as it might be. it as Russia than rather is, it as Russia with deal have to will and in any event Putin of President term current the out wait just to ill-advised be would Europe means This 2024. beyond Kremlin in the continuity to down boil probably will circumstances changing these Russia with relations locked of Europe’s dead context in the doxically, Para exception. no is politics International circumstances. changing to adapt to ability and an leadership requires often Politics 2017 in / Versailles of Palace the at Battles) of (Gallery Batailles des Galerie the in walk Macron Emmanuel President French and Putin Vladimir President Russian Source: to re-engage with Russia. Macron is is Macron Russia. with re-engage to attempts his intensified Macron President French tracks, in its everything stopped virus corona the before months, In recent deserve support, not scorn not deserve support, Russia towards Macron’s overtures Cold inComing from the 2020 APRIL - - kremlin.ru bureaucratised EU apparatus to lead a major amajor lead to EU apparatus bureaucratised the expect one should Nor itself. reinvent to EU trying and is the exited just has UK the while plate, the up to step will Germany hamstrung that likely very not is it days These and direction? purpose provide will who then ambition is serious, geopolitical that If ways. both have it cannot One politics. power European to and areturn acumen geopolitical for more call broad grandeur of illusions French typically lament they or disruptive often interventions Macron’s find who colleagues, European to-earth down- of his more some may irritate This visions. grand articulating to averse not , but at the same time there is a is there time same the at , but

Hugo Klijn & Bob Deen Clingendael Alert Clingendael Alert

strategic overhaul by itself, bound as it is to persistent anxiety over Russia will continue follow the lowest common denominator in to lock European states into a pattern of the positions of its divided member states.1 insecurity and a sustained dependency on This leaves Macron in a central position to American security guarantees. Provided the initiate a conversation with . US would still be prepared to shoulder the military burden, which is a big if, a further NATO build-up in Europe would encourage Strategic autonomy and Moscow to maintain its assertive military security dilemmas posture and belligerent tone and the downward spiral will continue. Breaking this security dilemma cycle would be in Europe’s, ’s overtures towards Russia as well as in Russia’s interest. should be interpreted in the framework of European ‘strategic autonomy’, a key tenet of Macron’s thinking that revolves Personal investment in dialogue around the ability to act and decide one’s own fate without dependency on others.2 Since the very beginning of his presidency This traditional French agenda has been Macron has been reaching out to his Russian rekindled because of longer-term and counterpart, in keeping with his conviction structural changes in international relations that diplomacy is carried by personal which have been accelerated by the Trump relationships. In 2017 he hosted Putin in administration. Macron’s justified fear is Versailles and in 2019 Macron invited him that Europe will increasingly find itself in a to Brégançon, on the eve of a G7 Summit situation where others are calling the shots in which Russia no longer participates. over European heads.3 On that occasion he also prepared the summit meeting of the Normandy Four that Macron argues that as long as Europe took place last December in Paris, the format is engaged in a prolonged security crisis initiated by German Chancellor Merkel and with Russia, the chances of reaching French President Hollande in 2014 to gather even a modicum of autonomy in its own Russia and Ukraine around one table. neighbourhood remain negligible. Recent developments with regard to and Iran Besides multilateral endeavours, Macron has serve as a reminder, with the risk of Europe also started a bilateral track with Russia on suffering the consequences of decisions a number of issues ranging from security made by others. His disparaging views and technology to human rights and the on NATO are well known, even if France conflicts in the Middle East, coordinated by continues to rely on the Alliance as the his adviser and including both cornerstone of European collective defence. countries’ Foreign and Defence Ministers.4 The issue Macron tries to address is that It appears from these talks that Russia is mostly interested in discussing security matters, and that it is primarily the political 1 See for an overview of the EU’s challenges dimension of these rapprochement efforts Sabine Fischer, What the New EU Leadership that is important for Moscow. This tells us Should Do About Russia, Carnegie Moscow, something about Russia’s own anxieties 4 December 2019, available on https://carnegie.ru/ and, contrary to outward appearances, commentary/80485. its awareness of political isolation. 2 , Emmanuel Macron’s Russian roulette, There is a profound lack of interaction with 14 February 2020, available on https://www.politico. Western powers, which makes it difficult eu/article/emmanuel-macron-russian-roulette- for Russia to balance its partnership with vladimir-putin-security-partner/. 3 Speech of Emmanuel Macron at de Ecole de Guerre on the defence and deterrence strategy, 7 February 2020, available on https://www.elysee. 4 See the interview with Pierre Vimont on B2 fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/discours-du- (5 March 2020), available on http://club.bruxelles2. president-emmanuel-macron-sur-la-strategie-de- eu/2020/03/comment-batir-une-nouvelle- defense-et-de-dissuasion-devant-les-stagiaires- architecture-de-securite-et-de-confiance-avec-la- de-la-27eme-promotion-de-lecole-de-guerre. russie-pierre-vimont/.

