Review no. 82

Press Review 1—15 December 2014

Table of Contents Pages

African Union

- 8e réunion des points focaux de lutte antiterroriste : Le CAERT a réalisé des résultats tangibles 4 - Le représentant de l’Union africaine :« Une évaluation des mécanismes de sécurité est nécessaire pour une lutte efficace contre le terrorisme 7

Terrorism in Africa

Algeria - Alger et Paris inquiets d’un possible déploiement de Daech vers le Sahel 8

CAR - The Central African Republic’s Hidden Conflict 11 - En Centrafrique, Sangaris a empêché le pire 13 - Opération Sangaris: peu à peu, Bangui reprend vie 15

Cameroon - Le parlement camerounais Cameroun vote une loi controversée sur le terrorisme 17

Egypt - Opinion: Egypt faces a war on several fronts 19 - Egypt’s experience is critical to teach others about terror 21

Kenya - Look no further, the jihadi enemy is here with us - not in Somalia 22

Libya - Focus on Libya before it’s too late 24

Mali - Mali et militarisation du Sahel 27

Nigeria - Boko Haram: The Other Islamic State 30 - Islamic Stat Has Spread its Influence to Nigeria's Boko Haram Terrorists 34 - PR Expert Analyses Boko Haram 36

Rwanda - Time Is Now for a Joint Regional Fight against Terror 40

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Somalia - Somalia: The CIA’s Secret Sites in Mogadishu 41 - Terrorism: Sugar and charcoal barons sleeping with enemy 46

Tunisia - Tunisia remains in the crosshairs of the Libyan war 50

International Organization

UN - West Africa: As Sahel Faces Mounting Threats, UN Envoy Urges Security Council to Remain Engaged in Region 53

Terrorism in the world

- REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SOURCES OF INSECURITY 55

France - I'm a jihadist...get me out of here 58

Iraq - Un Ontarien lance un appel au djihad 60 - Le groupe EI "en train d'être stoppé" mais le combat va durer des années 63 - Thomas Friedman: Islamic State is driving Muslims from 66

Jordan - La lutte contre l'EI, une «Troisième guerre mondiale», dit le roi de Jordanie 69

Syria - La Syrie accuse Israël d'avoir mené deux raids près de Damas 71

United Kingdom - Myopic global war on terror is not winning hearts and minds 74

USA - Congress must step up to challenge of ISIS 77 - Torture And Public Opinion: Prior To CIA Report, Many Americans Supported ‘Harsh’ Interrogations To Prevent Terrorism 79 - Washington défend son opération de sauvetage ratée 81

Yemen - 's al-Qaida blames Obama for hostage deaths 84 - Qui était Luke Somers, le journaliste américain tué par Al-Qaïda au Yémen ? 87

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African Union

8e réunion des points focaux de lutte antiterroriste : Le CAERT a réali- sé des résultats tangibles Le Centre africain d’études et de recherche sur le terrorisme a organisé, hier en son siège, la 8e réunion des points focaux de lutte antiterroriste 08-12-2014

Le Centre africain d’études et de recherche sur le terrorisme a organisé, hier en son siège, la 8e réunion des points focaux de lutte antiterroriste. Cette réunion de deux jours, qui coïncide avec la célébration du 10e anniversaire du centre est l’occasion de passer en revue le plan d’activité du CAERT de 2014 et d’analyser la situation actuelle du terrorisme sur le continent. Cette réunion vise également à coordonner l’action sur la lutte antiterroriste et s’accorder sur les dé- marches appropriées pour faire progresser les objectifs de la lutte contre le terro- risme en Afrique. La 8e réunion aura été surtout l’occasion de faire l’évaluation du

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centre depuis sa création en 2004. Dans son allocution d’ouverture, le directeur du CAERT, M. Madeira, a ainsi rappelé que le continent est toujours confronté à cette menace pernicieuse qu’est le terrorisme. Pis, dit-il, cette menace, en dépit des efforts déployés pour la combattre, est expansionnelle, car l’environnement qui règne aujourd’hui en Afrique correspond à ce que les terroristes recherchent pour mener leurs «objectifs djihadistes». Il indique que le continent a adopté toute une série d’action en vue d’y faire face, le CAERT en fait parti. Sa création répondait à une préoccupation croissante des dirigeants africains. Aujourd’hui, cette réunion nous offre l’opportunité d’évaluer les actions du centre et son impact sécuritaire en Afrique. Le CAERT est un outil pour lutter et galvaniser le plan africain de lutte contre le terrorisme. Le rôle joué par l’Algérie, qui a accueilli ce centre et qui a mis à sa disposition tous les moyens humains et matériels afin qu’il accomplisse au mieux sa mission a été salué par son directeur. Il constitue aujourd’hui une banque de données mise à la disposition des États africains qui luttent contre ce fléau. Mais pas seulement, puisque il a initié des programmes de formation et assiste les États africains dans leurs efforts d’éradication du terrorisme.

C’est pourquoi, dit le directeur du centre dans son allocution d’ouverture, «nous avons réalisé des résultats tangibles à travers nos points focaux». Toutefois, M. Ma- deira ne manque pas de relever que ce travail s’est fait «avec certaines difficultés». Il cite entre autres le manque d’effectifs et de ressources qui sont, souligne-t-il, «presque inexistantes». Ces difficultés minimisent l’action sur le terrain au moment où la menace rapide du terrorisme prévaut toujours. «La situation sécuritaire de- meure instable en dépit des améliorations», fait-il remarquer. La persistance des crises et conflits armés est selon lui une aubaine pour les activités criminelles et terroristes. Plus encore, cette situation encourage l’embrigadement de nouvelles recrues parmi les jeunes de ces pays. Pour le directeur du CAERT, cette situation exige une approche collective. Il a appelé au soutien de tous les États africains et partenaires étrangers pour trouver les moyens politiques et économiques qui per- mettront d’éviter aux jeunes de se faire embrigader par les groupes terroristes. Il faut de la prévention, une adaptation de la législation en vue de criminaliser tous les actes terroristes, traduire les leaders devant les tribunaux. Il faut aussi doter les points focaux de tous les moyens technologiques modernes et de communication.

Ces moyens permettront de renforcer les capacités du centre. Le CAERT qui veut poursuivre sa mission au profit des États africains recommande, par la voix de son directeur, l’engagement et l’appui de ces États. Ce n’est qu’à ce prix qu’il pourra réaliser ses objectifs et conforter son mandat. Intervenant dans son sillage, l’ambassadeur de Mauritanie à Alger représentant du président de l’Union afri- caine rappelle que «le terrorisme n’épargne aucune région et est, notamment pré- sent dans celle sahélo-sahélienne». L’absence de développement dans cette région est un facteur favorable à la présence de groupes terroristes et de réseaux de tra- fic. Cette présence est, dit-il, une préoccupation pour nos pays. Le risque de me-

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nace est démultiplié par les crises et conflits qui existent, notamment au Mali et en Libye. Cette situation encourage les terroristes qui veulent faire de cette région leur sanctuaire. Malgré les revers importants subis, l’insécurité persiste et la menace terroriste connaît une extension vers d’autres pays car ces groupes, fait-il remar- quer, ont une grande adaptation de nuisance. Les djihadistes veulent s’implanter durablement au Nord Mali qui échappe à l’autorité publique. La porosité des fron- tières est un atout pour eux. Il salue les efforts déployés par la médiation conduite par l’Algérie en vue de trouver une solution politique et parvenir à un accord de paix durable et définitif. La crise libyenne contribue également à cette situation d’insécurité dans la région puisque l’arsenal militaire de l’ancien régime se trouve aux mains des groupes terroristes. Il relève également les liaisons entre les diffé- rents groupes et l’allégeance faite à Daech qui aurait dans ses troupes quelque 4.000 combattants africains. Ce chiffre avancé par le commissaire pour la paix et la sécurité de l’union africaine constitue selon Smail Chergui une menace pour le con- tinent à leur retour dans leurs pays respectifs.

Il faut, dit-il, une réponse durable au terrorisme. «Nous devons renforcer la justice et les lois». Cependant, dit-il, il ne faut pas s’attaquer aux symptômes du terro- risme, mais à ses véritables causes. Ainsi, dit-il, «si des progrès ont été réalisés, force est de relever que la plate-forme africaine n’a pas encore atteint ses objec- tifs». Il y a des choses à parfaire nous dit M. Chergui. Il suggère de «réfléchir à com- ment combler les défaillances pour la décennie à venir». http://www.elmoudjahid.com/

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Le représentant de l’Union africaine : « Une évaluation des mécanismes de sécurité est nécessaire pour une lutte efficace contre le terrorisme » Le représentant de l’Union africaine, Boullah Ould Mougueya, a appelé à une éva- luation des mécanismes de sécurité mis en place par les pays de la région, en vue d’assurer une lutte antiterroriste «efficace». «Devant l’évolution grandissante de cette menace, il est nécessaire que les dirigeants des pays de la sous-région procè- dent à une analyse des différentes solutions qui ont été apportées pour lutter contre ce phénomène», a-t-il déclaré.

Il a ajouté qu’une évaluation des mécanismes de sécurité mis en place serait «nécessaire» pour une lutte efficace contre ce fléau.

«L’expérience nous a démontré que la force militaire ne suffit pas pour combattre ce phénomène. La lutte passe inévitablement par une connexion entre la sécurité et le développement, ainsi que d’autres solutions politiques, notamment la bonne gouvernance et la défense des droits de l’hommes dans une stratégie globale et profonde», a-t-il souligné. Le même responsable a relevé que le terrorisme repré- sentait la menace «sans doute la plus sérieuse, compte tenu de sa nature sour- noise, de sa capacité destructrice et déstabilisatrice», ajoutant que ce phénomène avait des ramifications avec le trafic de drogue, le blanchiment d’argent et le crime organisé, d’où, a-t-il dit, la nécessité d’une «réelle vision» et d’une coopération ré- gionale et internationale pour l’éradiquer.

Évoquant le conflit malien, il a indiqué qu’il était «certainement celui qui avait plus d’incidence sur la région en terme de menace terroriste». Pour lui, «malgré les re- vers infligés aux groupes terroristes du Nord Mali, l’insécurité persiste et la menace terroriste connaît des extensions vers d’autres pays de la région».

«La région connaît une dissémination à très grande échelle d’importantes quantités d’armement en provenance de la Libye. Ces arsenaux sont tombés entre les mains des terroristes et de narcotrafiquants», a-t-il averti, ajoutant que des groupes dji- hadistes allaient «se constituer menaçant les pays de la région». http://www.elmoudjahid.com/fr/actualites/70629

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Terrorism in Africa

Algeria

Alger et Paris inquiets d’un possible déploiement de Daech vers le Sa- hel 05.12.14

(Capture d’écran issue de la vidéo de revendication de l’assassinat de Hervé Gourdel par les Soldats du Califat) Les Soldats du Califat ont dépêché un émissaire de haut rang pour négocier avec les émirs d’AQMI du Sahara et du Sahel leur allégeance à Daech. Une nouvelle donne sécuritaire se profile dans toute la région. Cerné en Kabylie, le groupe des Soldats du Califat, qui a revendiqué le rapt et l’assassinat d’Hervé Gourdel fin septembre, veut sortir de son isolement et gagner en puissance en se déployant vers le Sahel. La découverte de cette nouvelle straté- gie a été possible grâce à l’arrestation récente, par les services de sécurité algé- riens, d’un terroriste mauritanien, Safi Eddin Al Mauritani, sur l’axe routier entre Biskra et Ouargla. Selon des sources sécuritaires, l’interrogatoire de cet important élément du groupe terroriste tunisien, Okba Ibn Nafaâ, qui, en provenance de Tuni- sie, tentait, au moment de son arrestation, de rejoindre le Mali, a permis de décou- vrir que les Soldats du Califat ont dépêché de l’est d’Alger vers le nord du Mali, dé- but octobre, un émissaire, qui serait un ancien dirigeant d’AQMI, mandaté pour négocier avec les différents groupes de l’émirat du Sahara leur adhésion au groupe qui se réclame de Daech. «Les Soldats du Califat et AQMI sont en train de se livrer une guerre sans merci pour le contrôle des groupes armés restés fidèles à Droukdel au nord du Mali», confie à El Watan Week-end un officier algérien de la lutte antiterroriste. «Les par- tisans de Daech dans le nord de l’Algérie et en Libye redoublent d’efforts pour con-

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vaincre les émirs du Sahara et du Sahel de les rejoindre, ajoute la même source. Nous présumons que Droudkel a donné des ordres pour suspendre les opérations de ses groupes au nord du Mali face à la suprématie aérienne des forces françaises afin de préserver leur capacité de nuisance, ce qui fait de ces groupes un important atout pour les Soldats du Califat, coincés dans les montagnes de Kabylie.» De plus, explique l’officier de renseignement, «le Sahel offre un terrain idéal d’embrigade- ment des recrues, comme nouvelle terre de djihad contre l’Occident selon la pro- pagande terroriste, mais aussi une zone d’entraînement et d’approvisionnement en armement.» Survie Pour les experts, Droudkel utiliserait sa dernière cartouche après les dissidences qui ont affaibli l’organisation : d’abord celle de Mokhtar Belmokhtar puis celle de Abdelmalek Gouri. «Sa querelle avec Daech et les groupes qui ont fait allégeance à Al Baghdadi se transforme en menace contre lui-même : s’il perd l’émirat du Saha- ra, AQMI sera réduit dans sa force et son influence, précise un expert. C’est une éventualité d’autant que des informations remontent du nord du Mali, où se tien- draient des réunions des chefs terroristes, notamment dans le massif des Ifoghas, pour étudier la possibilité de quitter la maison AQMI et faire allégeance à l’organi- sation de l’Etat islamique. Des groupes terroristes en Tunisie et en Libye sont déjà passés à l’acte, il n’est pas exclu qu’il en soit de même en Algérie.» Une autre source sécuritaire poursuit : «AQMI, face aux attaques de l’armée algé- rienne dans le nord de l’Algérie n’a pu ‘‘survivre’’ et garder une certaine visibilité que grâce à ses katibas du Sahel et du Sahara, avec des chefs très offensifs comme Abou Zeid et Belmokhtar.» Le nouveau groupe affilié à Daech peut très logique- ment penser à se déployer là où il aura le plus de possibilité d’actions et surtout, de recrutement. «Je ne serai pas surpris si dans un avenir proche on nous annonce la naissance d’un émirat du Sahara affilié à Daech, avec en plus, une possibilité de connexion avec tous les groupes armés de la région, du Nigeria, de la Libye, de Tu- nisie», poursuit-il. Un possible ralliement des chefs terroristes à Daech a d’abord alerté les services de renseignements algériens, mais aussi leurs homologues occidentaux, les Français en tête. Selon nos sources, Alger et Paris ont récemment relevé leur degré de coo- pération au même niveau qu’aux premiers mois du déclenchement de l’opération Serval au nord du Mali. Sur place, les forces françaises traquent le fameux émis- saire envoyé par le groupe de Abdelmalek Gouri pour se réunir avec les émirs du Sahara et du Sahel et tentent de recueillir le maximum de renseignements sur la nouvelle stratégie que veulent adopter les groupes armés djihadistes de la région. Grande-Bretagne, France et Tunisie : Principaux pays de recrutement Selon les enquêtes des services algériens, 80% des recrutements de Maghrébins pour le compte de l’organisation de l’Etat islamique se font à partir de la Grande- Bretagne, de la France (une vingtaine de cellules dans les départements du Sud et

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en région parisienne) et de la Tunisie. Deux raisons expliquent cette configuration. D’abord, les prédicateurs syriens, dont des radicaux, qui ont fui la Syrie au début de la guerre civile ont facilement trouvé refuge dans ces trois pays. Ensuite, en Algérie, l’opposition de l’émir d’AQMI, Abdelmalek Droukdel, à Daech a rendu difficile la création de réseaux de recrutement importants. Droudkel, resté dans le giron d’Al Qaîda, n’était pas d’accord pour donner la priorité au djihad en Syrie, alors que le nord du Mali était, à ses yeux, la seule véritable zone de combat pour ses hommes. (A. M.) Camps d’entraînement de Daech en Libye Les djihadistes de Daech affirment leur présence dans l’est de la Libye. «Ils ont ins- tallé des camps d’entraînement» en Libye, où se trouvent quelque 200 djihadistes, a déclaré, à des journalistes, le général David Rodriguez, chef du commandement de l’armée américaine pour l’Afrique. Le gradé américain a toutefois qualifié le phénomène de «très petit et naissant». Interrogé pour savoir si ces camps d’entraî- nement deviendraient une autre cible de l’armée américaine, déjà engagée dans des raids aériens contre l’organisation en Syrie et en Irak, le général Rodriguez a répondu : «Non, pas maintenant.» Daech «a commencé ses initiatives dans l’Est en introduisant des gens», a-t-il expliqué. «Mais nous devons juste continuer à surveil- ler et à regarder cela de près à l’avenir pour voir ce qui se passe et si ça se déve- loppe toujours», a-t-il ajouté. Les combattants du groupe de l’Etat islamique en Li- bye ne sont pas des volontaires venus de l’étranger mais des membres de milices qui ont fait allégeance à ce groupe djihadiste, a précisé le général. Selon des ex- perts, la ville de Derna dans l’est de la Libye s’est déjà transformée en «émirat isla- mique» et est devenue le fief des partisans de Daech. (Agences) Le Forum international de Dakar (Sénégal), sur la paix et la sécurité en Afrique, se tiendra du 14 au 16 décembre et réunira les personnalités africaines et internatio- nales les plus influentes. Parmi elles : Macky Sall, président du Sénégal ; Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, président du Mali ; Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz, président de la Mau- ritanie ; Idris Déby Itno, président du Tchad ; Smaïl Chergui, commissaire de l’Union africaine ; Pierre Buyoya, ancien président du Burundi ; Philip Carter III, ambassa- deur Africom ; Jean-Yves Le Drian, ministre français de la Défense ; le général Pierre de Villiers, etc. Les ateliers aborderont des thèmes comme la lutte contre le terro- risme et la prévention de la radicalisation religieuse, la sûreté et la sécurité mari- times, la menace des trafics, l’environnement sécuritaire et le développement éco- nomique. http://www.elwatan.com/

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CAR

The Central African Republic’s Hidden Conflict 12 December 2014 OVERVIEW While the international community and the transitional government focus on Bangui, the capital, most of the rural areas, in particular the west and centre of the Central African Republic (CAR), have turned into fields of violence. The fierce struggle between the ex-Seleka and anti-balaka militiamen has led to a surge of intercommunal clashes between pastoralist and farming communities since 2013. These clashes have formed a conflict-within-the-conflict that further destabilises the country, away from the international spotlight and the attention of the transi- tional government. Ahead of a new transhumance period that may intensify the ongoing rural warfare, the transitional government and the international commu- nity should focus closely on preventing the escalation of violence between pas- toralist and farming communities by making this aspect of the CAR crisis an inte- gral part of their stabilisation strategy. Before the CAR crisis began at the end of 2012, pastoralism had been a source of violence in rural areas for several years, notably between pastoralist and farming communities. The crisis has further exacerbated resentment and violence be- tween these groups because of the herdsmen’s perceived links to ex-Seleka members. Livestock is coveted both by anti-balaka and ex-Seleka militiamen, and pastoralists often respond to cattle thefts with brutal retaliations as cattle is the wealth of the poor. The enrolment of vulnerable young herdsmen in armed groups, the crumbling of traditional agro-pastoralist mediation structures and the yearly coming of pastoralists, especially Chadians, to CAR may amplify the ongo- ing bush warfare. Since 2013, this rural war has forced many pastoralist communities to take refuge in Chad and Cameroon or to flee to other CAR regions, often after having walked for a long time. These displacements are exacting a heavy toll, causing the col- lapse of the livestock farming sector, the radicalisation of some pastoralist groups and the blockage of transhumance movements between Chad and CAR. These long-term obstacles to the stabilisation of the country must be addressed. To contain rural violence in the short term: Create an information network, coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordina- tion of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the CAR livestock ministry, in order to locate the areas at risk of violent confrontation between, on the one hand, pas- toralists and, on the other, anti-balaka and local communities. This network must serve as an early warning mechanism for CAR authorities, NGOs and international forces (the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (Minusca) and the French mission Sangaris).

