, and then releasing more of

the net as the vessel moves around in a large circle until the two ends are

brought together and retrieved, and the purse seine wire that runs through the

rings around the lower weighted edge of the net is hauled to cinch the bottom

closed;

 Industrial long-line operations comprised of a number of different discrete

fleet segments and operations whereby vessels pull long-lines (comprising a

mainline to which branch lines with baited hooks are attached at intervals)

along the surface of the water behind it, and which can be grouped as (i)

tropical long-line fisheries largely targeting yellowfin and bigeye (including

‘offshore’ sashimi long-liners from Taiwan, China and from mainland China,

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and domestic fleets from Indonesia, Philippines, PNG, the Solomon Islands,

FSM, RMI and Vietnam; and ‘distant-water’ vessels from Japan, Taiwan,

China and mainland China and Vanuatu, operating primarily in the eastern

tropical waters of the WCPO), and (ii) southern long-line fisheries largely

targeting albacore (including Pacific Island fleets and ‘distant-water’ fleets

from Taiwan, China and mainland China operating in sub-tropical waters in

the southern area of the WCPO); and

 Industrial pole-and-line operations by domestic fleets from Indonesia,

Solomon Islands, French Polynesia and the distant water fleet from Japan,

targeting skipjack year-round, as well as seasonal sub-tropical skipjack

fisheries in the national waters of Australia, Japan (extending eastwards to

include albacore also) and the United States (i.e. Hawaii) (King, 2007; Gillett,

2014; SPC, 2015).

Collectively, these various harvesting units in the western and central Pacific produced a record yield of an estimated 2.86 million metric tons of tuna in 2014, constituting roughly 60 percent of the world’s tuna catch and approximately 8 times the harvest of all coastal fish stocks of the region combined (Williams and Terawasi, 2015; Gillett,

2014). In many cases, these represent some of the last tuna stocks still healthy enough

(i.e. with sufficient abundance as measured by biomass) to support the estimated annual maximum sustainable yield, roughly equivalent to the total annual tuna catch from all

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other major tuna fishing areas of the world combined – i.e. in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean (Gillett, 2014).

Provisional estimates for the break-down of the 2014 tuna catch by fishing gear are as follows:

 Purse seine catch: 2.02 million metric tons, comprised of approximately 1.60

million metric tons of skipjack, 0.36 million metric tons of yellowfin, and 0.07

million metric tons of bigeye (differences due to rounding);

 Long-line catch: 268,795 metric tons;

 Pole and line catch: 203,736 metric tons; and

 Troll and other small-scale gear catch: 367,469 metric tons (mostly in eastern

Indonesia and the Philippines) (Williams and Terawasi, 2015).

The specific break-down of the 2014 tuna catch by species is as follows:

 Skipjack: 1.96 million metric tons;

 Yellowfin: 608,807 metric tons;

 Bigeye: 161,299 metric tons; and

 Albacore: 132,849 metric tons (Williams and Terawasi, 2015).

In terms of the biological units of the WCPO purse seine tuna fishery system, two main species are targeted, skipjack and yellowfin, and a third caught incidentally as by-catch

– bigeye. As the tuna ‘science provider’ to the region, the assessments conducted by

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the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) serve as the basis for decision-making in the region, and indicate the following:

Bigeye. Based on the most recent stock assessment carried out in 2014, the stock is considered overfished and requiring a 36 percent in fishing mortality from the 2008 –

2011 average (notably a reduction in catch of juveniles): fishing mortality is estimated to be 1.57 times the level associated with a stock that could support the maximum sustainable yield, and the spawning biomass has been reduced to 16 percent of the unfished spawning biomass (WCPFC, 2014).

Yellowfin. Based on the most recent stock assessment carried out in 2014, the stock is not considered overfished, though fishing mortality has generally been increasing through time and is currently estimated to be 0.72 times the rate that will support the maximum sustainable yield (WCPFC, 2014). However, most recent catch levels are close to or have exceeded the estimated maximum sustainable yield by up to 13 percent, and the scientific community recommends that annual catches should not be increased from 2012 levels (WCPFC, 2014).

Skipjack. Based on the most recent stock assessment carried out in 2014, the stock is not considered overfished, though fishing mortality has generally been increasing through time and is currently estimated to be 0.62 times the rate that will support the maximum sustainable yield (WCPFC, 2014). However, most recent catch levels are slightly above the estimated maximum sustainable yield, and the current scientific consensus recognizes that fishing mortality is increasing and stock size declining (to

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about 52 percent of the level predicted in the absence of fishing), potentially resulting in a contraction of the geographic range of the stock and a reduction in availability in higher latitudes (WCPFC, 2014). According to the assessments, additional purse seine fishing effort in the WCPO will yield only modest gains in long-term skipjack catches and may result in a corresponding increase in fishing mortality for bigeye and yellowfin

(WCPFC, 2014. As a result, the recommendation of the scientific community is that fishing mortality should not be increased in order to keep the skipjack stock at approximately current levels (WCPFC, 2014).

Figure 34 below provides a snapshot of the rate that WCPO’s current portfolio of tuna stocks is being drawn down at the moment, in terms of the latest assessment of spawning stock biomass compared to the potential biomass that would be expected in the absence of fishing.

) 60 (SBo

30 Threshold /unfished biomassspawning below which

(SB) 20 stock is considered overfished 10

Albacore (N. Pacific) Bigeye Skipjack Yellowfin (latest spawning biomass spawning (latest

Latest estimate of fish stock as a % of unexploited potential stock potential unexploited of a % as stock fish of estimate Latest

Sources: Albacore working group (2014); Harley et al. (2014); Harley et al. (2014b); Rice et al. (2014b)

Figure 34. WCPO 'fish bank': tuna stocks in the water 351

The above figure depicts assessments of the current biological status of the tuna stocks, but does not indicate if this status is sustainable under current rates of fishing pressure, or if they will increase or decrease in the future if current rates of fishing pressure are maintained.

In terms of the broader governance context, in the late 1970s, with UNCLOS soon to be finalized and an objective of PICs to exercise sovereignty over a larger area, the countries perceived that many states external to the region had used a strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ to negotiate bi-lateral access agreements (Gillett, 2014). From this perception arose the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention of 1979

(Gillett, 2014), with the objective of driving regional cooperation for the sustainable use and management of Pacific Island Forum members’ shared tuna resources, and which created the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) in support of this objective (FFA,

2015). Governed by a Forum Fisheries Committee of member countries that meets annually and takes decisions based on consensus, the FFA Secretariat serves as an advisory body that provides expertise, technical assistance other support to inform members’ decisions about the use of tuna resources in their waters and participation in the WCPFC (FFA, 2015). Focused almost entirely on tuna, FFA supports development of regional and national policies, provides national and regional tuna fisheries management services (such as maintaining a tuna fishing vessel registry and a satellite- based tuna fishing vessel monitoring system) and providing information, analysis and training for industry development along the value chain (FFA, 2015). Under the 1979

Convention, the Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law

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Enforcement in the South Pacific Region was agreed in 1992 and amended with a subsidiary agreement in 2012. This treaty promotes cooperation among FFA members on: (i) enforcement of national tuna fishing laws and regulations, (ii) regional surveillance procedures and patrols, and (iii) establishment of harmonized minimum terms and conditions of foreign fishing vessel access to PIC waters, among others

(FFA, 2015). FFA has also helped facilitate agreement between members and the

United States on a Multilateral Fishing Treaty since 1987, for common conditions and fees for access to PIC waters by the U.S. tuna fleet, together with targeted bi-lateral aid from the U.S. (U.S. State Department, 2015).

In the early to mid-1990s there was a growing awareness of the need for collaborative governance among all states participating in the WCPO tuna fishery system, and specifically a tuna management agency that would cover an area larger than that encompassed by Pacific Island countries and which would include foreign nations with vessels fishing in the WCPO (Gillett, 2014). After six years of complex negotiations between the PICs and distant-water fishing nations, a treaty for the creation of a

Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) was opened for signature in September 2000 and the Secretariat established in Pohnpei in 2004 (WCPFC, 2015).

The WCPFC currently includes 26 member countries, 7 participating territories and 7 cooperating non-members, meeting annually with decisions generally taken on the basis of consensus towards the objective of ensuring the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the highly migratory fish stocks in the WCPO (WCPFC, 2015). The decisions of the Commission, known as ‘conservation and management measures,’ are

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binding upon members, and have included the requirement for example that all members’ vessels are authorized to fish in the WCPO and registered with the

Secretariat, as well as transfer information on vessels’ fishing activities in order to support management (WCPFC, 2015). The Oceanic Fisheries Program of the SPC is the agreed science service provider to the WCPFC, collecting and analyzing tuna catch and effort data, observer reports and other relevant information, and providing stock assessments to the Commission (Gillett, 2014).

Building from the context of the 1979 FFA Convention, PICs in the equatorial belt where the heaviest concentration of purse seine fishing takes place began to discuss more specific cooperation around the tuna fisheries in their waters (Gillett, 2014). In

1982 seven countries (and subsequently an eighth, Tuvalu) signed the Nauru

Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common

Interest, with the aim of coordinating and harmonizing management of the common fish stocks shared across the zones of the Parties to the Agreement (PNA, 2015). The

Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) agreed to work together to set uniform terms and conditions of access to tuna in their waters, including licensing, reporting, identification, etc. Following a period in the 1980s of policy focus in the sub-region

(and beyond) on public investment in local fleets and canneries, which by the mid-

1990s were generally judged to have been unsuccessful, some countries began to focus on increasing benefits from access fees (Gillett, 2014).

