VOLUME 6 EDITION 10 WINTER 2012 ISSN 1756-7335

THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS: HOPES, CHALLENGES AND TRANSITIONS

volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 1 Arches Quarterly is published by

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THIS ISSUE Volume 6 Edition 10 Winter 2012 ISSN 1756-7335 Available online: thecordobafoundation.com

Anas Altikriti Chief Executive Abdullah Faliq Editor

Editorial Team: Amjad M. Saleem S. Alam Arzoo Ahmed H.D. Foreman Dr Mehrunisha Suleman Catriona Robertson Baqaullah Ibn Faiz Amina Easat

A.S. Khan Art Editor

LITERATURE PROMOTIONS: 20 Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East: Reassessing the Causes of Terrorism - George Joff é 35 Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 Era - Rosemary Hollis 44 The Muslim World Book Review - The Islamic Foundation 52 The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath - Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn (eds.) 52 Demystifying the Caliphate - Madawi Al-Rasheed, Carool Kersten & Marat Shterin (eds.) 58 The First World War in the Middle East - Kristian Coates Ulrichsen 85 After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies - Christopher M. Davidson 109 Understanding the Nakba: An Insight into the Plight of Palestinians - Nasim Ahmed 109 Ashes of Hama: The Perilous History of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood - Raphael Lefevre 116 Islam and Civilisational Renewal - International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies 143 The Shi’a of Samarra: The Heritage and Politics of a Community in Iraq - Imranali Panjwani (ed.) and Charles R. H. Tripp (fwd) 143 Politics & Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring - Michael J. Willis

2 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 INTHISISSUE

04 Editorial Abdullah Faliq

08 Foreword Anas Altikriti

10 The Arab Intifada in Perspective George Joff é

Creeping Shari’a and Galloping Secularism: The Mimetic War between Perennialist Ontology 21 and Secularist Epistemology in the Arab Spring and the Global Awakening Robert D. Crane

28 Britain and the Arab Revolts Rosemary Hollis

36 Tunisia – Challenges of Coalition Rule and Democratisation Intissar Kherigi

45 Being Salafi : Modernity’s Neglected Children Omar Farahat

53 British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: The Challenges of Transition Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

59 Egypt’s Revolution and the Palestine Question Daud Abdullah

65 The Arab Revolts: The Soccer Impact on Central Asia James M. Dorsey

70 The Arab Spring and the Role of Al-Jazeera Wadah Khanfar

74 The Turkish Model of Governance and the Arab Spring Mustafa Akyol

The Muslim Brotherhood from Opposition to Governance: 86 Examining Classical and Contemporary Political Literature Sondos Asem The Caliphate and the Political Ideology of the Iraqi and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 97 Fareed Sabri

110 The Arab Spring: What did it do for women? Shazia Arshad

117 The Importance of Trade and Capitalism in a Changing Middle East Vali Nasr

124 In Search of a Political Vision for the Arab World Karim Sadek

134 Bahrain’s Oppressed: Lone Voices in International Law Imranali Panjwani

144 The Gulf Monarchies: In the Wake of the Arab Spring Christopher Davidson

150 The Battle for Public Opinion in Europe – Changing Perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian Confl ict Book Review 152 The Arab Spring & Religion or Belief: How Should Europe Engage and with Whom? EU Roundtable Report

158 Picture Gallery

volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 3 FROM THE EDITOR

ARAB SPRING – A DOUBLE- Th eir challenges range from fi re-fi ghting EDGED SWORD? to establishing law and order whilst he uprisings in the Arab world negotiating with security services and lit the fl ames of change for many the military - largely unhappy about the T- their quest for universal values of changes that have taken place; sustaining freedom, dignity, justice and democracy. coalition rule in the face of suspicion Who could have predicted that the and a barrage of attacks from secularists desperate act of the young Tunisian and liberals on the Brotherhood’s “real” fruit and vegetable vendor, Muhammad motives; and responding to the demands Bouazizi, setting himself on fi re, would and emotions of the revolutionaries – some ignite an unstoppable revolutionary spark now accuse the Brotherhood of reneging in North Africa and the Middle East. Th e on their promises. ensuing changes in the region were truly In reality, emergent governments such unprecedented, a seismic shift evidenced as those in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are by the swift ousting of the presidents of inexperienced and will need time to fi nd Tunisia and Egypt; the demise of Ghaddafi their feet and round their rough edges. in Libya replaced with civilian rule; as Patience is needed for this to occur, and well as major changes and developments in the context of the immense challenges in Yemen, Morocco, Bahrain, Saudi that confronted previous secular, liberal Arabia, Jordan and the drawn-out bloody and nationalistic political parties, and revolution against the Assad regime in ideological trends, this chance should be Syria. given. Th e election victories of Islamic- Whilst the changes in the region are a leaning parties and organisations have welcome sign for most, there are clearly also exposed their internal dynamics problems and challenges too; hence my and challenges, such as the formation of description of the Arab Spring as a double- splinter groups, and whether they are able edged sword. Th e positives are many, the to eff ectively carry their followers with removal of dictatorships; the emergence of them within the new politicised realities free and fair elections with participatory and politics-dominated work. democracy; the opportunity for coalition Externally, however, the myriad of crises, rule; respect for the rule of law, fair trials challenges and events do not make for a under civilian rule; greater economic smooth transition to eff ective civilian rule. prospects, to name but a few. Th e convergence and coalescing of secular, On the fl ip side, the challenges and liberal and former regime remnants problems are all too evident, such as (who faired poorly in the elections) have in Egypt and Tunisia. Th e previously become far more vociferous against the outlawed and main opposition force in new Islamist governments. Th rough Arab countries, the Muslim Brotherhood, demonstrations -- often violent -- and today enjoys political power in the countries negative caricature of strict Islamic Shari’a where former dictators have been ousted. states, they have been able to disrupt law

4 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 EDITORIAL and order, and undermine the Islamist-led signifi cantly impacted the Islamist psyche governments. Th e new governments seem – reinforcing or mainstreaming the interested in embracing diversity, through message of political engagement and social coalition rule, such as accommodating in activism such as that of the Brotherhood. government secular, liberal, salafi sts and For others, like the emergent Salafi sts, other new political actors. Whilst these the Arab Spring has helped moderate and new coalitions are fraught with challenges, bring them into the political realm, whilst they have nevertheless been relatively undermining the violent and radical successful in Egypt and Tunisia given the strands -- thus illustrating the futility of violence, disengagement and isolation. The Arab revolutions Th is issue of Arches addresses some of the above-mentioned matters and challenges have... presented the facing the region. As usual, our writers dilemma of knowing hail from a broad spectrum, including activists and stakeholders, commentators, the limits of protest experts and academics. We are particularly and expression... This grateful to Fair Observer for publishing newfound freedom the summaries of some of the articles in this issue of Arches, and also for sourcing a could backfi re if not kept number of these contributions. in check. Th ank you. Abdullah Faliq EDITOR obstacles and challenges. But how they ARCHES QUARTERLY perform and manage diff erence remains to be seen in the future with growing political and social instability. Th e Arab revolutions have also presented the dilemma of knowing the limits of protest and expression. Whilst people are now able to express themselves freely through protest and lobbying, the issue of responsibility appears to be somewhat lacking. Th is newfound freedom could backfi re if not kept in check – stability and the rule of law should take priority now. Despite the negatives associated with the Arab Spring, the outlook is positive. It has defi ed many generalisations, the common-held belief that Arab and Muslim countries are incapable of reinvigoration to awaken from their slumber to eff ect Abdullah Faliq helped set-up The Cordoba Foundation change in society, free from dictatorships, and edits Arches, amongst other publications, as the foundation’s Head of Research. In 2001, he helped launch corruption and injustice. It has also the “Declarations of European Muslims” by the Grand challenged prevalent but eschewed views Mufti of Bosnia Dr Mustafa Ceric. Faliq studied Arabic and about the role of religion at the state level, conducted research in Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Palestine & Bosnia as part of his MA and doctoral studies specialising in Islam in particular. Muslims can live and Arab political Islam and British Muslims. Active in the British organise themselves in the spirit of political Muslim scene since the 1980s, he is currently a trustee of the London Muslim Centre, former Deputy General Secretary of pluralism and diversity. the Islamic Forum of Europe, and a founding member of the Th e Arab revolutions have also European Network on Religion and Belief (ENORB).

volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 5 THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION

FOUNDED IN 2005, The Cordoba Foundation (TCF) is an independent Public Relations, Research and Training unit, which promotes dialogue and the culture of peaceful and positive coexistence among civilisations, ideas and people. We do this by working with decision- making circles, researchers, religious leaders, the media, and a host of other stakeholders of society for better understanding and clearer comprehension of inter-communal and inter-religious issues in Britain and beyond.

OUR ACTIVITIES INCLUDE: • Structured consultation and advisory services • Face-to-face interaction with decision-makers and fi gures of authority • In-house research • Workshops, seminars and debates on pertinent issues • Training and capacity-building • Periodicals and journals • Resourceful website 6 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 thecordobafoundation.com volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 7 FOREWORD BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

he year 2011 will always be region and beyond, there can be little remembered as the year of the Arab doubt that the precedence of free and TSpring. A number of regimes in the public elections held in these countries is North African region fell, after formerly a good thing. desperate, helpless and disenfranchised Th e fact that in virtually every round people throughout the region took to the of elections, political Islamic parties and streets in peaceful protests and demanded fi gures emerged as winners, with liberal, a radical change. left and secular parties on the margins, is While 2012 did not see any further source for much discussion and analysis. regimes fall beyond those of Tunisia, Questions on whether the Islamic Egypt, Libya and partially Yemen, the parties - or Islamists - will facilitate the Syrian revolution continues unabated establishment of modern civil states, edging towards victory and old-regimes respect previously ratifi ed international throughout the region look in anguish agreements and treaties, uphold the rights towards the approaching winds of change. of minorities and women and many However, among the many highlights of others, were immediately posed and 2012 around the world, it is the elections remain prominent points of debate and that took place in a number of ‘new disagreement. countries’ and the emergence of Islamic Th e economic fragility of the countries political parties that will prove a prominent that have recently emerged from under chapter. their old and corrupt regimes as well as Commentators, analysts and experts the security vulnerability, also led some remain hard at work assessing the factors to suggest that the people will come to see at play prior to and post the revolutions. the changes brought by the ‘Spring’ and And whilst great disagreement remains as yearn for the days of stability, albeit under authoritarian rulers. Iraq is often cited in In virtually every round this particular breath. What is notable however is that of elections, political regardless of these concerns, as important Islamic parties and and valid as they may be, is that 2012 seems to have presented a natural phase fi gures emerged as in the cycle of change which erupted all winners, with liberal, left of a sudden and virtually without notice and secular parties on in 2011. Th e past year saw a previously disenfranchised people in a number of the margins. countries, grappling with the realities of their new-found freedoms. Almost all of a sudden, the Egyptians, Tunisians and to whether these changes present a positive Libyans, found themselves contending or negative outcome for the people of the with crucial issues previously and for a

8 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 FOREWORD

roles of Turkey, Iran and Israel and the Democracy, constitution impact of this dynamism on Europe and drafting, institution the West generally. Th ese and many more will be the subject block-building and of much discussion in the months to political activity of all come, and this issue of Arches attempts to contribute to that discussion, and to off er sorts became realities an insight into the elements and factors and practices rather than that might not have grabbed the headlines, prohibited slogans. but would have played a crucial role in these historic events. very long time, beyond their reach and exclusively within the clutches of a ruling Anas Altikriti CHIEF EXECUTIVE elites. Democracy, constitution drafting, THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION institution block-building and political activity of all sorts became realities and practices rather than prohibited slogans. Notable too is that the rulers of countries yet to witness protests calling for the same, are now fully acknowledging the changes that have taken place, and the public appetite for more of the same throughout the region. As a result we are witnessing two main lines of response: Firstly, a n ack nowled g ment of t he need of such a change and that it has become more or less inevitable. Th is has led to adaptive policies which allow for greater public political participation, the facilitation of a dialogue between government and people, more eff ective civil society structures and the early steps towards a semblance of a democratic system. Secondly, a rejection of the need for such a change along with the warnings of the negatives that can be associated with the Arab Spring, leading to greater security lockdowns, prohibition of any Anas Altikriti, CEO of The Cordoba Foundation, is an internationally accredited translator and interpreter by criticism directed towards the state, greater profession and a postgraduate lecturer in the same fi eld. censorship on the use of social media and A leading fi gure of the British Anti-War Movement and Chair of the 2-million Iraq demonstration in February engagement with ‘foreign’ elements. 2003, Altikriti helped successfully negotiate the release Th e year 2013 is expected to off er a of nine hostages to date, including Western Christian peacemakers taken hostage in Iraq in 2005. He is a clearer picture of what the ramifi cations media commentator and writer in Arabic and English, as well as an advisor and consultant to numerous UK of each reaction could be. Questions and international organisations on Muslim politics, East- surrounding the future of the Arab Spring West relations, combating extremism, negotiations, and will undoubtedly continue; whether Syria dialogue. will see the removal of the Assad regime; Altikriti is former President of the Muslim Association of Britain, a founding member of the British Muslim whether Iraq will see similar protests to Initiative and an advisor to the European Muslim those across the border; the role of Al- Research Centre. Altikriti is completing a PhD in Political Qaeda, if any, in the changing region; the Studies at the University of Westminster, London.

volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 9 The Arab Intifada in Perspective1

GEORGE JOFFÉ

o appreciate what has actually in 1990 and oil prices peaked at $100 happened in the Arab world as a per barrel, compared with $71 per barrel T result of what in the West is called fi ve months before. Th e sudden and the “Arab Spring” but is referred to as the unexpected rises provoked protest riots “Arab Intifada” in the Middle East and throughout the Middle Eastern and North North Africa, and what is likely to take African region because general levels of place there, we should perhaps note that the poverty and economic under-development actual outcomes of the events of 2011 have meant that, for many, food and energy much to do with their specifi c causes, both requirements were inelastic. in regional and national terms, rather than Indeed, the second cause of what were to being simply the teleological evolution become political demonstrations creating of democratic governance worldwide, as challenges throughout the region refl ected most Western commentators would have what was a generalised developmental us believe. failure. Despite the fact that economic Th ey also refl ect the profound restructuring under the Washington diff erences between the individual states Consensus3 had been the dominant of the Middle East and North Africa and economic paradigm since the mid-1980s, it is for these reasons, no doubt, that no opening economies to international single paradigm has emerged to justify competition and investment, macro- and claims that the Arab world overall is microeconomic indicators persisted in already ‘Democratisation’s Fourth Wave’, showing that, fi rst, levels of prosperity had or as Alvaro Vasconcelos suggests, the not grown at anything like the projected second phase of Samuel Huntington’s rates and that, second, very little of the ‘Th ird Wave”.2 Th e domino eff ect increases in national wealth that had anticipated by Western commentators last occurred had ‘trickled down’ to national year did not occur, although there was populations. GINI coeffi cients – a measure undoubtedly a ‘contagion eff ect’ instead of income distribution – had remained which determined the timing of a series of static or had slightly worsened and the contiguous, yet separate events. proportions of national wealth held by the top 10 per cent of populations had, in THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION general, increased signifi cantly. Th e result Certain common causes for the events had been that between 20 and 40 per cent of 2011 can be defi ned, with the most of most national populations lived at levels proximate cause being socio-economic near to or below the World Bank’s absolute in nature. Th e crisis in food and energy poverty line of earnings of $2 per day. prices in the second half of 2010, combined Associated with this failure was the with the generalised consequences of the consequence of demographic growth in fi nancial and subsequent economic crisis the Arab region; up to 1990, the average in Western countries certainly set off the regional growth rate in population had events that formed the Arab Spring. In been of the order of 2.3-to-2.6 per cent December of that year, food prices rose per year, implying a doubling of the to their highest level since records began population every twenty-fi ve-to-thirty

10 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB INTIFADA IN PERSPECTIVE years. Th e demand on states to generate behind the term captured the belief of services for such a youthful population, outside observers that the Arab world was with over 60 per cent of populations being somehow not capable of participatory below the age of thirty, was massive and governance, off ering only the perceived – basically – unachievable. Th e World extremism of political Islam as an Bank has suggested that, to meet such alternative. challenges, states require sustained GDP Such very widely-voiced views, however, growth rates of between 5 and 7 per cent overlooked other realities. Firstly, one per year, far above the average growth reason why political change seemed so rates of Middle Eastern and North African impossible in the Arab region was the states over the past thirty years, unless degree of unquestioning support that they were oil-exporting, low capital- the regimes there received from external absorbing rentier states. And, even if powers, particularly in the United States population growth rates have fallen in the and the European Union. It was true past twenty years, youthful economically that there had been some desultory inactive populations have now become pressure in the 1970s and the 1980s for economically active, requiring jobs that changes towards political participation, simply are not there because of economic accountable government and respect for failure, leading to unemployment rates of individual human rights by the states 20 per cent on average. concerned. In such circumstances, there can Th is had, in fact, produced limited have been little surprise within regional change in that many regimes had governments at the sudden explosion of tolerated autonomous non-governmental popular protest! Equally unsurprisingly, organisations operating outside the regional governments tried the usual direct control of the state. Some had even nostrum of subsidising consumer prices for espoused, for largely cosmetic reasons, the essential foodstuff s despite the long-term rhetorical adoption of Islamic principles unsustainability of such policies.4 to the same end. However, in all cases, such initiatives were heavily circumscribed STRUCTURES OF STATE by the state, to ensure that the ultimate AND POWER location of political power was not Th is, however, was not the only challenged. challenge that they were to face. In fact, Daniel Brumberg has termed such the Arab world had been characterised for states ‘liberalised autocracies’, after decades by corrupt elites and repressive, remarking that, “In the Arab world, a set autocratic governance. Th e two issues of interdependent institutional, economic, were interlinked; it was because of the ideological, social, and geostrategic factors unaccountable status of ruling elites that has created an adaptable ecology of the economic elites associated with them repression, control and partial openness.”5 were able to exploit the economies of their He went on to point out that such systems states for their own private benefi ts. Often, also benefi ted from the acquiescence, even indeed, the two elites were interlinked degrees of active support, from opposition so that ruling elites enjoyed economic groups and movements because they advantage because of their political status. also benefi ted from the new autonomous Th ese problems had persisted for decades political space that regimes now tolerated, – ever since independence in most cases even if their autonomy was carefully – and had seemed so entrenched that circumscribed to ensure the security of the outside observers often referred to ‘Arab regime itself. exceptionalism’ as an explanation of the He added that, in such circumstances, apparent stasis of the undemocratic and illiberal oppositions could also be unaccountable political processes that manipulated to ‘crowd out’ genuinely characterised the region. Th e assumptions democratic alternatives whilst still volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 11 preserving the formal democratic illusion. towards their restriction over the decade Th e reverse was also true, in that state in question.9 However, such strategies of encouragement of restricted democratic “state-managed political liberalisation” expression could also be used to confi ne used by Arab governments to avoid “the and isolate illiberal opposition movements challenges of democratisation”, enabled as well, hence the treatment of Islamist external powers, such as the United States movements in Egypt under the Mubarak and the European Union, to persuade regime, for example. themselves that genuine liberalisation He went on to argue that such partial would ultimately be possible.10 political liberalization was not only a Th us real engagement to alter the conscious choice by regimes to ensure political realities of the Middle East survival but represented the ways in which and North Africa was not necessary – a autocratic regimes compensated for a lack particularly important point in view of the of alternative resources through which full securitisation agenda adopted by Western autocracy could be maintained. Th us the states after the events of September 11, Gulf states, in particular Saudi Arabia, 2001 inside the United States. had oil wealth as a resource through which Now all Western governments political discontent could be ‘bought off ’, securitised their external policies, adopting or symbolic or cultural capital, typically the discourses of governments in the Arab expressed by the formal mobilisation of region of the existential and systemic threat Islam, could be used to bolster regime that they faced from global salafi -jihadi legitimacy,6 as was the case in Jordan or terrorism. Arab regional governments, Morocco. However, if such resources were therefore, became the security partners lacking, then partial liberalisation – not as of the West, rather than the objects of a stepping stone to liberal democracy but their moral disapproval as had been the as a mechanism for regime acceptability – case before.11 Indeed, some governments, was the preferred option in the Arab world. particularly the French government, had Such were the regimes he considered to be anticipated this development in foreign ‘liberalised autocracies’. He noted that policy towards the region in the wake of they were characterised by toleration the short-lived democratic transition in for political dissonance and being non- Algeria between 1988 and 1992, before hegemonic in terms of dominant political ideologies, for their ruling elites could The nature of juggle competing ideas to ensure their own continued control as arbiters of such governance in the pluralistic political scenes, which they had Arab world had long no intention of ceding through genuine precluded domestic liberalisation.7 Such partial political liberalisation pressure for meaningful was also accompanied by a partially change towards liberalised institutional space as well. Th us political parties could be tolerated, participatory alternatives. provided they did not challenge existing regimes, as could institutions devoted to the Algerian civil war seemed to justify activities directed towards civil society such cynicism. Autocratic government objectives8, and individuals could could, it seemed, be tolerated as long as enjoy restricted, contingent individual it satisfi ed the Western security agenda. freedoms – contingent because they At best, they might fi t the paradigm of remained in the gift of the regime in ‘illiberal democracies’, as Fareed Zakariya question. Indeed, he pointed out that such suggested in 1997.12 concessions could be withdrawn as well Yet, in reality, the nature of governance as granted and he detected a tendency in the Arab world had long precluded

12 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB INTIFADA IN PERSPECTIVE domestic pressure for meaningful change mechanism for identity formation. In towards participatory alternatives. Quite addition, elites were not only rent-seeking, apart from making appeal to regional they also exploited the formal structures imperatives, such as support for the of the state to ensure private profi t.14 Both Palestinians in their struggle against mechanisms, because of their opacity, Israel (a support which was primarily only encourage corruption and thus further rhetorical for most Arab governments exclude those without power from access thoroughly disliked the Palestinian to the state as a disinterested guarantor of movements because they could not control individual rights15 alongside its monopoly them), there were ideological imperatives of legitimate violence.16 too, whether Arab nationalism in its Nasserist or Ba’athist versions (although THE ROLE OF SOCIAL Nasserism was quickly relegated to a MOVEMENTS cultural expression of Arabism after Gamel Populations, of course, were not passive Abdul Nasser’s death in 1970) or, after under this relentless and endless attack 1979, the lure of the Iranian-style Islamic on their collective sense of social and state. And, fi nally, there was fear; fear of political autonomy. After all, it is this the threat of salafi -jihadism after 1988-89 feature that autocracies fear because it and, most important, fear of the state itself. stimulates dissent and thus undermines the States in the Arab world were not only totalitarian ideal of social fragmentation as autocratic, whether through ideological the mechanism by which eff ective control justifi cation – Syria, Iraq and, until the can be imposed. Th e result is not merely 1970s, Egypt – or by reference to Islamic the process of physical repression but of constitutional principle – Jordan, Morocco psychological isolation as well, as analyses and Iran being the archetypical examples, of totalitarianism in Europe during the with Saudi Arabia fi lling a particular niche twentieth century have demonstrated.17 of its own because of the legitimisation of Th e typical response to this at a popular the Ibn Saud regime through its eighteenth level is a sense of personal outrage which, century association with the Wahhabi al- in the Arab world, has often been codifi ed Shaykh – they were also arbitrary and by contrasting regime behaviour with repressive. Th ey were either ‘fi erce’ states, cultural ideals and archetypes. in which the security services, led by the For most people, of course, these have mukhabarat, enforced conformity and been drawn from Islam, particularly in its obedience through main force – Iraq, Syria social dimension, with the emphasis being and Libya being good examples. Otherwise on issues of social justice which often they were ‘shadow’ states, in which refl ect, at the personal level, concerns arbitrary, unaccountable real power lay over ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’. Th us, over the concealed behind the formal institutions last quarter of a century – ever since the of government, usually enshrined in an aborted liberalisation in Algeria, in fact – institution such as the armed forces. Th at repressive regimes have been characterised was the case in Algeria and Egypt, for as ‘tyrannical’ and ‘arrogant’. example.13 Th ere have also been more organised Yet states in the Middle East and North responses, too. Indeed, the advent of Africa shared other characteristics too, political Islam, not just as a symbol around in terms of the ways in which power was which resistance to the political crises that mediated and distributed throughout have faced the Middle East, in particular, them. Th ey were both neo-patrimonial could coalesce18, but as a statement about and neo-prebendal. Personal relationships a political alternative, refl ecting the were the route to power through complex elevation of the individual to a proper place patronage-clientage networks, sometimes within a divinely inspired political order, is personal and often collective – hence one example of this. In other words, the the persistence of the tribal ethos as a dynamism of such ideological visions is volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 13 not primarily located in their doctrinal ideological confl ict. Such circumstances implications but predominantly over the certainly defi ne the background against construction of political alternatives, which such movements can develop, as despite the rhetoric they may use. they explain why collective action might Inevitably, such ideologies seek physical develop, although they do not describe form as well and their ability to realise such how it can occur. objectives is a statement about the political For this reason, explanations of this kind environment in which they operate. Th ey have long been regarded as too simplistic seek, in short, to become social movements to capture the complexities of social able to contest the hegemonic discourse of movements, particularly in terms of the the state. ways in which they operate.19 One major Social movements are, therefore, objection has been that explanations of this collective challenges to authority which kind do little to explain how individuals in embody common purposes. Th ey tend to the social atomisation implied by anomie be a product of transitional societies and could collectivise and mobilise their are facilitated by the social phenomena frustrations and aspirations and how they that such transitions produce, such as would then express them. Insofar as such urbanisation, industrialisation and mass movements are rational and organised, education as mediated through new means they will mobilise whatever resources are of mass communication and opportunities available to them. for political engagement. Th us they require and therefore create In a similar fashion, partial bureaucracies or take over existing liberalisation also creates circumstances administrative structures as part of the in which such movements may emerge process of formation. It is for this reason if the structures generated by such state- that, in Islamic activist movements, for directed liberalisation processes acquire instance, the mosque can play a crucial role independent agency as well. Th ey thus alongside informal Islamic institutions, often require catalytic events to initiate such as charities, schools, societies and them and, characteristically, often – cultural centres. Th e Muslim Brotherhood but not always – involve charismatic in Egypt has been adept at mobilising such leadership. In addition, insofar as they structures to its own advantage in the 1970s lie outside the established structures of before it moved on to exploiting more the state, they may also refl ect – or be formalised structures, such as professional alleged to refl ect – criminalised patterns of organisations and even political parties in behaviour, a refl ection of the anomie that the following decades. contributes to their formation as well as of Such patterns of resource mobilisation offi cial hostility towards them. can easily morph into more formal Such movements are, in eff ect, collective structures of contention such as political manifestations of social disequilibrium parties, as has tended to be the case with and a range of explanations has been Islamic social movements in recent years adduced to analyse what may cause such in countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Algeria a development. For functional social and Morocco. Indeed, social movements psychologists, they result from structural and political parties can co-exist as strain induced by a cause exogenous to diff erent patterns of mutually reinforcing the movement itself. Th is creates both contention, thus creating social movement generalised grievance and mass anomie such communities, as has been the case in that individuals engage in collective action Morocco and Algeria. Here, patterns of as a coping mechanism in a pathological contention are diff used between formal response to established political order. and informal movements with fl exible Th e exogenous causes can refl ect socio- leaderships and fl uid boundaries between economic transition, political exclusion them. Th is was precisely the pattern which and authoritarianism, as well as cultural or developed in Algeria during the 1980s

14 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB INTIFADA IN PERSPECTIVE and which contributed to the atmosphere strategy or tactics, such that mechanisms in which countrywide riots developed in are developed to impose a hegemonic October 1988 – making Algeria, in eff ect, discourse on the movement. It was this into the precursor of the Arab Spring that lay behind the struggle between of 2011. Th ese challenged the existing the GIA (Groupes Islamiques Armés – political system and initiated the changes Jama’at Islamiyya Musallaha) and the that were eventually to lead to the civil war AIS (Armée Islamique du Salut – Jaysh in the 1990s. In Morocco in that decade, Islamiyya li’l-Inqadh) during the Algerian it led to a formal political party and an civil war in the 1990s. Now, of course, informal social movement seeking similar the popular memory of the civil war political objectives of democratising has proved to be a massive disincentive the political system despite the formal to generalised participation in social competition between them.20 movements challenging the state, even Th e drivers for such resource mobilisation though the regime that mobilises it lacks are, of course, socio-political in nature popular acceptance. Th e frame can also and a crucial aspect of them is the way in be challenged from outside, particularly which participants either exploit existing if the movement’s major opponent, the informal political tendencies to articulate state, has created its own hegemonic their grievances or conceptualise their framing ideology. Th us the Moroccan own participation in collective action and monarchy’s claim to be a caliphate and attract others to join them. In other words, thus to dominate the domestic Islamic the way in which the hegemonic discourse agenda challenges the discourse of groups of contention for the social movement is such as ‘Adl wa’l-Ihsan and the PJD (Parti framed is a key factor in the mobilisation de la Justice et du Développement – Hizb of support and action. Th ese “frames of al-‘Adala wa’l-Tanmiyya) and is generally contention” are, in eff ect, interpretive accepted within the population. schemata which provide a context for In addition, as recent events in the an ideological analysis which justifi es Middle East and North Africa have contention and for the social movement shown, the Islamist discourse that was associated with it. Th ey provide diagnoses expected to dominate social movements of social disequilibrium, solutions to it and has been challenged by much simpler yet rationales for action to achieve them that more profound frames centred around have meaning and value for participants. basic individual rights and freedoms. In In the context of the Muslim world, many respects, no doubt, they refl ect a political extrapolations of Islamic doctrine basic demand for social justice typical have emerged as the most frequent framing of Muslim societies but they have been ideology but have latterly been challenged articulated without conscious recourse to by more secular discourses. In part the role political Islamic archetypes. played by political Islam has arisen from Alongside such demands which often the cultural context but it is also a conscious refl ect economic imperatives, there have reaction to other ideological failures rooted been political demands as well. Th ere are in nationalism and secularist ideologies demands that refl ect an imperious insistence of liberation and development. Specifi c on participating in the political process aspects of the Islamic corpus have become and thus challenge regime hegemony important, particularly those governing but, more importantly, they challenge the social and political organisation such as implicit assumption of autocratic regimes the concept of a just society and shar’ia that their control of power renders them in (Islamic jurisprudence), together with some way legitimate. more atavistic and symbolic concepts, such as the recreation of the Caliphate.21 A PARADIGM SHIFT? Such framing ideologies can, of course, Indeed, this has been one of the most be contested both in terms of content and direct threats to existing regimes and the volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 15 reason why, in Tunisia and Egypt, regimes even though the central organisation was were swept away under the pressure of government-controlled. the social movements that had emerged, Similarly, political parties had existed often by the core structures on which such openly ever since Habib Bourguiba regimes were based, in order to preserve authorised them in 1983, despite their their hegemony of power. Elsewhere, as in political marginalisation by the eff ective Libya or Syria, regimes have not acquiesced single political party and bulwark of the in their own demise but cannot impose regime, the Destourian Socialist Party, themselves by main force either, whereas renamed after 1987 as the Rassemblement in those circumstances where regimes have Constitutionelle et Démocratique (RCD). sustained popular perceptions of their In Tunisia, too, there was a strong legitimacy, as in Morocco or Jordan, they constitutional and institutional tradition, have survived, at the cost only of tactical reaching back to the original grant of concession. the Tunisian constitution in 1860, the Th e question is, however, how profound, fi rst in the Arab world. Th is gave added really, are the changes that we have seen impetus to the idea of dissent whenever a over the two years? Do they mark the regime abused constitutional provision or emergence of a paradigm shift, a completely institution. new set of references for our understanding In Egypt, the restoration of rights to of the region?22 political parties by the Sadat regime and It is in this context that the concept the renaming of the former single-party, of the liberalised autocracy becomes so the Arab Socialist Union, in 1977, had a important, for it gives us an insight as to similar eff ect. At the same time, the Muslim why such events in some countries led to Brotherhood was tolerated and allowed to changes in the natures of regimes, whilst develop its activities outside the formal in others, the only outcome could be open political scene, despite constant regime and violent confrontation. Th e existence harassment. It was able to penetrate Egypt’s of sectors within the public space in all-important professional associations and which non-governmental organisations to supplement, even replace, incompetent or even political parties were tolerated, and inadequate social services provided with or without formal recognition also by the state. In addition, the growth of meant that proto-social movements could intellectual elites committed to a secular emerge. Th at is indeed precisely what did vision of the state, although marginalised occur in Tunisia and Egypt, for example, by both the state and the pious mass of the whilst in Morocco they had long been population, sustained an active intellectual in existence. Th us, in Tunisia, human life. By 2004, this formalised as the Kefaya Movement, joined in the following year by There was a strong a new political party, al-Ghad, prepared to challenge the incumbent, Hosni Mubarak, constitutional and for the presidency. Th ree years later, the institutional tradition, working class emerged with a political reaching back to... 1860 voice through the April 6 Movement and two years after that, the egregious brutality [which] added impetus of the security services in Alexandria to the idea of dissent stimulated the Remember Khaled Mohammed Said Movement. Th e previous [against regime abuses]. year, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Authority, Mohammed rights organisations had long existed El-Barada’i, had returned to Egypt with despite constant government harassment the express objective of challenging the and the local branches of trade unions Mubarak regime. enjoyed considerable autonomy of action, Similar patterns could be pointed to

16 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB INTIFADA IN PERSPECTIVE elsewhere, where proto-social movements emptive intervention, as had occurred in existed, ready to be exploited should Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003. appropriate framing mechanisms for It is in this context that the actual events popular demand be developed and should of 2011 should be seen. the right political conditions obtain. In Th e catalyst was to be provided by two Morocco, for instance, the decision by the factors; the energy and food price crisis regime to liberalise in 1990, improving of late 2010, as described above and the individual rights and granting political quite fortuitous coincidence of the self- parties more autonomy in government immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in the despite strict royal control had resulted southern Tunisian town of Sidi Bou Zid. in two moderate Islamic movements, one It is important to appreciate that his action of which also had a political party, the was by no means unique. Self-immolation Parti de la Justice et du Développement, in despair at economic circumstance had associated with it, the other, ‘Adl wa’l- already emerged in North Africa as a Ihsan, preferring to avoid the limitations relatively frequent act of public desperation that formal political responsibility implied. at the iniquitous social consequences Even in Algeria, despite the unchanged of neo-liberal reform or at the moral nature of its ‘shadow state’ and Algerian implications of regime arrogance, tyranny skepticism about ‘façade democracy’, and corruption and there had been several there was an active political scene and the dozen such incidents in preceding months Algerian media were amongst the most and years and there have been over sixty outspoken in the region. cases since, mainly in Algeria. In other words, by 2011, liberalised However, it was the timing of autocracies had become the norm Mohammed Bouazzizi’s act, whether throughout the Middle East and North conscious or not, in the context of the Africa with full autocracies confi ned to wave of demonstrations over economic Syria, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Here no circumstance that gave it such moral informal institutions existed, either as and symbolic force, rather as the self- safety-valves for popular frustration and immolation of Jan Palach in Wenceslas resentment or as mechanisms through Square in Prague morally condemned which the expression of dissent could be the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia formalised for a dialogue with regimes. which ended the Prague Spring in 1968. Nor did these regimes see the utility of At a stroke, his action transformed what restricted autonomous political sectors had been relatively inchoate protests about as mechanisms for ensuring their own economic disadvantage and hardship into survival, as had been the case with their targeted statements of moral and political liberalising colleagues. On the other condemnation of the regimes that had hand, the level of alienation from regimes dominated the Middle East and North because of their moral, social and political Africa for so long. At the same time, it failings throughout the region had become should be noted that none of the regimes intense, such that the right catalyst would that faced such popular protest and set in play those organisations capable challenge simply crumbled away. All of of articulating and channeling such them were to resist and often with rather discontent into a political discourse of greater success than outside observers challenge and contention. expected. Even in Tunisia, the removal of Th e West, incidentally, was no longer Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali from power did seen as a potential source of moral and not mean the collapse of the regime he diplomatic suasion, as might have been had led. Instead, demonstrations had to the case in the 1970s, for it had discredited continue for a further month against the itself by its partiality over the Arab- continued dominance of the RCD, the Israeli dispute and its re-adoption of a real core of the regime before it, too, was neo-liberal imperialist narrative of pre- forced out of government and into political volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 17 oblivion. In Libya, the Qadhafi regime all, only the Gulf – except for Bahrain – managed to survive for a further eight appeared to have emerged unscathed from months, despite NATO’s intervention, the crisis and, even here, only at the cost before it collapsed and its remnants still of lavish subsidies; Saudi Arabia alone threatened its successors many months was estimated to have committed up to after its collapse. $130 billion to buying off its potential and In Egypt, the Supreme Council of active opposition. Yet such largesse might the Armed Forces (SCAF), struggled to only have delayed the crisis, not resolve it, maintain its position for over a year, despite for unemployment, inadequate education popular will that indicated unambiguously and exploding demographic growth were its preference for participatory governance, hardly harbingers of stability. dominated by the Islamist movements. What does seem to be clear, however, Even in Yemen, despite the demonstrators is that the fi rst stage of the transitions in Change Square in Sana’a, Ali Abdullah processes taking place in the region had Saleh and the General People’s Congress approached its climax with, perhaps, only only made a tactical retreat, as the single- Syria left to resolve the acute phase of its candidate presidential election in early domestic crisis. And, as things settled, it March 2012 showed. And, in any case, also seemed clear that we could establish there much greater problems persisted a typology of what had occurred which in the form of the Al-Houthi rebellion, might enable us to predict in general what the Southern Movement (the Harakat there is to come: as-Silmiyya li’l-Janub) and al-Qa’ida Th e major benefi ciaries of the events of in the Arabian Peninsula, comfortably the past year have been, undoubtedly, the ensconced in Zinjibar probably with Islamist movements in the region. Even regime acquiescence. And in Syria the though they took virtually no part, as horrifyingly violent crisis persisted for organised movements in the events came to over a year-and-a-half as the Assad regime exemplify the Intifada, they have certainly mobilised the Ba’ath Party as the protector seized the fruits. Islamists now dominate in of the country’s ethnic, sectarian and government in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco economic minorities just as much as it was and anticipate repeating their success in the instrument of unrelenting violence, the upcoming elections in Algeria in May whether through the Shabiha or the army’s and in Libya in June. Yet, their success special forces. conceals other questions. Th ere is, fi rst, a growing and unanticipated split within OUTCOMES the Islamist body politic between the Th e events of last year have made it mainstream Brotherhood movements and quite clear that, whether paradigm shift or their supposedly non-political Salafi yya not, the process of democratic transition, Ilmiyya counterparts. Th e latter emerged as if that was indeed what was under way in from nowhere, to play a part in enforcing the Middle East and North Africa, was public morality and in challenging going to take a very long time indeed. the hegemony of the Brotherhood Quite apart from the political processes itself. Th ere is also a worsening tension involved, the economic damage wrought between the gerontocratic leaderships of by profound political change, whether the Brotherhood in many countries and violent or not, would take a very long their more politically-minded younger time to repair. Beyond that, too, new supporters, especially in Egypt. diplomatic and international linkages Th ere is also a much more profound would have to be established with the wider issue; until 2011, Islamist movements were world – by-and-large still horrifi ed at the in opposition and the day-to-day tasks of disappearance of cherished alliances and governance had not formed part of their profoundly concerned by the new political agenda. Now they do, with all the practical contours emerging in the region. After compromises that may mean. It remains

18 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB INTIFADA IN PERSPECTIVE

North Africa, in short, is that the events of [Islamist] political last year will not lead, as many had hoped, leaderships must be to the region’s 1989 experience and thus uncomfortably aware the introduction to a new “Democratic Wave”,23 but could produce, instead, that they were elected its version of 1848 when, after a wave of precisely because they uprisings and the rejection of the ‘ancien régimes’ within the Hapsburg Empire were not besmirched by and elsewhere, a conservative reaction the taint of past failure. eventually restored the old order to power. to be seen how successful they will be in *George Joff é is a former Deputy Director at the Royal handling such agendas and their political Institute of International Aff airs in London engaged leaderships must be uncomfortably aware on a research programme on the Barcelona Process. He previously worked at the Instituto de Estudos that they were elected precisely because Estratégicos e Internacionais in Lisbon on Euro-Med they were not besmirched by the taint of policy matters. past failure. Now they cannot disappoint Joff é is currently an analyst for Noref, Norway, advising their electorates, despite the massive the Norwegian Government. He is an affi liate lecturer at the University of Cambridge on international economic and social challenges they face, relations and geopolitics of the Middle East and North for they know that electoral favour is fi ckle, Africa, including Mediterranean issues and Euro- Mediterranean policy. He has also delivered lectures particularly as those who elected them are at the Royal College of Defence Studies, the NATO not necessarily their doctrinal supporters Defence College in Rome and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Joff é has been engaged in research and but simply wished to punish their corrupt teaching on these regions since 1978 and has published predecessors. widely. Many of those now directly involved in the political process are prepared for such ENDNOTES compromises and they have their own 1. This paper is a shortened version of a paper presented at ideological guides in personalities such a conference in March 2012 in the University of Melbourne, as the Tunisian Islamist leader, Rachid Australia entitled, “The Middle East in Revolt: the First Ghannouchi or the Iranian political Anniversary.” 2. Vasconcelos A, (2012). Listening to Unfamiliar Voices – the philosopher, Abdelkrim Soroush. But Arab Democratic Wave, EU-ISS (Paris); p.19 many, particularly amongst the older 3. Williamson, J. (1989). What Washington Means by Policy generations, have yet to confront the Reform, in: Williamson, J. (ed.). Latin American Readjustment: realities of political power. How Much has Happened, Institute for International Economics (Washington DC). The term refl ects the general agreement Yet the signs are hopeful, especially between the United States and international institutions amongst the moderates. Increasingly in Washington that the path to economic success requires they focus on the practicalities, seeing overcoming the ineffi cient allocation of national resources by democracy as their primary target, nor opening an economy to realistic pricing policies refl ected in global market prices. A secondary objective is to reduce the morality. In that respect, perhaps, they role of the state within an economy. Subsequently, market are approaching the same patterns of distortions were to be handled by the use of New Institutional political evolution that faced Christian Economics, importing transparency and accountability Democracy in the nineteenth century in into the economic process. See Todaro M. (1989). Economic development in the Third World, Longmans (London); p.83. The which doctrinal rigidity also gave way to European Union’s policies towards the Mediterranean basin practical politics as Christian Democratic exemplify both the principles and the failures of this model of political parties moved towards power in economic development. the post-Second World War period. Th at 4. See Joff é E.G.H. (2011). “The Arab Spring in North Africa: origins and prospects,” Journal of North African Studies, 16, 4 would be an extremely hopeful outcome (December). in a situation which otherwise, despite 5. Brumberg D. (2002). “The trap of liberalised autocracy,” the sanguine hopes with which it was Journal of Democracy, 13, 4 (October); p.57. greeted last year, increasingly looks like the 6. Brumberg D. (2002). “The trap of liberalised autocracy,” Journal of Democracy, 13, 4 (October); p.59. proverbial curate’s egg – good only in parts. 7. Brumberg, op. cit. p.61. Th e danger facing the Middle East and 8. Hence the phenomenon of the ‘gngo’ – the government- volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 19 THE ARAB INTIFADA IN PERSPECTIVE

approved non-governmental organisation, whereby NGOs Press (Cambridge); proposition 257. have to be registered with the state. 16. ‘A state is a human community that (successfully) claims 9. Brumberg, op.cit. p.63. the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a 10. Brumberg D. (2005), “Democratisation versus liberalisation given territory’: M. Weber, ‘Politics as a vocation: lecture to the in the Arab world: Dilemmas and challenges for US foreign Free Students Society at Munich University, January 1919’, in policy,” SSI Monographs, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle PA) Gerth H. H. and Wright Mills C., trans. and eds, (1946). From Max (July); 1. Weber: Essays in Sociology. Oxford University Press, (Oxford and 11. Joff é G. (2008). “The European Union, Democracy and New York). Counter-Terrorism in the Maghreb“ Journal of Common Market 17. See Schmidt C., Joff é E.G.H. & Davar E. (2005). “The Studies, 46. 1; pp.147–171. Psychology of Political Extremism”, Cambridge Review of 12. The concept of an allegedly democratic process International Aff airs, 18, 1 (April). unleavened by liberal institutions, such as the rule-of-law, 18. See, for instance, *Ajami F. (1981)(2005), The Arab essential to guarantee viable democratic systems. Zakaria F. Predicament. (1997), “The rise of illiberal democracy,” Foreign Aff airs, 76, 6 19. See Wiktorowicz, Q. ed. (2004). Islamic Activism: A (Nov/Dec 1997); pp.22-43. Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana University Press 13. This is excellently discussed in Ayyubi N.N. (1995). Over- (Bloomington and Indianapolis). stating the Arab state: Politics and security in the Middle East. 20. Spiegel A. (2009). ‘Islamist Pluralism: Youth, Activism and 14. Neo-prebendalism; the exploitation of institutions of the the State in Morocco’, unpublished PhD, University of Oxford state for personal enrichment; a form of rent-seeking. The (Oxford). concept of prebendalism was fi rst used by R. A. Joseph to 21. This would also include the catchphrase, “Islam is the describe the sense of neo-patrimonial elite entitlement to solution” as a mechanism for rejecting ideological alternatives access to state revenues in Nigeria: see Joseph R.A. (1987). whether seen as secularist or as foreign cultural or political Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria, Cambridge imports. University Press, (Cambridge). Neo-prebendalism is used here 22. The term originates with Tomas Kuhn who argued that, in in a wider sense to indicate the exploitation of state resources science, progress occurs through radical shifts in structures of by politically relevant elites as an entitlement of political interpretation. Furthermore such shifts are incommensurate – position. the new structure of meaning cannot be interpreted in terms Neo-patrimonialism: patterns of patronage and clientage of its predecessor. His concept has since been applied to the reifi ed into structures of access into the framework of power political and social sciences, although the requirement of within the state. See Erdmann G. and Engel U. (2006). ‘Neo- incommensurability does not apply as diff erent structures of patrimonialism revisited: beyond a catch-all concept’, GIGA meaning can and do coexist and can be interpreted, the new working papers 16, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, by the old. See Kuhn T.N. (1962, 1969). The Structure of Scientifi c (Leibnitz:); p.18. Revolution. University of Chicago Press (Chicago). 15. Hegel’s “actuality of the ethical idea.” Hegel G.W.F. (Trans 23. See Vasconcelos (2012). op.cit. above. T.M. Knox)(1991). The Philosophy of Right, Cambridge University

BOOK PROMOTION Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East: Reassessing the Causes of Terrorism. EDITED BY GEORGE JOFFE

AreA today's radicals tomorrow's extremists? Are adherents to Islamism necessarily extremistex or violent? Most analyses of violence emanating from the Middle East or fromfr Europe's Muslim communities tend to assume that this is the case. Not so in tthis book. Instead, with a wide-ranging and case-by-case approach, it seeks to look beyondb these assumptions, examining the specifi c contexts of radicalism and asking whatw creates the conditions for radicalisation. Shedding much-needed light upon a phenomenon that has helped to defi ne today's world, Islamist Radicalisation will be essential for general readers, students and researchers who take an interest in the fi elds of Politics, International Relations and the phenomena of multiculturalism and terrorism.

Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East: Reassessing the Causes of Terrorism. Edited by George Joff e. Published in November 2012 by Tauris Academic Studies.

20 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 Creeping Shari’a and Galloping Secularism: The Mimetic War between Perennialist Ontology and Secularist Epistemology in the Arab Spring and the Global Awakening

ROBERT D. CRANE

JURISPRUDENTIAL democracy (either one-man-one-vote or METAPHYSICS: POSING THE one-dollar-one-vote) as a preferred political PROBLEM system. Perhaps this is a matter of taste, he issue is human rights. Th e because both are distasteful. Th e degree Qatar Foundation created a Center of distaste may depend on metaphysics, Tfor the Study of Contemporary specifi cally whether one argues within the Muslim Societies, of which I became the perennialist or the positivist perspective, fi rst Director in January 2012, to explore which, in turn, depends on the historical where and how the Arab Spring and any origin of these two opposing paradigms of Global Awakening have originated and the thought. extent to which the theories behind them Th e perennialist paradigm is best have been translated into practice. What illustrated by the shelf of books by Hossein these two phenomena are or might become Nasr, who represents the turath or heritage will be shaped by where they come from. of Persia and America, as well as by the Th e issue therefore is what, whither, and very similar paradigm of the Scottish whence. Enlightenment represented by Edmund In June, 2012, the sociology-of-Islam Burke, the leader of the minority Whig listserve produced a veritable book Party in the 18th century English Parliament, of debate on the subject. One thread who was the mentor of all of the Founders addressed the issue of the participants own of the Great American Experiment in just subjectivity in hopes and expectations. governance. Th ey both accepted monarchy To what extent were the discussants with limitations, but, like Aristotle, both merely refl ecting the Latin proverb de feared French Revolutionary democracy as gustibus non est disputandem, “there is no the worst form of government. Jeff erson’s disputing taste”. Th e master of mimetics, attack on the British monarchy in his Professor Muhammad Fadel, who, as a fi rst draft of the American Declaration Wall Street attorney, founded Muslims of Independence was one of the only two Against Terrorism in New York City parts of this document deleted by the immediately after 9/11, introduced the Continental Congress (the other being dichotomy between “creeping shari’a”, ironically his denunciation of human which is the beloved phrase of in-your-face slavery as the worst of all abominations). Islamophobes, and “creeping secularism”, Th e perennialist paradigm is essentialist, which is its opposite, though the jury is meaning that ontologically it exists still out on which is creeping the fastest. independently of context, and is based on Th e discussion began by addressing the the premise that truth is absolute. It is the fi eld of governance as the focus of current epistemological task of the human intellect interest in human rights, if not as the to understand enough of it to derive origin of human rights as a discrete fi eld principles of justice both from divine of knowledge. Professor Fadel suggested revelation and from the aspects of natural that respect for minority rights is a major law that can be deduced from observation criterion for deciding between centralised of the laws of the universe, including government in oligarchies and majoritarian human beings. It is the further task of volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 21 human governance, preferably through an to order their own lives. Th is assumes that elected legislature, to translate these ideal the particulars of justice will be developed jurisprudential principles into practical and respected in ways perhaps unique to guidance. If the specifi c laws have to be each person and civil union. Th is might enforced, then the entire exercise has failed be considered to be realistic utopianism in its primary purpose, which is education. or what I would prefer to call idealistic Th e key is that man does not invent truth, pragmatism as essential in all private and though he may derive universal principles public life. of global ethics from whatever glimpses Th is dichotomous paradigm of harmony he may receive from the ultimate or what between the political universal and the Meister Eckhart and Hans Kung have moral particular can provide a basis called “beyond being”. for developing a common language for Th e modern positivist paradigm, on the the spectrum of citizens who in most other hand, is best illustrated by Austinian Arab countries oppose the imposition of jurisprudence, which gained prominence values by either the Salafi st “right wing” at Harvard Law School shortly after the or the “socialist left wing”. Th ey are also American Civil War. Th is is why the main realistically suspicious of the Ikhwan or building there is named Austin Hall. In Muslim Brotherhood, in which the same contrast, a strictly secondary building is spectrum exists but not in such extremes. named after Supreme Court Justice Story, Underlying any idealistically pragmatic who championed natural law immediately solution to avoiding a pendulum swing before the Civil War as a holdover from back and forth from tyranny to chaos the time of the Founding of the United and back to tyranny is the problem of States of America. He was weakened by the defi ning the terms that are bandied back fact that the Southern Confederacy used and forth, whereby each appendage of the natural law and the Bible to defend slavery. many-sided hydra on the street claims the Positivist law consists of whatever same mimetic symbols as its own. Th is human beings posit as the law of the land. reminds one of the “fi rst martyr on Tahrir In order to avoid the natural tyranny that Square”. Six diff erent competing groups could result from such a paradigm, the claimed her as the soul of the revolution, supporters of positivist law emphasised an despite the fact that reporters subsequently implied contract between the people and established that she had never even been the government, which itself was based there. Th is is the art of mimetic warfare. on the spectrum of contract theorists, Whoever can capture the dominant mimes best illustrated by Locke, Hobbes, and in the form of either visual or oral symbols Rousseau, who exercised only a minor (e.g. placards, music, and poetry) has an infl uence on America’s Founders but advantage in shaping thought and action. conveniently provided a fall-back position. In the discussions at the conference on Professor Fadel supports the Rawlsian the Arab Spring held at the end of May and position, which warns against the danger the beginning of June, 2012, at the Qatar of “comprehensive doctrines” of either Foundation by its Center for the Study of perennialist/conservative or classically Contemporary Muslim Societies and its liberal persuasion. He prefers, therefore, partner, St. Antony’s College of Oxford, a restrained liberalism limited to political four representative mimes were advanced. constitutionalism applying to governance, Th ese are 'asabiya, khilafa, dawla, and especially in the era of the modern state, democratia. which recognises no authority above its Depending on how one defi nes them, own and certainly not the authority of any each can be seen as posing the threat transcendent absolute. of what Muhammad Fadel, using the At the individual level, as well as at the metaphor of “mission creep” evidenced in level of civil community, Rawls relies on the Iraq and Afghanistan, calls “shari’a creep” reasonableness of the majority of citizens and “secularism creep”. Th e question is