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Include the fight against cattle theft and trafficking into the mandate of a MINUS- CA cell against diamond, gold and ivory trafficking, whose creation has been rec- ommended by Crisis Group since June 2014. Reduce cattle density in south-western Chad by organising a regional consultation between Chadian, CAR, Cameroonian authorities and NGOs, under the aegis of MINUSCA, in order to identify in those countries safe areas with pasturelands for pastoralists. This should be a temporary settlement that requires the agreement of the host communities and the pastoralists. To address the causes of rural violence in the medium term: Revive traditional agro-pastoralist mediation mechanisms through organisation of informal meetings between representatives of the different communities by con- flict prevention NGOs. As confidence-building measures, international forces should forbid armed groups to get involved in these mechanisms. Broadcast messages through community radios run by churches and local NGOs recalling common interests and exchanges between pastoralists and farmers. These messages should especially be circulated among women who usually play a key role in these intercommunity exchanges. Include in livelihood activity programs led by international NGOs the pastoralists without livestock who took refuge in Chad and Cameroon and those still living in CAR. Launch a feasibility study by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to restart livestock breeding where the security situation permits it. Nairobi/Brussels, 12 December 2014 http://www.crisisgroup.org/

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En Centrafrique, Sangaris a empêché le pire 08/12/2014

Les deux mille militaires de l'opération Sangaris interviennent désormais principalement à Bangui et sur l'axe central du pays. Il y a un an, les militaires français entraient en Centrafrique pour enrayer une situa- tion prégénocidaire. Ils ont réussi, mais tout reste à faire. Le pays était à feu et à sang et rien ne semblait pouvoir rompre le cycle violence vengeance interreligieux et interethnique. « Un an après notre intervention, sou- ligne un officier français, il n'y a lieu ni d'être euphorique, ni de dramatiser. L'opéra- tion Sangaris a fait le job, continue de le faire et il y en a encore pour un certain temps. » La crise durait depuis la chute du président Bozizé, en mars 2013, renversé par la Séléka, agrégat de bandes armées venues du nord-est, majoritairement musul- manes, et qui, après avoir semé la terreur sur leur passage, avaient installé leur chef, Michel Djotodja, à la tête du pays. Aux massacres de la Séléka répondirent les massacres perpétrés par les milices d'autodéfense antibalaka, essentiellement chrétiennes.Un officier de renseigne- ment explique : Au début, on pouvait parler de clivages religieux et ethniques. Mais c'est bien plus confus et mélangé aujourd'hui. Des milliers de morts, 400.000 déplacés à l'intérieur du pays, plus de 60.000 à l'ex- térieur, un désarmement (1) loin d'être terminé, un État à rebâtir et une adminis- tration (notamment judiciaire) à réinstaller sur l'ensemble du territoire, voilà ce qu'il reste à faire, dans « un contexte général calmé, mais comportant encore des pics de violence, brefs mais intenses ».

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Le retour des ONG La présence de Sangaris a cependant permis, par exemple, outre le retour des ONG, de réduire de 80 % le nombre de déplacés rassemblés dans le camp M'Poko à Bangui (selon l'UNHCR), de rouvrir des mairies, des commissariats de police et des écoles « et aussi de rétablir le trafic routier commercial entre Bangui et le Came- roun ». Aujourd'hui, les deux mille militaires de l'opération Sangaris (2) concentrent leur action sur deux points sensibles : Bangui et « le couloir central du pays ». La Minus- ca, force des Nations unies, devrait au printemps atteindre son effectif prévu : 10.000 militaires et 1.800 policiers. Au fur et à mesure de cette montée en puissance, la France réduira sa force. Jeudi, le général Bellot des Minières, commandant de Sangaris, a indiqué qu'« une fois la Minusca pleinement opérationnelle, nous réorganiserons notre dispositif sous une force peut-être plus ramassée ». Il n'y a évidemment pas de calendrier précis. (1) Huit mille armes et 300.000 munitions ont été saisies et 14 tonnes détruites. (2) Auxquels s'ajoutent 200 personnels intégrés dans la force européenne et une dizaine dans la Minusca. La question Combien a coûté l'opération Sangaris ?

repères Trois morts : en un an, près de 9.000 militaires français se sont succédé au sein de la force « Sangaris ». Trois d'entre eux y ont été tués : le caporal Antoine Le Quinio et le caporal Nicolas Vokaer, du 8e RPIMa, le 9 décembre, et le caporal- chef Damien Dolet, du RICM, le 23 février. Selon l'état-major des armées, 120 soldats français ont été blessés depuis le début de l'opération. Des séquelles psychologiques : le nombre de blessés psychologiques n'est pas encore arrêté, mais il devrait être important, selon nos informations. Depuis septembre, un sas de décompression psychologique a été ouvert dans une sta- tion balnéaire du Sénégal. Les soldats revenant de RCA y passent trois jours.

Jean-Yves Le Drian l'avait expliqué il y a quelques mois : « En année pleine, ce sera aux environs de 200 millions d'euros », avait indiqué le ministre de la Défense, pré- cisant que cette enveloppe n'était pas prélevée sur le budget de son ministère, mais sur le budget global de l'État. Bruno Besson http://www.lanouvellerepublique.fr/

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Opération Sangaris: peu à peu, Bangui reprend vie 05-12-2014

Un an après le lancement de l'opération Sangaris, la vie reprend à Bangui. AFP Il y a tout juste un an, la France lançait l'opération Sangaris en Centrafrique, une intervention destinée à mettre fin aux violences. Un an après, la situation a radica- lement changé. A Bangui, la capitale de la RCA, la vie a repris. Les humanitaires s’inquiètent néanmoins de la sécurité sur les routes de l'intérieur du pays. Elles res- tent encore peu sûres, ce qui entrave leur action. Un an après le lancement de l'opération Sangaris, la situation à Bangui a radicale- ment changé. La vie a repris, même si la capitale n'est pas encore a l'abri de re- chutes. Pour Claire Bourgeois, la coordinatrice des affaires humanitaires de l'ONU en RCA, la réduction du nombre de personnes déplacées est un bon indicateur de l'amélioration de la situation. « Il y a encore énormément à faire mais le nombre de personnes déplacées, qui était autour de 400 000 en janvier-février 2013, est actuellement à moins de 60 000 autour de Bangui », explique Claire Bourgeois à RFI. « La vie a repris : les écoles ont rouvert pour la majorité, les services de santé reprennent également, les marchés ouvrent… La situation à Bangui est absolument différente de ce qui préva- lait il y a un an », poursuit-elle. « Il faut savoir que 70% des gens actuellement en- core déplacés viennent du 3e arrondissement de la capitale. Ces personnes sont prêtes à rentrer chez elle si la sécurité est rétablie dans leur quartier. J’ai bon es- poir que le nombre de gens qui vont rentrer va encore fortement augmenter. » L'insécurité des routes entrave l'action des humanitaires Mais si la vie a pu reprendre à Bangui, les routes de l'intérieur du pays restent en-

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core peu sûres. Cette insécurité entrave l'action des humanitaires. « Ce qui nous préoccupe beaucoup, sur le plan humanitaire, c’est l’accès. Sur certains axes, les humanitaires sont malheureusement arrêtés par des groupes, des gangs, des cou- peurs de route. Des paiements sont demandés, des téléphones portables sont pris ou bien ce sont des vols sur les convois alimentaires ou d’autres convois d’assis- tance humanitaire », rapporte la coordinatrice des affaires humanitaires de l'ONU en RCA. « Sur certains axes, cela prend une ampleur telle que l’accès est vraiment limités pour les humanitaires. Nous travaillons avec les autorités et les préfets pour qu’ils puissent intervenir autour de ces bandes. Nous travaillons également avec les forces pour avoir plus de patrouilles mais en tant qu’humanitaires nous refusons toutes escortes. Il faut que notre assistance soit vraiment comprise par tous. C’est une assistance pour tous, impartiale et neutre, pour laquelle le libre passage doit être assuré », explique Claire Bourgeois. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/

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Cameroon

Le parlement camerounais Cameroun vote une loi controversée sur le terrorisme 05/12/2014

Le Parlement camerounais a voté, jeudi soir, une loi portant répression des actes de terrorisme dans le pays mais que l’opposition qualifie globalement de liberti- cide. La disposition controversée porte sur la peine de mort prévue contre tout individu convaincu d’intimidation de la population, d’avoir provoqué une situation de ter- reur ou de contraindre la victime, le gouvernement et/ou une organisation natio- nale ou internationale à accomplir ou à s’abstenir d’accomplir un acte quelconque, à adopter ou à renoncer à une position particulière ou à agir selon certains prin- cipes. La même peine vise les individus coupables de perturbation du fonctionnement normal des services publics, de la prestation de services essentiels aux populations ou de création d’une situation de crise au sein des populations. En dépit des mises en garde de l’opposition et de la société civile, qui y voient dé- sormais une atteinte grave au droit de manifester, le Parlement, majoritairement acquis au Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC, au pou- voir), a adopté le projet de loi proposé par le gouvernement. Pour ‘’la diaspora combattante » d’Europe et des Etats-Unis, constituée d’exilés po- litique et qui s’est réunie à Paris (France), ‘’seule une épreuve de rapport de force

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amènera un véritable changement au Cameroun et contraindra le régime à enfin écouter les aspirations profondes du peuple camerounais ». Ce regroupement estime que le départ du président Paul Biya du pouvoir ‘’est la première et incontournable étape » vers cet objectif. Pour John Fru Ndi, le président du Front social démocrate (SDF, premier parti de l’opposition parlementaire), la nouvelle loi, qui n’attend plus que la promulgation du chef de l’Etat, comporte des ‘’mesures draconiennes » d’une autre époque. ‘’Je n’y vois qu’une stratégie visant à terroriser le peuple, à embrigader les libertés et qui va ramener le Cameroun à la période du maquis avec ses lois d’exception », a affirmé Fru Ndi appelant ses compatriotes à ‘’résister et dire non à cette autre ma- nœuvre » contre le peuple. Le président du Mouvement pour la renaissance du Cameroun (MRC), Maurice Kamto, invoque pour sa part ‘’une imposture juridique », d’une lutte lancée par le gouvernement contre la liberté et la démocratie au Cameroun ‘’à la lumière des textes internationaux pertinents en la matière ». Agrégé de droit, il promet d’attaquer ce texte à la lumière du système juridique du pays ou à travers d’autres conventions internationales ratifiées par le Cameroun. Signature : APA Copyright : © APA http://fr.starafrica.com/

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Egypt

Opinion: Egypt faces a war on several fronts 14 December 2014 The measures that some Western embassies in Egypt took this week—closing their doors and warning their citizens of potential terrorist attacks—remind us once again of the extent of the threats facing the Egyptian state, and the gravity of the events taking place not only in Egypt but the region in general. Terrorism, along with wars, has been a key tool in undermining regional security and ex- hausting and isolating states, by either making them collapse or drown in internal chaos. Terrorist attacks in Egypt have escalated remarkably since the expulsion ofthe Muslim Brotherhood from power. Most of the attacks have targeted the army and police, especially in the Sinai Peninsula, which some militants are seeking to turn into a base for terrorism and extremism. This was evidenced by Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis’s declaration of allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), before it started referring to itself as the Islamic State of Sinai. The connection between these two groups is perhaps what was behind the warnings issued by Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Australia, and the US, as ISIS recently threat- ened to target the countries participating in the US-led international coalition car- rying out airstrikes against the extremist group in Syria and Iraq. In a step obviously prompted by its support for the Brotherhood, ISIS threatened Egypt in June over its participation in the US-led airstrikes. Some have accused the Western countries that issued warnings of conspiring against Egypt in a bid to weaken it and portray it as an unstable state. But this interpretation overlooks the fact that the precautions taken by these embassies do not apply to Egypt alone and had already been applied in other countries where terror threat levels vary at different times and for different reasons. Western states are not alone, almost all countries take terrorist threats seriously in order to protect their interests, citizens and security, particularly at a time when terrorism has become an international obsession. The countries that an- nounced the recent precautionary measures have their own reasons that range from threats posed by ISIS, such as is the case for Britain, to fears of violent reac- tions to the release of a report accusing the CIA of using brutal interrogation tech- niques against detainees and using unreliable testimonies after the declaration of the “War on Terror” following the September 11, 2011 attacks. There are serious terrorist threats to Egypt and the country is in a state of war with extremists who have escalated their attacks after the ouster of the Brother- hood from power. More dangerously, terrorist threats have coincided with the upsurge in extremism after the outbreak of the Arab Spring. Since then, jihadist

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groups have managed to establish a strong armed presence in several countries, from Libya and Yemen to Syria and Iraq. After ISIS captured large swathes of Syria and Iraq, the Houthi takeover of Yemen, and attempts by extremist groups to take control of Libya, the aspirations of these groups undoubtedly began to expand. Giv- en its regional significance, Egypt remains at the top of the list in militant groups’ dreams and aspirations. The battle against terrorism overlaps with Egyptian efforts to reform its economy, a fundamental pillar of stability. As a result, friends of Egypt have rushed to provide support while its opponents have joined hands to hamper its economic recovery. Gulf states, particularly , the UAE, and Kuwait, have offered Egypt more than 10 billion US dollars in aid, and were keen to include the stability of Egypt on the agenda of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s recent summit in Doha. After the Egyptian economy recently started to show signs of recovery, the World Bank gave Egypt a positive assessment and predicted it would achieve almost four percent growth by next year. Therefore, hampering Egypt’s economic recovery has become an important objective for any entity that does not wish stability for Egypt. The tourism sector, along with the Suez Canal and remittances from expatriates, is the most significant source of hard currency, and has always been an easy target for terrorists. In this respect, one can understand the threats against embassies and tourists. Having recently focused on targeting the armed forces, terrorists will without doubt try to impede Egypt’s economic recovery, as their aim remains the destabilizing and weakening of the country by targeting its security, economy and social fabric. They certainly do not want to see achievements made by the government they want to undermine. Egypt is fighting a multi-faceted battle on different fronts. http://www.aawsat.net/2014/12/article55339374

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Egypt’s experience is critical to teach others about terror December 10, 2014 ABU DHABI // Egypt’s presence at the Global CVE Communications Expo was crucial given its experience with terrorism, a spokesman for the Egyptian ministry of for- eign affairs said. Badr Abdelatty said Egypt was at the front of battling extremism as it wasan “extremely important issue for us”. “We are with the view that without regional and international efforts no single country can defeat this ugly phenomenon,” Mr Abdelatty said. “We are here to present our vision for countering terrorism, which is a comprehen- sive one. “The security option is very important but not enough, and we have to adopt a comprehensive approach, which includes such events as this and how to combat extremist ideas through promoting moderate Islam, tolerance and equality.” He said media was of paramount importance. “Addressing the extremist ideas are very important, as well as promoting the cor- rect principles of Islam and sharing information,” Mr Abdelatty said. “There is a ten- dency of focusing on security only, which is not enough.” He said a comprehensive approach also meant not just focusing on one terrorist organisation. “Western countries are only focusing on this threat, which is valid,” he said. “But it’s not enough because there are other terrorist groups in the region, stretching from Libya to Yemen, and they have the same extremist ideas. The Muslim Brother- hood is, of course, at the centre.” Mr Abdelatty said that according to intelligence information, there was logistical coordination and cooperation among terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIL and Ansar Al Sharia. “It’s been proven they are coordinating on the operational level so it’s naive to fo- cus only on one specific terrorist group,” he said. “It’s very important to attend any forum to express our ideas and raise awareness of the international community that the danger of this threat can reach any coun- try, and it’s not only confined to the Middle East. “They’re knocking at the door of Europe and the US so it’s a very dangerous and global phenomenon and we have to work together to address its different as- pects.” http://www.thenational.ae/

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Kenya

Look no further, the jihadi enemy is here with us - not in Somalia Saturday, December 6, 2014 We have a Jubilee administra- tion that is out of its depth on counter-terrorism. Then we have vocal “experts” across the airwaves who act like they have the solution. But whenever they open their mouths, it is just puffs of political hot air they let out. Let’s go to the beginning. When Kenya invaded Somalia in 2011 to rout Al-Shabaab, one big sub NATION MEDIA GROUP -text was to create a buffer statelet in Jubaland, Somalia’s southernmost province adjoining Kenya’s eastern border. The KDF succeeded in imposing a quasi-client administration there after capturing Kismayu. Some questions arise. Did our military get so distracted in helping entrench a local Ogadeni clan administration that they overlooked its stated mission of snuffing out Al-Shabaab in the sector? It also looks like the soldiers were more focused on Low- er Juba province and its prized port of Kismayu. Lower Juba borders Lamu, Tana River and Garissa counties but does not cover the rest of the borderlands of Wajir and Mandera. The Mandera border where the lat- est infiltration is coming through adjoins Gedo province where KDF does not seem to have an active presence as it does in Lower Juba zone. Some of our media talking heads have proposed building a wall on the Kenya- Somali border, like the one Israel erected to shut out the West Bank enclave. The idea is impractical. First of all we are talking of a 700-km border. Building a fence this long is like undertaking another SGR-type project we obviously cannot afford. INSIDE SOMALIA However, the narrative that the problem is solely inside Somalia — where Al- Shabaab never confronts KDF directly — is a red herring. The problem is inside Ken- ya’s own borders. The terrorists who have been blowing up Kenyans with grenades and AK-47s in Nairobi, Mombasa and in the deep hinterlands of Wajir and Garissa cannot conceivably be Al-Shabaab footsoldiers who have walked across the border from Somalia. These are kindred terrorists who are embedded with us.

