Foreign Policy Research Institute • Black Sea Strategy Papers

SELIM KORU Foreign Policy Research Institute

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COVER: President Erdogan and President Putin at the Akkuyu Nuclear plant, April 2018. (Source: Kremlin.ru)

November 2018 Foreign Policy Research Institute

Mission

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The Resiliency of -Russia Relations

By: Selim Koru

Selim Koru is a Black Sea Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an analyst at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), where his research focuses on Turkish politics and foreign policy. Before TEPAV, he worked and interned at various media organizations. Koru holds a BA in History from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and an MA in International Relations and Economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Executive Summary

The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation are at odds over multiple issues, not least the , where they back warring proxies. Yet the two countries have bounced back from crises and are quickly deepening their relations. This paper will argue that this is due to the two countries’ relationship with the West, particularly the United States. Rather than concrete economic or strategic gain, it will highlight the importance of the Turkish leadership’s worldview as a force that brings the countries together. It will then discuss the limits of Turkey’s enchantment with Russia, arguing that enthusiasm is outweighing caution in .

5 Odd Bedfellows?

a ceasefire that has so far stabilized a Relations between the Republic of highly volatile situation in Idlib province. Turkey and the Russian Federation over How is it possible that such strong bonds the past few years could provide material should grow amidst such volatility? How for a long shelf of spy thrillers. Russia are Turkish-Russian relations this robust? has significantly upgraded its military presence in the Black Sea, far outclassing Turkey’s fleet. It has invaded two of Turkey’s neighbors; annexed Crimea, “Like hot steel quenched in the home of the Turkic Tatar people; put water, our bilateral relationship sanctions on Turkey’s goods; and banned has hardened and strengthened its tourists from vacationing on Turkish beaches. For its part, Turkey has shot with every failed provocation.”

down a Russian jet and saw a Russian President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ambassador assassinated in the center of its capital. Most destabilizing of all, the two countries have backed opposing Erdoğan is eager to answer these questions sides in ’s long and bloody civil war. to anyone who will listen. “Praise be God, our relations have overcome these harsh Any one of those things could be enough tests,” he said while hosting Putin at the to cause a significant crisis in bilateral site of the Akkuyu Nuclear plant this relations. Some of them have. But April. “Like hot steel quenched in water, remarkably, the two countries have not our bilateral relationship has hardened only overcome these crises, but they and strengthened with every failed also have deepened their relationship. provocation.”2 Erdoğan didn’t have to Russia is scaling up economic ties specify who was doing the “provoking.” with Turkey, building Turkey’s nuclear In his narrative, Western countries are reactors, and selling it top-of-the-line bloodthirsty imperialists, jealous of defense equipment—despite protest Turkey’s meteoric rise. Russia, on the other from members of the North Atlantic hand, is a fellow victim of the Western- Treaty Organization (NATO). Trade took imposed world order, and increasingly, a hit when relations were tense, but is a steadfast friend in the fight against it. 1 quickly reassuming its upward trend. The This point is not a trivial one. In order countries are signing visa agreements, to understand how relations between and tourism is at all-time highs. Vladimir the Erdoğan and Putin governments are Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are so robust, one has to understand the working through their differences on Erdoğan government’s feelings towards Syria. The two leaders recently negotiated the West.

1 “Turkey becomes Russia’s 5th biggest trading partner in H1 2 Şahan, Fazlı. “Oyunun Kuralları Değişiyor [The Rules of 2018,” Daily Sabah, 8 August 2018, https://www.dailysabah. the Game are Changing],” Yeni Şafak, 4 April 2018, https:// com/economy/2018/08/08/turkey-becomes-russias-5th-big- www.yenisafak.com/gundem/oyunun-kurallari-degisi- gest-trading-partner-in-h1-2018. yor-3192649.