22 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 CREEPING SHARI’A AND GALLOPING SECULARISM: THE MIMETIC WAR BETWEEN PERENNIALIST ONTOLOGY AND SECULARIST EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE ARAB SPRING AND THE GLOBAL AWAKENING is defi ned as tribalism, especially religious The most powerful force tribalism. Tribalism consists of pride in in the various springs... oneself and one’s own tribe at the expense of other tribes and even in denial of all all over the world is the human rights except one’s own. demand for dignity and Th e good ‘asabiya consists of pride in respect. the best of one’s own tribe with openness to share whatever wisdom one has with whether the phenomenon of creeping other tribes in order to cooperate for the extremism of all kinds will morph into common good. galloping chaos, or whether these terms Th e good ‘asabiya goes beyond mere can be reinterpreted to become part of tolerance, which means essentially, “I a common language for the moderate won’t kill you yet”. It goes even beyond middle, al-wasatiyah. tolerance to diversity, which means, “You are here and I can’t do much about it”. MIMETIC CHALLENGES TO Finally, it extends to pluralism, which DEVELOPING A COMMON means, “We welcome you, because we LANGUAGE each have so much to off er each other”. Th e good ‘asabiya can extend still further I. ‘Asabiya to respect not merely for individuals but Th e terms, ‘asabiya, khilafah, dawla, for their religions. and democratia, constitute symbols that God created humans with diversity embody entire frameworks of thought. of language, cultures, communities, Th ey can be manipulated through the art and even religions so that we as persons of paradigm management to either expand and as members of unique communities or limit the human mind subliminally so can get to know each other and thereby that the target audience is unaware of the cooperate for everyone’s mutual benefi t. imposed blinders. Critics of “nationalism” contend that Th e most powerful force in the various the construction of a polity on national springs that emerged in the Year 2011 lines, if it means a displacement of the all over the world is the demand for Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply dignity and respect. At its root the search unthinkable to a Muslim. Th is is correct, is for what Pope John Paul II called but equally valid is the principle that “personalism,” which involves both respect solidarity in recognising and respecting for the individual person as the purpose of universal human responsibilities and human governance and reliance on the human rights makes construction of individual to perfect the group. a polity without nations Islamically Equally important is respect for the unthinkable. Islamic ‘asabiya is the basis group or community all the way from for federations or confederations of nations the nuclear family to the nation. We may within a state or at a higher regional level. defi ne the nation as a group with a common Th e Qur’anic principle of tawhid heritage, common concerns in the present, provides for diversity in the created order and common hopes for the future, usually so that the coherence of diversity will point with a common language and sometimes to the oneness of the Creator. Otherwise with a common majority religion. there would be only one standard tree, Th is is what Ibn Khaldun called the one standard fl ower, and one standard good ‘asabiya or community loyalty, sunset, and therefore one standard human. but the term nowadays generally is used Th e attempt to standardise humans and pejoratively to justify secular statism and humanity therefore is the worst of all nation-building without nations as organic polytheisms. communities. Th e opposite is the bad ‘asabiya, which volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 23 II. Khilafah military or even political governance. Another term that requires Salafi extremists, among whom Osama understanding if it is to provide bin Laden was the most famous, claim productive guidance in understanding that Ibn Taymiya supports their call for the Arab Spring and its progeny, rather a one-world government under a single than serve as a barrier and challenge to Caliph. In fact, Ibn Taymiya developed communication and cooperation, is the a sophisticated understanding about “Islamic Caliphate”. Ideally this is based the Islamic doctrine of the khilafah that on the principle of khilafah, whereby every demolishes the extremists of his day and of person, including both the rulers and the ours. Ibn Taymiya was a political theorist ruled, are responsible fi rst of all to God as who was imprisoned by the reigning stewards of Creation. Th is means that the Caliph and died in prison ten years later institution of the caliphate is not military for opposing the extremism both of tyrants or political in nature but instead consists of and of their opponents. He was in fact a the ijma or universal consensus of the wise model of those who both understand the persons and scholars on the nature and sources of extremism and the means to application of justice, which one might call counter it. His mission was to deconstruct the academic discipline of ‘Ilm al ‘Adl. Th is extremist teachings doctrinally in order to is based on the Qur’anic verse, wa tama’at marginalise their adherents. kalimatu rabika sidqan wa ‘adlan, (Surah One of his modern students, Naveed al An’am, 6:115), “Th e Word of your Lord Shaykh, in his Th e New Politics of Islam: Pan- is completed and perfected in truth and Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States1, justice”. writes rather poetically that extremism Th e most articulate and assiduous of comes when pan-Islamists “operationalise the scholars on the meaning of the Islamic a unity of belief in a human community caliphate was Ibn Taymiya, who lived at of monist monolithism rather than in a the time of the Mongol invasion. Some boundless love for all of God’s creation Muslims, notably the Hanbalis, claim to in a transcendent Islamic cosmopolis.” honor Ibn Taymiya as their mentor, but Extremism comes when people substitute a political institution for themselves as the highest instrument and agent of God Ibn Taymiya was a in the world, when they call for a return political theorist who of the Caliphate in its imperial form was imprisoned by embodied in the Ottoman dispensation. It comes when they call for what Shah Wali the reigning Caliph Allah of India in the 18th century called and died in prison ten the khilafat zahira or external and exoteric caliphate in place of the khilafat batina or years later for opposing esoteric caliphate formed by the spiritual the extremism both heirs of the prophets, who are the sages, of tyrants and of their saints, and righteous scholars. In the late Abbasid period of classical opponents. Islam, according to Naveed Sheikh, “Th e political scientists of the day delegitimised they distort his most essential teachings. both institutional exclusivism and, For example, many Muslims condemn critically, centralisation of political Sufi sm as inherently un-Islamic, but they power by disallowing the theophanic seem to be unaware that Ibn Taymiya was descent of celestial sovereignty into any a Sufi who condemned the Sufi extremism human institution.” In other words, they that was spreading as a populist movement denied the ultimate sovereignty claimed in his day. He also was an ardent supporter by modern states since the Treaty of of the khilafah but not as an institution of Westphalia in 1648, which elevated states

24 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 CREEPING SHARI’A AND GALLOPING SECULARISM: THE MIMETIC WAR BETWEEN PERENNIALIST ONTOLOGY AND SECULARIST EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE ARAB SPRING AND THE GLOBAL AWAKENING to the ultimate level of sovereignty, in place legitimacy of practice must be determined of the divine, thereby relegating religion to by higher purpose. the periphery of public life or excluding it and with it morality altogether. III. Dawla and Democratia Th e late Abbasid scholars, faced with Many Muslims often refer to “the Islamic a gradual process of creeping despotism, state” as a goal of the Arab Spring. Such a denied the divine right not only of kings concept is un-Islamic because an Islamic but of every human institution, and they state is an oxymoron. Others refer to the condemned the worship of power and state in the Western sense as dawla, a term privilege that had brought corruption that originated in the early 20th century. upon the earth. For insisting on this Better might be the terms Islamic society foundation principle of Islam, the greatest or community or system of governance. scholars throughout Muslim history were Th e best term to use is “Islamic polity”, imprisoned, some for years and decades. fully recognising that there is no such See Chapter 59 of Khalid Abou el- polity in existence today and may never Fadl, “Th e Scholar’s Road,” in his book, be. Th ere are many Muslim states, defi ned Conference of the Books: Th e Search for as countries with a Muslim majority, but Beauty in Islam, Lanham, MD, University few, if any, of them qualify to be Islamic. Press of America, 2001. Th is is precisely Th is distinction is captured by contrasting why Muslims traditionally have considered Christianity with Christendom and Islam them to be great. with Islamdom. Ibn Taymiya completed the process of Th e concept of the state did not exist deconstructing the ontological fatalism in all of human history until the Treaty of caliphatic thought by restricting the of Westphalia in 1648 ended the “Th irty role of the caliphate to what perhaps Years War” in Europe between the Roman the greatest Islamic thinker of all time, Catholics and the Lutheran Protestants. Abu Hamid al Ghazali, had called an In order to end the war, the contending ummatic umbrella functioning only to parties agreed that until the end of time protect the functional integrity of Islamic political authority would not come from thought rather than to govern politically. any higher authority beyond humans, and Ibn Taymiya asserted that the unity of that human power alone would determine the Muslim community depended not what is right and what is wrong. Th is raised on any symbolism represented by the the question of managing human power. Caliph, much less on any caliphal political Some believed in elitism, sometimes in the authority, but on “confessional solidarity of form of Neo-Colonialism or more recently each autonomous entity within an Islamic in Neo-Conservatism. Others proposed whole.” In other words, the Muslim so-called democracy, usually in the form of umma or global community is a body of “winner take all”, whereby a 51% majority purpose based on worship of God. By of a vote was the only legitimate source contending that the monopoly of coercion of both law and ethics, though others that resides in political governance is not advocated proportional representation in philosophically constituted, Ibn Taymiya order to avoid the tyranny of the mob over rendered political unifi cation and the minorities. caliphate redundant. America’s Founders deleted Jeff erson’s Th e principal proponents of the esoteric opposition to the British monarchy caliphate, the khilafat batina, have been from his fi rst draft of the Declaration of the Shi’a scholars, because they were the Independence, because they were more most oppressed of the oppressed under the concerned about what James Madison most un-Islamic of the Muslim would- called the “elective despotism” of the be emperors. Th is may explain why they mercantilist parliament. have always emphasized that purpose takes Th e term “Islamic state” is an oxymoron, priority over practice, meaning that the because the institutionalisation of human volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 25 will as the highest source of truth is the by experts in jurisprudence. An Islamic exact opposite of Islam and of all the world polity can be described perhaps best as a religions. Unfortunately, the historical community or nation and an economic practice of Islamdom and Christendom and political system of governance that shows that the norm was the same as today, respects the human responsibilities and namely, “might makes right”. human rights enshrined in the classical America’s founders believed that understanding of the normative principles “right makes might”. Th ey universally of Islamic jurisprudence, namely, what condemned democracy as the worst form Hans Kung at the Second Parliament of of government, as did Aristotle, because the World Religion in Chicago in 1993 they associated it with the anarchy introduced as “global ethics” and what and subsequent totalitarianism of the the present author as a minority of one in French Revolution, which gave rise to the Muslim delegation translated as the Communism, Nazism, and modern essence of the maqasid al-shari’a. Zionism. Th e same may be the demise Th ree of the eight irreducible, normative of the Arab Spring or any other spring in principles known in all world religions but Iran, China, Russia, or even in America, best expressed in the maqasid al-shari’a unless it becomes more principled. and most relevant to the Arab Spring are: At the Constitutional Convention in 1) haqq al-nafs, which requires respect for 1787, according to the notes of James the sacredness of the individual person McHenry, who was one of Maryland’s created with a purpose by God; 2) haqq delegates, Benjamin Franklin was asked, al nasl, which requires respect for the “What have we got, a republic or a community from the nuclear family all monarchy”? ”He replied, “A republic, if the way to the nation, because it consists we can keep it”. A republic by defi nition of sacred individuals who in solidarity recognizes that natural law provides the have a divinely designed purpose; and 3) ultimate source of values and legitimate haqq al-hurriyah, which requires respect legislation. Natural law is a combination for political self-determination (political of divine revelation, scientifi c observation freedom) through the institutionalisation of the laws inherent in the physical world, of khilafa, shura, ijma, and an independent and rational thought to understand the judiciary. fi rst two elements of a higher reality. Th is political self-determination Th e drafter of the American Declaration presupposes economic self-determination, of Independence, Th omas Jeff erson, based on the principle of subsidiarity, emphasised education in virtue as the which provides that all problems must basis for responsibility of the person and be addressed at the lowest level and may community for a divinely inspired society be addressed at higher levels only when of faith-based freedom. Th is basis for a the lowest level cannot solve them. In a just society eliminates sectarianism and capital-intensive economy, this requires any eff ort either to prescribe or proscribe broadened and even universal and equal religion by political or any other pressure, access to individual capital ownership which could be the natural result of the through the institution of credit based worst form of government, namely, a on future profi ts from capital investment democracy. rather than exclusively from credit based Th e common wisdom of classical only on past wealth accumulation, as American and classical Islamic thought pragmatically explained in detail in the consists of recognition that both Islam books and hundreds of articles available and Christianity call for a republic, which at the Centre for Economic and Social by defi nition condemns the amoral and Justice.2 Th is bottom up, rather than usually immoral institution of the state. A top-down, ordering of society requires more generic term suitable for a republic is spiritual awareness and social solidarity at “polity”, which is the term increasingly used each of the lowest levels of community in

26 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 CREEPING SHARI’A AND GALLOPING SECULARISM: THE MIMETIC WAR BETWEEN PERENNIALIST ONTOLOGY AND SECULARIST EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE ARAB SPRING AND THE GLOBAL AWAKENING order to shape the institutions of society of the Arab Spring, namely, ‘asabiya as guardians for the ordered freedom of khilafa, dawla, and democratia, require the individual. Without such freedom general agreement on their meaning if and community solidarity in promoting what began as a “spring” is not to end up respect for human responsibilities (both in an “Arab Winter”. Th e fi rst requirement fard ‘ain and fard kifaya, i.e., both personal of a revolution is to go beyond the stage and social responsibilities), political of simple revolt in order to engage the governance cannot protect the individual substance of enlightened change by seeking person from the imposition of order by peace, prosperity, and freedom through elites and from the denial of human rights. the interfaith harmony of compassionate justice for everyone. The fi rst requirement of a revolution is to go *Dr Robert D. Crane is the former adviser to the late American President, Richard Nixon. He is Director of the Qatar Foundation’s Center for the Study of Muslim beyond the stage of Societies; Chairman of the Center for Understanding Islam; co-author of Islam and Muslims; and a regular simple revolt in order to contributor to Arches. engage the substance of enlightened change. ENDNOTES 1. Shaykh, Naveed (2002). The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States (London: Routledge Curzon). Th ese four terms basic to Muslim usage 2. http://www.cesj.org/ in discussing the past, present, and future

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[email protected] www.fairobserver.com volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 27 Britain and the Arab Revolts

ROSEMARY HOLLIS

he British response to the Arab uprisings of 2011 was mostly For the British, change in careful and reactive, aside from the name of democracy Tsome of the rhetoric. Apart from the British is welcome, provided it government’s decision to take a lead, along with France, in marshalling Western produces more stable military intervention in Libya, the UK role and eff ective governance could not be considered decisive. Overall, as concluded in a parliamentary report on and leaders still able...to British Foreign Policy and the ‘Arab Spring’ do business with Western published in July 2012: governments. Th e UK is still struggling to create a compelling and—most importantly— were no more than manifestations of the consistent narrative for its approach to the 1 dictator’s propensity for manipulation of region. tribal loyalties and mystical notion of his own role in Arab history. Yet, as argued here, there was an In sum, for the British, change in the underlying logic to the British response name of democracy is welcome, provided to the uprisings in each of the countries it produces more stable and eff ective concerned, namely the preservation of governance and leaders still able and willing the system of states that dates back to the to do business with Western governments collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the and commercial enterprises. Th is outlook end of the First World War, when Britain is in keeping with what characterised was one of the principal architects of that British views on the region before the Arab system. Spring when they preached the virtues of Th us, a change of leadership in any gradual economic and political reform, but one country could be accommodated, did not insist on such reform, or greater especially if new leaders could be elected respect for human rights as a condition and thence claim a higher level of for forging closer ties. Revealingly, in the legitimacy than their predecessors. Indeed, wake of the Arab Spring, the British now claimed the British, democratic leadership say they will be more circumspect and is preferable to dictatorship, in the interests judge governments on their performance, of long term stability. However, whole-sale including with respect to human rights, yet revolution and turmoil was to be averted apparently it is only the new leaders who if at all possible, including through the are in the spotlight. Th e intention here is retention of institutions associated with to turn the spotlight on the British to see dictatorial rule in the past, such as the what can be learned from their actions as armed forces and departments of state in well as their words. Egypt and Tunisia and the monarchy in Morocco or Bahrain. Only in Libya was REVEALED BY THEIR ACTIONS a complete restructuring contemplated Th e fi rst point to be made here is that, on the grounds that all institutions there

28 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BRITAIN AND THE ARAB REVOLTS when the uprising in Tunisia sparked a repressive security forces on the crowds of region-wide phenomenon, the British were unarmed demonstrators in Tahrir Square clearly taken by surprise. Th is in itself in Cairo. It was this which led Washington indicates a level of complacency about and to demand his immediate departure accommodation to the status quo ante that and London followed suit, though even brings into question what they understand then the decisive move was made by the by democracy or rights to freedom of Egyptian armed forces, who chose not expression and assembly. Secondly, to fi re on the crowds and manoeuvred Britain’s ex post facto expressions of Mubarak out. enthusiasm for some of the ideals espoused Even in the case of Libya, the British by the rebels and undertaking to revise its only opted for intervention once the Arab policies to champion such values, rather League abandoned Qadhafi and it looked than accept dictators as they fi nd them, as though the rebellious city of Benghazi look more like an attempt to repackage was about to witness a massacre at the than to fundamentally restructure British hands of Qadhafi ’s armed forces, on which conduct in the region. more below. To elaborate on the fi rst point: the British In both Morocco and Jordan the were not expecting Arab populations to reigning monarchs responded to popular take to the streets in one country after demonstrations by promising reforms and another, demanding ‘dignity’, ‘freedom’, initiating some measures towards this an end to corruption and economic end. Accordingly the British were able to opportunity in the way they did, starting embrace the cause of reform and support in Tunisia in December 2010. While the regimes. Bahrain proved more diffi cult they were conscious of the repressive for the British, because the government practices of Arab regimes and had been chose to crack-down on protesters and made aware of the existence of endemic arrested many of them, as well as physicians economic and related political and social who treated the injured. In so doing the problems through the UNDP’s Arab Bahraini monarchy was backed by the Human Development Reports over several Saudis, who sent troops to the kingdom. years, the British had not anticipated In these circumstances, the British opted the strength of popular frustration and for diplomatic pressure behind the scenes, disenchantment. In eff ect they had not to urge clemency for those arrested, and thought that dictatorial government could preach the value of reform in the name of be intrinsically unstable and the impetus future stability. With respect to Yemen, to resist repression so powerful, especially meanwhile, the British deferred to the in the age of the internet. Th e history Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), whose of resistance to their own imperial rule members eventually managed to persuade should have taught them otherwise. President Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign in Turning to the second point: when the interests of averting a civil war. faced with the Arab revolts the British government’s response was to call for THE UNDERLYING APPROACH pragmatism on the part of the dictators, In so far as there is a unifying theme in rather than embracing the cause of the British response to the Arab revolts, revolution. In the brief period before it is the precedence accorded to state-to- Tunisian President Ben Ali fl ed the country, state relations and bilateral diplomacy Britain simply urged him to honour over identifi cation with transnational human rights in his dealings with the movements or pursuit of normative demonstrators. With respect to Mubarak objectives. In the early days of the Arab they focused on his plans to stand again in Spring the British government explained the forthcoming presidential elections, but that its responses to the phenomenon the Egyptian President was not listening necessarily varied from state to state and sealed his own fate by unleashing his because the factors in play diff ered from volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 29 one country to another and it would not Nasser, before the Americans obliged them be appropriate to pursue one policy for to withdraw. Th at debacle marked the all. Indeed British diplomats often say nadir of British imperial infl uence in the that theirs is a pragmatic approach to Middle East, but the state system survived. dealing with diff erent countries, deeming By the 1960s the British were in full this a virtue. Yet, in adopting this stance retreat, ousted along with the monarchy the British give more importance to they had installed in Iraq, distanced by maintaining the state system that prevails the king in Jordan and fi ghting a full-scale in the Middle East than to those forces for rebellion in the Yemen. Yet the appeal change which could threaten to unravel of pan-Arabism also eroded, crucially the borders or unify peoples at the expense after the Arabs were so roundly defeated of governments. by Israel in the 1967 war. Th ereafter the Examples of how this outlook has Arab states began to concentrate on their informed British policy can be traced separate concerns, leaving the Palestine back to the period following the First Liberation Organisation (PLO) to fi ght World War when the British, along with its own corner, which it did initially from the French, drew the lines on the map inside Jordan, until the Jordanians forced that divided up the Arab world into the organisation to leave for Lebanon. In separate states. Th ey literally invented the the background the British regrouped, contemporary states of Iraq and Jordan and relinquishing their imperial identity for installed Hashemite monarchies in both. a new role as a middle-ranking power, Britain’s imperial predominance between within the western alliance, and retaining the World Wars rested on the claim that a permanent seat on the UN Security the British were simply preparing the new Council among other privileged positions entities, inclusive of the League of Nations in, for example, the global fi nancial Mandates of Iraq and Palestine, for fully institutions like the World Bank and IMF. independent statehood. As such, the British enjoyed a relatively By the end of the Second World War comfortable position within a global order however, the British were bankrupt and made up of states and alliances of states for their forces over-extended. In the face of the duration of the Cold War. both Jewish and Arab hostility to their In 1971 the British actually chose to continued rule in Palestine, the British wind-up their proprietorial relationships withdrew and the state of Israel was with the emirates and sheikhdoms of the declared and established in the fi rst Arab- Gulf that became the states of Qatar, Israeli war of 1948. Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates Th ereafter Britain’s hold on other parts (UAE) -- having already left Kuwait in of the region was challenged not only by 1961. Too small and vulnerable to assure local independence movements but also their own defence, these states have pan-Arab nationalism, championed by subsequently forged defence agreements Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. with the United States, Britain and France Th e Arab nationalist, anti-imperialist designed to protect their independence — (and anti-Israel) cause won supporters providing another illustration of Britain’s across the Arab world, including in Saudi investment in the regional state system. Arabia, until the Saudis changed their When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 it was tune following Nasser’s intervention in the British Prime Minister Margaret Th atcher Yemen (in support of the rebellion against who was instrumental in galvanising US the British) — for fear that populism, President George Bush to mount the war revolution and socialism could spill over eff ort — sanctioned by the United Nations into the Saudi kingdom. Th e British, along — that restored Kuwaiti independence in with the French, and in secret collusion 1991. Since the 1980s meanwhile, Britain with the Israelis, it will be remembered, has become a major supplier of armaments went to war in 1956 in an eff ort to topple to the Gulf states, second only to the

30 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BRITAIN AND THE ARAB REVOLTS

United States. Over the past ten years American arms sales to Saudi Arabia over 50% of all UK defence sales by value have served to cement the relationship by have been to the Middle East and North channelling some of the Saudi petrodollars Africa.2 British arms sales to Saudi Arabia into lucrative contracts for the US arms in particular have been vital to the fortunes industry (from which members of the Saudi of Britain’s major arms manufacturer BAE royal family have also benefi tted). Britain Systems, and thence to Britain’s own has been accorded a junior role in this defence industry.3 relationship, partly so that the Saudis can argue that they are not wholly dependent THE TIES THAT BIND on the Americans and partly, in the past at Th ere is more to say on the subject of least, so that the British can supply those British arms sales, in the context of the arms that the US Congress might choose Arab Spring, but before that there are other to prevent the Americans from selling to aspects of Britain’s role in upholding the the Saudis in deference to Israeli concerns. state system that require mention. After Whether they buy from the Americans Britain ended its military presence in the or the British, the Saudis insist on Gulf in 1971 there was a power vacuum that government-to-government deals, not troubled the United States. As the largest purely commercial purchases on the consumer of oil per capita and without open market. Consequently, the British suffi cient resources of its own to meet government is tied into honouring its domestic demands, the US established a commitments to the Saudi government in proprietorial interest in preventing any the defence sector. Th us when, in the wake rival powers or hostile states from gaining of the US-UK invasion of Iraq, there were control over access to Gulf oil supplies. a series of attacks on foreign nationals and During the Cold War its primary fear was Saudi targets inside the kingdom, attributed of the Soviets extending their reach to the to Al-Qaeda sympathisers and affi liates, Persian Gulf, especially after their invasion the British defence contractors stayed at of Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah of their posts in Saudi Arabia, even as other Iran (a close US ally) in 1979. Rivalry with British expatriates evacuated or stayed the Soviets ceased with the end of the Cold away. Th ereafter, as the Saudis instituted War and collapse of the Soviet Union but a counter-terrorism strategy that involved antagonism to the Islamic Republic of ‘re-educating’ Al-Qaeda sympathisers, Iran has if anything increased. Saddam normal commerce and relations resumed Hussein’s Iraq also posed a threat to US oil and the British Ambassador to Riyadh interests and one of the main motivations even praised the methods adopted by the for the US-led coalition to reverse the Iraqi Saudis as exemplary for countering the occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91 was to phenomenon of Al-Qaeda. prevent Saddam Hussein gaining control As this example illustrates, the British of not only Kuwaiti oil, but potentially approach to bilateral, government-to- Saudi oil thereafter. government relationships can involve very Protection of its interest in Gulf oil close ties indeed and thus Britain’s ability has underpinned US policy in the region to support the cause of the Arab revolts was since the American administration forged bound to vary from case to case. If the British a strategic relationship with the Saudi were to adopt a consistent and principled monarchy in the 1940s and presided over approach across the board it would have to the development of Saudi oil production question the repressive practices, abuse of for decades thereafter. To this day most human rights and lack of accountability Arabs assume that the US enjoys a cosy in the Gulf states and anticipate a relationship with the Al Saud ruling family cooling in relations as a result. Since Gulf by which the latter undertakes to maintain governments ultimately rely on the US the supply of oil at aff ordable prices in for their protection, and see the British as return for US protection from all comers. simply junior and potentially non-essential volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 31 partners in the overall relationship, it is the Yet there were limits to the British British who have more to lose than Arab relationship with Mubarak. Reportedly, governments if they fall out. In the case of in so far as the British did raise concerns Bahrain, the government’s maltreatment about the treatment of detainees in Egypt, of demonstrators was an embarrassment including members of the outlawed to the British, but not something they felt Muslim Brotherhood, whose deputy leader able to prevent by openly denouncing. has since been elected president, they were told to mind their own business and REACTIVE AND OPPORTUNISTIC concentrate on their own terrorist threats. So what of British reactions to the Meanwhile, in contrast to the situation challenge of the Arab revolts where they in the Gulf states, the British have not have brought down regimes? In the case of acquired a close relationship with the Tunisia, the British did not have very close Egyptian military and the Egyptians have ties with the Ben Ali regime in the fi rst place. not been interested in buying British arms. Added to which British trade with Tunisia Instead, they have received almost all their was in no way as signifi cant for the British defence equipment from the Americans, as economy or defence establishment as with part of the latter’s support to the Egyptian the Gulf States. In other words, the British military and government that has averaged could aff ord to accommodate to Ben Ali’s $2.1bn a year since Egypt signed its peace demise and even hope to capitalise on the treaty with Israel in 1979. fact that Rashid Gannouchi, the leading Th us, the British have less to lose in fi gure in the new Tunisian government, Egypt than the Americans, but even then, given the nature of the US relationship with the Egyptian armed forces, it is to British intelligence be expected that the Egyptian military has enjoyed close establishment will be inclined to resist cooperation with any move by the new civilian leadership to sever or radically revise relations with Egyptian intelligence, Washington. So Britain can hope that the though the British were US connection will disincline President Morsi to alienate the Americans, even as not granted any access he tries to balance this with meeting the to internal security... Thus expectations of the Egyptian people, who the British could not do not support the Egyptian relationship with Israel pursued by Mubarak and automatically capitalise considered so important by Washington. on Mubarak’s demise. For the British, the bottom-line is that, like it or not, they could neither save Mubarak nor oust him, so they opted to spent years in exile in Britain. However, accommodate and British Prime Minister British relations with Egypt were much David Cameron capitalised on this by more substantial, including with Mubarak visiting Cairo in late February 2011 to personally. Britain is the largest foreign signal a new beginning. investor in Egypt and bilateral trade has Even then, however, Cameron omitted been signifi cant too. Notably, British to seek a meeting with the leadership of intelligence has enjoyed close cooperation the Muslim Brotherhood, among them with Egyptian intelligence, though the Morsi, who has since won election to the British were not granted any access to presidency, and in the entourage of British internal security arrangements or data businessmen who accompanied the Prime in Egypt. Th us the British could not Minister were representatives of arms automatically capitalise on Mubarak’s companies looking for new deals, especially demise. in the Gulf, where Cameron proceeded

32 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BRITAIN AND THE ARAB REVOLTS after Cairo. In light of this, the speech made Qadhafi regime conducted business and by Cameron to the national assembly in had become increasingly disenchanted. Kuwait, in which he said that Britain had Th e potential for a clean break and new been wrong to support suppressive regimes beginning was thus beckoning. Crucially in the interests of stability and promised also, the UN Security Council adopted more attention to values in future, was not resolutions which sanctioned the use of wholly convincing. Meanwhile, the British force, in contrast to the stance of the UN have packaged their new thinking on the in the previous case of Iraq — thereby importance of democracy by describing it ensuring that Cameron, unlike Blair, could as better for stability than dictatorships. not be accused of acting in contravention Turning to the case of Libya, on the of international law by resorting to military face of it, it would appear that the British force. In addition, the Arabs themselves, in opted to act on the basis of values as the shape of the Arab League, called for opposed to commercial or other interests. intervention to save the Libyan people from Since persuading the Qadhafi regime to slaughter. Further, as the NATO military foreswear weapons of mass destruction, chiefs were able to attest, an air and sea and having secured a conviction for the operation, not including troops on the Lockerbie bombings and compensation ground, could save them, given the nature for the victims, the British had begun to of the terrain in Libya and the limited air forge a seemingly promising and lucrative power and air defences of Qadhafi ’s forces. relationship with Libya, as of 2004. Th at Lastly, the Libyan opposition managed to year British Prime Minister Tony Blair form a relatively cohesive diplomatic front signed the so-called ‘deal in the desert’ with which NATO could coordinate. In with Qadhafi , whereby British energy and short the Libyan operation was feasible and manufacturing companies won signifi cant potentially rewarding in many respects. contracts. Cameron and his cabinet seized the Against this background, the decision moment and championed the anti-Qadhafi made by the British government to take cause. As it turned out, NATO forces a leading role in pressuring the Qadhafi were fortunate. All the Europeans who regime, once the rebellion had begun contributed found themselves stretched to there, and then intervening militarily, may the limit to mount as much of the operation seem at odds with British policy elsewhere. as they did. It was the Americans who were However, it is worth remembering that the the decisive factor, and yet chose to take Blair government was no longer in power, a posture which they called ‘leading from replaced by the Conservative-Liberal behind’, thereby giving the lead and hence coalition led by Cameron. Th e latter could much of the credit to the Europeans, the therefore calculate that there would be British and French in particular because of political gain to be made at home in posing their strong and galvanizing stance from a contrast to Blair, especially since Qadhafi the start. was such an object of distaste, ridicule and embarrassment for most outsiders, SYRIA: A REVOLUTION TOO FAR including the British. Also, Qadhafi Speaking at the UN in September this himself caused outrage with his invective year David Cameron inveighed at the against his own people and threats to Security Council for letting down the eliminate all his detractors and opponents. people of Syria and abandoning them When his son Saif al Islam voiced similar to slaughter at the hands of the Assad threats, he dashed the hopes of all those in regime’s brutal campaign to suppress, Britain who had placed their hopes in him torture, maim and kill its opponents. Th e as a tempering infl uence on his father and real target of Cameron’s criticism was the potential reformer. Russians and Chinese who vetoed those Meanwhile, British contractors had Security Council resolutions drafted by been disappointed with the way the the US, Britain and France that would volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 33 have condemned the Assad regime and rebels, many believing that those rebels are imposed more stringent sanctions than infi ltrated by extremists, including foreign could the Americans and Europeans by jihadists, and the would-be leadership of themselves. the opposition on the outside has not been One of the arguments used by the able to mount a united front or present a Russians to explain their actions was that, credible government in waiting. the Western members of the Security All in all, the situation in Syria has Council could not be trusted, given the deteriorated to a point where, if peaceful way they had used the UNSC resolutions change were ever possible, that time has on Libya to mount an intervention which almost certainly passed. At the same time, went beyond protecting civilians to take the British government, as too the American sides in Libya, bring down the regime and French administrations have been and pave the way for a more Western- warned by their military establishments friendly one. As the British parliament’s that even with UN sanction, intervention Foreign Aff airs Select Committee opined in Syria would be much more costly and in its report on British policy toward the potentially open-ended than it was in Arab Spring (cited above), there is no way Libya. Th e fi ghting is in urban centres as of knowing whether a diff erent policy well as small towns and villages. Air power on Libya could have ensured a diff erent could not be deployed without risking Russian or Chinese stance at the UN on signifi cant civilian casualties and a toll Syria. on the intervening forces thanks to Syria’s Yet also uncertain is whether, had anti-air defences and fi repower. the Russians and Chinese agreed to the resolutions condemning the Assad regime, CONCLUSION he would have agreed to step down and/ Nearly two years’ on from the start of or institute a serious eff ort to meet at least the Arab revolts, one lesson to be learned some of the demands of demonstrators by the British is that their power to aff ect suffi cient to avert the civil war that now events in the region is strictly limited. threatens to tear the country apart. It can Th ey can say that they want democracies be said that, possibly infl uenced by the as opposed to dictatorships and had always precedents set in Tunisia, Egypt and most tried to urge reforms on the various Arab of all Libya, the US, British and French governments, but the Prime Minister governments were somewhat premature himself admitted British policy had been in pronouncing Assad’s days as numbered. more about the pursuit of self-interest than Against the backdrop of Libya, by calling promoting individual and human rights. on Assad to leave power, the language used Even then, they would likely have had little by the British and others was eff ectively impact, as witnessed by the response they uncompromising. Quite possibly he would did receive when they tried to raise the have proved defi ant even in the face of subject of torture and detention with the unifi ed pressure from the UN, but by the Egyptians. And so the diplomats have tried Western powers at least, he was not off ered to make a virtue out of being ‘pragmatic’ a way out short of conceding defeat. and ‘realistic’. Crucially, the Syrian opposition initially When the uprisings started, the British warned against any Western military could not infl uence their outcome. Only in intervention and for a while attempted to the case of Libya was Britain instrumental avoid taking up arms in revolt. Regime in the fall of Qadhafi , but as part of a repression subsequently turned the ranks coalition in which the Americans had of the opposition to violence, armed the decisive capabilities. Crucially, also, by supporters around the region but circumstances were auspicious for the incapable of matching the armed forces of success of the intervention in Libya, as the regime. Meanwhile, the Syrian people detailed above, but by the same token, have not all deserted the regime to join the absent those favourable circumstances, as

34 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BRITAIN AND THE ARAB REVOLTS is the case with Syria, there is not much future. Meanwhile, in so far as the British Britain or even America can do to curtail are on the side of democracy, there are the violence let alone restore peace and limits, because letting the people have order to the country. Th ey know that from exactly what they want in the Arab world the experience of Iraq as well as from the could challenge not only the regional order contrasts with the Libyan case. but the order of states at the global level In any case, as argued here, the theme too. running through all the British reactions to the Arab revolts attests to a British *Dr Rosemary Hollis is Director of the Olive Tree attachment to the kind of world order that Programme at City University, London, and was privileges states above other actors and formerly Director of Research at Chatham House. She privileges some states more than others. is the author of Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 Era. Ironically, tragically even, the Russians have shown themselves to be even more committed to this worldview than the ENDNOTES British, certainly as demonstrated in the 1. House of Commons Foreign Aff airs Committee, ‘British course of the Syrian crisis, where Moscow foreign policy and the “Arab Spring”’, HC 80, July 2012, p.75, par.183. has acted to reinforce the government over 2. Ibid. p 40, par 72. the opposition. Yet neither the Russians nor 3. See Rosemary Hollis , Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 the British can hope for a happy outcome Era (London: Wiley Blackwell and Chatham House, 2010) in Syria now, at least in the foreseeable Ch. 8.

BOOK PROMOTION Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 Era BY ROSEMARY HOLLIS

Th is authoritative book, part of the Chatham House Papers, examines British policy in the Middle East. It focuses on Britain’s response to 9/11 – particularly the dedecision to join the US invasion of Iraq – and how this has aff ected its role and rrelationse in the region. AAuthor Rosemary Hollis examines what was ‘new’ about the New Labour approach aand policies towards the Middle East and what changed as a result of 9/11 and the ‘w‘war on terror’. She contends the New Labour failed to understand the lessons of tthe past and radically altered UK–Middle East relations.

‘A wonderful and fascinating contribution to our understanding of Britain’s place in the morass created by 9/11. Th is is the fi rst work to set these current events in their true historical context. An absolute must for anyone wishing to understand the UK’s role in the wider Middle East, placed four–square within the story of our journey from Empire to confl icted transatlantic European power.’ — Jon Snow, Channel 4 News.

Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 Era by Rosemary Hollis. Published in 2012 by Wiley-Blackwell. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 35 Tunisia – Challenges of Coalition Rule and Democratisation

INTISSAR KHERIGI

“Democracy CANNOT be dictated, but must and entrenched forces is taking place. emerge through consensus-building and Th is paper explores the challenges facing bargaining” the Government’s four sectors, central to establishing a democratic system. he world watched, gaping Th ese were, incidentally, the old regime’s mouthed, at Tunisia’s sudden sprint favoured tools for maintaining an iron Tto revolution, as surprising as it was grip on power – security, judiciary, media short. As the warm afterglow of unity and and the economy. A constitution is also solidarity faded away, the jubilant sprint currently being drafted and was presented has given way to a grueling marathon. to the National Constituent Assembly Tunisians are left with the tough climb in October (2012), although the myriad of transforming their revolutionary spirit issues within this are beyond the remit of into meaningful, structural change. A this paper. government – the fi rst democratically Tunisia’s fi rst democratic elections elected in the country’s history – set to on 23 October 2011 brought to power a work nine months ago, translating the coalition of three political parties who nation’s revolutionary demands into came together on a platform of reform, new policies and decisive actions. Th e with a shared history of democratic challenges facing the Government, most struggle. Ennahdha Party (or An-Nahda), of them former political prisoners and an Islamic democratic party led by Rached democratic activists, make the perceived Ghannouchi, won 41% of the vote, and grueling days of opposition seem a gentle joined with the centre-left Congress breeze. for the Republic (CPR) with 13% led Numerous demands for jobs, security, by Moncef Marzouqi and the left-wing transitional justice, reform of police, Ettakattol Party (Democratic Forum for judiciary, the civil service, education and Labour and Liberties), led by Mustapha transport, among many others, are pouring ben Jaafar with 9%. Th is coalition unity in. Each of these opening up a Pandora’s government between Islamic and secular box inherited from the previous regime of parties is a rare one in the Arab world, but corruption, private interests and hidden the parties were clear about what unites power networks. Freedom of expression them – a shared history of struggle and has enabled, for the fi rst time, a frank commitment to democratic reform. Th is is discussion of social issues, shining a light a goal far greater than the elements that into the darkest corners and unleashing a divided them. process of discovery of decades of social Th e current Government reads like a problems that had festered beneath the Who’s Who of democracy and human cover of repression. rights activists - the President, Moncef All this takes place against a background Marzouqi, a founder of the LTDH, the of continued counter-revolution by those national league for human rights; the who refuse to play by the new rules of the Prime Minister, Hammadi Jebali, a game. Across each part of Government, a political prisoner for 16 years; the Leader political battle of wills between reformists of the Assembly, Mustapha Ben Jaafar,

36 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 TUNISIA – CHALLENGES OF COALITION RULE AND DEMOCRATISATION a prominent campaigner for human and cooperation of law enforcement rights and the rights of workers. Th eir agencies are critical to the maintenance of will to transform Tunisia into a vibrant the stability and to ensure the security that democracy is beyond doubt. Facing is key to Tunisia’s economic wellbeing. them is an obstacle course of diverse and A large section of Tunisia’s economy is contradictory demands. Th ese demands, dependent on the steady infl ow of tourists. which drove Tunisians to take to the Th e tourism sector contributes nearly 7% streets in December 2010, can be reduced of GDP and accounts for 450,000 jobs. down to two core themes - jobs and justice. As a result of the instability following Th is is perhaps no diff erent to what many the revolution, tourist numbers halved, young people marching in Spain and falling from 7 million tourists in 2010 to Greece are demanding – a chance to live 3.5 million in 2011, with approximately a dignifi ed life in a just society. Achieving 100,000 jobs being lost as a result and this in a post-revolutionary context after foreign reserve infl ows being cut in half. fi ve decades of dysfunctional rule is, however, a task of a diff erent order. What SECURITY Th e fi rst task of the new Government Justice... requires deep- was, therefore, to restore security. Doing this required relying on and gaining the seated reforms and the trust of internal security forces, while overturning of existing simultaneously removing and prosecuting those responsible for violations, putting an systems of corruption, end to rampant abuse, widespread torture, patronage and impunity, mistreatment and arbitrary detention. which threaten... stability. Th e government simultaneously had to put in motion a programme of serious reform to train security forces in their is more, this Government has some 18 new role of protecting the population as months to complete the task - due to an opposed to the regime. Transforming this agreement signed before the elections in huge dysfunctional beast (estimates put October 2011. the security forces at 100,000–200,000, Th e demands on the Government pull more than the UK’s police force, for a in two diff erent directions. Job creation population 1/6 of the size) has proven to requires economic growth, which in turn be an arduous undertaking. Th e fi rst task requires stability. Justice, however, requires of new Interior Minister, Ali Laarayedh – a deep-seated reforms and the overturning of political prisoner for 16 years, previously existing systems of corruption, patronage tortured in the basement of the very and impunity, which threaten to endanger ministry he is now heading – has been to the stability needed for economic growth. get to grips with a labyrinthine network Th is tension forces the Government to of security forces for which his ministry is walk a tightrope between stability and responsible, including the police, National reform. Guard, Presidential Guard, SWAT forces Th ese tensions are exemplifi ed in the and Judicial Police. Within this network area of security reform, perhaps the lie sub-networks of allegiances built by most complex of policy areas. Police and the former regime to maintain its grip internal security forces were Ben Ali’s on security. Th e dangers of disrupting most prized instrument of repression and these were demonstrated by the fate of are widely reviled by Tunisians. It is no the interim Interior Minister following coincidence that it was police mistreatment the revolution, Farhat Rajhi. When he – Mohammed Bouazizi’s altercation with tried to introduce sweeping reform by a policewoman – that sparked the entire fi ring a number of senior offi cials from revolution. Yet the continued functioning the Ministry, he was forced to step down, volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 37 having lasted only two months in offi ce. are some positive indications that security Th is episode provided a stark lesson in is being brought under control, with how sudden radical reform could prove too national crime fi gures showing crime to destabilising and ultimately ineff ective. have signifi cantly decreased from 2011 to Th is signaled to the coalition government 2012. that if it is to succeed, it must pursue a diff erent path. Th e example of Iraq and the JUSTICE disastrous consequences of dismissal of the Reform of the security sector is army and police are doubtless also at the intimately connected with transitional forefront of reformers’ minds. justice, a central demand of hundreds Laarayedh has instead adopted a policy of of families who lost relatives during the gradual reform, seeking to weaken existing revolution. Th ere are also hundreds of power structures by demoting some senior thousands of Tunisians whose lives were offi cials and transferring others. He has decimated under the previous regime - come up against numerous institutional those who were tortured, left permanently obstacles. Five weeks after taking charge, injured or psychologically scarred or whose he demoted Moncef Laajimi, head of loved ones died in police custody. Th ere the Security Intervention Units that are others who, due to student activism, were responsible for fi ring on and killing were expelled from university, prevented protesters during the revolution. Laajimi from working and are now left with no called on the help of his loyal unit, who qualifi cations, no career prospects and blocked access to him and went on strike no family life. Th ey are seeking justice in protest at his prosecution, leaving several and accountability from those responsible areas and installations with no protection. for their suff ering, while some are also Th is is only one example of a battle of demanding compensation for their lost wills that is taking place across Government years and opportunities. ministries, with new Ministers coming up Some of these victims have become against a web of institutional obstacles, impatient with the pace of reform, power confi gurations and bureaucratic demanding radical changes in the obstructionism. Laarayedh is nevertheless security sector. Th eir disappointment pressing on with the complex task has been compounded by the negative of unwinding and breaking up these campaign run by many media outlets networks and re-organising the security and opposition parties against proposals forces to introduce greater transparency to compensate victims of rights abuses. and executive oversight by his Ministry. While compensation for victims during Th e Judicial Police, which has the role the revolution is already underway, of collecting evidence and preparing proposals for moral and material prosecution reports, is also in need of compensation for those whose rights were reform, to move away from reliance on violated through the last fi ve decades by confessions in prosecutions to modern state and security forces have run aground investigative methods. Security forces amid political wrangling. Th e principle of must be persuaded that institutional compensation for these victims had been reform is in their interests – but many are universally accepted by all parties before fearful in this new age, afraid of reprisals the elections, and was adopted by the and confused by their sudden change from interim government. masters to servants of the public. However, following election of the Th ese changes are taking place in a new Ennahdha-led Government, some context of numerous security challenges, opposition parties and the majority of the including border unrest, transnational media have turned against this principle, smuggling, armed gangs and the rise of accusing Ennahdha of seeking to utilise Salafi -related violence, as seen in the US state resources – at a time of economic Embassy protests recently. However, there hardship - to compensate its own

38 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 TUNISIA – CHALLENGES OF COALITION RULE AND DEMOCRATISATION supporters, who, it is claimed, will be the been fraught with disagreement over the sole benefi ciaries of compensation. application of judicial independence in Th e media have misrepresented two the current post-revolutionary phase. In key facts – that compensation will be the context of transition from a corrupt given to all victims, regardless of political to a reformed judiciary, the principle of persuasion and that it will be provided over judicial independence can become a tool a period of time through a fund provided wielded by corrupt judges to prevent real partly from private contributions, not the reform and avoid being held to account. state budget. Th is has been repeatedly How are corrupt judges to be removed stated by Government Ministers, but and, where necessary, prosecuted if the the media continues to misreport the body responsible for doing so is itself policy. Th e dispute is indicative of how corrupt? Th ese are the questions with every issue, even the least partisan, has which the Government and civil society become an occasion for divisive political continue to grapple. Following suspension point-scoring, with informed public of the Supreme Council of Magistrates, the debate being derailed by a media blitz of National Constituent Assembly is currently misinformation. considering a proposal to establish a Transitional justice requires not only provisional, independent commission to political will but a robust judiciary. A oversee the judiciary. key demand following the revolution was domestic criminal prosecution for human MEDIA rights abuses. However, the judiciary left by Similar dilemmas exist with respect to the Ben Ali is a body riddled with corruption, media. Ben Ali’s regime fully understood compromised by a history of cooperation the strategic importance of media in with the old regime, widespread bribery controlling the Tunisian population, and the fi xing of sentences according to the exercising hegemonic control over public regime’s directions. Th e Supreme Council media and hiring and fi ring journalists of Magistrates, previously headed by Ben based on allegiance and connections. Ali, was tightly controlled by the old Ben Ali’s External Communications regime, with every judicial appointment Agency operated a system of patronage to a nd even leadership of judicia l unions being journalists around the world, paying them determined by the regime. Following the to improve its image and denigrating its revolution, this corrupt leadership has tried opponents. Th e list of those who received to cling onto power. Th us, judicial reform payouts from it includes almost all is both an element of and a precondition Tunisian papers, political fi gures, Arab and for transitional justice in Tunisia. foreign reporters and websites. Th e main Th e Ministry of Justice established Tunisian TV channel, ‘Channel 7’, was a commission to investigate judicial named after the date Ben Ali had assumed corruption, which has dismissed 180 power through a coup. Only two private judges implicated in corruption. A number stations were allowed to operate, owned by of judges’ unions went on strike against close friends of Ben Ali – most notorious the dismissals, arguing that the judiciary of whom is Hannibal TV’s owner, Labri should have independence and that the Nasra. Ethical and reporting standards, individuals had not been informed of needless to say, were not widely promoted, the charges against them nor had the and the importance of professionalism and opportunity to defend themselves. Th e objectivity played little role in journalistic Ministry of Justice allowed the judges to training. appeal the decisions, and these cases are Th e media has proven a particularly now making their way through the judicial thorny area of reform. As attested by system. industry insiders, both public and private Th e relationship between the media networks are still staff ed by the Government and judicial unions has same faces. Th e media, even the public volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 39 national channels, are largely hostile to in which the government always attempts the new Government – going so far as to restrict freedom of expression. However, to refuse to broadcast Government press this black and white image fails to conferences and the new President’s state recognise the complex web of the Tunisian visits. On the day on which the new, fi rst media and the games being played by democratically-elected Government was corrupt journalists and media proprietors. inaugurated, media networks from across Th ey are using freedom of expression as the world gathered to cover the event, while a smokescreen to hide their histories of the national news channel covered it as the collusion with the old regime. It is notable fourth item on the evening news broadcast. that many of the most prominent media Th ere was no coverage of President voices are those who have a clear and Marzouqi’s fi rst visit to Libya or of his documented record of collaboration with historic address to the French Assembly. the old regime. Th e Editor-in-Chief of Le In contrast, the amount of airtime granted Maghreb, for example, the highest-selling to opposition fi gures, many of whom national newspaper, is Zied Krichene, who obtained less than 1% of the national vote, wrote, following Mohamed Bouazizi’s self- is glaringly disproportionate. immolation in December 2010: “President Th is reporting blackout has created deep Ben Ali has not ceased, since his ascension frustration among both the Government, to power, to show his profound solicitude and the population, with large popular towards all Tunisia’s children, particularly protests and sit-ins outside the national those in misery and grief”. Krichene now channel demanding change. portrays himself as a defender of freedom On coming to power, the Government and democracy and is active in the SNJT. held a number of consultations with Th is continuity in editorial boards of the the SNJT, inviting them to put forward same voices that were praising Ben Ali’s proposals for reform of their sector. After speech on the eve of his departure has been months of waiting, with no proposals problematic for the development of an forthcoming, the Government moved inclusive, broad, genuine public debate on to replace the directors of the main many issues in Tunisia today. Th e media national television networks to encourage coverage of the political scene has been, by internal reform. Th e SNJT immediately all accounts, largely weighted against the responded with strikes and condemnation, current coalition Government, and has arguing that media independence had sought to belittle the role of the Constituent been violated and that the Government Assembly and the nation’s elected was cracking down on press freedom. Th is same pattern was repeated recently The battle over media when the SNJT promised to publish lists of corrupt journalists who had received reveals a key challenge public money from the old regime for their at the heart of Tunisian collusion. A year later, no list had been published. When the Government moved political culture, which to issue a list, the SNJT responded with must be resolved for any protests and vociferous condemnation of semblance of a healthy government meddling. Yet these sources are being relied upon, democracy. due to a lack of alternatives, by both Tunisians, and international audiences alike. representatives. It aims to marginalise Th e SNJT has been widely supported by the achievements of the Government, international human rights organisations, focus on social and economic problems, who have perceived the situation as a resulting in an undermining of trust in all traditional case of Government vs. Media, public institutions. Th is has left ordinary

40 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 TUNISIA – CHALLENGES OF COALITION RULE AND DEMOCRATISATION

Tunisians with a deep uncertainty as to of the most pressing issues is the escalating whom to trust and has left a huge defi cit number of unemployed graduates, with in credible, reliable sources of information some 50% of those completing higher that is key to genuine public debate. education unable to secure a job. GDP Th e battle over media reveals a key growth had already slowed in 2009-10, challenge at the heart of Tunisian political due to the global economic crisis and culture, which must be resolved for any its impact on Tunisia’s main trading semblance of a healthy democracy to thrive partners in Europe. Th e revolution to counter deep political polarisation. It is further dented the economy, with growth clear to see that a huge gulf exists between plummeting from 3% in 2010 to -1.8% those who hold political authority – in 2011. Th ousands of strikes and sit- Ennahdha, CPR and Ettakattol – and ins have taken place nationwide – an those who hold cultural and economic estimated 3000 in Sidi Bouzid alone, the power – the elites who largely thrived birthplace of the revolution – disrupting under Ben Ali and who maintained their industrial production and paralysing position through implicit or explicit transport networks. Th is has had serious cooperation with the old regime. Th is ramifi cations for local communities, with dynamic between the old cultural and 40,000 jobs being lost due to the strikes, economic elites and the new political as 120 foreign companies withdrew from leaders is key to understanding what is the country. taking place in Tunisia today. While Th e Government’s strategy has been to elections have delivered political authority restore stability and increase state spending to the coalition Government, power is still in order to generate employment and largely concentrated in the old political, stimulate demand. Its eff orts have been cultural and economic elites who are largely successful at shoring up Tunisia’s determined to prevent changes to their key sectors of manufacturing, tourism positions of power and privilege. Unlike in and agriculture. After tourist numbers Libya, for example, where state institutions dropped by a third after the revolution, have been decimated, the Tunisian numbers have rebounded in 2012, with revolution has left state institutions largely hotel occupancy rates almost back to pre- intact. While this is a strength, it also poses revolution fi gures. GDP growth reached a challenge, leaving many institutional 3.25 percent in the fi rst half of 2012. power confi gurations intact. Th e latter are Growth and government investment then able to wield their resources – money, resulted in 61,000 new jobs in 2012 (in media, culture, art, academia – to prevent addition to 30,000 in the public sector), and even sabotage, critical attempts at and fi gures from the National Institute reform. of Statistics show that unemployment Th e establishment of the Nidaa Tunis fell from the fi rst to the second quarter Party, led by the former Prime Minister of 2012, and in comparison to the same and Interior Minister, Beji Caid-Essebsi, period in 2011. Foreign direct investments who served under both former Tunisian have been rising, and have even exceeded dictators, Bourguiba and Ben Ali and pre-revolution rates, according to the brings together a spectrum of former Tunisian Agency for the Promotion of regime offi cials, has raised the spectre of Investment. It has reached 942.3 million a comeback by the old ruling RCD party. Tunisian Dinars at the end of the fi rst fi ve months of 2012, as compared with 823.9 ECONOMY million over the same period of 2010, an Th e right to employment and a decent increase of 14.4 %. standard of life were at the heart of the However, there have been a few Tunisian revolution, uniting unemployed stumbling blocks in achieving the graduates in urban centres with mine Government’s economic targets. Growth workers in the deprived inner regions. One has been hampered by the eurozone crisis, volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 41 due to Tunisia’s reliance on the EU as its and microenterprises to avoid taxation main market for exports and the source while medium-sized and large fi rms pay of the majority of tourist visitors. Th is 30% corporation tax. Th e latter does not has encouraged the Government to seek incentivise entrepreneurship and growth, to diversify its trading partners, and economic agreements have been signed with China, Pakistan, Turkey and Brazil. The Tunisian people Th e Government aims to achieve 4.5% took to the streets... to economic growth in 2013 by stimulating bring down not just a investment, increasing exports and boosting consumption. reviled tyrant but also an Th e most pressing issues are persistently oppressive system. high unemployment, particularly among youth and graduates, and vast inequalities between coastal areas and disadvantaged resulting in the vast majority of businesses interior regions in the South and West, providing fewer than fi ve jobs. 97% of creating social tensions. Nearly 70% of fi rms, according to National Institute the unemployed are under 30 years old, of Statistics data, provide fewer than 5 due to a signifi cant increase in graduates jobs. Th e Ministry of Finance is currently since the mid-1990s. Th ese numbers have working to revise the tax framework, not been met with a similar rise in labour along with state aid rules and the business market demand. Th e public sector – which regulatory framework to build a more provides better wages and job stability – transparent business framework and target has been unable to absorb the rising fl ow counter productive practices tolerated by of graduates, whilst labour demand in the old regime, including tax fraud and the private sector has remained limited, corruption in public procurement. providing mainly unskilled jobs. In the tourism sector, for instance, only 8 out CONCLUSION of every 100 jobs are suitable for those Th e Tunisian people took to the streets with post-secondary school education. in December 2010 to bring down not just a Th is leaves many young Tunisians with reviled tyrant but also an oppressive system the paradoxical situation that the more that had defi ned their existence for over 50 educated they are, the less employable they years. Th e dismantling of that system and fi nd themselves. rebuilding of a new just and democratic Th e challenge for the Tunisian order has proven to be a delicate balancing Government is to achieve not only higher, act between multiple actors and confl icting but more inclusive, growth, creating more factors - reform and stability, economic skilled jobs in the short term while shifting growth and social justice, accountability public investment to more deprived areas and reconciliation, liberalisation and in the medium term. Th is will require government intervention, decisive action structural reforms of the labour market and the need for consensus-building and and education system to address the consultation. Th e lifting of censorship has current mismatch between qualifi cations opened new spaces for public debate and and labour market needs. Th e Government national dialogue, allowing a process of is currently drafting a new investment self-discovery as society is fi nally allowed code in order to rationalise and simplify to examine frankly all its problems and investment laws, improve governance and challenges. remove barriers to entrepreneurship and However, the opportunities to establish investment, thus paving the way for the a new political culture are being threatened creation of more skilled jobs. by vested interests, partisan politics Reform of the taxation system is also and ideological polarisation, as power underway. Current rules allow small structures are redefi ned and alliances

42 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 TUNISIA – CHALLENGES OF COALITION RULE AND DEMOCRATISATION renegotiated. Th e Government must their ideological diff erences and approach manage these centrifugal forces while the current phase as a process of consensus pushing ahead with a clear plan of reform building and advancement, not trench and maintaining stability. In each area of warfare. Among all the challenges facing reform, they encounter resistance from the new Tunisia – economic, political, entrenched elites accustomed to dictating social and cultural – this is, perhaps, the the rules and procedures. deepest, and requires not just a change of Th e Government has adopted a system, but a change of mindset. consultative, gradualist approach in most areas, adopting the principle that *Intissar Kherigi studied Law at King’s College, democracy cannot be dictated, but must Cambridge, then specialised in human rights at the emerge through consensus-building Centre for the Study of Human Rights, London School of Economics. She has worked in the House of Lords, and bargaining. Th is approach has been the United Nations in New York, and the European variously welcomed and criticised. Reform Parliament in Brussels. has been slow in a number of key areas, due Kherigi is currently the Vice President of the Forum of to the processes of consultation, the need European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO), which works to facilitate development, to negotiate complex power structures networking and cooperation between European and the desire to maintain stability and Muslim youth and student organisations and to be their economic growth. Despite numerous representative voice within all European institutions. challenges and the relative inexperience of the new Government, it has largely managed to maintain stability, which is the primary concern of most Tunisians, THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION according to a number of surveys. Th e economy is the biggest success story, NEW WEBSITE with growth outstripping international expectations. Reform initiatives are We are very pleased to announce the underway in the fi elds of justice, transport, launch of our fantastic new website, along with a new look we have included security, foreign policy, agriculture and some features that we hope will make human rights. Th e media, however, has visiting the site a quicker, easier and seen little change – while the number more interactive experience. of media providers has proliferated, the quality and reliability of output is still substandard. A network of vested interests continues to dictate content and direction. As a key player in democratisation and a principal interface between Government and citizen, the media will play a signifi cant role in the upcoming elections and continue to shape the direction of public debate and international awareness. Observers of Tunisia’s vibrant, fragmented and shifting political scene are witnessing the painful birth of a new democracy, a counter-revolution, an experiment in Islamic-secular consociationalism - a fascinating struggle between diff ering structures of authority. In this formational phase, trial and error provides an opportunity for joint learning by all political forces. However, progress thecordobafoundation.com requires that opposing parties console volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 43 BOOK PROMOTION

THE MUSLIM WORLD BOOK REVIEW A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LITERATURE ON ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

Th e Muslim World Book Review, ppublished quarterly since 11980, off ers an indispensable aand broad survey of academic wwritings on Islam and the MMuslim world. It draws upon a wwide range of multidisciplinary eexpertise and insights from wwriters and scholars from across the Muslim world and elsewhere, to off er authoritative and mostly, but not exclusively, Muslim comment on current scholarship. Th e MWBR includes regular review articles on themes of current interest and topical book surveys.