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The late assistant minister Orwa Ojode once said the tail of Al-Shabaab may be in Mogadishu, but the head is very much in Nairobi’s Eastleigh. Even those terrorists presumably crossing over from Gedo to Mandera cannot do so without intimate supportive local networks. For once, we must have a brutally honest, non- hypocritical conversation about uprooting this enemy within. The law must not be- come an impediment. Ethiopia has been cited, correctly, as a neighbour where Al-Shabaab are extremely afraid of exporting their terror activities. We need to contextualise this fear as we get our bearings. The Ethiopian army gives absolutely no quarter to any secession- ist or jihadist activity from among the country’s ethnic Somalis. Any terrorist sym- pathisers like we have in Kenya (certain governors, senators and MPs) are arrested early whenever they raise their heads and are locked up indefinitely. There is no Bill of Rights in Ethiopia like ours to save these terrorists. MRC HEADACHE Parochial domestic politicians have been pushing for KDF’s withdrawal from Soma- lia. But who seriously believes the active local Al-Shabaab cells will melt away when the troops come home? Or will a withdrawal snuff out the Muslim youth radicalisa- tion festering in the coast? And how will the withdrawal have any effect on that other thing called the Mombasa Republican Council? Kenyan Somalis are also opposed to the KDF presence in Somalia for a very differ- ent reason which they can’t state openly. They feel ashamed when their kinsmen in Somalia are under the military boot of non-Cushitic nywele ngumu soldiers from Kenya. Choices have consequences. It is too late to stop the exodus of non-Muslim profes- sionals fleeing the stricken northeastern region. I understand the government’s concern about seeming to cede sovereignty there to terrorists. But let the army remain like it did in years past to maintain our flag there. Incidentally Lamu’s gover- nor has been advertising for foreign medical personnel. The local ones fled. I wish him luck. http://www.nation.co.ke/

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Libya

Focus on Libya before it’s too late December 7 2014

General Khalifa Haftar, fourth from left, talks about military operations with Libyan army commanders in Benghazi where clashes between pro- and anti-government forces have taken place. Photo: Reuters The assertion by General David Rodriguez, the head of the US Africa command, that Islamic State militants have set up training camps in eastern Libya, is extreme- ly worrying, but not surprising. General Rodriguez said there could be “a couple of hundred” IS fighters at these sites, and although the camps were at a very early stage, the US was watching them “carefully to see how it develops”. Some of these fighters are believed to be rebels who left to fight with militant groups in Syria after the overthrow ofthe Gaddafi regime, and who have now returned to Libya. Although it is likely that IS would rather concentrate on trying to keep the territo- ries it controls in Iraq and Syria than open up a new front in Libya, their presence in the country is still a matter for concern and should not be ignored. With Libya in turmoil, and the eastern city of Benghazi under the control of the al- Qaeda-linked Ansar al-Sharia, it was always a matter of time before IS raised its ugly head in the North African country. Although IS does not yet control territory in Libya and is still a very small fighting force, its presence there should sound alarm bells throughout the EU (and especially Malta and Italy). IS, after all, is in the EU’s back yard, and its presence there needs to be tackled now before things get out of control.

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Times of Malta reported on Friday that European countries are coordinating their intelligence amid concerns that IS was gaining a foothold in Libya. Foreign Minister George Vella told the newspaper that both the EU and Nato were monitoring the situation and a number of Mediterranean states were holding discussions on how to tackle this latest threat from IS. This is good, but hopefully the international community’s focus will be on preventing IS from establishing itself in Libya, which means a massive effort is needed aimed at stabilising the country, negotiating with all sides in the conflict (not the jihadists) and isolating IS. The situation in Libya has been deteriorating for some time now and Malta recently recalled its two remaining diplomats from its Tripoli embassy. Three years after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, the country has two rival parliaments and govern- ments, one in Tripoli – which is under the control of an alliance of Islamic militias from Misurata – and the other in Tobruk, where the internationally recognised ad- ministration is based. The two sides are engaged in a bloody conflict which is tear- ing the country apart. Having Benghazi under the control of Ansar al-Sharia, of course, makes the situation much more complicated. The European Union needs to redouble its efforts aimed at getting the Tobruk and Tripoli governments (headed by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni and the leader of Libya Dawn, Omar al-Hasi, respectively,) to speak to each other. Reconciliation and dialogue between the two sides is the only way forward to resolve this crisis, and the ultimate aim should be the formation of a power-sharing government, even if this sounds impossible at this stage. I have no doubt that there are elements within the EU who have an aversion to- wards the militias from Misurata because of their ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ or ‘Islamist’ label. This is wrong and Brussels should fully engage with the Tripoli gov- ernment on the same level as it does with the Tobruk administration – this is the position of the Maltese government and I believe it is a correct policy. Neither side, furthermore, is likely to win this conflict – indeed their fighting will simply make Libya more chaotic and unstable, meaning groups like al-Sharia and IS will continue to thrive – so those countries which seem to be arming the two rival governments (Qatar and Turkey for Libya Dawn; and Egypt and the United Arab Emirates for the Tobruk forces) should instead be encouraging them to negotiate with each other. IS, after all, is in the EU’s back yard, and its presence there needs to be tackled now before things get out of control In the meantime, plans must be drawn up to isolate both al-Sharia in Benghazi and IS in eastern Libya, and to have an effective military strategy in place to take on these two groups if necessary. A retired Libyan general, Khalifa Haftar, is presently battling Al-Sharia in Benghazi, and there have also been reports of Egyptian air- strikes against this al-Qaeda-linked group. We can expect more Egyptian interven-

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tion in Libya in the near future, especially if IS expands its operations there. Ultimately, however, the only way the jihadists are going to be defeated in Libya is if the country has one functioning government, recognised and supported by the international community and a return to a reasonable level of stability. A power- sharing agreement between the two sides is absolutely necessary, and it will be the Libyans themselves who will have to take on the jihadists. The prospect of a failed State in Malta’s back yard is indeed very bad news. A mass exodus of refugees and a haven for al-Qaeda or IS will have terrible consequences not only for our economy and security, but for the entire Mediterranean. Hopefully Malta will continue to make its voice heard in EU circles for more action on Libya. • US Secretary of State John Kerry’s declaration, at a meeting of the anti-IS coalition in Brussels, that months of airstrikes in Iraq and Syria had damaged the militant group’s capabilities, is encouraging. Kerry also said the fight against IS may take years but that the coalition will engage in this campaign “for as long as it takes to prevail”. The news, furthermore, that Iran has conducted airstrikes against IS targets in Iraq (which it denies) is also very interesting and shows that Washington and Teheran have something important in common: they both want to destroy IS. Can this be a good basis to take US-Iranian ties forward? http://www.timesofmalta.com/

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Mali

Mali et militarisation du Sahel 4 Décembre 2014 Dans le genre de conflits internes, tel celui du Mali, un accord de paix est généra- lement le résultat d’un processus long et tortueux. La conclusion des accords est un exercice difficile et frustrant avec ses nombreuses dérives, ruptures et reprises des négociations. Leur mise en œuvre effective est un autre défi, lui aussi, redoutable. De fait, tout au long de ces négociations, la psychologie importe souvent plus que la logique et pour aboutir un savant dosage de patience, de pédagogie et de fermeté est indis- pensable. Le soutien des pays de la région, ou pour le moins leur bienveillante neu- tralité, est indispensable. Méfiance et suspicions Pour les observateurs extérieurs, le projet d’Accord présentement à l’ordre du jour des pourparlers d’Alger est un bon produit. Il a de plus le mérite d’avoir été expli- qué aux populations les plus concernées. Il est important de poursuivre ces efforts de vulgarisation au niveau des faiseurs d’opinions tant à Bamako que sur le terrain. Le projet d’Accord bénéficie, en outre, du soutien de la communauté internationale L’obstacle majeur à sa signature et, donc à sa conclusion, réside en grande partie dans la méfiance et les suspicions. Souvent exacerbées par des extrémistes, au nord comme au sud, celles-ci ont une forte prévalence parmi et entre les parties. Naturellement, les difficultés dans l’exécution effective desprécédents Accords de paix inter maliens, (Tamanrasset en 1991, Pacte National en 1992, Alger en 2006) renforcent les doutes et scepticismes parmi les concernés. Pire, les bénéficiaires - nationaux, régionaux et internationaux - de la prolongation de la crise, soufflent sur les braises. La paix n’arrange pas leurs affaires ! Enfin, il est imprudent d’ignorer que, de national, le conflit malien est devenu largement régional. Il concerne tout le Sahel et le Maghreb. Cette dimension régionale de la crise malienne va s’amplifier davantage car liée à celle de l’insécurité telle que vécue au Sahel mais aussi telle que comprise par les partenaires extérieurs notamment les Nations Unies, la France et les Etats Unis. Plus elle durera et plus la crise malienne sera difficile à résoudre. D’abord parce qu’elle s’auto alimentera davantage par le financement du crime organisé. Ensuite les extrémistes, au sud comme au nord du Mali, exercent un chantage, moral et physique, sur les négociateurs pour retarder ou prévenir tout accord. Enfin, la crise se renforcera par d’autres facteurs d’instabilité régionaux dont en particulier les alliances entre les radicaux qui opèrent dans le nord du Mali et en Libye et aussi avec Boko Haram et ses ramifications inter étatiques.

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S’il n’est pas résolu rapidement, le conflit malien ne sera plus alors qu’une crise de plus parmi les nombreuses qui sévissent en Afrique et à travers le monde. Mais, sur le plan international, il constitue une crise de moindre priorité stratégique compa- rée au Moyen Orient où opère Daech / l’Etat Islamique. Militarisation du Sahel Exacerbée par les crises internationales et régionales, la polarisation des relations entre les forces de sécurité et les mouvements radicaux rendra le Sahel encore plus difficile à stabiliser. Plus les forces de sécurité durcissent les actions anti terroristes et plus les extrémistes opèrent des représailles encore plus sanguinaires. Les cas du Nigéria et de Libye sont les exemples les plus spectaculaires de cette polarisation et de la violence. Ils semblent répondre à la question : qui des forces de sécurité et des radicaux traumatisera le plus les populations ? Dans le Sahel, l’extrémisme violent est inséparable de la sclérose de la gouvernance dont l’un des déficits le plus manifeste est la crédibilité de la gestion économique et de l’organisation des élections. Le manque de transparence en matière écono- mique (spécialement dans le domaine des marchés publics) et la manipulation des votes renforcent le clivage entre dirigeants et populations. L’une des conséquences de cet antagonisme est la militarisation graduelle de la ré- gion. Une militarisation interne à travers l’accroissement continu des budgets na- tionaux consacrés aux forces de sécurité. Une militarisation externe aussi, certes pas encore au même degré que l’Afghanistan, mais de plus en plus comparable à celles de la Cote d’Ivoire ou du Congo et du Darfour en leurs débuts. Outre les Fran- çais, anciens sur place, les militaires américains et britanniques sont présents en Afrique de l’ouest contre Ebola et aussi pour faire face au terrorisme et aux trafics dans la bande sahélienne. Au Pentagone, il existe déjà une formulation consacrée à cette évolution vers la mi- litarisation rampante,the new normal ou la nouvelle norme. Au Sahel, celle - ci couvre plusieurs aspects : l’entrainement et la formation des soldats, le partenariat avec les pays, la présence de forces spéciales, de drones, de missions de reconnais- sance et enfin des partenariats avec les armées nationales des différents pays. Sortir d’un piège La militarisation rampante du Sahel est certes encore modeste. Mais c’est une ré- ponse qui, dans certains pays, conforte la légitimité voire la popularité des extré- mistes. Dans le domaine sécuritaire, il importe de différencier le traitement de la réponse apportée aux différents groupes radicaux. Les militaires ont pour mandat ‘’ de trai- ter ’’ les symptômes d’un conflit et non ses causes profondes. Cependant, ils peu- vent renforcer les capacités des troupes locales et aider à limiter les effets de la

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corruption sur le moral des soldats. Naturellement les forces étrangères ne peu- vent s’impliquer sans précaution. S’agissant de la réponse, la gestion des relations entre le gouvernement et les po- pulations frontalières et les jeunes, doit être plus responsable et plus souple. Ces groupes doivent se sentir parties prenantes de l’effort de construction du pays et donc intégrés dans le projet national. Cette construction doit s’appuyer sur un con- sensus politique large. Un consensus pour aider à minimiser le clivage terrorisme/ forces de sécurité en faveur des dernières. Le règlement durable de la crise malienne constituera le test tant attendu pour sa- voir la direction que prendra le Sahel les années à venir : le renouveau ou le statu quo aggravé. http://www.centre4s.org/

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Nigeria

Boko Haram: The Other Islamic State By JEREMY ASHKENAS, DEREK WATKINS and ARCHIE TSE DEC. 11, 2014 While much of the world has been focused on the rise of the Islamic State, another proto-Islamic state has been waging a campaign of terror while dreaming of a cali- phate in Nigeria. Since the public execution of Boko Haram's founder in 2009 by Nigerian security forces, a hard-line militant, Abubakar Shekau, has led this make- shift army of Islamist fighters through years of escalating attacks on government personnel, religious leaders, young students, crowded mosques and marketplaces. July 2010-April 2013: Rising Violence Under Mr. Shekau, Boko Haram picks up the pace of kidnappings, suicide and car bombings, assassinations and urban assaults. Although hit-and-run guerrilla tactics are still the group’s preferred mode of attack, Boko Haram begins to operate more brazenly in the rural areas of Borno State. For those affected by the violence, con- cern soars about Boko Haram's ability to mount sophisticated, large-scale opera- tions. ATTACKS AND BATTLES

May 2013-June 2014:State of Emergency Nigeria’s president declares a state of emergency in the northeast, sending in more troops and granting them additional powers of arrest and the ability to seize “any building or structure.” Boko Haram responds with a wave of attacks, issuing an ulti- matum to southern Nigerians living in the north. Hundreds of thousands flee. The United Nations calls the brutality and frequency of attacks on civil- ians “unprecedented.” According to data gathered from news reports by IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center, Boko Haram killed about 2,000 people during the

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first six months of 2014, nearly as many as during the entire previous four years. The attacks include: In July 2013, dozens of teenage male students are killed in a raid on a school in Buni Yadi. In August, Boko Haram fighters attack a mosque in Konduga with automatic weap- ons, killing more than 40 people. In December, hundreds of militants attack an air force base and military checkpoint in Maiduguri. In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnaps more than 250 schoolgirls in Chibok, setting off an international outcry. In May, in a brutal attack on the border town of Gamboru Ngala, Boko Haram fires on a busy marketplace, burns down houses, and shoots people attempting to flee; hundreds are killed.

A Boko Haram member posing for a portrait in a working class suburb of Kano, Nige- ria. Samuel James for The New York Times

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People gathered around a crater after a car bomb exploded in a busy market area near Maiduguri’s airport on March 2. Reuters

An image taken from a video released by Boko Haram on May 12 showed some of the Nigerian schoolgirls abducted in Chibok. Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

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Recent Weeks: In possible retribution for recent civilian and local militia resistance, Boko Haram strikes with a series of mass-casualty attacks in northern capital cities, killing more than 200 people. The attacks include: Nov. 25: Two suicide bombers blow themselves up at a bustling market in Maidu- guri, killing at least 45. Nov. 28: A bomb goes off at a central mosque in Kano, northern Nigeria’s largest city, killing 120 people. Dec. 1: Boko Haram fighters stage a pre-dawn raid on government, police and mili- tary buildings in Damaturu. In a repeat of the Nov. 25 attack, two female suicide bombers again detonate bombs at the central Maiduguri market, killing dozens.

People inspected the site of a bomb explosion on Nov. 29 in Kano, Nige- ria.Muhammed Giginyu/Associated Press http://www.nytimes.com/

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Islamic Stat Has Spread its Influence to Nigeria's Boko Haram Terrorists

13.12.2014 The Islamic State has spread its dangerous influence far beyond the Middle East: Boko Haram, a terrorist movement in African, has evidently been inspired by the success of IS radicals in Syria and Iraq, and dream of establishing a caliphate in Nigeria.