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Figure 1: January – August 2018 cumulative sum, billion USD

President and President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan launch the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in April 2018. (Source: kremlin/ru)

7 Cautious View of the West

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mevlut Cavusoglu April 2018. (Source: NATO) making European accession a cornerstone Turkey and Russia are not countries that of its policy. By the late 2000s, Putin had can take good relations for granted. The soured towards the West, and in 2007, tsars did more than a little to break up the he gave his famous speech at the Munich , and it was the territorial Security Conference on the transgressions ambitions of the that drove of the U.S.-led Western Alliance. modern Turkey towards a formal alliance “Independent legal norms are, as a matter with the West starting in World War of fact, coming increasingly closer to one II, and continuing with the Cold War. state’s legal system,” Putin said, “one Turkey’s membership in NATO meant that state and, of course, first and foremost it was hardwired into the West’s security the United States, has overstepped its infrastructure, most significantly as host national borders in every way. This is to American nuclear weapons. Though visible in the economic, political, cultural Ankara could be a prickly ally, it was and educational policies it imposes on reliably anti-Soviet throughout the Cold other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is War. happy about this?”4 Russian foreign policy has since been aimed at blunting NATO Since the early 2000s however, Turkey expansion, reasserting Russian influence, and Russia have gone through similar and undermining the political coherence phases in their relations with the West. In of the Western Alliance. his first term, Putin often spoke of Russia as a “European country” and “sharing European values.”3 Early Justice and Development Party (AK Party, or AKP) governments employed similar rhetoric,

3 İsaev, Andrey. “Jeopolitik Kavşakta Rusya [Russia at 4 “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Geopolitical Crossroads],” GazeteDuvar, 22 August 2017, Security Policy,” Washington Post, 12 February 2007, https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/yazarlar/2017/08/22/jeopo- http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti- litik-kavsakta-rusya/. cle/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html.

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Turkey’s Western Disenchantment

Erdoğan’s first major disappointment with the West remains somewhat underreported. It came in 2010 when Brazil and Turkey arranged for a nuclear deal with . This deal was meant to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons while allowing the peaceful production of nuclear energy. During a visit to Washington, D.C., Erdoğan said the agreement was about “resolving this issue between Iran and Western countries.”5 Turkey here would be an entity of its own, friendly to the West but separate from it, Fetullah Gülen at his Pennsylvania residence. going out and solving a problem nobody (Source: Radio Free Europe) else had been able to. in the United Nations Security Council.7 There were open questions about the This was the first time in recent memory technical merits of the agreement, but even that Turkey had wanted to do something without such concerns, Washington was of international significance without not going to let something this important Western handholding, and it ended in be done outside of its own initiative. embarrassing failure. The Barack Obama administration did not want to look obstructive, so it let Turkey’s chagrin and Western disdain the negotiations play out, but in private, only grew from there. The AK Party it was critical. The New York Times government became more reactionary, reported that “White House officials were slowly abandoned democratic norms, and clearly angered at the leaders of Turkey centralized power in Erdoğan’s hands, and Brazil,” citing technical problems while Western countries had less and with the deal. A Turkish academic in less respect for Turkish interests. The Washington wrote that experts there year 2013 was a turning point in this were “bewildered” at the thought of regard, since it saw the Gezi protests, a Turkey giving Iran the benefit of the nationwide wave of anti-government doubt. Erdoğan grew bitter, but pushed sentiment, as well as the beginning of on, saying he didn’t “need permission Erdoğan’s war with his erstwhile ally, from anyone.”6 The Obama administration Fetullah Gülen, a powerful cleric who begged to differ and steamrolled the deal resides in Pennsylvania. Erdoğan began to believe that Gülen’s organization acts with the oversight and direction of the 5 “Erdoğan: Hiçbir Ülkede Nükleer Silah Olmasın [No United States government, calling the Country Should Have Nuclear Weapons],” Milliyet, 13 April 2010, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-hic- bir-ulkede-nukleer-silah-olmasin-siyaset-1224321/. 7 Kaplan, Fred. “Are Brazil and Turkey Delusional or De- 6 “Kimseden icazet almayız [We do not need permission ceptive?” Slate, June 2010, https://slate.com/news-and-pol- from anyone],” Milliyet, 28 May 2010, http://www.milliyet. itics/2010/06/why-brazil-and-turkey-s-nuclear-deal-with- com.tr/kimseden-icazet-almayiz-siyaset-1243609/. iran-is-worse-than-useless.html.