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In 2000 a study by FFA suggested shifting the strategy of PNA efforts to manage the purse seine fishery in their waters, from input controls with a cap on vessel numbers

(and licenses), to a effort rights system based on a limit on purse seine fishing days

(Gillett, 2014). The transition was actually made seven years later (Gillett, 2014), and constitutes the key governance reform forming the basis of this case study.

Analysis of concepts and their variables or structures present, using the modified

SES framework from Chapter Three, and explanation of outcome measures that can be associated with governance reforms. Drawing upon the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter Three, the reforms undertaken in the purse seine fishery and targeted for further support by the PROP have been classified by the vertical and horizontal characteristics of their components.

Vertical Characteristics of Governance Components. In terms of the spatial scale of the governance reforms for the tuna fisheries, the boundaries are extensive.

Collectively, the various tuna stocks migrating throughout the western and central

Pacific form one of the world’s largest fishery systems by any measure – value, volume and range (Arnason et al, 2015). In terms of the ecological sub-system, the tuna stocks have defined ecological boundaries that form the basis of what is often referred to as the ‘Western and Central Pacific Ocean’ (WCPO) region. The WCPO region is a large area of the western and central Pacific Ocean defined by the Convention on the

Conservation and Management of High Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and

Central Pacific Ocean, and includes both the national waters of a number of countries

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as well as areas beyond national jurisdiction (WCPFC, 2010). Although the western boundary notionally extends to the East Asian seaboard, it is understood that the

Convention Area does not include the South China Sea (WCPFC, 2010). In the east, the Convention Area adjoins, or overlaps, the area of competence of the Inter-American

Tropical Tuna Commission, while the southern boundary extends to 60 degrees south and the northern boundary extends to Alaska and the Bering Sea (WCPFC, 2015).

Within this large spatial scale, the governments of 9 PICs collaborated to introduce new harvesting rules in 2009 for the portion of the purse seine fishery within their jurisdiction (World Bank, 2014b). The vertical entry points for reform were as follows:

- Scale: international;

- Jurisdiction of origin: state(s); and

- Level of rule: constitutional choice (PNA, 2010).

Horizontal characteristics of governance components. In 2009 the 8 PICs who are

Parties to the Nauru Agreement (subsequently joined by Tokelau) amended the Palau

Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery (most recently in 2015) to create a vessel day scheme (VDS) to manage access to Parties’ waters for purse seine tuna fishing vessels, by setting a total collective limit on fishing days in those waters by licensed purse seine vessels each year (total allowable effort or

TAE), and allocating that TAE among the Parties (Party allowable effort or PAE)

(PNA, 2010). All Parties agree to limit fishing effort in their water to the respective

PAEs, using standard criteria for reporting fishing days (World Bank, 2014b). Parties

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may transfer unused days within their PAEs, or agree on arrangements to pool them for sale (World Bank, 2014b). To combat ‘effort creep’ (increasing fish catch per the same measure of fishing effort, i.e. increasing catch per fishing day), the following conversion factors are used: (i) every fishing day by a purse seine vessel with a length overall of less than 50 meters shall equate to a deduction of one half of a fishing day;

(ii) every fishing day by a purse seine vessel with a length overall of between 50 meters and 80 meters shall equate to a deduction of one fishing day; and (iii) every fishing day by a purse seine vessel with a length overall in excess of 80 meters shall equate to a deduction of one and one half fishing days (PNA, 2010). The VDS is implemented as part of a Conservation and Management Measure agreed at the WCPFC, together with the Third Implementing Arrangement in 2009 that closes a number of high seas areas to foreign vessels wishing to obtain/maintain a license to fish in Party waters (PNA,

2015). Originally FFA provided secretariat services to the PNA, but in 2010 the Parties amended the Agreement to establish an office (PNAO) in Majuro (Gillett, 2014). With the VDS underway, in December 2014 the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved the Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program (PROP) to provide a series of grants and concessionary loans to the governments of FSM, RMI, the Solomon

Islands and Tuvalu in order to enhance the capacity of national agencies to monitor and enforce the use of vessel days within their waters (World Bank, 2014b).

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Table 34. Summary of the horizontal characteristics of fisheries governance reforms introduced for WCPO purse seine fishery since 2009

Countries Change in Horizontal Characteristics Policy Rules Organizations FSM Based on the 1982 Nauru Rights established around controls – effort Created a Kiribati Agreement signed between rights; creates the vessel day scheme (VDS) to governing body Nauru 8 of the countries (save manage access to the Parties’ waters for purse for the VDS – Palau Tokelau), the Parties to the seine tuna fishing vessels, replacing a previous an annual Nauru Agreement (PNA) input control setting a total limit of 205 vessels, meeting of the PNG signed the Palau by setting a total collective limit on fishing days Parties, which RMI Arrangement in 2009, which in the countries’ waters by licensed purse seine sets the TAE Solomon Tokelau subsequently vessels each year (total allowable effort or among other Islands joined, with the objective of TAE), and allocating that TAE among the operational Tokelau enhancing management of Parties (Party allowable effort or PAE). All rules. Tuvalu purse seine fishing vessel Parties agree to limit fishing effort in their effort in the waters of the water to the respective PAEs, using standard Created the signatory countries (i.e. criteria for reporting fishing days. Parties may Parties to the ‘Parties’) by encouraging transfer unused days within their PAEs, or Nauru collaboration between them, agree on arrangements to pool them for sale. Agreement and (i) promoting optimal Effort expended under the FSMA and US office, which utilization and conservation Treaty is included in the calculations for TAE helps of tuna resources, (ii) and PAEs, and Parties must allocate a portion administer the maximizing economic of their PAEs to account for any days fished by harvest rules by returns, employment their national fleets in other Parties’ waters. To monitoring and generation and export combat ‘effort creep’ (increasing fish catch per tracking effort earnings from sustainable the same measure of fishing effort, i.e. rights used by harvesting of tuna resources, increasing catch per fishing day), the following each country, (iii) supporting the conversion factors are used: (i) every fishing and development of domestic day by a purse seine vessel with a length maintaining a locally-based purse seine overall of less than 50 meters shall equate to a register of fishing industries, and (iv) deduction of one half of a fishing day; (ii) every purse vessels promoting effective and fishing day by a purse seine vessel with a length eligible for efficient administration, overall of between 50 meters and 80 meters rights (VDS management and shall equate to a deduction of one fishing day; registry). Also compliance. and (iii) every fishing day by a purse seine helps to vessel with a length overall in excess of 80 develop new meters shall equate to a deduction of one and operational one half fishing days. rules for In 2010 Parties amended the Palau Parties’ review. Arrangement to create collective choice rules to close the following international waters to foreign vessels wishing to obtain/maintain a license to fish in party waters: (i) the area of high seas bounded by the national waters of the Federated States of Micronesia, Indonesia, Palau and Papua New Guinea; (ii) the area of high seas bounded by the national waters of the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu; and (iii) any additional high seas areas located within 10˚N and 20˚S latitude and 170˚E and 150˚W longitude; requires purse seine vessels to retain all tuna catch fit for human consumption (PNAO, 2010b).

FSM N/A Enhanced RMI national agency Solomon capacity and activities for

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Islands administration Tuvalu of the VDS, including enhanced transparency

Increased monitoring in order to expand the information base required for reform, notably fish catch and effort monitoring

Enhanced national and regional agency surveillance and enforcement of existing rules (including expanded sea and aerial patrols, increased training, expanded observer programs)

Sources: PNA (2010); World Bank (2014b)

Summary of expected economic costs of governance reforms. Although not fully representative of the economic costs of the reforms undertaken, Table 35 provides a break-down of the financial costs (i.e. those costs actually financed by the World Bank) of reform in the four countries, drawing upon the conceptual framework in Chapter

Three.

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Table 35. Break-down of financial costs of governance reform in Phase One of the Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program*

FSM RMI Solomon Tuvalu TOTAL Islands Costs of formulating and enacting changes to institutions and organizations Policy formulation/ N/A N/A N/A 0.3 0.3 reform Development and N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A enactment of rule changes or new rules Organizational costs 5.2 5.9 8.0 5.6 24.7 to administer, monitor and enforce rule changes Costs of changes in fishing effort and subsequently yield Compensation for N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A resource rent foregone TOTAL 5.2 5.9 8.0 5.9 25.0 * Amounts given in US$ millions, as total projected costs over the duration of the project, from 2015 - 2020; Source: World Bank, 2014b

The continuing costs associated with reform that are financed by the PROP focus almost entirely on enhancing the capacity of state organizations in four of the nine countries to enforce compliance with harvesting rules, and administer those rules and monitor progress in the fishery systems towards agreed policy objectives. This reflects the focus and high costs of enforcement across vast EEZs, bordering pockets of high seas (World Bank, 2014b).

Associated changes in the outcome measures for the targeted ocean fishery SESs.

While Table 34 provides a summary the horizontal characteristics of the governance reforms introduced by the 9 PICs starting in 2009 and the reforms to be supported in four of them by the World Bank, it is a static representation. The following paragraphs provide a brief historical description of the series of events or pathways to these reforms

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based on outputs produced in each country, towards changing outcome measures in the targeted ocean fishery SESs.