Th e MWBR is an indispensable resource for librarians, scholars, students and interested general readers who wish to keep themselves well informed about current scholarship about Islam and the Muslim world.

Further information and subscriptions: [email protected] | www.islamic-foundation.org.uk

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44 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 Being Salafi : Modernity’s Neglected Children

OMAR FARAHAT

WHERE DID THEY COME FROM? showed that the replication of despotism rior to the outbreak of the popular with such a complex society and in the revolution against Mubarak’s regime presence of an old, multi-layered, largely Pin January and February, 2011, dysfunctional state would be far from and the subsequent developments, talk straightforward. within political and intellectual circles Th e picture was also complicated, about Islamist presence and potential in perhaps more than anything else, by Egyptian politics was almost exclusively the emergence of other self-proclaimed centered around the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamist groups as capable political actors, After all, it was the Brotherhood that such as al-Jamaa’a al-Islamiyya, but most consistently competed for parliamentary signifi cantly, the Salafi s. While the former seats, organised massive student protests, were notorious for their violent history, the and overall showed their readiness and latter had been virtually invisible on Egypt’s willingness to participate in Egypt’s messy political radar since their establishment in political and social aff airs. the 70’s and until their rise to prominence Not only were they willing to be following last year’s revolution. It became part of the political game, but the clear that, in Egypt, it was no longer Brotherhood, through such shows of force possible to speak of political Islam and the as the parliamentary victory in 2005,1 Muslim Brotherhood interchangeably, and demonstrated that they would be very that this illusion was shaped in part by the good at it. Th is eminent presence led to Brotherhood’s and the Salafi s’ contrasting them being frequently labeled as the only approaches to public life. organised opposition group in Egypt and In the Mubarak era, while the as the only alternative to the despotic Brotherhood would gather students in and fi ercely unjust system established by masses to chant slogans that mainly Mubarak and his clique.2 Th is situation was revolved around the “return” of a unifi ed behind the lesser of the two evils theory, Muslim army and the liberation of popular during Mubarak’s reign among Jerusalem, Salafi sts, on the other hand, secularists in Egypt and abroad, as well as would quietly post handwritten signs concerned citizens with pronounced social designed to promote their views on and economic interests. According to this Islamic ethics, appropriate attire, the theory, preserving Mubarak’s despotism importance of ritual practice and gender was a superior alternative to a popular segregation. Although largely quietist revolt that would replace Mubarak’s police before the revolution, Salafi s stormed state with a Brotherhood-led theocracy. into the spotlight over the past year and a However, the tumultuous transitional half, not only becoming a constant fi xture period that Egypt embarked upon in Egyptian daily media, but winning, following the eruption of the popular through their recently-formed Al-Nour revolt early in 2011 deeply challenged this Party (Hizb al-Nour), almost one quarter theory. While it became clear that the of the parliamentary seats in the fi rst post- Brotherhood do in fact possess the most revolutionary elections, a massive victory eff ective electoral machine in Egypt, it also by any standard. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 45 Scholars and political analysts watched these developments with a sense of Ibn Taymiyya’s legal- helplessness, and often disbelief. “Where ethical positions were did they come from?” is a question that predicated upon would, more often than not, be raised in discussions that involved the rise of, and complex theological and most recently, divides within, the Salafi s epistemological theories in Egypt. Th is would often lead to the misguided claim that, after the series that modern-day Salafi s of Arab popular uprisings, “clusters of are largely uninterested worshippers across the Middle East have in. morphed into powerful Salafi movements that are tapping into the disillusionment 3 over the respective weight of speculative and disorder of transitions.” and revealed knowledge, resulting in the establishment of a synthesis of both SALAFISM AND THE SALAFIS methods as the dominant trend in Islamic Before asking why, and to what extent, law.6 Major pre-modern thinkers such as the Salafi infl uence was underestimated for Ibn Taymiyya, and his illustrious disciple all those years, we ought to think about Ibn al-Qayyim, are favorites of modern what it means to be a Salafi or Salafi st. Egyptian Salafi s for their call to exclusively What is the signifi cance of adding an “-ist” follow the path of the prophet and to to the Salaf? Th e “Salaf” are the righteous renounce heretical innovations. However, predecessors, more specifi cally the prophet Ibn Taymiyya’s legal-ethical positions were Muhammad and his companions, or, predicated upon complex theological and in a stricter sense, simply the prophet. epistemological theories that modern-day Accordingly, being Salaf-i means to Salafi s are largely uninterested in, and adopt the example of the righteous Salaf most likely incapable of dealing with.7 as the primary, or even exclusive source, If fact, this aforementioned theoretical of ethical – and, eventually, political – 4 defi nition of Salafi sm is almost too broad guidance. Th is broad understanding to be helpful, since it applies to any self- of Salafi sm is behind one of the favorite conscious search for political-moral values claims of contemporary Salafi s, namely 5 that claim continuity with the past. In this that “all Muslims are Salafi s.” Like any sense, the common practices of invoking form of ideological, self-justifi catory the founding fathers in the US or the claim intended for political publicity, Council of the Resistance in France are this statement overlooks the many subtle Salafi in their own way. Even if modern diff erences its elements can bear beyond Salafi sm overlaps with certain broad this broad and seemingly innocuous intellectual and practical trends in Islam conceptual form. It cannot be denied that, at the most abstract level, it must be noted at the most abstract level, some of the most that this most abstract level is not the only prominent aspects of Muslim thought and conceivable one. Th e current political practice throughout history can be labeled reality of Egyptian Salafi sm as shaped and as “Salafi ”. re-shaped by the post-January 25th events Th e very early tendency in Islamic gives political Salafi sm a very particular societies to narrate and conserve prophetic form that easily distinguishes it from, traditions, which, in the second century of on the one hand, the historical trends Islam, matured into a science of narration it attempts to identify with, and, on the and authentication of the prophetic sayings other hand, the most general habits and and actions, is Salafi in this broadest convictions of Egyptian Muslims at large. of senses. Yet, unlike contemporary One signifi cant aspect of the inevitably Salafi s, those early Muslim communities politicised version of Egyptian Salafi sm witnessed profound confl icts and debates in the post-revolution era is the insistence

46 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE MUSLIM WORLD BOOK REVIEW on strictly and mechanically judging were primarily infl uenced by pre-modern contemporary socio-political phenomena scholars who advocated the renunciation through the lens of what appears to Salafi of un-Islamic innovations, such as Ibn leaders as the self-evident normative Taymiyya, and similar-minded (though positions of Muslim ethics, as would in this respect only) modern scholars such have presumably been approved by the as Abdullah bin Baaz and Muhammad righteous predecessors. One particularly Nasiruddin al-Albani. Th e emergence of signifi cant instance is the paradoxical the Salafi group as a stand-alone trend renunciation of the notions of democracy8 was in no negligible part a reaction to the and “civil state” by Salafi leaders as un- domination of the Islamist student scene Islamic innovations, following which the by the Brotherhood’s highly structural al-Nour Salafi party fi ercely competed in and pragmatic approach to politics. Th e the 2011 parliamentary elections. founders of the Salafi trend shunned the Th e sharpness and infl exibility of much Brotherhood’s ambiguous and seemingly of the politically-relevant Salafi positions opportunistic approach to Islamic ethical are received by non-Salafi Egyptians with teachings and sought to delve more very diverse reactions, including sympathy, directly into an intellectual exploration of indiff erence or even amusement, but what they hoped would constitute a body almost never with profound well-reasoned of pristine and authentic Islamic values. approval. For example, the fact that Salafi Th e movement witnessed a tremendous positions are often out of touch with horizontal growth in the seventies and the thick and complex daily realities of eighties, helped on the one hand by the gaps Egyptians led to the incorporation of the resulting from the gradual shrinking and image of the Salafi leader Abdulmoneim dysfunction of the post-Nasser centralised al-Shahhat while pronouncing something bureaucracy, and on the other hand, by as “haram (prohibited) in the fi rst place” the genuine need among wide segments of into the broad repertoire of comics used Egyptian students to be exposed to what by the online teenage crowd to mock the was presented to them as pure Islamic absurdities of their daily existence. teachings untainted by political agendas. Mubarak’s regime attempted to crackdown HISTORY AND POST- on Salafi s in the nineties, and continued REVOLUTION DEVELOPMENTS to harass them throughout the rest of his It may seem odd to claim that a group that reign. Yet, their quietist and horizontal achieved such a massive electoral victory nature made them highly elusive and is out of touch with reality, and in fact it virtually impossible to contain.10 is. However, I do not wish to argue that To a large extent, the impressively broad this victory was an inexplicable random Salafi clientele constituted social segments occurrence that took place in exceptional that had become economically and socially circumstances. Rather, I believe that the irrelevant to the capitalist-oriented state. Salafi s’ success and on-going turbulence Regrettably, they had also fallen off the are profound signs of the uniqueness of the radar of even the self-proclaimed socialists political scene in post-January 25th Egypt. among the intellectual elite, as a result Before this can be explored, however, we of their excessive fi xation on political ought to briefl y examine the history and developments at the highest level. After development of the contemporary Salafi the revolution when the virtual lines of groups in Egypt.9 Th ose groups were fi rst social segregation had fi nally been broken, shaped in embryonic form in the early it was inevitable that any attempt to seventies through a number of students begin a democratic process would include that already belonged to the Ikhwan- this widely popular group, even if their infl uenced al-Jamaa’a al-Islamiyya. Th is followers did not particularly sympathise group of students, which later included with democracy itself. Th is realisation the current Salafi leader Yassir Burhami, appeared to have been traumatic to volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 47 some of the secularist intellectuals, and portion of his short career apologising for a pleasant surprise to some of the Salafi statements made by his colleagues to the leaders. Following a victorious outcome media or in public gatherings. in the constitutional referendum of March 19, 2011, in which the Islamists heavily ARE SALAFIS REALLY SALAFIST? campaigned for a “yes” vote, the Salafi We have previously seen that the larger leader Mohammed Hussein Yaacoub notion of Salafi sm as an adherence to a could not hide his ebullience: “Isn’t this supposedly superior and glorious past democracy that they are talking about?” he is not very helpful, given that it is by no asked, rhetorically. “Th ey say it’s all about means a distinctive feature of modern- the will of the people, and the people want day Egyptian Salafi s. Now we ought to religion. And religion is our thing! [ihna consider whether this is in fact a feature bitu’ al-din]”11 Th ings turned out to be less of modern Egyptian Salafi s at all. In other simple than he had imagined. words, ought we to believe the Salafi s of Like any organised or quasi-organised al-Nour party when they claim that they group in Egypt, Salafi s suff ered from are really Salafi sts? Th e short answer to this the hostility of Mubarak’s regime, question is no. Th e reason for this is that, which almost always combined external in order to be Salafi , one should faithfully crackdown with internal infi ltration. It is follow a convincingly similar version of safe to assume that many Salafi fi gures, at what can be seen as the practice of the various echelons of its loose organisational predecessors in question. It is, however, structure, cooperated in one way or another my contention that the modern Salafi s’ with Mubarak’s security apparatus at some approach to matters of Islamic law and point.12 It would be, however, completely ethics is radically removed from anything arbitrary to attempt to speculate over the that can remotely be attributed to an exact nature and extent of cooperation. established legal-ethical practice in the Th e important point here is that once the fi rst four centuries of Islam, if not more. Salafi s stormed into the political scene Not only are responses given by Salafi and ceased to be a quiet and invisible scholars to questions of Islamic ethics group, their fl aws were abruptly exposed entirely unrelated to the epistemological to the public, and apparently also to system within which early Islamic law themselves. After his aforementioned functioned, the recent fi gures they hold enthusiastic outburst, Yaacoub had to issue as authoritative, such as Ibn Baaz and al- a short video clip in which he indirectly Albani, employ juristic methods that were apologised by explaining that he did not unheard of in early Islam. mean to say that the country now belonged By and large, contemporary Egyptian to Islamists only, and that he realises that Salafi scholars, and the scholars they heavily ”Egypt belongs to all Egyptians, Muslims rely upon, employ a method of extensive and Christians.”13 citation of textual sources, predominantly Salafi s realised that the kind of self- sayings (Ahadith) of the prophet, following righteousness that being in a closed circle which they immediately pronounce their of like-minded people facilitated can no answer to the question. Th is method longer be sustained in an intensely public assumes that the resolution of legal cases or forum such as the parliament. Hasty, self- questions immediately and self-evidently victimising comments that can be tolerated stems from the written sources that in a supportive environment, like claiming Islamic law is derived from, and that there that teaching English language in schools is always a statement in those sources that is a foreign conspiracy,14 can amount to a directly and unquestionably corresponds national-level scandal when professed in to any problem that can conceivably arise parliament. It is no surprise, therefore, in human life. that the now former spokesman of al-Nour A quick visit to any of the major offi cial party, Nader Bakkar spent a signifi cant Salafi websites15 would demonstrate the

48 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE MUSLIM WORLD BOOK REVIEW above. Questions by Salafi followers By the early twelfth century, the shari’a or curious individuals are always given had emerged into an extremely complex succinct yes or no (technically, jaa’iz/ intellectual edifi ce, which combined, permissible or haram/prohibited) answers among other things, the science of after a brief quotation from a prophetic authentication of prophetic traditions, Hadith or a Qur’anic verse. One of the most interpretation of the Qur’an, and disciplines recent responses given by Yassir Burhami of juristic theories and methodologies, involves a cla im t hat it is prohibited to na me the most prominent being usul al-fi qh a baby girl “Malak” for the simple reason (lit. the roots of legal knowledge). At no that this resembles certain habits of the point during those fi rst centuries, in which Jews and atheists, according to Burhami.16 shari’a was the supreme source of control In a short video clip, Muhammed Hussein of conduct in the Muslim world, had the Yaacoub answers a question about the opinion that solutions follow immediately permissibility of listening to music with and mechanistically from the text been a defi nite no. His reasoning is that the given any signifi cant weight. Th e practice prophet allegedly made a statement in of issuing legal opinions was subject to which he deemed some type of musical extensive linguistic, epistemological and instrument to be damned. Th e connection structural reviews that made the exercise of between the premises and the conclusion free analysis of the texts limited to only the is clearly incoherent, but Yaacoub does not most brilliant of each legal school’s jurists. care to provide any further explanation. It Th e remaining jurists were to a larger is noteworthy that one of the Salafi s’ pre- extent limited by the range of dominant modern favorites, Ibn al-Qayyim, wrote opinions in their own schools, thus an extensive book on the moral evaluation preserving the structural continuity of the of music in which he developed a whole schools of law (al-madhahib al-fi qhiyya), metaphysics of salvation. Ibn al-Qayyim the vehicle through which Islamic law and eventually expresses his overall distaste ethics lived and fl ourished within the early towards the musical practices of his time, Muslim communities.19 yet off ers an impressively subtle legal opinion that is, more importantly, based SALAFIS AND THE on an elaborate philosophical view of the MONSTROSITY OF MODERNITY human condition and the prospects of We have shown that the claim by reaching the path of righteousness.17 modern Salafi s to establish some form of In fact, the modern Salafi manner of continuity with early Islamic legal and approaching Islamic law and ethics has moral traditions is tenuous at best. In been utterly unknown in early Islamic other words, Salafi s are not quite Salafi in history. During the early expansion of terms of their methodology and substance. Islam, as shown by recent studies,18 a How, then, can they enjoy such a wide proper course of conduct for members popularity if their most basic claim is of the new Muslim community was established, in light of the Qur’anic ethics, The mechanistic with a combination of references to actions of the prophet and his companions, positing of values that and by well-reasoned opinion. It is only is characteristic of Salafi gradually and over several centuries that the study of the actions and sayings of the methods is structurally prophet was systematised and emerged as similar to the political a major source of Islamic law, which was and human rights accompanied by a parallel evolution in the theoretical sciences that regulated rational rhetoric that dominates and speculative methodologies deemed as secularist circles. valid ways of dealing with those sources. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 49 so deeply fl awed? Th is takes us back to popularity on demonising modern legal the question of the oddity of Egyptian and political systems. Put briefl y, Salafi sm politics. Th is oddity is evident when is what happens when modernity looks in we realise that the mechanistic positing the mirror and realises its own monstrosity. of values that is characteristic of Salafi “We want everyone to be equal, and for the methods is structurally similar to the people to freely make their own laws based political and human rights rhetoric that on their interests,” says the modernist. dominates secularist circles. Depending on But what do we do with those people a secularist’s position of choice, an opinion who do not wish to formulate laws based or practice that goes against the teaching of on socio-economic interests, and do not Marx, J.S. Mill or the Universal Declaration care much for the modernist version of of Human Rights, would be immediately equality? Do we impose our version of dismissed as backwards and threatening. democracy and equality on them because In a time where the Enlightenment’s linear this is what civilisation requires? Th is conceptions of history are coming under sounds disturbingly familiar. How does fi erce attacks in Western academic circles, the self-proclaimed secularist deal with the Egyptian secularists’ understanding Salafi sm without being the new voice of of what is politically desirable and valid imperialism? is increasingly linear. “Political Islam Even though they fail to establish a is plainly backwards,” will tell you the genuine continuity with early Islamic candid among them, and the most thought, or, for that matter, fail to off er ambitious will venture to announce that any intellectually valuable contribution “the problem with the Egyptian people to Islamic legal and ethical thought, is Islam.” In those circles, talk of Islamic Salafi s do impose on the excessively fl uid principles or values is taken quite plainly Egyptian political scene the most basic as an anachronism that goes against the question in its crudest form: what about movement of history, and hence, for this shari’a? If they did nothing else, that alone reason, deserves to be eliminated with all would constitute a valid socio-political forms of ridicule. function. Th e professional and social Th e Salafi s’ view of the acceptable diversity that constitutes Salafi followers direction in which Egypt should move is makes it diffi cult to claim that Salafi sm is merely a result of poverty and the lack of Salafi sm is what happens education, as many secularist intellectuals like to argue. For anyone who is willing when modernity looks in to face the messiness of Egyptian politics the mirror and realises its in its face, it is fl agrantly clear that the question of shari’a has to be resolved before own monstrosity. Egypt can witness any kind of durable stability. A very signifi cant segment of the similarly linear, but goes in the opposite Egyptian population is simply not ready to direction. In a recent article, Mustafa give up on twelve centuries of history and Kamel al-Sayed, professor of political some central elements of its identity, for theory at Cairo University, lamented the sake of a secularist project promoted by the eminent destruction of modernity a condescending elite that promises very (hadatha) at the hands of the Islamist- little beyond some Enlightenment values dominated constitutional drafting and materialist gains. committee.20 Modernity, for al-Sayed Whereas the Muslim Brotherhood and others, is a self-suffi cient value that represent the most opportunistic form of deserves protection without justifi cation. political exploitation of such a fact, the Al-Sayed’s lack of self-consciousness Salafi s bring it forth in its more radical and fear for his identity mirrors almost and blatant form. Merely pointing out to exactly the logic of Salafi s who base their the absurdity of some of their positions

50 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE MUSLIM WORLD BOOK REVIEW will not help solve Egypt’s complex socio- 6. Hallaq, Wael, B. (2009). ‘Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations’, Cambridge University Press, pp.55-60. economic issues. 7. See for example, Ibn Taymiyya (1983). Al-Istiqamah, Gami’at al-Imam Muhammad b. Su’ud al-Islamiyya. 8. http://www.masrawy.com/news/egypt/politics/2011/ *Omar Farahat studies early Islamic legal and ethical december/1/4635898.aspx theories and their place in the modern world. He 9. For a more detailed history, see Ahmed, Ammar (2012). is currently completing a doctorate at Columbia University, USA. As a lawyer and human rights ‘Salafi s in Egypt’, Aljazeera Studies, 12 July. http://studies. advocate, he examined and analysed violations of aljazeera.net/reports/2012/07/201271103413876925.htm - civil and political rights in Egypt under Mubarak. After accessed 20 November 2012. the latter’s ousting in February of 2011, Farahat wrote 10. The Salafi website www.anasalafy.com also includes several articles analysing the events of the Egyptian revolution and co-authored a book discussing Egypt’s information on the history of Salafi s in Egypt. post-revolutionary constitutional predicaments in 11. http://www.masrawy.com/ketabat/ArticlesDetails. light of its constitutional history. aspx?AID=97708&ref=hp 12. http://www.ahram.org.eg/Investigations/News/93587.aspx 13. http://www.alwafd.org/index.php?option=com_co ENDNOTES ntent&view=article&id=26926:%CD%D3%ED %E4-%ED%DA%DE%E6%C8-%DB%D2%E6%C9- 1. Otterman, Sharon (2005). ‘Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s %C7%E1%D5%E4%C7%CF%ED%DE-%CF%DA%C7%C8%C9- Parliamentary Elections’, http://www.cfr.org/egypt/muslim- %E6%C7%E1%C8%E1%CF-%C8%E1%CF%E4%C7- brotherhood-egypts-parliamentary-elections/p9319 - accessed %E5%D2%C7%D1 %DD%ED%CF%ED%E6&catid=131:%C7% 20 November 2012. E1%D5%DD%CD%E5%20%C7%E1%C7%CE%ED%D1%E5&It 2. “It has been the most popular and best-organised emid=370 opposition group in Egypt for decades” argued Michael Totten 14. http://almogaz.com/politics/news/2012/02/28/202899 in: Totten, Michael (2012). ‘A Leaner, Meaner Brotherhood’, The 15. Such as www.anasalafy.com, www.voiceofsalaf.com American Interest, Vol. 7, Issue 3, Jan/Feb. http://the-american- 16. http://shorouknews.com/news/view. interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1159 aspx?cdate=12102012&id=c389ef83-4ff 8-4391-9618- 3. Wright, Robin (2012). ‘Don’t Fear All Islamists, Fear 14fd0c28c7c6 Salafi s’, The New York Times, 19 August. http://www.nytimes. 17. al-Jawziyya, Ibn Qayyim (1992).Kashf al-Ghita’ ‘an Hukm com/2012/08/20/opinion/dont-fear-all-islamists-fear-salafi s. Sama’ al-Ghina’, Bayrut, Dar al-Jil. html?_r=0 - accessed 20 November 2012. 18. Hallaq, Wael, B. (2005). The Origins and Evolution of Islamic 4. For another attempt to defi ne Salafi sm, see Shaykh Law, Cambridge University Press. Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (1997). ‘The “Salafi ” Movement 19. Ibid. Unveiled’ As-Sunnah Foundation of America. 20. http://shorouknews.com/columns/view. 5. Mohamed Ismail al-Muqaddim, a major Salafi fi gure, makes aspx?cdate=01102012&id=1b0c3015-d472-4992-a5f7- this argument here in a characteristically short response: 7ce9eee9d28f http://audio.islamweb.net/audio/index.php?page=FullConten t&audioid=161917

MEDIA GUIDE

thecordobafoundation.com volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 51 BOOK PROMOTIONS THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH EDITED BY PETER COLE AND BRIAN MCQUINN.

Th is book off ers a novel, incisive and wide- ranging account of Libya's "17 February RRevolution" by tracing how critical towns, communities and political groups helped tto shape its course. Each community, whether geographical (e.g. Misrata, Zintan), ttribal/communal (e.g. Beni Walid) or political (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood) took iits own path into the uprisings and subsequent confl ict of 2011, according to their oown histories and relationship to Muammar Qadhafi 's regime.

Th e story of each group is told by the authors, based on reportage and expert analysis, from the outbreak of protests in Benghazi in February 2011 through to the transitional period following the end of fi ghting in October 2011. Th ey describe the emergence of Libya's new politics through the unique stories of those who made it happen, or those who fought against it. Th e Libyan Revolution and its Aftermath brings together leading journalists, academics, and specialists, each with extensive fi eld experience amidst the constituencies they depict, drawing on interviews with fi ghters, politicians and civil society leaders who have contributed their own account of events to this volume.

The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath. Edited by Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn. To be published in June 2013 by C. Hurst & Co Publishers.

DEMYSTIFYING THE CALIPHATE EDITED BY MADAWI AL-RASHEED, CAROOL KERSTEN & MARAT SHTERIN

IIn Western popular imagination, the Caliphate of¬ten conjures up an array of negative iimages, while rallies organised in support of resurrecting the Ca¬liphate are treated with a mixture of apprehension and disdain, as if they were the fi rst steps towards usurping ddemocracy. Yet these images and per¬ceptions have little to do with reality. Demystifying tthe Caliphate sheds light on both the historical debates following the demise of the last OOttoman Caliphate and controversies surrounding recent calls to resurrect it, transcending alarmist agen¬das to answer fundamental questions about why the memory of the Caliphate lingers on among diverse Muslims.

From London to the Caucasus, to Jakarta, Istanbul, and Baghdad, the contributors explore the concept of the Caliphate and the re-imagining of the Muslim umma as a diverse multi-ethnic community.

Demystifying the Caliphate. Edited by Madawi Al-Rasheed, Carool Kersten & Marat Shterin. Published in January 2013 by C Hurst & Co Publishers.

52 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: The Challenges of Transition

KRISTIAN COATES ULRICHSEN

he Arab Spring has profoundly human rights violations in the United challenged the tenets of British Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman over the Tpolicy toward the Middle East same period. Th e contrast with support and North Africa. It has required policy- for regime change in Libya and Syria, and makers in London to assess foreign political transition in Tunisia, Egypt, and policy priorities and balance multiple Yemen highlights the challenges facing strategic, commercial, defence, and British policy toward the Gulf States as counter-terrorism interests with support the Arab Spring nears the end of its second for human rights and political freedoms. year. Government offi cials have had to tread a diffi cult path between encouraging A PARADIGM SHIFT democratic and liberalising reforms while Th e sight of mass popular mobilisation engaging pragmatically with longstanding defying politically oppressive rulers and authoritarian partners. the omnipresent state security apparatus Meanwhile, the direction of travel to oust from power longstanding among the states in transition has by no Presidents in Tunisia and Egypt was means been clear, and policy-makers truly transformative. Th e rise of an frequently have had to react to fast- interconnected and empowered Arab paced developments without full or clear populace that has lost its fear is changing knowledge of all the facts. Th e result has the region’s politics beyond recognition. been a messy set of compromises that has done little to enhance British interests One of the momentous either among embattled political leaders or aggrieved protest and opposition consequences of movements. the Arab upheaval In the case of Libya, British foreign is the shaking of the policy was turned on its head almost overnight. However, that remains the authoritarian regional exception rather than the norm in the system that for so long overarching frame of the Arab Spring political transitions. Evidence from the stabilised and protected Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states Western interests. encapsulates the diffi cult balancing act that British foreign policy must now It is a process that will unfold over years strike. Th e uprising in Bahrain that began and even decades, although the end-result in February 2011 has exposed Britain (and is still far from clear. As political scientist the West, more broadly) to accusations of and Beltway insider Marc Lynch has double-standards in its treatment of the correctly observed, “Understanding this Arab revolutions. So, too, has the lack of newly empowered public and its eff ects apparent concern at the persistent low-level on the region’s power politics will be one violence in the oil-rich Eastern Province of the major challenges for policy and of Saudi Arabia or the signifi cant rise in scholarship in the coming years.”1 volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 53 One of the momentous consequences from the opening-up of the petroleum of the Arab upheaval is the shaking of and construction sectors in particular. the authoritarian regional system that for Diplomacy and commerce went hand in so long stabilised and protected Western hand, most notably during Tony Blair’s interests. In place of Zine el-Abidene Ben visit to Libya in May 2007, accompanied Ali, Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Gaddafi by the Chairman of BP, who signed a $450 (post-2003), and Ali Abdullah Saleh, new million oil agreement.4 revolutionary and potentially reactionary Beginning in February 2011, the forces have surfaced. Moreover, these carefully-constructed façade around profound social and political changes Gaddafi ’s modernising image rapidly across the Arab world are taking place crumbled away. Th e outbreak of violent at a moment of systemic weakness and protests in Libya’s second city, Benghazi, vulnerability in Western economies. escalated into a civil uprising against Furthermore, a decade of war in Gaddafi ’s 42-year rule. Saif al-Islam’s Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the fateful speech on 20 February 2011 operations in Libya in 2011, has resulted threatening mass retribution sealed the fate in military overstretch, and demonstrated of his cultivated Western image, which, in the limitations to the effi cacy of truth, had been under sustained pressure Western interventions through the use for several months already. Th e damage of force.2 Libya’s civil uprising in 2011 to existing British foreign, security, and demonstrated the rapidity with regional commercial interests was immediate and policy-making and international opinion irreversible, as the Gaddafi regime reverted can abruptly shift. Colonel Gaddafi ’s to the status of international pariah it had mercurial yet intensely repressive regime shed in 2003. Yet, in this instance, it led was rehabilitated in 2003-4 following to a rapid and complete shift in policy. two decades in international isolation. Prime Minister David Cameron and Th is followed the conviction in 1999 of a Foreign Secretary William Hague led the Libyan intelligence offi cer, Abdelbaset al- subsequent call for the creation of a No- Megrahi, for the destruction of Pan Am Fly Zone to protect the Libyan rebels, 103 over Lockerbie a decade earlier, the and participated in the fi ve month air payment of compensation to the bereaved campaign that culminated in Gaddafi ’s families in 2002, and Gaddafi ’s December ousting in August 2011. 2003 decision to dismantle and destroy Question marks surround the speed with Libya’s clandestine weapons of mass which the Libyan opposition was embraced destruction. As Prime Minister, Tony as the legitimate political authority. Th ese Blair was instrumental in bringing Libya have intensifi ed in the twelve months since back into the international fold, although Gaddafi ’s brutal killing in October 2011, as mounting domestic and economic much of Libya remains under the control of challenges within Libya also played a role rival militias, and the central government in Gaddafi ’s decision to repair his ties with remains weak and divided. Th e temporary the international community.3 Th e next gain provided by the successful holding of six years saw a thickening of economic, elections in July 2012 was subsequently commercial, and strategic ties within the off set by the rising violence in Tripoli and broader context of the ‘war on terror’ Benghazi that culminated in the terrorist and the Libyan leader’s control of illegal attack that killed the US Ambassador migrant fl ows from Africa to Europe. to Libya, Christopher Stephens, on 11 Many of these connections revolved September 2012. Th e incident underscored around the (perceived) modernising fi gure the fact that British offi cials, along with of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi as he introduced counterparts elsewhere, failed to conduct limited reforms to economic structures. suffi cient ‘due diligence’ on the parties British companies led the way in seeking they were arming and recognising in and gaining commercial advantage early-2011.

54 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ARAB SPRING: THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION

A BLIND EYE Bahrain is not a major oil or gas-exporting For all the above disquiet, the fact nation, its geo-strategic position accords remains that British foreign policy changed it great value, positioned as it is between abruptly in Libya in February 2011, and Saudi Arabia and Iran and thus caught that it did so largely for humanitarian in the crosshairs of regional rivalries. reasons. Th is suggests that British offi cials Bahraini policy-makers repeatedly claimed did at least acknowledge the scale and to identify a meddling Iranian hand in the meaning of the popular mobilisation in uprising, a charge formally disproved by support of rights, freedoms, justice, and the Bahrain Independent Commission of accountability across the Middle East and Inquiry in November 2011. North Africa. Yet, in Bahrain, the contrast Moreover, the confl ation of Iran’s with apparent British indiff erence to the supposed hegemonic ambitions with Shiite plight of demonstrators as the Al-Khalifa political demands conveniently created an crushed the burgeoning reform movement amorphous threat that enabled the regime is stark. Indeed, the same is also true of to defl ect attention from the local drivers British policy toward human rights abuses of discontent.7 For Britain (and the US), in the other Gulf oil monarchies, notably this played into the strategic dimension of in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Bahrain’s value as a Major Non-NATO Arabia. Ally and key security partner in the Like Libya, large sections of the Gulf. As host to the US Fifth Fleet and population in Bahrain revolted in February a longstanding ally of the West, British 2011. Th e protests began on 14 February and American offi cials were hardly going and rapidly escalated after the killing of to cast it aside at a time of escalating two demonstrators by the security services. tension with Iran. Offi cials in Bahrain Th ey also spread to the Pearl Roundabout (as in the other Gulf States) are aware of near Manama’s Financial Harbour, which this and know which buttons to press to became the symbolic heart of the uprising make themselves heard and understood and threatened to become the ‘Tahrir in Western capitals. To these ties of hard- Square’ of Bahrain. By the evening of 16 headed mutual interest must be added the February, tens of thousands of Bahrainis interpersonal connections generated by from all sects and socio-economic Bahrain’s historical relationship with the background were gathered in the square, United Kingdom, its protecting power calling for the replacement of the Prime until 1971. Minister of 41 years, Khalifa bin Salman As an illustration of their enduring Al-Khalifa, and, in some cases, for the warmth, the King, Hamad bin Isa Al removal of the regime itself. However, the Khalifa, is a Sandhurst graduate, the roundabout was violently cleared by the patron of the Sandhurst Foundation, and security services, which then embarked the donor of a major multi-million pound upon a merciless campaign to hunt down gift which, remarkably, was accepted after all avenues of dissent, aided by the arrival the uprising was crushed in 2011.8 British of forces from Saudi Arabia and the United government policy has similarly been Arab Emirates on 14 March 2011.5 lukewarm in response to escalating abuses Various factors meant that Bahrain of human rights and denial of political posed a very diff erent foreign policy freedoms in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. challenge than Libya. Even though the In the UAE, the arrest and continuing scale of demonstrations were so great as detention without trial of more than sixty to constitute, per capita, the largest of all individuals has barely elicited a word of Arab Spring protests6 with more than one- response from the British government, third of the population in the streets in despite credible reports that some of the early-March, British offi cials merely made men are being tortured.9 Th is reticence repeated calls for restraint and generic notwithstanding, the relationship between statements in support of reform. Although Britain and the UAE has been considerably volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 55 strained by ancillary developments relating perhaps never more so than in this age to the security crackdown. of instant news, which travels around the Notably, the launch in 2012 of an world in seconds on Twitter and YouTube. Emirates Centre for Human Rights in British support for regime change in London angered Emirati offi cials, as did Libya and Syria therefore comes under the extensive reporting of the arrests by greater scrutiny when it is compared and BBC Arabic. Remarkably, this has been contrasted with the durability of ties with linked with the sudden decision to block authoritarian ‘status-quo’ entities in the BP from bidding for the lucrative Abu Gulf. Dhabi onshore oilfi eld concession in 2014, thereby ending their 75-year collaboration A DELICATE BALANCE in the emirate. According to Reuters, Th e Arab Spring presents myriad this unexpected development refl ected challenges to foreign policy-making “a serious rift caused by frustration with at a number of interconnected levels. UK policies” and “anger over the West’s Domestically, within the UK, there support for the Arab Spring”.10 Persistent are pressures from parliamentary and and frequently violent protests in the advocacy groups to make a principled Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia have defence of universal values. Yet this occurred since the start of the Arab Spring. frequently clashes with commercial and Th e city of Qatif emerged as the epicentre strategic interests arising from the benefi ts of the demonstrations and the calls by accruing from Britain’s regional and Saudi Shiites for political reform and equal international partnerships and alliances. rights with Sunni Saudis. In keeping with a Th is is particularly so in the case of the long tradition of suppression of such calls, hydrocarbon-rich Gulf States, which are they were met with violence by the security sources of much-needed foreign investment services, resulting in dozens dead and, in (and concomitant job creation) at a time of July 2012, of the highly-provocative arrest economic weakness and austerity. of a leading Shiite cleric, Nimr al-Nimr. Moreover, private companies and As in neighbouring Bahrain, the demands UK-based multinational corporations of the protestors quickly radicalised into constitute just one element of ‘Britain calls for outright regime change and the abroad,’ with higher education and downfall of the ruling Al-Saud family.11 cultural institutions also being prominent Th is places British offi cials in another in the specifi c Gulf context. All of these extremely awkward position, caught entities, whether public or private, must be between concern for the maintenance taken into consideration as together they of human rights and awareness of the represent the panoply of British interests commercial and strategic value of their in the Middle East. Th e rise of ‘citizen partnership with Saudi Arabia. journalism’ and public empowerment Indeed, the indications that BP may across the Middle East and North Africa has have been targeted for reprisal (as a changed the parameters of policy-making. perceived British company) in the UAE Together, they constitute powerful new suggest that British foreign policy – in methods of holding governments and the Gulf at least – is in a no-win situation. offi cials publicly to account for their Either the Foreign Offi ce follows through actions. Th is is as true just as much for on its declaratory statements in support Western partners as it is for local regimes. of (generic) reform and commitment to Moreover, the instantaneous spread of rights, in which case it angers Gulf ruling information and sharing of uncensored, elites who perceive this as an unacceptable raw footage magnifi es manifold the impact interference in domestic aff airs, or it does and reach of individual events and the not, thereby opening up British foreign reactions to them. Th e fact that there is policy to accusations of hypocrisy and no hiding place in today’s interconnected double-standards. Perceptions do matter, world means that all governments are more

56 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ARAB SPRING: THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION vulnerable to public and political opinion than ever before. Continuing a ‘business Set against this are the structural ties as usual’ strategy is no that bind together countries in the inter- longer a viable option state system of alliances and partnerships. Th e strength of these connections and as it exposes the gaps the sensitivity of countries to perceived between policy toward external interference in domestic aff airs have proved an awkward balancing act individual countries, and in the Arab Spring. US policymakers, between offi cial rhetoric for example, only withdrew support from and reality. President Mubarak once it became clear that Egyptian public opinion had decisively 12 far from resolved and the direction of travel swung against him. US Secretary of still uncertain, British foreign policy needs State Hillary Clinton starkly laid out the to be proactive as well as reactive. competing and contradictory strands of Continuing a ‘business as usual’ policy-making in a speech to the National strategy is no longer a viable option as it Democratic Institute in Washington, exposes the gaps between policy toward DC, in November 2011. In her remarks, individual countries, and between offi cial Secretary Clinton acknowledged that rhetoric and reality. Th is appeared to be “our challenge in a country like Bahrain” acknowledged by the incoming Foreign is that “Our choices also refl ect other Secretary William Hague, in a major interests in the region with a real impact speech he gave in September 2010 entitled on Americans’ lives — including our fi ght Britain’s Values in a Networked World.15 against al-Qaeda; defence of our allies; Given before the start of the Arab Spring, and a secure supply of energy. Th ere will its title and content carries a poignant tone be times when not all of our interests align 13 as subsequent events have only reinforced . . . that is just reality”. how ‘values’ are not necessarily aligned Th e contagious wave of popular rejection with ‘interests’ and, in fact, are frequently of authoritarian misrule that swept four in confl ict. Arab leaders from power may have passed for now, but the impact of the Arab Spring is ongoing and transformative. *Kristian Coates Ulrichsen is Co-Director at the Kuwait Research Programme on Development, Governance Th e powerful reaffi rmation of support and Globalisation at the London School of Economics. for universal values such as human and Ulrichsen is also an Associate Fellow for Chatham political rights and social and economic House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme. justice has demolished any perception of ‘regional exceptionalism.’ Th is smashes the ENDNOTES cosy interrelationship between regional 1. Lynch, Marc (2012). The Arab Uprising: The Unfi nished strongmen and their political and security Revolutions of the New Middle East, New York: PublicAff airs. partners in the West. As one of those 2. Gerges, Fawaz A (2012). Obama and the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. partners, with a prominent historical legacy 3. Vandewalle, Dirk (2011). A History of Modern Libya, across the Middle East and North Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Britain is viewed in a particularly critical 4. Daily Telegraph (2007). Blair, Gaddafi and the BP Oil Deal, light. Th us, issues such as the appointment May 30. 5. Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian (2011a). Bahrain: Evolution or of former Metropolitan Police assistant Revolution? Open Democracy, March 1. commissioner John Yates to ‘advise’ the 6. Lynch, Marc. (2012) The Arab Uprising Government of Bahrain on security 7. Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian (2011b). Bahrain’s Uncertain Future, reform become contextualised within Foreign Policy, November 23. longstanding records of British support for 8. Sunday Times (2012). Bahrain’s King Gives £3m to Sandhurst, 14 September 2. the Al-Khalifa dating back to 1925. 9. Human Rights Watch (2012). UAE: Enforced Disappearance With the major issues of the Arab Spring and Torture September 14. 10. Reuters (2012). BP’s UAE Rebuff Shows British Lustre Faded in volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 57 BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ARAB SPRING: THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION

the Gulf, August 30. Daily Telegraph (2007). Blair, Gaddafi and the BP Oil Deal, May 30. 11. Perazzo, Bayan (2012). The Wretched of the Kingdom: Shiites Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce (2010). Britain’s Values in a in Saudi Arabia. Muftah.org, September 19. Networked World. September 15. 12. Gerges, Fawaz A. (2012). Obama and the Middle East Gerges, Fawaz A. (2012). Obama and the Middle East: The End of 13. Washington Post (2011). In Arab Spring Speech, Clinton America’s Moment? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Defends US Stance on Syria, Bahrain. November 8. Human Rights Watch (2012). UAE: Enforced Disappearance and 14. Curtis, Adam (2012). If You Take my Advice – I’d Repress Torture. September 14. Them. BBC Blog, May 11. Lynch, Marc (2012). The Arab Uprising: The Unfi nished 15. Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce (FCO) (2010). Britain’s Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: PublicAff airs. Values in a Networked World. September 15. Perazzo (2012). The Wretched of the Kingdom: Shiites in Saudi Arabia. Muftah.org, September 19. Reuters (2012). BP’s UAE Rebuff Shows British Lustre Faded in REFERENCES the Gulf. August 30. Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian (2011a). Bahrain: Evolution or Sunday Times (2012). Bahrain’s King Gives £3m to Sandhurst. Revolution? Open Democracy, March 1. September 2. Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian (2011b). Bahrain’s Uncertain Future. Vandewalle, Dirk (2011). A History of Modern Libya. Cambridge: Foreign Policy, November 23. Cambridge University Press. Curtis, Adam (2012). If You Take My Advice – I’d Repress Them. Washington Post (2011). In Arab Spring Speech, Clinton BBC Blog, May 11. Defends US Stance on Syria, Bahrain. November 8.

BOOK PROMOTION The First World War in the Middle East BY KRISTIAN COATES ULRICHSEN

Th e First World War in the Middle East is an accessibly written military and sosocialc history of the clash of world empires in the Dardanelles, Egypt, PalPalestine, Mesopotamia, Persia and the Caucasus. Ulrichsen demonstrates hohow wartime exigencies shaped the parameters of the modern Middle EaEast, and assesses the major campaigns against the Ottoman Empire and GeGermany involving British and imperial troops from the French and RuRussian Empires, as well as their Arab and Armenian allies.

AAlso documented are the enormous logistical demands placed on host ssocietieso by the Great Powers' conduct of industrialised warfare in hhostile terrain. Th e resulting deepening of imperial penetration, and the eextension of state controls across a heterogeneous sprawl of territories, ggenerated a powerful backlash both during and immediately after the wwar, which played a pivotal role in shaping national identities as the Ottoman Empire was dismembered.

The First World War in the Middle East by Kristian Coates Ulrichsen. To be published in May 2013 by C. Hurst & Co Publishers.

58 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 Egypt’s Revolution and the Palestine Question

DAUD ABDULLAH

f all the changes that have taken often to the detriment of the Palestinians. place in Egypt since the overthrow Many inside Egypt and across the region Oof Hosni Mubarak’s regime, therefore regarded its overthrow as a major the election of President Muhammad step toward the restoration of Palestinian Morsi is, unquestionably, one of the most rights. Th e great lesson from the Egyptian signifi cant. Not only did Egyptians vote experience is that by exercising their for a civilian president for the fi rst time political will, it is possible for any people since the demise of the monarchy in 1952, to determine their own destiny and change the course of history. Accordingly, the While post-Mubarak popular demands for rights would not stop in Cairo. Egypt will concentrate To all intents and purposes, Egypt now on its many domestic stands at the threshold of freeing itself from the political, security and economic challenges, it would arrangements which alienated it from its off er more support for Arab milieu. Th e challenge facing the the Palestinian people leaders of the January 25 Revolution, as it came to be called, is to reassert Egypt’s [for their] freedom and political independence, particularly in independence. regard to the asymmetrical relationship that existed with Israel over the last three decades. If successful, this would but they voted for a member of the once place the Palestinians in a much better proscribed Muslim Brotherhood. Th is position to pursue their rights in regional development is expected to impact, for and international forums. Th is is by no better or for worse, on relations with Israel means an easy task and it will not be and infl uence Egypt’s future approach to accomplished overnight. If nothing else, the Palestine Question. the new authorities in Egypt need ample While post-Mubarak Egypt will time to address the country’s chronic concentrate on its many domestic socio-economic problems, foremost challenges, it would offer more support among them; unemployment, declining for the Palestinian people in their quest education and health standards as well as for freedom and independence. President endemic public sector corruption. Morsi said as much in his inauguration Under the guise of normalisation, Israel speech at Cairo University, on 30 June had for several decades benefi ted from 2012, “I announce from here that Egypt, its relationships with Egypt’s previous its people and presidential institution autocratic regimes. After the 1979 Camp stand with the Palestinian people until David Treaty, it was given a virtual carte they regain all their rights”. blanche, invading Arab countries and As a central pillar of the Western grabbing land at will. Lebanon was the fi rst regional alliance, the Mubarak regime victim in 1982, when General Ariel Sharon had for decades protected Israeli interests, ordered his troops all the way to Beirut. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 59 Th is invasion and its attendant occupation A CHANGE OF ORIENTATION resulted in the destruction of the PLO’s Th us far, the process of political transition military capability and the dispersal of its in Egypt has thrown up few surprises. leadership across the region. Both the parliamentary and presidential To the same extent, Israel after Camp elections which took place after Mubarak David enjoyed unbridled freedom to act confi rmed the strength and popularity with impunity against the Palestinians, of the Islamist parties, particularly the without any fear of Arab intervention. In Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and the occupied territories, it intensifi ed its Justice Party. Th is was an eventuality settlement activity, often accompanied which both the Americans and Israelis had by ruthless military aggression. Between worked hard to prevent for decades. Th eir the start of the peace process in 1991 abiding preference was always stability and 2010, the Israeli settler population before democracy. During that period, in the occupied territories doubled from the Palestine portfolio remained fi rmly roughly 232,000 to well over 500,000. It in the hands of the Egyptian military and continues to grow at an average rate of 3.5 intelligence apparatus. President Morsi’s per cent each year, which is three times dramatic dismissal of the heads of both the growth rate of the Jewish population institutions suggests that as far as Israel within Israel.1 Since the start of the Arab is concerned, it would not be business as Spring, Israel has exploited the prevailing usual. uncertainty in the region to accelerate its From the onset, the Egyptian people settlement activity. In a report released were adamant that they would not be in March 2012, the Israeli human rights content with few personnel changes at organization B’Tselem confi rmed that 39 the upper echelons of the state. Th ere per cent of the construction approved by was an almost national consensus that the Israeli government in 2011 was outside fundamental changes were needed both in of Israel proper, most of it in Jerusalem and domestic aff airs as well as the orientation the rest in other parts of the West Bank.2 of the country’s foreign policy, especially On another level, the Camp David Treaty on the regional level. After the signing presented Israel with a comfortable security of the 1979 Camp David Treaty, Egypt’s cushion that allowed it to lower its defence policy toward Palestine was transformed spending from 35 per cent of its national from being a party to the confl ict to being budget in the period before 1978, to 15 per a mediator between the Palestinians and cent in recent years.3 the Israelis. Th is role was largely restricted Other notable economic benefi ts came to eff orts aimed at closing the gap between directly from Egypt. In 2005, the now the parties. Th e Egyptians tried to validate ousted Mubarak regime signed a 20-year this strategic choice and supported the agreement for the export of natural gas to Palestinian parties which adopted it. On Israel for a price ranging between seventy the other hand, they opposed those parties cents to $1.5 per million thermal units. that adopted the strategy of resistance. As At the time, the price for the commodity far as the Mubarak regime was concerned, on the world market was $5 per million negotiations were the only way to resolve thermal units. Many Egyptians were, the confl ict with Israel. understandably, deeply angered by After Hamas foiled a Western backed this misappropriation of their national coup against its elected government in resource, not least because 50 per cent of Gaza, in 2007, the Egyptian government the country’s 85 million population lives threw its full political weight behind below the poverty line. Whatever the Fatah in the ensuing dispute. As an off - political background or composition of the shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo new administration in Cairo, it would not felt compelled to undermine the Hamas be allowed to maintain the same pattern of authority in Gaza, fearing that their success relations with Israel. would strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood

60 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST in Egypt. On his part, Fatah Chairman went so far as to threaten to “break the Mahmoud Abbas presented his Ramallah feet of anyone who crosses our border.”4 based Palestinian Authority as an integral Under the new circumstances, Palestinians part of the region’s ‘moderate camp’ of anticipate an easing and ultimate lifting which Egypt was the linchpin. And it was of the blockade. Many senior fi gures in upon this basis he sought both legitimacy the Muslim Brotherhood including its and support from Cairo and Western spokesman, Mahmoud Ghuzlan, have capitals. Th ose who willingly obliged already made it clear that Egypt wants to ignored the fact that after almost twenty end the misery of Gaza’s population; and years of negotiations, all Abbas had to show that a permanent reopening of the Rafah was the continued loss of Palestinian land Crossing would be a fi rst step in this to Israeli settlements. Unlike the Mubarak direction. regime, the new Egyptian administration Relations with the Gaza Strip is would not pressure Abbas to indulge in the arguably one of the most immediate and farcical cycle of negotiations given Israel’s diffi cult aspects of the Palestine Question stubborn refusal to freeze its settlement which the new Egyptian government expansion, and Judaisation of Jerusalem. faces. Its immediacy and complexity is More importantly, the new administration directly linked to the issue of security in must invest more time in the specifi c the Sinai Peninsula. Shortly after taking question of Palestinian reconciliation, offi ce, President Morsi was confronted something which the previous regime had with a terrorist attack on the Egyptian obstructed because of its alliance with border near Rafah, which left 16 Egyptian Israel and refusal to play an impartial border guards dead. Within hours of the mediating role. attack, the fi ngers of blame were pointed at In retrospect, many Palestinians and elements within the Gaza Strip operating Egyptians look back with horror at the fact in conjunction with groups in the Sinai. that the former Israeli foreign minister, Morsi wasted no time in ordering a Tzipi Livni, all but declared the war on massive security operation in the region, Gaza from Cairo during a press conference the fi rst and largest of its kind since the with her Egyptian counterpart, on 25 signing of the Camp David Treaty. Despite December 2008. “Th is is something that the national trauma the incident caused, it has to be stopped,” she said with reference provided the perfect backdrop for the new to the rocket salvoes from Gaza. “And this president to replace the leadership of the is what we’re going to do.” Subsequently, intelligence and military establishments. both Cairo and Tel Aviv blamed Hamas Some analysts argued that had they spent for provoking the Israeli aggression. more time protecting Egypt’s national Th e level of collaboration between the borders instead of dabbling in the country’s two countries was so intense that Egypt politics and economic aff airs, this could rejected an invitation for an emergency have been prevented. Arab summit in Qatar, which at the time It is noteworthy that right after headed the Arab League. Mubarak’s ousting, Israel’s Prime Once the Israelis had decided to impose Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, ordered their blockade of the Gaza Strip, the the construction of a wall along the border Mubarak regime readily complied claiming with Egypt to be speeded up. He later that it was part of a 2005 agreement with followed this up with the deployment of Tel Aviv for the monitoring of the border. Special Forces to the area, comparing the On other occasions, they rationalised their Sinai to the American ‘Wild West’. Th is support for the blockade on the grounds cynical rhetoric did not go down well in that they did not want to give legitimacy Cairo, and the former head of the military to the division between the West Bank council, Field Marshal Muhammad and Gaza. Quite astonishingly, Mubarak’s Hussein Tantawi, was obliged to issue a last foreign minister, Ahmad Abul Gheyt, strong warning against any infringement volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 61 of Egypt’s sovereign territory. In this context, the veteran Egyptian At the heart of the current tensions is the columnist, Fahmi Howeidi, pointed out view that under the Camp David Treaty, that even if international obligations dictate Egypt is barred from deploying its troops respect for the Camp David Accords, there in the Sinai. A recent study written for is nothing therein which obliges Egypt to the Israeli Institute of Security Studies be an ally of Israel and an accomplice in its based on an analysis of social network crimes. One thing can thus be said with discussions among Egyptians concerning certainty, that the new administration in the future of the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty Cairo would not entertain any suggestion concluded that the prevailing view is that of the Sinai becoming an alternative home it is necessary to review the treaty and for the Palestinians or their resettlement. remove all restrictions on the deployment Th at is simply out of the question. Th ere is, of the Egyptian army in the Sinai.5 It in fact, a growing sense of urgency among remains to be seen how the Egyptian Egyptian offi cials regarding their country’s government will respond to such calls in need to exercise its full sovereignty over the future, especially as they are expected the Sinai. Although the Israeli occupation to grow louder and stronger. ended with the Camp David Treaty, Meanwhile, Israeli offi cials have been Egyptians remain ever conscious of Israel’s keen to impress upon the Americans and territorial designs over the territory. One Europeans that after Mubarak’s ousting, reason for Egypt’s growing concern is the Camp David Treaty is under threat. In related to what some Palestinians describe response, many of Westerners have made as Israel’s colonial ambition to make the this their sole concern in their meetings vast Sinai a sanctuary to absorb Gaza’s with the new Egyptian administration. population which is expected to reach 2.1 As patron of the Camp David Accords, million in 2020. While this may prove Washington considers itself duty bound to an attractive option for Israel to get rid ensure that the peace treaty remains intact. of its perennial problem of Gaza, neither While it is all well and good for Cairo to the Egyptians nor Palestinians would adhere to the treaty between Egypt and countenance such a scenario. Th e Sinai will Israel, there is no doubt that it is not in remain Egyptian and Gaza will remain an a position to honour the fi rst part of the integral part of Palestine. Camp David Accords in so far as they Ultimately, while Egypt remains relate to Palestine. committed to the Camp David Treaty For a start, the Camp David Accords do with Israel, it is very likely that a brake will not allow for the Palestinians to attain and be placed on political, economic, security exercise their rights fully. Th e treaty merely and cultural cooperation. off ers “autonomy” and a “self-governing authority” for Palestinians in the West ISRAEL AND THE SEARCH FOR A Bank and Gaza Strip. Because it ignored all WAY OUT the other rights usurped in 1948, notably Th ere is no doubt that the January the right of return for refugees, Egypt 25 Revolution in Egypt took many by is not in a position to endorse it. Th ey surprise, especially the regional and must, therefore, remind their Western Western intelligence agencies. In Israel, interlocutors that it was precisely because politicians made a last ditch attempt to of these built-in defi ciencies that the save the Mubarak regime but to no avail. Accords were condemned by the UN on 29 In the event, they tried unsuccessfully to November 1979: “ the Camp David accords install Umar Sulayman, the former head of and other agreements have no validity in so the Egyptian intelligence as his successor. far as they purport to determine the future of Th e changes taking place in Egypt were so the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian profound and far-reaching that even the territories occupied by Israel since 1967.” attempts to ease Mubarak’s last serving [Resolution 34/65] Prime Minister, General Ahmad Shafeeq,

62 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST into the presidency ended in failure. Once positively on the Palestinians even though started, the revolutionary process seemed it will take time to materialise. Indeed, unstoppable. For the foreseeable future, some observers believe it may take much Israel would have no ability to infl uence longer than expected, given the enormity Egyptian decision-making. Th e new of Egypt’s domestic problems. priorities there will be national interests Irrespective of its mandate and rather than the demands and priorities of popularity, Egypt’s democratically elected external powers. government would be under intense public In so far as Palestine is concerned, the scrutiny and pressure to deliver on all its Israeli establishment is still determined to promises. Similarly, the Palestinian people reach a security solution. Th e incumbent would force both administrations in Gaza Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu and Ramallah to end their division and has declared that his vision has already direct their energies against the occupation. been outlined in the 2004 Bush-Sharon Th ey would be encouraged to adopt this exchange of letters. Its basic tenet is that course having witnessed how a united and “In light of new realities on the ground, determined Egyptian population was able including already existing major Israeli to change their own circumstances. Even population centres, it is unrealistic to so, the Palestinians cannot do it on their expect that the outcome of fi nal status own; a lot depends on how much pressure negotiations will be a full and complete the Arab Spring states, and in this case return” to the 1967 lines. Meanwhile, Egypt, is prepared to exert on both sides, Ehud Barak, the Minister of Defence has, not for their partisan interests, but in the however, urged a return to the negotiating interest of the Palestinian national cause table as soon as possible. Th ough by no for liberation and independence. means a political dove, Barak explained “whoever thinks that incorporating the *Dr Daud Abdullah was born in Grenada, where he settlements or all of the West Bank into received his early education. He obtained his fi rst Israel is living a fantasy”.6 degree from the University of Guyana in 1981, later studied Arabic Language at King Saud University in Unable to make progress with Abbas Saudi Arabia. In 1989 he received his doctorate in over the settlement issue, it appears that Islamic History from the University of Khartoum, Sudan. Israel has taken a decision to convince the Abdullah lectured in history at the University of West that it is an obstacle and that they Maiduguri in Nigeria and Birkbeck College, University of London. He worked as senior researcher at the have tried for peace and failed. Th is tactic is London-based Palestinian Return Centre, and edited one of the last desperate measures adopted the (Palestine) Return Review. Abdullah was Deputy Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain from by the Israelis in light of their growing 2006-2010. Currently, he is the director of the Middle international isolation, even among their East Monitor. Jewish constituency in the United States. Already, the new political realities in ENDNOTES Egypt have created conditions for the 1. Elkindy, Khaled (2010). “Original Sin: How the Oslo Accords Palestinians to make limited gains. After Enabled Continued Settlement Growth”, Miftah, August 2. See fi ve years of unsuccessful negotiations also Beinart, P. (2012). The Crisis of Zionism (Times Books, New for a prisoner exchange in return for York: 2012), p.19. 2. Saleh, M. (2012). The Israeli stance towards Egypt’s 25 January the captured soldier Gilad Shalit, post- Revolution. (Al-Zaytouna, Beirut), p.6. Mubarak Egypt managed within months 3 . Al Sahli, N. (2011). Al Thowrat Al Arabiya wa Afaaq Al to facilitate the release of Shalit, in October Qadiyah Al Filastiniyeh. Al-Jazeera.net, 22 March. 2011, in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian http://www.aljazeera.net/analysis/pages/75a451a7-bf02- 4014-92ea-bef359ab5da5 prisoners from Israeli jails. 4 . Jamal, K. (2011). Thowrah Masr wa In’askasaatiha ‘ala Al Egypt’s January 25 revolution off ers an Qadiyah Al Filastiniyeh. Al-Quds, March, No. 147, p. 71. opportunity for the country to embark on 5 . See Dekel, U. & Perlov, O. (2012). President Morsi and Israel- a new path of national reconstruction, and Egypt relations. INSS Insight No.357, July 25. the restoration of its natural leadership 6 . Arab48, 29/9/2011 position in the region. Th is will impact volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 63 A publication of The Cordoba Foundation that provides a medium for diverse opinions, presenting a comprehensive view of the myriad perspectives pertaining to dialogue and cross-cultural exchange. This is done by publishing important contributions by experts and world leaders.