9 Demonstration for slain PKK members in Paris, 2013. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

group “a subcontractor of global forces,” Gülen network and the PKK. The coup or “the gang that acts with orders from attempt on July 15, 2016 was further proof abroad.”8 to the Erdoğan government that the West was the enemy. Today, it is an unshakable The Kurdish peace process, an initiative to belief of the Erdoğan government that end Turkey’s 40-year-old ethnic conflict, the U.S. and EU want regime change in also failed in 2014, reigniting Ankara’s Turkey. war with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). With a fully blown ethnic conflict, a purge of Gülenists, and the Syrian Civil War on its border—and with increasingly autocratic rule—Turkey no longer looked like a serious candidate for membership in the European Union (EU). To top it off, the United States also chose to support the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, as its ground force against ISIS. In the eyes of the Erdoğan government, the U.S. was now the patron to its two most hated organizations: the

8 “Türk-ABD ilişkilerinde Pensilvanya açmazı [The Pen- nsylvania Dilemma in Turkey-USA Relations],” Hürriyet, 8 May 2014, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turk-abd-iliskilerin- de-pensilvanya-acmazi-26374632.

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On the Same Level

In September 2015, Putin invited a series The Russians, of course, have been of Muslim leaders to open ’s talking to the Marxist-Leninist PKK since renovated grand mosque.10 Turkey had the Cold War, and they make a point of helped with the renovation, and Putin keeping up those connections. They have gave Erdoğan pride of place, asking him also trampled on Turkish interests at to deliver an opening speech. The Turkish the United Nations, killed en enormous president’s remarks contained some of number of Muslim civilians as the chief the highest praise he has bestowed on benefactor of Bashar al-Assad, and have any foreign country: done other things that would ordinarily send Erdoğan into fits of rage. But I would like to emphasize that Turkey’s relations with its treaty allies is especially when it comes to slipping, while its relations with Russia are the freedom of belief, we do robust. This has something to do with the not see the tens of thousands way the countries perceive themselves of Russian citizens who on the global hierarchy. Russian-Israeli reside in our country, chiefly political expert Yakov Kedmi said, “The in and Antalya, relations of the West with Turkey were of as different from our own instrumental character. Russia is the only citizens. We are happy to have great power to offer equal partnership them as guests in our country. 9 to Turkey.” It isn’t that Russia is Turkey’s I believe that our citizens, our equal—it has vastly superior capacities— soydaş [meaning “kin,” used for but Putin understands, and to a significant Turkic peoples abroad], and extent shares Erdoğan’s emotional state, our coreligionists in Moscow and approaches him appropriately. This and many places throughout approach makes a big difference. Russia, feel the same way. As the representatives of the two ancient cultures of Eurasia, “It isn’t that Russia is Turkey’s equal— the genuine cooperation it has vastly superior capacities— and solidarity we display will but Putin understands, and to a benefit our people as well as the whole world.11 significant extent shares Erdoğan’s emotional state, and approaches him appropriately.” 10 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Putin ile Moskova Merkez Camii’nin açılışını yaptı [President Erdoğan Opened the Moscow Central Mosque with Putin],” Hürriyet, 23 September 2015, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/cum- hurbaskani-erdogan-putin-ile-birlikte-moskova-merkez-ca- miinin-acilisini-yapti-30146277. 11 T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı, “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Moskova Merkez Camisinin Açılış Törenine Katıldı| 9 “Визит Путина в Анкару открывает новую страницу 23.09.15 [President Erdoğan Participated in the Opening в отношениях двух стран [Putin’s visit to Ankara opens Ceremony of the Moscow Central Mosque 23.09.15],” a new page in the relationship between two countries],” Youtube, 24 September 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ Russia 24, April 3, 2018, https://youtu.be/0HROjfG3Yk8. watch?v=0Bce2abZRn0.

11 Erdoğan with U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry during the NATO Summit in Newport, 5 September 2014. (Source: U.S. Department of State)