MOSCOW, December 13 (Sputnik), Ekaterina Blinova — The Islamic State has spread its influence far beyond the Middle East: Boko Haram, an African Islamic militant group which has been terrorizing Nigeria and its neighbors since 2002, is evidently copying the IS movement. "Outside observers see the Islamic State's influence, for example, in the tactics, rhetoric and even online media presence of the Boko Haram rebels of northeast Nigeria and neighboring border areas," Agence France-Presse reported. Experts note that the Islamic State has already displaced al-Qaeda as "a source of inspiration" and it's likely that IS's rapid rise is winning much more support in Africa. "[The Islamic State] can inspire and motivate perhaps to a greater extent than AQ, which has never motivated people. Al-Qaeda is negative, about smashing things; IS is also smashing things, but [it is] building something. IS has effaced the colonial boundaries, in a very concrete way," Former CIA officer Michael Shurkin stated, as quoted by Agence France-Presse. Experts stress that although Boko Haram terrorists do not necessary receive orders from the Islamic State's leadership, they are obviously copying the infamous ex-

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tremist movement. "[Boko Haram] has more recently begun to model its ideological and military doc- trine after the Islamic State and, in turn, has started to receive recognition from the Islamic State," Jacob Zenn, an Africa specialist for the Jamestown Foun- dation emphasized.

Remarkably, both ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Boko Haram head Abuba- kar Shekau are demonstrating "direct inspiration" and "even a cross-fertilization of ideas," experts point out. "There are no direct operational contacts. But it is quite clear that Boko Haram is paying attention to the IS and the IS is paying attention to Boko Haram," under- scored Peter Pham, the head of the Washington-based Africa Center at the Atlan- tic Council. Meanwhile Boko Haram has changed its tactics: experts point to the fact that Af- rican insurgents are moving from sporadic terror actions towards "standing their ground." The Islamist African movement has already occupied about 20,000 – 40,000 square kilometers (7,700 – 15,400 square miles) and has maintained its control over ten local governments. Like the Islamic State's insurgents, Boko Ha- ram terrorists march with tanks and heavy equipment, seized from Nigeria's mili- tary, in an obvious show of force. "While much of the world has been focused on the rise of the Islamic State, an- other proto-Islamic state has been waging a campaign of terror while dreaming of a caliphate in Nigeria," warns the New York Times, adding that Boko Haram killed about 2,000 people in the first six months of 2014, as many as it murdered during the past four years. http://sputniknews.com/

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PR Expert Analyses Boko Haram

10 December 2014

Public Relations and Communications expert, Oke Ikechukwu, writing on Thisday, takes a critical look at the activities of the terrorist group, Boko Haram, and how their actions have brought the economy of northern Nigeria to its knees.

“The laws of nature and the laws of life forbid the purposeless of malignity that keeps replicating itself under the umbrella of Boko Haram. While the reported suc- cessful evacuation of the insurgents from Mubi is good news, what is not good news is the fact that their brief occupation of the place was like a reversal of all val- ues, Islamic and Western. Let those who care to verify sit down and do a clear-eyed evaluation of the damage to the psyche of the people and to the environment. Let the authorities also assess the circumstances of the collapse of all security forces before the insurgents, prior to the takeover. Above all, let us all take time to note a few points about the growth of this insurgency and how it can (could have been) contained.

Local economies have collapsed in various parts of the north because of the grow- ing Boko Haram activities. Traditional rulers have been ‘replaced’ and others killed. The spate of bombings and the sacking of otherwise peaceful villages and neigh- bourhoods are ever on the increase. Meanwhile, it all started very quietly and grew instalmentally for decades. The activities of the group only became a matter of seri- ous national concern when the negative social, economic, security and political im- plications of its increasing violence became too alarming to be ignored. For a sect whose name, ‘Boko Haram,’ is coined from the fundamental teaching that Western Education (boko) is sin (haram), the major pretension is that it exists to serve the better and purer values of spirituality and genuine human development.

Its presumed forte lies in the domain of values. But it is precisely here that its greatest failing stands out and blossoms everyday with embarrassing luxuriance. It rejects Western education, Western culture, science and anything that tends to- wards ‘modernity, because it believes that these values pollute our higher humani- ty and spirituality. While it is true that some aspects of Western education and val- ues are undeniably inimical to everything good, its replacement is not happening in the way it ought to happen. So what does it really offer as proof of this presumably superior standpoint? The group’s official name, Jamaiatu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awata Wal-, means ‘Association of Sunnis for the Propagation of Islam and Jihad,’ but is it propagating Islam? But that is only part of the problem.

It has been argued in some quarters that the origins of Boko Haram can be traced to Mohammed Marwa, founder of an older militant Maitatsine religious group, or at least that the circumstances that created this earlier group contributed to the current situation. True or not, one clear issue before us is that the inattention of

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the authorities to the progressive radicalisation of large populations of the not so educated and economically disadvantaged is a major contributory factor in all of this. As for those who argue that colonialism laid the foundation for varying forms of Islamic fundamentalism in northern Nigeria, they need to review their sense of history and locate the emergence of religious extremism elsewhere. One of such argument which submits that Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, only capitalised on the prevailing poverty in the North to link everything bad with West- ern influence falls flat on its face because available evidence proves the contrary.

The more believable account of the origins of the Boko Haram sect goes back to a 2002 clash between the moderate Islamic teachings of the prominent Sheikh Jafaar Adam and the more militant interpretation of the Qur’an by his disciple, Moham- med Yusuf. Yusuf’s expulsion and ostracism was said to have led to his building his own mosque, through which he attracted vulnerable youths to persuade them that Western education (Boko) is a sin (Haram). The aims of the group include the de- sire to create an Islamic state in Nigeria and achieve its anti-Western education tar- get by stopping all regular schools. Its strength has also grown from the fact that it is seen as providing jobs for the unemployed youths in its area of influence, as over 75 per cent of the people are said to live below the poverty line in the region.

What appears to give credence to some tendentious views about the origins, activi- ties and aims of Boko Haram is the fact that Yusuf used a school in his mosque for the recruitment of jihadis, or warriors for Islam; wherein the far more ambitious goal of creating a team that will later fight for the creation of an Islamic state was a quietly pursued aim. The group was able to draw more followers from the fact that it simultaneously denounced official corruption, while promising better material welfare to the people. This fact alone, among others, enabled the group to draw more followers, while remaining largely peaceful within the first seven years of its existence.

The Wikileaks account of the origins and goals of Boko Haram, though it initially sounded unbelievable, appears to be borne out of the unfolding events between Nigeria and the US since the up-scaling of hostilities by Boko Haram. The Wikileaks view is that the US embassy in Nigeria is an operating base for far reaching acts of subversion against the country. In the context of this presumed conspiracy, the US is seen as taking advantage of the growing sectarian violence in Nigeria to recruit jobless Islamic youths and extremists. Part of the alleged game plan is to work to- gether with some Muslim groups and even traditional leaders in the steady pro- curement and training of these potential time bombs through foreign-based terror groups. True or not, this view may well be a latter day development, except we go back to review the reported US-funded spreading of Islamic education among unor- thodox Islamic scholars which began in 1994.

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When the Federal Government set up its Committee on Security in the North-east, the report indicated that the critical propelling factors for the Boko Haram insur- gency included high levels of poverty, illiteracy, massive unemployment of skilled and unskilled youths, the existence of private militias, which were set up, funded, used and dumped by politicians it was the ready availability of these abandoned militias of almajiris as canon fodder, as well as the influx of illegal aliens through Nigeria’s porous borders that aided the crisis. Add the foregoing to the provocative and inciting preaching of some religious leaders that radicalised their listeners to the extra-judicial killing of the sect leader Yusuf and some members of the sect by security agents and you have the recipe for the mayhem on our hands.

The Federal Government committee also fingered poor service delivery by state governments, the general failure of effective intelligence gathering and preemptive intelligence work, absence of high level security network/forum outside the statu- tory national security institutions, limited institutional structures to manage inter- religious affairs and promote harmonious co-existence, as well as failure of the fed- eral and state governments to implement the reports of various committees which made useful recommendation in the past. That is why, today, the armed forces pla orms and personnel are overstretched and diverted from their primary func- tions. This development makes the nation vulnerable, in the event of external ag- gression. The cloud of general insecurity also allows opportunistic criminality to thrive. This is dangerous for civil political stability, as it undermines the rule of law and encourages behaviour that is on the fringes of legality.

The further upshot is that more of our national resources are now going into the fight against Boko Haram, with consequential negative impact on the amount of resources available to other sectors of the economy. The result is a general decline in GDP, lower expenditure on social infrastructure per capita and a growing disre- gard for those essential economic variables that drive growth and productivity. The traumatised cities and states of North-eastern Nigeria, where Boko Haram is strongest, cannot speak of any meaningful productivity, or of any serious economic activities, that can add to the GDP and aid national development. The farmlands are desolate, as the people have either fled to other parts of the country, or have been killed. Factories are shut down, many of them for over two years now. Most cottage industries are no more and there are no schools in session, as these, too, have also been shut down by Boko Haram.

The absence of organised services, wherein labour is recognised and treated well, is the norm. The absence of factories, farmlands and cottage industries automatically translates into lower input into overall GDP, all ensuring a precipitous decline in overall national productivity. The ultimate casualty in all of this is, of course, is na- tional development, as no new knowledge, skills or technology can be acquired or deployed where schools are either shut down, or are not able to function because of social tension or outright insecurity. This is what Boko Haram is inflicting on some cities of North-eastern Nigeria today, leading gradually to retrogression, or

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knowledge retardation.

With no new knowledge, there will be no new skills or technology. The shock re- ceived by any environment wherein the economy is wrecked and schools are closed translates into a social dysfunctionality that could last for many years there- after. That is the real ‘Haram’ today.”

Ikechukwu’s analysis is definitely a good read, as he takes the reader into a journey of the history of the terrorist group, how they came about, how their ranks have swelled over the years, the economic implications of their actions and the security challenges that they have caused through their activities in the North of Nigeria. http://www.naij.com/

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Rwanda

Rwanda: Time Is Now for a Joint Regional Fight Against Terror Public opinion in East Africa is unanimous that terrorism orchestrated by Islamic militants, the Al Shabaab and militias roaming the jungles of the vast DR Congo re- mains the single biggest threat to security person and property. The public also rightly believe that if not jointly tackled, terror attacks in any mem- ber-country can potentially be dangerous to the core objectives of our integration- economic development. The question therefore is: What should be done to ensure that terrorist organisa- tions fail in their machinations to make East Africa unsafe for enjoyment of human freedoms and doing business? Some say, the answer may lie with fast tracking the last stage in the region's gradu- al integration process, political federation. A federation, they say, will ensure syner- gies to deal with this global menace. They are absolutely. Terrorists operate a well-oiled and intricate network that fears confrontation with the military and targets defenseless civilians. Take the example of the Somali militants, the Al shabaab, who will melt away in mere sight of Kenyan armed forces inside Somalia, but will hit civilians going about their business in shopping malls and buses in Kenya or Uganda. Here at home, the FDLR from their hideouts in DR Congo will not provoke a fight with the RDF, but will throw grenades at civilians in markets. The complexity of terrorism is also manifested in the ease with which they lure and radicalize unsuspecting youth into their ranks to advance their agenda. Neutralizing such activities will require not only enormous financial and military resources, but also manpower, research, coordination and sensitization. Only joint efforts can marshal such logistics quickly and efficiently. But must we wait for a federation? Not at all. Everything humanly possible should be done immediately to take this fight back to door steps of the terrorist. http://allafrica.com/stories/201412081177.html

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Somalia

Somalia: The CIA’s Secret Sites in Mogadishu December 10, 2014

Washington (HAN) December 10, 2014 – Expert Analysis, Your Power Regional Influence Magazine, opinion page by. Jeremy Scahill . Renditions, an underground prison and a new CIA base are elements of an intensifying US war, according to a Nation investigation in Mogadishu, (This article appeared in the August 1-8, edition of The Nation).

Nestled in a back corner of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport is a sprawling walled compound run by the Central Intelligence Agency. Set on the coast of the Indian Ocean, the facility looks like a small gated community, with more than a dozen buildings behind large protective walls and secured by guard towers at each of its four corners. Adjacent to the compound are eight large metal hangars, and the CIA has its own aircraft at the airport. The site, which airport offi- cials and Somali intelligence sources say was completed four months ago, is guard- ed by Somali soldiers, but the Americans control access. At the facility, the CIA runs a counterterrorism training program for Somali intelligence agents and operatives aimed at building an indigenous strike force capable of snatch operations and tar- geted “combat” operations against members of Al Shabab, an Islamic militant group with close ties to Al Qaeda.

Gutteridge, who has worked extensively tracking the disappearances of terror sus- pects in Kenya, was deported from Kenya on May 11.

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The underground prison where Hassan is allegedly being held is housed in the same building once occupied by Somalia’s infamous National Security Service (NSS) dur- ing the military regime of Siad Barre, who ruled from 1969 to 1991. The former prisoner who met Hassan there said he saw an old NSS sign outside. During Barre’s regime, the notorious basement prison and interrogation center, which sits behind the presidential palace in Mogadishu, was a staple of the state’s apparatus of re- pression. It was referred to as Godka, “The Hole.”

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Some prisoners, like Hassan, were allegedly rendered from Nairobi, while in other cases, according to Aynte, “the US and other intelligence agencies have notified the Somali intelligence agency that some people, some suspects, people who have been in contact with the leadership of Al-Shabaab, are on their way to Mogadishu on a [commercial] plane, and to essentially be at the airport for those people. Catch them, interrogate them.” As part of its expanding counterterrorism program in Somalia, the CIA also uses a secret prison buried in the basement of Somalia’s National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters, where prisoners suspected of being Shabab members or of having links to the group are held. Some of the prisoners have been snatched off the streets of Kenya and rendered by plane to Mogadishu. While the underground pris- on is officially run by the Somali NSA, US intelligence personnel pay the salaries of intelligence agents and also directly interrogate prisoners. The existence of both facilities and the CIA role was uncovered by The Nation during an extensive on-the- ground investigation in Mogadishu. Among the sources who provided information for this story are senior Somali intelligence officials; senior members of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG); former prisoners held at the underground prison; and several well-connected Somali analysts and militia leaders, some of whom have worked with US agents, including those from the CIA. A US official, who confirmed the existence of both sites, told The Nation, “It makes complete sense to have a strong counterterrorism partnership” with the Somali government. The CIA presence in Mogadishu is part of Washington’s intensifying counterterror- ism focus on Somalia, which includes targeted strikes by US Special Operations forces, drone attacks and expanded surveillance operations. The US agents “are here full time,” a senior Somali intelligence official told me. At times, he said, there are as many as thirty of them in Mogadishu, but he stressed that those working

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with the Somali NSA do not conduct operations; rather, they advise and train So- mali agents. “In this environment, it’s very tricky. They want to help us, but the sit- uation is not allowing them to do [it] however they want. They are not in control of the politics, they are not in control of the security,” he adds. “They are not control- ling the environment like Afghanistan and Iraq. In Somalia, the situation is fluid, the situation is changing, personalities changing.” According to well-connected Somali sources, the CIA is reluctant to deal directly with Somali political leaders, who are regarded by US officials as corrupt and un- trustworthy. Instead, the has Somali intelligence agents on its pay- roll. Somali sources with knowledge of the program described the agents as lining up to receive 200 monthly cash payments from Americans. “They support us in a big way financially,” says the senior Somali intelligence official. “They are the larg- est [funder] by far.” According to former detainees, the underground prison, which is staffed by Somali guards, consists of a long corridor lined with filthy small cells infested with bedbugs and mosquitoes. One said that when he arrived in February, he saw two white men wearing military boots, combat trousers, gray tucked-in shirts and black sunglasses. The former prisoners described the cells as windowless and the air thick, moist and disgusting. Prisoners, they said, are not allowed outside. Many have developed rashes and scratch themselves incessantly. Some have been detained for a year or more. According to one former prisoner, inmates who had been there for long peri- ods would pace around constantly, while others leaned against walls rocking. A Somali who was arrested in Mogadishu and taken to the prison told The Nation that he was held in a windowless underground cell. Among the prisoners he met during his time there was a man who held a Western passport (he declined to iden- tify the man’s nationality). Some of the prisoners told him they were picked up in Nairobi and rendered on small aircraft to Mogadishu, where they were handed over to Somali intelligence agents. Once in custody, according to the senior Somali intelligence official and former prisoners, some detainees are freely interrogated by US and French agents. “Our goal is to please our partners, so we get more [out] of them, like any relationship,” said the Somali intelligence official in describing the policy of allowing foreign agents, including from the CIA, to interrogate prisoners. The Americans, according to the Somali official, operate unilaterally in the country, while the French agents are embedded within the African Union force known as AMISOM. Among the men believed to be held in the secret underground prison is Ahmed Ab- dullahi Hassan, a 25- or 26-year-old Kenyan citizen who disappeared from the con- gested Somali slum of Eastleigh in Nairobi around July 2009. After he went missing, Hassan’s family retained Mbugua Mureithi, a well-known Kenyan human rights law- yer, who filed a habeas petition on his behalf. The Kenyan government responded that Hassan was not being held in Kenya and said it had no knowledge of his whereabouts. His fate remained a mystery until this spring, when another man who