Download for free thecordobafoundation.com 64 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 The Arab Revolts: The Soccer Impact on Central Asia

JAMES M. DORSEY

wo years ago, the scenes in With countries like Turkmenistan and the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek Uzbekistan ranked among the world’s Tresembled those in Cairo’s Tahrir worst violators of basic freedoms, the Square in the last 18 months. Mass anti- region is feeling the impact of the revolts government protests demanding an end in the Arab world. Like the Middle East to autocratic rule toppled the country’s and North Africa’s battles are often fought ruler despite attempts by security forces to on the soccer pitch. squash them. Th e protests paved the way However, Central Asia’s sustained for presidential elections contested by a suppression of regime critics, including former prime minister under the ancient Islamists, and its eff orts to severely curtail regime and a host of Islamist and non- expressions of religion is bucking the trend Islamist candidates. towards a greater public role for religion Th e Kyrgyz voters chose their former seen in West Asia, such as the success of prime minister, Almazbek Atambayev as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Central Asia’s fi rst democratically elected Justice and Development Party (AKP) president. Two years later Mohammed in Turkey and the rise of Islamists in the Morsi, a leader of the long outlawed Middle East and North Africa as well Muslim Brotherhood, was elected as the growing infl uence of Christian president of a post-revolt Egypt. Th ough evangelists in the United States. the results may be diff erent the elections At a recent inter-faith meeting in represent two sides of a fundamental issue Kazakhstan, a Christian participant was that both Central Asia and the Middle quoted by Th e National newspaper of East and North Africa are grappling with: the United Arab Republic as saying: “Th e the rise of religious parties in their politics removal of religion from the society also and public life. removes the values of the society. Th e Decades of neglected discontent in the atheist societies of the 20th century failed Middle East and North Africa erupted and were swept away. Faith is a natural in December 2010 in Tunisia, sparking a desire of a human being. Societies that do wave of popular revolts that has toppled not recognise this are not realistic. Th ey the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and will fail as well.” Yemen, fomented a civil war in Syria and Th e suppression of Islamist forces in has other Arab leaders scrambling to avoid the Central Asian republics of the former being next. Soviet Union serves not only to maintain Discontent is similarly simmering in autocratic rule in most of the newly the Central Asia region where half of independent states but also as a mechanism the population is below the age of 30, for as long as it lasts to preserve stability and the constituent countries are largely in a region that shares a long border with ruled by former Soviet Communist Party Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran where the bosses who became the presidents of confl uence of religion and politics has Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, produced a combustible mix. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan upon the Several of the Central Asian republics demise and breakup of the Soviet Union. have experienced cross border attacks by volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 65 republic’s reputation in the international The fate of autocratic arena,” the government said in a statement leaders in the Middle after the Asian success. East and North Africa To cement his attempt to steal the show, Mr. Karimov persuaded Spanish giant holds a cautionary lesson Real Madrid to open a soccer school in for Central Asian leaders Tashkent. Th e moves did little to counter discontent, particularly among soccer fans whose raison d’etre is frustrated with corruption in the sport. to maintain repressive Clashes among fans have taken the regime autocratic powers. by surprise. In Guzar, it took security forces a day to restore order after soccer Islamic militants, Uzbekistan is home riots that spilled into the town itself. to the jihadist Islamic Movement of Similarly, celebrations of the 100th Uzbekistan (IMU), and Tajikistan is still anniversary of Uzbek soccer were coping with the aftermath of a fi ve-year civil repeatedly postponed because of delays war. A leader of the Islamic Renaissance in the completion of Tashkent’s showcase Party (IRPT) in Tajikistan, the foremost 35,000-seat Bunyodkor stadium amid opposition group, was recently killed and fears that fans were unlikely to show the another has disappeared in the rebellious necessary enthusiasm. “Few spectators province of Gorno-Badakhstan. now come to watch football games at our Nonetheless, the fate of autocratic leaders stadiums. Many good football players have in the Middle East and North Africa holds left the country” because of low salaries and a cautionary lesson for Central Asian corruption,” Eurasianet quoted an Uzbek leaders whose raison d’etre is to maintain journalist as saying. “When the winners repressive autocratic powers despite of the fi rst and second places are already economic mismanagement and widespread known, why should the championship be corruption. Many, like Uzbekistan’s Islam of interest?” added Uzbek coach Birodar Karimov see soccer, Central Asia and the Abduraimov in comments made to Uzbek Caucasus’ most popular sport, as a way to newspaper InterFutbol. polish their tarnished image domestically Turkmen President Gurbanguly and internationally -- a tactic that bought Berdymukhammedov employs soccer to deposed Arab leaders time but ultimately indoctrinate his people and install his sense failed to distract attention from widespread of discipline in them. State employees are discontent. In Turkmenistan, soccer serves obliged to purchase spectators’ uniforms as a tool to regiment the population. for matches which they attend under Mr. Karimov last year ordered the supervision of their manager who authorities to build new stadiums, open ensures adherence to a cheering protocol. new football schools, and expand training Spectators practiced recently in Asgabad opportunities for players and referees. Th e stadium when it became apparent that a Uzbek leader hoped to capitalise on the Turkmen President Cup’s match between fact that an obscure Uzbek club, Nasaf Armenia and Kyrgyzstan was postponed Karshi, won the Asian Football Cup last because Mr. Berdymukhammedov was year as well as an earlier success of the reportedly travelling elsewhere in the country’s Under-17 youth team. In line country, according to a Radio Free Europe/ with Arab autocrats, Mr. Karimov lavishly Radio Liberty correspondent, “when the rewarded the successful players with salary president appears in the stadium, everyone bonuses and free housing. Th e U-17 team will stand up and say the following, ‘My were exempted from university entrance beloved country Turkmenistan and glory exams and tuition fees. “Th e achievements to the Protector.’ Let’s practice it!” the of our country’s athletes are convincingly correspondent quoted an announcer as promoting the strengthening of our young saying. Spectators were instructed abstain

66 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB REVOLTS: THE SOCCER IMPACT ON CENTRAL ASIA from whistling and to use the Turkmen was assassinated in the stands of Terek’s equivalent of the universally used word former grounds. goal. “Whenever a team scores a goal, Russia’s soccer policy targets non- you will not say ‘goal’ but ‘utuk,’” the Chechen Russians in a bid to convince announcer said. that Chechnya is a Russian republic like all Chechnya too has tried to employ others that is dealing with a small group of soccer as the opium of the people. Wahhabi-inspired terrorists. Th e Russian Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin eff ort got a boost in 2004 when Terek last year announced funding for 30 Grozny won the Russian Cup without new development projects in the North playing in the Premier League weeks after Caucasus, including soccer-related ones the assassination of Akhmad Kadyrov. Th e that appeared to have been earmarked Cup victory qualifi ed Terek to compete in more for their public relations value than the European soccer body’s UEFA Cup. their contribution to sustainable economic Terek has since played in Russia’s Premier development. League. Pro-Russian politicians spared no I n Ju ne of 2 011, p ol ic e u s e d s t u n g ren a de s expense in the construction of Grozny’s and tear gas in the south-eastern Tajik city new $250 million state of the art stadium of Khulob against soccer fans protesting that was inaugurated last year in a political interference and corruption in televised event with fi reworks, musical the beautiful game. Supporters of the performances, and a match between a city’s Ravshan club accused referees and regional squad and Team Kavkaz that linesmen of favouring Dushanbe’s visiting was headed by Diego Armando Maradona Istiklol team because President Emomali and included President Ramzan Kadyrov, Rahmon’s eldest son, Rustami Emomali, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s in the mould of ousted Libyan leader personal envoy to the North Caucasus Moammer Qadaffi , Al Saad al Qadaffi , Aleksander Khloponin, Chechen Prime co-owns the club and serves as the team’s Minister Odes Baysultanov, and Kadyrov’s captain as well as deputy chairman of cousin Adam Delimkhanov, who is also the Tajik Football Federation and head Chechnya’s representative to the Russian of Tajik customs. Soccer protests erupted State Duma. again ten days later this time in Dushanbe Th ere could be little doubt that the after a match between Ranshan and opening and the match constituted an CSKA-Pamir, Dushanbe’s second major attempt by Russia and its Chechen allies to club, in the city’s Politekhnicum Stadium. demonstrate that Chechnya has returned Tajikistan, a mostly mountainous nation to normalcy after years of brutal war. It also of seven million people on the border with was intended to boost the personality cult Afghanistan and western China, is the Mr. Kadyrov has developed. Th e crowd poorest of the former Soviet republics. chanted his name in a stadium dominated In Afghanistan, soccer symbolises the by his portrait and that of Russian Prime country’s choices coming full circle as Minister Vladimir Putin and were handed U.S. forces prepare to withdraw from the fl ags with Mr. Kadyrov’s picture. Critics Central Asian nation more than a decade charged that spectators were forced to go after they invaded it. Back in late 2001 to the stadium with students being told and early 2002, U.S. troops fresh from they would not be allowed to graduate overthrowing the Taliban viewed soccer if they failed to attend. Russia has long balls and shoes as just as basic to mending funded FC Terek Grozny, which is chaired Afghanistan’s social fabric as beams and by Mr. Kadyrov and last year hired Dutch girders were to mending war-damaged star Ruud Gullit as its coach, as part of buildings. Soccer paraphernalia served as a its eff ort to pacify Chechnya. Th e new tool to win hearts and minds and counter stadium is named after Kadyrov’s father, Iranian eff orts to exploit the beautiful former president Akhmad Kadyrov, who game for the same purpose. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 67 A decade later, a major Afghan project and former national team players, telecommunications company, Roshan said the AFF hoped that the league would Telecom Development Co., and media also help stimulate business and build tycoon Saad Mohsen’s Moby Group are bridges. “After years of civil confl ict and launching Afghan Premier League soccer war, people will focus on football and in what David Ignatius of the Washington the businessmen from each zone will try Post juxtaposes as Afghanistan’s post- to have the best players. It will create withdrawal options: televised soccer national unity because if the central zone, rivalry or armed civil war. for example, has a really good player, the Afghanistan Football Federation (AFF) southern zone team will want to buy him. president Keramuddin Karim backed Th ey will not care about his ethnicity. by sociological analysis argues that “to Th ey will not care about his tribe. Th ey establish peace and stabilize a country, one will care that he is one of the best players,” must not only focus on training soldiers. Mr. Walizada said. Sport is also a strong base for peace, as it Th e launch of the premier league comes embodies values such as unity, integration, among fears that the Afghan army will split pride and prevents racism, drugs and along ethnic and sectarian lines following other elements that bring insecurity to the an American withdrawal, plunging the country.” country into chaos with the Taliban stepping up its insurgency and various groups that fought each other in the past Nelson Mandela used picking up arms again. a racially integrated U.S. military and civilian offi cials national rugby team to believed a decade ago that reopening soccer stadiums and encouraging people unite South Africa in the to play free of fear or persecution would wake of apartheid -- a win hearts and minds among those scarred by regimes for which soccer was either the story now made famous enemy or a weapon of terror. Th e premier by the movie Invictus. league is one way of putting that to the test. Th e hope is that the new league’s eight teams who represent diff erent parts of Mr. Karim is taking a leaf out of the the country with a history of being at experience of other countries where sports loggerheads with one another will compete in general and soccer in particular have had on the pitch instead of the battlefi eld once a cathartic eff ect by channelling human U.S. forces have left despite the fact that aggression away from violence and into some of them bear the names of fi ery birds: more healthy channels. Nelson Mandela the Eagles of the Hindu Kush in central used a racially integrated national rugby Afghanistan, the Goshawks from south- team to unite South Africa in the wake eastern Afghanistan and the Falcons of of apartheid -- a story now made famous Kabul. by the movie Invictus. South Africa went Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s only middle- on to become the fi rst African nation to income country, in 2011 experienced its successfully host the World Cup. fi rst suicide bombing and several lethal In a letter announcing the premier attacks on police offi cers as a result of a league that includes eight teams, the AFF crackdown on religion and a deteriorating said that it would cut “across all ages, socio- economy. Discontent in the volatile economic groups, regions and tribes.” In Fergana Valley recently spilled into the fact, it will cut across regions and ethnic, streets of the Uzbek city of Andijan, where tribal and religious groups that have in the hundreds were killed during mass protests past been at loggerheads with one another. in 2005. Abdul Sabor Walizada, a trainer for the Kazakh soccer like that of other

68 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB REVOLTS: THE SOCCER IMPACT ON CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asian nations has been dogged Th e rise to power through the ballot box by political intrigue with President of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia is forcing Nursultan Nazarbayev seeking to turn them to focus on their country’s economic the beautiful game into a political tool. problems and to demonstrate their ability Th e former head of the football federation, to reach out to secular and non-Muslim Mr. Nazarbayev’s former son-in-law groups. It has not made soccer less political Rakhat Aliyev, fl ed the country after but deprived the beautiful game of the falling out with the country’s powerful many manipulative advantages it off ered leader. Th e new-look federation under Mr. autocrats and illustrated the limitations of Nursulatan’s guidance has embarked on soccer as tool to maintain power. While the a 10-year plan to develop youth football, jury is still out in Egypt and Tunisia, the based on the German model with the successful overthrow of autocratic leaders German Football Federation supervising strengthens the basis for international a program to install a youth center at pressure on Central Asian autocrats to every Premier League club. Soccer “puts loosen the reins and move towards greater Kazakhstan on the map. It’s an incentive transparency and accountability. If that for us. We want to be recognised not only comes about it might well be the most for our weightlifters and boxers, but for lasting impact of the Arab revolts on the our football,” said national team captain post-Soviet states of Central Asia. Kairat Nurdauletov. In breaking with its Central Asian *James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow of the S. Rajaratnam neighbours, post-revolt Kyrgyzstan, School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang like post-revolt Arab states, has allowed Technological University. He is an award-winning foreign correspondent, a syndicated columnist and Islamist parties and groups to operate the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle openly in a bid to take the sting out of their East Soccer. Dorsey has covered ethnic and religious confl icts for more than three decades and has been bite. Th e experience of Turkey shows that based in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin giving Islamists space has produced what America and the United States. He has, on and off , many see as a model for the Middle East covered Central Asia for the past two decades. and North Africa and perhaps for Central Asia too.

THE ARAB UPRISINGS: AN INTRODUCTION (forthcoming)

The ongoing Arab Uprisings are a seminal moment in world history. For years, Arab regimes have expropriated power and wealth from their people. In the age of the Internet, exploding populations and greater aspirations, these regimes have been increasingly incongruous. Nowhere in the world do people do not want to live in fear. They do not want a midnight knock on their door. They do not want their elites to steal the wealth of the country. They want education, jobs, healthcare and prospects of a better future.

In The Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, Abul-Hasanat Siddique and Casper Wuite examine what happened, why did it happen and what might happen in the future.

[email protected] | www.fairobserver.com volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 69 The Arab Spring and the Role of Al-Jazeera

WADAH KHANFAR

eing in Al-Jazeera for the past 10 in December 2001 in Kabul where the years has meant that you are defying temperatures plummet. One day, when the Bmany synthetic problems. In 2004, sun appeared, we decided to take a walk for instance, we were under pressure from and stopped at a ‘coff ee shop’ (again it was the Americans such that we were unsure no shop and it had no coff ee). It was selling if Al-Jazeera would be on air the next day, Afghani Green Tea without sugar as well. especially when Mr George Bush and Mr As our team sat down, some Afghanis at Tony Blair were reported to have discussed the next table, hearing us speak Arabic the possibility of bombing Al-Jazeera came over and started to converse with us. headquarters in Doha. Th is was a crucial It turned out they were from Kandahar moment in our history which in the end and had come to Kabul by foot (taking turned out to be a blessing. At that stage, them about ten days) to look for their we had three choices: 1) shut down Al- relatives who it had turned out had fl ed to Jazeera, 2) take a leap of faith and continue Pakistan. So the conversation proceeded broadcasting but be mindful of external like this and we paid $2 for the tea for all pressures on the station, or 3) continue of us and we left. without tuning down our coverage. At the About 100 yards from the shop, I heard end, we chose to continue broadcasting them shouting and running after us. It and resisted the pressures that were turned out they had discovered that I had imposed on us. paid for the tea and had come to pay it back. I believe this period was a testing Th ey said ‘Th is is our culture. You are our time for Al-Jazeera. It was one of the guest. We will not accept you paying for most unique experiences in dealing with us. It is us who have to pay’. Th ey started those challenges but Al-Jazeera was able to cry. For fear of upsetting the men, I took to manage the situation well. I wish to the money. Th ese two people had walked share now you a few short stories and my all the way from Kandahar, they appeared personal experiences of working with Al- penniless yet whatever state of poverty Jazeera. they were living under, they still refused Th e fi rst story relates to the time when I a guest to pay for them. Th ese were two was working as a journalist in Afghanistan. people I had accidentally met. I remember this story well because, in my Had the Americans, the British and their opinion, it represented something much allies, been a little bit more considerate in more valuable than the occurrence itself. their approach with the Afghans, they I went to Kabul just after the war and would have understood the nature, the the collapse of the Taliban. I stayed in a culture, the tradition and the collective hotel called Intercontinental which had heritage of this proud people. Th ey would nothing to do with anything related to have understood much better the Afghan Intercontinental or any other hotels. We society that also may have refused to had booked a room on the fourth fl oor, surrender Osama Bin Laden because they which had no lifts, water, electricity, glass felt he was a guest and their culture did windows or ceiling. It was a space that we not allow it. Th ey would have also perhaps had rented and had to manage. Th is was understood how best to deal with them.

70 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB SPRING AND THE ROLE OF AL-JAZEERA

Th is experience opened my eyes to Jaber squares. A cameraman who stood for something important about the media. a cause and the people appreciated what he Without understanding this connective was doing. When I received the news that memory and connective binding force of Ali Hasan al-Jaber was killed, I appealed the society, its social and political DNA, to Al-Jazeera staff in Libya to withdraw you can never understand, analyse or but they refused, telling me instead that forecast events taking place in a society. they would continue to cover the story One needs to understand these things from regardless of what transpires – “we are within. It can’t be done as an explorer or as not about to retire”, they added. After this someone who is discovering the society. It incident we saw thousands of people in has to be done by someone who actually almost every city in Libya coming out of understands and empathises deeply with the streets chanting slogans in support of what it means to be an Afghani, Pashtun, Al-Jazeera but also praising Qatar as the Muslim and so on. late Al-Jaber was a Qatari. Th e people of Th e second story is from Libya, where Libya prayed janaza (funeral prayer) for I spent my last week as the Director Al-Jaber and raised the Qatari fl ag in all General of Al-Jazeera. Th ere I visited city squares throughout Libya. Tripoli, Misratah, Zawiyah, and spoke From these two experiences, two things to the people, interacting with them and are central in mind. Firstly, it is imperative understanding what people had in mind. for those of us working in the media industry I was overwhelmed by the warmth and to have the compass directed towards the love these people showed to me and to Al- Jazeera. Although I had spent eight years If the media serves travelling the Arab world and had got to know to what extent people appreciate the centres of power, as well as criticise Al-Jazeera, Libya was it means that it is not diff erent. In Tripoli, wherever I went I found people gathering, shaking hands, anchoring its editorial hugging, taking camera footage and philosophy to something inviting me into their houses. Th eir love that is fi rm. and concern for us was such that the local people who were with me suggested that I should not continue walking alone in the people. Otherwise we will always miss city because the city was not yet safe. When the point and we would be following the I walked in Misratah, the city most famous centres of power which involves changing for resisting Ghadaffi ’s forces, I came and shifting interests. Th is is the nature across a street exhibition of the weapons of political and commercial centres of that had been used against the people. power as they change their alliances and Th ese had been collected and put in the perceptions. If the media serves the centres street; they had called the exhibition, Ali of power, it means that it is not anchoring Hasan Al-Jaber. its editorial philosophy to something Who is Ali Hassan al-Jaber? Ali Hasan Al- that is fi rm. Hence it has to be with the Jaber was a camera man for Al-Jazeera. He people, who have more stability in their was killed by Ghadafi ’s forces in Benghazi perception, their knowledge and in their during the fi rst months of the revolution. collective wisdom. It is important to have Can you imagine the relationship between that kind of alliance where you – as the this cameraman from Qatar and the media – stand courageously supporting people of Libya, to such an extent that people and directing your relationship they named the biggest resistance group, into that direction. Otherwise things start Ali Hasan Al-Jaber brigade. Th ere were to shift and control is lost, as you become places in almost every city, called Ali a centre of power and you guard your Hasan Al-Jaber streets and Ali Hasan Al- interests, thereby disassociating yourself volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 71 from the public. Or you take into account We need a grand debate about Islam and everyone’s interest and once again, public politics, Islam and the public sphere, Islam interest is sacrifi ced. For Al-Jazeera, it took and democracy. We need to understand public interest as its core editorial policy. how Islamic movements can become an We think of people before we think of integral part of the political process. We what the centres of power have to say. need to discuss the management of Islam During our editorial meetings in Al- and the individual sphere: how to cater Jazeera, I recall discussing how many for people’s interest? How to run states dignitaries, presidents and politicians in a complicated international situation would express an interest to talk to Al- whilst coexisting with others from Jazeera. Whilst we gave them a platform diverse backgrounds? We need to debate because we were open to all, we always in roundtables. We need think-tanks to ensured that there was wider coverage. It write papers and we need our politicians would be a disaster for our newsroom if to be educated about these issues. We need something happened in the public sphere Islamists in the Arab world to sit down that involved people and we did not cover and brainstorm the ideas of secularism, it. In this sense, our reporters were always democracy and Islam. If we need to pass directed to be wherever the people were; to the second phase of permanent and they were told to ‘try to refl ect or try stable democracy we need to settle all these to cover the stories that people created disputes once and for all. Th is is where I themselves’. Th e people understood this think people in the West can help us in and hence they thought of Al-Jazeera as sponsoring these initiatives and trying to their own. bring people together to discuss, debate Th is attraction and closeness to Al- and contemplate issues and developments Jazeera, a television station, sometimes but with distance from the immediacy of proved too overwhelming for us, as we the events. would on occasions be called to sort out Th e second issue that I view as issues and problems amongst people. I important from experiences related earlier remember our bureau chief in the month concerns the current Arab revolutions. of Ramadan used to tell me that men Th ese revolutions, in my mind, will not would phone him to complain about their reach their destinations if the international wives! We had to stress that we were not society is going to block them or places a political party, nor a reform movement. obstacles in the path. During the last We are currently going through a golden few months I felt that a lot of suspicious opportunity in the Middle East, some call thoughts and ideas emerged in Western this the Arab Awakening, Arab Spring, or capitals about where these revolutions were the Arab Revolution. Change in one way heading. Th eir relationship with Israel; or another is taking place in the Middle their relationship with the West; to what East, which is the most signifi cant change extent Islamists are going to be in power; since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. to what extent the media is involved. Th e issue is not only about taking down I warn against adopting democracy corrupt authoritative regimes but about selectively, for if we do this we will have the a continuous change within our political same problems that exist between Hamas and cultural paradigm. Th is requires a lot and Fatah (elections are good for some, of action on the ground. We are busy on the not for others). I’m afraid we are not only streets; we are busy trying to understand going to spoil this opportunity but we are the direction that politics and protests are also going to create a huge division again going to take; we are busy fi ghting fi res. between the Muslims and the West. Th is We do not have time to think about what thinking needs to change and requires we are actually doing. Muslims in the West to take proactive In the West, people (especially Muslims) steps, using their infl uence and circles of have the time to contemplate and think. relationship to sponsor a new mode of

72 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB SPRING AND THE ROLE OF AL-JAZEERA Many of the people... battle, a battle for every freedom-loving leading the recent people. Adapted from a speech given at a ceremony in London in 2011 revolutions, were in jail to felicitate Wadah Khanfar, organised by Islam Expo. only a few months ago. *Wadah Khanfar is the Co-founder of The Sharq Forum They cannot be expected and the former Director General of Al-Jazeera Television Network. He began his career with the network in to behave and perform 1997, covering some of the world’s key political zones, including South Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq. He was like polished diplomats. appointed the chief of the Baghdad bureau, and later as the network’s Managing Director. thinking about the world. In 2006, he became Al-Jazeera’s Director General. During his 8-year tenure at the helm, Al-Jazeera Many of the people who were leading transformed from a single channel into a global media the recent revolutions, were in jail only a network as well as Al-Jazeera Center for Studies. few months ago. Th ey cannot be expected Khanfar, who resigned from the network in September to behave and perform like polished 2011, has been ranked one of Foreign Policy’s Top 100 global thinkers of 2011 as well as one of Fast Company’s diplomats. Th ey need to be given the ‘Most Creative People in Business’ of the year. Khanfar opportunity to understand politics that has a diverse academic background with post- graduate studies in Philosophy, African Studies, and could be useful for every one. So it is International Politics. He is a member of the Board of upon us to help them. If democracy in Advisors of The Cordoba Foundation. the Middle East reaches stability then everyone will benefi t from this. Th ere is a mutual interest for everyone to make what is happening in the Arab world and the Muslim world a success and I don’t see a threat in this unless we spoil it by our own actions, impatience, hijacking the process THE SHARQ FORUM and directing it. So I appeal to all in Britain and elsewhere to actually to start discussing and refl ecting on these issues because it will aff ect all of us. We never expected that something in Arab world, like the recent revolutions, would take place only a year ago. We are sick and tired of being on the verge of revolting against oppression. We need to live our lives and establish something that is dear to us all. Everyone has a vision. We need to start working together and start building on initiatives to realise our collective visions. We have been actually belittled and we have been insulted as nations in the region. We feel that we are once again being appreciated. We seem to be now getting out of the inferiority complex which we have suff ered from for a long time. Th ere is a new mood, a new spirit of optimism that is emerging. We need to encourage and protect this, and we need to fi rmly stand WWW.SHARQFORUM.ORG by it. It would be futile if we just sit back and analyse from afar. Th is is our own volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 73 The Turkish Model of Governance and the Arab Spring

MUSTAFA AKYOL

uch has been discussed self-styled secularism. Th e ruling party, in regarding the Turkish system of fact, barely survived being disbanded – like Mgovernance as a model of ‘Post more than two dozen parties previously –Islamism’ for countries emerging out of -- simply for failed to comply with some the ‘Arab Spring’. However before such aspect of the country’s offi cial ideology, claims might be made, it is important to secularism. understand the model. In the middle of this peculiar political Turkey began 2008 in the shadow of a controversy -- during which “freedom” and very heated debate, the issue being whether “secularism” had become opposing and female university students could cover polarising slogans -- an interesting voice their hair with a headscarf — a practice emerged from female students wearing allowed in the free world, except in Turkey, headscarves, whose right to education was where it was banned by the staunchly being discussed. On a website titled “We secularist Constitutional Court in 1989. Are Not Free Yet,” three hundred students Th e incumbent Justice and Development put their signatures in support of the Party (AKP) was a “conservative” party following statement: led by devout Muslims. Th ey had just won What we have suff ered since the day that a sweeping election victory six months the door of the university was shut in our earlier, in July 2007, and were willing face taught us something: our real problem to permit the headscarf — which most is the authoritarian mentality which assumes of their wives and daughters wore — on a right to interfere in the lives, appearances, campuses. words, and thoughts of people. In February of that year, the AKP, with Th us, as women who face discrimination the support of two other parties in the because we cover our heads, we hereby declare Turkish parliament, passed an amendment that we won’t be happy simply by entering that inserted two clauses into the universities with our scarves—unless: constitution. One of them stated that all - Th e Kurds and other alienated groups citizens, regardless of their religion, race, in this country are given the legal and or ethnicity, would “benefi t from public psychological basis to consider themselves services equally.” Th e other amendment fi rst-class citizens. provided a guarantee: “No citizen can be - Th e foundations of the [non-Muslim] barred from the right to higher education.” minorities that were shamelessly confi scated Th ese clauses might sound like are given back. commonsense declarations to most - Th e “insulting Turkishness” cases [mostly people, but to the secularist establishment brought against many liberal intellectuals] they constituted an unacceptable heresy are brought to an end. that opened the doors of the universities to “backward-minded” conservative Th e rest of the text continues to ask Muslims. Th e Constitutional Court for “freedoms” for all suppressed groups stepped in nullifying the amendment in Turkey, including the Alevis (an and also levying a hefty fi ne on the AKP unorthodox Muslim sect), and denounces government for violating the country’s “all forms of discrimination, suppression,

74 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE TURKISH MODEL OF GOVERNANCE AND THE ARAB SPRING and imposition.” Finally, these “covered” infl uences of Islam and make it bow down women justifi ed their entire stance to modernity. with a sayings attributed to the Prophet However, there are two good reasons Muhammad: “Th e heavens and the earth to doubt that narrative. Firstly, Arab and stand on justice.” Muslim countries did in fact have their Th is genuinely liberal and Islamic Atatürks — secular dictators who did try message immediately became popular and to crush the power of Islam. Reza Shah made national headlines, with the number and his son in Iran, Bourguiba and Ben of signatories to the statement increasing, Ali in Tunisia, or Nasser and his successors reaching about twelve hundred in just a in Egypt tried similarly authoritarian few weeks. measures against Islamic groups and Th is is just one example of a phenomenon individuals. In fact, most of the regimes that has emerged in Turkey since the overthrown or challenged by the Arab early 1990s, of a growing acceptance and Spring are these very secular dictatorships advocacy of liberal political ideas by the who used Atatürk as the model. Secondly, country’s practicing Muslims. the Turkish story is much more complex How all this came about is a story worth than the ‘creation-ex-nihilo-by-Atatürk’ examining in the lessons that can be learnt narrative. for similar situations in the current Middle East. OTTOMAN DELIGHT One should note that the pre-“Kemalist” HISTORY REVISITED Ottoman Turkey was not in “the age of What the story above serves to illustrate darkness” before its destruction in World is that among the Muslim societies of War I, as offi cial Turkish literature has the Middle East, Turkey, despite all its claimed for decades. Quite the contrary, fl aws in terms of how it approaches its the Ottomans had achieved a lot in terms Islamic heritage, is still the best example of modernisation, for a good simple reason: of a functioning democracy. Its Islamic from the 15th century, the Ottoman Turks movements and parties have almost had the advantage of being the superpower never followed a radical agenda, and have of the Islamic world, situated on the door even come to appreciate the blessings of step of Europe. Hence, they not only modern liberal democracy. Hence it is for discovered the advances of the West before these reasons that the Turkish model of most other Muslim nations, but they saw democracy and governance has been cited the need to replicate such advances, such as a source of inspiration for countries as reforming their military. However, emerging out of the events of the Arab they soon realised that they needed to Spring. incorporate not only the “hardware” of However, to what we do owe this relative modernity but also its ”software,” i.e. success of Turkey? Th e most common modern political and legal concepts. answer, articulated especially in the West, Th is paved the way for the Ottoman is that we owe it all to the founder of the reform edicts of 1839 and 1856, which Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, limited the powers of the Sultan/Caliph and the radical secularist reforms of his and introduced the concept of modern era, 1924 and 1938. It is widely believed citizenship. Th is had several immediate that with these authoritarian measures — implications, for example; changing the which included the banning of all Islamic status of non-Muslim subjects of the schools, Sufi orders and even religious empire, from dhimmi (protected) status garments — Atatürk’s regime tamed Islam according to traditional Islamic law, to enough to make it democracy-friendly. Th e one of equal rights. By 1876, the Ottoman Arab and Muslim world, the narrative goes, Empire had accepted a constitution based only needs its own Atatürks — secular on liberal principles and a new legal dictators who will crush the theological code, the Mejelle, based on traditional volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 75 Islamic law. Th e code also included many In the beginning, there was another important modifi cations and was prepared political party with a more Ottoman-like based on the maxim, “as time changes, the mindset. Founded by war heroes such as laws should also change.” Kazım Karabekir, Refet Bele and Rauf By the start of the twentieth century, Orbay, the Progressive Republican Party the slogan amongst the Ottoman (PRP) outlined a program in 1924 which intelligentsia, which included many proposed a free market economy, a more devoutly religious fi gures, was “freedom”. gradual reform process, a softer approach Prince Sabahattin, the nephew of Sultan towards Kurds, and, most important of all, Abdülhamid II, promoted the principles of maintaining esteem for religion. Th e party individual entrepreneurship and a limited, though could survive only for six months decentralised government. Hence in 1908, and was closed down by the Kemalist the Ottoman Parliament reconvened with regime on June 5, 1925, with its leaders not just Muslim but also Greek, Armenian, excluded from politics. Th e announced and Jewish deputies and in the last decades reason was Article 6 in its constitution, of the empire, societies emerged with names which noted, “We are respectful to like Taal-i Nisvan (Th e Advancement of religious ideas and sentiments”. Women) or Mudafaa-i Hukuk-u Nisvan Consequently, Turkey’s “single party (Th e Defense of the Rights of Women). In regime” (1925–50) arose, along with its 1910 Ottoman feminist Fatma Nesibe, a iron-handed policies aimed at secularising Muslim follower of John Stuart Mill, even the public square. Textbooks and state argued that the empire was on the eve of a rhetoric started to glorify the pagan “feminine revolution.” culture of the pre-Islamic Turks, and In short, the Ottoman Empire had begun scientism became a sort of offi cial faith. its modernisation at least a century before Some Kemalists even considered turning the Turkish Republic, and had achieved the magnifi cent Blue Mosque of Istanbul a lot on that route. Th e modern Turkish into an art gallery. Republic owed much to its Ottoman Th e early Turkish Republic crushed predecessors. Th e Republic’s founders, not only political opposition but also Atatürk included, had been educated in civil society; amongst others, the feminist the modern schools founded by Sultan/ societies dating from the Ottoman years Caliph Abdülhamid II. were closed down. Th e regime did not oppose feminism per se, but assumed that, SECULARISM IN, DEMOCRACY like everything else, it was “of the state, by OUT the state and for the state.” Yet, there was a profound diff erence between the Ottoman modernisation Had Turkey remained and the superseding “Kemalist” one, led by Atatürk and his followers. Where the under... the Kemalist Ottomans had tried to create a synthesis single party regime, its of Islam and modernity, the Kemalists had neither the time nor the vision to do that. political fate probably Instead, taking their inspiration directly would not have been from the staunchly secularist French too diff erent from that of Enlightenment and the anti-clerical French Revolution, the Kemalists tried Egypt or Tunisia, which to minimise the role of religion in society have both suff ered under through the use of state power. Actually the Kemalist project, carried secular dictatorships out by the Republican People’s Party until the Arab Spring. founded by Atatürk in 1923, was not the only available vision for modern Turkey.

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Quite notably, whilst the Kemalist and respectful to religion, more lenient Revolution was a great leap forward for to the Kurds, and in favour of a market secularisation, it was a great regress for economy rather than the “statism” of the democracy which had started to emerge in Kemalists. the late Ottoman period, with an elected Th e DP won the elections decisively and parliament and competing political its leader, Menderes, who had promised parties. Atatürk turned the multi-party to make Turkey “a little America,” soon system into a single-party dictatorship embraced the Marshall Plan, sent Turkish sacrifi cing democracy, for the self-styled troops to the Korean War, and joined secularism he introduced. NATO. He also created an economic boom that would grant him three election THE TURNING POINT (1950) victories in a row — the second one with 57 Had Turkey remained under the thumb percent of the votes, an unmatched record of the Kemalist single party regime, its in Turkish political history. Amongst political fate probably would not have his supporters were the pious Muslims been too diff erent from that of Egypt or of Turkey, who realised that democracy Tunisia, which have both suff ered under would bring them at least some of the secular dictatorships until the Arab religious freedom for which they yearned Spring. Fortunately, Turkey’s “spring” under Kemalist oppression. would be much earlier in 1950, when the However, the Kemalist “center”— country had its fi rst free and fair elections the bureaucracy, the military, the since the beginning of the republic in judiciary, and the universities — despised 1923. Th is turning point in the country’s Menderes, regarding him as the leader political journey came about for a number of a counterrevolution. Th eir cumulative of reasons: with Atatürk’s death in 1938, hatred was unleashed on May 27, 1960, the articulation of Kemalist policies had when the Turkish military staged a coup, lost its chief architect. His successor, I·smet established martial law, and imprisoned I·nönü, was a relatively moderate and less hundreds of DP members on Yassıada, an authoritarian fi gure, who could tolerate island on the outskirts of Istanbul. Th e being challenged by an opposition party junta set up a show trial, which sentenced and concede power to it. In a post-1945 era, Menderes and two of his ministers to when most Arab countries were concerned execution, for subjective crimes including with independence from colonial powers “empowering religious retrogrades.” On (and the issue of Israel), Turkey’s main September 17, 1961, Menderes, the most concern was the Soviet threat. Th is led popular prime minister in Turkish history, Ankara to orient itself towards the “free was hung on the gallows. world,” which meant a transition to Th is was another crucial turning point. democracy. Th is was ultimately helped Th e “Turkish Spring” which had begun so by the democratic roots planted in the positively in 1950, by transferring political Ottoman period, whereby Turkish society, power peacefully via free and fair elections at least its elites, were ever conscious of had been crushed a decade later by a representative and multi-party politics. military junta, with a new constitutional Consequently the Kemalist regime regime that gave the military dominance accepted the formation of Turkey’s “second over elected politicians party,” the center-right Democrat Party Th e following fi fty years would see (DP) led by Adnan Menderes in 1946. Th is a “Turkish model,” that comprised of party contested the elections of 1950 with a quasi-military regime and a political the slogan, “Enough: Th e nation has the scene, defi ned by the fault line created word!” Th e DP was an heir to some of the by the 1960 coup: secularists became the liberal ideas of the Progressive Republican best allies of the military, seeing the latter Party, which had been closed down in as the “guardians of the republic”— the 1925 and was therefore more tolerant of republic being a euphemism for a Kemalist volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 77 oligarchy. “a planned economy”. By 1987, Özal Ironically, the Islamic camp, despite submitted Turkey’s application to the an Islamist swing in the 1970s and European Union (EU). Authoritarian 1980s under the leadership of Necmettin articles in the penal code, which banned Erbakan and his National View movement, “religious propaganda” and many other increasingly became the champion of “thought crimes,” were rescinded. Th e democracy. Th anks to the DP experience, tyrannical prohibitions on the Kurdish pious Muslims realised that they could language, which criminalised even bring their favorite politicians to power Kurdish songs, were, at-least partly, lifted and tame an otherwise oppressive state. (Özal had proudly noted that his mother was Kurdish, thus breaking the taboo on THE ÖZAL REVOLUTION the K-word). On September 12, 1980, Turkey once Özal also tried to restore respect for the again entered a new era in its political Ottomans, who for decades before had journey. Turkey’s generals launched been the bête noir of offi cial ideology. He another military coup and initiated a brutal articulated parallels between the Ottoman three-year-long military rule, during which Empire and the United States, arguing thousands of politicians and activists were that both granted diverse communities the jailed with widespread torture. When the freedom to exercise their religion, culture, generals scheduled national elections for and economic aspirations. 1983, they allowed only ‘newcomers’ to run Most Kemalists, unsurprisingly, for offi ce and consequently Turgut Özal, a despised Özal, seeing him as a counter- former bureaucrat and economist, and his revolutionary undoing all the great things newly formed Motherland Party came to Atatürk had done half a century earlier. power. Th e next ten years would be known Th e fact that he was both pro-Islamic and as “the Özal decade,” a revolutionary age pro-American even led some to suspect a of liberalisation during which the Islamo- Western plot to overthrow the Kemalist liberal synthesis, almost forgotten after Republic — a paranoia that would reach decades of forced amnesia, was reborn. its zenith in the 2000s, when the pro- As a member of a Naqshbandi Sufi Islamic AKP became the champion of the family, Özal was a devout believer in Islam. EU bid. But as a former employee of the World Özal also had his fans. Among them Bank and the private sector, he was also was a tiny group of liberal intellectuals a genuine believer in the market economy —most of them secular but not secularist and, in a broader sense, the American — who had been sidelined for decades in a idea of liberty. In the words of American political sphere dominated by the Kemalist journalist Robert Kaplan, Özal “loved to state, the Marxist Left, and the nationalist read the Koran and watch soap operas, to Right. Also in favor of Özal were the bang his head against the carpet in a Sufi country’s millions of Kurds, whose identity mosque and go to Texas barbecues.” It is had been systematically suppressed since this ability to transcend two seemingly the early years of the Republican era. Th e diff erent worlds that explains why as third and largest group of Özal supporters the most far-reaching Turkish leader was the Islamic camp. To them, he was since Atatürk, Özal was able to “restore not only a savior who eased the burdens religion to Turkey’s political space without of the ultra-secularist regime but also, as threatening the country’s pro-Western the fi rst Turkish prime minister to make a orientation.” pilgrimage to Mecca, he was the man who Özal based his policies on the notion returned religion to the public sphere and of “the three freedoms”— ideas, religion, respectability. and enterprise. Th us the economy opened With the Özal revolution, people in the up, abandoning decades-old Kemalist Islamic camp started to realise that their policies of protectionism, “statism,” and yearning for religious freedom could be

78 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE TURKISH MODEL OF GOVERNANCE AND THE ARAB SPRING satisfi ed by adopting Western-style liberal which seemed to herald an Islamist regime. democracy, rather than the Islamist utopia In response to this Islamist challenge, that the Islamist movement of Erbakan had on February 28, 1997, the military been promising. For decades, most of them initiated a process that later would be had perceived Kemalism, which claimed to dubbed “the post-modern coup.” Th e Westernise Turkey, as a natural extension generals orchestrated the whole Kemalist of the West. Th is started to change as “center”— the bureaucracy, the judiciary, these Islamic Turks learned more about the universities, and the “mainstream” the world. Th e liberal West, they realised, media — to force the government to was better than the illiberal “Westernisers” resign. Th e Welfare Party was closed down, at home. Th is was made more clear when resulting in a crackdown on Islamic groups some of the young headscarfed women, and their resources. In June 1997, the excluded from Turkish colleges, headed generals declared a long list of companies to universities in Europe and the United as “backward-minded” (i.e. too religious) States, where they found freedom and and promoted boycotts of their products. respect. Some Islamic leaders were put on trial for “establishing anti-secular organisations.” THE LAST COUP Some “undesirable” journalists were fi red In April 1993, Özal suddenly died and several were even discredited with fake of a heart attack at the age of sixty-six. documents prepared by the military. Following a huge public funeral, he Certain members of the Welfare Party, was buried at a site next to the Adnan including its rising star, Recep Tayyip Menderes Mausoleum — which he had Erdoğan, then mayor of Istanbul, were commissioned to be built in 1990 to honor given prison terms for “inciting hatred” his precursor, whom the military had against the Kemalist regime. “Erdoğan’s executed three decades earlier. political career is over,” some newspapers Th e next nine years in Turkish politics, wrote in September 1998. “From now on, until the arrival of the AKP in November he can’t even be a local governor.” Th e 2002, has sometimes been called “the lost speech that earned Erdoğan a ten-month decade,” because it saw a series of ineffi cient prison term was indeed harsh, but it also and unsuccessful coalitions that ultimately included an interesting remark that hinted led the country into a dreadful economic at the direction he would follow: “[Th e] crisis in 2001. However, this period also Western man has freedom of belief,” brought about some signifi cant changes Erdoğan said. “In Europe there is respect that transformed the Islamic camp. for worship, for the headscarf. Why not in One of the outcomes of Özal’s death Turkey?” was the resurgence of National View, the political Islamist movement led THE AKP’S PATH TO POST- by Necmettin Erbakan. In June 1996, ISLAMISM Erbakan’s Welfare Party built a coalition Following the 1997 coup, a more with the center-right party led by Tansu moderate group in the Welfare Party Çiller, who had previously been Turkey’s looked for a new vision. Led by Abdullah fi rst female prime minister. Th is dual Gül, probably the most sophisticated government lasted for a year, during which fi gure in the party’s ranks, this “reformist Erbakan found the chance to implement movement,” spoke more favorably of only a few of his ideas, such as building Western-style democracy and began to closer ties with other Muslim countries argue that “the state should be in the and hosting receptions for tarikat leaders service of the people, rather than a holy in his offi cial residence — all shocking to state that stands far above the people.” Th e the secular establishment. What provoked movement soon broke with National View the secularists even more though was his and joined forces with Erdoğan to form the rhetoric, and that of his party members, Justice and Development Party (AKP) in volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 79 August 2001. genuine, for a few good reasons. First, the From its fi rst day, the AKP declared that new direction that the AKP embraced, it was not “a political party with a religious “democratic conservatism,” was not axis”; it defi ned its ideology as “democratic unheard-of in Turkey. Quite the contrary; conservatism.” In November 2002, just it had its roots, as we have seen, among the over a year after its founding, the AKP won Islamic liberals of the Ottoman Empire the general elections with 32 percent of the as well as in the center-right tradition votes and took power. To the surprise of of Turkish politics represented by the the whole world, this post-Islamist party Progressive Republican Party in 1924, by initiated a staggering number and scope of Menderes between 1950 and 1960, and by democratic reforms”, and turned out to be Özal between 1983 and 1993. a most dedicated and successful pursuer of Second, the AKP’s political Turkey’s bid to join the EU. transformation was in line with the Th is might well have been interpreted as changing intellectual landscape in Turkey. a historic defeat for Turkish Islamism, but Classical liberalism, an idea popular in the the Kemalists believed the exact opposite. late Ottoman Empire but denounced by Th ey had never trusted the AKP, and the Kemalist Republic, was rediscovered insisted on calling its members “Islamists,” in the late 1980s, thanks to the reforms of asserting that the party’s transformation Özal and the eff orts of new organisations was just a trick to deceive outsiders. such as the Ankara-based Association for Some of the conspiracy theories were Liberal Th inking. Th e nascent group of mind-boggling. In 2007, for example, a liberal intellectuals was critical of Kemalist staunchly Kemalist author, Ergun Poyraz, secularism and in favor of broader religious produced a series of bestsellers arguing freedom. Th eir growing interaction with that both Erdoğan and Gül were “secret Islamic conservatives gave the latter Jews” collaborating with “international new perspective and rhetoric. Hence, Zionism” in order to destroy Atatürk’s from the early 1990s onward, Islamic republic and enslave the Turkish nation. intellectuals started to question the idea of Th is anti-Semitic lunacy was just one of the “an Islamic state” and instead spoke of “a many signs of the amazing transformation non-ideological state” or “a neutral state,” occurring in the political landscape. defending “pluralism” as their social ideal. Th e AKP’s outreach to the West had In 1998, the infl uential Gülen turned the tables, and now the Kemalists, Movement, an Islamic community, who were also horrifi ed that the EU was organised a conference entitled “Islam and asking for more rights for Kurds and Secularism,” attended by a handful of the other minorities, had started to turn most prominent theologians and Islamic anti-Western. Yet the Kemalists were not pundits of Turkey. Following three days alone in suspecting that the AKP had a of discussion, they declared that Islam and “hidden agenda.” Some Western observers the secular state were compatible, as long as also believed that any party made up of the latter respected religious freedom. Th e devout Muslims must be illiberal and modernist theologian who championed this undemocratic. Critics could certainly view, Mehmet Aydın, promoted “liberal point to traces of Islamist sentiment in democratic culture” for the whole Muslim the AKP’s ranks, along with the typical world, and would become the minister problems of Turkey’s patrimonial politics, responsible for the Directorate of Religious including nepotism and corruption. Aff airs (Diyanet) in the AKP’s fi rst term. Erdoğan also showed signs of what can Th e third factor that helps to explain the be called “Muslim nationalism”—or transformation of the AKP was a gift from simply “Muslimism”—in the way he Özal to Turkey: free market capitalism. demonstrated an emotional affi nity for Ultimately it was this factor that was so Muslim actors around the world. defi nitive and vital to the change in Turkish Yet the AKP’s post-Islamist position was Islam.