As mentioned previously, in 2000 a study by FFA suggested that the PNA members shift their strategy to manage the purse seine fishery in their waters, from input controls with a cap on vessel numbers (and licenses), to a effort rights system based on a limit on purse seine fishing days (Gillett, 2014). The transition was actually made seven years later (Gillett, 2014), and the Parties subsequently amended the Palau

TAE), and allocating that TAE among the Parties (Party allowable effort or PAE)

(PNA, 2010). All Parties agree to limit fishing effort in their water to the respective

PAEs, using standard criteria for reporting fishing days (World Bank, 2014b). Parties may transfer unused days within their PAEs, or agree on arrangements to pool them for sale (World Bank, 2014b). To combat ‘effort creep’ (increasing fish catch per the same measure of fishing effort, i.e. increasing catch per fishing day), the following conversion factors are used: (i) every fishing day by a purse seine vessel with a length overall of less than 50 meters shall equate to a deduction of one half of a fishing day;

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deduction of one and one half fishing days (PNA, 2010). The VDS is implemented as part of a Conservation and Management Measure agreed at the WCPFC, together with the Third Implementing Arrangement in 2009 that closes a number of high seas areas to foreign vessels wishing to obtain/maintain a license to fish in Party waters (PNA,

Islands and Tuvalu in order to enhance the capacity of national agencies to monitor and enforce the use of vessel days within their waters (World Bank, 2014b).

Outputs from the reform processes in the PNA to date as summarized in Table 35, include:

 Introduction of a harmonized system of tenure rules for purse seine tuna

fishing in PNA waters (77 percent of the fishery system), placing a cap on

fishing effort at 2010 levels and closing access to any vessels purse seining in

the high seas (FFA, 2015);

 Establishment of the PNAO and a VDS registry, together with a fisheries

information system for vessels to electronically report fishing catch and effort;

and

 National agency commitments to enhance operations to support VDS, with

financing from the PROP, including expanded observers to monitor catch and

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effort and increased surveillance to enforce VDS compliance (World Bank,

2014b).

In terms of measuring outcomes from the governance reforms and establishing causality, the conceptual framework in Chapter Three suggests that taking the net present value of resource rents after reform, including the marginal costs of introducing the reforms, can measure outcomes for efficiency and equity to future generations

(given that yield is a function of fish stock biomass and ecological factors) – though without capturing objectives for equity to present generations.

For the unit of analysis, the increase in the NPV of rents is one measure, based on the yield, price and cost of fishing effort, as well as any costs for the reform. In the case of the yield, for the entire purse seine fishery system in the WCPO, both yield and fishing effort (or number of fishing vessels as a proxy for effort), have both continued an unabated increase even after the introduction of the reform, per Figure 35 below.

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# Vessels Catch Fishing Vessels MT Catch

400 2,500,000

350 2,000,000 300

250 1,500,000 200

150 1,000,000

100 500,000 50

0 0

Source: WCPFC (2014b)

Figure 35. Trends in WCPO purse seine catch and capacity

However, within the wider WCPO, catch and effort have not been distributed homogenously even along the equator, but rather catch in the high seas pockets has decreased with the rule passed by the PNA to link access to their waters to non-fishing in these pockets, while catch levels in Indonesia and the Philippines have increased significantly (FFA, 2015). The VDS and the cap on effort has held catch levels in PNA waters relatively but not completely constant – as Figure 35 illustrates, total purse seine catch for PNA waters (including Tokelau) and the high seas has increased, even while the latter has decreased, indicating that catch under the VDS has grown beyond just the relocation of fishing activity from the high seas (FFA, 2015). Much of the jump occurred from 2013 to 2014, and may be attributable to an increase in free school catch rates (Clark, 2015).

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Mt Catch 2,000,000

1,800,000

1,600,000

1,400,000

1,200,000

1,000,000

800,000

600,000

400,000

200,000

0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Source: FFA (2015)

Figure 36. Trend in purse seine catch in PNA waters + high seas

An overall hard limit was applied to the fishing days available under the VDS in 2012, and in 2014 total fishing days were slightly less than those issued in 2010, while the total number of purse seine vessels registered to fish in PNA waters was roughly the same as in 2010 (Clark, 2015). However, at the same time, fishing effort (as measured in days fished) has increased substantially in waters outside of the PNA since the introduction of the VDS, although catches and catch rates have increased much more slowly, per Figure 37 below:

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Fishing Days

9000

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Note: Excludes fishing in the waters of Indonesia and the Philippines Source: Clark (2015)

Figure 37. Fishing effort in WCPO waters outside of PNA

In summary, based on the data available it appears that purse seine fishing catch has risen in PNA waters beyond the level of just transferring or enclosing fishing effort from the high seas – but relatively slowly: the combined catch from PNA waters and the high seas in 2014 was roughly 15% higher than 2010 levels, and in 2013 was roughly 3% above 2010 levels (FFA, 2015). Essentially 2014 saw a jump in catches in the high seas pocket mentioned previously, as well as in PNA waters (FFA, 2015).

More broadly, per Figure 56, fishing effort seems to have increased much more in the

WCPO waters outside the PNA, although catch rates have declined (from 86 metric tons per fishing day in 2010 to 51 metric tons per fishing day in 2014) (Clark, 2015).

Throughout the entire WCPO, a total of 57,138 days were fished in 2014 (excluding national waters in Indonesia and the Philippines), which could be translated into the number of vessels that would be estimated to operate full time at that level: equivalent

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to a total of 229 vessels – below the current levels registered, suggesting that many of these vessels may be operating less than full time (Pilling and Harley, 2015).

Additionally, Pilling and Harley (2015) estimated that 281 to 289 vessels could operate full time within the total limit of 65,867 fishing days per year currently agreed at the

WCPFC, including: 51,879 for PNA countries and Tokelau (including archipelagic waters), 7,047 days for other countries’ waters in the WCPO, and 6,941 for the high seas, but excluding the waters of Indonesia and the Philippines (Pilling and Hardy,

2015). However, Pilling and Harley (2015) note that the number of vessels operating full-time would be significantly less if the WCPO wants to maintain the skipjack tuna stock at a target biomass of 50 – 60% of unfished levels: in the range of 142 to 220 vessels – i.e. below current levels. Additionally, Tidd et al. (2015) recently found that the ‘catching capability’ of purse seine vessels in the WCPO steadily increased between

2005 and 2011 at a rate of 3 – 5% per year, as younger and bigger vessels in the fleet tended to be more efficient (i.e. catching more fish per day than previous). At this rate, a day of fishing was 19 – 34% more effective in 2011 than 2005, again reflecting not just the growing fleet size and catch, but the growing efficiency of the WCPO purse seine fleet (Tidd et al., 2015).

Given these trends in increasing catch and effort, the trend in ‘delivered value’ – the

Bangkok processors’ price for tuna multiplied by the yield – as a proxy for total revenues in the harvesting, has steadily increased, but given the significant portion of the global supply originating from the WCPO, price has been influenced as well, and shows a similar trend, per Figure 38 below:

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2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

Source: FFA (2015)

Figure 38. Bangkok price of a ton of skipjack

Given trends in price, yield and total revenues, as well as increasing effort, total resource rent can be expected to have remained constant. However, the unit of analysis is on outcomes for PICs, which also relates to any change in distribution of rents resulting from the reforms. This is because the WCPO purse seine fishery system supports a global supply chain, where the current economic contributions to PICs can be measured at each component of the chain, as follows:

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Revenue from the Benefits Captured by Pacific Fisheries allocated along Island Countries the Global Value Chain

Distr/ Wholesale & Retail Marketing Distributors, groups, Costs companies who sell to other  Labor retailers or final consumers  Capital  Other inputs

Processing Processing  Domestic ownership of enterprises Individuals, groups, Costs companies, etc.  Employment in local plants Pacific transforming raw fish into  Labor  Taxes Island the product  Capital  Locally sourced inputs  Other inputs Countries

Harvest Labor

Fishing Fleet(s)  Fishers Other Inputs  Local labor on vessels  Technology (incl.  Purchase of domestic goods & suppliers and servicers) Capital services  Methods  Domestic ownership of fleets  Effort  Taxes on capital

 Access fees Resource Rent Ocean Ecosystem

Ecological unit

Source: Adapted from IFC (2000)

Tuna stock(s) Note: Pacific Island labor is shown as a benefit, rather than a cost of production, given high regional unemployment

Figure 39. Current economic benefits to Pacific Island countries from WCPO tuna fisheries

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The portion of the resource rent captured by PICs via payment of access fees by foreign harvesters, has grown steadily in the five years since the introduction of the vessel day scheme (VDS) by the PNA member countries and Tokelau, as the price of a vessel day has increased from $1,500 in 2010, to $8,000 in 2015 (FFA, 2014; World Bank, 2014b).

