A Privacy Threat for Internet Users in Internet-Censoring Countries
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PVC Technical Specifications V.1.0
Pryvate™ Ltd. Functional & Technical Specifications PVC Technical Specifications V.1.0 APRIL 10, 2018 © PRYVATE™ 2018. PRYVATE™ is a suite of security products from Criptyque Ltd. Registered in the Cayman Islands. PRYVATE™ Is a brand wholly owned by CRIPTYQUE Ltd. Pryvate™ Ltd. Functional & Technical Specifications TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 GENERAL INFORMATION 5 1.1 Scope 1.2 Current Platform Summary 2 FUNCTIONAL TECH SPECIFICATIONS 5 2.1 Encrypted Voice Calls (VOIP) 2.2 Off Net Calling 2.3 Secure Conferencing 2.4 Encrypted Video Calls 2.5 Encrypted Instant Message (IM) 2.6 Notification of Screenshots 2.7 Encrypted Email 2.8 Secure File Transfer & Storage 2.9 Pin-Encrypted Mobile Protection 2.10 Multiple Account Management 2.11 Secure managed conversations 2.12 Anti-Blocking 3 HYBRIDIZATION 13 3.1 Voice / Video / Messaging 3.2 File Storage / Archival 3.3 Pryvate Crypto Wallet 3.3.1 Two-Wallet Solution 3.3.2 Three Methods 3.3.3 Enterprise Multi - by Pryvate 3.3.4 Risks of Cryptocurrency Wallets 3.4 Decentralized Email 3.5 Pryvate Dashboard 4 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 20 4.1 System Maintenance 4.2 Failure Contingencies 4.3 Customization and Flexibility 4.4 Equipment 4.5 Software 4.6 Interface / UI 5 CONCLUSION 21 6 APPENDIX 22 © PRYVATE™ 2018. PRYVATE™ is a suite of security products from Criptyque Ltd. Registered in the Cayman Islands. PRYVATE™ Is a brand wholly owned by CRIPTYQUE Ltd. Pryvate™ Ltd. Functional & Technical Specifications Acronyms: Definitions SCP = Secure Communications Platform Crypto= Cryptocurrency IPFS= Interplanetary File System ZRTP= ("Z" is a reference to its inventor, Zimmermann; "RTP" stands for Real-time Transport Protocol) it is a cryptographic key-agreement protocol to negotiate the keys for encryption between two end points in a Voice over Internet Protocol Diffie-Hellman= A method of securely exchanging cryptographic keys over a public channel and was one of the first public-key protocols as originally conceptualized by Ralph Merkle and named after Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. -
Internet Censorship and Resistance May 15, 2009 1 / 32 Historical Censorship
INTERNET CENSORSHIP AND RESISTANCE Joseph Bonneau [email protected] (thanks to Steven Murdoch) Computer Laboratory Gates Scholars' Symposium 2010 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Internet Censorship and Resistance May 15, 2009 1 / 32 Historical Censorship He who controls the past controls the future, and he who controls the present controls the past —George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty Four, 1949 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Internet Censorship and Resistance May 15, 2009 2 / 32 Historical Censorship He who controls the past controls the future, and he who controls the present controls the past —George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty Four, 1949 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Internet Censorship and Resistance May 15, 2009 2 / 32 Information as a Human Right Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres- sion; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without inter- ference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. —Article 19, UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Internet Censorship and Resistance May 15, 2009 3 / 32 Information as a Human Right The final freedom, one that was probably inherent in what both President and Mrs. Roosevelt thought about and wrote about all those years ago, ... is the freedom to connect—the idea that governments should not prevent people from con- necting to the internet, to websites, or to each other... a new information curtain is descending across much of the world. —Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State (2010) Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) Internet Censorship and Resistance May 15, 2009 3 / 32 The Internet Dream The Net treats censorship as damage and routes around it. -
Everyone's Guide to Bypassing Internet Censorship
EVERYONE’S GUIDE TO BY-PASSING INTERNET CENSORSHIP FOR CITIZENS WORLDWIDE A CIVISEC PROJECT The Citizen Lab The University of Toronto September, 2007 cover illustration by Jane Gowan Glossary page 4 Introduction page 5 Choosing Circumvention page 8 User self-assessment Provider self-assessment Technology page 17 Web-based Circumvention Systems Tunneling Software Anonymous Communications Systems Tricks of the trade page 28 Things to remember page 29 Further reading page 29 Circumvention Technologies Circumvention technologies are any tools, software, or methods used to bypass Inter- net filtering. These can range from complex computer programs to relatively simple manual steps, such as accessing a banned website stored on a search engine’s cache, instead of trying to access it directly. Circumvention Providers Circumvention providers install software on a computer in a non-filtered location and make connections to this computer available to those who access the Internet from a censored location. Circumvention providers can range from large commercial organi- zations offering circumvention services for a fee to individuals providing circumven- tion services for free. Circumvention Users Circumvention users are individuals who use circumvention technologies to bypass Internet content filtering. 4 Internet censorship, or content filtering, has become a major global problem. Whereas once it was assumed that states could not control Internet communications, according to research by the OpenNet Initiative (http://opennet.net) more than 25 countries now engage in Internet censorship practices. Those with the most pervasive filtering policies have been found to routinely block access to human rights organi- zations, news, blogs, and web services that challenge the status quo or are deemed threatening or undesirable. -