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THE RISE OF ISLAMIC him were also afraid of “being outclassed CAPITALISM by people who had no taste for secularism.” As I argue in my book, Islam Without Pamuk’s fears would start to be realised Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty, Islam a few decades later, during the Özal was born as a business-friendly religion. Revolution. By liberalising the economy, Th e subsequent rise of “Islamic capitalism” diminishing the role of the state, and facilitated the dynamism and splendor personally inspiring a religiously devout of Islamic civilisation, while its decline and economically entrepreneurial spirit, resulted in the stagnation and eventual Özal created a space for Islamic-minded decline of Islamdom. Th e Ottomans entrepreneurs. As early as the late 1980s, realised — albeit quite belatedly — the economists started to talk about the importance of private business and tried “Anatolian Tigers”— companies founded to jumpstart it via some of its Tanzimat in the conservative cities of Anatolia reforms. However, even though the that quickly utilised the groundbreaking Ottoman eff orts led to the appearance of a opportunities for manufacturing and Muslim middle class, the development was exporting in the brave new world of the very limited in scope and the bourgeoisie free market, but who also had their roots remained primarily non-Muslim until the in Islamic practice. For example in 1990, fall of the empire. a group of these conservative businessmen Th is explains why the Young Turks, created a union named MÜSIAD, a and later the Kemalists, sought to create clear alternative to the well-established a “national bourgeoisie” that had state TÜSIAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and support. Th ey were successful to a certain Businessmen’s Association), which degree, but it occurred by unfair methods. represented the more secular “Istanbul An “opportunity” for Turkish capitalists bourgeoisie.” Th e letter “M” stood for had opened up because of the wartime the word müstakil, or “independent,” but expulsion of Armenians — a tragic many thought it actually meant “Muslim,” decision that led to sporadic mass murders as most MÜSIAD members are mosque- — and later a “population exchange” with going conservatives whose wives and Greece. Th e Kemalist regime also imposed daughters wear headscarves. a hefty “wealth tax” on Jews, Greeks, In 1994, MÜSIAD published an Islamic and Armenians between 1942 and 1944, economic manifesto in a booklet titled under a cabinet with Nazi sympathisers. Homo Islamicus. Th e document encouraged Th ose unable to pay, in line with the dark hard work and free trade, referring Turks standards of the time, were sent to a labor to the life of the Prophet Muhammad as camp in Eastern Turkey. a merchant. It vigorously defended the Both the formation and the composition free market system and opposed the state’s of this state-made “national bourgeoisie” intrusive role in the economy. It also added were unfair. Only urbanites who could that theirs was a capitalism tamed by the wine and dine the secular politicians and compassionate and altruistic values of bureaucrats received lucrative contracts Islam, not a “ruthless” one. and loans from the state. By the end of the 1940s, the Kemalist “center” had THE ‘CALVINISTS’ OF ISLAM successfully created a business elite in its One of the urban centers that gave rise own likeness. to the Anatolian Tigers was Kayseri, a Meanwhile, religion survived mainly mid-size city in the heartland of Turkey. among the less privileged. “Th e nation- Kayserians had always been famous for state belonged more to us than to the both business-mindedness and religiosity, religious poor,” says Orhan Pamuk, but they had their great leap forward Turkey’s Nobel laureate in literature, courtesy of the Özal Revolution. From the recalling his childhood days in 1950s mid-1980s onward, the city experienced Istanbul. He adds that secular people like an industrial boom, with hundreds of volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 81 new factories being opened. By the mid- more than $300 million in fi ve years 2000s, just one of its textile companies to support clinics, schools, and various produced one percent of the world’s denim other charitable organizations. By 2005, jeans including for brands such as Levi’s, sixteen separate soup kitchens in the city Wrangler, and Diesel. Kayseri’s furniture were serving almost ten thousand people companies supplied 70 percent of the daily. Kayseri’s culture was a combination Turkish market and exported their wares of “entrepreneurship, asceticism, and to many countries in the Middle East. altruism.” In 2005, a Berlin-based think-tank, Th e AKP’s political transformation the European Stability Initiative (ESI), was not unrelated to the interests of these studied Kayseri to understand the secret Islamic Calvinists. Th e latter needed a of its economic miracle. After several Turkey that could be integrated into the weeks conducting interviews with the global economy, anchored in the EU, and city’s prominent businessmen, the ESI that had closer ties with all the neighboring team wrote a report that emphasised the countries — the exact strategy of the AKP. curious role of religion in the motivation It is no wonder therefore that all of the of these entrepreneurs. “Nine out of ten “Islamic Calvinists” were supporters of of one’s fate depends on commerce and Erdoğan and Gül, and Kayseri was in eff ect courage,” one of the Kayseri businessmen an AKP city, giving the party a staggering said, quoting the Prophet Muhammad. 66 percent of its votes in 2007. Another businessman argued, “It is good for a religious person to work hard... [and] THE MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASS to open a factory is a kind of prayer.” Th e In July 2009, the founder of MÜSIAD, founder of a furniture company stated, “I Erol Yarar, a practicing Muslim, gave an see no black and white opposition between interview to a Turkish newspaper, sparking being modern and [being] traditional,” a nationwide debate. Th e headline read, and said that he was “open to innovation.” “We Are the Real Bourgeois Class of “To understand Kayseri,” the former Turkey.” Yarar argued that while some big mayor of the town, Şükrü Karatepe, told businesses were supported by the state, “we the ESI researchers, “one must read Max grew with our own eff ort, much like the Weber.” Weber, of course, pointed to the bourgeoisie in Europe.” role that ascetic and hardworking ethic of Yarar also noted something signifi cant: early Protestants, particularly Calvinists, on the one hand, Muslim entrepreneurs played in the rise of modern capitalism were creating a capitalism inspired by in Europe. According to Karatepe, one their religious values; on the other hand, could observe the same work ethic in their religious values were being altered by Kayseri and a few other Anatolian cities, their engagement in capitalism. “When thanks to the teachings of Islam. Fittingly, we held our fi rst meeting in a fi ve star the ESI researchers titled their report hotel,” he recalled, “some of our friends “Islamic Calvinists.” Th eir conclusion was [in MÜSIAD] were asking, ‘what are that Kayseri was only a single case study, we doing here?’ Most of them had never and, in general, “over the past decade traveled abroad and were hostile to Europe, [1995–2005], individualistic, pro-business America, and Russia... Th ey wanted to currents [had] become prominent within leave their companies to their sons, and did Turkish Islam.” not care much about the education of their Th ese “individualistic, pro-business daughters. Since then, these wrong notions currents” were certainly capitalist, but have changed a lot. Now they are traveling not materialist, hedonist, or selfi sh. to Europe just to see it more and more... Quite the contrary, they went hand Recently, I entered a little mosque in a big in hand with a strong sense of social shopping mall in Istanbul. I looked at the responsibility, as emphasised by Islam. shoes; they were all high-quality brands! Kayseri’s Islamic entrepreneurs spent Th is is the revolution that is taking place

82 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE TURKISH MODEL OF GOVERNANCE AND THE ARAB SPRING in Turkey.” “Islamic novels” in Turkey. Th e change In other words, engagement with the became clear when he contrasted two eras modern world as equal partners has of novels — the fi rst being the 1980s, the ameliorated formerly negative attitudes second starting from the mid-1990s. In toward it. Th e experiences of these Muslim the fi rst era, all of the characters in these businessmen are quite diff erent from an novels were clear-cut fi gures — immoral engagement with the modern world as secularists versus exemplary Muslims. its victims — as Muslims under Western Each story had a hero who, after some occupation or a secularist dictatorship soul-searching, saw the light and became would see themselves. It is also diff erent a devotee of “the Islamic cause.” Even his from the feeling of being the modern marriage was about “raising good kids for world’s outsiders, as many marginalised Islam,” and not focused on romance and Muslim immigrants in European societies love. feel. In the second era, though, the characters in the “Islamic novels” became much more The demand for a “shari'a real and their stories more complex. Now the secular fi gures were not necessarily all state” in Turkish society bad, and the Islamic ones were more human had fallen from 21 — with sins, self-doubts, and love stories. Moreover, criticism was now directed not percent to 9 percent in only to the outsiders but also to the Islamic just seven years. camp itself. One of the female authors, whose earlier novels idealised “the Islamic way of life,” was now criticising injustices Th e Islamic Calvinists have also created within the Islamic community, such as a new generation of Muslim professionals. misogynist husbands who adopt mistresses In just two decades — from the mid- as “second wives.” 1980s to the mid-2000s — a “Muslim In short, in the words of sociologist middle class” emerged, to the shock of the Kenan Çayır, Islamic literature shifted secularists. As its social context changed, from “a rhetoric of collective salvation” to this middle class started to change its “new individualistic Muslimhoods.” All political attitudes. One example was of this is directly related to the changing the decline of Islamism. A public survey socio-economic background of the writers conducted by a liberal Turkish think-tank and their readers. Th e Islamic novels of in 2006 (when the AKP was in power) the 1980s “refl ected the experiences of showed that the demand for a “shari'a the newcomers to the big cities... people state” in Turkish society had fallen from of the lower class.” However in the late 21 percent to 9 percent in just seven years. 1990s, those people were no longer When questions were asked about some newcomers; “they had found modern extreme measures of the shari’a, such jobs as engineers, mayors, businessmen, as stoning, this support dropped to one and businesswomen.” No wonder that in percent. this era, the old “salvation novels” and “Ah, those idealist mujahids of the other “ideological books” did not sell 70s,” wrote an Islamic pundit in 2009, well anymore. What instead had become “now they all have become money making popular were books about personal müteahhids [i.e., building contractors].” development. As pious Muslims entered In addition to its changed outlook on the urban middle class, in other words, political life, this new Muslim middle class their understanding of religion became less started to develop a whole new culture. ideological and more individualistic. An interesting study that demonstrates In 2009, an Islamic Turkish intellectual this transformation comes from a Turkish summed up the change: the modernising sociologist, who examined the content of Muslims of Turkey, he wrote, were now volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 83 THE TURKISH MODEL OF GOVERNANCE AND THE ARAB SPRING

more interested to hear about “the Koran if other Muslim nations would ever need and freedom” rather than “the Koran and one. obedience.” The above is an adaptation by the author from his book, Islam Without Extremes – The Muslim Case for Liberty (W. W. Norton THE TURKISH MODEL — & Co. / 2011). DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET ECONOMY? *Mustafa Akyol is a columnist for two Turkish newspapers, Hürriyet Daily News and Star. His articles Th is is the story that lies behind the have also appeared in Foreign Aff airs, Newsweek, New makeup and the success of Turkey’s AKP York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, The Guardian and many other publications. He studied — a party which still contains some traits political science and history at the Boğaziçi University of Turkey’s intrinsically authoritarian in Istanbul, where he still lives. His book, Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty, An Argument for political culture, but whose post-Islamist “Muslim Liberalism,” was published by W.W. Norton transformation has been genuine and in July 2011. The book was described by the Financial Times in 2011 as “a forthright and elegant Muslim signifi cant. In it perhaps are lessons for defense of freedom.” countries emerging from the shadows of the Arab Spring. In a nutshell, what has happened in Turkey in the past eighty years is that the society has not become as thoroughly secularised as the Kemalist Revolution intended. A large part of the society remained piously Muslim but, thanks to their access to democracy since 1950, these pious Muslim Turks never followed a radical, let alone violent, agenda. Instead of opposing democracy — as some Middle Eastern Islamists have done — Turkey’s Islamic movements gradually became the champions of democracy. On the other hand, the expanded market economy, along with urbanisation, gradually closed the gap between the urban seculars and the formerly rural conservatives and “Islamist Calvinists”. Th is is important, for throughout the whole Middle East, the secularist-Islamist divide is often also a class confl ict — the rich versus the poor. Turkey’s “Islamist Calvinists” have overcome this added layer, making themselves as cosmopolitan- minded as, or sometimes even more than, the secularists. Th erefore, one could well say that while Interested Turkey’s secret lies less in secularist legacy in writing of Atatürk — it equally is infl uenced from the “conservative” legacy of Menderes, for Arches? Özal, and lately Erdoğan. Atatürk’s vision was based on a rejection and suppression E-mail your interests and ideas to of Islam for the sake of modernity. Th e [email protected] latter›s vision, however, is about how to be modern and Muslim at the same time. thecordobafoundation.com Th erein lies the better “Turkish model,”

84 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BOOK PROMOTION

After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies BY CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIDSON

Th e Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia and its fi ve smallers neighbours: the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,K Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain) have long beenb governed by highly autocratic and seemingly anachronistica regimes. Yet despite bloody confl icts ono their doorsteps, fast-growing populations, anda powerful modernising and globalising forces impactingi on their largely conservative societies, theyt have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Obituaries for these traditional monarchies have frequently been penned, but even now these absolutist, almost medieval, entities still appear to pose the same conundrum as before: in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring and the fall of incumbent presidents in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, the apparently steadfast Gulf monarchies have, at fi rst glance, re-affi rmed their status as the Middle East s only real bastions of stability.

In After the Sheikhs, however, Gulf expert Christopher Davidson contends that the collapse of these kings, emirs, and sultans is going to happen, and was always going to. While the revolutionary movements in North Africa, Syria, and Yemen will undeniably serve as important, if indirect, catalysts for the coming upheaval, many of the same socio-economic pressures that were building up in the Arab republics are now also very much present in the Gulf monarchies. It is now no longer a matter of if but when the West s steadfast allies fall. Th is is a bold claim to make but Davidson, who accurately forecast the economic turmoil that affl icted Dubai in 2009, has an enviable record in diagnosing social and political changes afoot in the region.

After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies by Christopher M. Davidson. Published in November 2012 by C Hurst & Co Publishers.

volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 85 The Muslim Brotherhood from Opposition to Governance: Examining Classical and Contemporary Political Literature

SONDOS ASEM

he Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) cultural and political hegemony. Th e electoral victories after the January intellectual legacy of Jamal al-Din al- T25 revolution, have spurred the Afghani (1938-97), Mohamed Abdu anxiety of a plethora of domestic and (1849-1905), and Rashid Rida (1865- international observers concerned about 1935) had a profound eff ect on Banna’s the future of democracy, and the civil conception of Islam as a religion and a state state under Islamic governance. Th is paper (din wa dawla), and the need to revive the revisits the Brotherhood’s literature on the Islamic spirit of the nation vis-a-vis two dichotomy of “Shari’a and governance” to kinds of imperialism, foreign occupation, contextualise the current political vision and domestic political corruption and of the Freedom and Justice Party, and subservience to the occupying power forecast the extent to which it might evolve (Mitchell, p.218; Ghanim, pp.15-46). in years to come. Banna’s contribution was crystallised in Th e Brotherhood’s current conception his original approach, combining religious of the civil state, Shari’a, and democracy preaching with grass-roots mobilisation did not materialise overnight, rather it is and activism based on a comprehensive the culmination of 84 years of social and understanding of Islam (al-fahm al- political endeavors and constant revisions shamil). In that sense, he defi ned the MB by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a as a Salafi message, a Sufi way, a political movement, as well as Islamic thinkers entity, an athletic group, a culture and and jurists inspired by the Brotherhood’s knowledge league, an economic enterprise, school of thought. Not only did the MB and a social school of thought (al-Banna, usher in generations of practicing Muslims 2011, p.121). Th rough a gradual method worldwide who espoused its socio-religious (tadarruj), Banna sought to establish an ideology, but even more signifi cantly, it Islamic order starting with reforming introduced a distinct Islamic political the Muslim individual, then reforming school of thought that continues to shape society and the political system, with the the core ideology of leading Islamic ultimate goal of forming a “League of political parties in Muslim-majority Islamic States”, which would embody the countries, including Turkey, Tunisia, historical notion of Caliphate and thus Morocco, Jordan, among others. restore the long-awaited Muslim glory and renaissance. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S CLASSICAL LITERATURE (1928- SHARI’A 1960S) On top of the debates pertaining to the Hasan al-Banna’s (1906-1949) school MB’s political vision lies the contentious of thought emerged at the climax of the issue of “applying Shari’a” combined Islamic awakening of the late 19th and with speculations about how that would early 20th centuries. Th is era witnessed the jeopardise the civil state, particularly with rise of Muslim reformers dismayed at the Egypt’s new constitution underway. Does declining Islamic civilisation in the face the MB seek to apply Shari’a rulings, of Western colonialism and its subsequent including criminal punishments, or will

86 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FROM OPPOSITION TO GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL LITERATURE it reconcile Shari’a with universal secular for insistence on freedom from the past (natural) laws and liberal values? And was a necessary prelude to the assertion what about Maqasid al-Shari’a, frequently that the Shari’a was general, fl exible, mentioned in MB’s discourse and electoral developing, and universal in scope, that campaigns? To answer these questions, it prescribed the principles of action it is necessary to explore the original necessary for progress and happiness in all times and places” (Mitchell, 1969, p.238). Banna sought to create Th is understanding of Shari’a was in line with the Maqasid approach. Maqasid an Islamic order (Nidham (i.e. objectives of Shari’a) as a methodology Islami) with Shari’a as its seeks to explain the divine intents and moral principles -- such as justice, dignity, cornerstone. and human rights -- upon which Islamic law is based. In that sense, it provides areas Brotherhood rhetoric in that regard and of common grounds between the Islamic how it evolved. In fact, the Brotherhood’s civilisation and contemporary universal conception of Shari’a is one area which sets human rights principles incorporated in the Brotherhood’s school of thought apart modern constitutions and international from literalist Islamic trends. law, while preserving the exclusive Banna sought to create an Islamic identity of Muslim-majority countries and order (Nidham Islami) with Shari’a as its providing religious motives for committing cornerstone. Unlike other civilisations to the laws of the land. Th e rational basis of which could dispense with religious Maqasid according to Islamic theorists is institutions, the Islamic civilisation to achieve the interest of humanity by the without the Shari’a was meaningless preservation of God-given blessings such and doomed to failure. “We want to be as mind, soul, and off spring (Auda, 2008; distinguished by our own values and the Chapra, 2008). qualities of our life as a great nation,” said Maqasid al-Sharia draws a fi ne line Banna in one of his messages (quoted in between acts of worship and worldly Mitchell, p.242). Shari’a, as conceived transactions, crimes and sins, and the by Hassan al-Banna, refers to the set of civil and the religious in the application principles and rulings derived from the of Shari’a (Auda, 2012). As 8th century Divine revelation (Th e Qur’an) and the Muslim scholar Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi deeds and sayings of Prophet Muhammad explains, “Literal compliance is the default - the Sunna - taken from authentic sources. methodology in the areas of acts of worship, Fiqh (Jurisprudence) refers to the while the consideration of purposes is human interpretation of these rules. Th is the default methodology in the area of understanding was coupled with the worldly dealings” (quoted in Auda, 2008, rejection of imitation of juristic traditions p.11). Moreover, sins are not equivalent to (taqlid), thus depriving jurists of sacredness, crimes. For instance, drinking alcohol in while encouraging constant renewal of a private space is not punishable by law. Islam (tajdid) as a religious necessity. It’s a sin, not a crime. It only becomes a Furthermore, opening the door of human crime when it harms the rest of society reasoning (ijtihad) was central to MB’s by public drunkenness, for example. Th e approach to jurisprudence, besides analogy state’s job is merely to preserve public (qiyas), consensus (ijma’), and deduction interest. If it abuses that role by interfering (istidlal) as tools of renewing religion. Th e in the citizens’ private sphere, it would be ultimate objective of legislation was to deviating from its original mission (Auda, achieve “the general welfare” (al-maslaha 2012, pp. 93-98). al-‘amma) (Dostourona, 2012; al-Banna, Maqasid al-Shari’a also resolves the 2011, pp. 313-333). “A Shari’a so viewed dilemma of the scope of the religious vs. was eminently less diffi cult to cope with, the civil in the application of Shari’a. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 87 Whereas some political theorists defi ne truly Islamic society. Th e same vision the civil as anything but religious, in the is reiterated in the contemporary MB Arab and Islamic contexts this defi nition thought, exemplifi ed by Qaradawi.1 For is untenable. As Jasser Auda explains, there instance, a thief can only be sentenced are three levels of public aff airs according to the ultimate punishment (cutting off to Shari’a: the only-religious, the only- hands) if the state has already provided civil, and the grey zone in between. As for him/her with suffi cient food, clothing, and the fi rst, i.e. the only-religious, it refers to shelter. Similarly, an adulterer/adulteress the private sphere which has nothing to can only be convicted if caught in the act do with the state’s institutional structure by four eye witnesses, which renders this or laws. Th is includes matters of faith, sentence highly unlikely in a Muslim- and applies to Islam and Christianity in majority nation (Mitchell, 1969, p.241; al- the Egyptian context. Secondly, the only- Banna, “Dostorona”; Al-Ghazzali, Islam civil is the equivalent of the public sphere and our Economic Conditions; Awda, 1985; in modern political theories. It relates to Qutb, 1993; al-Hudaybi, 1977). the state and its offi cial and semi-offi cial According to Banna, the application institutions, which are not directly linked of Shari’a is what makes a state “Islamic”. to religion, but can be guided by its If the ruler fails to apply it, he can no universal values and principles such as longer claim to be an Islamic head of fairness and equality. Th e overlapping area state. Similarly, if the nation (Umma) between the civil and the religious has to accepts violation of divine laws, it does not be based on national consensus, such as deserve the label “Islamic”. Every Muslim laws pertaining to personal aff airs where nation should oblige the ruler to abide religious groups choose to refer to their by Shari’a law in governing the nation, relevant religious laws (Auda, 2012, pp. while safeguarding religious freedom and 69-80). protecting religion from any distortion (al- Th e Brotherhood’s school of thought Banna, 1948). advocates the above understanding of Shari’a by supporting checks and balances THE CONSTITUTION against the state’s interference in the In response to reports about pictures personal sphere of citizens. Additionally, circulating in Swedish media which showed the MB subscribes to contemporary soldiers with mutilated hands, allegedly Islamic scholarship, as refl ected in the cut off by Muslim fundamentalists, works of Rashid Rida, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Banna realised how Shari’a has been and Mohamed al-Ghazzali, which induced misconceived. He wrote an article titled universal Maqasid directly from Islamic “Our Constitution” (Dostourona) to clarify texts (Qur’an and Sunna) rather than the the MB’s position in that regard.2 Th e strict reliance on the traditional Islamic Qur’an is not merely composed of laws, legal schools (Auda, 2008). Al-Sayyid Banna mentioned, but it also provides Sabiq, a leading twentieth century jurist a set of values and principles that would affi liated with the Brotherhood, was contribute to the welfare of society. He assigned by Banna to author a work that advocated the understanding of the Quran refl ects this approach, which materialised as a “way of life” unconfi ned to rulings. in his Fiqh al-Sunna, which remains one It provides answers to all issues faced by of the Muslim world’s best-selling texts on the Muslim Umma: these answers are Islamic Jurisprudence (Desouki, A., 2012). sometimes expressed in general terms, Regarding the often feared Hudud and sometimes specifi cally. In those issues (Shari’a-based criminal punishments), which the Qur’an did not address in detail, Banna, as well as other classical MB Muslims are mandated to fi nd out how thinkers such as Abdel Qader Awda, to deal with them, provided they abide and Hassan al-Hudaybi, explain that by the general principles outlined in the they could not be applied except in a Qur’an. Furthermore, Banna goes on to

88 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FROM OPPOSITION TO GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL LITERATURE explain the components of Qur’anic law, fi nancial, and military. Th e president is stating that Muslims are required to abide the supreme leader of the Armed Forces. by all the rulings regarding rituals, human Although the president’s tenure is for life, he transactions, punishments, and the verses is to be held accountable and should stand stipulating the relation between the ruler trial as an ordinary citizen if he violates the and the ruled. Non-Muslims are free to law. Chapter 4 on civil rights states that all refer to Islamic laws or their own in matters humans (al-nas) are born equal in dignity, of personal or family laws. In areas where rights, and freedoms, and that there is no Christianity does not include relevant discrimination based on race, religion, laws, such as commercial transactions, color, or language. Moreover, it includes Islamic laws can suffi ce as the reference articles that safeguard freedom of speech, (Dostourona, 2012). expression, faith, thought, and assembly. Th e fi rst comprehensive vision for an Based on the above, the concept of Islamic constitution proposed by the MB sovereignty of God versus the authority of was drafted in 1952, by the movement’s the nation is clearly defi ned. Th e people are legal committee. Law Professor Taha the ultimate source of power, and the rulers Badawi authored 103 articles under the are only there to serve the public interest in supervision of Chancellor Mohamed accordance with the Islamic principles of Kamel, the chairman of the MB’s legal good governance (MB Constitution, 1952; committee. After extensive consultations, Chapra, 2008). a fi nal draft was approved and offi cially In contemporary Brotherhood literature, endorsed by the MB, published at however, including the 2011 Freedom the movement’s printing houses, then and Justice Party (FJP) platform, this publicised as the MB’s proposal for a new classical vision has been reviewed to adapt constitution based on Islamic principles. to the changing contexts. For instance, Th e constitution defi nes the Egyptian the Brotherhood today rejects the idea state as Islamic, with a parliamentary of “president for life” while favoring a system. Th e members of parliament, as presidential tenure limited to two terms. well as the president, must vow to “respect Further, the 2011 party platform of the FJP the constitution.” It is noteworthy that the as well as the 2012 Nahda Project clearly constitution does not specify the religion defi ne the state as “civil”, a term which of the president or members of parliament. did not exist in the old rhetoric. However, However, all legislation is to be based on the meaning of the word “civil” according “the teachings of Islam”, and article 97 to MB refl ects its classical understanding stipulates that Islam is the religion of the of the “Islamic State”, namely that it can state. Th e powers of the state are divided neither be a theocracy nor a military state. into fi ve: the legislative, executive, judicial, Th e FJP’s 2011 platform clearly stands by democracy, civil liberties and universal human rights principles. Nevertheless, The people are the to reassure skeptics and build consensus ultimate source of ahead of elections, the MB and FJP were power, and the rulers signatories to other documents stipulating the principles of the new constitution. are only there to serve Th e fi rst was the Democratic Alliance the public interest in document,3 proposed by the MB in March 2011, and supported by the majority of accordance with the liberal and leftist parties, and the second Islamic principles of was the Al-Azhar Document4, proposed in good governance (MB January 2012 by the Imam of Al-Azhar. Th e two referred to the Objectives of Constitution, 1952). Shari’a as the main source of legislation, and included articles upholding freedom volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 89 of religion and worship, civil liberties, and objectives of Shari’a, such as justice and the right of non-Muslims to refer to their good governance, not an end in its own personal and family laws -- which were right. Moreover, the term Caliphate, in signed by most parties from across the Banna’s defi nition, is equivalent to the political spectrum. Th ese initiatives were a union of states adopting that vision (al- testimony that the Egyptian political arena Banna, 2011, p. 146). Th us, the concept after the revolution was not polarised over of Caliphate in the original MB political the Islamic reference of the constitution. thinking was not simply the replication of Indeed, Egypt enjoys a broad consensus the historical notion of Th e Four Rightly among Muslims and non-Muslims that Guided Caliphates, but rather upholding the Maqasid reference preserves citizenship the principles and values that prevailed at rights and refl ects the identity of the that early time in Muslim history--viewed nation. by the majority of Muslims as the ideal form of just rule (Moten, 1996; Qaradawi, GOVERNMENT FOR THE 2001; Ghanim, 1992). Moreover, the name MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD given to the ruler-whether Imam, Khalifah, Islam, said Hassan al-Banna, laid or President, or any other--is unimportant, out the principles of governance while since the idea of good governance in clarifying the rights and obligations of accordance with Shari’a is what matters the ruler and the ruled (al-Banna, 2011, (Mitchell, 1969; Moten, 1996). p. 313). Regarding the Islamic system of Additionally, the classical MB literature government according to Banna, it should emphasises that the people are the sole be based on four principles: accountability source of authority. Th e relationship of the ruler; unity of the nation; Shura; between the ruler and the people, as and the nation as the source of authority. described by Banna, is a “social contract” Th e objective of government is to protect where the ruler is a “trustee” and “agent” the public interest, by achieving equality (‘amil wa ajir), which conveys a sense and justice. Rights of non-Muslim citizens of accountability and limited authority must be respected: “they have the same without any exclusive divine right. rights and obligations as Muslims,” said Hereditary or authoritarian rule, based on Banna, echoing the words of Ali, the last the above conditions, is not a possibility Caliph, regarding the treatment of non- under sound Islamic governance. Muslims “lahum ma lana wa ‘alayhim ma Banna endorsed the Egyptian ‘alayna” (al-Banna, 2011, pp.313-333). Parliamentary system of his time as an Th e exact nature of the Islamic state acceptable form of government compatible has not been specifi ed, neither by Banna with Islam. He cited two systems as nor by Islamic political theorists to date potential models to be adopted: the British (Moten, 1996; Qaradawi, 2001; Ghanim, parliamentary pattern, and the American 1992). In early MB ideologue Sayyid Qutb presidential one. Th ough he did not object stated, “When we come to discuss political to the former, he favored the latter type and economic theory from the practical of government as more representative point of view of the state, we fi nd that of public will, probably because of the the course of history shows an exemplary corrupted Egyptian parliamentary system failure in the life of Islam” (quoted in at that time (Mitchell, 1969, p.246;al- Mitchell, p. 245). However, Muslim Banna, 2011, pp. 131-133). thinkers have only agreed on a set of Th e ruler of an Islamic state, as put values and principles that defi ne the state, forth by Banna and early MB thinkers, and left the type of government to every has to have certain qualities. Th ese nation’s free choice based on diff erent include: being Muslim, male, adult, sane, historical and geographical contexts. healthy, knowledgeable in Shari’a, just, Th erefore, the Islamic state, scholars agree, pious, virtuous, and capable of leading is only a means to achieve the ultimate the nation. Th e tenure of the head of an

90 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FROM OPPOSITION TO GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL LITERATURE Islamic state, according to Banna, may support the majority decisions. Parliament be for life, and this is to be left to the is authorised to discuss all issues except nation to decide. However, the nation those that bear a single view, such as the has the right to remove him from power established scientifi c facts and religious whenever he deviates from just rule. Th e tenets (Mitchell, 1969, p.248). nation, i.e. the people, are the source of According to Awda and Said Ramadan, all the ruler’s authority. Th e relationship as cited in Mitchell, and similar to between the ruler and the people, as the system put forward in the 1952 described by Banna, is a “social contract” constitutional proposal mentioned above, where the ruler is a “trustee” and “agent” the Islamic state composes of fi ve powers: (‘amil wa ajir). Hereditary rule, based on 1) executive: the ruler; 2) legislative: shared the above conditions, is not a possibility between the ruler and parliament; 3) under sound Islamic governance according judiciary: independent, and nominated by to the Muslim Brotherhood (Mitchell, the ruler; 4) fi nancial power: appointed by 1969; Qutb, 1993; Awda, Islam and our the ruler and accountable to the people; 5) Political Conditions; Al-Ghazzali, Islam the power of control and reform: belongs and Despotism). to the people and exercised through the elected parliament (Mitchell, p.249). ELECTIONS Commenting on the above clarifi cation of Banna and early MB theorists the powers in the Islamic state, Mitchell endorsed elections as the means for concludes: selecting representatives in the legislative “Th e Islamic state, thus outlined, would and executive branches of government be unique … it would not be a theocracy (Mitchell, 1969; al-Hudaybi, 1977; Awda, because the authority of the ruler derives Islam and our Political Conditions). Awda from man not God; it would not be a proposed three stages for the election of the dictatorship because the ruled may remove executive ruler in a parliamentary system: their ruler if he breaks his contract; and it 1) nomination by the previous ruler or by would not be a monarchy because the ruler the Members of Parliament; 2) selection has no hereditary authority” (p.249). and acceptance by Members of Parliament (MPs); 3) oath of loyalty (bay’a) in which Taking part in elections the ruler vows to govern by Shari’a (the Qur’an and Sunna) and with justice. Th e did not contradict with ruler is then responsible for all his acts, the slogan “the Qur’an has no special privilege, and is to be held accountable before the law (Mitchell, is our constitution” (Al- 1969, p.247). Banna, 1941). Regarding the parliament (ahl al-shura), its members must also be elected by free popular will. To be eligible for the post, Although Banna ran for parliamentary Banna suggests, members of parliament elections twice in the 1940s, he never should have t wo qua lities: they have genera l made it into parliament due to resistance knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, by the British-controlled prime ministers and are practiced in leadership (Al- at that time, Mustafa al-Nahhas and Banna, 2011, pp. 131-133). According to Ahmad Maher. Banna listed three reasons Awda, the majority of MPs should have for running: spreading the Islamic call suffi cient legal knowledge. A number of (Da’wa) through politics; the weakness MPs should also be specialists in various of the existing political parties; and scientifi c fi elds as required by the needs of challenging the government’s restriction the nation. Parliament is to take decisions of MB social activities. Th e principles of after debating the issues and reaching a Shura, freedom, and the nation as the majority vote, while the minority should source of authority were compatible with volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 91 Islam, Banna said, and therefore taking majority of Muslim theorists, should be part in elections did not contradict with defi ned by Muslims depending on the the slogan “the Qur’an is our constitution” specifi city of time, place, and political (Al-Banna, 1941). Th e political platform realities. of Banna called for an Islamic state and Banna viewed the Caliphate as “a proposed solutions to the prevailing socio- symbol of Islamic unity” representing economic problems. It included programs the close bonds that should exist among on the revitalisation of industry and the Muslim-majority nations. It is imperative economy, and encouraged small enterprises on all Muslims to work for the realisation and the creation of national companies.5 of that goal, which requires several steps: cultural, social, and economic cooperation POLITICAL PARTIES between Muslim countries, regional Despite Banna’s clear endorsement alliances and treaties, jointly-sponsored of the Western form of parliamentary conventions and conferences, and fi nally democracy of the time, he vehemently the formation of the “League of Islamic opposed partisan politics (or what he Nations” with an elected leader (Al-Banna, called hizbiyya) that prevailed under 2011, pp. 109-156). Th e Islamic Nation British occupation, on the grounds that (al-watan al-islami) is every land where a it only led to factionalism and disunity, Muslim lives. Contrary to the prevailing which further weakened the nation and nationalist paradigm, Islamic nationalism empowered the colonisers. Th e parties “transcends geographic boundaries, which Banna criticised were corrupt; political divisions, and the varieties of color, guided by personal interests of particular race, and languages because it is founded individuals; had no real programs; and were on the notion of unity of humankind … not elected through free and fair elections. divinely inspired by the triple principles Hence, Banna favored a parliamentary of Godliness, humanitarianism, and system without political parties, which he internationalism” (Mitchell, p.250). To believed was viable. Nevertheless, Banna advocate this goal, the MB founded a suggested the creation of a single political section devoted to fostering spiritual and party “with an Islamic reform program” cultural bonds among Islamic nations, and that represents the entire nation, citing the its publications were venues for advocating examples of Russia and Turkey at the time. international Muslim causes. He also stated that two-party systems, such as those of the US and Britain, were MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S successful examples that could be emulated CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE (Al-Banna, 2011, pp. 313-333). (1990-2012) While early MB literature (1928-1960s) THE CALIPHATE refl ected the post-colonial political and Th e concept of Caliphate (Khilafa) in cultural contexts, the recent literature the early MB literature was inspired by (1990-2012) marked the transformation of the age of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs (al- MB from exclusion to gradual integration Khulafa’ al-Rashidun), whose leadership into Egyptian politics. Th e period in of the Islamic nation was characterized between, 1970s to 1980s, witnessed the by Shura, just rule, and good governance. rebirth of the organisation after a decade Beside that of Prophet Muhammad’s rule of suppression under Nasserite rule (1956- in Madina, this short period in Muslim 1970). Contesting parliamentary elections history was the only acceptable example was a main highlight of that period. of an ideal Islamic polity (Mitchell, Following in the footsteps of Banna, some 1969; Ghanim, 1992; Moten, 1996). Th is Muslim Brothers decided to run for offi ce example, however, was a model in terms as independents in the years 1976 and of principles and values, not the system 1979. Taking advantage of the relative of government, which according to the political openness at the beginning of

92 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FROM OPPOSITION TO GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL LITERATURE Mubarak’s rule, the MB joined electoral law; repealing emergency law; allowing coalitions with liberal and leftist parties in the freedom to establish political parties; the 1980s, winning 8 seats in 1984 and 36 independent judicial supervision of seats in 1987 elections. Th e slogan “Islam elections; a parliamentary system of is the Solution” was used for the fi rst time government; the right of the People’s in the 1987 elections to refl ect MB’s call Assembly (lower house of parliament) to for Islamic governance and a Shari’a-based amend the budget; the Shura Council’s legal system. right to oversee government and legislate; Th is decade marked MB’s full embrace election of the president from among a list of democracy as a form of government of several candidates, with a limit of two (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009). Th e terms; all legislation should be compatible electoral alliances signaled a pragmatic with Shari’a, and non-Muslims have the shift and a less hostile attitude toward right to refer to their own laws in cases political parties, thus departing from of contradiction; independence of the Banna’s anti-party stance. It also witnessed judiciary; press and media freedom and the emergence of the term “Islamic granting all parties equal opportunities civil state” advocated by the MB and to appear in offi cial media (Harnisch & Islamic thinkers of the centrist school of Mecham, 2009, pp. 190-192). thought, including Qaradawi, Mohamed Th e 1990s saw the election of MBs in Emarah and Mohamed Salim al-Awa. professional syndicates, labor unions, Th ese thinkers considered democracy and student associations where they as consistent with Islam, and reviewed assumed leadership positions and Banna’s earlier rejection of political parties signifi cantly widened their constituency, (Qaradawi, 2001). which rendered the MB the largest and MB publicly supported democracy as only genuine opposition to the ruling both a religious and civic value, and in National Democratic Party (NDP). Th e 1989, MB spokesperson stated that it will frequent electoral successes by the MB in guard Egyptian democratic system and will the 1990s led to harsh crackdown on the hold on to it. Th is position was offi cially movement by the Mubarak regime, which articulated in an internal MB document felt threatened by the rising popularity of that cited Islamic arguments for the the MB. Mubarak referred tens of MBs to acceptance of pluralism and democracy, military trials and sentenced them to 3-5 and rendered their application mandatory years in prison.6 to prevent totalitarianism and unchecked In a 1999 speech marking the 70th authority (Shura and Pluralism in Muslim anniversary of the Muslim Brotherhood, Society, 1994). In 1991, MB and nine the General Guide (Chairman) other parties signed an agreement to abide Mustafa al-Mashour, emphasised MB’s by 10 principles as the basis for reform commitment to the moderate centrist approach to Islam (I’tidal wa Wasatiyya) All legislation should be that embraces dialogue, tolerance, respecting diff ering opinions, and the compatible with Shari’a, primacy of the public interest. “Freedom and non-Muslims have is an inherent human right, including freedom of expression, thought, and the right to refer to their religion,” he said, and reiterated MB’s own laws in cases of commitment to “democracy, pluralism, contradiction. circulation of power, and freedom of association” as fundamental rights to all citizens. Moreover, Mashour praised the in Egypt. Th ese included a commitment late GG Hassan al Hudaybi for his role to human rights and civil liberties in in “protecting the Muslim Brotherhood accordance with Sharia and international from takfi ri (apostasy) ideas”, in reference volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 93 to his book Preachers, not Judges, which of January 25, 2011. Th e FJP’s 2011 party he authored in response to some Brothers’ platform as well as Mohamed Morsi’s 2012 deviation from the MB’s school of thought, electoral program addressed the nature of particularly Sayyid Qutb.7 Mashour the state and the political system in more explained that the Muslim Brotherhood detail. For instance, it includes reference to believes that freedom of opinion rather Maqasid al-Shari’a as the main source of than repression is the best means to counter legislation, and the Higher Constitutional extremism and radical ideas. Political Court as the main body charged with reform, he added, should be coupled with assessing the constitutionality of laws. moral and economic reform, to achieve the Moreover, the state is responsible for desired renaissance. 8 protecting religious freedom for both In March 2004, the Muslim Brotherhood Muslims and non-Muslims. released its fi rst comprehensive vision for Th e main characteristics of the state reform entitled “the Muslim Brotherhood’s include: upholding the principle of Initiative for Internal Reform in Egypt”.9 citizenship, abiding by shura (considered Political reform was listed as the “starting synonymous to democracy), and enjoying point to reform the rest of all life walks a strictly civil nature (i.e. non-military which witness a speedy decline.” Moreover, and non-religious). Additionally, the role the MB emphasised the importance of of civil society is considered crucial to “national reconciliation” as a prerequisite preserving the civil state, and therefore for any meaningful reform, and considered its empowerment is part of both the party “political stagnation, corruption, and platform and Morsi. 10 social injustice” as the “destructive trio” of the nation. Regarding the political system, CONCLUSION the document stressed MB’s commitment Th e above review illustrates several to a “republican, parliamentary, crucial facts about MB’s political ideology. constitutional, and democratic regime, First, the principles of classical MB political within the framework of Islamic thought remain unchanged throughout principles.” Democracy, as mentioned in history, i.e. the call for a Shari’a-based the document, leads to all types of reform. legislation, accountability of the ruler, It is a concept which the MB espouses and shura-based decisions, separation of encourages other parties to support as “a powers, people as the source of authorities, national covenant”. rejecting military and theocratic rule, a Th e document reiterated the notion that belief in human rights and civil liberties as the nation is the source of all powers, and central to Islam, and favoring the modern that circulation of power through free parliamentary system of government. Th e and fair elections is a must. Freedoms of fact that the key principles of governance religion and worship have also been stated since 1928 till today are consistent across as fundamental principles. Th is document the several stages in MB literature suggests presents the fi rst platform that outlined that its discourse on democracy and civil MB’s political vision with such detail, and rights is not tactical, but rather derives from it provided the ideological basis for all deeply-rooted ideological foundations. other platforms released afterwards. For Second, the enormous developments that instance, the 2005 electoral platform of the occurred in MB approach to governance MB parliamentary candidates presents the since Banna should not be overlooked. same vision, yet with more elaboration on Whereas the MB since the 1990s fully the role of Shari’a and religion in politics, embraced democracy and pluralism as employing heavy reference to the “Islamic consistent with Islam, Banna held diff erent method” in governance, and explaining views. Despite his clear endorsement of the how it off ers solutions to modern day Western form of parliamentary democracy problems. Th ese documents were slightly of his time, he vehemently opposed developed after the Egyptian revolution partisan politics that prevailed under

94 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FROM OPPOSITION TO GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL LITERATURE British occupation. Nonetheless, the MB’s movement -- garnered much sympathy contemporary vision on pluralism and and support from average Egyptians over democracy represents a clear departure the past few decades through its civil from this classical approach. For instance, society work, its popularity is surely at the FJP contested the 2011 Parliamentary stake if Morsi fails to deliver on promises elections under a coalition with secular of swift economic and political stability in parties, and favored a coalition government his fi rst presidential term. rather than an Islamic one.11 In part, this refl ects the Brotherhood’s gradual *Sondos Asem is Editor-in-Chief of ikhwanweb.com, integration into Egyptian politics and based in Cairo, Egypt. She is a non-resident research the pragmatism it developed as a result. fellow at the International Institute of Islamic Thought. Asem is a member of the Nyon Process, part of the UN Such radical revisions imply MB’s political Alliance of Civilistions. resilience, which would continue to unfold under Morsi’s presidency. Th ird, MB’s political discourse evolved ENDNOTES corresponding to the changing political 1. “Hudud in Contemporary Islamic Jurisprudence,” Al-Shari’a dynamics. Th e Brotherhood was founded wal-Hayah, Interview with Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 2011. Aljazeera Satellite Channel program. Text of the interview (Arabic) within a colonial environment under retrieved from http://aljazeera.net/programs/pages/1033246e- British occupation, which imbued the 121f-4e87-927b-8116d8b9e544 early discourse with emphasis on the need 2. As of now, this document remains unpublished and to revive Islamic identity vis-à-vis Western would only be found in the MB’s offi cial online encyclopedia Ikhwanwiki. cultural hegemony. On the other hand, 3. Democratic Alliance Document, 2011 (Arabic). Retrieved the contemporary political scene involves from http://www.masress.com/alwafd/67996 diff erent priorities, the majority of which 4. Al-Azhar Document, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.dar- alifta.org/Viewstatement.aspx?ID=557&text=%D9%88%D8%A B%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3 The challenge facing %D8%B2%D9%87%D8%B1 5. Muslim Brotherhood in Parliament. Ikhwanwiki (the MB’s the Brotherhood offi cial historical index), retrieved from http://www.ikhwanwiki. com/index.php?title=%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8_ today is how to turn its %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9 %86_%D9%81%D9%8A_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B Islamic ideology into a 1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%B9%D8%A8%D successful model of good 8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9% 8A%D8%AE governance. 6. History of MB Military Trials, Ikhwanwiki. Retrieved from http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9 %84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7 are socio-economic. Th e demands of the %D8%AA_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8 January 25 Revolution, of which the MB %B1%D9%8A%D8%A9_%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE %D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8 was a key participant, acted as a blueprint %B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86_%D9%81%D9%8A for all post-revolutionary governments. _%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF_%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D Accordingly, the challenge facing the 8%B1%D9%83 Brotherhood today is how to turn its 7. Sayyid Qutb’s ideas regarding the sovereignty of God and apostasy have been challenged by Hassan al-Hudaybi and Islamic ideology into a successful model shunned by the Muslim Brotherhood. The infl uence of Sayyid of good governance that would genuinely Qutb’s political ideas and the reviews of his ideas by the MB improve the livelihoods of Egyptians and deserve an independent research paper. realise social justice. Mohamed Morsi’s 8. “Mustafa Mashour’s Speech on the 70th anniversary of the Muslim Brotherhood”. Ikhwanwiki. Retrieved from http://www. victory as Egypt’s fi rst democratically ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A7 elected President marks the transformation %D8%A8_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8 of the Muslim Brotherhood from decades- %A7%D8%B0_%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%89_ long marginalisation to a new era of %D9%85%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1_%D9%81%D9 %8A_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1 tremendous political and economic _%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%8A_%D8%B6%D9%85_% challenges. While the Brotherhood -- as D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1_%D8%A7%D9% the country’s most suppressed political 84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A8_%D9%81% D9%8A_%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1_%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9% volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 95 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FROM OPPOSITION TO GOVERNANCE: EXAMINING CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL LITERATURE 85_1999%D9%85 and the Inability of its Scholars. (Al-Islam Bayna Gahl Abna’ihi 9. “Muslim Brotherhood Reform Initiative”, Aljazeera Arabic. wa ‘Agz ‘Ulama’ihi). Ikhwanwiki. Retrieved from http://www. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.net/specialfi les/pages/ ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5 a7d9e130-0f09-4b77-bbb0-ee07dd61afd3 %D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9 10. Freedom and Justice Party 2011 Elections Platform. %86_%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%84_%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%86 (Offi cial Translation). Retrieved from http://www.scribd.com/ %D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%87_%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AC%D8 doc/73955131/FJP-Program-En %B2_%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%87 11. “Katatni: Democratic Alliance Eyes Coalition Government,” Awda, A. (n/d). Islam and Our Political Conditions. (Al-Islam wa Ikhwanweb. Retrieved from http://www.ikhwanweb.com/ Awda’una al-Siyaasiya). Ikhwanwiki. Retrieved from http:// article.php?id=29217&ref=search.php www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%84% D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85_%D9%88%D8% REFERENCES A3%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7_% Al-Banna, H. (2011). Collection of Hassan al-Banna’s Letters. D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9% (Majmu’at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hassan al-Banna) Dar al- 8A%D8%A9 Tawzi’ Wal Nashr al-Islamiyya. Cairo. Desouki, A. (2012). “Al-Sayyid Sabiq”. Ikhwanwiki. Retrieved Al-Banna, H. (1948). The Battle of the Qur’an, Where is God’s Rule? from http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7 (Ma’rakat al-Mus-haf, Ayna Hukm Allah?). Retrieved from http:// %D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF_%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8 www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D9%85%D8%B9%D8 %A8%D9%82 %B1%D9%83%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5% Dostourona, 2012. Rare unpublished document written by D8%AD%D9%81_.._%D8%A3%D9%8A%D9%86_%D8%AD%D Hassan al-Banna. Date of writing not specifi ed. Found in 9%83%D9%85_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%D8%9F the Muslim Brotherhood’s online encyclopedia Ikhwanwiki. st Moten, Abdul Rashed (1996). Political Science, An Islamic Retrieved on July 1 , 2012, from http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/ Perspective. Macmillan Press LTD, London. index.php?title=%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B Al-Banna, H. (1941). Letter on the Elections. (Risalat al- 1%D9%86%D8%A7 Intikhabaat). Ikhwanwiki. Retrieved from http://www. MB Constitution (1952). The Muslim Brotherhood’s Proposed ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7 Constitution of 1952. Ikhwanwiki. Retrieved from http://www. %D9%84%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8 ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%A %AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA A%D9%88%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE% Al-Ghazzali, M. (n/d). Islam and Political Despotism. (Al-Islam wal D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85_195 Isibdad al-Siyasi). Nahdet Masr Publishing House, Cairo. 2%D9%85 Al-Ghazzali, M. (n/d). Islam and Economy. (Al-Islam wal Awda’ Mitchell, Richard P. (1969). The Society of Muslim Brothers. al-Iqtisadiyya). Retrieved from http://www.alghazaly.org/index. Oxford University Press, London. php?id=43 Okeil, A. (2000). Min A’lam al-Da’wa wal Haraka al-Islamiya al Al-Hudaiby, H. (1977). Preachers not Judges. (Du’at la Qudaa). Mu’asira (Pioneers of Contemporary Islamic Call Movement). Dar al-Tawzi’ Wal Nashr al-Islamiyya, Cairo. Dar al-Tawzi’ Wal Nashr al-Islamiyya. Cairo. Auda, J. (2008). Maqasid al-Shari’a as a Philosophy of Qaradawi, Y. (2001). The State in Islam. (Min Fiqh al Dawla fi l Islamic Law. The International Institute of Islamic Thought, Islam). Dar Al-Shorouq Publishing House, Cairo. Washington. Qutb, S. (1993). Islam and Social Justice (Al-Islam wal ‘Adala al- Auda, J. (2012). Between Shari’a and Politics. (Bayna al-Shari’a Ijtima’iya). Dar al-Shorouq Publishing House, Cairo. wal Siyaasa). The Arab Network for Research and Publishing, Shura and Pluralism in Islam, 1994. Internal Muslim Beirut, Lebanon. Brotherhood document (Arabic). (No publication information Awda, A. (1985). Islam Between the Ignorance of its Followers available in the document).

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARENA OF DIALOGUE AND CIVILIZATIONS

96 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 The Caliphate and the Political Ideology of the Iraqi and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

FAREED SABRI

he term “Islamic caliphate” often its evolution over the past sixty years. conjures up fears of an Islamic Th e history of the Muslim Brotherhood Tempire where Muslims seek in Iraq and its political ideology is closely political control over Muslim and non- linked to its mother organisation in Egypt. Muslim nations. It is often perceived by Whilst Egypt witnessed the emergence of the West and Westernised Arab elite as political Islam as early as 1928, Iraq was unison between religion and politics. merely a passive recipient of Islamism.2 Fears of religious wars justifi ed by religious Th ere is little evidence of any politically- diff erences are legitimate if the Caliphate ideologised Islamic undercurrent or structured thought emerging to challenge The modern political secular political parties since the creation of modern Iraq after the First World War movement in the Islamic and before the advent of the Egyptian world... advocates the infl uence. Before touching on the subject of the Egyptian infl uence it would be unity of both the political prudent here to look at the history and and the religious. the evolution of the caliphate governance system.

(the term denoting the political system THE CALIPHATE - HISTORICAL under which Muslims were governed ANTECEDENTS until 1924) is synonyms to the papacy in Islam emerged in the seventh century Europe in the Middle Ages. Th e European in modern-day Saudi-Arabia, and the Wars of Religion and the Crusades are new state that culminated was one of frequently cited as historical examples. religio-political nature.3 For a period of Th ere is no denying in the fact that the 39 years the political leadership acted as modern political movement in the Islamic the religious leadership, manifested by the world which takes Islam as its point of Prophet Muhammad (570-632) and his reference advocates the unity of both the four Caliphs (successors of the Prophet political and the religious. Th is argument Muhammad in leading the Muslim is based on the rationality of Islam as a community) who ruled after him (632- religion compared to the Christianity of 661). Th ey led the community in Friday the Middle Ages.1 However in practice congregational prayers and exercised Islamists of the mainstream persuasion in direct political, military, fi scal and judicial general have demonstrated a remarkable control applying the laws of the Shari‘a.4 degree of ideological pragmatism and Th e Caliphate period underwent broadly adaptability in their political struggle fi ve distinct phases: the rightly guided with secular regimes in the Middle East. caliphs (632-661), the Umayyad period Expounding on the above, this paper (661-750), the Abbasid period (750- analyses the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood 1258) ending with the fall of Baghdad, as a case in point, shedding light on the the capital city of the Abbasid Empire at Brotherhood’s ideology of governance and the hands of the Mongols, followed by a volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 97 period of divided Sultanates5 in Egypt, fi rst sign of separation between the two North Africa, the Levant and Yemen. spheres of authority. Islamic law started to At the outset of the fi fteenth century take shape during the fi nal stages of the the region witnessed the emergence of a Umayyad dynasty and fl ourished in the new power that would rule and assume fi rst century of the Abbasid empire with the religious and political authority of the establishment of four Sunni Schools of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. Jurists or legal scholars (Hanafi , Maliki, Th e Ottoman Empire would continue Shafi ’i and Hanbali). Th ey directed their to dominate the majority of present- eff orts and attention to ‘ibadaat (acts of day Middle East and Arab countries pure worship like praying, fasting, reciting until the collapse of the Empire and the the Qur’an, etc.) and Mu’amalaat, which establishment in its place of the secular constituted all the duties towards other republic of Turkey in 1924. people (penal, civil and family codes). Sunni Islamists of the past and present Th e Fiqh or Islamic Jurisprudence refer to the fi rst period of twenty nine was extensively developed in the two years of governance (after the death of areas mentioned but lacked the same Prophet Muhammad) as a period of the thoroughness in dealing with the issues Rightly Guided Caliphs (al-Khulafa’ al- of governance and political theories. Rashidun) - a model for their political, Jurists encouraged citizens of the empire social and religious aspirations.6 During to obey the ruler as long as the ruler this period, the selection of the caliph was upheld the implementation of the shari’a made through a process of nomination law irrespective of the personal conduct and consultation; the four caliphs followed of the Caliphs and their respective courts. the example of Prophet Muhammad in Political stability was their main concern governance, organisation and kept direct since the Islamic state was plagued with contact with their citizens, thus setting an revolutions and uprisings from the ninth example in austerity and piety. Th is era century8 and up until the sixteenth ended in a civil war and the assassination of century when the Ottoman Empire’s the fourth Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib (655- armies conquered most of the Arab 660), ushering in the establishment of the countries including North Africa. By the Umayyad Dynasty. Th e Umayyad laid the end of the Abbasid era, Muslim jurists foundation of the fi rst Muslim hereditary developed their idealised political theory, monarchy ending an era of consultation, detailing the divine authority of God nomination and election when it came to through the Shari’a law; the Caliph is to selecting the new Caliph.7 be nominated from the house of Quraysh Hereditary kingship was considered an (Muhammad’s tribe), the Caliph is innovation and deviation from the era of responsible for the implementation of the Prophet Muhammad and his four caliphs Shari’a and the protection of the umma giving citizens of the state and religious (nation) and is nominated and elected by leaders a reason to criticise and challenge the Ahlul Hal Wal-‘Aqd or the “People of the ruling dynasty through numerous Authority”.9 Both dynasties with the later revolutions that occurred over the period Ottoman rule came to power not through of 102 years. Th e Umayyad and the natural evolution of political theories and Abbasid Caliphs enjoyed both political practises but rather hereditary succession and religious sovereignty over their citizens and military power. and were responsible for the defence of the Th e Ottoman sultans continued their state and the implementation of the shari’a claim of authority on both religious law (Islamic law). Regardless of their and political spheres. During much of claim over religious authority, Muslim the life span of the Ottoman Empire, scholars developed their schools of law and the sultans ruled the state by a simple jurisprudence independent of the state’s system that had two main dimensions, direct infl uence, which is considered as the the civil administration and the military

98 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE CALIPHATE AND THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE IRAQI AND EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD administration. Th e civil system was based on local rulers in the diff erent regions of The majority of the the empire. Structurally, the sultan’s rule entities that struggled was an indirect autocracy through local against colonialism governors. Accounts of early Muslim history in the Arab world (622-661) demonstrate a range of diverse during the 19th [and practices of shura (consultation) which could have been developed into an early 20th centur[ies institution helping the grassroots to have were] sustained by a political say, and in turn stimulate the movements... closely notion of freedom of expression, pluralism and political diversity. Th is diversity would affi liated to the notion of not have contradicted the principle of the Muslim umma. ‘divine unicity’ (rabbaniyya) as Muslims always believed in one God, His Prophets credible and workable political systems. and the Qur’an (holy text), but their Th e majority of the entities that struggled pluralism and diversity of opinions came against colonialism in the Arab world from their diff erent interpretations of the during the 19th century and the early parts text. However, the Ottomans did not of the 20th century were organised and help develop their own political theory sustained by movements and organisations over four centuries of rule as the Empire’s closely affi liated to the notion of the primary concern was the consolidation and Muslim umma, since the idea of Arab integrity of their territories from European nationalism was not developed in theory and Safavid10 expansionist tendencies. and practise until the early stages of the Eventually it led to the disintegration of twentieth century with the collapse of the the Empire after the First World War. Ottoman Empire.11 A modern secular republic of Turkey Modern-day political Islam is greatly replaced the old Sultanate (Caliphate) indebted to the eff orts of revivalists and rule. State and religion were also separated. reformers of the 19th and 20th centuries. Consequently Shari’a was replaced in most Muhammed Abdu, Jamal al-Din al- of the Arab territories under colonial rule Afghani, Rashid Rida and Hassan al- with new penal and civil laws modelled on Banna, were among the notable revivalists the French and British. of the time. Al-Banna had the most Islam was the main source of shared infl uence on the ground, as he was able identity between the citizens of the four to link and infuse pure intellectual theory distinctive Caliphate eras up and until about the degeneration of the Muslim the colonial period and the formation of umma with organisational and political the national states when citizenship took activism. precedence and became the main focus of identity. Muslim citizens of the new HASAN AL-BANNA Arab national states felt deprived of their Hasan Al- Banna was born in 1906 sense of unity and strength and hence in the small town of Mahmudiya near blamed the colonial powers for their Cairo, Egypt. He became active at an early weakness, economic shortcomings and the age joining religious societies teaching disintegration of their umma. Th e notion youngsters the observance of Islamic of the umma is considered divine, closely morals and directing people’s attention linked with God and His Prophet which towards performing religious duties.12 is associated with past glory and great Banna joined a Sufi order called Al- civilisation of Islam. On the other hand, Hasafi yya Brothers at the age of 13, soon the nation state was viewed as a failed after becoming the secretary of a charity, socio-economic project, unable to develop the Hasafi yya Society for Charity. His volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 99 enthusiasm for working in an organised was top of the movement’s agenda then. form to impart his ideas and beliefs was Gradually they began the process of evident at an early age. At the age of 16, institutionalisation, employing people to he entered Dar al-Ulum College in Cairo, administer the growing number of recruits later to become the University of Cairo. He and establishing headquarters all over graduated after four years during which he Egypt. became increasingly aware of the secular Training and education of members and Western infl uence on Egyptian society was Banna’s top priority at the time. at the time. Banna criticised the traditional He organised lectures every Tuesdays ‘ulama (Islamic scholars, mainly graduates at the Brotherhood HQ, and published of al-Azhar University) for their lack of magazines, namely al-Nadhir and al- action in reversing the tide of secularism Ikwan al-Muslimin. He organised study and Western infl uence in the country. circles for members so they can properly Banna was infl uenced by the salafi recite and memorise the Qur’an and study movement too, through the works of Rashid the Islamic Sciences. Th e strategy was Rida, and in particular his magazine, Al- to educate people and recruit enough Manar (Th e Light House). Banna shared members to be able to infl uence political Rida’s belief in the need to return to an change. unadulterated form of Islam and reversing Th e Brotherhood believed in the need the tide secularism throughout Egyptian to return to the fundamentals of Islam. society. In March 1928 he established In the eyes of the Brothers, the ideal form the Society of Muslim Brotherhood (Al- of governance was the period of the 29 Ikhwan al-Muslimoon) with six friends. years following the death of the Prophet Within a few years, membership of the Muhammad (632-661). Th is was a period society grew dramatically, to more than that witnessed unity between religion 500 thousand in the early 1940s. Th e and the state (Deen wa Dawla), where the Egyptian government felt threatened by people had a say in appointing the four the Brotherhood, especially after Banna Caliphs, and in return they were consulted organised a paramilitary unit, Tandhim al- and involved in the workings of the state. Khassa, to fi ght the occupation in Palestine Th is period of competent, qualifi ed and in 1948. Eventually the Brotherhood was just Caliphs was called the Khilafa Rashida banned by the government in December (the Rightly Guided Rule).13 1948, for alleged involvement in the Th e Shari’a has been the political, moral assassination of government offi cials. and religious constitution for Muslims Scores of Brothers were jailed and the for many centuries. According to Banna, organisation’s assets confi scated. In it would be unimaginable for a society to February 1949, Banna was assassinated at achieve its goal of the individual’s inner the age of 43. harmony, political stability and social justice without seeking the guidance of MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD God’s law.14 Since the Qur’an is the true In 1932 Al-Banna moved his and literal word of God and the Hadith organisation’s headquarters to Cairo from (the word of God through the teachings al-Isma’ilya, a small city located on the of the Prophet Muhammad), salvation and north east of Egypt. Th e move proved justice could only be achieved by the close successful, as the Brotherhood managed to adherence to the two main sources of the enlist large numbers of students, peasants Shari’a. Th e return to the principles or the and urban labourers from across Egypt. spirit of Islam is imperative, but without But the most important change was the abandonment of the principles and the movement’s direct contact with the trappings of modern civilisation. Th e political center of the country. Reform spirit of the Shari’a is paramount, since and the liberation of Egypt’s political and the perseverance of life, religion, kinfolk, economic will from British intervention justice and wealth are the main objectives