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had been held in the Mogadishu prison contacted Clara Gutteridge, a veteran hu- man rights investigator with the British legal organization Reprieve, and told her he had met Hassan in the prison. Hassan, he said, had told him how Kenyan police had knocked down his door, snatched him and taken him to a secret location in Nairobi. The next night, Hassan had said, he was rendered to Mogadishu. According to the former fellow prisoner, Hassan told him that his captors took him to Wilson Airport: “‘They put a bag on my head, Guant namo style. They tied my hands behind my back and put me on a plane. In the early hours we landed in Mog- adishu. The way I realized I was in Mogadishu was because of the smell of the sea—the runway is just next to the seashore. The plane lands and touches the sea. They took me to this prison, where I have been up to now. I have been here for one year, seven months. I have been interrogated so many times. Interrogated by So- mali men and white men. Every day. New faces show up. They have nothing on me. I have never seen a lawyer, never seen an outsider. Only other prisoners, interroga- tors, guards. Here there is no court or tribunal.’” After meeting the man who had spoken with Hassan in the underground prison, Gutteridge began working with Hassan’s Kenyan lawyers to determine his wherea- bouts. She says he has never been charged or brought before a court. “Hassan’s abduction from Nairobi and rendition to a secret prison in Somalia bears all the hallmarks of a classic US rendition operation,” she says. The US official interviewed for this article denied the CIA had rendered Hassan but said, “The United States provided information which helped get Hassan—a dangerous terrorist—off the street.” Human Rights Watch and Reprieve have documented that Kenyan security and intelligence forces have facilitated scores of renditions for the US and other governments, including eighty-five people rendered to Somalia in 2007 alone. Gutteridge says the director of the Mogadishu prison told one of her sources that Hassan had been targeted in Nairobi because of intelligence suggesting he was the “right-hand man” of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, at the time a leader of Al Qaeda in East Africa. Nabhan, a Kenyan citizen of Yemeni descent, was among the top sus- pects sought for questioning by US authorities over his alleged role in the coordi- nated 2002 attacks on a tourist hotel and an Israeli aircraft in Mombasa, Kenya, and possible links to the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. An intelligence report leaked by the Kenyan Anti-Terrorist Police Unit in October 2010 alleged that Hassan, a “former personal assistant to Nabhan…was injured while fighting near the presidential palace in Mogadishu in 2009.” The authenticity of the report cannot be independently confirmed, though Hassan did have a leg amputated below the knee, according to his former fellow prisoner in Mogadishu. Two months after Hassan was allegedly rendered to the secret Mogadishu prison, Nabhan, the man believed to be his Al Qaeda boss, was killed in the first known tar- geted killing operation in Somalia authorized by President Obama. On September 14, 2009, a team from the elite US counterterrorism force, the Joint Special Opera- tions Command (JSOC), took off by helicopters from a US Navy ship off Somalia’s

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coast and penetrated Somali airspace. In broad daylight, in an operation code- named Celestial Balance, they gunned down Nabhan’s convoy from the air. JSOC troops then landed and collected at least two of the bodies, including Nabhan’s. Hassan’s lawyers are preparing to file a habeas petition on his behalf in US courts. “Hassan’s case suggests that the US may be involved in a decentralized, out- sourced Guant namo Bay in central Mogadishu,” his legal team asserted in a state- ment to The Nation. “Mr. Hassan must be given the opportunity to challenge both his rendition and continued detention as a matter of urgency. The US must urgently confirm exactly what has been done to Mr. Hassan, why he is being held, and when he will be given a fair hearing. http://www.geeskaafrika.com/

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Terrorism: Sugar and charcoal barons sleeping with enemy December 6, 2014

Suspected Al-Shabab fighters are paraded at the Uganda In the early hours of Tuesday morning, suspected Al-Shabaab militants entered a tented labourers’ camp in a quarry 10 kilometres from Mandera, singling out 36 non-Muslims for execution at point-blank range. At least two men were beheaded, according to witnesses. The quarry killings followed in the wake of a similarly barbaric attack in the same area two weeks earlier, in which 28 non-Muslim bus passengers—mostly school- teachers returning to Nairobi for the holidays – lost their lives. The quarry attack made a mockery of Deputy President William Ruto’s claim that the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) had eliminated more than 100 militants involved in the first massacre. But the government’s ineptitude in Kenya’s lawless and economically desolate north-eastern region is nothing new, with the cancer of corruption remaining one of the greatest impediments to security. UNDERMANNED POLICE BRANCHES The rampant smuggling of sugar across the porous border, which has the political backing of wealthy politicians, is a testament to this national failure.

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Though Kenya has four police branches as well as the General Service Unit (GSU) and KDF stationed along the 700-kilometre frontier, most units are immobile and undermanned. Nor does the KDF have the capacity to consistently maintain unmanned aerial vehi- cles in the air to spot militants and smugglers crossing the border. “Eighty per cent of the time you’ll get through,” a former senior Kenyan intelli- gence officer told me. Corruption among the border security forces has the dual effect of weakening Ken- ya’s overall ability to prevent militants from entering the country, as well as strengthening Al-Shabaab’s finances. Charcoal exported through Kismayo, largely to Gulf countries, constituted the prin- cipal source of Al-Shabaab revenue before the KDF seized the port in September 2012. Yet the lesser-known trade is the smuggling of processed sugar from Somalia into Kenya, a consequence of the Kenyan government’s exorbitant tariffs on sugar im- ports aimed at propping up a flagging domestic industry. AL-SHABAAB'S REVENUE SOURCE Information provided to me by a regional intelligence source, dating to early 2011 – before Al-Shabaab was driven out of Kismayo by the KDF – depicted a sophisticated sugar smuggling network with links to the Kenyan political elite. Through cross-border co-operation with Al-Shabaab-linked brokers in Dhobley, So- malia, the smuggled sugar crossed the border at Liboi and passed through the Da- daab refugee camps before making its way to the regional hub of Garissa. There it was stored in several depots – two of which are possibly owned by an Al- Shabaab affiliate– before being transported to wholesale markets in Nairobi. In 2011, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia estimated that Al-Shabaab generat- ed as much as 800,000 (Sh72 million) from import taxes on sugar. Although Al-Shabaab’s defeats in Lower Juba in 2012 mean the group no longer controls the illicit trade, the smuggling networks that operate it are still active (the intelligence source speculated that the KDF now had “tentacles” in the business, having taken over control of the Dhobley-Kismayo road from Al-Shabaab). Kenyan sugar prices in the first quarter of 2014 fell from an average of 43 (Sh3,870) to 36 (Sh3240) per 50-kilogramme sack due to illegal imports, Kenya Sugar Board CEO Rosemary Mkok told South Africa’s Financial Mail newspaper in May. The black market trade is so entrenched that domestic sugar processors routinely

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import cheaper sugar and repackage it under their own brand. Mohamed Moham- ud Hassan is a former smuggler living in Dadaab’s Ifo camp. LUCRATIVE BUSINESS Camp life, he said, includes a mini-cartel made up of a few dozen importers con- trolling the trade in sugar – as well as powdered milk, oil, pasta, rice, cigarettes and clothing items – and colluding to keep the price around 34 (Sh3,000) for a 50kg sack. When there are disagreements among members, he said, the price of a sack can drop to as low 25 (Sh2,200). Two or three lorries typically arrive in Ifo every night, each carrying 250 bags of smuggled sugar. Hassan stated that for each lorry, the police officers receive a payoff of around 1,120 (Sh100,000), roughly 15 per cent of the worth of the shipment. So lucrative are the illicit gains that branches of the Kenyan security forces compete against one another for bribes. Mr Hassan recalled a night when he was transporting a consignment of smuggled cigarettes and was stopped by an Administration Police (AP) patrol demanding a payoff. “We couldn’t agree on an amount. They wanted too much,” he said. Having no le- gal jurisdiction to arrest and hold the smugglers themselves, the officers handed them over to the local police station. This second group of officers was more amenable to negotiating a financial ar- rangement. They then agreed to help Mr Hassan evade the AP patrol, still lurking nearby. “So the police took the cigarettes to the camp in a police car,” Hassan laughed. “When the AP officers asked about them, they said that customs agents seized them.”

UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM A local senior police officer told me that cross-border smuggling is an unsolvable problem, citing the numerous service roads – known as ‘cut lines’ – built by oil companies that make it easy for traffickers to bypass official routes. But he pointed to an instance in August when police had seized 150 sacks of illicit sugar. When such seizures happen, Mr Hassan said, it is usually because officials from Nairobi are visiting the district. “You have to show them that there are people actually doing their jobs,” he said.

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The sometimes under-appreciated link between corruption and national security is nowhere more salient than in Kenya. Author Michela Wrong addressed the issue in a May 2014 Foreign Policy article: “What perhaps most frustrates the government’s critics is its failure to trace the causal connection between grand corruption and deteriorating security in a coun- try once regarded as a rare ‘safe’ African state.” PAYING THE PRICE Illustrating the point, the four perpetrators of the September 2013 Westgate mall attack had crossed overland from Somalia into Kenya some four months prior, pos- sibly somewhere around Liboi. To view the ease of their entry into Kenya as a distinct issue from the ease with which smugglers crisscross the border would be naive. “The more charcoal exported from Kismayo, the more sugar comes in to Kenya, the more that border policy in Kenya is distorted, the more smuggling of other things takes place, and the more dangerous Kenya becomes,” the regional intelligence source said. In the aftermath of Tuesday’s attack, Interior Minister Joseph Ole Lenku and In- spector General David Kimaiyo took the fall for the broader national security fail- ure, with the former being sacked and the latter retiring. But this cosmetic response has done little to address the underlying problem. So far, Kenya’s leaders have opted to take the easy way out, cracking down on the country’s Somali community in lieu of tackling corruption – what Wrong calls the “eating” culture. Future generations of Kenyans are likely to pay the price. http://www.nation.co.ke/

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Tunisia

Tunisia remains in the crosshairs of the Libyan war 5 December 2014

Tunisian security forces take security measures near Raj Jedir border crossing on the Tunisian-Libyan border after an air strike hit a Libyan militia post on the border with Tunisia on December 5, 2014. Anadolu Agency/Tasnim Nasri By: Noureddine Baltayeb Published Thursday, December 11, 2014 On Monday, December 8, Tunisian media reported that a special security unit ar- rested a Libyan leader from the Fajr Libya group which controls the capital Tripoli. The Interior Ministry did not deny the reports. Tunis – The militia leader’s presence in Tunisia and his success in infiltrating the borders validate Tunisia’s concerns over the possibility that the militants – who are fighting the forces of General Khalifa Haftar in Libya – would enter the country. This concern is related particularly to the elements controlling the key border crossing of Ras Jdir, where Haftar’s forces have been engaged in bloody battles since the end of last week to liberate it from outlawed armed groups, as they are referred to in “Operation Dignity” statements led by Haftar. Since the Mahdi Juma government took power in the country last February, Tunisia has tried to stay neutral regarding the situation in Libya. The Foreign Ministry, un-

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der Monji al-Hamdi, has managed to maintain Tunisia's independence, unlike the first two Troika governments, which supported the Islamists against their oppo- nents in an unprecedented move in the history of Tunisian diplomacy. Al-Hamdi said that Tunisia “remains faithful to its diplomatic traditions, rejects for- eign intervention in Libya, and insists on dialogue between all parties." Tunisia played an active role in this direction through meetings held in Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan. However, the developments in Libya; the edging of the armed conflict towards the Tunisian borders (around 20 kilometers away); successive ex- plosions, and gunfire heard in towns and villages along the border created a state of fear within Tunisia's border strip, despite the assurances of Prime Minister Juma. The latter said in a press conference that "the state is capable of protecting Tunisi- ans and is ready for all possibilities, including the worst scenarios." Despite its significance, Jumaa's statement was not enough to reassure Tunisians, given the fragile situation in their country. Since the fall of Colonel Muammar Gad- dafi's regime, Libya has been hosting large numbers of Tunisian militants, who are planning criminal and retaliatory operations against Tunisia, according to the Interi- or Ministry. Also, Libya is a main source for smuggling arms and ammunition, and harbors the most infamous Tunisian terrorists implicated in assassinations and ter- rorist operations, such as Abu Ayyad and most leaders of the banned Ansar al- Sharia group, which includes suspects in the assassination of Mohammed Brahimi and Chokri Belaid. Libya is a "convenient ground" for hundreds of young Tunisian men to train on weapons and explosives. The Interior Ministry uncovered last week a cell special- ized in sending young men to Turkey and Syria through Libya after training them on the use of weapons, and drug smuggling. The collapse of the Libyan state and the weak government headed by Abdullah al- Thani, which derives its legitimacy from the Libyan parliament, are the primary threat to the security of the Tunisian people.The collapse of the Libyan state and the weak government headed by Abdullah al-Thani, which derives its legitimacy from the Libyan parliament, are the primary threat to the security of the Tunisian people. While Libya embodied the hope that could save Tunisia from its economic crisis by regaining its position as a job and trade market that would revive the Tuni- sian economy, it has now become a real “nightmare” due to the collapse of the state and the absence of a strong negotiating partner. Tunisian authorities and public opinion remain neutral to the conflict in Libya be- tween the parliament, al-Karama Forces, and the al-Thani government on one hand, and the National Conference, Libyan Dawn (Fajr Libya) forces, and the al-Hasi government on the other. However, Tunisia needs to keep a watchful eye on the developments in Libya to avert a possible flood.

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Several Tunisian parties have accused interim President Moncef Marzouki, who is biased towards the National Conference, of seeking to postpone the presidential elections in the hope that he would be “saved” by the deteriorating situation in Lib- ya, and the chaos that may result if Islamist militants raid the Tunisian border, which is very possible given the absence of the Libyan state. Marzouki: Willing to cooperate with the government of Nidaa Tunis In an exclusive interview with Anadolu news agency, Moncef Marzouki – incum- bent Tunisian president and candidate in the second round of the presidential elec- tion – expressed willingness to cooperate with the government to be formed by Nidaa Tunis party, which won in the latest legislative elections, and whose leader Beji Caid Essebsi he will run against in the second round of the presidential election on December 21. Marzouki expressed regret over Essebsi's refusal to face him in a debate, noting that he has the support of the "social left" in the upcoming presidential election, while the "ideological left" supports his competitor. "For all Tunisians, the current conflict is between the old system, which is returning with all its power and former mechanisms, and the slowly-advancing new demo- cratic system," Marzouki said. On the external front, he spoke about Syria. "Some believe that it was a diplomatic mistake (to cut off relations), but I do not see it as such. I believe it was our people who started the Arab Spring. The Syrian revolution followed the Tunisian revolu- tion, not in imitation but as a continuation of it. I am truly surprised by those who oppose corruption, dictatorship, and killing people, but still find it normal for Tuni- sia – the cradle of the Arab revolution – to turn a blind eye to a corrupt dictator, a family dictator who displaced a third of his people and killed 200,000 of them un- der the pretext of a non-existent rejectionism. This is a position I will not change." http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/22847/

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International Organizations

UN

West Africa: As Sahel Faces Mounting Threats, UN Envoy Urges Securi- ty Council to Remain Engaged in Region 11 DECEMBER 2014 Amid a proliferation of militant groups and "disquieting" levels of food insecurity, the situation in the Sahel has become increasingly fragile, a United Nations special envoy told the Security Council today, as she urged the international community to ramp up its efforts towards helping the diverse and troubled region. "The security situation in the Sahel continues to be impacted by the crises in Libya, northern Nigeria, northern Mali and the Central African Republic," Special Envoy for the Sahel, Guebre Sellassie said in her end-of-year briefing to the 15-member body. Ms. Sellassie last updated the Council in June providing a similarly bleak overview of the situation in the Sahel - a vast expanse of territory stretching from Mauritania to Eritrea, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan. In her briefing today, however, the envoy explained that the region was facing an added threat as reports that Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants had established a bulwark in the Libyan desert. "The persistent allegations that the Islamic State has set up training camps in Libya are particularly worrisome," she said. "If the situation in Libya is not quickly brought under control, many states in the region could be destabilised in the near future." Coupled with the ISIL threat, Ms. Sellassie warned, was the deteriorating security situation in northern Mali where deadly attacks targeting UN "blue helmets" and communities living along the border with Niger were steadily intensifying. This, she said, came despite progress achieved in the inter-Malian talks held in the Algerian capital of Algiers and an agreement by peacekeeping countries to strengthen re- gional security cooperation. In addition, instability in Nigeria's north also endangered the wider region as "unspeakable Boko Haram atrocities" continued to pose a threat to some Sahel communities and countries. As a result of the militant groups' continuing opera- tions, an estimated 100,000 people had fled into Niger's Diffa region, further exac- erbating the Sahel's humanitarian situation which remained "disquieting." "Five million more people have become food insecure since the last reporting peri- od. The number of children affected by acute malnutrition in the Sahel also in- creased from 5 million in January to 6.4 million today," Ms. Sellassie continued,

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noting that spiralling insecurity and conflicts had already displaced some 3.3 million people, amounting to a two-fold increase from January. Against that backdrop, she added, the overall 1.9 billion humanitarian appeal for the region continued to remain underfunded. Nevertheless, the Special Envoy indicated that "some progress" had been achieved, including a European Union-led partnership which was continuing to provide "a critical framework for regional cooperation on resilience"; a UN Development Pro- gramme (UNDP) initiative aimed at supporting Mali to mainstream social cohesion in its delivery of social services as well as help build the capacity of Government institutions in Mauritania and Niger on conflict prevention and the protection of human rights; and a UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) plan to support the development of accessible, efficient and accountable criminal justice systems across the Sahel - a region crisscrossed by drug trafficking and illicit trade. Despite the "important and necessary steps" taken by the international community and regional partners in boosting the Sahel's security and economic outlook, Ms. Sellassie cautioned that Member States could not afford to become distracted from the perilous situation on the ground. "The Sahel region continues to face multifaceted challenges to peace and develop- ment," she acknowledged. "Given the deterioration of the political and security sit- uation in the region and the adverse impact on humanitarian and development gains, the need for sustaining Security Council attention on the Sahel is greater than ever." http://allafrica.com/

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Terrorism in the World

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SOURCES OF INSECURITY 12.12.2014

Terrorism has been affecting and changing the global and regional environment of the Middle East since 9/11. The consequences of these attacks can still be seen in the considerations of Western decision-makers. It is also an issue of top priority on the international security agenda, along with the civil wars in the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational crimes such as human, arms and drugs trafficking and smuggling, among others. All these is- sues were discussed widely at the International Symposium on Terrorism and Transnational Crimes organized by the International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crimes (UTSAM) of the Turkish Police Academy. The U.S. invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the civil wars in Libya and Syria, besides the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and the emergence of Daesh (ISIS), illustrate the increasing importance of hard power over soft power when dealing with the resolution of the main issues on the security agenda, as Dr. Mehmet Özkan, direc- tor of UTSAM, portrayed in the opening discourse. If we look at the current re- gional situation, there is a growing sense of insecurity due to the spread of these transnational threats that are affecting the traditional nation-state actors both inside and outside the region. However, the present dilemma of insecurity at a regional level is an unwanted – but expected – outcome of the expeditionary U.S. presence (and then, hurried return), in Iraq, and the reversion of the popular de-

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mands of the Arab Spring.

