The Tor Project
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The Tor Project Our mission is to be the global resource for technology, advocacy, research and education in the ongoing pursuit of freedom of speech, privacy rights online, and censorship circumvention. 1 ● Online Anonymity – Open Source – Open Network ● Community of researchers, developers, users and relay operators. ● U.S. 50 !c)!#" non$ profit or&anization 2 Estimated 2,000,000 to 8,000,000 daily Tor users 3 Threat model: what can the attacker do? Alice Anonymity network Bob watch Alice! watch (or be!) Bob! Control part of the network! 4 Anonymity isn't encryption: Encryption just protects contents. “Hi, Bob!” “Hi, Bob!” Alice <gibberish> attacker Bob 5 6 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. Anonymity “It's privacy!” Private citizens 7 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. Anonymity Businesses “It's network security!” “It's privacy!” Private citizens 8 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. “It's traffic-analysis resistance!” Governments Anonymity Businesses “It's network security!” “It's privacy!” Private citizens 9 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. Human rights “It's reachability!” “It's traffic-analysis activists resistance!” Governments Anonymity Businesses “It's network security!” “It's privacy!” Private citizens 10 The simplest designs use a single relay to hide connections. Alice1 Bob1 E(B ob3 ” ,“X “Y ”) Relay Alice2 E(Bob1, “Y”) “Z” Bob2 ”) “X , “Z ” ob2 Alice3 E(B Bob3 (example: some commercial proxy providers) 11 But a central relay is a single point of failure. Alice1 Bob1 E(B ob3 ” ,“X “Y ”) Evil Alice2 E(Bob1, “Y”) Relay “Z” Bob2 ”) “X , “Z ” ob2 Alice3 E(B Bob3 12 ... or a single point of bypass. Alice1 Bob1 E(B ob3 ” ,“X “Y ”) Irrelevant Alice2 E(Bob1, “Y”) Relay “Z” Bob2 ”) “X , “Z ” ob2 Alice3 E(B Bob3 Timing analysis bridges all connections through relay ⇒ An attractive fat target 13 So, add multiple relays so that no single one can betray Alice. Alice Bob R1 R3 R4 R5 R2 14 Alice makes a session key with R1 ...And then tunnels to R2...and to R3 Alice Bob R1 R3 Bob2 R4 R5 R2 15 16 17 18 19 Tor's safety comes from diversity ● #1: Diversity of relays. The more relays we have and the more diverse they are, the fewer attackers are in a position to do traffic confirmation. (Research problem: measuring diversity over time) ● #2: Diversity of users and reasons to use it. 50000 users in Iran means almost all of them are normal citizens. 20 Transparency for Tor is key ● Open source / free software ● Public design documents and specifications ● Publicly identified developers ● Not a contradiction: privacy is about choice! 21 But what about bad people? ● Remember the millions of daily users. ● Still a two-edged sword? ● Good people need Tor much more than bad guys need it. 22 23 24 25 26 Alice Alice Alice Blocked Alice User Alice R3 Blocked Alice R4 User Bob Alice Blocked R2 User Alice R1 Blocked Alice User Alice Alice Blocked Alice User Alice Alice 28 Pluggable transports 30 Pluggable transports ● Flashproxy (Stanford), websocket ● FTEProxy (Portland St), http via regex ● Stegotorus (SRI/CMU), http ● Skypemorph (Waterloo), Skype video ● uProxy (Google), webrtc ● ScrambleSuit (Karlstad), obfs-based ● Telex (Michigan/Waterloo), traffic divert 31 32 33 35 36 37 38 39 “Still the King of high secure, low latency Internet Anonymity” Contenders for the throne: ● None 40 Alice Alice Alice Blocked Alice User Alice R3 Blocked Alice R4 User Bob Alice Blocked R2 User Alice R1 Blocked Alice User Alice Alice Blocked Alice User Alice Alice 41 42 44 Arms races ● Censorship arms race is bad ● Surveillance arms race is worse – And centralization of the Internet makes it worse still 45 46 Onion Service 47 Onion service properties ● Self authenticated ● End-to-end encrypted ● Built-in NAT punching ● Limit surface area ● No need to “exit” from Tor 48 49 50 q 51 52 53 SecureDrop Today, 30+ organizations use SecureDrop https://securedrop.org/directory 54 Ricochet 55 OnionShare 56 Tor isn't foolproof ● Opsec mistakes ● Browser metadata fingerprints ● Browser exploits ● Traffic analysis 57 How can you help? ● Run a relay (or a bridge) ● Teach your friends about Tor, and privacy in general ● Help find -- and fix – bugs ● Work on open research problems (petsymposium.org) ● donate.torproject.org 58 Relay operator meetup, today 15:00 today in room H.3244 59 ooni.torproject.org 60 explorer.ooni.torproject.org ● I 61.