2013 ISSUE 1 - VOL. 1- JANUARY JANUARY 1- VOL. - 1 ISSUE

IN THIS ISSUE… : FROM A FAILED DEMOCRACY TO A SUNNI SPRING. EGYPT, THE AND THE DEEP STATE. PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT. GULF REGION AND THE BAHRAIN CRISIS. the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 1 TUNISIA AND EGYPT – IDEOLOGICAL PROMISES AND BREAD FOR THE POOR. FRANCE’S WAR ON MALI ABOUT THE MENA REPORT

The MENA Report, published monthly by The Cordoba Foundation, provides unique insights and analysis of events and developments in the Middle East and North Africa. Seeking to provide impartial, accurate and authoritative content and analysis, we do this through The Cordoba Foundation’s unique access to rare and highly important primary sources in the Middle East and beyond.

2 the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 CONTENTS

05 Welcome by Dr Fareed Sabri 06 Iraq in the aftermath of the occupation, from a failed democracy to a Sunni Spring 10 Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Deep State 13 Palestinian-Israeli confl ict 14 Events in the Gulf region are dominated by the Bahraini crisis and the fallout of the 16 Tunisia and Egypt - From the ideological promise to the struggle to provide bread for the poor 17 France’s war on Mali

the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 3 SERIES EDITORS: Anas Altikriti Chief Executive

Dr Farid Sabri Head, MENA Programme

Abdullah Faliq Head of Research & Editor

Amjad Mohamed-Saleem

Hamzah D. Foreman

DESIGN & ART DIRECTION: Abdullah S. Khan www.moonlight.org.uk

ABOUT THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION Founded in 2005, The Cordoba Foundation (TCF) is an independent Public Relations, Research and Training unit, which promotes dialogue and the culture of peaceful and positive coexistence among civilisations, ideas and people. We do this by working with decision-making circles, researchers, religious leaders, the media, and a host of other stakeholders of society for better understanding and clearer comprehension of inter-communal and inter-religious issues in Britain and beyond.

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COPYRIGHT © The MENA Report is a publication of The Cordoba Foundation. All rights reserved 2013.

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4 the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 WELCOME WELCOME

Welcome to The MENA Report, published by The Cordoba assets to achieving an in-depth analysis and uncovering Foundation’s Middle East and North Africa Programme. the ulterior motives behind the multi-layered events in The report provides analysis and insights of events, this ancient and ideologically-driven region. developments and transitions currently taking place in the region. In 1918, US Senator Hiram Warren Johnson is purported to have said: “The fi rst casualty of war is truth”. However Truth, objectivity and the unbiased analysis of events from a deep acquaintance with the ideological and social in the region is a claim very diffi cult to attain as many make-up of the region and from past experience, we institutions, indigenous and foreign, claim to have can safely say that war is the logical consequence of the achieved. At The Cordoba Foundation, we aim to present ideological schism, racism and greed hidden behind a our readers with diverse viewpoints and perspectives, thin veneer of truth. hailing from political and religious players as well as protagonists. We believe integrity and professionalism The only casualty is our humanity. is our best vehicle to getting in-depth contacts and analysis. Thank you.

Both the underdog and those in the position of Dr Fareed Sabri responsibility respect our commitment and our ethical HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA PROGRAMME THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION methodology. The latter and the former are our main

the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 5 IRAQ IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE OCCUPATION, FROM A FAILED DEMOCRACY TO A SUNNI SPRING IRAQ IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE OCCUPATION, OCCUPATION, THE OF AFTERMATH THE IN IRAQ SPRING. SUNNI A TO DEMOCRACY FAILED A FROM Nearly fi ve weeks have passed since the mainly Sunni part in the demonstrations since they are part of the fabric populated regions in Iraq erupted in mass picketing and of Iraqi society and they fully support the demands of demonstrations against what they claim to be a campaign their constituents. However we found evidence to partially of discrimination and human rights violations, carried out support the governments charge. against them by the Shi’i-led government. The government soon dismissed the demonstrations in a speech by Prime From the fi rst day of the mass rallies, a number of the Minister Nuri al-Maliki as nothing but a dirty bubble. most infl uential IIP politicians frequented the main stage of the demonstrations. Furthermore, our researcher met Members of al-Maliki’s Da’wa Party and local offi cials close young activists affi liated to the Muslim Brotherhood, they to al-Maliki accused the demonstrators of being remnants of elaborated on their eff orts in securing and organising the the Ba’ath regime and Wahhabi terrorists. They also claimed various aspects of the demonstration camp in al-Anbar in a number of comments on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya province. satellite television channels that the main instigator and organiser of these demonstrations is the , Understandably the leadership of the IIP does not want to the political arm of Iraq’s Muslim Brotherhood. be targeted by the Shi’i-led government. The party feels unprotected especially in the capital . In countless The Cordoba Foundation contacted a senior member in the occasions the Iraqi government displayed its ability to Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) to shed light on the government’s mobilise the law, judiciary and the various militias against its accusations. Our source denied the charges categorically. opponent with an unmistaken veracity. He claimed that it is normal for members of the IIP to take