100 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE CALIPHATE AND THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE IRAQI AND EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD of the shari’a – or al-maqasid al-shari’a. Nonetheless Banna and his movement Egypt was occupied by the British were restrained in their criticism of al- in 1882, a year later civil courts were Azhar and the traditional ‘ulama.16 established and foreign judges were Initially the attitude of Banna’s appointed to follow the newly adopted movement towards political parties and French laws, while Shari’a law was politics of the time were negative. Th e sidelined and relegated to deal with lesser organisation saw political parties at the signifi cant family laws, including time as opportunist, self-serving and (marriage, divorce, and maintenance and corrupt,17 though they participated in custody of children). A modern banking the political process to seek change from system was adopted based on interest or within. Th is attitude towards social and usury which is forbidden in Islam and political participation is evident in today’s the sale and, consumption of alcohol was political direction adopted by like-minded legalised.15 Al-Azhar, one of Islam’s most Islamic movements in the Arab world prestigious Islamic seminery, was (and such as Hamas in Palestine, al-Islah in is still) renowned for producing most of Yemen, and the Iraqi Islamic Party. Th is Egypt’s (also the Muslim world’s) judges, also extends to organisations in other parts imams and scholars, religious teachers, of the world, such as Jama’at-e-Islami in and government offi cials. However with Pakistan. Western-style democracy was the new radical transformations, such as seen as the best system at the time as it the introduction of secular subjects and gave Islamic organisations the platform a move away from the teaching of Islam and freedom to practice and promote and the Islamic Sciences, some Muslims their strands of religious politics. Moral came to view this shift as undermining the and Islamic religious values fused with very institution of Al-Azhar. Key among democracy, believed the Brothers, would them was Banna, who asked Azhari rid society of its ills, while keeping the scholars to mobilise themselves to show positive aspects of political stability.18 their disapproval of this shift. His eff orts According to the ideology of the were largely unsuccessful as it proved very Brotherhood, reform, political change diffi cult to change centuries of tradition of and turning the fortune of the umma is the separation of the state and religion. best achieved through a gradual process Since 661 AD, Muslim scholars were (tadarruj), manifested in three stages: separated from the sphere of politics; their fi rstly, the process of informing people relevance in the process of appointing the of all social levels of the ideology of the new Caliphs was signifi cantly reduced, organisation. Secondly, to recruit people though their consent and public approval in to the organisation, while continuing to was sought by the ruling class for the sake of raise their level of awareness and the need legitimacy. A peaceful coexistence between to be active in seeking change and reform. the two (ruler and scholar) was observed Th irdly, is the implementation of the ideals as long as the ‘ulama were not vocal or of the organisation through its political, organised in their disapproval of the social and religious programmes.19 sovereign. Th is division of responsibilities Clearly, the Brothers focused their led the class of ‘ulama and their religious eff orts before 1944 on recruitment, institutions to be over protective. Hence education and charity work which allowed it was not surprising when al-Azhar and them to expand and prosper in relative many Islamic scholars in the Arab world peace, whilst political education and saw the rise of the Brothers as a direct propagation (da’wa) was present through challenge to their prestige and authority. their annual general conferences and Th ey viewed Brotherhood activists as publications including Al-Nadhir (1938- encroaching on the scholar’s religious 1939), and Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (1933- domain and eventually this would weaken 1939). Politics was clearly on the agenda their infl uence among the faithful. at the time too but they felt the time was volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 101 not right for the leadership to actively Nation.25 Th e weekly Al-Ikhwan al- participate in the political process. Banna Muslimin newspaper (of June 11, 1937), followed his three step-strategy, ending the listed 11 countries where the Brotherhood fi rst stage in 1938 (propagating the ideals had branches: Th e Sudan, Hijaz (currently and principles of Muslim Brotherhood to Saudi Arabia), Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, the general public) after which he initiated Morocco, Bahrain, Yemen, India, the second phase of recruiting, organising Somalia, and France. It is noted that these and reaching out to other political parties embryonic structures were directly linked (also infl uential people in the government to the mother organisation with no eff ort of the day).20 to expand horizontally. Th is is because One of the key slogans attributed to the the doctrine of political Islam was new to Brotherhood is “Islam is Din wa Dawla” the Muslims. Local converts to the new (Islam is religion and state). Explaining political ideology were unable to establish the meaning and the relevance of the a wide following not until early in the slogan, Banna addressed members at 1940s when the organisation established a their Fifth Conference, Al-Mu’tamir al- foot-hold in the universities. Khamis, in 1938,21 where he explained Th e wide distribution of Al-Ikhwan al- that the provisions of Islamic law were Muslimin along with members dispatched comprehensive and encompassed all aspects of this life and beyond: ‘’Islam is The tense political creed and worship, state and nationality, action and spirituality, the Holy Book environment in the Arab [Qur’an] and the sword’’.22 world especially after Th e Brotherhood view the separation of state and church (religion) as “not [being] the 1936 Arab uprising an Islamic issue”, rather it pertains to in Palestine, made the the relevance of the specifi cs of western Brotherhood’s slogan an history. Th ey believe that historically Islam developed and evolved as a complete appealing prospect. system of ethics and laws, providing for all aspects of life. Power in the eyes of the Brotherhood ideologues was vital to to missions abroad, helped by the tense carrying the values and teachings of the political environment in the Arab world religion without which Islam loses its especially after the 1936 Arab uprising in authority, and in turn the ability to protect Palestine, made the Brotherhood’s slogan its teachings and values.23 Th is would an appealing prospect.26 lead to disunity and weakness as Islam is Th e earliest recorded delegation of disposed of its power. Brotherhood members sent on missions abroad was in August 1935 to Syria,27 EXPORTING THE IDEOLOGY followed by Beirut in October of the same It was evident from careful investigation year. Both the delegations were headed that Banna was instrumental in spreading by prominent Brotherhood members his new doctrine of political Islam (Islam as like Abdul-Rahman al-Sa’ati, head of Din wa Dawla) as early as 1932,24 roughly the organisation’s Cairo branch and four years after the movement’s formation. Muhammad Hadi ‘Attiya, lawyer and Djibuti was the fi rst country outside Egypt a close confi dant of Banna. From their to receive Banna’s attention. It was most public speeches in those missions, they put probably due to the presence a number of strong emphasis on Jihad and the struggle students from Djibouti studying in Egypt against colonialism. Th at was probably at the time. In one of his fi rst essays he one of the biggest factors that helped the affi rmed his belief in uniting all Muslims Brotherhood gain acceptance amongst the in one single political entity, the Muslim youth and the educated. Th e Caliphate

102 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE CALIPHATE AND THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE IRAQI AND EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD and the unity of the Muslim Nation defi ned, and the age of the nation-state were primarily used as an instrument of had arrived with the British occupation liberation, rather than a proven and tested of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, the three tool of governance. provinces to the South East of modern In the speech of al-Sa’ati at the Amawi Turkey. 31 A new form of political order was Mosque in Damascus, he recited the to organise the three wilayat (provinces) following lines of poetry: into a single entity called Iraq. For Centuries Our Nation (Muslim However, the occupation of Iraq did not nation) reveled in its glories - come without its fair share of woes. Th e demands for independence culminated in So as the sons of Ghassan (the Syrians) a violent uprising against the British army in 1920. In response the British pegged We loath indignity their hopes on Faisal bin al-Hussain al- For us life with no dignity equals Hashimi, the son of Sharif Hussain, who death.28 was brought-in to preside over the new Arab nation covering the three wilayat of Th en he continues his speech, Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. To gain the We asked you (the Syrians) to commit support and acceptance of his sovereignty yourselves for Jihad in the way of Allah and from the Shi’i community, King Faisal you accepted. Th en we promised each other to successfully touted his noble genealogy as continue our mission in spreading the word of a direct descendant of the Prophet. Islam. We presented ourselves as members of Faisal was crowned king of Iraq on 23 the Ikhwan and you welcomed us with open August 1921. He relied heavily on the arms…29 Sunni offi cers (300 in total) who had An autonomous and activists’ strand helped his father in the Hijaz against the of Islam is clearly discernable in Sa’ati’s Ottomans to administer the aff airs of the speech, which was ready to be exported state. Rather than being a sectarian ploy, it to the region. Banna planned to repeat was born of necessity due to the shortage the success of mobilising various social of well-educated Shi’a at the time.32 structures in Egypt to other Arab Soon the sectarian and ethnically diverse countries. However the mission proved to Iraqi society promulgated a number of be more diffi cult, especially in Iraq due to nationalists and ideological parties and the diff erent social, ethnic and religious associations. Th e majority were targeted make-up of the country. towards creating a national unity against One of Banna’s missions to Iraq, a the British mandate while few were created teacher named Muhammad Abdul-Hamid to serve the interests of big land owners and Ahmad returned to Egypt in 1946 after those close to the monarchy. Al-Nahda spending two years in Iraq. In a bitter (Th e Awakening) and al-Watani (Th e speech and in front of Banna and hundreds National Party) were the fi rst to enter the of Brotherhood members, he accused the political arena, in 1922. However political Iraqis of being morally corrupt and more Islam in its organised form was not part open to communism than Islam.30 of the Iraqi political scene, not until the From then on, the mission of spreading arrival of a young Iraqi clergy studying in the Da’wa in Iraq was to be carried out by Egypt. local converts. Shaykh Muhammad Mahmud al- Modern Iraqi State under the British Sawwaf arrived from Egypt in 1947 eager Mandate (1920–1932) to prove to Hasan al-Banna that Iraq Th e surrender of the Ottomans in 1918 was fertile ground for da’wa, as he had heralded the collapse of the 1,300-year promised a year earlier in a general meeting Islamic Empire. Religion and loyalty to the with the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo. khilafa in Istanbul was no longer the basis On his arrival in Iraq, al-Sawwaf founded upon which society and its politics were usras (units), constituting mainly of college volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 103 students. It was the beginning of the to historical procedures leading to the organisation of Muslim Brotherhood. It is empowerment of the early righteous also important to note that leaders of the caliphs (al-Khulafa’ al-Rashidun). Th e Iraqi Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood Brotherhood adhered fully to the strategy never intended it to become a political of the Eg yptian Brotherhood in prioritising party – at least, not until the revolution the establishment of the Caliphate, though of 1958. Th e Iraqi Brotherhood saw their it was considered as a by-product of actual mission as beyond that of the national state preliminary achievements. According to boundaries. It was one of the renaissances Bannah, the total integration of Muslim of the Muslim umma. Th is mission was all- nations culturally, economically and encompassing: social, political, intellectual socially and the creation of super Islamic and certainly religious. Th ey believed the union were all a precursor for appointing perils and suff erings of the umma were an Imam (caliph).38 due to the collective deviation from true Th e dramatic events of the 1958 Islam.33 revolution against the monarchy, and Al-Sawwaf acknowledged the symbolism the consequent repression the Muslim of the Caliphate especially since Baghdad Brotherhood in Iraq persuaded the new was the centre of the Muslim Caliphate leadership to form a political wing.39 Ethical for nearly fi ve centuries (762-1258).34 values, Islamic education and da’wa had However he did not specifi cally elaborate been the major tenets of the movement in the return to the caliphate rule in Iraq, the previous 10 years or so. Th e leadership rather his goals were to install justice had not pursued a confrontational policy and equality among people; rid people of or ever questioned the legitimacy of the poverty and ignorance; and help guide monarchy. Th ey had appreciated that the people to return to the tenets of Islam and monarchy had limited resources at its the implementation of shari’a.35 disposal. In their opinion, Iraq needed Caliphate is a long-term goal and not time, political reform, education and an immediate concern for the founder of moral guidance to carry out the desired the Iraqi Brotherhood. In the 1940s and changes required by the people.40 1950s, Al-Sawwaf did not think it was the right time to enter the political arena THE IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY but tolerated the policies of the monarchy, Th e newly-formed party was as an sensing the dangers posed by communist extension of the aims and ideology of its and nationalist ideologies secularising Iraqi mother organisation ie, the Iraqi Muslim society. Th is sense of political pragmatism Brotherhood. It had to juggle between the and the awareness of diffi culties associated stringent party promulgation laws and with unifying religion and politics were the main goals of the organisation of the shared by Abdul Karim al-Zaydan, the Muslim Brotherhood without losing its second general Guide of the Iraqi Muslim authenticity. Brotherhood. Zaydan acknowledged the On the nature of the state envisaged by importance of establishing the rule of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), Article 2 of Islam through the Caliphate. He gave it an its fi rst manifesto states that the aim of the absolute priority since according to him, party was to fully apply the rules of Islam shari’a rule cannot be established without in all aspects of life, i.e. both individual having the will, authority and power of an and state. Th e party’s aim of campaigning Imam (caliph).36 to establish an Islamic state through However Zaydan was not sure of the political means was clear.41 However there best process needed for the Muslim umma is no reference to the caliphate to be found to choose its caliph or his deputy.37 He in the manifesto. Political pragmatism gave a number of possibilities synonymous necessitated the down-sizing of goals to to present Western-style democracies fi t party promulgation laws and the reality claiming that all had a resemblance of ethnically diverse Iraqi society. Th e

104 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE CALIPHATE AND THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE IRAQI AND EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD successive Iraqi regimes refused permission of association to parties based on religion The Brotherhood in Iraq or parties that have a trans-national links and its off shoot, the and agendas. IIP, never experienced From 1958 to the early 1990s, politics in Iraq stagnated. Government repression governance or real impeded all sorts of political parties and participatory politics. natural progression of political thought. Th e opportunity arose with the weakening Th e Brotherhood in Iraq and its off shoot, of the Iraqi regime after the invasion of the IIP, never experienced governance or Kuwait in 1990. All sorts of political real participatory politics. Th eir dynamics parties that represent the divisions and and moods of action since 1959 resembled diversity of Iraqi society sprung to action covert organisations. Both the original in exile. program of 1960 and the one promulgated in the 1990s off ered only generalities. Th e POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE party thus committed to such objectives as IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY the struggle to end poverty, fear and the Th e IIP’s sets of ideas, goals, expectations establishment of virtuous polity. No more and actions mirrored the Iraqi and this generality is evident than in the fi rst international Muslim Brotherhood manifesto, section seven was dedicated to ideology. Close organisational cooperation the economy. with sister Brotherhood organisations Its 13 articles were mere bullet points ensured the strict adherence to the or slogans that lacked any clear defi nition. original principles laid out by Hasan al- Article 42, for instance, states the party Banna. Th e main purpose behind IIP believes in the protection of private ideology is to off er change in state and ownership of property, while article 44 society, making it adhere to Islamic ethics criminalises usury, monopoly and all and the implementation of Shari’a law.42 actions causing harm to the society. Article Whilst this goal has always been implicit 48 states that the party believes in the need by the party’s ideologues and activists, to develop the Iraqi economy.44 Evidently the dynamics and actions were dictated these formulas came with signifi cant by contexts and the peculiar make-up religious sentiments, thus underpinning of the Iraqi society. Repetitive themes, the religious identity of the party in the discourses, signs and framings off ered face of a strong secular government and by the IIP serve to reproduce and project public traditions. the ideals and political structure of early Th e distinction between being a political “righteous’’ Caliphate. party or all encompassing Islamic trend In the 1960s after its inception the party was still in its evolutionary stage. Emphasis promoted the creation of an Islamic state was placed on the moral well being of the through electing consultative council state and individuals. In an opening article, analogues to parliamentary democracy.43 Ayad al-Samara’i the editor of IIP’s Dar al- However it was unclear in the party’s Salam45 prioritised the party’s message to fi rst constitution if they were ready to the reshaping of the moral structure of the accept true participatory democracy with Iraqi people - a prelude to the construction other secular trends. Th is vague political of the Islamic civilisation.46 In the 1990s posture was probably due to their political the leadership of the party was exposed to experience in the 1950s and 1960s which the experience of free democratic space in was shaped by a destructive struggle with the West. However the author noted that Communists and Arab nationalists. Th e the new experience touched only those reciprocal animosity and acute ideological activists at the helm of the movement. No polarisation was not conducive to any sort real eff ort was spent into disseminating the of free political space. new political and ideological shift to the volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 105 rank and fi le. It was virtually impossible and cultural pluralism. He argued that for the leadership in exile to relay their Islamists will be the fi rst to reap the fruits political experience to the covert part of of political liberalisation. Moreover he the organisation in Iraq.47 posited that the re-Islamising of the society Th e IIP moved towards the discourse can only take place if society is free and of purely political rule. Th e Caliphate was open to multiple political and ideological no more considered as a religious entity trends.50 Samara’i also stressed the need to nor ever mentioned in the original 1960 bridge the gap between diff erent political manifesto or later versions of the 1990s. trends and ideologies through contact and In a multi-ethnic society like Iraq the IIP dialogue. advocated true political pluralism and Th is political wisdom became the theme equal citizenship. It advanced the notion of all Brotherhood organisations in the that power should be open to all political Arab world having realised that they were participants based on the choice of people. the fi rst victims of the political repression. Article 1 of a document, titled, “Political Th e Egyptian Brotherhood were fi rst to Change in Iraq”, the party commits enter parliamentary elections in 1984. Th ey itself to the establishment of plural also declared their support for democracy and constitutional rule.48 Th is political and accepting political pluralism – and evolution is by no means a collective the peaceful rotation of power, and thus theme adopted by all members and affi rming their belief in the nation being branches of Iraqi Brotherhood, as pockets the source of all powers.51 of diff erent political ideologies within it Th e Iraqi Brotherhood and its political existed in various parts of Iraq. Political wing initially struggled to rid the traditional repression prevented the organisation system of governance of Western infl uences from creating eff ective network of contacts but never contemplated to overthrow the and communications to disseminate their monarchy or the regimes that supplanted literature. it to create anew state based on indigenous One has to concur when reading Dar al- Islamic values and practices. Successive Salam the IIP endeavoured to transcend Iraqi regimes were not only exploitative religious particularities among diff erent but also ran contrary to a variety of Muslim sects.49 Faced with stiff challenges interpretations of economic, social and dictated by polarised communities it political requirements of the Islamic faith. was eventually forced to contend with Th e IIP advocated a constitutionalist the struggle to represent the Sunni approach to political change during the community. To go around this ethnic sanction years (1992-2003). Th e core idea diversity the IIP developed strong national rested on the combination of Western ideas tendencies, favouring a unifi ed and even a about the supremacy of constitutionally- highly centralised Iraq. Concurrently the prescribed representative bodies and the party argued paramount Islamic identity recognition of traditional Islamic notions for the country to dampen Kurdish fears of the authority of Islam as only directly of the dominance of the Arab identity. enforceable in moral and religious matters. Furthermore Kurdish autonomy was However the party also advocated that tolerated though within the borders of a at no time must any legal enactment of unifi ed Iraq. the state be at variance with the sacred To get an accurate picture of the IIP’s principles of Islam. political evolution one has to refer to the Th e above principles were incorporated articles posted on Dar al-Salam a decade in the new Iraqi constitution drafted after the re-launch of the party in the after the American invasion in 2003. United Kingdom. In an opening article, Members of the IIP often refer to this editor Samara’i confesses to the fact that constitutionalist approach as their strategy the Islamists cannot be an obstacle to to establishing a civil society. It is still political openness and political, ideological unclear if this political realism is shared

106 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE CALIPHATE AND THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE IRAQI AND EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD by all segments of the Iraqi Brotherhood Islamist who have been politically-active including their political wing since such as the Brotherhood. Th e allure of the religious text is always open to re- politics in its secular and democratic forms interpretation depending on the context, touched the traditional and apolitical political experience and the intellectual Salafi s in Egypt. On the back of the success discipline of individual members of the of the Arab Spring which saw the ouster of Brotherhood. According to a senior Mubarak, the Salafi s inaugurated their fi rst Brotherhood ideologue, there are no clear- political party, Hizb al-Nour (“the light”) cut agreements between members of the to participate in the elections,56 which they Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood on the shape have been largely successful at. Th e advent and form of the government they strive of the Arab Spring mainstreamed the to achieve.52 Th e caliphate is a political strand of Muslim Brotherhood political entity and it should not be included into ideology. Even extremists and Salafi sts as the religious domain.53 Hence people and we have already seen realised the benefi ts the context of their existence are the only of the democratic system. determinants of political system they Th e Caliphate system will remain a topic choose. of debate, between those who identify it as the right to rule by supreme religious and CONCLUSION political fi gurehead and those who deny its Th e overwhelming majority of Muslim religious theme. However in sectarian and jurists theologically justify the religious ethnically-diverse societies such as that of dimension of the Caliphate.54 Unity of Iraq, the religious dimension is diffi cult to religion and state is one of the major realise since it involves the redefi nition of themes and slogans propagated by the the conventional view of juristic pluralism Muslim Brotherhood. It is important so that it corresponds to the typically to note that the context in which the unitary theocratic leadership. Brotherhood struggled to resurrect the Caliphate was during an era of direct *Dr Fareed B. Sabri is a British/Iraqi academic who colonialism and its drive to westernise obtained his doctorate from the department of Muslim societies. However after the Theology and Religious Studies at Kings College, London. Currently, he works for The Cordoba advent of the independent national state Foundation and heads its Middle East and North Africa in the Middle East, the struggle towards Programme. establishing the Caliphate was relegated Sabri previously worked as a visiting lecturer at the to being no more than an abstract notion. University of Westminster, Department of Politics & International Relations. He is a committed political Political and religious unity of the Muslim activist, who moved to academia with over 25 years umma would be the natural result of close of experience in Iraqi and Middle Eastern politics. For the past eight years he worked as a policy advisor to cooperation and integration of independent a major Middle Eastern political movement and a Muslim states as fi rst stipulated by Hasan number of distinguished politicians. al-Banna.55 Henceforth the Caliphate was never an immediate or a burning issue. In the past 60 years the struggle of the ENDNOTES 1. Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf (1993). Bayyinat al-Hal al-Islami wa Brotherhood was mainly over the limited Shubuhat al-‘Almaniyyen wal Mutagharibyn (Evidence of the political space in an attempt to establishing Islamic Solution and the Misconceptions of the Secular and the a quasi Western-style democracy. Th is Westernised), Beirut: al-Risala Foundation), p.16. struggle has induced a secularising eff ect 2. Islamism or Political Islam is broadly defi ned as the merging of Islamic principles and political discourse. within the movement to an extent where 3. Hilmy, Mustafa (1977). Nizam al-Khilafa fi al-Fikr al-Islami the Islamist political success of the Turkish (The System of Caliphate in the Islamic Thought). Cairo: Al- Justice and Development Party merited an Ansar Press, p.3 absolute fascination by the Brotherhood 4. Islamic law; the term means “way” or “path”; and is based on Islamic jurisprudence. and other Islamic trends. 5. Governorates of the provinces without the total authority of One would be wrong to assume that a caliph, though a few declared themselves as the legitimate the secularising eff ect touched only those heirs of the Abbasids. 6. The term al-Khulafa’ al-Rashidun was mentioned in an volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 107 THE CALIPHATE AND THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE IRAQI AND EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

authentic narration of Prophet Muhammad, instructing the Dhikrayati (From the Records of my Memory), 1st edn, Cairo: faithful to follow their guidance after his death. Muslim history Dar al-E’tisam, p.101 books are littered with favourable references to the period. 31. Tripp, Charles (2005). A History of Iraq, New York: Cambridge Ibn Katheer (Born 1318), al-Bidaya Wal-Nihaya (The Beginning University Press, p.32. and the End), CD number 15 (electronic copy), Series of the 32. Incidentally, the Shi’i clergy prohibited their followers from Benefi cial Science 2006), vol 1: 153; joining the Ottoman administration or the army. In fact, many Abd al-Rahman al-Jiberty (1756-1825), Aja’ib al -Athar Fil people took Iranian citizenship to avoid serving in the army. Tarajim Wal Akhbar (Interesting Events, Biographies and 33. Interview with Nu’man al-Samara’i, fi rst leader of the Iraqi History), CD no. 15 (electronic copy) ,Series of the Benefi cial Islamic Party, Damascus, October 2007. Science 2006) vol 3: 117; 34. Al-Sawwaf, p,13. Muhammad Ibn Ahmed Ibn Othman al-Dahaby (1274-1348), 35. Ibid. p.15 Taarikh al-Islam (History of Islam), CD no. 15 (electronic copy), 36. Zaydan, Abdul Karim (1976). Usul al-Da’wa (Principles of Series of the Benefi cial Science 2006 ), vol 1:1766 (al–Eswa Islamic Propagation), Baghdad: al-Manar Islamic Bookshop, Centre for Programs, Medina, Saudi-Arabia). p.196 7. Esposito, John L. (1991). Islam and Politics. Syracuse 37. Ibid. p.200 University Press, Syracuse, New York, Third Edition, p.10 38. Al-Banna, Islamuna p.50 8. Ibid. p.23 39. Interview with Nu’man al-Samara’i, Damascus, October 9. The theory of politics and sovereignty was developed by the 2007. Abbasid jurist Abu al-Hasan 40. Ibid. al-Mawardy (982-1068). He wrote many books on political 41. Al-Mashayikhi, Kazum Ahmad (2005). Taarikh Nash’at al- doctrine such as, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya (The Provisions of Hizb al-Islami al-Iraqi (Genesis of the Iraqi Islamic Party), 1st edn, Sovereignty), Qanun al-Wizara (Ministerial Law) and Adab al- Baghdad: al-Raqim Library, p.32. Dunya WalDin (Rules of Life and Religion). 42. Ayad al-Samara’i, editor’s column, Dar al-Salam, May 1997, 10. Shi’a dynasty ruled Iran (1501-1722) p.4. 11. Abdul Qadir al-Jaza’iri (1807-1883) revolted against the 43. Al-Mashaykhi, Tarikh... p.34 French colonial rule of Algeria. 44. Ibid. p.40. Omar al-Mukhtar (1862-1931) started a resistance movement 45. A fortnightly magazine established in Britain in 1992 to against the Italian occupation of Libya. represent IIP’s political views. Muhammad Ahmed al-Mahdi (1843-1885) resisted the British 46. Ayad al-Samara’i, editor’s column, p. 5 occupation of The Sudan. 47. The author was an active member of the IIP in the early 12. P Mitchell, Richard (1969). The Society of The Muslim 1990s. He observed the ideological shifts among Iraqi and Brothers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, New York, p.2 other Arab Brotherhood leaderships. Media and literary 13. Ibid. p.210 censorship in the Arab world was the biggest hurdle against 14. Hasan al-Banna, Islamuna, Fifth Conference 1938, (Dar open debate and the fl ow of new ideas. al-E’tisam Cairo), p.16 48. Document from the archives of the IIP in exile, entitled, 15. Yousuf al-Wa’i (2001). Al-Fikr al-Siyasi al-Mua’sir e’nd al- ‘Political Change in Iraq’, 8 February 1999. Ikhwan al-Muslimin (The Contemporary Political Thought of the 49. Ayad al-Samara’i, editor’s column, p. 4. Muslim Brotherhood), Kuwait: al-Manar Bookshop, p. 14 50. Ibid. p. 4. 16. Op. cit. Richard P Mitchell, p.212 51. Al-Wa’i, Al-Fikr... p. 56. 17. Al-Qaradawi Yousif, (1999), al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoon 52. Interview with Osama al-Tikriti, leader of the Iraqi Sab’in Aman Fi al-Da’wa Wal Tarbiya Wal Jihad (The Muslim Islamic Party (2009-2011) and member of Iraqi House of Brotherhood, Seventy Years in Religious Activism, Education Representative (2007-2011), London, 14 May 2011. and Jihad), Cairo: Wahba Bookshop, p.127 53. Ibid. 18. Al-Wa’i, Al-Fikr al-Siyasi… p. 138 54. Al-Rashid, Muhammed Ahmed (2003). Usul al-Ifta’ wal 19. Al-Banna ,Islamuna, Fifth Conference 1938, p.23 Ijtihad al-Tatbiki (Principles of Religious Opinion and Applied 20. Al-Wa’i, Al-Fikr al-Siyasi… p. 34 Jurisprudence), 2nd Vol. Canada: al-Mihrab publishing, p. 56 21. Al-Banna ,Islamuna, p.17 55. Al-Banna, Islamuna.. p.50 22. Ibid. p.14 56. Asharq al-Awsat, Al-Nour Party: Egypt’s Salafi s go 23. Enayat Hamid (2005). Modern Islamic Political Thought. New mainstream, June 20, 2011, http://www.asharq-e.com/news. York: I .B.Tauris, p.85. asp?section=3&id=25602 - accessed July 13,2011. 24. Abdul Aziz, Jumu’a Amin (2003). Al-Ikhwan wal Mujtama’ al-Masri wal Dawli fi al-Fatra min 1928-1938 (The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian and International Society between 1928 and 1938), Cairo: Islamic Printing and Publishing House), p.375 25. Ibid. p.353 26. Most of the Arab countries were under colonial rule. Calls for liberation and the emancipation of the people found wide appeal among the Muslims and Arabs in the region. 27. Al-Banna, Hasan (n.d.). Mudakarat al-Da’wa Wal Da’iya (Memoirs of the Mission and the Missionary), Dar al- E’tisam, Cairo, pp.231,232 28. Abdul Aziz, Jumu’a Amin, p. 371 29. Ibid. 30. Al-Sawwaf, Muhammad Mahmoud (1987). Min Sijil

108 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BOOK PROMOTIONS Understanding the Nakba: An Insight into the Plight of Palestinians BY NASIM AHMED

UnderstandingU the Nakba off ers a commentary which ties in theological and philosophical threadsth that are clearly woven into the very nature of the Palestinian-Israeli confl ict. Th e Palestinian Nakba, as the book argues, is not merely an event in history but a historical processp whereby eschatological visions and theological certainties take the driving seat in a modernm political project, creating the ongoing dispossession and exile of an entire nation anda its people.

AuthorA Nasim Ahmed provides a fresher understanding of the Nakba, the ongoing dispossession of Palestinians and the future trajectory of this confl ict.

Understanding the Nakba: An Insight into the Plight of Palestinians by Nasim Ahmed. Published in 2012 by The Palestinian Return Centre.

Ashes of Hama: The Perilous History of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood BY RAPHAEL LEFEVRE

WhenW the convulsions of the Arab Spring fi rst became manifest in Syria in March 2011, theth Ba'athist regime was quick to blame the protests on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood anda its alleged al-Qaeda affi liates. But who are these Islamists so determined to rule a post- AssadA Syria? Little has been published on militant Islam in Syria since Hafez Assad's regime destroyedd the Islamist movement in its stronghold of Hama in February 1982. Ashes of HamaH tries to bridge that gap by providing readers with the fi rst comprehensive account oof the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's history to date.

Raphael Lefevre draws on previously untapped sources: the memoirs of former Syrian jihadists; British and American archives; and also a series of wide-ranging interviews with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's historical leaders as well as those who battled against them.

Ashes of Hama: The Perilous History of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood by Raphael Lefevre. To be published in March 2013 by C. Hurst & Co Publishers. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 109 The Arab Spring: What did it do for women?

SHAZIA ARSHAD

arlier this year London played role of women sought to use women’s rights host to the highest ranking female and gender issues as a mark of success of Epolitician in the Arab world, her the Arab Spring.2 Th e Western audience position made possible by the advent of the watched (and continue to do so) with Arab Spring – and specifi cally the Jasmine baited breath at the Arab Spring unfolded Revolution which catalysed it in her home across the Middle East, with hopes for country of Tunisia. Mehrezia Labidi came new democracies and liberal revivals as to hold the position as the Deputy Speaker old dictatorial regimes were overthrown of the Tunisian National Assembly and rebelled against. As has become a following the election of Ennahda in the common part of Western discourse, the fi rst democratic elections in Tunisia after measurement of democratic success is the Jasmine Revolution in October 2011. weighed in the treatment of women, their A few months earlier the Yemeni Nobel advancement in politics, media and social Peace Prize Winner, Tawakul Karman1 spaces and the ways in which women’s had also been in London following her issues are defi ned and responded to. role in popular protests in Yemen, which Yet whilst the Arab Spring was not a catapulted her into the international gender based revolution it did mark a spotlight. Th e common thread running turning point for the role of women in public space and the advent of women The development of as part of these protests was a signifi cant marker in the changing dynamics that the Arab Spring across were beginning to take force. While the the Middle East was not revolutions were not defi ned by the role of women there was a general call by both a gender based issue, men and women for regime change and yet it was the issue of revolution – but signifi cantly the gender women’s rights which identities of the revolutionaries was not the focus of the revolutions. However, sought to defi ne it in the the overthrowing of the old traditional perception of the ‘West’. regimes meant that there were calls for old practises to be ended and with that came the call for the end of traditional through their experiences has been the patriarchy, the norm for many of these events of the Arab Spring during the last Arab societies. Women in Tunisia, Egypt 18 months. and Libya (and elsewhere across the region) Th e development of the Arab Spring found that they had access to newer and across the Middle East was not a gender wider audiences who were interested in and based issue, yet it was the issue of women’s allowed for their voices to be heard directly rights which sought to defi ne it in the from them. Tawakul Karman became a perception of the ‘West’. Th e increase in fi gure of the Yemeni uprisings; her role articles from a wide spectre of British, as a revolutionary catapulted her into the European and American journalists on the media spotlight, her role as a strong woman

110 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB SPRING: WHAT DID IT DO FOR WOMEN? cemented that position. Despite the fact countries, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen that the revolutions were not gender based as well as in Bahrain, Libya and now in calls for freedom, the spotlight on women’s Syria, women took to the streets to become roles across the Middle East and North part of the social protest movement. In the Africa was intensifi ed. infamous days of protest in Cairo’s Tahrir For all the discussion about women Square, which saw tens of thousands of during the Arab Spring, most academics, Egyptians demand the removal of the politicians, commentators and most then President Mubarak, thousands of importantly participants note that the women joined these protests. Anecdotes Arab Spring has been a turning point for from Western travellers and tourists to women in the Middle East. By challenging pre-revolution Egypt often remarked on the patriarchal norms of society, the the invisibility of women in Egyptian growth of these visible women has brought society, particularly in the political sphere about a paradigm shift in the discussion on – the Tahrir Square protests challenged women in the Middle East. No longer are this notion head on (though there were they just talked about; they are the ones undeniable challenges and the situation doing the talking. Yet their roles during the was fraught with diffi culties, which be revolution, and now in the development of discussed later). new, post-revolution societies, demands Tunisia provided another example some attention and it is not without facing of women’s active participation. As the numerous challenges that these women protests gathered pace across Tunis, foray into the public space. women took to the streets demanding political freedom as well as responding DURING THE REVOLUTION to rising unemployment, corruption and When Mohammed Bouazizi set unsustainable food prices. Additionally himself on fi re in December 2010 he there were calls for women’s rights to be became the catalyst for a wave of protests honoured, for the personal status code3 to and ultimately revolutions against old, be upheld and enforced and for women to dictatorial regimes which had held their be allowed greater political involvement in Middle Eastern fi efdoms in a stranglehold their country. During Ben Ali’s reign of the for decades. Ultimately, these social country, his grip on the fi nances had begun protest movements were calling for social to plunge the Tunisian economy into ruin justice for the impoverished citizens; and with this came rising unemployment rising unemployment, depleting living and consequently a number of other social standards, lack of political freedom grievances. It was this fi scal burden that and free speech were all motivations for sparked Bouazizi’s fi re when he committed the protestors across the Middle East. the most defi ning act of the Arab Spring. Whilst each country had their own Interestingly, it was reported that he was specifi c challenges and diffi culties, these fi nally pushed over the edge when he was common themes emerged as calls from the assaulted by a female police offi cer whilst protestors to fi nd a solution began to echo he was working as a fruit seller. Whilst across the region. Th e demand for human the police brutality seemed to be par for rights came from both men and women the course in Tunisian society, his family and women played an active role in the reported that his humiliation had been protests and revolutions. made worse by the fact that the police During these protests women were able offi cer had been female.4 to express for themselves their demands for As a refl ection of society’s attitudes an end to the political dictatorships, to call towards women in pre-revolution Tunisia, for the fi nancial burdens on the countries’ this is indeed telling -- highlighting the citizens to be lifted, to demand an end to presumptions around women’s roles and the rising unemployment that had begun place in society. What this does not refl ect to engulf their countries. In a number of or highlight was one of the main reasons volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 111 why women were so keen to be active in to turn out on the streets and in Tahrir the public space – their roles as heads of Square. People appeared to heed her call families and households whilst their fathers (and of course the call of many others) and husbands were imprisoned by Ben when they did just that on January 18th. Ali’s torturous regime. In this way, women Whilst it will not be decisively concluded were forced to take responsibility and be as to whether or not the Arab Spring was the voice of their family when calling for indeed a social media revolution, what their male relatives to be brought home; is without doubt is the greater ease the demanding an end to Ben Ali’s regime internet and social media gave protesters, was a logical conclusion to that end. An allowing them to discuss, organise and anecdote, by a Tunisian revolutionary- develop their protests in a virtual (and cum-politician, revealed how women were most importantly), distinct space away compelled to respond to the brutalisation from the regime. In cases where anonymity of their society by taking forceful action was needed, the internet allowed protestors and making their demands known. to discuss their concerns without fear of In Yemen, Tawakkul Karman’s story brutal repercussions. And of course, this was most telling. Again, in a traditional was particularly the case for women. society, Karman challenged Yemeni norms Whilst women were fi nding their feet in by becoming the voice of the revolution the physical public space, they were able to and spearheading protests against the assert their voices in the virtual public space regime. As an initial organiser of student with as much dominance and authority as rallies, she was notoriously stopped their male counterparts – where previously and detained in prison by unidentifi ed they may have been restricted by barriers policeman for 36 hours. Responding from travelling or family concerns over to her detention protests sprung up and reputation or no access to the places upon her release she called for a ‘Day of where discussion was taking place – these Rage’ hoping to emulate the protests of restrictions were no longer physical barriers Tunisia and Egypt. Encouraging women’s to their participation. groups to participate in these protests she Th ough the revolution brought women inspired hundreds of women to join in. and their concerns and frustrations into Conservative estimates suggest that of the the eye line of the wider society, indeed protestors, 30% were women.5 Th is was the eye line of the global community – it a remarkable achievement in Yemen and was not without continued challenges and, signalled the potential that women could perhaps inevitably, the stories of women have in the renewal of their countries suff ering at the hands of the revolution futures. Th ough Karman was encouraged became a common theme in the media. by her conviction to better her country, it is without doubt that her womanhood CHALLENGES DURING THE garnered her extra motivation and, in turn, REVOLUTION greater publicity and media coverage. Th eir description as challenges perhaps Another triumph for women during the does much injustice to the women who Arab Spring was their constant presence faced immense diffi culties during the throughout the social media sphere. revolution. Th e female revolutionaries, Whilst some commentators dubbed it the journalists, protestors, commentators and ‘Social Media Revolution’ and debate has citizens did indeed have the spotlight continued about the eff ect of social media shone upon them as the Arab Spring on the Arab Spring, what was undeniable began to sweep the Middle East. Yet with was the plethora of women who could this spotlight came intense scrutiny from be heard tweeting, writing and debating the brutal elements of their society and about these issues. One such blogger was resultantly reports of rape, sexual assault, the Egyptian 26 year old Asma Mahfouz, physical attacks as well as verbal assaults who put out a call on Facebook for people and other such anguishes became an all too

112 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB SPRING: WHAT DID IT DO FOR WOMEN? common occurrence. Th e female actors in extra burdens upon the female protestors the protests were perhaps regarded as easy – not only were they facing the challenge targets, though it should be noted that of removing the dictatorial regimes, like the brutality was not limited to women. their male counterparts – but traditional, Th ese reports were not limited to police patriarchal attitudes towards women, and regime attacks; there were also cases along with physical threats to their safety of women being attacked by protestors and certainly made their situation far more other people present during the marches challenging. As one commentator noted, and protests in the various squares and “Women in Egypt face three times the streets of cities across the region. pressures that men do: fi rst, from the Th e Egyptian experience perhaps military regime as protesters; second from brought a magnifying glass upon these the society, just for being women, and attacks; during the Tahrir Square protests third, from all sides for trying to claim from January 18, there were numerous their rights to participate in public life.”7 reports of police sexual attacks on female Th ese were sentiments that echoed across protestors – most infamously, the virginity the Middle East. tests. Egyptian military doctors subjected Th ese are examples of some of the some female demonstrators (Amnesty more immediate challenges that women International put the initial fi gure at 17) participants of the Arab Spring faced. to invasive ‘virginity tests’, following Yet despite that, the female actors in the the police having arrested them for revolutions continued to keep up their demonstrating. A young Egyptian woman, demands for reform and revolution and Samira Ibrahim fought to take her case to hoped to play a signifi cant role in the court, along with other female protestors. political change that came after the revolts. Whilst an order was put out demanding an end to the practice, the military court PART OF THE POLITICS? cleared the doctor who had performed the As the revolutions brought about serious ‘test’. Th ese tactics were used to frighten political change in respective countries off the growing presence of women during across the Middle East, women began to the Egyptian protests.6 Th ough losing the lawsuit, Ibrahim’s case did garner the Female protestors and media’s attention and interest. Alongside these reports came stories of sexual assault demonstrators across of female journalists. CBS reporter Lara the Middle East [are Logan captured the attention of most Western media outlets when she reported demanding inclusion her story of having been sexually assaulted of]women in the new by men whilst she was reporting at the regime[s]. demonstrations. Following this, further stories where reported of a young British journalist, Natasha Smith, and American- fi nd out what role they would now play in Egyptian commentator, Mona el-Tahawy, these new regimes they had fought so hard having been subjected to similar attacks. for. Having been part of the struggle to Th ese were some of the better reported remove the old dictators, female protestors stories, but of course there were many and demonstrators across the Middle East more that began to circulate during the made demands of the new political players Arab Spring. that were emerging: calling on them to Egypt was not the only case. Women in include women in the new regime, to Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria all respect and protect women’s rights and reported similar instances having occurred overall to turn away from the patriarchal during protests and demonstrations. system of rule that had engulfed the Th ese very physical challenges posed Middle East for decades. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 113 Following the fall of the old regimes, obligation to work for all their country’s new political players and revolutionaries men and women. Notably, it was under emerged to lead the transition to new Ennahda that the fi rst woman to hold the systems of rule. Egypt and Tunisia saw highest political offi ce in the Middle East their fi rst free and fair elections in decades occurred when Mehrezia Labidi took her and saw the rise of previously banned and/ position as Deputy Speaker of the Tunisian or exiled fi gures returning to frontline Parliament. politics, with groups such as Ennahda and When Labidi visited London early in the Freedom and Justice Party declaring 2012, she answered the question that many their intentions to run for government western commentators and journalists were in elections. During the transitional keen to ask – was the inclusion of women periods all new emerging political fi gures in Ennahda merely a façade? And with committed themselves to upholding this repeated question, came a constantly women’s rights and to supporting women repeated phrase – the women of Ennahda as an equal part of the new society that was (and of Tunisia) were not there as décor forming. but were keen actors in the revolution and Tunisia witnessed dramatic changes in would be too in the politics. Indeed, these respect of female political participation women would not allow themselves to be and representation. With a history as a décor and demanded that their voice be progressive arena for women’s rights in heard. It is without doubt, that with her the Middle East, many of the female offi ce Labidi’s voice is heard – and with revolutionaries pointed to the Personal that comes the hope that many more such Status Code as an example of legislation female voices will be too. which gave women numerous rights. Yet Whilst, the situation cannot be described they acknowledged that with Ben Ali as anywhere near perfect for the female treating Tunisia as a personal playground, citizens of Tunisia, it is safe to say that the the upholding of these rights, along with situation is much improved. Although a numerous other rights for all Tunisians, report by the International Federation for had eroded away. As Ennahda gained Human Rights, circulated to the EU and political momentum, they declared a its member states, did report that women commitment to upholding the rights of in Tunisia faced uncertainties in relation women across Tunisia. While Western to new laws. Questions about new custody journalists and commentators questioned laws and adoption laws were cited as two the compatibility of Islamist movements examples of potential threats to women’s with politics and women’s rights, Ennahda, rights. particularly through the voice of its female Th ough the success of women’s representatives, argued that it would representation in Tunisia has not yet enshrine the protection of women’s rights been mirrored across the Middle East, in the new constitution as it was formed.8 there have been attempts by revolutionary Indeed, Ennahda’s subsequent electoral actors to encourage greater women’s success symbolised the progress of women rights. In Egypt, whilst the Freedom in the revolution and in post-revolution and Justice Party publicly committed transition. Ennahda instituted a 50:50 itself to including women in the political ratio of female to male candidates and transition, only a handful of women were with this came the election of 60 women voted in during the elections. Egypt’s out of 217 MPs; of the 90 Ennahda political transition has come under much MPs, 42 are female. Nine women have scrutiny for its treatment of women and been appointed to head new government their representation at political levels. commissions. However, there are still Despite commitments to inclusivity, the only 3 female government ministers. new Egyptian cabinet included just two Th is commitment to equal representation women ministers. Th ere are indeed many symbolised Ennahda’s desire to fulfi l its more challenges facing women in the new

114 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB SPRING: WHAT DID IT DO FOR WOMEN? political era, not just in Egypt but across Arab Spring had brought about complete the Middle East. An entire thesis could equality for women, but it is noteworthy be devoted to the legislature which poses that women were given such attention. great diffi culties for women in various For the fi rst time in recent Middle Eastern countries, as well as the challenges of history, women played a crucial role in existing societal attitudes towards women defi ning their countries’ futures. and women’s rights. So, what did the Arab Spring do for women? It amplifi ed their voices across the WHAT DID THE ARAB SPRING Middle East, their demands for a better DO FOR WOMEN? future for themselves, their families and It would be impossible to provide a full their countries and their demand to end analysis of the Arab Spring’s eff ect on to injustice, brutality and corruption. Of the lives of women and its female actors, course, there is much more that all these primarily because in many instances the diff erent women want to achieve, but the Arab Spring continues in varied forms as Arab Spring has provided the fi rst leap the countries continue constantly to adjust towards their myriad of goals. to new rules of law and governance. Yet, what cannot be denied is the role that *Shazia Arshad is a Parliamentary Offi cer at the Middle women played in the Arab Spring and the East Monitor (MEMO). She previously worked for a Member of Parliament at the House of Commons in potential that this has given women to London. In her current role at MEMO Arshad led a determine their own futures in their newly parliamentary delegation to Israel, the West Bank and liberated countries. Th e Arab Spring gave Jerusalem. women a platform for their voices to be Arshad studied at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), gaining a BA in History and MA in heard. Middle Eastern history, specialising in the history og In some instances, this was a success: the Palestine. role of women in Tunisia and specifi cally the Ennahda party highlighted the importance ENDNOTES of women’s rights. It showcased how a 1. Tawakul Karman was a co-recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize new political identity could be formed 2011 alongside Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee for “their non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for with the inclusion of women and, more women’s rights to full participation in peace-building work.” importantly, it highlighted the necessity 2. A ‘Google news’ search of “women in the Arab Spring” to include women in these forums. Not brings up 16, 500 results – a Google search of the term brings only had the women been participants up 153, 000, 000 3. The Personal Status Code was adopted in 1956 by President in the Spring – but they too would be Bourgiba in order to protect the family lives of Tunisian participants in the future. Of course, there women, abolishing polygamy, requiring the consent of both are innumerable challenges that occurred spouses to conclude a marriage contract and giving men and – both during the Spring and since. Whilst women equal access to divorce before a court. http://www. europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/201206 it would be diffi cult to list them all, they 08ATT46510/20120608ATT46510EN.pdf cannot be ignored. Th ere are challenges 4. Sengupta, Kim (2011). “Tunisia: ‘I have lost my son but I am of representation in Egypt, in a number of proud of what he did’”, The Independent (21 January) http:// countries it is the legislation and perhaps www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/tunisia-i-have-lost- my-son-but-i-am-proud-of-what-he-did-2190331.html across the board it is the challenge of old, 5. Almasmari, Hakim & Jamjoom, Mohammed (2011). “Women patriarchal dominancy which still poses a march in Yemen’s capital”, CNN (17 October) Mhttp://edition. challenge to the women. cnn.com/2011/10/17/world/meast/yemen-unrest/index. It should also be noted that ‘women’ in html?iref=allsearch 6. Mohsen, Habiba (2012). “What made her go there? this context do not represent a homogenous Samira Ibrahim and Egypt's virginity test trial”, Al-Jazeera group. Th ey have varied, sometimes English (16 March) http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ contrasting, goals and ambitions, but opinion/2012/03/2012316133129201850.html despite this, they are all hoping that 7. Ibid 8. Mcrobie, Heather (2012). “Will the Tunisian constitution they have the opportunity to voice their erode the gains of women in the revolution”, New Statesman numerous concerns and demands. It (15 August) http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/ would be reckless to conclude that the politics/2012/08/will-tunisian-constitution-erode-gains- women-arab-spring volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 115 BOOK PROMOTION ISLAM AND CIVILISATIONAL RENEWAL

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An inter-disciplinary peer-reviewed journal ICR covers the spectrum of scholarship and published quarterly by the International research in civilisation studies, comparative Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) religion, Shariah studies, Islamic banking Malaysia. and fi nance, inter-faith dialogue and peace studies, government and international Since 2008, ICR has been enlarging the relations, post-confl ict recovery and Islamic space for civilisational exchange, rehabilitation, market economy and attracting Islamic, Asian and Western authors globalisation studies. Th roughout, ICR and readers in a diverse and synergistic maintains a strong policy orientation with forum that is alive to the challenges of our actionable recommendations for decision- age and the scope for collaborative eff ort makers. towards peace and social well-being for all. www.iais.org.my

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116 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 The Importance of Trade and Capitalism in a Changing Middle East

VALI NASR

e are passing through was a place where children were punished interesting times given the for playing on a Sunday and people were Wchanges taking place in the Arab not allowed to work. It was extremely World which has not only raised a number puritanical and brings to mind the of issues vis-a-vis the relationship between Taliban’s Kabul more than anything else. Islam and the West (and the way we think However what happened to Scotland much about that relationship). In particular, later, through people like David Hume, is the current changes in the Arab World essentially the model people are talking have highlighted a political narrative about today. Scotland went from being which has not been about extremism an extremely puritanical and religiously- vs moderation or Islam vs the West but constrained place to being a place where actually a much more nuanced political reality that refl ects the aspirations of the Much of what is people. Th is is perhaps in sharp contrast to how many western countries including happening in the Middle Great Britain have approached the issue of East today and what what is happening in the Muslim / Arab World, which has largely been understood will transpire [is] about through the prism of the extremism threat. economics. Th e current belief has been that the Muslim /Arab world is in the grip of somewhat of an excessive religiosity and is thus open industrial revolution took fl ight and the to the persuasion of extremist forces and driving force was essentially commerce. ideas. Th is has sparked discussion in the Ultimately the argument I would like to West about the changing situation (and its make is, much of that is happening in the eff ects), thus advancing the argument that Middle East today and what will transpire there needs to be some form of internal in the Middle East is not about religion but intellectual, ideological and religious about economics. Put it simply, the change reform within the Muslim World. agent I would like to think of the Muslim Many in the West look back at world is more likely to be businessmen and European history and view in terms of the people engaged in commerce and more protestant movement which ‘reformed’ so than the intellectuals and clerics or and ‘transformed’ Christianity, opening enlightened thinkers. the doors for modernity in the West. In At some level we have to intuitively reality, in my humble submission, what understand that a lot of the problems really is desired in the West is not so in the Muslim world have to do with much a reformation in Islam but that the economic issues. If we look at the revolt Muslim World would essentially arrive at a that is sweeping across the Arab world, post industrial revolution Europe scenario. we see one of the driving factors is that For example, if we take the history of the there is too much poverty. Th ere is too British isles, reformation brought John little money at the bottom of the society, Knox to Scotland. John Knox’s Scotland a greater amount at the top, and very little volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 117 in the middle. For example, in Egypt conservative estimation. whilst about half the population live on Not every middle class is the right middle their $2 a day, a development report by an class though. Often people say that in Arab forum in 2002 argued that by 2015, many Muslim countries there has been the the region will need 115 million jobs in presence of the middle class for a very long order to catch up with demand. Th e rate time. Going back to the colonial period or of population growth in Middle Eastern early state development in Arab countries, countries exceeds the rate of economic in Iran, Turkey, in Indonesia, there was a growth and with that pace the economics middle class. Whilst this is true, it is not cannot possibly produce enough jobs to the kind of middle class that really matters meet demand. You thus face a situation in terms of social and cultural change, and of increasingly declining quality of life, in particular democratic change. Th is education, social services and alike. middle class is one that has been built A common narrative in the West argues top-down by the state through education that extremism is essentially a result of and social engineering. More importantly, poverty and social frustration. Whilst this it is economically-dependent on the state may be true, the problem in the Middle because it either works for the state or East is not so much the presence of a large collects a salary -- or because it depends on lower class but there is actually too little of state entitlement. a middle class. Ultimately in the waves In the West we often think that the of modernisation and successful waves Muslim World is distinguished by many of democratic change seen historically in things such as being excessively religious Europe and currently in Latin America, or not sharing common global values. One East Asia, Eastern Europe, the agents of of the most distinguishing factors in my social, economic and political change is opinion is that many parts of the Muslim the middle class -- this is true in the case world, pa r ticu la rly t he A rab region operates of Brazil, India or even China today. by-and-large outside of the global economy Economists defi ne the middle class as the with very little participation. Selling oil and ‘middle rung’ of society. Th ey are neither buying fi nished manufactured products is poor but not necessarily rich. Th ey have a not really active participation. In other steady job and income, and if you put aside words, it is not properly integrated into the food, basic necessities and housing at-least supply chain that constitutes globalisation. a third of their income is still available As a rule of thumb, seldom do you fi nd any for disposable discretionary spending. product in your local department store in From this basic defi nition of middle class, the West where it says ‘made in the Arab additional defi nitions like education as world’. Many of the Arab economies are well as social values like respecting human still functioning in the mould of the 1960- rights, rights of women and so on, can be 70’s pre-globalisation economies of many added to the defi nition. parts of the third world. Th is is a very If we just consider the basic defi nition critical issue, because without integration (all other things being equal), then there into the global economy and without the is potentially a huge middle class in presence of market forces, the middleclass the Muslim World, from Indonesia to (the entrepreneur class) that everywhere Morocco. Whilst countries will have else in the world plays a critical role in varying sizes of middle class, the ball- socio-economic transformation is generally park fi gure is that at-least 15- 20% of the absent in the Muslim world or in the Arab population on average of these countries world countries. Where it does exist it is not constitutes the middle class. Th is is quite a suffi ciently politically powerful in order large size of the overall Muslim population to have an impact. What matters is that of 1.3 billion people, looking at a 150- 200 areas of the world that have gone through million people that would easily qualify cultural and political transformation have as middle class and above, which is a been integrated into the supply chain that