These are not words spoken as a matter education.12 Turkish news—pro-Erdoğan of course, but deeply felt sentiments. The and otherwise—reported weeks in equality between Russian and Turkish advance that Erdoğan and Obama would citizens, as well as the Islamic and Orthodox be present at the opening together. For faiths, he mentioned in the speech stands all its resentment of the West, the Turkish against the backdrop of European and right actually loves basking in its attention, American treatment of Muslim refugees, and a mosque opening with a President as well as Islamophobia in those countries, of the United States with the middle all themes that are prominently covered name of “Hussein” would have been in Turkish media. Putin’s appreciation for of enormous significance. Right before Turkish involvement, the exchange of gifts the trip however, the Wall Street Journal that followed the ceremony, and overall published a story saying that Obama had acceptance of Erdoğan as an authority turned down Erdoğan’s request to join figure of Muslims everywhere, including him at the mosque opening and would Russia, sweetens a relationship that could not be meeting him face-to-face. Erdoğan otherwise feel very unequal. was too authoritarian, the article said, and would face “a cool reception.”13 The In 2016, Erdoğan flew to another mosque opening, this one in the U.S. 12 AA, “Erdoğan opens Maryland social complex and This mosque was one of the largest in mosque in US with message of peace and faith,” Daily Sabah, 2 April 2016, https://www.dailysabah.com/tur- the United States, fully funded by Turkey, key/2016/04/02/erdogan-opens-maryland-social-complex- and included a large complex for Islamic and-mosque-in-us-with-message-of-peace-and-faith. 13 Nissenbaum, Dion and Lee, Carol E. “Turkish President Faces a Cool Reception in U.S. Visit,” Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkish-presi- dent-faces-a-cool-reception-in-u-s-visit-1459114068.

12 Foreign Policy Research Institute president’s opponents at home gloated at Western lives are more valuable than the news. Muslim ones. Western governments are also arrogant—they do not respect other At the mosque opening, Erdoğan’s authorities and flaunt their designations remarks were quite a contrast to those in of terrorist groups. An informed analysis Moscow: of these matters might well reach different conclusions, but that has little impact on It is utterly unacceptable that this worldview. all Muslims should be made to pay for the pain and horror a handful of terrorist inflicted on the people of America on September 11. In the wake of this tragic indecent, prejudice against Muslim groups and individuals continues to climb in the West as a whole, as in America. Today there is terror in Brussels, and there is terror in Paris. But never forget, there is incomparably more terror in Turkey. There is incomparably more terror in Lahore. Let us please see this. We [Turkey] have been fighting terror for 35 years. We have lost 40 thousand lives to terror. But despite all this, when we request [the arrest] of terrorists who have fled Turkey to the West, they do not return them to us.14

Russia is a place where Muslims are seen as equals, they are treated with respect, and their senior-most leader was honored at the highest level in the capital. “The West” is a place where Muslims—and therefore also Turks—are treated as suspect. In the Western-imposed order,

14 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, (CAMİ AÇILIŞI) Amerika Diyanet Merkezi Açılış Töreni 02.04.2016 ABD [President Erdoğan, (MOSQUE OPENING) Diyanet Center America Opening Ceremony 02.04.2016 USA],” YouTube, April 25, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnpEx8s7ZEo.