6 the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 FROM A FAILED DEMOCRACY TO A SUNNI SPRING. IRAQ IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE OCCUPATION,

In 2003, the Americans and their Western allies invaded Iraq. of women prisoners in Iraqi jails were sexually assaulted by The occupation was facilitated by a concoction of mainly their Shi’i captors. Furthermore the arrest of the bodyguards Shi’i Islamists backed by Iran, the Kurds and a plethora of the Sunni politician and the Minister of Finance Dr Rafe’ of small and fragmented secular forces. The Sunnis, be it al-Issawi proved that the Sunnis in Iraq had reached a dead Islamists, Arab nationalists and even those with no political end. persuasion were considered as remnants of the bygone era. The Sunnis put up a heavy fi ght against the Americans and Demands raised by the demonstrators are mainly focused their allies until their departure in 2011. on four points. First, is the immediate release of thousands of innocent prisoners of which the vast majority are Sunnis. Consequently Shi’i political parties close to Iran seized the Second, the abolition of ad hoc laws that were specifi cally opportunity to ethnically-cleanse (known locally as tat-hir) designed to target the Sunni community. Third, a call the Iraqi institutions, especially the security and armed for the government to rebalance the staffi ng of the Iraqi forces. Credible reports from inside the government claims ministries and security institutions in particular and put that the 17 Iraqi army divisions are all commanded by Shi’i an end to the institutional discrimination against them. offi cers apart from one Kurd. Arbitrary arrests and torture Finally, for the Sunni community to be allowed to exercise are rife, the Sunnis believe they have been targeted with ad their constitutional demand in creating their own federal hoc legislations such as the de-Ba’thifi cation law and the so provinces. called Article 4/Terrorism. It is unlikely that the Iraqi government will ever be able to The fi nal straw came when it was alleged that the majority achieve the wishes of the demonstrators. The unpopularity

the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 7 Th e demonstrations in the Sunni parts of Iraq will not achieve their goals as long as the rest of Iraq and the capital remain aloof from the demonstrators’ demands.

IRAQ IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE OCCUPATION, OCCUPATION, THE OF AFTERMATH THE IN IRAQ SPRING. SUNNI A TO DEMOCRACY FAILED A FROM of the government among the Sunni community is As a strategy, the government will most likely continue translated to popular satisfaction in large parts of the Shi’i talking to the demonstrators with limited off ers until the populated regions. After all, the hundreds of thousands of sting of the demonstrations fi zzles away. On the other hand well-paid jobs by the massive Iraqi oil revenues are reserved the demonstrators are wary of the government’s strategy. by members of the Shi’i community. Decades are needed to They threatened to up the ante and resort to diff erent address this imbalance, especially in armed forces and the strategies. What that means is unclear at the moment, but security institutions, provided that there is good will in the what is clear is that both sides know the alternative to a fi rst place to address this. Iran is also a major factor, since the negotiated settlement, means another sectarian war. imbalance has served to alter the traditional enmity it faced by the Iraqi politicians and consequently the armed forces to The Sunni provinces are still suff ering from the devastating the neighboring Arab countries. consequences of fi ghting the American and the Iraqi armies during the occupation from 2003 -2011. The Iraqi Realistically the demonstrations in the Sunni parts of Iraq government backed by Iran does not want to open another will not achieve their goals as long as the rest of Iraq and front because both are preoccupied providing assistance the capital remain aloof from the demonstrators’ demands. to the Syrian government to quell its armed uprising. The It is a given fact that to create an atmosphere of urgency for Iraqi Prime Minister hinted at a security solution to the Sunni change, there is a need to disrupt the day-to-day functioning uprising but he quickly backed down favoring to wear down of the state institutions, similar to what happened in Egypt his opponents before committing to any such move. and Tunisia amid the Arab Spring. The Iraqi government is in The present outlook of the situation does not favor the a safe position as long as the demonstrations and vigils are integrity of Iraq as a single political entity. The country is confi ned to the three Sunni provinces. quickly evolving into two distinct ideologically divided

8 the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 FROM A FAILED DEMOCRACY TO A SUNNI SPRING. IRAQ IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE OCCUPATION,

communities (there are clear signs that the Kurds are weighing their options with the Sunnis for various reasons, the sectarian and the geopolitical are among many).