As mentioned previously, the new harvest rules, i.e. the VDS, set a collective cap on purse seine fishing effort in PNA waters, translates that cap into a common currency (a fishing day by a vessel – i.e. vessel days), agrees on a minimum ‘benchmark’ price that countries will charge harvesting units for vessel days (though countries may charge more), and allocates the cap of vessel days to the countries according to an agreed formula (Havice, 2013). While the agreed price of vessel days is publicly available, i.e. the minimum ‘benchmark’ price, the distribution among the member countries often is not, thus calculating the distribution of the fees in Figure 66 is difficult. According to the Palau Arrangement, the distribution of vessel days is based on formulas that rely at least in part on the 7-year moving average of the distribution of tuna catch in the waters of member countries (PNA, 2015). For indicative purposes only, the 2007 – 2009 moving average of the distribution of the purse seine catch among member countries available from SPC has been applied to the total purse seine foreign access fees

(including revenues from the U.S. Treaty but excluding concessionary access fees received under the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement) shown in Figure 40 below, as follows:

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US$ 450,000,000 400,000,000 350,000,000 300,000,000 250,000,000 200,000,000 150,000,000 100,000,000 50,000,000 - 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

FSM Kiribati RMI PNG Sols Tuvalu Nauru Tokelau Palau

Note: Does not include fees received from vessels operating under the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement (FSMA) for Regional Access

Figure 40. Indicative growth in purse seine foreign access fees received by PICs

The above fees again are indicative only of the break-down between Pacific Island countries, using the 2007 – 2009 distribution of catch among countries’ waters as a proxy. Nonetheless, they provide a useful proxy or indicator of the magnitude of fees received by Pacific Island countries for access by foreign purse seine tuna vessels. Of note, this would only represent gross benefits to the countries rather than net benefits, as Pacific Island countries’ (as well as donors’) expenditures on fisheries management have not been subtracted. While data on Pacific Island country public expenditures for fisheries management are scarce, the best available information provides an annual expenditure on the tuna fisheries combined of some US$50 million (Govan, 2015).

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% GDP % 20

0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

FSM Kiribati RMI Solomon Islands Tuvalu

Note: Access Fees estimated based on Distribution of Total Revenues according to 2007 – 2009 distribution of moving average of purse seine catch; 2014 GDP figures are an estimate, taking 2013 values and adding 2 percent. Sources: GDP at purchaser’s price in current US dollars, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD

Figure 41. WCPO tuna access fees from foreign fleets as a % of GDP

The returns from the region’s tuna asset are not distributed evenly, but rather reflect

higher endowments in the waters of some countries compared others. Additionally, the

dependence of Pacific Island countries upon these returns varies. Figure 41 above

highlights the magnitude of the growing contribution of foreign fleet access fees from

the purse seine fishery as public revenues to the economies of five Pacific Island

countries, notably Tuvalu (equivalent to 36 percent of GDP in 2014), Kiribati (32

percent), FSM (10 percent), RMI (4 percent) and the Solomon Islands (3 percent).

In conclusion, while the data available do not indicate a clear trend in resource rent

from the WCPO purse seine tuna fishery, the trend in the portion of the rent captured

by the PNA countries after introducing the VDS is clear. The VDS has increased rent

capture by the state in PICs, re-distributing benefits from foreign fleets to Pacific Island

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countries, while also holding fishing catch and effort levels to a slower growth path than for waters outside the PNA jurisdiction. Yet total effort (as measured by vessels) has increased to new highs, as have catch volumes.

Table 36. Summary of Indicators for Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms Supported in the Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program (PROP)

Parties to the Nauru Agreement (8 PICs) and Tokelau Ecological Sub- WCPO are clearly defined, within this area the purse seine System fishery is concentrated along the equator, with 77% taking Clarity and size of place in the waters under the jurisdiction of PNA countries system boundaries and Tokelau, with another 13% in Indonesia and the Philippines, and the remaining 10% on the high seas Number and Principally skipjack stock targeted, with yellowfin as diversity of targeted approximately 20% of the catch, and smaller proportion of fish stocks catch from juvenile bigeye Growth rates of Skipjack have relatively fast growth rates targeted fish stock(s) Governance Palau Arrangement in 2009 between 8 PICs as an Reforms articulation of shared policy objectives and agreement to Policies cooperate on the vessel day scheme Rules Rights established around controls – effort rights – through the vessel day scheme Organizations Created an organization – PNAO – to administer the cooperative agreement and monitor rules

In FSM, RMI, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, Enhanced national agency capacity and activities for administration of the VDS, including enhanced transparency; increased monitoring in order to expand the information base required for reform, notably fish catch and effort monitoring; and enhanced national and regional agency surveillance and enforcement of existing rules (including expanded sea and aerial patrols, increased training, expanded observer programs) Costs over 6 years In FSM, RMI, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, organizational of formulating and costs to administer, monitor and enforce rule changes ($24.7 enacting changes to m) institutions and organizations:

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Social Sub-System N/A Number of fishers Number and type of 344 purse seine vessels are registered to the WCPFC fishing vessels (fleets) Fishing gear type Purse seine nets, with some vessels setting nets on fish used aggregating devices (FADs) Socio-economic Industrialized vessels with high profit levels, for largely attributes of fishers foreign fleets, many of whom from high-income nations History of use Fishery has developed and grown exponentially since 1980, with traditional fleets from Japan and Korea maintaining activity levels, U.S. fleet decreasing, and fleet from China increasing Dependence on Fleets are highly mobile, and could in theory move to other resource tuna fisheries Interactions 2010: est. 280 vessels licensed to fish in PNA waters Fishing effort (by 2014: est. 280 vessels licensed to fish in PNA waters fleet) Fish catch (by 2010: 1.4 million mt targeted stocks) 2014: 1.6 million mt (mt/year) Outcomes Skipjack: est. 48% of unfished spawning biomass Measured Yellowfin: est. 40% of unfished spawning biomass Ecological: biomass of targeted stock(s) Ecological: N/A diversity of animal species and ecological structures Social: efficiency of Resource rent captured by PICs has increased from $60 m in harvesting 2009 to over $300 m in 2014 operations as measured by the PV Total resource rent generated by the fishery: N/A of resource rent Social: equity N/A measure not yet defined (distribution of changes to the PV of resource rent?)

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The table above highlights the key point earlier, that the governance reform to introduce the VDS has been associated with a much higher proportion of the resource rent captured by PICs, but not necessarily a higher rent for the entire fishery. Similarly, catch has increased (12%), and some 23% of the fishery is not governed by the rule change (VDS). It is too soon to associate changes in biomass to governance reforms, however the VDS has the potential to maintain the TAE and thus total fishing effort for at least 77% of the fishery. To visualize graphically these points and the reform to introduce the VDS within the WCPO, in the conceptual framework from Chapter

Three, see Figure 42 below:

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Figure 42. Conceptual framework for ocean fisheries governance reform in Western & Central Pacific: introduction of effort rights for purse seine tuna fishing (2010 - 2015)

4.4 Comparison of Indicators for Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms Supported in 5 World Bank Projects

Based on sections 4.1 through 4.3, the proposed indicators for ocean fisheries governance reform supported in 5 of the cases reviewed have been synthesized for comparison, using a SES conceptual framework as discussed in Chapter Three, as a basis for further analysis. Table 39 below summarizes the information available for each case, towards associating specific governance reforms with changes in system outcome measurements. Although incomplete, these 5 cases were synthesized based on the amount of information available, as well as similarities in the ecological characteristics of the systems in at least four of the cases. In the future, improved collection of data for these indicators can give an indication of the change in the outcomes as a result of the reforms, or impact.

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Table 37. Summary of Indicators for Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms Supported in 5 World Bank Projects

Indonesia Tanzania Cape Verde Liberia coastal Senegal coastal Sierra Leone Purse Seine Tuna coral reef coastal coastal demersal fisheries demersal coastal Fishery in the Waters of fisheries fisheries demersal fisheries demersal the Parties to the Nauru fisheries fisheries Agreement (8 PICs) and Tokelau Ecological Clearly- Not clearly Narrow Liberia has a coastline Coastal demersal Coastal demersal WCPO are clearly defined, defined defined, continental shelf, of some 590km, a fishing takes fishing takes place within this area the purse Sub-System nearshore reef coastal with a total relatively narrow places in the over the shelf area seine fishery is concentrated Clarity and fisheries in 6 fisheries with estimated area of shelf with an average waters above the of some 27,000 along the equator, with 77% size of system coastal exchange only 5,394 km2 width of 31km, and relatively narrow square kilometers, taking place in the waters boundaries districts in between (down to depths of total Economic area of shallow with the shelf under the jurisdiction of PNA Eastern villages 200m), but the Exclusion Zone continental shelf somewhat wider in countries and Tokelau, with Indonesia eastern islands Sal, (EEZ) of around (approximately the north. another 13% in Indonesia and Boavista, and 18,400km2. The shelf half of the 27,600 the Philippines, and the Maio, form a more is slightly narrower in square kilometers remaining 10% on the high extensive northern waters and of continental seas

378 continental shelf rather broader in the shelf are at depths

system. No true south, where it greater than 100 coral reefs exist in virtually provides the meters), along the the Cape Verde starting point for the country’s roughly Archipelago, but Gulf of Guinea. 1,300 kilometers there are a number Unlike the coastal of coastline. of sites with rich regions to the north coral communities. such as Sierra Leone Shelf conditions and Guinea, Liberia is are characterized not affected by the by predominantly upwelling effects of sandy bottoms the Canary Current, with rocky which therefore limits outcrops of its productivity, volcanic rock. although it does Waters around the receive heavy Cape Verde seasonal discharges Islands are from the numerous generally rivers and their characterized by a estuaries; these

much lower provide productive primary conditions for productivity penaeid shrimp compared to the fisheries. upwelling areas of the W. African coast.