13 Revolutionaries

his people.18 For months afterwards, pro- To understand the Erdoğan Erdoğan media and the president himself government’s disposition towards these framed the coup squarely as an “invasion relations, it pays to take a closer look attempt” by the U.S., so much so that today at the July 15, 2016 coup attempt. On this is framed as fact in the vast majority that night, a group within the military, of media channels in the country.19 including, if not led by the Gülen network, Russia, on the other hand, features as the tried to capture the government, but helping neighbor. Turkish media across succumbed to stiff resistance from the board wrote that Putin was the first 15 security forces and the public. Erdoğan to call Erdoğan, expressing full-throated had often referred to his ascent as a “slow support and regret at the loss of life.20 revolution,” implying that his government Stories abound about how “the Russians was becoming more than a mere link in did not sleep that night either,” and 16 the chain of democratic succession. In watched closely as its neighbor fought the wake of the coup, he accelerated this off an alleged U.S. invasion attempt.21 So transformation by centralizing powers in positive was Russia’s image that soon after the executive. “New Turkey,” as this new the coup, there were rumors about how order is known, takes the coup attempt as its founding event—“the Turkish nation’s 18 “Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın darbe girişi- second war of independence” as Erdoğan minin yaşandığı 15 Temmuz gecesi yaptığı ilk konuşma, 4 17 ay sonra yayınlandı [First speech made by President Recep likes to put it. Tayyip Erdoğan on the night of the attempted coup on July 15, has been released 4 months after the event],” Sputnik, Both, the U.S. and Russia feature 20 November 2016, https://tr.sputniknews.com/turki- prominently in New Turkey’s founding ye/201611201025892099-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-15-tem- muz-ilk-yayin/. myth. There was an impromptu recording 19 Arango, Tim and Yeginsu, Ceylan. “Turks Can Agree of Erdoğan on the night of the coup in which on One Thing: U.S. Was Behind Attempted Coup,” he strongly implies that the action was New York Times, 3 August 2016, https://www.nytimes. com/2016/08/03/world/europe/turkey-coup-erdogan-fethul- staged by the “higher mind,” a term used lah-gulen-united-states.html. A few examples of this for the United States government among phenomenon are: Karagül, İbrahim. “ABD’nin Teröristleri Türkiye’ye Saldırıyor [The US’ Terrorists are Attacking Turkey],” Yeni Şafak, 21 July 2016, https://www.yenisafak. com/yazarlar/ibrahimkaragul/abdunin-teroristleri-turkiy- 15 Oğur, Yıldıray and Kenar, Ceren. “Who Was Behind euye-saldiriyor-2030563 (for an English translation, see: The 15th July Coup in Turkey?” Medium, 21 March 2017, https://www.yenisafak.com/en/columns/ibrahimkaragul/ https://medium.com/@15thJulyCoup/who-was-behind-the- the-uss-terrorists-are-attacking-turkey-2030568?n=1); and 15th-july-coup-in-turkey-19f75a5771c5. Ramoğlu, Ersin. “ABD Önce ‘Darbe’ Sonra ‘İşgal’ istiyor 16 “Erdoğan: AK Parti Devrimci bir Partidir [Erdoğan: [The USA wants first a coup, then an invasion],”Sabah , 9 The AK Party is a Revolutionary Party],” Sputnik, October 2017, https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/bolgeler/ 6 August 2017, https://tr.sputniknews.com/turki- ramoglu/2017/10/09/abd-once-darbe-sonra-isgal-istiyor. ye/201705301028666338-erdogan-cumhurbaskani-ak-par- 20 “Darbe Girişimine Karşı Dünyadan Türkiye’ye Des- ti-grup-toplantisi/. tek [Support for Turkey from the World against the Coup 17 “15 Temmuz Türk Milletinin İkinci Kurtuluş Savaşı’dır Attempt],” Anadolu Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ [The 15th of July is the Turkish Nation’s Second War gunun-basliklari/darbe-girisimine-karsi-dunyadan-turkiy- of Independence],” The Presidency of the Republic of eye-destek/640160. Turkey, 29 September 2016, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/ 21 “O gece Ruslar da uyumadı [The Russians did not sleep haberler/410/52441/15-temmuz-turk-milletinin-ikinci-kur- that night either],” Hürriyet, 22 August 2016, http://www. tulus-savasidir. hurriyet.com.tr/o-gece-ruslar-da-uyumadi-40163428.