At best, Iraq will move to some kind of loose federation if the present warring political parties agree on the principles of such a solution. Otherwise the fallout of the Syrian revolution, the intransigence of the Iraqi government and the hard line elements within the demonstrators in the three Sunni provinces will recreate events of the civil war in 2006 but on a grander scale.

the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 9 EGYPT, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE DEEP STATE

EGYPT, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE DEEP STATE DEEP THE AND BROTHERHOOD MUSLIM THE EGYPT, Egypt is a latent force in the making. It has the potential to There are clear indications that the policy of creating becoming a regional power again to resume its infl uence internal and external troubles and enemies has been very as it did in the 1960s and 1970s. Deep government (the successful in the Sudan. The success is to the extent that remnants of the Mubarak institutions), nepotism, corruption the so-called Islamic Project in the Sudan is considered a and weak economy are major factors in Egypt’s current crisis. total failure in the eyes of many prominent Islamists in the On Tuesday 22nd January, the Supreme Court, “Egypt’s top Middle East. The new American policy is also evident in Syria. court”, was to rule on whether Egypt’s Islamist-dominated Sources from within the Turkish government claimed that Senate should be dissolved as well as on the validity of a the US demanded that the Turkish government block all panel that wrote the country’s controversial constitution. The eff orts to supply the Free Syrian Army with heavy and anti- decision was relegated to a later date but this proved that aircraft weapons. the judiciary is playing a political game since it displayed a propensity to annul laws and decrees by the Islamist Israel is also concerned about developments in Syria. Early dominated government. Deep state is in action to overrule this month Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the revolution and hinder Egypt’s transition to a democracy his government’s plan to erect a wall between Israel and if political Islam is deemed to be the main benefi ciary. Syria, to protect Israel from “global jihadi forces” which he claims have moved in place of the Syrian Army on the Golan There are also clear signs that the US government regained Heights. its composure after the initial shock of the Arab Spring and the loss of its key allies in the region. The new policy is The full cycle of events since the fi rst Gulf war appears to be evident in the orchestrated vehement media attacks carried repeating itself. The dynamic and the fl uidity of the situation out by allies of the Americans in the Gulf region. in the region are polarising the protagonists into two sides.

10 the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 EGYPT, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE DEEP STATE

We are witnessing an undeclared alliance between Russia and the United States with lesser allies such as Iran and the tiny Gulf states to halt the advance of the Arab revolutions and the ascendancy of political Islam.

We are witnessing an undeclared alliance between Russia institutions remain intact from the days of the ousted and the United States with lesser allies such as Iran and the president who hand-picked the chain of command and tiny Gulf states to halt the advance of the Arab revolutions the top offi cers. The police force in particular feels it and the ascendancy of political Islam. was humiliated by the revolution. It would have been unthinkable by them only two years ago that the very same Uncertainty and the fl uidity of political alliances in the people they used to regularly imprison, torture and fi rmly Middle East is the only certainty in the region. However, believe as constituting a threat to the state i.e., the Muslim It is not obvious to what extent the ideological disparities Brotherhood, would become their political masters in such a between the lesser players will dictate the unscheduled short span of time.. events and alliances. The schisms between Iran and the Gulf States are very diffi cult to bridge since the religious Morsi and his government seem to be fi ghting on three establishment in Iran has undeniable strong infl uence on its fronts; the military and Police forces, the High Court as well foreign policy. as a plethora of liberal and secular movements. The latter constitute only a minority as proven in the rounds of elections As in the past, Iran will come out the clear winner since it and referendums held to date, but they are a formidable musters many cards at its disposal. Among the many, are power nonetheless since they have the ability to mobilise and the nuclear issue and the Shi’i demographic pockets on the use street protests to their advantage - and enjoy the backing other side of the Arabian Gulf. of most media outlets, state and privately owned.

The other destabilising factor for president Morsi’s There is clear evidence that the army is hinting towards a government is the loyalty of the army and police. Both return to power to oblige calls by members of the secular

the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 11 EGYPT, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE DEEP STATE DEEP THE AND BROTHERHOOD MUSLIM THE EGYPT, opposition. Egypt’s armed forces Chief General Abdel Fattah If so, Egypt would be sidelined as a regional force for at al-Sisi’s latest comments have sparked fears that the military several years to come. might once again intervene in the day-to-day governance of Egypt, a country ruled for most of the past century by army offi cers. Writing on the army’s Facebook page, The General said: “The continuation of the struggle of the diff erent political forces over the management of state aff airs could lead to the collapse of the state.”