The U.S. military invasion in Iraq broke the foundations of the Iraqi nation-state. If it is true that Saddam Hussein was a proven autocrat, there were no challenges in the domestic arena until the arrival of the U.S. and its allies. After the invasion, the Iraqi resistance movement, including the Shiite and Sunnis, attempted to make the occupiers uncomfortable. Nonetheless, part of the Sunni resistance movement decided to ally themselves with Al-Qaida, and adopted the jihadi ide- ology. Before the invasion, there was no "Islamic terrorism" in Iraq but following the invasion, it expanded considerably. On the other hand, the failure of the Arab Spring's institutionalization led to a se- vere repression of popular movements. For example, the harsh responses against the democratic demands in Libya and Syria generated civil wars that, in the case of Syria, has resulted in more than 200,000 deaths and 3 million Syrian refugees. The civil war in Syria also affects the chronic problems of the political representa- tion of minorities in Iraq and vice versa. The lack of recognition of democratic de- mands, plus the regional disorder is largely due to the U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy in the region, which has deepened existing ethnic, religious and geopolitical fracture lines in the region. ISIS, the main threat to the modern Middle East as traced by the Sykes-Picot Treaty, is a not an anticipated result, but a very real one.

During the symposium, several speakers attempted to explain the roots of this new danger, and a consensus on the political and religious illegitimacy of the pre- tend "Islamic State" was reached. On the other hand, ISIS reflects the transfor- mation inside the "jihadi movement" which is moving away from the Al-Qaida core in terms of political ambitions and military actions. As an example, the kind of pretensions of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi presenting himself as caliph, and the con- trol of large territorial areas is unimaginable in the organization founded by Bin Laden. ISIS's actions include terrorist methodologies, but also a pragmatic organi- zation and aims to become an international movement, as affirmed by Fatma Ceren Yazgan from the Foreign Ministry. The ISIS menace has struck twice in the West. On the one hand, the perception of a radical Islamism threat has grown up not only in the governmental security agencies, but also in the media and public opinion. The immediate reaction has been the growth of Islamophobia, and the progressive rejection of everything that has to do with the Islam. A similar reaction was seen after the 9/11 attacks. These perspectives bring us closer to a Clash of Civilizations, not to the sought- after Alliance of Civilizations. The second is not an "imagined" menace by the West, but a certain one – that is,

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the foreign fighters. Western radicalized Muslims – and the new "wrongly" con- verted – have been recruited to join ISIS, Al-Nusra and other "Islamist" militant organizations to fight in Iraq, Syria or Libya. There is no reliable statistics on this issue, but some estimation such as the U.S. National Counter-Terrorism Center calculates that more than 1,000 Europeans and 100 Americans have joined the estimated 15,000 foreign fighters in Syria alone. Now, the dilemma of insecurity is not just inside the Middle East, but also linked to Europe and the U.S. This is a negative, unintended consequence. The horizon is grey, but there are some alternative answers to the traditional anti -terrorism approach based on force and military capabilities. Firstly, Professor Hamed Al-Said from Manchester Metropolitan University gives the example of the multidisciplinary, embracing economic, political, and societal initiatives of Turkey's counter-terrorism strategy. This problem of terrorism will not be fixed only by force, but with a wider approach which dislocates the roots of terrorism. Secondly, the fight against terrorism is not eternal. At some point, there is a win- ner, and the asymmetrical relationship between the winner and the looser will enable it to embark on a peace process, as Professor Nur Murphy from Johns Hopkins University pointed out. Lastly, there was a consensus about the im- portance of state-building to avoid domestic instability and regional insecurity, in addition to solving post-civil war conflicts. Turkey's policy towards Somalia is an example that state-building is an effective approach. http://www.dailysabah.com/

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France

I'm a jihadist...get me out of here December 04th 2014

French jihadists complain about demeaning labor, cold, and missing comforts of Western life Western Jihadists fighting for the Islamic State group are becoming increasingly dis- illusioned by misery, boredom and fear they experience as the harsh reality of life with the radical Islamists begins setting in, letters of French jihadists published by the French Le Figaro revealed. In a series of letters seen by the newspaper, some of the 376 Frenchmen currently fighting in Syria have complained that, rather than participating in battle asex- pected, they have been acting as jihadi henchmen. “I do nothing other than distribute clothing and food. I occasionally help clean some weapons and transport the bodies of fallen jihadists from the front,” one un- happy militant complains. “Winter is here. It’s getting very hard.” Another complained: "I'm fed up. They make me do the washing up." "My iPod doesn't work any more here. I have to come back," a third one wrote, complaining about his mission to fight in Syria. In its report, Le Figaro said it had been noticed that some of the French were begin- ning to want to leave. "Everyone knows that, the longer these people stay there, the worse it will be be- cause having watched or committed atrocities, they become ticking time bombs," said one lawyer, quoted in Le Figaro. "But, when it comes to having a discussion about whether France is ready to accept repentants, no politician is willing to take the risk. Imagine if one of these ex-jihadis (ts) is involved subsequently in an attack?" “After spending time fighting for Daesh [referring to IS’s name in Arabic] in Iraq and

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Syria, they came to a conclusion that no matter how bad in their opinion their life was in the West, it still remains much better to what they are currently encounter- ing,” Hilal Khashan, a political science professor at the American University of Bei- rut, told Al Arabiya News. “This is a wakeup call for them, probably, and it might as well open new horizons for them once they get back… Western countries need to treat this phenomenon as a psychological case rather than as a criminal issue,” he added. Of the approximately 100 jihadists who have returned to France, 76 are in prison. Indian IS recruit 'goes home after having to clean toilets' The complaints expressed in the letters are similar to those of an Indian student who traveled to Iraq to join the Islamic State group and returned home disillu- sioned after jihadists made him clean toilets and do other menial jobs. Areeb Majeed, 23, left for Iraq with three friends in late May amid fears by authori- ties that IS militants were attempting to recruit from India's large pool ofyoung Muslim men. The engineering student flew home Friday to Mumbai where he was arrested and charged by India's elite National Investigation Agency (NIA) with terror-related offenses. Majeed told NIA officers he was sidelined by the jihadists for whom he fetched wa- ter and performed other lowly tasks such as cleaning toilets, instead of taking part in the deadly offensive like he wanted, the Press Trust of India news agency report- ed. He phoned his family to say he wanted to come home after suffering an unex- plained bullet wound for which he did not get proper medical attention, the agency said late Sunday. "Only after I begged them, I was taken to a hospital," he was quoted as saying by NIA officers. "There was neither a holy war nor any of the preachings in the holy book were followed." (with AFP) http://www.i24news.tv/

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Iraq

Un Ontarien lance un appel au djihad 08 décembre 2014

L'auteur du message vidéo, John Maguire, aurait été surveillé par la GRC après sa conversion à l'islam, ce qui ne l'a pas empêché de s'envoler vers la Syrie en 2013. Image tirée d'une vidéo

Une vidéo menaçant directement le Canada pour son implication dans la mission de combat contre le groupe armé État islamique (EI) a été publiée hier, et elle met en scène un jeune homme «typiquement canadien», qui a quitté le pays pour re- joindre l'organisation djihadiste. Dans les ruines d'un pays non identifié, la caméra est braquée sur le jeune Ontarien John Maguire. «J'étais l'un de vous. J'étais un Canadien typique. J'ai grandi sur une patinoire et passé mon adolescence sur une scène, à jouer de la guitare. Je n'avais pas de casier judiciaire, j'étais un étudiant brillant et je maintenais une bonne moyenne à l'université», lance l'ancien étudiant de l'Université d'Ottawa, avant d'inciter ses auditeurs à mener le djihad contre l'Occident. «Soit vous faites vos bagages, soit vous préparez vos explosifs. Soit vous achetez votre billet d'avion, soit vous aiguisez votre couteau», ordonne le jeune homme à la fin d'une vidéo de six minutes qui a d'abord émergé sur les sites archive.org et ou- Tube, qui hébergent tous les deux des vidéos envoyées par des tiers. «Soit vous ve- nez dans l'État islamique et vivez selon les lois d'Allah, soit vous suivez l'exemple de

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notre frère Ahmad Rouleau», lance John Maguire. Car selon lui, le statu quo est in- tenable. «Plus vous allez nous bombarder, plus il y aura de musulmans qui com- prendront qu'aujourd'hui, mener le djihad contre l'Occident et ses alliés est devenu une obligation religieuse qui lie tous les musulmans, clame-t-il. Votre peuple sera ciblé, comme vous ciblez le nôtre.» John Maguire, identifié comme Abu Anwar al-Canadi dans la vidéo, a fréquenté l'or- ganisation musulmane de l'Université d'Ottawa pendant ses études, de 2010 à 2013. Le jeune converti se rendait à la prière du vendredi. Il socialisait, maisne semblait pas avoir d'amis intimes, selon Stéphane Pressault, qui le côtoyait à l'époque. Originaire de Kemptville, en Ontario, John Maguire aurait aussi fait son secondaire dans la région d'Ottawa. Après sa conversion à l'islam, il aurait été sur- veillé par la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC). Mais il serait passé sous le radar en janvier 2013, quand il a pris un avion pour la Syrie, sans billet de retour. Les cordes sensibles l'écran, il est vêtu d'une tunique et apparaît parfois avec un AK-47 à la main. Il parle d'un pays qu'il ne considère plus comme le sien, mais dont il connaît plusieurs codes culturels, observe Thomas Juneau, professeur adjoint à l'Université d'Ottawa. «Il fait exprès pour toucher des cordes sensibles, en parlant du hockey, en laissant entendre qu'il vient d'une bonne famille, en disant qu'il était un bon étudiant à l'université, note le spécialiste du Moyen-Orient. Il tente de contrer l'idée voulant que ce soit des aliénés ou des personnes marginalisées socialement qui vont com- battre auprès de l'EI.» John Maguire, actif sur les médias sociaux sous le nom de Yahya Maguire, projette l'image du jeune homme ordinaire qui a «vu la lumière», selon Thomas Juneau. «Pourquoi n'êtes-vous donc pas en mesure de comprendre que des opérations comme celle de notre frère Ahmad Rouleau, de Montréal, de même que l'attaque sur la colline du Parlement, à Ottawa, sont des réponses directes de votre participa- tion dans la coalition de nations pour faire la guerre au peuple musulman?», lance-t -il à l'ouverture de la vidéo. «C'est presque une vidéo de revendication des attentats, considère l'auteur et jour- naliste Fabrice de Pierrebourg. Il formule des menaces directes au Canada. Et en plus, la vidéo incite d'autres Bibeau ou d'autres Rouleau à passer à l'acte», prévient -il. Selon lui, il est aussi fascinant qu'inquiétant de voir un «bon Canadien» tenir ce genre de discours, qui semble s'adresser à de jeunes recrues. «Ici, le sous-entendu, c'est: "Je ne suis pas un fou, j'étais un gars comme vous", analyse l'auteur. C'est une vidéo intéressante à diffuser et à écouter, parce que les Canadiens l'oublient, mais nous sommes en guerre.» Steven Blaney réagit Le ministre de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile du Canada, Steven Blaney, a réagi à la diffusion de la vidéo sur sa page Facebook, dimanche après-

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midi. «Le terrorisme constitue une menace réelle et sérieuse pour les Canadiens et nous devons demeurer vigilants. C'est pourquoi nous prenons part à la coalition qui mène actuellement des frappes aériennes contre l'EI [État islamique en Irak et au Levant] et que nous appuyons les forces de sécurité en Irak dans leur lutte contre ce fléau terroriste», -a t-il écrit. Le Canada a notamment déployé six avions de chasse CF-18 afin de combattre l'EI. Quelque 600 employés canadiens sont engagés dans la mission de combat, qui vise à freiner l'ascension du groupe armé État islamique, créé au début de l'intervention américaine en Irak. http://www.lapresse.ca/

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Le groupe EI "en train d'être stoppé" mais le combat va durer des an- nées 03-12-2014

Le secrétaire d'Etat américain John Kerry (c) lors d'une réunion avec les membres de la coalition internationale sur le groupe Etat Islamique, le 3 novembre 2014 au siège de l'Otan à Bruxelles

Bruxelles (AFP) - L'organisation Etat islamique "est en train d'être stoppée" en Irak et en Syrie, a affirmé mercredi la coalition conduite par les Etats-Unis, qui ont salué les frappes iraniennes "positives" contre les jihadistes dans ce combat qui pourrait durer "des années". Grâce au "millier" de frappes menées depuis le mois d'août, "la dynamique de l'EI a été stoppée", s'est félicité le secrétaire d'Etat américain John Kerry. "Ils ont dû changer leurs tactiques, cela contrarie leurs actions", a-t-il ajouté après avoir réuni ses homologues d'une soixantaine de pays participant à la coalition contre l'organisation jihadiste. Dans leur déclaration finale, ceux-ci affirment que les frappes aériennes commen- cent "à montrer des résultats", tout en reconnaissant qu'il faut faire plus pour tarir les revenus de l'EI, notamment pétroliers, et "endiguer le flot de combattants terro- ristes étrangers". "Nous n'avons constaté aucun changement", a au contraire déclaré le président syrien Bachar al-Assad, dont le régime est accusé d'avoir favorisé l'EI pour affaiblir l'opposition modérée qu'il combat sans merci depuis 2011. "On ne peut pas mettre fin au terrorisme par des frappes aériennes. Des forces ter- restres qui connaissent la géographie et agissent en même temps sont indispen- sables", a souligné M. Assad à l'hebdomadaire français Paris-Match.

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Cette réunion de la coalition était la première à ce niveau depuis le débutdes frappes américaines le 8 août en Irak. Onze pays arabes et la Turquie, tous ennemis déclarés de M. Assad, y ont participé, ainsi que le Premier ministre irakien, Haidar al-Abadi. Elle a commencé quelques heures après que le Pentagone eut confirmé que l'Iran avait mené des raids aériens contre l'EI dans l'est de l'Irak ces derniers jours. Téhéran, qui n'a pas confirmé, est un allié de circonstance plutôt inattendu, d'au- tant plus que les Etats-Unis ont réaffirmé leur refus catégorique de toute coordina- tion militaire avec l'Iran. M. Kerry n'a d'ailleurs ni confirmé ni démenti les frappes iraniennes, tout en souli- gnant que "cela a un effet qui, au final, est positif". Téhéran équipe déjà les milices chiites en Irak ainsi que des unités de l'armée ira- kienne avec des fusils et des lance-roquettes. L'Iran a également mis à la disposi- tion de l'Irak des avions de combat Soukhoï Su-25. Les Etats-Unis sont le moteur de la coalition internationale contre l'EI, qui a procla- mé en juin un "califat" à cheval sur la Syrie et l'Irak, où il disposerait de 30.000 com- battants, et a décapité plusieurs otages occidentaux. - 'Des bottes sur le terrain' - "Nous allons mener cette campagne aussi longtemps que nécessaire pour gagner", a affirmé M. Kerry au cours de la réunion à Bruxelles. "Notre engagement durera certainement des années". "Cela représente un effort à très très long terme, il y aura des revers et des pro- grès", a estimé un haut responsable américain présent dans la capitale belge. "Les terroristes de Daech sont un fléau. Tout doit être fait pour l'éradiquer", a de son côté lancé le ministre français Laurent Fabius. "L'action militaire de la coalition commence à porter ses fruits, notamment en Irak, mais il reste beaucoup à faire", a -t-il estimé. En Irak, les Etats-Unis ont reçu l'aide d'avions français, australiens, britanniques, canadiens, danois, belges et néerlandais. Par ailleurs, depuis le 23 septembre, les Américains frappent des positions de l'EI en Syrie, avec la participation de l'Arabie saoudite, des Emirats arabes unis, de la Jordanie et de Bahreïn. En 2015, cette campagne aérienne devrait coûter 5,6 milliards de dollars aux Etats- Unis. "La solution nécessite des bottes sur le terrain, les bombardements sans un appui terrestre ne permettent pas d'en finir avec EI", a toutefois averti le ministre espa- gnol José Manuel Garcia Margallo. Jusqu'ici, M. Abadi et les pays occidentaux ont exclu toute intervention étrangère au sol.