Shedding Light on Mobile App Store Censorship
Shedding Light on Mobile App Store Censorship Vasilis Ververis Marios Isaakidis Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany University College London, London, UK [email protected] [email protected] Valentin Weber Benjamin Fabian Centre for Technology and Global Affairs University of Telecommunications Leipzig (HfTL) University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT KEYWORDS This paper studies the availability of apps and app stores across app stores, censorship, country availability, mobile applications, countries. Our research finds that users in specific countries do China, Russia not have access to popular app stores due to local laws, financial reasons, or because countries are on a sanctions list that prohibit ACM Reference Format: Vasilis Ververis, Marios Isaakidis, Valentin Weber, and Benjamin Fabian. foreign businesses to operate within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, 2019. Shedding Light on Mobile App Store Censorship. In 27th Conference this paper presents a novel methodology for querying the public on User Modeling, Adaptation and Personalization Adjunct (UMAP’19 Ad- search engines and APIs of major app stores (Google Play Store, junct), June 9–12, 2019, Larnaca, Cyprus. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 6 pages. Apple App Store, Tencent MyApp Store) that is cross-verified by https://doi.org/10.1145/3314183.3324965 network measurements. This allows us to investigate which apps are available in which country. We primarily focused on the avail- ability of VPN apps in Russia and China. Our results show that 1 INTRODUCTION despite both countries having restrictive VPN laws, there are still The widespread adoption of smartphones over the past decade saw many VPN apps available in Russia and only a handful in China. -
Psiphon User Guide
PSIPHON USER GUIDE Psiphon is a free and open source web proxy that helps internet users bypass content-filtering systems used by governments in countries like China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. It was developed by the Citizen Lab's CiviSec Project at the University of Toronto and was first released in December 2006. In this how to guide, learn how to provide a proxy service to someone behind a firewall with psiphon . If you are behind a firewall and want to learn how to connect to psiphon and access blocked content, check out this how to guide . Psiphon, unlike other circumvention services, is not intended to be a public, open proxy service. It’s based on a “web of trust” system so psiphon nodes are harder to block. What this means is that a person in an unrestricted location (one that is not behind a firewall) provides a psiphon proxy service to a person they are familiar with who is going online in a place where online access is limited. This is known as a psiphonode . A psiphonite is a psiphon user living in a censored country. The psiphonite connects to a psiphonode (set up by someone they know and trust) to access information freely. NOTE: Psiphon only works on Windows and Linux. There is no Mac version yet. Step 1. First, you should be in a location where you have open access to the internet. You should know someone in another location where access is limited. You will be providing a psiphonode for this person. Tip! If you do not know any psiphon users, but still want to provide a psiphonode, you can find users on psiphon’s Facebook page or Twitter page. -
Threat Modeling and Circumvention of Internet Censorship by David Fifield
Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship By David Fifield A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Professor Deirdre Mulligan Professor Vern Paxson Fall 2017 1 Abstract Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship by David Fifield Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Research on Internet censorship is hampered by poor models of censor behavior. Censor models guide the development of circumvention systems, so it is important to get them right. A censor model should be understood not just as a set of capabilities|such as the ability to monitor network traffic—but as a set of priorities constrained by resource limitations. My research addresses the twin themes of modeling and circumvention. With a grounding in empirical research, I build up an abstract model of the circumvention problem and examine how to adapt it to concrete censorship challenges. I describe the results of experiments on censors that probe their strengths and weaknesses; specifically, on the subject of active probing to discover proxy servers, and on delays in their reaction to changes in circumvention. I present two circumvention designs: domain fronting, which derives its resistance to blocking from the censor's reluctance to block other useful services; and Snowflake, based on quickly changing peer-to-peer proxy servers. I hope to change the perception that the circumvention problem is a cat-and-mouse game that affords only incremental and temporary advancements. -