It is unclear whether this intervention if it ever happens would be under the authority of president Morsi or a coup d’état by offi cers still loyal to the Mubarak regime. If this were to happen we are likely to witness civil unrests and possibly a war by some activists belonging of Jihadi/Salafi persuasion -- similar to what had happened in Algeria in the 1990s when the army annulled the election results which the Islamic Salvation Front had clearly won. A number of leaders from Jihadi and Salafi groups in Egypt have already threatened to up the ante if the democratically-elected president is toppled by force.

12 the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Israel continued its land grabbing and settlement building in Gaza. It is estimated that the number of foreign in the present climate of internal struggle in Egypt, civil fi ghters in Syria amounts to a few thousands and they are war in Syria and the West and America’s shift of attention on the increase. Besides the conspiracy theory which is the towards internal politics, economic diffi culties and the rising dominant ideology in the Middle East, the logical question power of China and the Iranian nuclear issue. Unable to is, to what extent the French intervention in Mali will serve build on the tacit support of the Egyptian regime as before, to halt the infl ux of foreign fi ghters into Syria. Lebanese and the Israelis seem set on continuing their policy to degrade Syrian Christian leaders exerted an immense pressure of the Hamas’s military and political and organisational capabilities French government to stop its support for any sort of action by targeting its leaders and the Gaza Strip with air strikes. in Syria that will lead to the toppling of the regime. They feared a mass exodus of the Christian community similar to The show of force by Israel may be aimed at sending a what happened in Iraq after the American invasion in 2003. clear message to its neighbors that its policy of using its military might whenever it deems necessary hasn’t changed, especially amid growing concerns that the civil war in Syria is gradually spilling over into the occupied Golan Heights.

Clearly, Israel and Iran share the concern that Sunni Islamists will eventually supplant the Syrian regime. The question arises as to what extent both sides will collaborate on these strategic issues and what are the consequences for

the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 13 EVENTS IN THE GULF REGION ARE DOMINATED BY THE BAHRAINI CRISIS AND THE FALLOUT OF THE ARAB SPRING

The current crisis in Bahrain is more of a demographic of Bahrain. Last year’s demonstrations and strikes left the BAHRAINI CRISIS BAHRAINI issue than a political one. The Saudis and other Gulf states already weak economy in tatters. are trying to solve this issue through some sort of close cooperation leading to a quasi-confederal state. No one The economy will not get better since Bahrain has very in the Gulf region wants to concede to the democratic limited resources and virtually no agricultural or industrial demands of the opposition for two reasons. First, it will infrastructure. Dialogue is the only way out to end the defi nitely lead to a government that is closely linked to the present tension and the presence of the GCC troops in Iranian regime. Secondly, from the failed experience of the this tiny Kingdom. However dialogue in itself is only a ”democratic project” in Iraq, it will inevitably lead to the mechanism to reaching justice and fair representation. discrimination against the Sunni community which the Both sides need to dig deep in the recent history and learn majority of Gulf States share the same religious persuasion. lessons from Iraq. Obviously the Shi’i opposition is insistent on a full constitutional monarchy. In fact it called for a Finally, the mere talk about democracy sends shivers down regime change in the last leg of the demonstrations in 2012. the spine of the hereditary rulers in the region. Hence the On the other side, the regime fully understands the Iraqi Gulf will remain in a stalemate for the time being. Everyone lesson. Conceding to the opposition means total political in the region is monitoring intensely the ”overt and covert” annihilation and the suff rage of the Sunni community. negotiations between the West and Iran as well as the outcome of the economic sanctions imposed on it. Unfortunately unless there is deep ideological review and reform is instigated among and in between the religious The opposition, emboldened by its demographic advantage communities and sects in the region, the present tensions and its close ties to Iran just a few miles on the opposite and instability will not ebb. shores will continue its unrelenting pressure on the rulers

14 the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 BAHRAINI CRISIS

A publication of The Cordoba Foundation that provides a medium for diverse opinions and perspectives pertaining to dialogue, contemporary issues, and cross-cultural exchange. DOWNLOAD FOR FREE thecordobafoundation.com the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 15 TUNISIA AND EGYPT - FROM THE IDEOLOGICAL PROMISE TO THE STRUGGLE TO PROVIDE BREAD FOR THE POOR.