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15 the Russians helped Erdoğan’s plane avoid received fairly good prices.26 getting shot down by putschist F-16s.22 The ’s prominent role in In December 2016, a Turkish police the attempted coup also strengthened officer who appeared to sympathize the notion that the pilots who shot with Turkish-backed Syrian rebel groups down the Russian SU-24 had been rogue shot and killed Russian Ambassador Gülenists—and therefore under American Andrei Karlov at a public event in Ankara. orders.23 Regardless of the highly dubious Both leaders growled that the act was a veracity of many of these accounts, they “provocation” by dark actors who wanted set a narrative with a very clear notion of to stop normalization between the who the good guys and bad guys were. countries.27 Turkey predictably argued that the perpetrator had been an undercover A boost in real Turkish-Russian relations Gülenist. Russia sent investigators who reflects this idea. On August 9, Russia was worked closely with Turkish authorities, the first foreign country Erdoğan visited but if they had different findings, they after the coup.24 Only shortly prior to the didn’t say. Turkey renamed the street in coup, Erdoğan and Putin had agreed on front of the Russian embassy in Ankara moving past the SU-24 crisis and normalize after the slain ambassador, and relations relations. They would now accelerate ploughed on.28 The synchronized that process. In subsequent months and language at the top and the speed with years, Erdoğan and Putin scaled up their which both sides moved on from the communication (see below figure) and brutal event was striking, and certainly a broadened their cooperation on a number contrast to Turkey’s crisis-prone relations of fronts. In December 2016, they began with Western countries. the Astana process, a platform for high- level talks on Syria, which included Iran In the following months, Turkey braved and excluded Western countries.25 The (with relish) Western criticism to purchase Russians dropped sanctions on Turkish products, and the two sides went ahead 26 Astakhova, Olesya and Tattersall, Nick. “Russia and with energy deals in which Turkey has Turkey sign gas deal, seek common ground on Syria as ties warm,” Reuters, 10 October 2016, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-energy-summit-turkey-russia/russia-and- turkey-sign-gas-deal-seek-common-ground-on-syria-as- ties-warm-idUSKCN12A244; and Bechev, Dimitar. “The 22 “15 Temmuz gecesi Ruslar Tayyip Erdoğan’ı nasıl Turkey-Russia Gas Saga Continues,” Ahval, 1 June 2018, kurtardı [How the Russians saved Tayyip Erdoğan on the https://ahvalnews.com/russia-turkey/turkey-russia-gas-sa- night of July 15th],” odaTV, 7 April 2017, https://odatv. ga-continues. com/15-temmuz-gecesi-ruslar-tayyip-erdogani-nasil-kurtar- 27 “Erdoğan says attack on Russian envoy ‘provocation’ di-07041852.html. to harm Turkey-Russia normalization,” Daily Sabah, 19 23 “Uçak Krizini FETÖ Çıkardı [The Plane Crisis was December 2016, https://www.dailysabah.com/diploma- caused by FETÖ],” A Haber, 23 July 2016, https://www. cy/2016/12/19/erdogan-says-attack-on-russian-envoy-prov- ahaber.com.tr/gundem/2016/07/23/ucak-krizini-feto-cikar- ocation-to-harm-turkey-russia-normalization; and Kremlin di. Press Service. “Putin Says Assassination of Russian Am- 24 Walker, Shaun and Rankin, Jennifer. “Erdoğan and bassador in Turkey Was a ‘Provocation’,” Moscow Times, Putin discuss closer ties in first meeting since jet downing,” 19 December 2016, https://themoscowtimes.com/news/ Guardian, 9 August 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/ putin-says-assassination-of-russian-ambassador-in-tur- world/2016/aug/09/erdogan-meets-putin-leaders-seek- key-was-a-provocation-56584. mend-ties-jet-downing-russia-turkey. 28 Borger, Julian. “Why killing of Russian diplomat may 25 Wintour, Patrick. “Turkey and Russia ‘agree terms of well bring Turkey and Russia closer,” Guardian, 19 Decem- Syria ceasefire,’”Guardian , 28 December 2016, https:// ber 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/19/ www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/28/turkey-russia- why-killing-of-russian-diplomat-is-likely-to-bring-turkey- agree-terms-syria-ceasefire. and-russia-closer.

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Russian S-400 air defense systems, which to Western news agencies. By are not compatible with NATO systems. [sic] developing Western clichés Turkey had expressed interest in the in Turkey, these agencies present S-400 as early as 2009, but would now to the Turkish reader generally speed up the process.29 Some have argued inaccurate information about Russia that is established in the that given the prominent role of the West. In Russia, there is a similar Turkish air force in the attempted coup, problem concerning Turkey’s and Turkey’s near-complete reliance on perception. This was discussed at American fighter jets, the S-400 purchase the extended Russo-Turkish public might be about protecting Ankara from forum. There is a serious attitude NATO planes as well as its own.30 Though towards rectifying this situation.32 it might sound outlandish, the idea is plausible considering the country’s post- The idea here is that there is a Western coup mindset. membrane between Turkey and Russia that impedes good relations. Without Much of Russian-Turkish diplomacy that membrane, the thinking goes, the today appears to consist of an exercise two sides will be free to form a natural in cleansing the relationship of Western friendship. When Erdoğan said that influence. Both countries seem to agree he would like to trade with “national that Western influence is a silently currency” rather than U.S. dollars for imposed, malicious presence that example, Russia immediately responded, poisons the daily lives of their citizens. In saying that it has been advocating the Erdoğan’s Turkey, pushing back against issue for a long time.33 There may indeed this tide is called being “yerli ve milli” or be disadvantages to relying too much “local and national.” When adorned with on things like the English language and this adjective, anything from weapons the American dollar in bilateral relations systems to children’s toys is assumed between countries like Russia and Turkey. to be inherently virtuous. 31 In a recent But this is not a matter for debate in interview, the Russian Consul General to Erdoğan’s Turkey as much as a new Istanbul displayed a keen awareness of orthodoxy. Purging the relationship of the concept: Western influence is a virtue of its own.34