118 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE AND CAPITALISM IN A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST constitutes globalisation. Islamic Finance, One is that it is where Th is is not to say that this is not the case Muslim money and Muslim business across the whole of the Middle East. Th ere meets international global fi nance. Whilst does exist to some degree, a footprint for Islamic Finance, as a concept, existed for the middle class that is based in markets a long time and promoted by ideological and global economy in diff erent parts of thinkers like Maulana Maududi in the world. Th us where we see political and Pakistan or by the Islamically-learning social change it is largely associated with rulers like King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, the middle class. Th e green movement in they could never get it to work as it never Iran in 2009 was rooted in the middle class seemed profi table. It was like a white that was a product of the privatisation of elephant project that was supported as a the Iranian economy in 1990. It is not a mark of piety. It was only when the likes surprising therefore that this movement of the Deutche Bank, HSBC and Citibank sought religious, political and cultural turned to Islamic Finance did it fl ourish change as well as much more engagement because they believed there was a market with the world. It is not coincidental that for it. Th ese banks realised that they were the Arab Spring started in one country with missing out on a market and by providing the largest middle class and the country that an alternative product, have found that is most integrated into the global economy, especially in the West, Islamic Finance is Tunisia. It went through a decade and half growing on the back of the Muslim middle of very rapid economic growth, which class. In Chicago, for example, four years many thought was a sort of a China model ago a local bank decided to off er Islamic as it combined authoritarianism with a Car loans and within a day there was a line 7-8-9% growth rate. It did not produce running out of the bank around the block. a very happy country but did produce a Now, Muslims who buy cars are not lower country that had a sizable middle class class but anybody who needs to fi nance that was very much tied to Tunisia’s export their cars are not rich. So they are at least relations with Europe. middle class. If we look at the growth of Th e Arab Spring subsequently took the Islamic Finance it does say something place in the next country, Egypt, that has about the presence and the potential of this done most to open up its economy in the middle class. recent years to the global economy. In the Two further cases also illustrate the last decade of Mubarak’s rule Egypt went reality and the potential of this middle through a period of rapid economic growth class. Th e fi rst concerns an experiment in and at-least a certain degree of opening. Dubai. Dubai in recent years has captured We must also think about the size of this a lot of attention in various ways. Whilst it middle class which can be analysed by what it consumes. It is interesting to note that the Muslim middle class is today characterised Dubai is... proof of... the by a burgeoning of fi nancial products. In Muslim middle class recent years, Islamic fi nance has increased and the importance up to 4-5trillion dollar economy. Th e spectacular growth of Islamic Finance is of business and linked to wealth in the region that mostly entrepreneurship. originates from oil. However the growth of Islamic Finance in the United States and Europe cannot be explained in terms of is no longer portrayed as a business success, global wealth. Islamic Finance is a niche I maintain that Dubai’s decline after product in the global fi nancial sector but 2008 is exactly to do with the fact that it it is the most rapidly expanding part of participated in the global economy and the global fi nancial structure. Here, two therefore it was susceptible to the pressures things are important to highlight about in the fi nancial market. Dubai is important volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 119 because it is proof of a concept, about the reject all things Western and care only Muslim middle class and the importance about certain values that are not tangible of business and entrepreneurship. Dubai is in terms everyday interest and with what not the wealthiest of the Gulf sheikhdoms everybody else can identify. Dubai was and in fact pumps less oil today than it did about engaging the West economically and a decade ago. It decided that it had to earn fi nancially and it was about things that are money some other way. It decided to do immediate and about people’s immediate this was to provide a ‘virtual marketplace’ concerns. that would allow integration into the global Th e fact that Dubai became popular economy, particularly global fi nance and as it did in the Muslim imagination was other areas by deregulating its market and extremely important. It means that if opening it to direct foreign investment. there is a business driver and markets, it Th ereby making it easier to do business in is extremely compelling to Muslims. What Dubai. Muslims liked about Dubai was manic Now it is not so much the citizens of consumption - it was a mix of Disneyland Dubai who took advantage of this success and Las Vegas. It was about that sort of but Muslims everywhere else. Muslims audacity, its malls and about consumption. who could not do business in their own Dubai became the epitome of what country converged and did business the Muslim classes would want, from in Dubai with Muslims who could do a business, consumption and religious business elsewhere; also meeting with perspective. It has now exported this idea Chinese, Russians, Australians, British, and has been replicated elsewhere. Today, Americans etc. So what Dubai showed is go to many Muslim cities like Kuala that if there is a capitalistic environment Lampur, Istanbul, Beirut, Rabat and a and market forces, Muslims are likely very similar kind of consumer business to be as capitalist as anyone else. So the model exists which caters to the same argument that Muslims are averse to class within an Islamic setting. Ultimately modernity simply does not hold. the important thing is what it says about As Dubai grew it captured the Muslim Muslim middle class and the potential imagination. A poll in 2008 found that change that awaits if they are engaged Muslims preferred visiting Dubai and with. I once asked a Saudi businessman in living in Dubai more than their own Dubai what he really liked about Dubai. countries. For the fi rst time it became He replied, “in Dubai you sleep in 5-star more popular than the US and UK as hotels and pray in 5-star mosques”. What a destination for tourism. For the fi rst does this mean? Ultimately piety is piety time Dubai also became the place that and faith is faith but upwardly-mobile Muslims preferred to live other than their people will behave like upwardly-mobile own country that was not in the West. It people everywhere. Th ey desire quality of is important to remember that those who life, good products and services. visit Dubai are generally not poor unless Th e second case study about the reality they go to work there. Th ey tend to be the and the potential of the middle class middle class, and the attraction of Dubai concerns Turkish middle class. Th ere is was not because it implemented the shari’a currently much talk about the Turkish strictly but because it allowed people to model and about transplanting it to enjoy the comforts of home within an Cairo for example, so that overnight, the ‘Islamic’ environment. Everything about Muslim Brotherhood would undergo Dubai is the antithesis of al-Qaida. If the metamorphosis into the AKP or that the Jihadi message is about reward in the next Egyptian military would behave like the life, Dubai is all about reward in this life Turkish military. Th ere are particularities and worldly gains. Th is clearly goes against about the case of Turkey which involves, the rhetoric of al-Qaida particularly as it amongst many things, the Kemalist is understood in the West that Muslims experience which placed signifi cant

120 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE AND CAPITALISM IN A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST investments in education, secularism really epitomises this is the small industrial and infrastructure. Accepting this fact, town called Kasseri in the Anatolian the Turkey of today is a country that has heartland. Kasseri was a very small town attracted over 50 billion dollars in direct with very little industry but when the foreign investment between 2002 and opening in 1980’s came, businessmen in 2007. Th is investment grew at a very rapid Turkey took advantage of the government rate of 7- 8 % (growing still at a rate of credit and access to export market and 5% during the fi nancial crisis of the past began to build a very aggressive export two years). Turkey earned itself a seat at oriented businesses. Kasseri is now a the G20 not because of new oil it pumps major export of furniture to Europe even out of the ground but because of the power though it is not near any forest or source of its economic performance that has of wood. It is also one of the largest increasingly put it in the same league as suppliers of denim and accounts for 5-6% Brazil, India, China as a Rising Tiger and of all Denim Jeans produced globally. One regional economic powerhouse. company in Kasseri accounts for 1-2% of But this success is not necessarily all denim produced globally. Yet Kasseri attributable to Kemalism. Rather is a conservative town, like rural America, something else happened in Turkey that which has strong religious values, highly may have built on the Kemalist experience nationalistic, right off centre and also very that was transformative but the contours capitalist. It is still a very conservative of it are fairly obvious to us, except the town but it is dominated by a new business lessons are not really extrapolated quite class. Th e wonderful shining mosque in the same way. In the 1980’s Turkey was the middle of town is crowded by a line of bankrupt pretty much fi nancially with Mercedes Benzes on Fridays. It speaks to a similar profi le to Argentina, Brazil and the sort of relationship between capitalism other countries that have heavily invested and the moral compass of the new class. in large enterprises that were subsidised by the government but were not profi table. The middle class After the military coup of 1980, Turkey was told by the IMF that it needed to revolution in Turkey... devalue its currency, to cut credit to these is grounded in its rural large industries -- and to privatise them in order to boost exports. As Turkey (... Anatolian) settings implemented this, the larger industries rather than urban. It that were very closely associated with is very religious in its the Kenalist establishment of the time ended up as losers and it was the small sensibilities rather than businessmen in the heartland of Turkey, secular.. the so called Anatolian Tigers, who essentially took advantage of the opening of the global economy. Th us the Turkish Hence the middle class revolution in economic boom was built on the back of Turkey has produced one that is grounded this entrepreneurial business classes rather in its rural (in this case Anatolian) settings than the old class. rather than urban. It is very religious in its In Turkey today, this is what defi nes sensibilities rather than secular but in same the two middle classes: the Kemalist way it is more modern and integrated into middle class that was the product of state the global economy than the middle class education and social policies and the that it replaced. Often what is confusing middle class that is the product of Turkey’s about looking at Turkey is that whilst the entrance into global economy, which is old middle class ought to appear more even represented by the diff erent business familiar because it is secular it is in fact the associations in Turkey. An example that new middle class that look more familiar volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 121 THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE AND CAPITALISM IN A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST

because it is actually on par with where in Turkey, and in a major way the rule things are globally. Th e Kemalist never of the market in a political and religious updated or reinvented the French secular discussion in Turkey is in the moderation. state of 1930s or 1950s whilst the new Th ere is a capitalist business interest in not Turkish middle class is essentially post- going down the path of extremism. Th e globalisation. real lesson that has to be understood is that Why does this matter? Largely because it is because of triumph of markets and it this middle class that accounts for capitalism, that the transformative force in democracy in Turkey for a variety of Turkey has been business. reasons. It serves as an economic and What is desired is a middle class like business interest. It is also the class that that of Turkey, not only for its piety (or is most pro-Europe, because its interest is lack of it) but because it sees its interest as refl ected in continuation and expansion of refl ected in the global economy. Or that it business in Europe whilst setting its own sees its interest in a shared value that others agenda. If we say for example, the thing do, and ultimately is not achievable unless that matters to the West is the issue of there are middle classes that have built on extremism and how Muslims think about the back of markets, of open markets, and their faith, the new Anatolian Tigers are of capitalist economies. not the voices of secularism in Turkey. Th ey probably are the promoters and supporters Adapted from a speech given at a seminar ‘The Rise of Trade and Capitalism in a Changing Middle East’ organised by The of some form of religious piety and they are Cordoba Foundation and Business Network on 3rd May 2011 at consumers of a lot of religious product in Imperial College, London. Turkey. Th e women are more likely to be wearing the headscarf than not. However *Vali Nasr is an Iranian-American political commentator the key issue is what kind of Islam is it that and scholar of contemporary Islam. Born in Iran, this up-and-coming capitalistic middle Nasr and his family immigrated to the United States following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. He received a class is prompting in Turkey? BA from Tufts University in 1981 and a masters from To a large extent, religion is about value the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1984. He earned his PhD from MIT in political science in 1991. and not necessarily about political action. Religion provides a moral compass, rather Nasr is the author The Shia Revival, Democracy in Iran, and The Islamic Leviathan. He has taught at the than being the agent of social change. Th e University of San Diego and the Naval Postgraduate Turkish business community in general School, and is currently a Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard and Professor of International Politics does not support Jihad. When you talk at Tufts. to these businessman who are exporting A Life Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Nasr variety of things in to Europe, as a rule has written for the Foreign Aff airs, The New Republic, Foreign Policy, Time, the New York Times, and the of thumb, if you are exporting leather to Washington Post, among others. He is an editor of the Ferrugamo in Milan, jihad is not good Oxford Dictionary of Islam and has appeared on CNN, the BBC, National Public Radio, and not least of all The for business. Th e image of Turkey is the Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report. responsibility of the businessman. Th e state was largely put aside by IMF and then by Europe. Its wings were clipped politically and economically. Th e big state enterprises were force to make room for the market. Europe provided export access and forced the Turkish establishment to provide room for democracy. So unfortunately you had the thriving of a business network that directly ties a town like Kasseri directly to German, Italian other European markets and other distant global markets from central Asia to East Asia. Th ere exists in reality a genuine takeover of the market

122 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 Download for free thecordobafoundation.com volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 123 In Search of a Political Vision for the Arab World

KARIM SADEK

A PROBLEMATIC POLITICAL perceiving the other as a threat to their SITUATION identity. If, on the other hand, contenders' he Arab uprisings have, in some loyalties go to a genuinely inclusive political countries, ousted authoritarian vision, then they could see one another not Trulers and everywhere expressed as threats but as partners in a common democratic aspirations of an Arab public project. In this way, their disagreement can sphere. Th is presents an unprecedented be a cause for cooperation in fi guring out opportunity to break a long cycle of a solution to a common problem. Without authoritarianism and oppression, and the a genuinely inclusive social and political chance for Arab populations to realise ideal that is acceptable to religious and their right to political self-determination. secular Muslims, as well as non-Muslims, While democratic aspirations in the post- political disagreement would most likely uprising Arab world are widely shared, lead to more social fragmentation rather disagreements abound on the meaning than social solidarity. and conditions for their realisation. Th e responsibility for developing such For some, the infusion of politics with an ideal falls, above all, on intellectuals. Islamic principles and fundamentals - i.e. Th is paper aims to make progress in that the practice of Islamic politics - is key to direction. Th e paper draws on the work their emancipation and for the realisation of Tunisian Islamic political thinker and of equality, freedom and justice. For leader of An-Nahda Movement, Rached others, however, such an infusion bodes Ghannouchi, to make explicit resources degeneration into an Islamic version of internal to the Islamic tradition that can authoritarianism. To do justice to this play an instrumental role for developing a social reality, both the emancipatory and genuinely inclusive political ideal for the the authoritarian potentials of Islamic post-uprising Arab world. politics must be accounted for. Ghannouchi’s approach to debates Th is problematic political situation concerning the compatibility of Islam illuminates the fact that the post-uprising and democracy is worth highlighting as Arab world lacks a shared commitment to he neither rejects nor uncritically adopts a common political vision. Th e pragmatic Western notions or models of democracy benefi t of developing such vision should and modernity wholesale. Engaging with not be undermined. Consider, for the Western tradition while maintaining instance, debate contenders who aspire an informed and strong foothold in the for freedom of speech but disagree on Islamic tradition allows him to make a how to specify it - say, whether neo-Nazi contribution in simultaneously addressing groups or the producers of "Innocence of the worry that many Muslims have over Muslims" should be protected as a matter the survival of Islamic identity in the of principle. modern world, on the one hand, and the Without a shared commitment to a worry that many other Muslims and non- political vision, contending parties would Muslims have regarding Islamic politics end up identifying with their respective being undemocratic and exclusionist. specifi cations, which could lead to Th is engagement with Ghannouchi treats 124 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL VISION FOR THE ARAB WORLD him as a social and political thinker who has something to say on the relationship While a radically between religion, state and society in an democratic secular ongoing and urgent debate on the place of arrangement with an religion in politics generally, and the place of Islam in the post-uprising Arab world Islamic veil might satisfy specifi cally.1 non-Muslims and secular Assuming that the post-uprising political ideal should (a) be democratic in Muslims, it will not satisfy character, and (b) attend to Islamic parties Islamists. and interests - as refl ective of a major social and political constituency, an old at the surface and, hence, will not satisfy chestnut becomes pressing: Are Islam and those for whom politics is a vehicle for democracy compatible? Th e challenge is the realisation of their religion. While a not merely to crack the chestnut, but to do radically democratic secular arrangement so in a constructive way. Th e controversy with an Islamic veil might satisfy non- is not about whether the democratic ideals Muslims and secular Muslims, it will not of freedom and equality square with satisfy Islamists. To adequately address the an Islamic worldview, but about their challenge at hand, we need to put forward meaning and conditions for realisation a political arrangement that is both in the Arab social context. To address the suffi ciently democratic and suffi ciently challenge adequately, two rather unhelpful Islamic. if not empty extremes need to be avoided. Start with the "suffi ciently democratic" On one extreme, we could maintain leg of the challenge. When developing a a robust conception of an Islamic state political ideal for the Arab world we must that is electorally democratic (think of aim for a model where democratic will- something along the Iranian model). formation takes shape in free and public Electoral democracy might be necessary contestations where contending parties are but it surely is not suffi cient for the full and to convince one another about the value proper realisation of democratic ideals. and importance of their point of view and Not only do elections get manipulated, but how that can be accounted for by way of issues of rights and power get politicised in fi nding solutions to common problems. divisive ways. Th ese, among other reasons, Th e post-uprising political arrangement are behind the radical turn in Western should, at least, establish and preserve democratic theory away from democratic public forums that can guarantee the well elections towards a democratic public functioning of the contestation battle. Th e sphere.2 Notwithstanding the diff erences "suffi ciently Islamic" leg of the challenge among radical democrats, establishing and will unfold as we proceed. preserving a vibrantly alive open and free democratic public sphere is a requirement. THE PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF While a religious political arrangement ISLAMIC IDENTITY with a democratic veil might satisfy Before the uprisings, Islamic politics Islamists, it will not satisfy non-Muslims was systematically and forcefully excluded and secular Muslims. from the public realm, which in turn, Alternatively, and that is the second motivated a struggle for the public extreme, we could adopt the more recognition of Islamic identity. Th is stringent requirement of radical democracy struggle primarily aimed for equal legal within a secular political arrangement recognition.3 Ghannouchi, for instance, and an Islamic party in power (think of explains that the challenge the Islamic something along the Turkish model). Th at movement faced “lies in convincing the is a frail conception of an Islamic state that ‘other’, that is the ruling regimes, of the is radically democratic. It is Islamic only principle of ‘the people’s sovereignty’ volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 125 and of the right of Islamists – just like forms in which Muslims have articulated other political groups – to form political their acceptance of the authority of al- parties, engage in political activities and Nass throughout history. Th e point is to compete for power or share in power recognise the condition for the possibility through democratic means."4 Here, the of any genuinely Islamic politics - one that emancipatory call of Islamic politics was a is committed to al-Nass in all spheres of call to be recognised as an equal social and human existence.7 political participant. Legal recognition, Th e quandary is how to incorporate however, no more occupies a central stage Islamic reasoning - one that takes al-Nass in the post-uprising Arab world. Both in to be the absolute source of knowledge and Tunisia and Egypt, Islamic parties are validity - into public reasoning without dominating the political scene. Does this undermining the well functioning of mean that the emancipatory call of Islamic democratic will-formation in the public politics has been satisfi ed once and for all? sphere. Th e worry arises on the level of Not really. Any characteristically Islamic both the citizen and the state.8 Would conception of politics must accept the not the acceptance of the authority of authority of al-Nass (Qur'an and Sunna).5 al-Nass lead Muslim citizens to think Furthermore, a genuine engagement in and act in an authoritarian fashion with public aff airs in a characteristically Islamic their contenders in public debates? Th e fashion is wedded to forms of reasoning case of the religious hypocrite is of no that take al-Nass to be the absolute source of interest here. What we are looking for, knowledge and validity. Th e emancipatory instead, is a self-consistent believer who call of Islamic politics is a call not only is able to participate in politics without for the participation of Islamic parties in employing authoritarian reasoning. So elections, but also for the inclusion of the much for citizenship; at the state level, acceptance of al-Nass as a legitimate basis if Islamic politics gathers a majority and for doing politics. Only in this way would democratically wins political power, won't we open the doors for a characteristically its acceptance of the authority of al-Nass Islamic social and political practice that lead to enacting policies that preserve infuses public life with Islamic principles, and promote an Islamic worldview at the fundamentals and reasoning. Consider as expense of others? a case in point the aspect of Ghannouchi's Th e preservation of a democratic public political struggle that goes beyond getting sphere requires not only that Muslims rid of oppressive state measures, his act in a non-authoritarian fashion when aspiration to enter modernity through conducting public debates, but also the doors of Islam. He writes: “Instead of that an Islamic government that seeks pseudo-modernity, Islamists today seek to preserve and promote an Islamic genuine modernity, one that emanates worldview will be able to maintain an all- from within, one that is in response to inclusive public sphere where the political local needs and that is in conformity with autonomy of individuals and minorities the local culture and value system.”6 does not get undermined through the In order for committed and sincere enactment of policies for establishing an Muslims to be active political actors, and exclusivist public sphere. Here, the work hence allow for a genuinely Islamic voice of Ghannouchi is particularly helpful. His to be heard and express local needs and model of the Islamic state puts on the table values, Islamic forms of reasoning should resources internal to the Islamic tradition be included in public reasoning. that can fend against both charges of It is crucial to keep in mind that one authoritarianism. Let us turn to these can recognise the authority of al-Nass resources. as a legitimate basis for doing politics, without recognising the value, truth, or AUTHORITARIAN CITIZENSHIP validity of all the diff erent shapes and Forms of reasoning that accept the

126 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL VISION FOR THE ARAB WORLD authority of al-Nass will, per force, stifl e take over divine perfection and speak in public debates not as a result of Muslims its name to dominate and oppress others. believing that God is an unimpeachable Doing so, from the Islamic perspective, source of authority, but of those who amounts to authoritarianism.12 Further, might wield that belief as a conversation and this is equally if not more important stopper. Being a believer doesn’t imply to clarify, the fl exibility and revisability that you must view those who do not share of ijtihad does not imply that "anything your beliefs as unreasonable or incapable goes." Ijtihad must be grounded in Islamic of making legitimate contributions to sources and there are well-developed sets the public discourse. Such a view would of practices and norms against which come about only when religious citizens make a further epistemic assumption to God assigned humans the eff ect that they have access to absolute knowledge, and take references to divine with the task and authority to be suffi cient to impose their authority to establish views on others regardless of what those others happen to think. justice... and freedom in To see how Ghannouchi conceives the accordance with al-Nass relationship between divine and human - Ghannouchi. authority, we need to look at his conception of ijtihad (the process and outcome of interpreting al-Nass).9 interpretations of the text make sense and Al-Nass represents divine authority. are to be compared and assessed. Th us, it is the source of truth and validity Ijtihad is not only fl exible and revisable in an overarching, unquestionable, and but also all-inclusive. According to universal sense. We have access to the Ghannouchi, God assigned humans with ethically valid standpoint in the form of the task and authority to establish justice, a text, which Muslims are to understand, good and freedom in accordance with al- apply, and live by. While the directives of al- Nass. Doing so binds Muslims to abiding Nass are abstract and universal, human life by the principle of shura – (consultation), is concrete and changing; hence creating a which is the locus of human authority. gap between the universal general and the Shura is "the spinal cord of the umma's concrete particular. Th e function of ijtihad authority in establishing political rule on is to bridge that gap. “Transforming the the basis of participation, co-operation Book into an 'ummah is the essence of the and responsibility" (H, 109). Ghannouchi mission of 'ulama, and it is a mission that builds on the principle of shura to give goes beyond individual eff orts”10 explains the Islamic community a role in the Ghannouchi. Given the changing nature process of ijtihad - of operationalising and of social life, ijtihad must be fl exible. But concretising al-Nass in a particular socio- ijtihad is also revisable and fallible since it historical context. Members of a society could never reach the epistemic status of have the fi nal say in determining whether certainty. the jurists have succeeded in understanding Th e fl exibility and revisability of ijtihad, and accounting for their own needs and however, do not undermine the universal interests. Th ere should be a harmony- validity of al-Nass. Al-Nass is general of-fi t between the jurist's understanding and perfect, human interpretations are of the text, on the one hand, and that particular and imperfect. Th ere should understanding's fi t with the community's always be an awareness of an ineliminable self-understanding, including the deep- gap between God's law and all actual seated, normative expectations and human attempts to understand, interpret intuitions of social members, on the other and apply it.11 Th is awareness is crucial hand. In that sense, the process of ijtihad in not allowing human imperfection to is all-inclusive.13 volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 127 By accepting or rejecting a certain MAINTAINING AN ALL- outcome of ijtihad, social members do INCLUSIVE PUBLIC SPHERE not aff ect the validity of divine law and Th is is not enough, however. Th e principles themselves. Jurists have a preservation of a democratic public privileged position in understanding and sphere requires not only that Muslims fi guring out the meaning of the text; they act in a non-authoritarian fashion when are the experts. Th eir interpretations, conducting public debates, but also that an however, are intended for social members Islamic government that seeks to preserve and will materialise only within a particular and promote an Islamic worldview will socio-cultural context with its own maintain an all-inclusive public sphere reality, history and particularities (social, where minorities' political autonomy is not psychological, economic, environmental, undermined. Once again, Ghannouchi's etc). Th us, the success of interpreting divine work provides us with appropriate law cannot be determined independently resources. from the subjects for whom they are made Ghannouchi has no explicit or well- and with whom they are to take shape and defi ned conception of the public sphere. get implemented - otherwise, how could His conception of shura, however, applies the Book be transformed into an umma? to a broad swathe of the social and political Th at, according to Ghannouchi, is at the spectrum. Th e principle of shura applies not "essence of the mission of 'ulama" (H, 297- only to formal mechanisms and procedures 298). for decision-making and will-formation, In sum, a sincere Muslim citizen could but also to social norms and habits on a accept the unquestionable authority of pre-political level: shura is a procedural al-Nass without letting the universal and principle as well as a principle for social objective status of directives transfer to interaction (H, 190-191). Th erefore, the human understandings and applications of characteristics of shura - participation, those directives. Accepting the authority co-operation and responsibility - infuse of al-Nass should not be deployed as a the entire social and political spectrum conversation stopper in public debates including interaction in the public sphere because the process of interpreting divine and public reasoning. Th e question for us will is, itself, the product of human is how these characteristics play out when endeavor, fallible and fl exible. Furthermore, it comes to group identities and minorities. this process of interpretation does not end Citizenship in Ghannouchi's model of with the jurist's rationalisation of laws on the Islamic state is open to people of all the basis of al-Nass. creeds and is based on allegiance to the Th is rationalisation is intended for the state (H, 137). Ghannouchi also makes the community and that community must be important point that to accept someone’s willing and capable to live it out. Finally, creed implies acknowledging their right to and crucially, it is the community and defend it and to show its advantages over, not the jurists who determine whether a and the disadvantages of, what diff ers particular interpretation harmoniously fi ts from it. Th at is why Ghannouchi allows its background self-understanding. With non-Muslim citizens to preach to Muslims the function, epistemic status, and process and attempt to persuade them to join their of ijtihad in view, we should expect that a creed. More generally, citizens of all faiths, self-consistent Muslim who internalises a as well as atheists, are welcome to engage conception of ijtihad as fl exible, revisable, in public debates, to defend their views, and all-inclusive would accept the authority criticize others, etc. (H, 292). In that of al-Nass without being led into thinking sense, Ghannouchi's model does publicly or acting in an authoritarian fashion in the recognise all group identities by securing public realm. the opportunity for each group to publicly express its identity in public debates. Th is is not an empty opportunity. Ghannouchi

128 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL VISION FOR THE ARAB WORLD leaves the door wide open for non-Muslims to engage with one another respectfully to organise themselves in the way they see and on the basis of arguments aimed at fi t in order to guarantee their survival and convincing others rather than shaming or to defend their existence. In this way, the coercing them.14 Nevertheless, it is clear opportunity for groups to express their that the limits he imposes do not target the identities turns into the exercise of their content of public reasoning, but the ways right to political self-determination. Non- in which public reasoning is conducted. Muslims, for instance, can form political Th at is a crucial point. What is missing is a parties, establish newspapers, magazines common framework of reference. and other forms of expression without Ghannouchi's reliance on maslaha need for a license (H, 300). Th e depth (public interest and well-being) is of Ghannouchi's position here lies in most useful here. Maslaha is one of the the organising role he assigns to political principles of legislation and interpretation parties, be they Islamic or not. If society in Islamic jurisprudence. Th e history of does not organize, the principles of shura maslaha is rich and complex but the basic and of doing good and forbidding wrong idea is straightforward: the purpose of remain slogans lacking the mechanisms divine revelation is the improvement and that allow it to become a power to check attainment of human interest and well-being and control the power that represents in this life and the hereafter.15 Ghannouchi it. “Th e truth is that in the absence of follows al-Shatibi's categorisation of the mechanisms that organise the crowd, in requirements of maslaha into essential, order to transform it into a power, there special, and ameliorative. Given our will be an imbalance between the ruler and purposes we will restrict our focus on the the ruled” (H, 296). essential requirements, i.e. those "without All groups are then included in public which life would be ruined; these include debates. If such groups, however, are to the protection of faith, of life, of progeny, abide by strict rules of what can be or of wealth and mind."16 cannot be discussed in these debates, or With maslaha the literality of the text by rules of what counts as good and valid is transcended systematically. Textual reasoning, then Ghannouchi's all-inclusive rulings themselves can be questioned in party pluralism is more decorative the sense that under certain circumstances than substantive. Recall from above there is no religious duty to obey that how including Islamic parties in public particular text for promoting the interest debates while excluding Islamic forms of of man and avoiding harm.17 Th e political reasoning defeats the point of publicly upshot of maslaha is that it can function recognising Islamic identity. Whether as a text-independent framework for the all-inclusiveness of public reasoning questioning and revising Islamic rulings. in Ghannouchi's model succeeds in If, for example, a non-Muslim group adequately recognising group identities makes a case that this or that particular depends on the limits he imposes on public ruling violates the protection of its essential reasoning, and on the availability of a text- requirements, that ruling would have to independent framework that those groups be either changed or that group would be can refer to in order to question and revise exempted from abiding by it. To be sure, Islamic rulings. the normative validity of the maslaha Th e constraint that Ghannouchi imposes framework diff ers between citizens in on public reasoning is that "all parties of the Islamic state. Unlike Muslims, non- the debate abide by the general morals of Muslim citizens are not required or dialogue" (H, 293). It is unfortunate that expected to accept the validity of God's he does not elaborate on what exactly he law because "shari'a for them is nothing means by the "general morals of dialogue" more than a law that organises the political other than that they exclude coercion community" (H, 105). In other words, and force - public debate participants are there could be an overlapping consensus18 volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 129 on the framework of maslaha, i.e. diff erent goal getting rid of the basis of society; Islam social constituencies can adopt and abide (H, 294). Th ese sorts of restrictions have by the framework of maslaha for their own to do more with the underlying intention reasons. behind one's reasoning - as opposed to In sum, the principle of shura in the content and mode of one's reasoning. Ghannouchi's model of the Islamic state In that sense, Islam as the basis of social embodies a conception of public reasoning solidarity in the Islamic state is also a limit according to which groups publicly on public reasoning. Th is is problematic, express their identities, and are organised however. Consider Ghannouchi's position in political parties to preserve and affi rm on apostasy where his intention-based their identities and ways of life. No one limit on public reasoning is clearest. is to be excluded from public reasoning Ghannouchi is of the opinion that in the on the basis of the content of their views Islamic state, apostasy is not a theological but only on the basis of the way in which but a political crime. As a political they defend and promote their views. And crime, apostasy is punished by political fi nally, when diff erent groups contest the authorities only if it takes signifi cant Islamic state's rulings and policies, they do momentum as part of an organised not need to do so by reference to al-Nass. attempt to overthrow the Islamic regime or Instead they can refer to the framework becomes part of a campaign to undermine of maslaha. If we combine Ghannouchi's the foundational basis of state and society. conceptions of ijtihad, shura, and maslaha Ghannouchi explicitly maintains that, as a framework for public reasoning, we get from a theological point of view, and a non-authoritarian conception of Islamic absent the political dimension, apostasy politics with strong radical-democratic would not be punished by the authorities features. And, this is a considerable though it would be socially looked down achievement in constructively cracking the old chestnut of whether Islam and In the Islamic state, democracy are compatible. However, nothing of what has been apostasy is not a said so far implies that this conception theological but a political of Islamic politics could not be authoritarian. Ghannouchi's model of crime. - Ghannouchi the Islamic state contains important anti- authoritarian resources, but does it also upon and thus indirectly controlled by the harbor features that make it susceptible majority of social members in an Islamic to authoritarianism? Could his model society (H, 50). How damaging "social function as a political vision for the post- punishment" would be depends on the uprising Arab world? context; Islamic societies would diff er in their degree of tolerance in that regard. It PLURALISM, SOLIDARITY, AND is not social punishment that is troubling, PRESERVING THE ISLAMIC however. Th e more troubling feature of the CHARACTER OF THE STATE intention-based limit concerns the criteria Th e Islamic state is committed to for determining when the public expression its Islamic character. Without such of apostasy reaches a momentum and commitment there would be no robust organisation that warrants punishment by sense that that state is Islamic. One of political authorities. Intentions are subject the conditions that Ghannouchi puts to varying interpretations and are resilient on political parties is that they must to measurement and verifi cation. Any "acknowledge the state" - by which he intention-based limit on public reasoning means the Islamic character of the state - in presents a serious threat to an all-inclusive order to get legal protection. Th e idea here public sphere. is that political parties cannot set as their To prevent the conception of public

130 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL VISION FOR THE ARAB WORLD reasoning we have developed on the basis than the democratic procedures for will- of Ghannouchi's work from turning into formation and hence, on their own they an exclusionist public sphere, it is not are incapable of preserving the Islamic enough to design a list of clear, verifi able, character of the state. Th ere is nothing and public criteria of what counts as an characteristically Islamic about these attack on the social glue of an Islamic procedures. If, alternatively, one suggests society. Th e intention-based limit should treating al-Nass as the constitution, the be dropped altogether. Islamic character would be preserved. Doing so, however, is not as easy as Th e problem is that in such a scenario the one might think. Although Ghannouchi interpretations of al-Nass eff ectively turn supports pluralism, he is explicit in into positive law. From the perspective of maintaining that the Islamic state is Islamic politics we are working with, this fundamentally committed to Islamic unity is problematic for two reasons. (H, 236). Pluralism and unity, however, First, making the interpretations of are in tension. While unity and solidarity al-Nass positive law implies making tends towards exclusion, pluralism tends them rigid, infl exible, and enforceable towards inclusion. Acknowledging the irrespective of what Muslims think Islamic character of the state is supposed and feel about them. But not only can a to grant solidarity, and the intention- Muslim choose to follow other competing based limit aims at preserving it. Given and maybe incompatible interpretations of party pluralism and the tension between al-Nass, a Muslim can at any point decide solidarity and pluralism, letting go of the to reject Islam in its entirety. Apostasy intention-based limit would eff ectively as a theological crime is punishable by dilute the Islamic character of the state. God and only the involved individual is Can the Islamic state preserve its pluralism to bear responsibility. Turning al-Nass's given its commitment to solidarity? interpretations into positive law would Th e most informative thing Ghannouchi undermine Muslims' own freedom of says in this regard is: "it is better to religion by making it compulsory. understand Islamic unity not in terms of Second, al-Nass can't be accepted as simple unity but in terms of unity that is the constitution since the constitution is produced by variety through al-Nass and supposed to be that which makes people shura, or commitment and freedom" (H, into a people. At best non-Muslims can 256-257). Th ough vague, this is suggestive. have an overlapping consensus on the Th e basic idea is that solidarity and framework of maslaha, which should not pluralism do not have to be in tension; in be equated with al-Nass. fact they should complement one another. Th us, acknowledging the Islamic Further, solidarity should not be construed character of the state can be satisfi ed in terms of harmony and homogeneity neither by adopting al-Nass as the where there are little or no diff erences in constitution, nor by merely relying on opinions, views, etc. Th at would be "simple the procedural mechanisms of shura. Th e unity." So it is some sort of complex unity Islamic state is the state of God and the that Ghannouchi envisages and it is to be people, of al-Nass and shura, and without "produced by variety through al-Nass and a way of understanding that dictum we shura, or commitment and freedom." won't be able to make much sense of a But how are we to understand this characteristically Islamic state without claim? To what exactly are citizens of the undermining the radical democratic Islamic state to be committed, and why? At anti-authoritarian features we have been minimum, all parties are to acknowledge developing. For that purpose, consider the state as the designated authority to the following suggestion: the Islamic enforce the law, and to preserve and state is the state that is limited by al-Nass enhance the mechanisms of shura. Th ese - a political arrangement whose political mechanisms, however, are nothing more outcomes are checked against al-Nass. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 131 Th ink of a constitutional democracy implications, Ghannouchi is committed with a supreme court, a parliament, to maslaha, and maslaha is concerned etc. Call it the "political system." Th e with the well-being of humans. Just like political system produces laws, policies, discoveries about say the human body etc. Alongside it, there is what we shall and physical health can aff ect what is call the "religious system" - specifi cally, an conducive to maslaha, the realisation that Islamic system which includes the jurists certain recognition conditions must hold who derive interpretations on the basis in order for individuals to be capable to of al-Nass and whatever other democratic form identities and be autonomous should mechanisms that guarantee a back and also aff ect what is conducive to maslaha. forth feedback between the jurists and Islamic politics is already commitment to the Islamic community, which has the a framework of recognition. What is still fi nal say in determining the success of crucially missing is the institutionalisation the diff erent interpretations in capturing of that framework. A third "recognition their own social, economic, psychological system" needs to be added. and historical context. When a law or a What we have then is a tripartite policy is being discussed or enacted the political arrangement. A political system Islamic system gives its say and if it turns generates political outcomes, an Islamic out that that law or policy clearly violates system guarantees these outcomes do how the majority of society (in this case the not go beyond a moving threshold Muslims) choose to embody al-Nass then determined by the Muslim community that law must be changed or abandoned. as constituting the majority, and a While this gives a more nuanced recognition system guarantees that the understanding of what it means to limits of the Islamic system do not go acknowledge the Islamic character of below a minimum moving threshold. All the state we cannot stop here. Why three systems are governed by radically would all citizens endorse a common democratic mechanisms. Commitment commitment to al-Nass as the limit on to this tripartite system is a commitment political outcomes? True, non-Muslims to democratic procedures, to al-Nass as an can form political parties, organise their upper limit and to recognition-conditions social constituencies, and their identities as as a lower limit on political outcomes. In groups would be expressed and respected, this way Muslims can see their political but what if the Islamic religious system practice as a vehicle for the realisation of imposes unbearable limits on them, as their religion, and non-Muslims can grow groups or as individuals? It is unreasonable and fl ourish as groups and individuals to expect non-Muslims to accept such while simultaneously limiting what the a limit with no guarantees for their own majority can do to them. Such a system survival, fl ourishing, and freedom. Th e stands to win the commitment of all challenge then is: how to limit the religious citizens. system without undermining the Islamic character of the state? *Karim Sadek is a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in the Arts Drawing on our discussion thus far, and Humanities at the American University of Beirut the conception of Islamic politics we have (AUB). He received a B.A. in Economics and an M.A. in Philosophy from AUB before completing a doctorate in been developing already implicitly accepts Philosophy at Georgetown University in August 2012. recognition conditions19 for the well- In his dissertation, "Islamic Democracy: the Struggle for and Limits of Recognition", Sadek conducted an functioning of human life. Ghannouchi's intellectual rapprochement between contemporary treatment of non-Muslim minorities, Critical Theory and contemporary Islamic political thought. With a focus on the works of Axel Honneth his conception of group pluralism, and and Rached Ghannouchi, he argues for a radically the crucial role political parties play democratic conception of Islamic politics. in the Islamic state clearly indicate Sadek has previously taught at AUB, Georgetown that he accepts some complex forms of University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, and Georgetown University's main campus in Washington recognition. Further, and this has wider D.C.

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ENDNOTES "Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and 'Reasons that All Can 1. Thus, this paper puts aside the question of whether Accept'," The Journal of Political Philosophy vol 17, no 3, (2009), Ghannouchi's Islamic model is "truly" Islamic, and does not pp.253-275. address Ghannouchi the person, his political rhetoric, or his 15. For a classifi cation of the diff erent ways maslaha has been party's political statements and performances. used and incorporated into legal theory in the middle period 2. Cohen, Joshua and John Archon Fung (2004). “Radical of Islam refer to pp.193-197 in Felicitas Opwis, "Maslaha in Democracy.” Swiss Political Science Review. 10:4: pp.23-34. - Contemporary Islamic Legal theory," Islamic Law and Society, http://www.archonfung.com/docs/articles/2004/Cohen_Fung_ 12.2. Debate_SPSR2004.pdf 16. Ghannouchi (1998). “Participation in Non-Islamic 3. In "Islamic Democracy: the Struggle for and Limits of Government.”, p.91. Recognition" the author argued for the connection between 17. Ibid for an example on how Ghannouchi employs maslaha recognition and the emancipatory potential of Islamic politics. to adapt God's law and accommodate for the needs of The author focused on Axel Honneth's recognition-based Muslims. critical theory and Ghannouchi's demand for the recognition 18. Rawls, John (2005). "The Idea of an Overlapping of Islamic identity. This paper does not directly engage the Consensus." John Rawls. Political Liberalism. New York: recognition model though it indirectly relies on it. Columbia University Press. 4. Ghannouchi, Rached (1998). “Participation in Non-Islamic 19. For considerations of space, this paper has not delved into Government.” Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook. ed. Charles Kurzman. the specifi cs of recognition conditions. In "Islamic Democracy: New York. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 95. the Struggle for and Limits of Recognition" the author draws 5. This paper follows Ghannouchi in understanding al-Nass on Axel Honneth's recognition model for such conditions while as including both Qur'an and Sunna. What matters, for the showing their limitations and suggesting how they could be purposes of this paper is that al-Nass refers to the ultimate expanded and supplemented in order to normatively grasp source of truth and validity in Islam, which is available to us in and respond to the demand for the public recognition of the form of a text. Islamic identity. 6. Ghannouchi, Rached (2000). “Secularism In the Arab Maghreb.” Islam and Secularism in the Middle East. ed. Esposito, John and Tamimi, Azzam. New York University Press, p.100. 7. A failure to fully and adequately account for the emancipatory potential of Islamic politics explains, at least in part, the ongoing popularity of more fundamentalist versions of Islamic politics in post-uprising Arab world. 8. The author’s discussion of authoritarianism on the level of citizenship draws on Maeve Cooke's notion of "authoritarian citizenship." In "Islamic Democracy: the Struggle for and Limits of Recognition" the author engages with Cooke's notions of "authoritarian citizenship", "authoritarian position", and "situated rationality," and incorporate them within a broader distinction between practical and theoretical authoritarianism. Refer to: Cooke, Maeve (2007). A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? Postmetaphysical Political Theory and the Place of Religion. Constellations. 14:2; Cooke, Maeve (2006). Re- Presenting the Good Society. Cambridge: MIT Press. 9. Ijtihad refers to the "legal methods of interpretation and reasoning by which a mujtahid (q.v.) derives or rationalises law on the basis of the Qur’an, the Sunna and/or consensus; also, a judge's evaluation of customary practices as they bear on a case brought before him." Hallaq, Wael (2009). An Introduction to Islamic Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, p.173. 10. Ghannouchi, Rached (1993). Al-Huriyat Al-‘Ammah fi Al-Dawla al-Islamiyah. 1st ed. Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihdah al-`Arabiyah, pp.297-298. Hereafter (H). 11. This distinction maps on the distinction Maeve Cooke makes between static and dynamic universalism. Op. cit. Cooke (2006) Re-Presenting… p.20. 12. Refer to Abou el-Fadel (1997). The Authoritative and the Authoritarian in Islamic Discourse. Dar Taiba; also his (2009). "Islamic Authority" New Directions in Islamic Thought. Ed. Kari Vogt, Lena Larsen and Christian Moe. London: I.B. Tauris. 13. Ghannouchi distinguishes between political and creedal umma. He is ambiguous in his use of the term. However, for the purposes of this paper we can stick to creedal umma. 14. In "Islamic Democracy: the Struggle for and Limits of Recognition" the author expands on what the "general morals thecordobafoundation.com [email protected] of dialogue" could mean by drawing on James Bohman and Henry Richardson's conception of democratic civility in their volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 133 Bahrain’s Oppressed: Lone Voices in International Law

IMRANALI PANJWANI

he Formula One Grand Prix sovereignty over the international legal held in Bahrain, on 22nd April order, thereby ignoring the calls for greater T2012, exemplifi es that human socio-political freedoms by its citizens. rights abuses were not high on the agenda of the government of Bahrain as well CONTEXT AND KEY THEMES as the wider international community. In February 2011, hundreds of Despite the evident outrage, including thousands of Bahraini citizens took to the by Human Rights Watch in relation streets to call for the ouster of the ruling to this lack of prioritisation (Mepham, al-Khalifa family. Th e date they chose had 2012), protestors’ voices, particularly huge signifi cance; February 14th marked of Shi‛i-Muslims, remain isolated. Th e the nine-year anniversary of Bahrain’s Grand Prix only served to highlight their 2002 constitution and the protests began continual loneliness and lack of support shortly after mass uprisings in Tunisia, and by the international community. Th is is Egypt. Th is has two major implications. an attempt to examine the legal processes Th e fi rst is that the so-called Arab Spring behind both international and state was motivated by what the public saw as machinery in order to illustrate why the unjust regimes which had governed for international community chooses to act far too long in their respective countries. selectively in the Middle East, especially With respect to Bahrain, the constitution in light of the so-called Arab Spring. was essentially a unilateral document that What is particularly important in supported King Hamad b. Isa’s dynasty. It analysing international law is its lack of states, enforcement mechanisms, and how it ‘the regime of the Kingdom of Bahrain easily confl icts with state sovereignty. is that of a hereditary constitutional In the case of Bahrain there was a clear monarchy, which has been handed down confl ict between NGOs who advocated by the late Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al human rights, and Bahrain who relied Khalifa to his eldest son Sheikh Hamad bin on a neighbouring state, Saudi Arabia, Isa Al Khalifa, the King. Th enceforward it for help in crushing the protests (Krauss, will pass to his eldest son, one generation 2011). During such confl icts, it is crucial after another, unless the King in his to understand how international legal lifetime appoints a son other than his processes may enable such violence eldest son as successor, in accordance with to occur. Using the issues in Bahrain the provisions of the Decree on inheritance over the year as a case study, this article stated in the following clause’ (Article examines how human rights violations 1(b), Th e Constitution of the Kingdom of and collaboration with neighbouring Bahrain, 2002). Gulf States facilitated greater force against Despite the clear mention of serving God Bahrain’s protestors, that resulted from and human beings in the constitution’s the lack of enforcement machinery in preamble, it was the hereditary succession international law, and the fl exible nature and the policies of this family that of international custom. Th is will show has caused unrest in Bahrain. Th is is how Bahrain has attempted to assert its exemplifi ed by the largely ignored Shi’i

134 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BAHRAIN’S OPPRESSED: LONE VOICES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW majority who not only have been given law, it is important to appreciate the false promises for socio-political reform in struggle between state sovereignty and the the country, but have also been the subject international legal order. International law of violent deaths by police (predominantly is a system, ‘by which legal rules are created pro-Sunni) during the protests (see in order to structure and organise societies Kinninmont, 2012). and relationships. It acknowledges the Th e second implication is the relationship infl uence of political, economic, social and between those Gulf States who believed cultural processes upon the development that violently crushing protests which of legal rules’ (Dixon & McCorquodale, demanded rights, justice, and human 2003: 1). National law is the exclusive legal liberties was a legitimate international system of a country or state that seeks to action. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia and organise its inhabitants and territory using neighbouring Gulf States sent their troops its own executive, legislative and/or judicial to help the government of Bahrain (in processes. Its laws do not apply to countries March 2011) in crushing the protests, many outside its borders. Prima facie, there is a of which involved Shi’i Muslims. However, confl ict between states and international there was little international measures law since, ‘the international legal order against these governments coming seeks to organise international society in together to curb the expression of human accordance with the general interests of rights (Jones, 2012). Th us, Bahrain could the international community whilst state violate international human rights treaties sovereignty can be used to protect a state by obtaining support of neighbouring against the intervention of international Gulf States. Th is creates an international, law into its national legal system’ (Ibid: or at least, regional customary law where 104). Th us, if a state decides to treat its unifi ed state sovereignty can rise above inhabitants in a particular way which is at international human rights norms. Th is variance with the norms of international is highlighted by Bahrain hosting the law, then there can be a confl ict between Formula One Grand Prix, in April 2012 the state in question and the rest of the amidst anti-government protests showing international community. that it could ignore the needs of protestors It is possible that this confl ict is merely who are attempting to claim their rights. theoretical, or even, ‘a doctrinal squabble’ Th ese two implications set the context as some have argued (Collier, 1989: 935). of this article and will be examining Th is is because the majority of states accept some of the human rights abuses in the international legal order and wish to Bahrain and in particular, explore how be part of the international community. international legal processes have allowed However, whilst there are evidence to this to happen. Secondly, it examines support this, ranging from the distinction the grouping of Bahrain with other Gulf between a national and international States such as Saudi Arabia to show how legal system, membership to treaties, the international custom is formed in order to acceptance of customary international law deny the rights of the voiceless. Th ese two and the assistance national law gives to themes are analysed within the broader international law, a struggle does exist in relationship between state sovereignty some crucial and far-reaching areas. and international law to show the tensions Th e state as an independent sovereign between a state’s own policies, and the entity has gone through an evolution into norms set by the international community. a state within an international community. Th is international community is not an THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN isolated one but one, which actively regulate STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE areas concerning the state, such as Human INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER Rights and the Environment. It is therefore Before examining Bahrain’s human a myth to say all states would automatically rights issues in light of international welcome the international legal order volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 135 without attempting to assert decision- (Krauss, 2011). making power through its constitutional Th is disregard for human rights has processes. Th is particularly relates to the recently been confi rmed by Human Rights binding nature and enactment of treaties, Watch who have argued, international political pressure as well as ‘Bahrain’s acceptance of most UPR recommendations needs to be quickly Bahrain is attempting to followed by releasing leaders of peaceful protests, holding accountable high offi cials exert its state sovereignty responsible for policies of torture, and over international legal adopting broader reforms to uphold human rights,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East norms. director at Human Rights Watch. “Th e government has been claiming for months adhering to the moral connotations of the that it accepts the recommendations of international legal order. Ultimately, the the Bahrain Independent Commission of interests of states precipitate acceptance Inquiry but continues to stall on the core of the international legal order but the issues and to deny that political detainees evolving nature of this order poses an are still in Bahraini jails’ (Human Rights increasing threat to state sovereignty. Watch, 2012). With the case study of Bahrain, Th e aforementioned reports are the argument is that there is a direct signifi cant not only because of the confl ict between the human rightscontinuing human rights breaches of the treaties in international law and Bahrain’s government of Bahrain, but the nature implementation of these rights. Bahrain of these breaches. Th e mass arrests of is attempting to exert its state sovereignty protestors and denial of political freedoms over international legal norms and this is an infringement of article 9(1) of the means, its protestors do not have a means ICCPR which states, ‘everyone has the by which to channel their voices through right to liberty and security of person. No international legal mechanisms. one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention’ (International Covenant on HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN Civil and Political Rights, 1966). BAHRAIN Can mass arrests be justifi ed when the Bahrain is a signatory of six international government of Bahrain denies its citizens human rights including the International the means to express their political ideas? It Covenant on Civil and Political Rights appears these mass arrests are arbitrary and 1966 (ICCPR) (OIC Signatories). Th is demonstrate a lack of concern for the basic demonstrates Bahrain’s commitment dignity of individuals. Th is is confi rmed by to international human rights norms. article 19(1) which states, ‘everyone shall However, the attitude of the government have the right to hold opinions without of Bahrain towards its protestors since interference’ (Ibid) and article 21 which February 2011, has shown a lack of states, ‘the right of peaceful assembly shall commitment to and breach of these norms. be recognised’ (Ibid). Th ese two articles For example, it was reported in April 2011, are crucial in guaranteeing fundamental that, civil liberties of human beings yet jailing ‘With Saudi troops now in the country political activists and even torturing them to support King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, (a breach of article 7) goes against the letter Bahrain has taken on the likeness of a and spirit of the ICCPR. police state. Th ere have been mass arrests, What is worse is the violence towards mass fi rings of government workers, the protestors. One cannot disregard the reports of torture and, on Sunday, the video evidence through YouTube and other forced resignation of the top editor of internet and social media that have played the nation’s one independent newspaper’ a crucial role in raising awareness of how