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Number and High, multi- High, multi- Over 30% of Coastal demersal Multi-species Coastal demersal Principally skipjack stock diversity of species reef species fishery harvests were a fisheries target harvests of some fisheries target targeted, with yellowfin as targeted fish fishery grouper species multiple species, 100 individual multiples species, approximately 20% of the stocks (Cephalopholis including from stocks stocks of shrimp, including from catch, and smaller proportion taeniops), also of Grunts cuttlefish, stocks of croakers, of catch from juvenile bigeye coastal and deep (Haemulidae), octopus, croakers, sea breams, sea lobsters Croakers, Seabreams breams, groupers, groupers and such as Dentex threadfins, soles snappers, and congoensis (Congo from the shrimp, among dentex) and Dentex ecological sub- others. angolensis (Angolan system, usually dentex), Groupers harvested at and Snappers, and depths between 30 shrimp, among others to 60 meters – most do not migrate and spend their life cycle within Senegalese waters.

380 Growth rates Extremely Variable, Extremely Extremely variable, Extremely Extremely Skipjack have relatively fast

of targeted fish variable, relatively slow variable, though though key species variable, though variable, though growth rates stock(s) though key growth rates key species have have relatively slow key species have key species have species such relatively slow rates relatively slow relatively slow as grouper and rates rates rates snapper have relatively slow rates

Governance Policy N/A Articulation of a Articulation of a new Pilot a change in Finalize Palau Arrangement in 2009 statement new national national policy strategy towards articulation of a between 8 PICs as an Reforms articulated for policy statement statement for ocean inclusion national policy articulation of shared policy Policies increased for ocean fishery fishery systems, review objectives and agreement to equity to systems, together with a new Development of cooperate on the vessel day present specifically a mid- law to formalize new policy scheme generations in term evaluation of principles and objectives (and coral reef the objectives accompanying communities implementation of regulations) for the Fisheries Development of new coastal demersal Sector policy objectives for fish stocks Management Plan the coastal demersal 2004 – 2014, and fisheries then development of any necessary revisions to the Plan Rules Introduction Introduction Community Input controls for Community Development of Rights established around of community of community management rights industrial vessels management regulations for controls – effort rights –

381 management management over adjacent rights to fishing input controls for through the vessel day

rights rights for 170 areas of the sea Community associations for industrial trawl scheme new (resulting in the management rights adjacent areas of fisheries (outsides community- introduction of a over adjacent areas of the sea (resulting the 6-mile coastal scale range of technical the sea in one to two in the introduction zone) organizations measures, pilot areas (resulting of a range of in the including gear in the introduction of technical Community mainland and restrictions, closed a range of technical measures, management rights 136 such areas, etc.) in two measures, including including gear in four pilot areas organizations pilot areas gear restrictions, restrictions, in Zanzibar, closed areas, etc.) closed areas, etc.) covering a in 12 pilot sites total of 10% of the country’s waters

Organizations Enhanced Extension by Enhanced national Enhanced national Enhanced Enhanced national Created an organization – extension by national agency capacity agency capacity and national agency agency capacity PNAO – to administer the national and agencies and activities for activities for capacity and and activities for cooperative agreement and regional administration of administration of activities for administration of monitor rules public rules for tenure, rules for tenure, administration of rules for tenure, agencies; including including enhanced rules for tenure, including enhanced In FSM, RMI, Solomon Enhanced enhanced transparency in the including transparency in the Islands and Tuvalu, research, transparency in the licensing of access for enhanced licensing of access Enhanced national agency monitoring licensing of access industrial vessels, transparency in for industrial capacity and activities for and for industrial increased the licensing of vessels, increased administration of the VDS, assessment vessels, increased communication and access for communication including enhanced communication dialogue with industrial vessels, and dialogue with transparency; increased and dialogue with resource users and increased resource users and monitoring in order to resource users and communities, communication communities, expand the information base communities, increased registration and dialogue with increased required for reform, notably increased of fishing vessels resource users and registration of fish catch and effort registration of communities, fishing vessels monitoring; and enhanced fishing vessels Increased research, increased national and regional agency assessment and registration of Increased research, surveillance and enforcement

382 Increased research, monitoring in order to fishing vessels assessment and of existing rules (including

assessment and expand the monitoring in order expanded sea and aerial monitoring in information base Increased to expand the patrols, increased training, order to expand the required for reform, research, information base expanded observer programs) information base including working assessment and required for required for with a university to monitoring in reform, including reform, including build a research order to expand training and stock assessments program and conduct the information technical for coastal resource assessments base required for assistance in demersal species reform, including analysis of key Enhanced national working with the fisheries statistics Enhanced national agency surveillance oceanic research agency and enforcement of center (CRODT) Enhanced national surveillance and existing rules to synthesize data agency enforcement of (including expanded on stock status surveillance and existing rules sea and aerial patrols, enforcement of (including increased training, Enhanced existing rules expanded sea and observers on national agency (including aerial patrols, industrial vessels, surveillance and expanded sea and increased training, establishment of a enforcement of aerial patrols,

construction of satellite-based fishing existing rules increased training, two surveillance vessel monitoring (coastal observers on outposts) system, linked to a surveillance industrial vessels, fisheries monitoring stations) establishment of a Extension by center, two satellite-based national fisheries surveillance stations) National agency fishing vessel agency extension monitoring system, Extension by national linked to a fisheries agency, Local government fisheries linkage to national surveillance monitoring center, surveillance support support to two surveillance communities stations)

National agency extension Costs over 6 Development Development Policy Policy formulation/ Development and Policy In FSM, RMI, Solomon years of and enactment and enactment formulation/ reform ($0.5 m) enactment of rule formulation/ Islands and Tuvalu, formulating of rule of rule reform ($0.4 m) changes or new reform ($0.3 m) organizational costs to changes or changes or Development and rules ($2.3 m) administer, monitor and 383 and enacting new rules new rules Development and enactment of rule Development and enforce rule changes ($24.7 changes to

($38.7 million ($27.9 million enactment of rule changes or new rules Organizational enactment of rule m) institutions and over 5 years); over 5 years); changes or new ($0.8 m) costs to changes or new organizations: Organizational Organizational rules ($0.5 m) administer, rules ($1.4 m) costs to costs to Organizational costs monitor and administer, administer, Organizational to administer, enforce rule Organizational monitor and monitor and costs to monitor and enforce changes ($5.5 m) costs to administer, enforce rules enforce rules administer, rule changes ($8.1 m) monitor and changes changes monitor and enforce rule ($14.3 million ($15.6 enforce rule changes ($10.8 m) over 5 years) million) changes ($2.6 m)

Social Sub- Varies, in Collectively N/A N/A High – large and N/A – large canoe N/A some cases large, but migratory fleet fleet System relatively varies by Number of small by weight fishers village and reef

Number and relatively variable large N/A N/A Large fleet of N/A 344 purse seine vessels are type of fishing homogenous number of motorized canoes: registered to the WCPFC vessels (fleets) fleet for reef vessels Est. 11,000 fisheries, vessels at modest baseline, number number confirmed at over 18,000 before close of project Fishing gear hook and line mixed Small-scale hook Small-scale hook and Small-scale hook Small-scale hook Purse seine nets, with some type used generally, but and line, gill nets line, gill nets; and line, gill nets and line, gill nets; vessels setting nets on fish also industrial bottom industrial bottom aggregating devices (FADs) destructive trawl trawl types reported such as dynamite, cyanide Socio- high low-income Varies heavily by Fishing communities Coastal fishing Coastal Industrialized vessels with economic variability island of migrant fishers communities with communities often high profit levels, for largely between and from Ghana, long history of with little road foreign fleets, many of whom 384 attributes of fishers within the 6 traditional Kru fishing, but access to connect from high-income nations

targeted fishing communities growing to cities towns districts urbanization Industrial trawl fleets were largely made up of foreign vessels operating as joint ventures with local companies are purchasing access through local agents History of use Long N/A Fleet growing Migrant small-scale Senegal is one of Sierra Leone has a Fishery has developed and traditions fleets from Ghana the oldest fishing long tradition of grown exponentially since fishing for decades, nations in West fishing, and its 1980, with traditional fleets all industrial fishing Africa, and its fishers can be from Japan and Korea interrupted by coastal found off the maintaining activity levels, conflict and only communities have coasts of many U.S. fleet decreasing, and beginning to resume been fishing for neighboring fleet from China increasing

centuries, countries, developing a particularly in strong culture Guinea – with the around the civil war only activity and at the reinforcing the time of appraisal tendency to contributing as operate outside the much as 17 country percent of the labor force Dependence on High High Variable, High, particularly High in coastal High in coastal Fleets are highly mobile, and resource depending upon with high communities communities could in theory move to other island unemployment after tuna fisheries the conflict

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Interactions Though N/A N/A N/A Reduced in the N/A 2010: est. 280 vessels Fishing effort targeted, pilots licensed to fish in PNA fishing effort waters (by fleet) measures were 2014: est. 280 vessels not collected licensed to fish in PNA systematically waters by village or district Fish catch (by N/A N/A Baseline: small- Baseline: 4,500 from Baseline: small- Baseline: small- 2010: 1.4 million mt targeted scale – 1,222 small-scale and scale – 100,300; scale – 107,000; 2014: 1.6 million mt stocks) industrial trawl fleets industrial trawl – industrial trawl – (mt/year) Est. Potential: 35,000 9,000; industrial Sandy bottom: 700 shrimp trawl – – 2,800; Rock Est. aggregate 1,400 bottoms: 3,000 – potential: 130,000 6,500; Lobsters: 90 – 115

Outcomes N/A N/A Biomass estimates Biomass estimates for Trend had been Biomass estimates Skipjack: est. 48% of for individual individual stocks or declining, as for individual unfished spawning biomass Measured stocks or aggregate unavailable World Bank stocks or aggregate Yellowfin: est. 40% of Ecological: aggregate at close of project in (2004) reported unavailable. unfished spawning biomass biomass of unavailable 2015. Most recent that the total targeted measure available biomass of 5 of stock(s) comes from a Fridjtof the most Nansen survey in commercially 2007 which estimated valuable species a biomass of roughly Pandoras 13,000 tons of (Pagellus demersal finfish and bellottii), White cephalopods (shrimp groupers not included) (Epinephelus aeneus), Sea breams (Pagrus caeruleostictus), Goatfishes (Pseudupeneus

387 prayensis) and

Lesser African Threadfins (Galeoides decadactylus)) declined by roughly 75% from 1983 to 1998.