Array AG 9.4 CLI Handbook
Array AG 9.4 CLI Handbook Copyright Statement Copyright Statement Copyright©2000-2018 Array Networks, Inc., 1371 McCarthy Blvd, Milpitas, California 95035, USA. All rights reserved. This document is protected by copyright and distributed under licenses restricting its use, copying, distribution, and compilation. No part of this document can be reproduced in any form by any means without prior written authorization of Array Networks. Documentation is provided “as is” without warranty of any kind, either express or implied, including any kind of implied or express warranty of non-infringement or the implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. Array Networks reserves the right to change any products described herein at any time, and without notice. Array Networks assumes no responsibility or liability arising from the use of products described herein, except as expressly agreed to in writing by Array Networks. The use and purchase of this product does not convey a license to any patent copyright, or trademark rights, or any other intellectual property rights of Array Networks. Warning: Modifications made to the Array Networks unit, unless expressly approved by Array Networks, could void the user’s authority to operate the equipment. Declaration of Conformity We, Array Networks, Inc., 1371 McCarthy Blvd, Milpitas, CA 95035, 1-866-692-7729; declare under our sole responsibility that the product(s) Array Networks, Array Appliance complies with Part 15 of FCC Rules. Operation is subject to the following two conditions: (1) this device can not cause harmful interference, and (2) this device must accept any interference received, including interference that can cause undesired operation. -
Blockchain: an Enabler for Power Market Operations Exploring Potential Uses of Distributed Ledger Technology in the Evolving Georgian Power Market
BLOCKCHAIN: AN ENABLER FOR POWER MARKET OPERATIONS EXPLORING POTENTIAL USES OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY IN THE EVOLVING GEORGIAN POWER MARKET USAID GOVERNING FOR GROWTH (G4G) IN GEORGIA 30 May 2019 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Deloitte Consulting LLP. The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. BLOCKCHAIN: AN ENABLER FOR POWER MARKET OPERATIONS EXPLORING POTENTIAL USES OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY IN THE EVOLVING GEORGIAN POWER MARKET USAID GOVERNING FOR GROWTH (G4G) IN GEORGIA CONTRACT NUMBER: AID-114-C-14-00007 DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP USAID | GEORGIA USAID CONTRACTING OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVE: PHILLIP GREENE AUTHOR(S): SRI SEKAR, JAMES CALLIHAN, AVTANDILI TODUA ACTIVITY AREA: 4420 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 30 MAY 2019 DISCLAIMER: This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Deloitte Consulting LLP. The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. USAID | GOVERNING FOR GROWTH (G4G) IN GEORGIA BLOCKCHAIN: AN ENABLER FOR POWER MARKET OPERATIONS i DATA Reviewed by: Giorgi Giorgobiani, Andrea Lora Project Component: Energy Trade Policy Improvement Component Practice Area: Electricity Trading Mechanism (ETM) Key Words: Blockchain, -
W Shekatkar Committee Report W Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan W
MONTHLY MAGAZINE FOR TNPSC EXAMS MAY–2020 w Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan w Cleanest City List w Shekatkar Committee Report w Konark Sun Temple w Char Dham Project w Samagra Shiksha Abhiyan VETRII IAS STUDY CIRCLE TNPSC CURRENT AFFAIRS MAY - 2020 An ISO 9001 : 2015 Institution | Providing Excellence Since 2011 Head Office Old No.52, New No.1, 9th Street, F Block, 1st Avenue Main Road, (Near Istha siddhi Vinayakar Temple), Anna Nagar East – 600102. Phone: 044-2626 5326 | 98844 72636 | 98844 21666 | 98844 32666 Branches SALEM KOVAI No.189/1, Meyanoor Road, Near ARRS Multiplex, (Near Salem New No.347, D.S.Complex (3rd floor), Nehru Street,Near Gandhipuram bus Stand), Opp. Venkateshwara Complex, Salem - 636004. Central Bus Stand, Ramnagar, Kovai - 9 0427-2330307 | 95001 22022 75021 65390 Educarreerr Location Vivekanandha Educational Institutions for Women, Elayampalayam, Tiruchengode - TK Namakkal District - 637 205. 04288 - 234670 | 91 94437 34670 Patrician College of Arts and Science, 3, Canal Bank Rd, Gandhi Nagar, Opposite to Kotturpuram Railway Station, Adyar, Chennai - 600020. 044 - 24401362 | 044 - 24426913 Sree Saraswathi Thyagaraja College Palani Road, Thippampatti, Pollachi - 642 107 73737 66550 | 94432 66008 | 90951 66009 www.vetriias.com My Dear Aspirants, Greetings to all of you! “What we think we become” Gautama Buddha. We all have dreams. To make dreams come into reality it takes a lot of determination, dedication, self discipline and continuous effort. We at VETRII IAS Study Circle are committed to provide the right guidance, quality coaching and help every aspirants to achieve his or her life’s cherished goal of becoming a civil servant. -
A Framework for Identifying Host-Based Artifacts in Dark Web Investigations