Open up any Turkish newspaper, and you will see – if there is anything written on Russia, it will 32 Sudagezer, Elif. “Başkonsolos Podyelışev: Rusya-Türki- have been written with reference ye ilişkileri spekülasyonlarla değil gerçeklerle değerlendi- rilmeli [Consul General Podyelishev: Russia-Turkey rela- tions should not be evaluated with speculations, but with 29 “Turkey hopes to buy S-400 air defense systems from realities],” Sputnik Türkiye, 11 May 2018, https://tr.sput- Russia,” Sputnik, 27 April 2009, https://sputniknews.com/ niknews.com/turkiye/201805111033404133-rusya-turki- russia/20090427121328739/. ye-podyelisev-istanbul-baskonsolos-ikili-iliskiler-ticari-si- 30 Stein, Aaron. “Ankara’s Look East: How Turkey’s yasi-isbirligi-spekulasyonlarla-degerlendirilmemeli/. Warming Ties With Russia Threaten Its Place in the 33 “Türkiye’nin milli para hamlesine Rusya’dan destek Transatlantic Community,” War on the Rocks, 27 December [Support from Russia for Turkey’s national money move],” 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/ankaras-look- TRT Haber, 13 August 2018, https://www.trthaber.com/ east-how-turkeys-warming-ties-with-russia-threaten-its- haber/dunya/turkiyenin-milli-para-hamlesine-rusy- place-in-the-transatlantic-community/. adan-destek-379915.html. 31 Kocalar, Zuhal. “Çocuklar ‘yerli oyuncaklar’la büyüye- 34 “Turkey favors switching from dollars to national cek [Kids will grow up with local toys],” Anadolu Agency, currencies in trade with Russia & China,” Russia Today, 17 April 2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/cocuk- 15 August 2018, https://www.rt.com/business/436005-dol- lar-yerli-oyuncaklarla-buyuyecek/1120429. lar-turkey-russia-china-trade/.

17 Russia: Model or Friend?

is a model for Turkey’s new realists. It is Turkey’s transformation also includes a a self-reliant, hard-nosed country that shift in strategic culture. The generation stands up to the West. Feeling sympathy of Turkish leaders that came out of the for Russia makes them want to be friends Cold War conducted themselves based on and work side-by-side towards common the principles of liberal internationalism. objectives. But do such countries have Turkey saw itself as a country that placed “friends” in any real sense? Does Russia great importance on international norms, ever make itself as reliant on another laws, and regulations. It was inherently country as Turkey has made itself reliant skeptical of the use of force and had on Russian energy and technology? relatively underdeveloped foreign Looking closely at Turkey’s approach to intelligence capabilities. Since the Syrian Russia, one still sees a desperation for Civil War, Erdoğan has left this path, friendship that can never be. and looking back, does not have a high opinion of it. “There was a Turkey,” he says, “that looked in one direction only, “Like Russia, Turkey now stages it was pro-status quo, afraid of change, military interventions and when lacked confidence, its fighting spirit was blunted, it was closed into itself.”35 The necessary, even occupies neighboring new Turkey likes to speak of its “national territory, as it has done in Syria.” interest” and flout international norms. AK Party types study up on military hardware and speak of a “new realism” that “does not act cowardly when it comes to the In Ankara, this tension comes up again and 36 use of force.” Like Russia, Turkey now again in conversation. Many think that stages military interventions and when Russia’s status as a former superpower necessary, even occupies neighboring gave it an advanced start in the global territory, as it has done in Syria. struggle against Western domination. In 2006, for example, Russia shut down Turkey is very understandably preparing the schools of the Gülen network, then itself for a world without friends, but this known for its close connections to the AK is where there is a subtle contradiction in Party government. Russian media stated Turkey’s attitude towards Russia. Russia that this was done on national security grounds, citing the esoteric ideology of the movement, as well as its efforts to gather “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan seçim manifestosunu açıkladı 35 37 [President Erdoğan announced election manifesto],” sensitive intelligence. Conservative Anadolu Agency, 6 May 2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ media in Turkey reported that then-Prime gunun-basliklari/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-secim-manifes- tosunu-acikladi/1136739. 36 Yeşiltaş, Murat. “Türkiye Merkezli Yeni Dış Politika 37 “Нурджулар. Российская ФСБ оказалась права? [Turkey-Centered New Foreign Policy],” SETA, 12 May [Nurdjular. The Russian FSB turned out to be right?],” 2018, https://www.setav.org/turkiye-merkezli-yeni-dis-poli- Glosislama.ru, 26 March 2018, https://golosislama.com/ tika/. news.php?id=22750.