Ecological: diversity of N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A diversity of animal species animal species and ecological and ecological structures: Impact on structures structures as a result of a 60% decrease in the use of dynamite to catch fish near coral reefs Social: N/A N/A N/A Baseline: $2.9 m/yr Baseline: $-3.4 Baseline: $69.7 m Resource rent captured by efficiency of from small-scale and m/yr annual rent from PICs has increased from $60 harvesting industrial trawl small-scale and m in 2009 to over $300 m in operations as industrial trawl; 2014 $1.9 m from measured by industrial shrimp Total resource rent generated the PV of fishery by the fishery: N/A 388 resource rent

Social: equity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A measure not yet defined (distribution of changes to the PV of resource rent?)

In review of the 5 cases synthesized in Table 37 above, with the exception of the Pacific

Island purse seine tuna fishery system, efforts in Indonesia, Tanzania and the four West

African countries focused on the sedentary coastal demersal fisheries, all of which have more localized distributions of resources adjacent to the coastline. With the exception of Indonesia where the coral reefs clearly defined the ecological boundaries of the system, the boundaries were rarely well-defined as a basis for governance reforms, often with the line blurred between one ecological sub-system and the next (e.g. defining all coastal demersal stocks on the continental shelf as one unit targeted for governance reforms, or each area of the shelf adjacent to a coastal community or group of communities, etc.). At the same time, again with the Pacific Island exception, the social sub-systems were extremely complex, with large numbers of highly mobile resource users, targeting multiple species using a range of gear types.

In this ecological and social context, governance reforms almost uniformly focused on establishing co-governance partnerships between the state and communities of resource users, in some cases newly organized into fishing associations or ‘beach management units’, with the state recognizing management rights for these users over defined spaces of the sea. In almost all cases, by the end of the time period assessed (the life of the

World Bank project), resource users had exercised these rights to introduce new rules over fishing effort, though data on changes in fishing effort or yield were sparse and rarely measured. Even less measured than these interactions between the social and ecological sub-systems, data on changes in outcome measures were lacking in most cases, though in several pilots in Senegal as well as more widely in Indonesia, data

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showed a reduction in total or destructive fishing effort respectively, and in the case of

Senegal corresponding increases in yield per user and efficiency outcomes.

The case of the Pacific Islands purse seine tuna fishery (as well as the Peruvian anchoveta or the Southwest Indian Ocean offshore fisheries for which less information was collected here), highlights a very different ocean fishery SES which is much less connected to local users, and covers a much larger spatial scale (roughly 5% of the global ocean). Users invest in much more technology, including large purse seine vessels with helicopters searching for tuna schools in some cases. The users consist of foreign and local fleets from a wide range of countries, and the jurisdiction for governance includes the national waters of at least 11 countries, as well as areas beyond national jurisdiction. In this case, governance reforms required enhanced cooperation at the level of states, all of whom linked rule changes to activity in the adjacent high seas. While outcome measures of the distribution of the resource rents generated by the fishery system have improved for the Pacific Island countries in association with the reforms, data are not available to confirm changes in the measure of resource rent generated overall by the fishery system (though indications suggest that the enhanced efficiency of access arrangements has increased efficiency and profitability along the value chain), nor on the biomass of the skipjack and yellowfin stocks (from an ecological perspective, there is concern about accidental catch of another species, bigeye). Hence the governance reform may have achieved equity objectives for present generations from the system if defined in terms of the distribution of rent to relatively low-income Pacific Island countries, but changes in measures of equity to future

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generations (e.g. biomass of targeted stocks) or efficiency from the system are less clear.

In all cases, governance reforms focused heavily on investment in enhanced capacity for state organizations to administer, monitor and enforce tenure rules, particularly in

West Africa for public agencies to increase surveillance and enforcement of compliance with existing rules prohibiting the use of bottom trawl gear within 6 miles of the coast. Similarly, the effort initiated by the state to establish co-governance partnerships with resource users, often organized by community or user associations, was labor-intensive and required significant investment in extension (as well as monitoring, surveillance and enforcement of compliance with user-articulated rules).

Lastly, in all cases, governance reforms implicitly or explicitly aimed to enhance the property rights characteristics of tenure, linking objectives of efficiency for present generations and equity to future generations. As mentioned previously, data on changes in outcome measures associated with these reforms are sparse, though very limited measurements in specific pilots (not generalizable) showed reduced fishing effort and enhanced efficiency over time. Even less clear were the equity implications for present generations, in terms of the distribution of any benefits from reforms, particularly implications for poverty reduction.

The cases highlight the challenges of supporting governance reform in tropical ocean fishery SESs at large spatial scales, and illustrate the efforts of states in a number of

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countries to establish (or re-establish) partnerships for governance over the use of coastal demersal fish stocks, with the resource users, often organized around coastal fishing communities. Establishing and supporting such partnerships at large spatial scales along the coasts required significant investments by states, often with public agencies that lacked the capacity to deliver the reforms (generally within wider governance contexts where public agency capacity was considered low). In such contexts, scarce resources were often not invested for monitoring changes in outcome indicators for the targeted SESs, nor even clear changes in the interactions between the social and ecological sub-systems (i.e. fishing effort and yield). Going forward, investing in much greater monitoring of changes in fishing catch and effort in targeted

SES, as well as sampling of biomass and ecological indicators, and the size and distribution of the resource rents generated, together with counterfactuals, would provide much greater indications of the benefits associated with reforms.

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Chapter 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Following the Sustainable Development Goal (14) to end overfishing worldwide that was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in late 2015, this research has focused on governance as one of the key (and most feasible) variables that can be changed in order to achieve this objective. Through a large literature review fisheries governance has been defined as a systemic concept relating to the exercise of control or influence over fishing activity by political, economic and social institutions, and the organizations emerging from them and articulating policies to implement or change them or establish new rules.

Because ocean fisheries are diverse and any changes to their governance in order to reduce overfishing will be context-specific, this research has focused on the need for more empirical analysis to understand the types of governance changes that could support progress in different contexts and at different scales (i.e. ‘reforms’), and their potential costs. Although overfishing is increasing the most in tropical waters, to date relatively few cases have been documented of national or large-scale fisheries governance reforms in tropical developing countries. To support greater empirical analysis of the types of governance reforms that could contribute to the goal of ending overfishing at large spatial scales in tropical waters, this research has developed a

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conceptual tool for identifying and classifying these reforms in great detail, and correlating them to changes in fishing effort and eventually fishery outcomes.

The literature review conducted allowed for development of a tool to classify various types of fisheries governance reforms within the context of a socio-ecological systems

(SES) framework. This classification tool allows for the categorization of fisheries governance reforms in terms of changes to policies, rules or organizations, within the wider SES framework, in order to both graphically illustrate and quantitatively measure changes in fishery outcomes correlated to governance reforms. Developing this tool and embedding it within a SES framework provides in aggregate a modified conceptual framework as a lens for viewing and empirically analyzing fisheries governance reforms. The elements of this framework are not new to the field of ‘fisheries management’ and the relatively recent field of ‘fisheries governance,’ but have been re-organized and in some cases expanded upon, in such a way as to attempt to provide a practical tool for classifying and analyzing fisheries governance reforms at a variety of spatial scales and contexts, using quantifiable measures of fishery outcomes.

This tool has been applied to the World Bank’s portfolio of public investment projects in tropical fisheries governance reform that began roughly 10 years ago and has increased since. That portfolio of projects provides a relatively unique body of publicly available data on experiences in large-scale tropical fisheries reform efforts, including financial cost data. Each project includes a detailed project document summarizing field assessments and available data on the fisheries and existing governance

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frameworks, and where the project has been completed ex poste evaluations of outputs and to some extent outcomes are available. Within this dataset, two case studies from different types of fisheries and geographies were reviewed in detailed, one coastal in

West Africa, the other with small islands in the western Pacific.

The conceptual framework proved workable in the variety of tropical contexts and cases reviewed from the World Bank’s portfolio of projects (notably West Africa and the western Pacific, but also to a lesser extent Indonesia and Tanzania for example), and provides a practical tool for organizing information for detailed analysis of the types of governance reforms introduced in a given fishery SES and associated changes in measures of outcome indicators. Some of the key challenges in using the tool included the complexity of the systems studied, and the lack of data collection and monitoring undertaken in order to measure changes in fishery outcomes that may be associated with governance reforms.