Dakota State University Beadle Scholar Masters Theses & Doctoral Dissertations Fall 11-2020 A Framework for Identifying Host-based Artifacts in Dark Web Investigations Arica Kulm Dakota State University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.dsu.edu/theses Part of the Databases and Information Systems Commons, Information Security Commons, and the Systems Architecture Commons Recommended Citation Kulm, Arica, "A Framework for Identifying Host-based Artifacts in Dark Web Investigations" (2020). Masters Theses & Doctoral Dissertations. 357. https://scholar.dsu.edu/theses/357 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Beadle Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses & Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Beadle Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING HOST-BASED ARTIFACTS IN DARK WEB INVESTIGATIONS A dissertation submitted to Dakota State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Cyber Defense November 2020 By Arica Kulm Dissertation Committee: Dr. Ashley Podhradsky Dr. Kevin Streff Dr. Omar El-Gayar Cynthia Hetherington Trevor Jones ii DISSERTATION APPROVAL FORM This dissertation is approved as a credible and independent investigation by a candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy in Cyber Defense degree and is acceptable for meeting the dissertation requirements for this degree. Acceptance of this dissertation does not imply that the conclusions reached by the candidate are necessarily the conclusions of the major department or university. Student Name: Arica Kulm Dissertation Title: A Framework for Identifying Host-based Artifacts in Dark Web Investigations Dissertation Chair: Date: 11/12/20 Committee member: Date: 11/12/2020 Committee member: Date: Committee member: Date: Committee member: Date: iii ACKNOWLEDGMENT First, I would like to thank Dr. -
Decoy Routing: Toward Unblockable Internet Communication
Decoy Routing: Toward Unblockable Internet Communication Josh Karlin Daniel Ellard Alden W. Jackson Christine E. Jones [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Greg Lauer David P. Mankins W. Timothy Strayer [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Raytheon BBN Technologies an indirect method, such as a proxy server placed out- side of the filtered network. At a high level, this is the Abstract mechanism used by popular services such as Tor [13], Global Pass [4], and anonymizer.com [2]. Clients con- We present decoy routing, a mechanism capable of cir- nect to a server located outside of the filtered network, cumventing common network filtering strategies. Unlike and the server connects to the blacklisted destination on other circumvention techniques, decoy routing does not the client’s behalf. Although these services use differ- require a client to connect to a specific IP address (which ent techniques (VPNs, SOCKS proxies, HTTP proxies, is easily blocked) in order to provide circumvention. We content forwarders) we categorize them collectively as a show that if it is possible for a client to connect to any circumvention proxy or proxy. unblocked host/service, then decoy routing could be used to connect them to a blocked destination without coop- The problem with the proxy approach to circumven- eration from the host. This is accomplished by placing tion is that the adversary can also blacklist the circum- the circumvention service in the network itself – where vention proxy, preventing communication between the a single device could proxy traffic between a significant client and the proxy. -
Style Counsel: Seeing the (Random) Forest for the Trees in Adversarial Code Stylometry∗
Style Counsel: Seeing the (Random) Forest for the Trees in Adversarial Code Stylometry∗ Christopher McKnight Ian Goldberg Magnet Forensics University of Waterloo [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT worm based on an examination of the reverse-engineered code [17], The results of recent experiments have suggested that code stylom- casting style analysis as a forensic technique. etry can successfully identify the author of short programs from This technique, however, may be used to chill speech for soft- among hundreds of candidates with up to 98% precision. This poten- ware developers. There are several cases of developers being treated tial ability to discern the programmer of a code sample from a large as individuals of suspicion, intimidated by authorities and/or co- group of possible authors could have concerning consequences for erced into removing their software from the Internet. In the US, the open-source community at large, particularly those contrib- Nadim Kobeissi, the Canadian creator of Cryptocat (an online se- utors that may wish to remain anonymous. Recent international cure messaging application) was stopped, searched, and questioned events have suggested the developers of certain anti-censorship by Department of Homeland Security officials on four separate oc- and anti-surveillance tools are being targeted by their governments casions in 2012 about Cryptocat and the algorithms it employs [16]. and forced to delete their repositories or face prosecution. In November 2014, Chinese developer Xu Dong was arrested, pri- In light of this threat to the freedom and privacy of individual marily for political tweets, but also because he allegedly “committed programmers around the world, we devised a tool, Style Counsel, to crimes of developing software to help Chinese Internet users scale aid programmers in obfuscating their inherent style and imitating the Great Fire Wall of China” [4] in relation to proxy software he another, overt, author’s style in order to protect their anonymity wrote.