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La coalition veut aussi contrer la "propagande" de l'EI sur les réseaux sociaux. "Il faut agir sur le terreau sur lequel prospère l'idéologie" jihadiste, a souligné le mi- nistre allemand, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. "C'est aux Etats musulmans de dire clai- rement que l'EI n'agit pas au nom de l'islam". L'EI a commis de nombreux viols, enlèvements, meurtres de masse et crucifixions de civils dans les régions sous son contrôle, et les revendique même activement sur les réseaux sociaux. "Des crimes barbares" dénoncés mercredi par Ahmed al-Tayeb, le cheikh d'Al-Azhar au Caire, l'une des plus prestigieuses institutions de l'islam sunnite. http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/

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Thomas Friedman: Islamic State is driving Muslims from Islam December 6, 2014

Egyptians protest in Cairo last week. Young Muslims across the Arab world have also been speaking out online. The Islamic State has visibly attracted young Muslims from all over the world to its violent movement to build a caliphate in Iraq and Syria. But here's what's less visi- ble — the online backlash against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS and ISIL, by young Muslims declaring their opposition to rule by Islamic law, or Shariah, and even proudly avowing their atheism. Nadia Oweidat, a senior fellow at theNew America Foundation who tracks how Arab youths use the Internet, says the phe- nomenon "is mushrooming — the brutality of the Islamic State is exacerbating the issue and even pushing some young Muslims away from Islam." On Nov. 24, BBC.com published a piece on what was trending on Twitter. It began: "A growing social media conversation in Arabic is calling for the implementation of Shariah, or Islamic law, to be abandoned. Discussing religious law is a sensitive top- ic in many Muslim countries. But on Twitter, a hashtag which translates as 'why we reject implementing Shariah' has been used 5,000 times in 24 hours. The conversa- tion is mainly taking place in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The debate is about whether religious law is suitable for the needs of Arab countries and modern legal systems. Dr. Alyaa Gad, an Egyptian doctor living in Switzerland, started the hashtag. 'I have nothing against religion,' she tells BBC Trending, but says she is against 'using it as a political system.'"

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The BBC added that "many others joined in the conversation, using the hashtag, listing reasons why Arabs and Muslims should abandon Shariah. 'Because there's not a single positive example of it bringing justice and equality,' one man tweeted. ... A Saudi woman commented: 'By adhering to Shariah we are adhering to inhu- mane laws. Saudi Arabia is saturated with the blood of those executed by Shariah.'" Ismail Mohamed, an Egyptian on a mission to create freedom of conscience there, started a program called "Black Ducks" to offer a space where agnostic and atheist Arabs can speak freely about their right to choose what they believe and resist co- ercion and misogyny from religious authorities. He is part of a growing Arab Athe- ists Network. Another voice getting attention is Brother Rachid, a Moroccan who created his own YouTube network to deliver his message of tolerance and to expose examples of intolerance within his former Muslim faith community. (He told me he's converted to Christianity, preferring its "God of love.") In this recent segment, youtube.com/watch?v=QxzOVSMUrGM, which has been viewed 500,000 times, Brother Rachid addressed President : "I ask you, Mr. President, to stop being politically correct — to call things by their names. ISIL,al-Qaida, Boko Haram, al-Shabab in Somalia, the Taliban, and their sis- ter brand names, are all made in Islam. Unless the deals with Islam and separates religion from state, we will never end this cycle. ... If Islam is not the problem, then why is it there are millions of Christians in the Middle East and yet none of them has ever blown up himself to become a martyr, even though they live under the same economic and political circumstances and even worse? Mr. Presi- dent, if you really want to fight terrorism, then fight it at the roots. How many Sau- di sheiks are preaching hatred? How many Islamic channels are indoctrinating peo- ple and teaching them violence from the and the ? ... How many Is- lamic schools are producing generations of teachers and students who believe in jihad and martyrdom and fighting the ?" The Islamic State, by claiming to speak for all Muslims — and by promoting a puri- tanical form of Islam that takes present-day, Saudi-funded, madrassa indoctrination to its logical political conclusion — has blown the lid off some long simmering frus- trations in the Arab Muslim world. As an outsider, I can't say how widespread this is. But clearly there is a significant group of Muslims who feel that their government-backed preachers and religious hierarchies have handed them a brand of Islam that does not speak to them. So a few, like Brother Rachid, leave Islam for a different faith and invite others to come along. And some seem to be quietly detaching from religion entirely — fed up with being patronized by politically correct Westerners telling them what Islam is not and with being tyrannized by self-appointed Islamist authoritarians telling them what Islam is. Now that the Internet has created alternative spaces to discuss these

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issues, outside the mosques and government-owned media, this war of ideas is on. http://www.timesunion.com/

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Jordan

La lutte contre l'EI, une «Troisième guerre mondiale», dit le roi de Jor- danie 05 décembre 2014

Le roi Abdallah II de Jordanie a rencontré vendredi le président Barack Obama, qui a annoncé une hausse sensible de l'aide de Washington à Amman.

Le roi Abdallah II de Jordanie a qualifié la lutte contre le groupe État islamique de «Troisième guerre mondiale», à l'occasion vendredi d'une rencontre avec le prési- dent Barack Obama qui a annoncé une hausse sensible de l'aide de Washington à Amman. M. Obama a indiqué que l'assistance américaine passerait à 1 milliard de dollars par an, contre 660 millions de dollars par an actuellement. Il a également promis de nouvelles garanties de prêt. «Tout ceci vise à renforcer les réformes politiques et économiques qui sont menées en Jordanie», a-t-il souligné. La Maison-Blanche a précisé que cette aide, qui devrait être débattue au Congrès, s'appliquerait sur la période 2015-2017. Rappelant que la Jordanie avait accueilli «des centaines de milliers de Syriens» dé- placés en raison de la guerre civile dans leur pays, M. Obama a souligné l'impor- tance d'aider ce pays «qui fait toujours face à ses responsabilités».

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Le souverain hachémite, l'un des principaux alliés des États-Unis au Moyen-Orient, a remercié M. Obama pour cette aide à un moment «très difficile» pour la Jordanie où les réfugiés représentent désormais «20% de la population». Interrogé par la chaîne CBS News à propos de la lutte contre le groupe EI en Syrie et en Irak, le roi de Jordanie a estimé qu'il s'agissait «clairement d'un combat entre le Bien et le Mal». «Je crois que c'est une Troisième guerre mondiale par d'autres moyens», a dit Ad- dallah II dans un entretien réalisé jeudi et diffusé vendredi par la télévision améri- caine. Reprenant ce qu'avaient déjà dit il y a plusieurs mois le président Obama et son se- crétaire d'État John Kerry, le souverain a encore comparé la lutte anti-djihadiste au «combat d'une génération». Le Royaume de Jordanie est frontalier de l'Irak et de la Syrie, deux pays dont des pans de territoires sont contrôlés par les ultra-radicaux sunnites de l'EI. http://www.lapresse.ca/

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Syria

La Syrie accuse Israël d'avoir mené deux raids près de Damas 07/12/2014 La télévision officielle syrienne a évoqué un "soutien direct" aux rebelles et aux dji- hadistes. Le secteur de Dimas et l'aéroport de Damas auraient été visés.

Photo d'illustration. © JACK GUEZ / AFP La Syrie a accusé dimanche Israël d'avoir mené deux raids contre des secteurs te- nus par le pouvoir près de Damas, l'accusant d'apporter un "soutien direct" aux re- belles et aux djihadistes. Ailleurs dans le pays déchiré par plus de trois ans de guerre civile, les forces pro-gouvernementales ont repoussé un assaut des dji- hadistes du groupe État islamique (EI) dans la province orientale de Deir ez-Zor et resserraient l'étau sur des positions rebelles dans le secteur d'Alep (nord). Dimanche après-midi, "l'ennemi israélien a attaqué deux régions sécurisées (gouvernementales) de la province de Damas : le secteur de Dimas (nord-ouest) et celui de l'aéroport international de Damas", a accusé l'armée syrienne dans un communiqué diffusé à la télévision, précisant que les raids n'avaient causé que des dégâts matériels. Le ministère syrien des Affaires étrangères a indiqué dimanche soir qu'il demandait au secrétaire général Ban Ki-moon et au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU d'imposer des sanctions contre Israël. Le ministère a qualifié ces raids de "crime atroce contre la souveraineté de la Syrie", selon l'agence de presse officielle Sana. Selon l'Observatoire syrien des droits de l'homme (OSDH), Dimas est un site militaire et l'aéroport de Damas est en partie civil et en partie militaire. "Cette agression directe par Israël a été menée pour aider les terroristes en Syrie après que nos forces eurent remporté d'importantes victoires à Deir ez-Zor, Alep et ailleurs, a ajouté l'armée. Cela apporte la preuve du soutien direct d'Israël au terro- risme en Syrie." Dans la terminologie du pouvoir syrien, le mot "terroriste" englobe tous les rebelles, qu'il s'agisse des modérés ou des djihadistes. Les autorités israé- liennes n'ont pas réagi dans l'immédiat.

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Un assaut de l'EI repoussé L'armée et l'aviation israéliennes ont mené plusieurs attaques contre des positions militaires en Syrie depuis le début de la révolte contre le président Bachar el-Assad en mars 2011. L'aviation israélienne a aussi visé en Syrie des infrastructures appar- tenant au puissant mouvement libanais chiite Hezbollah ou des armes lui étant des- tinées. Le Hezbollah - qui soutient militairement le président Assad - et Israël s'étaient livré une guerre dévastatrice et meurtrière en 2006. L'annonce de ces raids survient alors que les forces pro-gouvernementales sy- riennes ont connu plusieurs succès ces 24 dernières heures. Elles ont réussi di- manche à repousser une attaque de l'EI contre un important aéroport militaire si- tué à Deir ez-Zor, selon l'OSDH, qui a précisé que plus de 100 djihadistes et 59 com- battants loyalistes avaient été tués. L'aéroport militaire de Deir ez-Zor est considéré comme la seule voie de ravitaillement alimentaire des forces gouvernementales dans l'Est syrien. C'est de là que les avions et les hélicoptères de l'armée décollent pour des raids contre les djihadistes et rebelles dans plusieurs régions de Syrie. Rencontres diplomatiques Par ailleurs, l'armée avançait dimanche dans la province d'Alep, selon l'OSDH, qui a précisé qu'au moins 24 rebelles et djihadistes avaient été tués au nord-est de la ville éponyme. "L'armée (...) a pris le secteur de Breij", a déclaré à l'AFP le directeur de l'OSDH, Rami Abdel Rahmane. Cela signifie que l'armée resserre l'étau sur les rebelles à l'est d'Alep. Deuxième ville de Syrie, Alep est divisée depuis juillet 2012 entre secteurs loyalistes à l'ouest et secteurs rebelles à l'est. Le conflit en Syrie a commencé en mars 2011 par un mouvement de contestation pacifique qui s'est transformé en rébellion armée. Celle-ci a été ensuite largement éclipsée par la montée en puissance de groupes djihadistes, notamment l'EI. Alors que les combats ont fait plus de 200 000 morts, les efforts diplomatiques ont repris pour tenter de mettre un terme aux violences. L'émissaire de l'ONU en Syrie, Staffan de Mistura, discutera dans les prochains jours à Gaziantep, en Turquie, avec les chefs rebelles d'Alep d'un "gel" des combats dans cette ville. La Russie, qui entend relancer le processus de paix, recevra de son côté mercredi une délégation d'opposants syriens tolérés par le président Assad, après des per- sonnalités du régime fin novembre. Le Canada, qui participe aux frappes aériennes contre l'EI, a réaffirmé dimanche sa détermination à lutter contre le "fléau terro- riste" en Irak, quelques heures après l'appel d'un djihadiste canadien à mener des attaques isolées sur le sol canadien. "Le terrorisme constitue une menace réelle et sérieuse pour les Canadiens, et nous devons demeurer vigilants", a déclaré Steven Blaney, ministre de la Sécurité publique. Plus de 30 organisations humanitaires ont lancé lundi un appel pour que des États s'engagent à accueillir quelque 180 000 ré- fugiés syriens pour l'instant pris en charge par les pays limitrophes de la Syrie. Il y a actuellement plus de 3,2 millions de réfugiés syriens, selon l'ONU.

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http://www.lepoint.fr/

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United Kingdom

Myopic global war on terror is not winning hearts and minds 09 December 2014 The 2014 Global Terrorism Index highlights the urgent need for new African-led ap- proaches – but rash action could have dire consequences.

Isis militants. (Reuters) As if to underline the recent release of the 2014 Global Terrorism Index – which shows that rates of terrorism are increasing in breadth, frequency and intensity – on November 20, members of Somalia’s al-Shabab terror group hijacked a Kenyan bus near the border town of Mandera, interrogated its 60 passengers and executed the 28 non-Muslims on board. On November 28, in northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram sought to establish its own Islamic State-like caliphate, militants attacked the Grand Mosque in Kano and killed 100 Muslims gathered for Friday prayers. In the wake of these seemingly incoherent acts of ultraviolence increasingly punc- tuating our headlines, it is easy to lose track of what motivates terrorism and what methods of counterterrorism actually work to bring conflict to an end. Being that variations of extreme interpretations of Islam are common to the several organisa- tions most responsible for rising rates of terrorism, it is also easy to confer too much weight on religion as an explanatory factor driving the scourge of terror. Drawing from a data set of 125 000 codified terrorist incidents to generate a com- prehensive picture of the dynamics that give rise to terrorism and encourage

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groups to use it as an act of warfare, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) helps to shed light on terrorism as one of the defining political phenomena of the 21st century. The recent GTI report is concerning. Terrorism is getting worse. Much worse. Last year, 55 countries recorded one or more deaths from terrorist activity and the number of countries that experienced more than 50 deaths rose from 15 to 24. Over the past decade, there has been a 61% increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3 361 in 2000 to 17 958 in 2013. Not only is terrorism becom- ing more widespread, it is also increasing in intensity. A new type of war Africa is already home to Boko Haram, al-Shabab and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, which are responsible for a significant number of increasing terrorism-related deaths. The GTI report also identifies 13 countries at risk of increased future terror- ist activity. Half of these are in Africa. The fall of the Berlin Wall was famously theorised by the political scientist Francis Fukuyama as “the end of history”; the radical ideologies of the 20th century had lost, which would see states begin to move towards a liberal-democratic utopia. Yet everywhere we see ideology forcing its way into the public space. Boko Haram, the Taliban, al-Shabab and al-Qaeda and its affiliates are only the most radical incarna- tions of this trend. Yet despite the radical interpretations of Islam common to all these groups, most terrorist organisations are responding to the same political, social and economic grievances that at earlier points in history may have been expressed in separatist, nationalist or Marxist rhetoric, even though masked in a religious narrative. Struc- tural inequality did not change, but the response to it did. This is not to say that conflict framed in religious terms does not make negotiated peace settlements especially difficult to achieve. It does. As terrorism analyst Mark Juergensmeyer writes, religion can turn conflict into a zero-sum game forcing rivals into vastly opposing positions and making compromise difficult. It can also provide moral justification for the use of extreme violence and offer per- sonal reward for the perpetrators of violence. War waged in a godly time span also need not be won immediately but can grind on indefinitely. A forced response The Global Terrorism Index identifies three factors that are the most common driv- ers of terrorism: social hostility between different ethnic, religious or linguistic groups; the presence of state-sponsored violence such as extrajudicial killings and human rights violations; and a high level of other forms of violence, such as violent demonstrations and violent crime.

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In the light of these factors that we know fuel terrorism, strongly militaristic ap- proaches towards counterterrorism seem wholly unable to combat the problem. In March, after two al-Shabab attacks in Kenya, the Kenyan government began a secu- rity crackdown on Somali refugees called Operation Usalama Watch, which Amnes- ty International reported led to thousands of arbitrary arrests, harassment, forcible relocation and expulsion. In 2009, the Nigerian police arrested some of the founding members of Boko Ha- ram and publically executed them without trial, marking a turning point in the group’s trajectory of terror. And the African Union Mission in Somalia, which is to date the largest deployment of AU forces on the continent, is wholly reliant on the United States for operational and technical support in carrying out targeted killings of al-Shabab leadership fig- ures. Conflict breeds conflict In the aftermath of 9/11, as the great US war machine again rolled into the Middle East to disastrous effect, then-president George Bush made a speech in which he proclaimed the US’s purpose to be to “rid this world of evil and terror”. “The evil ones have roused a mighty nation, a mighty land. And for however long it takes, I am determined that we will prevail.” In this myopic vision of a “war on terror” to end “evil”, US counterterrorism policy had been decided. “Disrupt and destroy” became the mantra of US leadership and it echoed around the world. There was little attention given to structural inequalities, state-sanctioned violence, aggressive foreign policy – all those things that create the frustrated and disenfran- chised classes easily recruited into terrorist groups. It was easier to paint with broad strokes. Terrorists are evil and evil is the enemy. Since the 1960s, 80% of all terrorist groups have disbanded as a result of negotia- tion by being brought into the political process. The US’s militaristic approach to combating terrorism has been a complete failure, yet it is unlikely to change any- time soon. Too many resources have been committed to developing the capabilities to fight an indefinite war on terror, a war that African leaders are slowly being co-opted into waging on their behalf. It is going to be up to African leaders to explore soft ap- proaches to creating the reconciled and just societies that best guard against ter- rorism. http://mg.co.za/article/

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USA

Congress must step up to challenge of ISIS DECEMBER 10, 2014

An explosion rocked the Syrian city of Kobani during a reported suicide car bomb attack by ISIS militants in October. WAR IS the most serious business any government can engage in. That’s why the silence in Congress about the US military campaign against militants associated with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS, has been deeply disap- pointing. Lawmakers deliberately punted on the debate over authorizing the use of military force against ISIS until after the midterm elections. Indeed, some in Con- gress would be happy to steer clear of this debate forever. In their mind, there is no reason to get their hands dirty with a vote about this war when Obama has already determined that he has the authority to combat ISIS. The trouble is, Obama’s authority to act is based on two outdated laws: the 2001 authorization of military force against Al Qaeda and a 2002 authorization touse force in Iraq. Even before the rise of ISIS, there was an urgent need to repeal these two authorizations and replace them with newer ones better tailored to current challenges. While ISIS is a direct descendant of Al Qaeda, it is not the same organization. And while the US involvement in Iraq today is a direct descendant of the US-led 2003 invasion, the military mission is much changed.