5.1 Discussion of Results

Use of the fisheries governance tool to review the World Bank’s portfolio showed several common types of governance reforms supported with varying degrees of success in contributing towards reducing or preventing overfishing, including establishment of co-governance partnerships between the state and resource users to create (or in some cases return) management rights for the latter over coastal and multi- species sedentary fisheries near the coast; introduction of effort and catch rights in industrialized fisheries taking place farther offshore (i.e. small and large pelagic

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fisheries); and enhanced efforts of state agencies to support reforms, notably to increase compliance with existing rules.

In cases of coastal demersal fisheries reviewed, common types of tenure reforms included:

 Establishment of co-governance partnerships between the state and resource

users to create (or in some cases return) management rights for the latter over

coastal and multi-species sedentary fishery systems occurring in defined,

bounded and adjacent ocean spaces (Indonesia coral reef fisheries; coastal shelf

demersal fisheries in Tanzania, Vietnam and West Africa);

 Introduction of input controls for coastal industrial fishing fleets previously

regulated only through (relatively low levels of) taxation; and

 Enhanced efforts of state agencies to support these partnerships and enforce

community/user management rights, as well as enforce compliance with input

controls, through expanded extension efforts, increased capacity for

administration and monitoring of rules, and significant investments in

surveillance (e.g. establishing inter-agency fisheries monitoring centers linked

to satellite-based fishing vessel monitoring systems, expanded sea and aerial

patrols of fishing activity, etc.).

In the cases reviewed of migratory small and large pelagic fisheries (e.g. western

Pacific tuna, Peruvian anchoveta), where resource users typically invested much more

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in technology (i.e. ‘industrial fishing vessels’), the types of tenure reforms introduced focused on:

 Introduction of effort and catch rights (in the industrialized purse seine tuna and

anchoveta fishery systems of the western Pacific and Peru respectively); and

 Enhanced efforts of public agencies to support these reforms, notably for multi-

state cooperation in the case of the western Pacific.

A common feature of all of the cases of governance reforms reviewed, was the effort at a large spatial scale to introduce or strengthen the property rights characteristics of tenure in ocean fisheries. However, very few of these cases included sufficient data collection and monitoring to measure changes in indicators of fishery outcomes, such as the size and distribution of resource rent, or the biomass of targeted and associated stocks, maintenance of ecological structures, etc.

In those cases where data were sufficient to indicate changes in outcome measures, large-scale efforts by the state to create (or return) management rights to communities and resource users showed some success reducing overfishing in coastal demersal fisheries, for example in places like Indonesia and Senegal. However, the behavior change undertaken in these efforts took time, for at least five years in each case. In many of these cases, the state supported extension agents (acting as facilitators) to establish partnerships with communities, often helping community members to form new organizations (e.g. private associations of fishers in Senegal: ‘comites locaux des pecheurs’). In all cases, the community management rights resulted in the introduction

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of some form of new technical measures, and in some cases with increased catch rates subsequently observed. However none of the cases included the introduction of exclusion rights (e.g. TURFs). Essentially, reforming rules to strengthen the property rights that fishing communities exercised over access to ocean zones with sedentary species, contributed to achieving objectives of efficiency and increased equity to future generations in a number of cases, as well as (but not always) enhanced equity to present generations via greater inclusion in governance. Indeed a case could be made that the means to achieve increased efficiency in coastal demersal fisheries is to invest in more inclusive governance, for example through the state formalizing co-governance partnerships with resource users and communities, and in some cases recognizing community management rights.

Of course fishing communities are different in each context and heterogenous, so creation of community management rights by the state can still be prone to elite capture within communities (Davis and Ruddle, 2012), and fail to meet principles for equity present generations. In some of the cases reviewed, the lack of an exclusion right associated with community management rights became an obstacle to improved fishery outcomes, such as in Ngaparou, Senegal where increased catch rates in the stakeholder- managed zone attracted new and external entrants from neighboring waters, and created potential conflicts. This may be a reflection of the ‘patchy’ nature of the reform via a stepwise or ‘pilot’ approach, whereby neighboring communities did not have similar management rights created and supported by the state. Additionally, in some cases of community management rights, the management rights were not fully allocated by the state (or at least not perceived to be by resource users), as in Liberia where stakeholders

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felt the state had too much control in decision-making – essentially questioning the scope of their management rights. In all cases of community management rights, intensive government investment in facilitators and dialogue in order to build partnerships with stakeholders was required, as well as sustained external enforcement of stakeholder rules in some instances.

In the cases reviewed of the industrial anchoveta and tuna fisheries in Peru and the western Pacific respectively, the reforms moved governance towards the right of the above spectrum of property rights, to strengthen the property characteristics of access for users. In the case of the Pacific tuna fisheries, shortening the duration of access from one year to one day, but ensuring the terms of access to a migratory fishery were shared across the countries who are Parties to the Nauru Agreement, appears to have increased flexibility and hence efficiency for fleets, as they have been willing to pay more for access. At the same time, the enhanced cooperation among states has allowed for essentially a collective bargaining position vis-à-vis foreign fleets, whereby PNA members collectively agreed to a minimum ‘benchmark’ price for access to their waters. The increase in access fees that they have negotiated in five years has been exponential, from some $60 million in 2009 to an estimated $400 million in 2015. With this increase, the effort rights introduced in the Pacific have shown promise for increasing efficiency outcomes from the fishery, as well as ecological outcomes (based on relatively flat trends in fishing effort in PNA waters). However, rising catch levels at the spatial scale of the entire purse seine fishery system raise uncertainty about potential ecological outcomes, and a potential mis-match of rules to the spatial scale of

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the fishery system (as some 23 percent of catch occurs outside of PNA waters).

Similarly, effort creep appears to have been occurring, as the fleet changes behavior in response to the rules.

Interestingly, the cases reviewed in the World Bank’s portfolio included reform efforts for governance of coastal demersal fisheries (e.g. based on groupers, croakers and snappers) or of large pelagic fisheries (e.g. tuna), but with the exception of Peru or

Cape Verde, not small pelagic fish stocks (which constitute the largest proportion of the catch by volume off of the coast of West Africa). The large spatial scale at which these resources are distributed often renders them unaffected by localized management measures in coastal communities. In the few reform experiences tried (e.g. Cape Verde small pelagic fisheries, or the Peruvian anchoveta fishery), individual rights were created by tenure regimes to reflect the diversity and mobility of resource users. Hence, at the moment relatively few cases of large-scale governance reform of tropical small pelagic fisheries exist, though they may often constitute the largest proportion of the volume of the catch and of food fish consumed.

5.2 Conclusions

Building upon the literature and cases reviewed, key conclusions can be drawn about effort needed by tropical states to reform fisheries governance, based on the following assumptions:

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 Strengthened governance is one of the keys to reducing overfishing and

maintaining fishing effort at levels that can generate at least the maximum

sustainable yield;

 Traditional and customary governance of coastal demersal fisheries in the

tropics has in many cases been unable to adapt to site-specific combinations of:

(i) state appropriation of jurisdiction following the ratification of UNCLOS, (ii)

advances and in some cases industrialization of harvesting technology, (iii)

increased exposure and access to markets reflecting a growing global demand;

and

 State governance of migratory and generally industrialized fisheries for small

and large pelagics in the tropics has often failed to keep pace with the changes

in harvesting technology or growing demand.

 Hence, reform or strengthening of tropical fisheries governance begins with

the state in most cases.

Key Conclusion #1: Many tropical states lack the capacity to deliver fisheries governance reform at the spatial scales needed. For tropical states to reform and strengthen fisheries governance–in predominantly commercial fisheries (in some cases linked to global markets and supply chains) where economic incentives can be at least partially effective, yet the context for users is one of prevailing poverty in many cases and even insecure human rights–requires a capacity that is often missing. As demand, overfishing and resource scarcity grow in contexts of poverty, states in the cases reviewed appear to be increasingly turning to tenure reforms that provide some

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customized form of enhanced property rights to fishing access, located at different points along the spectrum based on the characteristics of the socio-ecological system.

Yet while such reforms and strengthened property rights hold the potential to increase efficiency outcomes and enhance equity to future generations (and in some of the cases reviewed such reforms have achieved these results)–carrying out the reforms in a way that is consistent with principles of equity to present generations is an incredibly complex task (perhaps beyond the capacity of any state or stakeholder exogenous to the community of users).

In fact, a common theme emerging in the review of all of the case studies, was that states were not up to this task of initiating governance reforms that simultaneously enhanced efficiency and equity to future generations, without compromising equity to present generations. State agencies reviewed in the case studies consistently displayed weak capacity to administer, monitor and enforce reforms, as many had been organized in the past around objectives of fisheries production. Such agencies were often the vertical entry points for reform given the large spatial scale targeted, but struggled to carry out large-scale extension efforts or diffuse monitoring and surveillance of fisheries. In the aggregate, the cases evoke Hilborn’s (2007) suggestion that actors focus on minimum reforms to ensure limited access while simultaneously working to enhance inclusion in governance institutions–in order to allow stakeholders to work through the governance process to find mutually agreed solutions over time. Such a suggestion seems particularly relevant for tropical fishery systems given their complexity and the emerging analyses of the challenges involved in their governability

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(Kooiman and Bavinck, 2013). The takeaway may well be that states should invest in greater inclusion in fisheries decision-making, and increased efficiency and sustainability would follow.