18 Foreign Policy Research Institute

Joint news conference of Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, April 2018. (Source: kremlin.ru)

Minister Erdoğan called Putin to vouch for whether he shares his thoughts with his the schools, warning him that economic colleagues, he says he does freely, but relations could suffer if he insisted on that “they [pointing up] have their own closing them.38A young civil servant looks ideas.” back on that time: “Russia is a serious state. They were already in the fight when Erdoğan’s “New Turkey” urgently needs we asleep. We have catching up to do,” a discussion on Russia, but there is no he says, and goes on to praise Russia’s evidence that such a discussion can take intelligence and defense capabilities. place in any meaningful way. Even if the government tried, it would be hard to Whether this can be the basis of a start. The Turkish elite has traditionally friendship is a touchy topic. A civil focused on the West, and the Islamists servant in a position to know says: “The have in recent decades devoted some most America is going to do is to put a attention to understanding the Middle few of its men in as your aide-de-camp,” East, but the country has little experience referring to the president’s aides who in studying Russia. There are only a handful were arrested after the coup attempt of Turkish bureaucrats and experts who for being clandestine members of the speak Russian. The only serious work Gülenist network. “Would the Russians of history on Russian-Turkish relations be that gentle? From what I can see, they in Turkish appears to have been written don’t go for half measures.” When asked by a Tatar historian named Akdes Nimet

38 “Putin’e okul resti çekti [He called Putin on schools],” Star, 7 December 2013, http://www.star.com.tr/politika/putine-okul-resti-cek- ti-haber-813591/.

19 Kurat in 1970.39 There is some notable Economic and security interests still contemporary work by think tankers and matter, and can—for tactical reasons— journalists, but hardly enough to serve override the Erdoğan government’s as a base for a workable Russia strategy. emotional proclivities. Yet, the question Absent a more analytical conversation, of identity means that Turkey is more Russia as a model of independence likely to overcome crises with revisionist might increasingly turn into Russia the countries such as Russia than it is with friend, setting Turkey up for a costly Western countries. Over time, this disappointment. makes a difference. It puts pressure on Turkey’s treaty obligations with NATO Meanwhile, its Western treaty allies will and its application to the EU, while giving continue to struggle in interactions with impetus to new, and ever-deepening ties Turkey. Liberal observers in the West with Russia. seldom take it seriously when they are portrayed as the bad guys in someone else’s story, dismissing it as a cynical autocrat’s pandering to the masses. They are also hesitant to think that countries will forego tangible economic and security interests for intangible things like national pride and resentment. In Turkey’s case, they are wrong on both counts: Erdoğan may be a pragmatic tactician, but his strategic goal comes from an emotional place, rooted deep in the country’s consciousness.

The emotional aspect of the relationship does not mean that Turkey will always be on bad terms with Western countries, or will always enjoy good relations with Russia. A month after the Moscow mosque opening in 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 jet (probably by executive order) and relations with Russia went into a tailspin. When President Donald Trump imposed sanctions and tariffs on Turkey, the Erdoğan government launched a full- throated rapprochement with the EU.40

39 Kurat, Akdes Nimet. Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII.Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri (1798-1919) [Turkey and Russia: Turkco-Russian Relations from the XVIII. Century to the War of Independence (1798- 1919)], (Ankara, 1970). 40 Yetkin, Murat. “Thanks to Trump, Turkey and Europe get closer,” Hürriyet Daily News, 17 August 2018, http:// www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/murat-yetkin/thanks- to-trump-turkey-and-europe-get-closer-135882.

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