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That’s why it’s a good thing that Congress is finally turning its attention to this matter, months after President Obama announced a stepped-up ISIS campaign. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is holding a hearing on the authorization for the use of military force. And finally, Senator Robert Menendez, the New Jersey Democrat who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has put forth a bill that would authorize military force against ISIS for three years only. The bill is a reasonable attempt to narrowly tailor the mission without fatally hamstringing the military in a way that destroys its chances of success. It stipulates that US ground troops should be used sparingly, and that they should be limited to discreet missions, such as the rescue of US soldiers or citizens, opera- tions against high value targets, and intelligence collection. The bill appropriately asks the administration to provide clear benchmarks for suc- cess, a list of the organizations and entities that will be targeted, and an estimate of what operations will cost. However, it does leave room for mission creep. US ground troops, for instance, can be used to provide “advice and assistance to forces fighting ISIS in Iraq or Syria,” a clause that could be interpreted in ways that cover a far wider range of activities than many lawmakers currently imagine. Also, the bill asks the White House to report on the geographical scope of the military’s mission, but does not appear to limit it to any particular country or region. Another problem with the bill is that, while it repeals the 2002 war authorization against Iraq, it remains silent on the 2001 war authorization against Al Qaeda. This is probably because that law remains the legal basis of ongoing drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. Congress should update those authorities appro- priately in a separate bill. The farther we get from Sept. 11, 2001, the more tenu- ous that use of force authorization becomes. While ISIS is a direct descendant of Al Qaeda, it is not the same organization. Perhaps the thorniest issue with the bill is an inevitable consequence of responsible oversight: it will force the Obama administration to be more transparent about its targets, making it crystal clear that the United States does not intend to go to war with Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Up until now, ambiguity has served a pur- pose. We lead a far-flung coalition that includes key partners who insist upon As- sad’s departure. The more information the Obama administration provides publicly about its meth- ods and targets, the less enthusiastic allies like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Syrian rebels themselves will be about our campaign. These players view Assad as a great- er threat than ISIS. This reality highlights the difficulty of exercising oversight over one of the messiest conflicts the United States has been involved with in genera- tions. Nonetheless, Congress must not shy away from the task at hand. http://www.bostonglobe.com/

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Torture And Public Opinion: Prior To CIA Report, Many Americans Sup- ported ‘Harsh’ Interrogations To Prevent Terrorism December 09 2014

CIA Director John Brennan. Reuters The U.S. reacted in shock Tuesday to the release of a damning report on the Central Intelligence Agency’s routine torturing of suspected terrorists, but for years many Americans said they considered so-called enhanced interrogation techniques nec- essary to prevent terrorist attacks. Over the course of George W. Bush’s eight-year presidency and even after the election of U.S. President Barack Obama, Americans increasingly said they favored torture tactics, especially when they believed it would lead to vital information or save lives, according to research from Reed Col- lege in Portland and the University of California, Irvine, published in 2010. Despite Obama ostensibly banning torture as a means of extracting information from U.S. detainees in 2009, 47 percent of respondents to an April survey from YouGov said the use of harsh interrogation tactics like waterboarding were “sometimes” or “always” justified, while only 22 percent said such torture tactics were “never” justified – a dramatic shift in the country’s moral compass from 10 years ago, when 82 percent of Americans said they considered such extreme tactics to be wrong. The figures from this year are consistent with a trend seen throughout the Bush administration in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Overall, most Americans have remained opposed to torture, but “opposition to torture has de- clined” since 2004, according to researchers who described American support for

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torture as a “very recent phenomenon.” “A majority supporting torture did not emerge until June 2009, six months after the inauguration of [Obama],” according to the study. Researchers considered 32 polls conducted between 2001 and 2009 from a variety of media and survey groups that asked Americans to gauge their support for torturing suspected terrorists. They found that “the mean over the nine-year period is 55 percent in opposition to and 40.8 percent in favor of the use of torture.” Between 2004 and 2009, public opinion polls showed fewer Americans opposed torture, while an increasing number of Americans said they supported some forms of it. Public support for torture hit an all-time high in 2009. Researchers said the tilt in public opinion toward torture occurred largely because of the politically polarizing nature of the torture debate. “We believe that torture may have become a partisan symbol, distinguishing Republicans from Democrats, that demonstrates hawkishness on national security in the same way that being supportive of the death penalty indicates that a person is tough on crime,” re- searchers wrote. The U.S. learned on Tuesday that the interrogation tactics used by the CIA against suspected terrorists were much harsher than was previously thought. Among other things, the report revealed that the agency routinely waterboarded detainees to the point of vomiting and often deprived prisoners of sleep for up to a week at a time. The report, compiled between 2009 and 2013, angered many lawmakers who said the CIA had misled them about the nature of its interrogation tactics. The CIA, however, defended its use of questionable interrogation techniques. “We acknowledge that the detention and interrogation program had shortcomings and that the agency made mistakes ... [but] our review indicates that interrogations of detainees on whom [enhanced interrogation techniques] were used did produce intelligence that helped thwart attack plans, capture terrorists, and save lives,” said the agency’s director, John Brennan, following the report’s release. http://www.ibtimes.com/-

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Washington défend son opération de sauvetage ratée 06 décembre 2014

Le photojournaliste américain Luke Somers résidait dans cet édifice dans dans le vieux . Les États-Unis ont défendu le bien-fondé de l'opération lancée samedi au Yémen pour libérer l'otage américain Luke Somers même si son échec a conduit à son dé- cès et à celui d'un Sud-Africain qui s'apprêtait à être relâché par Al-Qaïda selon une ONG. Le président Barack Obama est rapidement monté au créneau pour affirmer avoir «autorisé cette opération de sauvetage (...) en coopération avec le gouvernement yémé- nite» après des «informations indiquant que la vie de Luke était en danger immédiat». Au cours de cette opération, Luke Somers, un photojournaliste de 33 ans kidnappé en sep- tembre 2013 à Sanaa, et Pierre Korkie, un en- seignant sud-africain retenu depuis mai 2013, «ont été assassinés par les terroristes de l'Aqpa» (Al-Qaïda dans la péninsule ara- Luke Somers bique), selon le secrétaire d'État américain Chuck Hagel.

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Les circonstances exactes de leur mort restaient incertaines dimanche. Les autori- tés yéménites soutiennent, comme Washington, que les ravisseurs «ont tiré sur les deux otages pour les liquider» après avoir «refusé de se rendre», selon la haute commission de sécurité à Sanaa. Dix combattants présumés d'Al-Qaïda ont été tués et quatre membres des forces antiterroristes yéménites ont été blessés lors de l'opération, a indiqué le gouverne- ment de Sanaa. Il n'y aurait pas eu de victimes civiles, selon des sources sécuri- taires. Le sauvetage a échoué en raison de «la faiblesse des informations rassemblées par les services de renseignements américains sur le lieu de détention des otages et les mouvements de leurs ravisseurs», a estimé Mustafa Alani, spécialisé dans les affaires de sécurité et du terrorisme. «Les Américains ont la capacité de mobiliser des commandos mais leurs renseigne- ments restent faibles», a ajouté cet expert du Gulf Research Centre, basé à Genève. Al-Qaïda n'avait pas encore donné dimanche sa version des événements survenus à Noussib, une région reculée de Chabwa dans le sud-est du pays. La mission était «extrêmement dangereuse et compliquée», a reconnu le secrétaire américain à la Défense Chuck Hagel. Elle a été lancée dans l'urgence sur la base de «très bonnes indications» selon lesquelles Somers allait être tué de façon immi- nente, peut-être dès samedi. Un influent élu républicain américain a déclaré dimanche que M. Obama avait pris «la bonne décision» mais qu'il y avait «toujours un risque» à lancer une telle opéra- tion. Les forces spéciales sont intervenues moins de 24 heures avant l'expiration de l'ulti- matum d'Aqpa, qui avait menacé jeudi de tuer Luke Somers si Washington ne ré- pondait pas à des exigences non précisées. Une précédente opération avait été me- née il y a une dizaine de jours, permettant de libérer huit otages mais pas Luke So- mers. Tristesse en Afrique du sud Les Américains ont affirmé ne pas avoir su que Pierre Korkie était également déte- nu au même endroit. Sans chercher à polémiquer, l'association caritative sud-africaine musulmane Gift of the Givers, qui négociait depuis un an sa libération, a fait savoir que l'enseignant s'apprêtait à recouvrer la liberté, peut-être dès dimanche. L'Afrique du Sud est «profondément triste» de la mort de Pierre Korkie, a réagi di- manche le gouvernement, en indiquant avoir «pris de nombreuses initiatives» pour le faire libérer.

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Selon Gift of the Givers, les ravisseurs récla- maient une rançon de trois millions de dollars mais avaient récemment envisagé de réduire leurs prétentions.

Mais, comme le rappelle l'expert Alani, les États-Unis refusent «l'échange d'otages avec des prisonniers et le versement de rançons», et n'ont donc pour le moment pas d'alterna- tive «aux solutions militaires». M. Obama a martelé samedi que «les États- Pierre Korkie Unis n'épargneront aucun effort (...) pour ra- mener sains et saufs les Américains, où qu'ils se trouvent». Au Yémen, un pays pauvre à structure tribale où la population est fortement ar- mée, les rapts sont fréquents mais les otages sont généralement libérés sains et saufs, souvent en échange de rançon ou de concessions des autorités. C'est la première fois que des otages d'Al-Qaïda sont tués au Yémen depuis 1998. Seize touristes occidentaux avaient alors été kidnappés par des islamistes dont quatre avaient été tués par les ravisseurs lors d'une opération de sauvetage yémé- nite, selon Sanaa. Les morts de Luke Somers et de Pierre Korkie surviennent dans un contexte régio- nal particulièrement tendu et marqué par les multiples exécutions perpétrées par le groupe extrémiste État islamique en Irak et en Syrie. Al-Qaïda au Yémen détient toujours un diplomate iranien enlevé en juillet 2013 et un diplomate saoudien enlevé en mars 2012 à Aden. Un Britannique est également en captivité au Yémen, selon la presse. Dimanche, les forces de sécurité ont été mises en état d'alerte dans les provinces de Chabwa et du Hadramout, deux bastions d'Al-Qaïda dans le sud-est du Yémen, pour «prévenir une quelconque action terroriste», a annoncé le ministère de l'Inté- rieur. http://www.lapresse.ca/

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Yemen

Yemen's al-Qaida blames Obama for hostage deaths 10 December 2014

FILE - In this Feb. 11, 2013 file photo, Luke Somers, 33, an American photojournalist who was kidnapped over a year ago by al-Qaida, poses for a picture during a pa- rade marking the second anniversary of the revolution in Sanaa, Yemen. The body of an American photojournalist killed during a high risk raid to free him and a South African teacher from al-Qaida militants in Yemen is back on U.S. soil. The remains of Luke Somers arrived at Dover Air Force Base Wednesday aboard a U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft. There was no public announcement. The Somers family was there to receive the remains, but no media coverage was allowed, according to a U.S. de- fense official who spoke on condition of anonymity because the arrival was not publicly announced. (AP Photo/Hani Mohammed, File) Posted: Thursday, December 11, 2014 9:00 am | Updated: 1:01 pm, Thu Dec 11, 2014. SANAA, Yemen (AP) — A top al-Qaida leader in Yemen on Thursday blamed Presi- dent Barack Obama for the deaths last week of an American and a South African hostage in a failed U.S. rescue operation. The video message by Nasr bin Ali al-Ansi, posted on one of the militant group's Twitter accounts, was the first comment by al-Qaida's Yemeni branch on the killings of Luke Somers and Pierre Korkie. The two were killed when U.S. special forces attacked an - al Qaida safe house attempting to rescue American photojournalist

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Somers. Officials said U.S. forces did not know that he and Korkie, a South African schoolteacher, were being held together. About 40 U.S. special operations forces, backed by Yemeni ground forces, were in- volved in the half-hour rescue attempt in Shabwa province, which followed U.S. drone strikes in the area east of the capital of Sanaa, U.S. officials said. After a fire- fight with militants, the rescuers eventually reached the men and found them alive but gravely wounded. They both died shortly after as medics tried to save them. Al-Ansi said he warned the U.S. against such attempts after an earlier, first rescue attempt in November also failed. He accused Obama of recklessness, and said the raid "caused things to go in a completely different way than we wanted." Obama said he ordered the raid because the 33-year-old Somers was believed to be in "imminent danger." The president condemned Somers' killing as a "barbaric murder." Al-Ansi described the rescue operation as an "execution order" and claimed that poorly equipped militants fended off heavily armed U.S. forces for nearly three hours. Initial -al Qaida demands were never clear. Al-Ansi on Thursday claimed that al- Qaida wanted to negotiate the release of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. He also mentioned Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, known as the "Blind Sheik", who is serving a life sentence in the United States on a terrorism conviction. "They could have at least negotiated with us about some clauses or shown sinceri- ty," he added. Al-Ansi also warned that al-Qaida would continue to "put the lives of all Americans in danger inside and outside of America ... in the air, on the ground and in the sea." Washington considers Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, as the Yemeni branch is officially known, to be the most dangerous affiliate of the terror group founded by Osama bin Laden. The group has been linked to several sophisticated plots to attack the U.S. homeland that were either botched or foiled. With the permission of Yemen's government, the U.S. has for years launched drone strikes against militant targets in the country and provided Yemen with hundreds of millions of dollars in security assistance. Civilian casualties from the drone strikes have stoked anger. Hours before the release of the video, the al-Qaida affiliate said it shelled a Yemeni air base used by U.S. forces. It was not immediately clear if there were casualties at the Al-Annad base early Thursday in the southern province of Lahj. Ambulance rushed to the site and wit- nesses say they saw bodies taken to nearby hospital. The base is where American

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and European military advisers help Yemen battle Yemen's al-Qaida branch. The militant group claimed on its official Twitter account that its militants fired six grad missiles at the base. In a brief statement, the group said it hit the "American section" of the base, in retaliation for killings of Yemenis, including the group's fighters, during last week's U.S. raid. There was no immediate comment from the Yemeni government or Washington. http://www.thepublicopinion.com/

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Qui était Luke Somers, le journaliste américain tué par Al-Qaïda au Yémen ? 06-12-2014 Luke Somers, 33 ans, disait vouloir, avec son travail, raconter la vie quotidienne des gens ordinaires.

Luke Somers était un journaliste américain de 33 ans. Le journaliste américain Luke Somers, détenu par Al-Qaïda au Yémen, a été tué par ses ravisseurs samedi 6 décembre lors d'une opération des forces américaines pour tenter de le libérer. L'opération de sauvetage a été autorisée par le président américain Barack Oba- ma "en coopération avec le gouvernement yéménite", alors que des "informations indiquaient que la vie de Luke faisait face à un danger imminent". Au cours de l'opération conduite par les forces spéciales américaines, Luke So- mers et un citoyen Sud-africain, Pierre Korkie, ont été assassinés par les terroristes d'Aqpa [Al-Qaïda dans la péninsule arabique, NDLR]. Selon les proches de ce se- cond otage, il devait lui être libéré dans les prochains jours. Luke Somers, 33 ans, disait vouloir, avec son travail, raconter la vie quotidienne des gens ordinaires. Enlevé en septembre 2013 Le jeune homme s'était rendu au Yémen il y a deux ans avec l'ambition d'y ensei- gner. Mais très vite, le photographe amateur, armé de son appareil, commence à saisir des images des rues de Sanaa, la capitale yéménite, alors que le pays est secoué par une crise politique et des violences qui débordent lors des élections de 2012.

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Photographe "freelance" pour la BBC, il travaille aussi pour des journaux locaux, notamment le "Yemen Times", où il est éditeur et traducteur, avant d'être, un jour de septembre 2013, enlevé dans les rues de Sanaa. Somers disait vouloir raconter les multiples histoires des Yéménites ordinaires, montrer leur vie de tous les jours, que ce soit lors d'un rassemblement politique ou dans un hôpital, ou en passant du temps avec des militants handicapés. C'est tellement important pour les gens ici de savoir que leurs histoires sont enten- dues et vues", expliquait-il à la BBC. Ses photos montrent qu'il n'avait pas peur d'aller au plus près de l'action, saisissant parfois des images crues de victimes des manifestations violentes au Yémen. Il ra- conte à la BBC que "l'odeur de la mort" restait souvent après qu'il avait fini son tra- vail. Un meurtre "barbare" Somers, qui était né au Royaume-Uni mais avait passé la majeure partie de sa vie aux Etats-Unis, avait également dit à la BBC qu'il avait prévu de quitter le Yémen en août 2013, soit un mois avant d'être kidnappé. Son frère Jordan le décrivait avant sa mort comme "quelqu'un de bien". "Il essaie juste de faire des choses biens pour la population yéménite", expliquait-il dans une vidéo plus tôt cette semaine, aux côtés de leur mère Paula. Il fait tout pour prendre soin et respecter les gens ordinaires et il s'est fait de nom- breux amis durables au Yémen", ajoutait Jordan. Son meurtre, que Barack Obama a qualifié de "barbare", intervient quelques jours après que Somers est apparu dans une vidéo dans laquelle il disait que sa vie était en danger et demandait de l'aide, tandis que ses ravisseurs dans une autre vidéo menaçaient de le tuer. Je recherche la moindre aide qui pourrait me faire sortir de là. Je suis certain que ma vie est en danger", y affirmait Somers, portant chemise et lunettes. Sa mère avait appelé ses ravisseurs à l'épargner. Nos coeurs sont avec toi, tu nous manques et nous t'aimons. Tout ce que nous vou- lons est te revoir et t'avoir en sécurité dans nos bras", avait-elle dit à l'adresse de son fils. "Luke n'a jamais reculé devant les lignes de front" Le journaliste freelance Tik Root, qui avait rencontré Somers au Yémen, l'a qualifié de "garçon discret". Mais ses clichés n'avaient rien de discret, selon lui. "Luke n'a jamais reculé devant les lignes de front. Il a passé des heures intermi-

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nables à montrer les révolutionnaires de la Place du Changement à Sanaa et a pris en photo aussi bien l'ancien président du Yémen que des enfants frappés par la malnutrition", écrit Tik Root, sur le site internet de PBS NewsHour. "Son travail ouvre une fenêtre captivante sur un pays qui est rarement l'objet de l'attention mondiale. Il révèle aussi l'amour profond et persistant (de Somers) pour ce pays", estime-t-il. http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/

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