Some questions for further research may include: if far-ranging and complex governance reforms are to be initiated by states at large spatial scales, but tropical state agencies are often the weak link, why is this the case? Are such agencies the product of an institutional framework that consistently leads to such outcomes, or renders them particularly prone to rent-seeking? For example, in many of the cases reviewed, project implementation units (PIUs) responsible for leading reform efforts were comprised of consultants compensated at vastly different terms from agency officials, likely hampering collaboration. Given the importance of agency delivery of large-scale fisheries governance reforms, much greater analysis and understanding is needed of the incentive structures and functions of effective state agencies for fisheries governance in a given context, notably to enforce compliance with rules and to provide the services needed to limit access at a large spatial scale.

Key Conclusion #2: Many tropical states are not prepared for the financial costs and duration of the fisheries governance reform process. Given that many of the states in the tropics are considered as lower or lower-middle income countries with fewer public resources to invest in reform, the financial costs of introducing and administering/monitoring/enforcing new rules for ocean fishery systems are a significant factor for the introduction of these reforms. The financial costs, i.e. those

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costs incurred by states, of reforms in the cases was on the order of $245 million total, across 11 countries and one regional agency (i.e. the regional effort in the SWIOFP), over a period of 5 years maximum. The distribution of these financial costs was as follows:

US$ M 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Policy Development Organizational Compensation formulation/ and enactment of costs to for resource rent reform rule changes or administer, foregone new rules monitor and enforce rule changes

Source: www.worldbank.org

Figure 43. Distribution of financial costs of ocean fisheries governance reform in 7 cases

The costs of policy formulation and reform were relatively small across the cases, though this was often a relatively lengthy time process, while the majority of the costs were incurred in developing and enacting rule changes or new rules–generally the transaction costs of establishing and supporting community/stakeholder management rights in co-governance partnerships, and also the costs of enhancing operations of state organizations charged with supporting harvest rules, such as monitoring and surveillance to enhance compliance–essentially the enforcement costs.

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In terms of the financial costs of compensating foregone production and resource rent, there were relatively few cases where such compensation occurred. In West Africa, effort reductions were achieved by reducing illegal fishing effort and the industrial vessel buy-back in Senegal never occurred. Communities exercised management rights to introduce technical measures that led to local effort reductions in Senegal only, where some $1.5 million was allocated over five years to compensate local fishers for any foregone rent. Similarly in the Pacific Islands, the introduction of reforms in the purse seine fishery prior to overfishing, has offered the potential to avoid effort reductions and foregone rent, in favor of a cap or limit. The challenge in that context will be the increasing efficiency of the fleet, i.e. ‘effort creep,’ which could eventually lead to overfishing even if the current freeze or cap on fishing days is maintained. In three other projects, financing was provided directly for compensation to resource users for any resource rent foregone as a result of the introduction of new harvesting rules, taking very different forms (revolving micro-credit funds in Indonesia, small grant funds in Tanzania, and early retirement funds in Peru). However, foregone harvests and rents as a result of reforms, compared to a counterfactual without the reforms, were not estimated (and likely cost-prohibitive to do at scale for hundreds or thousands of community-based fleets).

More broadly, the scale of financing for reform–some $245 million in 11 countries over

5 years –is both significant and yet a fraction of the ocean fishery systems in many of these countries: representing seven districts in eastern Indonesia, four out of nine

Pacific Island Countries, 10 percent of the EEZ in Tanzania, just under 20 pilot sites

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for coastal sedentary fishery systems in four countries of West Africa, etc. The duration of reform has been a minimum of five years in these cases, with many efforts still ongoing after this period.

Key Conclusion #3: For commercial ocean fishery systems in the tropics, governance reform efforts may continue to push rules for tenure towards the right on the spectrum of strength in property rights. Care must be taken in extrapolating from case studies

(Miles and Huberman, 1994), and certainly it is not possible to generalize from the small sample size of cases reviewed. In these cases, as mentioned previously in every instance reforms to rules concentrated on enhancing the property rights characteristics of fishing access to some degree. Should such reforms become a more widespread response to scarcity and sustainability concerns in tropical fisheries, then significant care would need to be taken to ensure that they are carried out in such a way that is consistent with internationally-agreed principles for equity to present generations, notably for poverty reduction. Where the context and organizations allow, enhanced management rights for users may be a first step in strengthening property rights, in a manner consistent with equity principles.

Key Conclusion #4: A mis-match between the spatial scale of the ecological sub-system and the rules governing the interaction with the social sub-system was prevalent in the cases reviewed. Tropical ocean fishery systems are often based upon multiple species distributed over varying geographic ranges, which may rarely overlap with jurisdictional boundaries. Hence, there has often been a challenge to match rules to the

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spatial scale of the ecological sub-system, such that they govern all of the fishing behavior affecting the sub-system. Addressing this challenge begins with clearly defining the boundaries of the resource and the system, as a basis for use and rules, and then subsequently the definition of inclusive institutions for rules of their use.

Key Conclusion #5: Improved monitoring and analysis of the association between fisheries governance reforms and outcomes in a SES framework is needed. This research has suggested a tool to expand and precise the classification of fisheries governance reforms, embedded within a larger SES framework in order to begin to correlate such reforms to changes in outcome measures. Greater empirical analysis will be needed of large-scale fisheries governance reforms in order to determine causality, beginning with increased collection of data on governance and outcome variables in a given SES. Perhaps some of the most important data gaps in correlating governance reforms to outcomes in tropical fisheries are on the interactions between the social and ecological systems, in terms of fishing effort and catch, as well as the indicators of system outcomes such as the size and distribution of resource rent, and the biomass of targeted and associated stocks, as well the status of ecological structures supporting targeted stocks. For example, Table 38 summarizes from Chapter Three some key indicators that could be monitored in order to assess the impacts of governance reforms in a given ocean fishery SES, focusing on the ecological, social and governance sub-systems. These proposed indicators should be measured over time in a greater number of Tropical SESs, essentially before (i.e. baseline) and after the introduction of governance reforms, in order to give an indication of the change in the

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outcomes as a result of the reforms. In particular, changes in fishing effort (or catch per unit of fishing effort) and resource rent, may be instructive in the correlation of governance reforms to outcomes.

Table 38. Variables for Indicators for the Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Ocean Fisheries Governance Reforms

Interactions  Fishing effort (by fleet)  Fish catch (by targeted stocks)

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Recommendations for design of tropical fisheries governance reforms. With the assumption that tropical fisheries governance reform begins with action by the state in most cases, this research has suggested 5 key conclusions:

1. Many tropical states lack the capacity to deliver fisheries governance reform at

the spatial scales needed;

2. Many tropical states are not prepared for the significant financial costs and

duration of the fisheries governance reform process;

3. For commercial ocean fishery systems in the tropics, governance reform efforts may

continue to push rules for tenure towards the right on the spectrum of strength in

property rights, but ensuring equity for present generations may be a concern;

4. A mismatch between the spatial scale of the ecological sub-system and the rules

governing the interaction with the social sub-system was prevalent in the cases

reviewed; and

5. Improved monitoring and analysis of the association between fisheries

governance reforms and outcomes in a SES framework is needed.

Given these conclusions, the following six steps are recommended to guide tropical states as they identify and design fisheries governance reforms:

1. Define the boundaries of the system (to avoid a spatial mismatch between the

rules and the ecological sub-system) and identify the specific vertical entry

points for reform (i.e. spatial scales, jurisdictions of origin and levels), knowing

that some may be nested within others;

2. Via modeling or empirical observation, develop reforms associated to changes

in the outcome measure for efficiency and for equity to future generations

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(incorporating expected changes in fishing behavior in response to governance

changes, and expected changes in ecological units as a result of changed fishing

behavior, and ultimately changes in outcome measure for current efficiency of

the system and equity to future generations);

3. Ensure these proposed governance reforms are consistent with universally-

agreed principles of equity to present and future generations (acknowledging

the gaps in current metrics to measure progress towards specific equity policy

objectives);

4. Estimate the financial costs of the proposed reforms over time, including

compensation for foregone production where needed;

5. Carry out a ‘reality check’ or feasibility assessment on the capacity of the

responsible agency to deliver the reforms, including political feasibility and

‘governability’ from the literature on political economy (and particularly the

distribution of the perceived economic costs of reforms); and

6. Introduce enhanced monitoring of governance and SES outcome measures

together with the reforms.

Implications for the SDG target to end overfishing by 2020. Given the deadline of 2020, and the mixed picture of success (as well as lack of data) in the cases reviewed here, a note of caution may be warranted as to the scale of reform efforts needed in tropical ocean fishery systems in order to meet the SDG target. The World Bank invested some

$245 million in fisheries governance reforms in West Africa, the Pacific Islands, 6 districts of eastern Indonesia, Tanzania and Vietnam, without yet measuring clear and

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sustainable results for ending overfishing (though a measurable reductions have taken place in each of these cases). Even if much more external financing became available, in the cases reviewed the characteristics of reform suggest the six-step process proposed above will take years in most tropical contexts. In particular, the ability of state agencies in tropical developing countries to deliver this reform process is doubtful, given weak capacity and incentives that are often aligned with the current distribution of benefits. Hence at the current rate of governance reform across the tropics, the SDG target seems unlikely to be met by 2020 (or even 2030). Essentially, the scope and complexity of the governance reform task required is massive, and likely beyond the financial means or timeframe of most. A much greater understanding and dissection of context-specific governance reforms will be needed if the picture and outlook for ending overfishing in the tropics is to change, and this dissertation has aimed to provide conceptual tools and empirical reviews to contribute towards this priority field of research.

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