TUNISIA AND EGYPT AND TUNISIA Revolutions in the Arab world are more about stabilising factors. Now to what extent will the West and individual freedom and democracy than creating social America in particular be willing to help stabilise these transformations based on ideological premises as was the regimes? case during the Communist and Arab Socialist era. The economy is very important for the survival of the present Could an economic miracle be achieved in Egypt in the regimes. absence of political stability, democratic institutions, effi cient agricultural and industrial infrastructure that helped the A big part of the revolutionary grievances directed against Turkish Islamists to stay at the helm of government for more the fallen regimes is nepotism, corruption and ailing than ten years? and faltering economies. It is a dilemma for the new governments. They need quick fi xes in order to create Facing such burning and diffi cult issues, the Islamists, both some sort of economic relief for the masses and those who Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi s reached a conclusion suff ered and the poor in particular. Yet they need the old that Egypt is a pot of myriad of problems. Solving it is the corrupt bourgeoisies who were selected and helped by the responsibility of all political trends. There are talks that old regimes to support a semi-free capitalist’s economy. the Brotherhood’s political party, the FJP, is in negotiation with al-Ghad party headed by the secularist Ayman Noor If the governments fail to inject hope to these masses to enter the next election in one list. It is obvious that the and the poor in particular, the consequences will be dire Islamists need others to share the responsibility and hence ideologically and politically for the new regimes. Hence an the liability, while the secular and liberal parties need the injection of quick hard currency by the Gulf regimes and Islamists to solve their unpopularity and weak electoral loans with favourable terms from the IMF will be urgent representation.

16 the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 FRANCE’S WAR ON MALI FRANCE’S WAR ON MALI

France began a bombing campaign in Mali on 12th January. animosity and mistrust between the communities. We often It also sent ground troops to drive back the Islamist fi ghters hear in the Western media that the Islamists turned on and their Tuareg1 allies. The French president said France the Tuareg, and they eff ectively run the show in Northern had intervened at the behest of the Malian government. The parts of Mali and both are involved in the drugs traffi cking attack followed the usual and expected media campaigns to Europe. However we are not sure to what extent these that preceded military actions in the past in Afghanistan, reports are credible since it was also alleged previously Iraq and the Sudan. Francois Hollande received wide support that the Taliban in Afghanistan were implicated in the from his Western allies and also from two major North drugs trade. Only to discover after the American invasion African countries, Morocco and Algeria. that the Taliban were very effi cient in destroying the drugs plantations and virtually putting an end to the drug industry The civil war in Mali has been going on for decades. The in the areas under their jurisdiction. confl ict is however not between the Islamists and the secular and democratic governments. Rather, it is a war between Among the many claims the fact remains that France has ethnic Tuareg who feel that their culture and ethnic identity been historically supporting dictators and warlords in West has been discriminated against by the African majority. Africa with its superior fi re-power in return for access to oil The Islamist trend is a transient issue. A lack of government and minerals. It is inevitable that the French army with its air control in the Northern parts of Mali encouraged remnants superiority will soon roll back the Islamists to their original of the Islamists from North Africa to set bases in Mali. bases in Northern Mali. The topography of the Malian desert does not favor the columns of Islamists jeeps armed with the The French intervention will not end the ethnic grievances limited fi re-power of their 1950s technology of the Russian in Mali; in fact it will only serve to deepen the feelings of 23 mm anti-aircraft guns.

the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 17 FRANCE’S WAR ON MALI ON WAR FRANCE’S The battle to regain large sways of the Malian deserts fl ow of viable anti-aircraft weapons to guerrillas especially and towns will not take long, but the implications of the in the Middle East and Africa. The outdated SAM 7 or its North African support for this expedition will resonate in variations is the most advanced anti-aircraft weapon that the mosques, towns and cities of Algeria and Morocco for could be found in the hands of the Islamists and guerrillas months to come. in the region. This 1970s technology is unable to match the vast Western air technological advances. The kidnapping of foreign gas workers in Ras Menas in Algeria is the beginning of troubles for the Algerian regime. Dien Bien Fu, Iraq and Afghanistan are lessons France chose Algeria escaped the Arab Spring with harsh clamp-downs to ignore. Time will tell what the French will learn in Mali. on the protestors and strong economy aided by large rises in oil prices. The Malian expedition defi es any sort of political wisdom since it could instigate the sort of civil strife we have seen in the 1990s right on the door-step of Europe.

It would appear that the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan have not been learnt by the super powers. Air superiority seems to be one of the deciding factors behind the 1. Also spelled, Twareg or Touareg, inhabit the Saharan regions of North Africa willingness of Western politicians to commit to military - Niger, Mali, Libya, Algeria and Burkina Faso. Reputedly of Berber descent, the gambles. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the language of the Tuareg is Tamachek, with their own script known as Tifi nagh, ideological divide between Russia and the West ended the thought to have ancient Libyan roots.

18 the mena report | volume 1 | issue 01 | january 2013 Download for free

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