136 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BAHRAIN’S OPPRESSED: LONE VOICES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW protestors have been treated, in Bahrain be performed by them in good faith’, (see DeLong-Bas, 2011 and Faris, 2010). known as pacta sunt servanda (Ibid: Art Ahlulbayt TV, a Shi’i television channel 26) and most importantly, ‘a party may based in the United Kingdom, issued a not invoke the provisions of its internal law special broadcast on 30th March 2011 as justifi cation for its failure to perform a along with an e-mail outlining the acts of treaty…’ (Ibid: Art 27). violence by the government of Bahrain, Th us, once a state is bound by a treaty, with links to various YouTube clips.1 it must perform the obligations set out in Th ese acts of violence according to that treaty. Bahrain is therefore obligated Ahlulbayt TV coverage, by the government to uphold the articles of the ICCPR and of Bahrain (but not shown by major news other human rights treaties. Th is shows channels at the time) is indicative of a clear that international law does have a binding infringement of article 6(1) of the ICCPR, aspect through treaties but the question which guarantees human beings the right to remains as to who actually enforces these life. Moreover, ‘this right shall be protected treaties when they are breached. Th is by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived is where the problem of enforcement of his life’ (International Covenant on machinery within international law arises. Civil and Political Rights, 1966). What Here, Hart observes the ‘absence of we have seen over the past year or so is an international legislature, courts with the outright deprivation of this right by compulsory jurisdiction and centrally the obstruction of medical aid towards organised sanctions’ (Hart, 1961: 209) injured protestors and disregard for the life and Harris states, ‘a state can usually of children, women and the elderly. Th us, fl out international law if it wants to and the question here is why have these human get away with it’ (Harris, 1998: 7). Th is rights breaches occurred despite Bahrain’s is worsened by the idea that international commitment to international human human rights can be a particular threat rights treaties such as the ICCPR? What to state sovereignty; Cassese argues it is ‘a is the underlying tension between the state subversive theory destined to foster tension of Bahrain and the wider international and confl ict among states’ (Cassese, 2005: legal order? Th is requires an analysis of 375). Th is is because human rights treaties the eff ectiveness of international law in explicitly protect persons, not as citizens enforcing human rights conventions. or representatives of a state but as human beings regardless of state affi liation. EVALUATING THE For example, article 2(1) of the ICCPR EFFECTIVENESS OF THE guarantees rights for human beings ENFORCEMENT MACHINERY OF ‘without distinction of any kind, such INTERNATIONAL LAW as race, colour, sex, language, religion, Arguably, the main reason why political or other opinion, national or social Bahrain is able to breach international origin, property, birth or other status.’ human rights treaties is because of the Th erefore, if according to Hart, there lack of enforcement machinery within is an absence of international legislature international law. Treaties are ‘the most and according to Harris, states attitudes’ important source of international law’ in fl outing international law are a reality, (Dixon and McCorquodale, 2003: 25) that what chance is there for Bahrain to be imposes legal obligations on a state when it legitimately regulated by international law? wishes to exercise its own sovereign power. Th is is a crucial area of struggle between A treaty is defi ned as ‘an international state sovereignty and the international agreement concluded between states in legal order and gives us the fi rst reason written form and governed by international as to why there have been human rights law…’ (Vienna Convention on the Law of breaches in Bahrain. Treaties 1969: Art 2(a)). Further, it ‘…is Th e second interrelated reason is the binding upon the parties to it and must underlying nature of international law volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 137 and its interaction with Bahrain’s national a path to a water hole). law. International law is often known as Shari’a is often known as Islamic law, soft law as has benn argued above, it lacks though fi q h (jurisprudence) is a more mechanisms which bind or enforce states to accurate term for Muslim law. Regardless, perform their obligations within the wider shari’a demonstrates the goal of trying international community. According to to understand God’s will for the moral Andorno, soft law is often defi ned as, and social aff airs of human beings. ‘...opposition to treaties, as “non-binding Muslim jurists (fuqaha) try to interpret instruments.” Th is characterisation is not the shari’a as best they can and far from entirely wrong but may be misleading the misleading propaganda on what the because although soft law does not have shari’a is, the attempt to develop shari’a per se binding eff ect, it is conceived to have in accordance with evolving human such eff ect in the long term. Th is means that contexts is a crucial and noble enterprise while treaties are actually binding (after (see Hallaq, 2005 and Dutton, 1999). ratifi cation by states), soft law instruments However, when this process of evaluation are only potentially binding. Soft law is and evolution remains stagnant than just indeed conceived as the beginning of a like any other legal system, shari’a can gradual process in which further steps become out of touch with human needs. are needed to make of such agreements Article 2 of the constitution of Bahrain binding rules for states. It should be noted explicitly states that, ‘the religion of the that if the binding eff ect were totally State is Islam. Th e Islamic Shari'a is a absent from such instruments, then they principal source for legislation. Th e offi cial would not be “law” at all, because one of language is Arabic’ (Th e Constitution of the main distinctions between “ethics” the Kingdom of Bahrain 2002) and in the and “law” is precisely that law is made-up constitution’s preamble, there is a clear of enforceable norms while ethics is not mention of the, ‘acknowledgment of our enforceable’ (Andorno, 2007). obligations to God’ (Ibid). Here, shari’a Andorno’s defi nition is important; becomes the foundational law for Bahrain soft law is ‘non-binding’ and could be but if human rights violations occur, then categorised as merely ethics if enforceable does shari’a permit this and if it does, then norms are not attached to it in the long- does that mean the Qur’an and Sunnah term. Th at is why Andorno states soft law (Prophetic Traditions) - as sources of the is a ‘gradual process in which further steps shari’a, contain a legitimate legal scope for are needed to make of such agreements justifying the actions of the government binding rules for states.’ However, the of Bahrain? If the shari’a does contain this question is how long will this so-called scope, then it means the government of gradual process take in formulating Bahrain’s actions towards its protestors are binding rules when many citizens are halal (lawful). suff ering in Bahrain? It is entirely possible for Bahrain to prolong this process which The shari’a becomes is what has been happening in accordance with the Human Rights Watch report as a tool to justify a above. Th us, soft law can actually uphold government’s actions, the status quo of a state’s actions, despite giving the appearance of human rights however deplorable they norms which end up being ethical rather may be. than legal. If international law, as soft law, upholds the status quo of Bahrain without specifi c enforcement than there Th us the shari’a becomes a tool to justify is little evaluation of Bahrain’s own legal a government’s actions, however deplorable policies which are rooted in a particular they may be. If the shari’a does not contain understanding of shari’a (literally, meaning such a legal scope, then Bahrain is in

138 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BAHRAIN’S OPPRESSED: LONE VOICES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW violation of its own national law as well as Th is ‘campaign’ that Mahmoud talks of international law. Th erefore, there is not echoes the King of Saudi Arabia’s, Abdullah only a confl ict between Bahrain’s sovereign b. Abdulaziz al-Saud, proposal to unite power as a state within the international the six members of the Gulf Co-operation community but also an inherent confl ict Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, with Bahrain’s own national law. In some Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates). respects, Bahrain has been able to overcome When this was discussed in May 2012, this problem by garnering the support of thousands of mainly Shi’i Bahrainis neighbouring Gulf States, which is the protested outside the capital against the next issue in this paper.. plan primary because the plan confi rmed the continual denial of the socio-political BAHRAIN’S COLLABORATION rights of the Shi’a in Bahrain. WITH OTHER GULF STATES Here, the presence of Saudi troops in IN FORMULATING POLICIES Bahrain along with Bahrain’s collaboration TOWARDS PROTESTORS with other Gulf States shows that there Th e second theme of this paper seeks to may be an underlying agreement between analyse Bahrain’s collaboration with other them of how to respond to the protests in Gulf States, in particular Saudi Arabia, in Bahrain. Th e clear military support lent tackling the expression of civil liberties by to Bahrain coupled with discussions on t he c it i z e n s of B a h r a i n . Th e aim here is to see unifying the six states is paving the way for how this collaboration aff ects international international custom to be formed on how custom in the implementation of human to handle the expression of civil liberties rights for the citizens of Bahrain. Th is will in Bahrain. So far, this custom appears further serve to highlight how states can to be the use of force, imprisonment and come together to create a powerful dissent increased controls on free speech to deny against prevailing international legal the voice of the protestors. As discussed norms. earlier, these are violations of international In March, and April 2011, it was human rights treaties but they also reported that in order to stop the mass show how states can come together to protests in Bahrain, the government sought formulate a policy that potentially violates military help from Saudi Arabia leading international law, whilst at the same time to a dramatic increase in the presence of cementing their state sovereignty. troops in Bahrain: ‘Bahrain is now under Th erefore, by Bahrain attempting to emergency law with heavily armed troops ally itself with other Gulf States, it is visible on certain street junctions and over creating another means by which to deny 1,500 Saudi and other Gulf state troops basic human freedoms to the citizens and police stationed’ (Gardner, 2011). of Bahrain. Th e means to do this is Th is has been substantiated by personal international custom which is another accounts of the presence and intimidation mechanism within international law that of Gulf soldiers in Bahrain, particularly in can be used both positively, and negatively Shi’i villages. For example, Mahmoud, a in the actualisation of human rights. Shi’a who lives near Bahrain’s capital has said, THE CREATION OF ‘Since the Gulf soldiers came to Bahrain, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM life in the Shi’a villages and suburbs of International custom or customary the capital, Manama, has been non-stop international law is defi ned as, ‘evidence of intimidation, violence and threats. Even a general practice accepted as law’ (Statute trying to move around in normal ways of the International Court of Justice 1945: has become life-threatening. Th ey are Art 38(1)(b)). Th is constitutes of two trying to beat down the opposition with elements – state practice and opinio juris. a long campaign against us’ (Mahmoud, Th e former refers to general and consistent 2011). practice by states, whilst the latter means volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 139 that the practice is followed out of a belief preparatory norms that cannot be violated of legal obligation. Th e problem is how by treaties or local laws. Th ese include the to determine international custom since prohibition of slavery, torture, genocide, it is diffi cult to categorise state behaviour war of aggression and crimes against (see Roberts, 2001). If a state consistently humanity. However Bahrain aligns itself violates human rights conventions yet with fellow Gulf States does not change adopts these conventions, do its actions the fact that its policies of aggression form part of customary international law? towards protestors cannot be justifi ed by In the case of Bahrain, there has been a any international legal principle. Rather, consistency in the violation of human human rights have a natural normative rights treaties and therefore, one can term force and should be a means by which the this is as consistent breach of international voiceless should have a voice. law. In fact, McCorquodale has commented Indeed, Bahrain has made open that, ‘the current international legal system declarations that it follows human rights recreates and affi rms the dispositions by treaties which constitute opinio juris since colonial powers, it privileges certain voices these statements are about the legality and silences others, and it restricts the of actions. Th ese declarations become legally binding and so the government of Bahrain has infringed these treaties. On Human rights have a the other hand, has Bahrain taken any natural normative force genuine measures to implement human and should be a means rights locally? It may be a signatory of six international human rights conventions by which the voiceless but has it backed up these signatures with should have a voice. real actions to show that it implements these rights? If it hasn’t then there has been no general and consistent practice identities of individuals to those defi ned to uphold human rights and whilst this by state boundaries…While territorial is a violation of human rights treaties, boundaries are artifi cially created by the the reality is that there is no genuine legal international legal system, they tend to norm created to honour these treaties. arise only from the imagination of these Th e problem, therefore, with regimes of power…Th ere are new ways international custom is how to categorise to imagine the international legal role of it and diff erentiate between what a territorial boundaries...’ (McCorquodale, state believes and what it actually 2001: 155). Th e silencing of voices sums practices. Moreover, what kind of up the feelings felt by those individuals practice contributes to the formation of who possess no identity, voice, or rights. international law? Does the collaboration Bahrain’s protestors fall under this category of Bahrain with other Gulf States result in and have been ignored by the international a regional policy to tackle protestors with community thus far (see Jones, 2012). force? If so, then this becomes a kind of Th e fl exible nature of international international custom agreed upon by a core custom demonstrates that it can be used group of states which makes their violent to confi rm illegitimate and immoral state actions towards the protestors in Bahrain practice. When Bahrain or any other state legally valid. International custom then is wishes to express its own sovereignty, it can manipulated by state sovereignty and this do so by collaborating with other nations is worsened when states get together to to form a policy which denies the rights form a new custom that may be immoral of those who go against state ideology. and other states remain silent in the face of International custom, therefore, represents human rights violations. However, human a state’s social and political attitude rather rights are considered to be jus cogens i.e. than any structured legal obligation.

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Th ey refl ect something much wider than states. Th e protestors of Bahrain can only law – they refl ect a state’s ethics, attitude, carry their voices so far and if international and culture. Th ese are variables, always human rights are worth their letter and changing with human progression or spirit, then those states that are observing regression. With such fl exibility within the plight of the oppressed need to the sources of international law, there is genuinely listen to these voices. a huge scope for manipulation and lack of enforcement and this is why, it can be *Imranali Panjwani is a tutor and fi nal year PhD argued that the government of Bahrain Candidate in Theology & Religious Studies at King’s has been able to violate human rights College London. He obtained his LLB in Law from the University of Sheffi eld and underwent hawza conventions thus far. (seminary) training in Islamic Studies & Arabic at Al-Mahdi Institute, Birmingham. Concurrently, he attended the College of Law to study on the Legal CONCLUSION Practice Course. He is currently researching the role of Th e case for Bahrain’s protestors and the self in Islamic-Western human rights discourse and is the editor of The Shi'a of Samarra: the Heritage and more generally, those who continue to Politics of a Community in Iraq (I.B Tauris, 2012). be oppressed in Bahrain are lone voices in international law. Th ey have been denied their civil liberties not just by ENDNOTE the government of Bahrain but with the 1. According to Ahlulbayt TV broadcast, ‘during the massacre at Pearl Square, Manama, Ambulances were not allowed to aid of other Gulf States and the silence pick injured from the massacre location. (2) Bahrain's King of the international community. Th is is deceived its population by fi rst giving guarantees of no evidenced by the human rights violations Military/Police action, and then attacking innocent peace- in Bahrain since February 2011 as well as loving unarmed civilians at 3 am when they were asleep without any warning. The victims include Children, elderly, its collaboration with other Gulf States to and Women. (3) Ambulance drivers were beaten up. Doctors, use force on protestors. In particular, the and nursing staff were also beaten up by Bahrain Police on Shi’a have experienced intimidation and the orders of Bahrain King, and government. (4) Army sprayed violence on the streets and in their villages. peaceful demonstrators with live bullets on the order to kill by Th e premise is that these two issues of the government...’ (Ahlulbayt TV, 2011). human rights abuses and collaboration with neighbouring Gulf States represent REFERENCES Bahrain’s attempt to assert its state Ahlulbayt TV (2011). ‘Interview with Sayed Mahdi Al-Modarrasi, sovereignty over the international legal conducted by Zahra Al-Alawi regarding the current atrocities order. occurring in Bahrain’, Ahlulbayt TV, 29 March. http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=Mil7GuA1VkY&feature=related – Moreover, Bahrain has been able accessed 12 October, 2012. to conduct this because of the lack Andorno, Robert (2007). The Invaluable Role of Soft Law in the of enforcement machinery within Development of Universal Norms in Bioethics, UNESCO, July. international law to monitor human http://www.unesco.de/1507.html - accessed 12 October 2012. Cassese, Antonio (2005). International Law, Oxford: Oxford rights breaches, and the fl exible nature University Press. of international custom which can be Collier, J (1989). ‘Is International Law Really Part of the Law of used to politically benefi t states, rather England?’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol than create genuine and benefi cial norms 38, 924-35. DeLong-Bas, Natana J (2011). The New Social Media and the for the international community. Th is Arab Spring, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 12 December. demonstrates the need for consistent http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/Public/focus/essay0611_ standards in upholding human rights by social_media.html - accessed 12 October 2012. all states as otherwise international law Dixon, Martin & McCorquodale, Robert (2003). Cases and Materials on International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. descends into political law and the political Dutton, Yasin (1999). The Origins of Islamic Law: The Qur’an, the will of the majority will dictate the type of Muwatta’ and Madinan ‘Amal, London: Curzon Press. law created and enforced. Faris, David (2010). Revolutions without Revolutionaries? Social Bahrain is a timely reminder of the Media Networks and Regime Response in Egypt, PhD Dissertation for University of Pennsylvania. suff ering that can result when processes Gardner, Frank (2011). ‘Leading Bahrain Activist Abdulhadi within international law are abused or al-Khawaja Arrested’, BBC News, 9 April. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ lack cohesive support from other powerful news/world-middle-east-13023428 Hallaq, Wael (2005). The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 141 BAHRAIN’S OPPRESSED: LONE VOICES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mepham, David (2012). ‘Don’t Kid Yourselves: Bahrain Hasn’t Harris, David (1998). Cases and Materials on International Law, Changed’, Human Rights Watch, 18 April 18. http://www.hrw. London: Sweet & Maxwell. org/news/2012/04/18/don-t-kid-yourselves-bahrain-hasn-t- Hart, H.L.A (1961). The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press. changed - accessed 11 October, 2012. Human Rights Watch (2012), ‘Bahrain: Act on UN Human Rights Roberts, Anthea Elizabeth (2001). ‘Traditional and Modern Commitments – Release Peaceful Critics; Hold Senior Offi cials Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’, Accountable’, Human Rights Watch, 19 September. http://www. vol 95, American Journal of International Law: 757 – 91. hrw.org/news/2012/09/19/bahrain-act-un-human-rights- ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966’, commitments - accessed 12 October 2012. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm - accessed 12 Jones, Toby (2012). ‘Bahrain: Human Rights and Political October, 2012. Wrongs’, Sada, 25 September. http://carnegieendowment. ‘OIC Signatories of International Human Rights Treaties’, org/2012/09/25/bahrain-human-rights-and-political-wrongs/ Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. http://oic-info.org/sites/ dwgi - accessed 11 October 2012 default/fi les/oic_signatories_of_international_human_rights_ Kinninmont, Jane (2012). Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse, London: treaties_0.pdf - accessed 12 October, 2012. Chatham House – The Royal Institute of International Aff airs. ‘The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain 2002’, http://www. Krauss, Cliff ord (2011). ‘Bahrain’s Rulers Tighten Their Grip servat.unibe.ch/icl/ba00000_.html - accessed 11 October 2012. on Battered Opposition’, The New York Times, 6 April. http:// ‘Thousands of Shia Muslims protest over Gulf union plans’ www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/world/middleeast/07bahrain. (2012), BBC News, 18 May. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- html?_r=1&ref=world – accessed 11 October, 2012. middle-east-18120787 - accessed 12 October 2012. ‘Mahmoud’ (2011), The Guardian: The Observer, 16 April. http:// ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.’ www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/16/bahrain-eyewitness- http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ riot-police?CMP=twt_gu – accessed 12 October 2012. conventions/1_1_1969.pdf - accessed 12 October 2012. McCorquodale, Robert (2001). ‘International Law, Boundaries ‘Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945.’ http:// and Imagination’ in Miller, David & Hashmi, Sohail. Boundaries www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 – and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives. Princeton: Princeton accessed 12 October 2012. University Press: 136 – 63.

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142 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 BOOK PROMOTIONS The Shi’a of Samarra: The Heritage and Politics of a Community in Iraq EDITED BY IMRANALI PANJWANI. FOREWORD BY CHARLES R. H. TRIPP.

OnO 22 February 2006, the main dome of the al-Askariyya shrine in Samarra was blown up.u In the aftermath, sectarian strife between Shi'i and Sunni communities in Iraq and theth wider region resonated around the world. Th e assault on Samarra, which was built in theth period of the Abbasid caliphate in the ninth century CE, therefore came to represent forf many a symbol of the destructive civil confl ict which engulfed Iraq following the 20032 US-led invasion.

In Th e Shi'a of Samarra, edited by Imranali Panjwani, explores and analyses the cultural, architectural and political heritage of the Shi'a in both Samarra and the Middle East, thus highlighting how this city functions as a microcosm for the contentious issues and debates which remain at the forefront of eff orts to rebuild the modern Iraqi state.

The Shi’a of Samarra: The Heritage and Politics of a Community in Iraq Edited by Imranali Panjwani. Published in January 2012 by I.B. Tauris.

Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring. BY MICHAEL J. WILLIS

Th e overthrow of the regime of President Ben Ali in Tunisia on 14 January 2011 took theth world by surprise. Th e popular revolt in this small Arab country and the eff ect it hadh on the wider Arab world prompted questions as to why there had been so little awarenessa of it up until that point. It also revealed a more general lack of knowledge abouta the surrounding western part of the Arab world, or the Maghreb, which had longl attracted a tiny fraction of the outside interest shown in the eastern Arab world ofo Egypt, the Levant and the Gulf.

Politics and Power in the Maghreb examines the politics of the three states of the central Maghreb Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco since their achievement of independence from European colonial rule in the 1950s and 1960s. It explains the political dynamics of the region by looking at the roles played by various actors such as the military, political parties and Islamist movements and addresses issues such as Berber identity and the role played by economics, as well as how the states of the region interact with each other and with the wider world.

Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring. By Michael J. Willis. To be published in May 2013 by C. Hurst & Co Publishers. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 143 The Gulf Monarchies: In the Wake of the Arab Spring

CHRISTOPHER DAVIDSON

espite appearing relatively living in the Gulf monarchies and the stable - at least compared to rights of Shi’a citizens and other religious Drevolutionary North Africa, Syria, sects that have lived there for centuries. and the Yemen – the six ‘Gulf Monarchies’ Th e more extensive use of censorship is of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, similarly worrying, as although the regimes Kuwait, and Oman are nonetheless also have largely been eff ective in choking off having to contend with mounting internal channels of free expression, they are now pressures and some very serious weaknesses. required to deploy the latest and most Aff ecting the six regimes’ ability to keep sophisticated technologies. In this manner distributing wealth and meeting the the Gulf’s oil wealth is not always being expectations of citizens, the region’s used to distribute wealth to citizens, but declining natural resources and looming is instead being used to fi nance powerful, ‘youth bulge’ now really matter. As do expensive, and highly sophisticated police the mounting challenges of unsustainable state apparatuses. subsidies, labour nationalisation, and External pressures are having a similarly ‘voluntary unemployment.’ negative impact on the Gulf monarchies’ In many ways, these are the by- citizen-ruler contracts. Th e dangers of products of their oil-fi nanced, subsidy- rapid economic liberalisation in many of based economies, and in particular the these states - and most particularly those cradle to grave welfare systems that that have opened up to foreign direct have up until recently underpinned investment and tourism - are already political acquiescence. Corruption and apparent. Various relaxations have the squandering of national resources by taken place, often without the consent the ruling families and their unelected of citizens, as governments have tried to governments is also a growing concern. make their countries more appealing to Th ese polities – which have little legal- foreign investors, residents, and visitors, rational authority – are now playing host to despite necessarily eroding religious and unaccountable elites and decision-makers. tribal heritage legitimacy resources. Th e Th ese have been allowed to squander monarchies’ close military relationships national resources by fi nancing prestige with Western and other non-Muslim projects, making duplicate investments, powers are becoming another major and accumulating vast personal wealth. source of concern for citizens as there Further interconnected internal are a growing number of foreign military pressures are also evident, including bases being established on their soil and increasing poverty among Gulf nationals, there has been accelerating spending on even in the wealthiest of the monarchies, imported armaments. along with rising real unemployment, and Also disquieting is the hawkish and a widening wealth gap between the richest seemingly dangerous stance being taken on and poorest citizens. Discrimination Iran, and the monarchies’ discreet eff orts against certain sections of society is equally to improve relations with Israel, despite noticeable, especially relating to the offi cial boycotts being in place and again hundreds of thousands of stateless persons regardless of public opinion. Meanwhile

144 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE GULF MONARCHIES: IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB SPRING the lack of collective security and basic hitherto frightened opposition voices. unity between the six monarchies, in Further eroding their stability, many of the particular their inability to settle long- Gulf monarchies have erred in their foreign running disputes and strengthen the policy since the onset of the Arab Spring, existing Gulf Co-operation Council, and having openly positioned themselves the frequent coup attempts in the region, on the side of other Arab authoritarian all continue to expose these states to regimes and thus presented themselves as malicious neighbours and other foreign ‘status quo powers’ – essentially trying to interests. counter the pro-reform momentum that Most of the earlier opposition groups has been building in the region. that challenged the Gulf monarchies were Of the six monarchies, Bahrain’s has successfully contained, as the various by far the bleakest future, with little hope regimes were able to co-opt most of the that the ruling family can restore suffi cient modernising forces impacting on the legitimacy to ever govern again without region and keep the number of dissidents resorting to martial law and extensive small. But the post-2011 opposition repression. It is currently being kept afl oat has been markedly diff erent, with new by its regional allies – namely Saudi Arabia pro-reform and pro-democracy fi gures and the UAE – which will have to continue and movements emerging in the region committing troops and supplying the that can no longer be placed into the kingdom with fi nancial assistance. old categories. In particular, the impact Although – unlike the other regimes of new, ‘greater’ modernising forces that have faced Arab Spring revolutions on the Gulf monarchies is becoming – the Bahraini ruling family is not yet vitally important, especially relating to facing signifi cant pressure from the improved education and more advanced international community, this will change communication technologies – including within the next year or so, as the weight satellite television, but especially social of evidence against the authorities grows. media and other peer-to-peer networking. But for the time being the US and other Despite their best eff orts the regimes seem Western powers are still willing to treat the unable to co-opt these eff ectively, with an revolution as an exceptional case, mainly increasing number of Gulf nationals now due to the presence of the US Navy base in Bahrain and its potential front line role The Arab Spring in any regional confl ict with Iran. The temporary block on the US arms trade revolutions elsewhere in to Bahrain has been lifted, and senior the Middle East seem to British and American police advisors have now been appointed by the king. Dozens be serving as catalysts for of ill-researched opinion pieces have also the beginning of the new been appearing in Western newspapers movements in the Gulf. highlighting the supposed connection between Bahrain’s opposition and Iran. As a good example of the kingdom’s able to share freely information amongst latest soft power strategy, these fear- themselves in an educated manner, and mongering pieces have usually been written communicating more easily with activists by Western academics, former diplomats, in revolutionary Arab states and with the and other distinguished personalities who rest of the international community. have been approached and paid by public On top of this, the Arab Spring relations companies employed by the revolutions elsewhere in the Middle East Bahraini government. In most cases they seem to be serving as catalysts for the have presented a skewed and inaccurate beginning of the new movements in the picture of the Bahraini opposition and Gulf, or at the very least have emboldened have made unsubstantiated claims about volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 145 Iran’s intentions in the Gulf monarchies. even revolutionary activity will occur, References to the Bassiouni report’s especially in Saudi’s Shi’a-dominated fi ndings on the lack of Iranian connections Eastern Province. And if unemployment, are never discussed, and explanations are the wealth gap, and other socio-economic rarely made that most Bahraini Shi’a problems remain unchecked it is probable do not subscribe to the Iranian doctrine that insurgency will spread further across of wilayet-e-faqih or rule by clerics, and Sunni communities, thus helping the instead look to Iraqi Shi’a clerics, rather reform movement gain much broader than Iranians, for direction. support beyond the Shi’a population. Although the Omani ruling family’s Th e most recent Saudi protests and outlook is less precarious than Bahrain’s, demands have already been quite varied, with the state not suff ering from the same occurring all over the country. Th ey levels of sectarian strife or discrimination, have ranged from men being arrested for nor having had to invite troops from fi lming and then uploading onto YouTube neighbouring countries to assist in a video about widespread poverty among suppressing protests, there are nonetheless Saudi nationals in Riyadh - a video which serious concerns about political stability. has now been watched by more than one As with Bahrain, Oman only has limited million, to women in Jeddah, Riyadh, and resources and cannot rely indefi nitely on the Eastern Province fi lming themselves creating public sector opportunities for driving on motorways - a fl agrant act of its citizens in order to appease protests civil disobedience given the prevailing ban and demands. Indeed, Oman’s stability on women driving. Th e women involved already rests on external assistance, mostly tweeted that they were carrying their from Saudi Arabia, and over the next year belongings as they were 'ready to go to or two this will serve to delegitimise the prison without fear’ while others told the aging, heirless ruler and his government. international media that 'this is a right for Moreover, when fresh protests erupt – women that no law or religion bans... [we] either as a result of continuing government went out to get our rights, so that it would corruption or the state’s likely failure to be up to us to drive or not.' As expected, deliver on its economic promises – these Facebook and Twitter are also playing a key will undoubtedly be met with an even role, with leading activists claiming that heavier response than the 2011 riots, as ‘they can now speak to thousands across the ruler’s new backers will be unwilling the world... without the strict censorship to tolerate fresh challenges to another they live under in the off -line world’ monarchy on its doorstep. and that ‘we’re so thirsty for freedom of In many ways the kingpin of the Gulf expression and a forum for expression that monarchies, Saudi Arabia’s ruling family you see [we] are far more involved [in social may appear more stable than its Bahraini media] than our neighbours.’ Certainly, and Omani neighbours given that its government still has the ability to keep There are now frequent distributing wealth in order to appease citizens; but in reality the Saudi system samood or ‘resistance is equally unsustainable and probably salons’ being held in the prone to implosion within the next couple of years. With on-going demonstrations villas and apartments of regardless of the new subsidies and job known activists, despite... creation schemes, and with increasingly death penalty [threats]. repressive tactics being used to suppress freedom of expression, the kingdom is now looking very brittle. If, as is as Saudi activist Muhammad Fahad Al- likely, conditions in Bahrain deteriorate Qahtani has claimed, ‘the government further, then more serious protests and has underestimated the power of social

146 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE GULF MONARCHIES: IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB SPRING media in Saudi Arabia and now it’s too referred to as the 'Intifada of Dignity.' A widespread to censor.’ total of ten protestors are believed to have Meanwhile there are now frequent been killed since the beginning of the samood or ‘resistance salons’ being held uprising with regular fi refi ghts now taking in the villas and apartments of known place, and in July 2012 one of the regime’s activists, despite some having already been strongest critics was badly wounded by threatened with the death penalty. Writing security forces. in the Washington Post in April 2012 one In Kuwait’s case, with the ruler of these embattled fi gures, Waleed Abu choosing to dissolve parliament in June Alkhair, related that such events are giving 2012 rather than allow calls for anti- him ‘the pleasing epiphany that religious corruption investigations to continue, hard-liners have begun to lose control and asserting that the election result was of a young generation that is hungry for ‘illegal,’ he has undoubtedly made his freedom.’ He gave the recent example position even weaker. With opposition of a ‘brave young man who responded MPs claiming that his self-described ‘fi nal passionately to clerics [also] invited to and unchallengeable decision’ amounts to participate in the salon and who had being a ‘coup against the constitution,’ it threatened him for supporting freedom is likely that the government will fi nd it of expression and belief.’ According to much harder to keep control over future Alkhair, the young man replied to the protests. Indeed, most of the recent clerics by asking ‘Who are you? Who are examples of dissent have been dealt with you to infl ict your religious guardianship in a very heavy handed manner. In April upon us?’ and then stating ‘We are free, free 2012 a young Kuwaiti Twitter user was to say what we like. You are just like us, not jailed for posting blasphemous tweets better. Th e era of religious guardianship about Prophet Muhammad, while in July is over.’ 2012 even a member of the ruling family Similarly, other Saudi activists have been was arrested following his tweets that he congregating in ‘safe houses,’ claiming that wanted to stand in the next parliamentary their country is little more than a ‘prison,’ elections and ‘expose corruption among and arguing that ‘we are not far away from top offi cials.’ Th us, while Kuwait may the uprisings that are happening in other not yet have witnessed the violent countries.’ Indeed, fresh protests outside confrontations that have occurred in ministries by unemployed graduates have Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, the been staged in Jeddah and Riyadh. At outlook for its ruling family is perhaps just these events participants lamented that as bleak, with the monarchy’s traditional '...after seven years of unemployment we authority being gradually eroded by a more have no other choice' and ‘[we] plan to stay confi dent and demanding citizenry that here until we fi nd a solution,' while - rather has already proven that it can embarrass worryingly for the government - others and contain the ruler and his appointed stated that 'we expect to hear promises to prime ministers. calm us down and disperse us but we will Th e UAE’s ruling families appear to be back. We will be back until they fi nd a be in a stronger position, as most citizens solution.' And more seriously, in January currently seem content with the state's 2012 following the killing of a young Shi’a ability to keep distributing wealth. But man by police due to their 'indiscriminate as with the Saudi and Kuwaiti spending use of force' a reported crowd of thousands programmes, it is questionable how long or even tens of thousands took to the streets such generosity can be sustained. Indeed, of Awwamiya to commemorate his death. a decree was circulated in Abu Dhabi Together with several other dead government departments in March 2012 activists he is now being described as a stating that a number of the promised martyr in the Eastern Province, and the big salary increases could not, after all, be opposition movement is increasingly being delivered. volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 147 Moreover, it is unlikely that the its people, who are loyal to the nation, situation in the poorer northern emirates the country and its leadership. We don’t can be contained or remedied in the care about the raising of trivial things near future, and street protests or other and arguments that have already been manifestations of opposition will probably defeated.’ Most recently, even the ruler of soon emerge, most probably in Ra’s al- Sharjah joined the chorus, explaining that Khaimah. Most importantly, the UAE ‘...these people were held at airports, or at monarchies have faced a serious and likely border crossings with Oman or Qatar... permanent loss of legitimacy over the they were running away to establish an past year, largely because of the alacrity outside organisation.’ with which they resorted to repression. Most worryingly, in a sort of twisted Although the bulk of the population has paternalism he claimed that the arrests certainly been scared by the large number were part of a measure to ‘help those who of arrests, especially as they have included deviated’ and that the state’s measures prominent and educated UAE nationals, were ‘to protect its sons’ and to provide the strategy seems to have backfi red as ‘treatment, not punishment.’ Th ese ruling total acquiescence has not been achieved family backlashes - likely to become anti- and the UAE's international reputation - Western - will most probably intensify, as which is very important given its described a London-based, Syrian-style observatory economic model and emphasis on soft for human rights – the Emirates Centre power strategies, especially in the West – is for Human Rights – has now been undoubtedly going to become tarnished. established. Detailing the various human Reminiscent of 2011’s collapsing North African regimes, a number of the recent The Qatari ruling family’s UAE arrests have been accompanied by offi cial government press releases claiming future is a little rosier that there is an ‘international plot’ and than that of the other that the opposition has connections to ‘foreign organisations and outside Gulf monarchies. agendas.’ Meanwhile, the ruler of Ra’s al- Khaimah delivered a speech in May 2012, rights abuses in the UAE and recording also reported by the offi cial state news the status of all political prisoners, it has agency, warning ‘those who poked their begun to lobby against the UAE regime in noses into the UAE’s [internal] aff airs to the international community. mind their own business.’ He went on to As the only outlier, the Qatari ruling explain ‘We hear today... that there are family’s future is a little rosier than that of some who are trying to tamper with the the other Gulf monarchies: the state can stability of the UAE. I would like to say actually sustain high spending and wealth to them: the people of the UAE don’t need distribution to its national population. lessons from anyone. Th ey are confi dent in As one recent study put it, ‘It seems at themselves and in the solidarity that they fi rst glance Qatar has bought itself out share. Th ey don’t change.’ Referring to of the possible ill eff ects of modernity.’ the aforementioned citizenship-stripping Furthermore, it lacks a poor hinterland, practice, he also explained that ‘He who is relatively calm, and has fewer issues does not like this should leave for another of sectarianism or discrimination, and place. Any treachery is a shame for him, it is generally perceived as having played and for his country,’ before concluding a positive role in the Arab Spring. Th e that ‘the UAE is sheltered by the heritage ruler also seems to be more sympathetic of Sheikh Zayed and by the achievements than his regional counterparts towards of the president, His Highness Sheikh his citizenry’s cultural and religious Khalifa, and of the rulers and Supreme practices, and it’s possible he may follow Council members, and is safeguarded by a route towards constitutional monarchy

148 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE GULF MONARCHIES: IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB SPRING in the next few years. Nonetheless there issues. Already, for example, the groups are a number of areas of concern, and if contain much criticism of the ruler’s wife’s mismanaged these could still derail the dress code which is deemed ‘too open and ruler’s liberal autocratic ambitions. In public for the wife of a ruler,’ along with particular, if a more organised opposition calls for genuine democracy. does emerge, the authorities might still be Indeed, as reported by the New tempted to resort to heavy handedness, Statesman, the audience of a recent Doha which could delegitimise the ruler and Debates forum voted overwhelmingly in expose his limitations to his own people favour of democratisation over economic and the rest of the Arab world. Various liberalisation which – although perhaps not websites and Facebook groups have already yet representative of the nation – indicated been set up, including a ‘Revolution in that the increasingly well-educated Qatari Qatar’ forum which features cartoons of youth are likely to push soon for a new the ruler dressed as an Orthodox Jew or environment where legitimate democratic depicted naked, with a US fl ag draped discussion can take place. around his body and horns protruding from his head. It also features photographs *Christopher Davidson is author of After the Sheikhs: The of the ruler meeting with Israeli offi cials. Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies. He is the author of four other sole-authored books on the Gulf States, Although these groups are not yet very including Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success and Abu active – at least compared to similar groups Dhabi: Oil and Beyond. He regularly writes for leading international newspapers with his opinion pieces focusing on other Gulf monarchies – and having appeared in the New York Times, the Guardian, although they still seem to focus mostly on the Daily Telegraph, and other such publications. Qatar’s foreign policy, they could be used Davidson has appeared on most major British and to discuss future arrests or crackdowns American current aff airs shows, including the BBC’s Newsnight, NPR’s All Things Considered, and CNN’s against activists in the emirate itself, or Connect the World. He has taught at universities in Britain, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates, and he could facilitate discussions about the holds degrees from the universities of Cambridge and ruling family, corruption, or other red line St. Andrews.

The Center for Understanding Islam seeks to present an enlightened understanding of Islam in America. Our focus is education. We emphasize the common humanity of people of all faiths, rather than taking sides on political issues. We urge everyone to distinguishh between the true teachings of Islam as a faith and thee diverse cultural traditions of Muslim societies. Actions of a tiny minority of extremist Muslims cannot be used too defi ne the faith tradition itself. Serious Muslims have ann obligation to take back their faith from those who trieded to hijack it for their political purposes. CUI repudiates aallll hateful messages regardless of the source.

WHAT WE DO • Organise leadership conferences, workshops and seminars on Islam and Muslims. • Publish discussion guides, articles, and books on FAQs • Build a research library. • Provide commentators for radio, TV, and the print media. • Marshal expertise of scholars on issues of conscience. • Retreats for Muslim and non-Muslim youth and community leaders. • Speakers Bureau on Islam. WWW.CUII.ORG volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 149 BOOK REVIEW THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE – CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT EDITED BY DAUD ABDULLAH AND IBRAHIM HEWITT

at the results, the contributing authors gog on to discuss their conclusionsc of what thist survey suggests for theth future of the Israel- PalestineP question – one ofof the most important issuesiss facing the modern worldwo today. OpeningO with a foreword,fore Karen Koning AbuZaydAbu highlights the poignancypoig of the book. As the former Commissioner- GeneralGen of the United NationsNati Relief and Works AgencyAAgen for Palestine RefugeesReRefug in the Near East (2000-2012),(20000 she notes that thethe aattitudes of Western Th e Battle for Public Opinion, edited by governments and their Daud Abdullah and Ibrahim Hewitt is policies showed an imbalance of support for very timely, published a year after the Israel over Palestine. AbuZayd highlights Middle East Monitor, European Muslim that this new book shows how the focus Research Centre and Al-Jazeera Centre is beginning to change, particularly in for Studies commissioned an ICM poll the sphere of public opinion and how that looking at European public opinion on may come to eventually have an eff ect the Israel-Palestine confl ict. eTh fi ndings upon policy making. Th e book refl ects were stark; they showed a change in the on the fi ndings from the survey that perceptions of the European public towards was published last year, which revealed the confl ict. The book brings together that public opinion was out of step with leading academics, journalists and Middle European governments; for example 45% Eastern politics experts to analyse and survey respondents thought that Jerusalem discuss the results of this survey. Looking should be an internationalised city and

150 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 45% of respondents thought that Hamas obstacle to work peace, refl ecting on the should be included in peace talks. survey’s observation that found 13% of Th e book is divided into three helpful people thought of Israel not just as a threat sections and begins by looking at the to the Palestinians but also as a threat to ‘competing forces’ – those factors which world peace. aff ect public opinion on the confl ict. The Th e third and fi nal section, ‘Impact and main focus of this section is the growth Changing Perceptions’, looks at the reality and infl uence of the pro-Israel lobby on of changing public opinions in comparison the media and politics across Europe to the politics of the situation. Maria Holt versus the public perceptions of the how helpfully points out how these changing lobby is viewed by the European public public perceptions, as highlighted by the (70% of respondents thought that the pro- survey, will eventually work to bring about Israel lobby had an eff ect on the media and a political change on the ground. Daud 67% thought that the lobby had an eff ect Abdullah goes on to highlight how the on politics). Th is fi rst section analyses love aff air, that once existed between Israel just how much infl uence the lobby has. and Europe, has turned sour and that the Interestingly, Tim Llewellyn, the former relationship must now be re-examined as BBC Middle East correspondent discusses Israel works out how to break a growing the eff ect the lobby has on the BBC and wall of isolation that it is gathering around just how much the broadcaster's reporting it. has come to be aff ected. In an anecdote, Th e Battle for Public Opinion is important he notes that since leaving the BBC as a because it refl ects on the important fi ndings full time staff , when he had returned to be of a poll carried out last year, which interviewed on Middle Eastern stories he was not merely an academic study of an had been referred to as a member of the ongoing confl ict, but a reality check for all Council for Arab British Understanding, the actors involved in the Israel-Palestine rather than as a former BBC journalist. confl ict. eTh discussion in the book brings Llewellyn concludes that the BBC seems together experts about how the confl ict to be out of step with the general public, may pan out in the future and what the noting that “(o)ne Jewish woman (he) major considerations of the confl ict might know(s), traditionally a supporter of Israel, be according to the European public, who, watches Al-Jazeera English rather than the as described by Th e Guardian last year BBC”. in response to the survey, are war weary Th e second section looks at the issues and hope for a solution to this 60-year old surrounding the confl ict and discusses confl ict. some of the main factors on the ground as questioned in the survey. Leading Israeli *Dr Daud Abdullah is the Director of the Middle East academic, Professor Ilan Pappe questions Monitor and a part-time lecturer at Birkbeck College, the democratic nature of Israel asking University of London. He lectured previously at the University of Maiduguri, Nigeria. He is the author of A whether Israel is actually a democracy. He History of Palestinian Resistance (2005) and contributed notes that this is an often heard argument to a collection of essays published under the title, Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective from “the Western solidarity movement” (Edinburgh University Press: 2007) and American yet it is a defi nition which should be Foreign Policy & the Muslim World (Al Zaytouna Centre moved away from as Israel continues to for Studies and Consultations, Beirut, 2009). pass “apartheid law(s)”. Pappe goes on *Ibrahim Hewitt is Senior Editor at the Middle East Monitor. He is also chair of the board of trustees of the to describe Israel as one of the “worst British charity Interpal, and the Managing Trustee of Al- Aqsa School in Leicester, United Kingdom. Hewitt is a segregationist regimes in the world”. Other contributor to Al-Jazeera net and is the author of What contributing authors in this section include Does Islam Say? (2004). Corinna Mullin who discusses Israel as an

volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 151 EU ROUNDTABLE REPORT

THE ARAB SPRING AND RELIGION OR BELIEF: HOW SHOULD EUROPE ENGAGE AND WITH WHOM?

he roundtable began with a warm minorities cope with the situation? welcome and an introduction by All the speakers agreed that the Tthe host, Dennis de Jong, Member democratisation processes in the "Arab of the European Parliament (MEP) for Spring Countries", Egypt and Tunisia the Dutch Socialist Party. De Jong is in particular, are very relevant to these one of the founders of a network of like- questions. De Jong recognised that the EU minded MEPS who are concerned about does not have an entirely clean slate when freedom and religion for all, believers or it comes to promoting human rights in the non-believers on an equal footing. One of region. It has for decades done business the key issues this network seeks to study with regimes it now considers to be is whether governments can engage with dictatorships. It now has to convince the religious leaders in order to promote this rest of the world that the EU is actually one goal and if so, what are the limitations? Th e of the good guys. Th e situation in the Arab roundtable was convened by the European world is not clear cut, as there are many Council of Religious Leaders – Religions dilemma's at play. for Peace.1 Religions for Peace co-organised this Th e goal of this gathering was to answer roundtable, and its Secretary-General Stein the following questions: With whom Villumstad gave an introduction about its should Europe engage to promote freedom work in the fi eld. Th e network does not focus on theological discussions, but rather on religion in society (How do religions (or The EU does not have should they) relate to the state? What role an entirely clean slate... should religion play in public life? What It has for decades done can religious communities do to help solve problems in their societies? business with regimes Th e network has organised three it now considers to be conferences on freedom of religion in the Middle East and North Africa Region dictatorships. It now has (MENAR), one of which was held in Oslo. to convince the rest of Th e focus was on the relationship between the world that the EU is Europe and the MENAR.In a declaration at the end of this conference, the participants actually one of the good coming from the MENAR called on guys - De Jong MEP. European politicians, civil society groups and media to learn about the historic relationship between Christians and of religion and belief? Is it at all useful Muslims in their home countries. Th ey also to speak to religious leaders? What are urged the European participants to speak the dilemmas of religious leaders at the out against antagonistic interpretations moment? What is the relationship between of this relationship and inter-religious religion and the state? How do religious prejudices.

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Th e second conference took place in rising sectarian tensions in the MENA Marrakech, Morocco,in November 2012 region. Foreign interventions, in whatever which brought together senior religious way they are being carried out, have to be leaders from the region. Villumstad carefully considered. However, the EU will briefl y quoted the statement of the not hesitate to hold its partners to account Marrakech meeting. In this declaration, when it comes to freedom of religion or the participants acknowledged the belief. importance of respecting and protecting Th e EU considers freedom of religion religiously diverse communities and called or belief for all as a universal human right on religious believers in the region to that needs to be protected everywhere unite in order to ensure their governments and for everyone. Th e EU has used the uphold human rights and human dignity full range of diplomatic instruments to without exception. Th e third conference promote freedom of religion, both bilateral took place in the summer of 2012 and and multilateral. In the coming months, brought together youth groups from both the European External Action Service the MENAR and Europe. (EEAS) will issue new guidelines which aim to achieve a maximum of coherence. Th e High Representative for the European GUEST SPEAKERS Union, Catherine Ashton, confi rmed this in her message to the Organisation of Jean-Bernard Bolvin - ON BEHALF OF Islamic Countries (OIC) in Djibouti. MACIEJ POPOWSKI, DEPUTY SECRETARY Th e EU is willing to assist its partner GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE countries with advice on writing their constitution whenever it is needed and Bolvin began his presentation by appropriate. Th e basis for Europe's remembering the hope the Arab Spring engagement with religious leaders is article gave to the people in the region, especially 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. Th is article states hope for better living conditions. He the EU respects and does not prejudice explained that a sense of common purpose the status under national law of churches, developed and members of all communities religions associations and communities. took to the streets. However, Bolvin noted with concern Sameh Fawzy - POLITICAL violence against religious minorities RESEARCHER, SPECIALIST IN CITIZENSHIP is still taking place. Fundamentalists AND DEMOCRATISATION STUDIES attack churches and Sufi shrines. In some countries, the government prohibits non- Fawzy started by giving an overview Muslims from worshipping in locations it of the current situation in Egypt. Egypt has not approved. Non-Muslims are not has become a highly polarised society. allowed to proselytise among Muslims, Th e controversy centres around the even though the reversed is allowed. draft Constitution. In the second half He viewed the guaranteeing freedom of November 2012, several non-Islamic of religion as an important task for the members withdrew from the committee new appointed leaders in the Arab Spring responsible for drafting the Constitution. countries. Without these, the transition One of them was the Coptic Church, which from dictatorship to democracy would not stated there were insuffi cient guarantees be complete., he cautioned. that the outcome of the negotiations would Bolvin considers it the task of the EU refl ect the religious diversity of Egypt. and its partners to ensure that religious Nevertheless, president Morsi decided to extremism and intolerance do not thrive put the hotly disputed draft constitution due to poverty and a lack of opportunities. to a nationwide referendum on the 15th of Th e EU is especially concerned about the December. Th is pleased the Islamists, but volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 153 frustrated the non-Islamists. includes Islamists, who still keep their Both sides are now organising big distance from the Christian community. rallies. A political balance between the Th irdly, there has to be a political will to two sides exists. On the one hand, this tackle the long-standing and well-known is an encouraging sign, as it shows Egypt problems of the Christian community. is still pluralistic. On the other, it is a Th ere are some immediate tasks such risky move for a country going through a as adopting a new law for building and transition from dictatorship to democracy. repairing churches; developing an electoral Christians in particular are caught in system that allows for a better representation the middle between Islamists and non- of Christians in Parliament; appointing a Islamists, whereas Christians and Muslims number of Christians on public positions normally live peacefully side-by-side. Even based on their merits and qualifi cations; though religious tensions sometimes erupt, and acknowledging Christians have the Egyptian society so far remains immune to right to return to their own religion when disintegration. it comes to marital issues. Fawzy emphasised that the tensions In the longer term, a broader development between Muslims and Christians are not agenda must be adopted. In particular, caused by religion, but by bad governance the government should fi ght illiteracy. on socio-economic issues. A lack of Th is is the fuel of religious intolerance. development is the true root cause, and Lastly, religious organisations must act better public policy is the logical solution as consensus builders. Fawzy mentioned to this problem, he explained. Al-Azhar University, where the Grand Imam has brought intellectuals of diff erent Islamists should backgrounds together, as a fi ne example. Th is group of intellectuals has drafted recognise both in theory a document about the future of Egypt, and in practice that which has served as a working document for the Constitutional Assembly. Even Egypt is for Muslims and the new Coptic Patriarch has promised to Christians and has to be engage in a partnership with the Islamic rebuilt by both - Fawzy. establishment at Al-Azhar. President Morsi in turn has received the new Patriarch, even though he has not attended his Fawzy recommended fi ve steps which enthronement. have to be taken in order to improve the Fawzy also emphasised that he position of Christians in Egyptian society. feels Egypt does not need to import Firstly, Islamists should recognise both jurisprudence from outside. It has its own in theory and in practice that Egypt is jurisprudence concerning the position and for Muslims and Christians and has to the rights of religious minorities, which be rebuilt by both. Th e second step is refl ects Egyptian society and culture. that Christians have to consolidate their contribution in building the new Egypt. In the fi rst half of the 20th century, Waleed El Haddad - COORDINATOR OF Christians had a noticeable role in public THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF life. Th is changed in the second half of the THE FREEDOM AND JUSTICE PARTY, EGYPT century. Fawzy encouraged Christians to return El Haddad began by emphasising that to politics. Yet, he also warns that this was the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was not a one-way street. Th e mushrooming of not the ruling party. President Morsi comes political parties and social movements in from this party, but he had resigned from turn have to reintegrate Christians. Th is the FJP in order to be able to represent all Egyptians.

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El Haddad views the current period an Mehrézia Labidi Maiza – VICE CHAIR unique time for Egypt, as the Egyptians OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, TUNISIA; ECRL MEMBER AND DEPUTY SPEAKER OF Egyptians are now for the ANC, TUNISIA. fi rst time able to build Maiza was unable to make to the roundtable due to pressing demands in their new democracy Tunis. She sent this written message, alone - Haddad. which was read at the meeting. are now for the fi rst time able to build “Honorable religious leaders, their new democracy alone. To enjoy the fruits of the revolution, a couple of Dear colleagues institutions have to be built, explained El From Tunisia, I greet all of you with Haddad. Th e fi rst of these was the election Peace and blessings of God, I wish you a of President Morsi, whilst the second is successful meeting and thank all of you the drafting of the Constitution. Some for the concern you have to the democratic Egyptians asked themselves why there process my country is undergoing. I was a dominance of Islamist forces in would have liked to be with you and the Constitutional Assembly. However, to contribute to this gathering but the El Haddad pointed out that even though situation in Tunisia is quite sensitive: we more than 80% of the members of the are facing diff erent challenges, economic Egyptian Parliament are from Islamist diffi culties, security issues and transitional persuasion, only 50% of the members of justice process … We are discussing the the Constitutional Assembly are Islamists. law concerning the implementation of a Th is was agreed upon before the formation of the Constitutional Assembly. Moreover, The law concerning Th e Freedom and Justice Party actually has the implementation Christian candidates on its list. El Haddad also emphasised strongly that of a high authority to he felt there was no reason to fear Egypt supervise elections [in is once more turning into a dictatorship. Th e decree grants President Morsi´s past Tunisia]... will have a and future decisions immunity from permanent character juridical review was meant to immune the and will guarantee... Constitutional Assembly from dissolution by the Constitutional Court. Th is Court transparency... and consists of judges appointed by the ousted independence. president Mubarak. It is also intended to ensure that the transitional period will be - Maiza. as short as possible. Supporters of Mubarak are trying to block any progress towards democracy. Moreover, it will expire the day high authority to supervise elections which after the referendum. will have a permanent character and will El Haddad also encouraged Christians guarantee the transparency, the neutrality to engage with Egyptian society. Th ey and independence in the running of the have to use the soft power of the Coptic elections. Church, like the Islamic community uses I am chairing the plenary sessions in the soft power of the Al-Azhar University. the assembly, reason for which I cannot be with you. Th e president of our Assembly, Dr Mustapha Ben Jaafar is leading the work of our constitutional committees volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 155 which is quite advanced. Indeed we have guarantees in the proposed Egyptian now fi nished the offi cial fi rst draft of the Constitution with regards freedom and constitution: a constitution confi rming the belief. Fawzy pointed out it was a very rights and the liberties of the citizens, the positive development that Christians rule of law, the importance of human rights are now free to build churches without and reconciling Islam and democracy any interference from the government within a civil state based on the value of and to settle certain disputes among citizenship, solidarity, liberty, social justice themselves. De Jong voiced some concerns and equality. about the fact the draft Constitution I want to thank each one of you for the still contains a reference to the Shari’a. wisdom and the experience of dialogue Th e principles of Islamic Shari’a are to over the years I have been with you as be the leading principles of Egyptian member of RfP and ECRL. Th is has legislation, according to article 2 of the enabled me to play a role of moderator in draft Constitution. According to De this very important transitional period of Jong, this will probably have a huge the history of my country. impact on not only the Constitution, but Th ank you for your support and for especially on laws adopted later on. Fawzy prayers, Tunisia needs both of them replied that even though the Christian to achieve this noble goal: a successful community actually agrees with article 2, transition to democracy! many Christians are still worried. Article Salam to all of you." 219 defi nes Shari’a in a very broad way, which could open the door for restrictions DISCUSSION on freedom of religion. De Jong also had As part of the discussion, Bishop William some doubts on whether the Constitution Kenney asked Bolvin what the EU actually will also guarantee the rights of those not means by freedom of religion or belief. He belonging to one of the Abrahamic faiths, argued it should not only include the right Bahá´is for example. to worship, but also the right of access to religious education and the right to CONCLUSIONS participate in public debates as a believer. De Jong closed the meeting, stating that Bolvin agreed that the EU has an inclusive freedom of religion or belief is extremely view on freedom of religion. Th e future important. He added that almost everyone guidelines on freedom of religion will also agrees on the principle, but not on how to provide a defi nition of the concept. implement it. For De Jong, this illustrates Cyprus PSC Ambassador Louis the need for guidelines for diplomats, who Telemachou raised the second issue. Many have to deal with these issues, but are not of t he EU´s pa r t ners i n t he M idd le E a st have always experts on the matter. He welcomed expressed doubts about this universality the upcoming guidelines as proposed by of human rights, claiming they are just a EEAS, and promised that he and the other Western interpretation of human rights. members of the European parliament He acknowledged this is a very diffi cult network on Freedom of Religion and question to answer, especially because he Belief will be happy to discuss the draft agreed with De Jong and Bolvin that there of these guidelines with EEAS. Th ere is a is universality of human rights and that it need for more clarity for diplomats in the is in the DNA of the European Union to fi eld. For example when is it necessary to promote this. Telemachou pointed out that intervene in cases concerning freedom of even within the Western world there is no religion or belief, but also about the best agreement on the place of religion in the way to carry out this intervention. Some public sphere, as the diff erences between situations require vocal diplomacy, others the EU and the US demonstrate. silent diplomacy. He ended the meeting Th e third question concerned the by echoing the feelings of the Egyptian

156 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 THE ARAB SPRING AND RELIGION OR BELIEF: HOW SHOULD EUROPE ENGAGE AND WITH WHOM? speakers that it was not entirely correct to ENDNOTE speak of the Egyptian Christian minority 1. The European Council of Religious Leaders – Religions for Peace (ECRL) brings together senior leaders from Europe’s being in danger. Rather, they should be historical religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam together seen as Egyptians and be encouraged to with Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs and Zoroastrians. ECRL, world’s engage with and participate in Egyptian largest and most representative multi-religious coalition society. advancing common action for peace since 1970, has participatory status with the Council of Europe. ECRL is one Summary report of a roundtable held at the European Parliament, of the fi ve regional Interreligious Councils with the Religions Brussels, convened by the European Council of Religious Leaders - for Peace network, which is accredited to the United Nations. Religions for Peace on 5th December 2012. http://www.rfp-europe.eu/

PICTURES COURTESY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 157 Why an European network? The increasing importance of matters of Religion and Belief in public life across Europe has been recognised in Article 17 of the Treaty of Lisbon: that the European Union:

“Respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States.

Equally respects the status under national law of philosophical and non-confessional organisations.

Recognising their identity and their specifi c contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations.”

The European Network on Religion and Belief (ENORB) seeks to work with others to develop a long-term network, within the framework of EU policies on equalities and fundamental rights, to combat discrimination and promote mutual understanding in the fi eld of Religion and Belief. ENORB facilitates dialogue between Religion and Belief traditions of all kinds and support the development of similar networks in all member-states.

The Cordoba Foundation is a founding member of ENORB. www.enorb.eu

The MENA Report is a new publication of The Cordoba Foundation’s Middle East and North Africa Programme. Seeking to provide impartial, accurate and authoritative content and analysis of events and developments in the Arab world, we do this through our unique access to rare and highly important primary sources in the Middle East and beyond. thecordobafoundation.com 158 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 Westgate House, Level 7, Westgate Road, Ealing, London W5 1YY • Tel 020 8991 3372 • Fax 020 8991 3373 [email protected] • www.thecordobafoundation.com volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012 arches quarterly 159 ORDER YOUR COPY TODAY! thecordobafoundation.com

Level 7, Westgate House Westgate Road, Ealing London W5 1YY United Kingdom Telephone +44 (0) 20 8991 3370 Telephone +44 (0) 20 8991 3372 Facsimile +44 (0) 20 8991 3373 [email protected] www.thecordobafoundation.com

Twitter @CordobaFoundati(The Cordoba Foundation) 160 arches quarterly volume 6 edition 10 winter 2012