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China, an opportunistic coalition that makes position of not ‘rewarding Russia for bad geopolitical sense but does not always behaviour’ has got in the way of conducting sit comfortably. diplomacy.

Getting to the root of Overcoming obstacles the problem to engagement

Of course, over the years many attempts The fear of appeasement is an emotional at ‘selective engagement’ with Russia have and historically rooted sentiment, especially been made, but proposals for more cultural for Eastern European countries which exchanges, however useful, are not likely to continuously suspect betrayal when Western resolve the underlying problems. Because at leaders reach out to Moscow. This lack of the core of the animosity is Russia’s deeply trust is a major obstacle to a joint European felt frustration with the way the European approach towards Russia. It is therefore security order evolved after the Cold War.5 no coincidence that in February Macron Moscow’s misgivings are well known, made his first official visit to Warsaw in an and relate to subsequent waves of NATO effort to reassure of his commitment enlargement plus membership guarantees to European defence and underlined that for Georgia and Ukraine, missile defence “France is neither pro-Russian or anti-Russian, installations in central and it is pro-European”.6 Indeed, discussing and interventions in former Yugoslavia controversies does not amount to approval. and Libya. But Russia also perceives the advances of the EU on its neighbouring Similarly, better use must be made of the countries as political, not technocratic. so-called Structured Dialogue in the OSCE, the only organisation where at least on paper we The West may have publicly renounced have a permanent security debate with Russia. the establishment of zones of interest but The then German Foreign Minister Steinmeier Russia has not, and recognises this from launched this process in 2016, which seeks afar. No matter how much we disagree to discuss “current and future challenges and with Russia’s positions and actions, the risks to security in the OSCE area to foster acknowledgement that these are stemming a greater understanding on these issues”.7 from intransigent but sincerely held Some Western countries have tried to dilute convictions could pave the way for a serious this dialogue by insisting on tabling human conversation. This conversation is needed, rights issues. Important as they are, these are because without addressing these core also covered by other forums. These countries security issues we just keep regurgitating seem unwilling to distinguish hard security our mutually exclusive narratives. In order issues from other topics, and only want to to make headway, the West will have to discuss them on their own terms as an added depart from the idea that talking to Russians bonus. But unless these core issues are is doing them a favour. For example, while addressed, the stalemate will endure because it made sense for NATO to cease ‘business of Russian stamina and our lack of resolve. as usual’ within the NATO-Russia Council in Again, Ukraine is a case in point. 2014 because of Ukraine, it ended up only speaking about Russia, and not to Russia. The hesitant resumption of some of these 6 ‘Macron: France neither pro-Russian nor anti- meetings in 2016 still does not exploit the Russian but simply pro-European’, Reuters, NATO-Russia Council’s potential for crisis 3 February 2020, available on https://www.reuters. management and for discussing ‘unusual com/article/us-poland-france-macron-russia/ business’. It seems that our principled macron-france-neither-pro-russian-nor-anti-russian- but-simply-pro-european-idUSKBN1ZX1PA. 7 From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the 20th Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms 5 William H. Hill, No Place for Russia – European Control, adopted at the OSCE Ministerial Council on Security Institutions Since 1989, Columbia University 9 December 2016, available on https://www.osce.org/ Press 2018. chairmanship/289496.

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A needed, but not risk-free En marche – avec l’Europe endeavour France admits that it cannot go it alone, realising that its bilateral diplomacy must Critics say that one of the flaws in be embedded in a broader EU strategy Macron’s approach is that Russia will if it is to be effective. Macron should be simply not reciprocate, pocketing any mindful of the red lines of other countries, French concessions while continuing to and in turn they should give him and his undermine Europe’s stability.8 But Macron, envoy Pierre Vimont, who knows the EU’s himself having been the target of a Kremlin- constraints inside out, space to explore sponsored disinformation campaign during strategic openings. This also applies to the his presidential bid, is not naïve. He argues Netherlands, despite its travails to seek that he wants to speak to Russia from justice for MH17 in the face of disingenuous a position of strength, without yielding obstructionism by Russia. Ultimately, to it or forgetting what it has done, or even this difficult case may benefit from what it is doing.9 The fact that Macron is thawing relations. Ideally, Paris would have advancing suggestions for further European accomplished the ice-breaking and found defence co-operation and is even openly openings for further engagement by the time contemplating a European role for France’s the EU, as announced by the Commission, nuclear weapon capabilities is indicative would be ready to revisit its five ‘guiding of the seriousness of his ideas.10 Much principles’ for relations with Russia in order as Europeans may have reasons to be to get out of the current deadlock.12 suspicious of Macron’s overtures towards Russia, it would be too easy to dismiss Of course, if Russia were genuinely them as the appeasement of Moscow or interested in a meaningful dialogue with grandstanding to beef up domestic approval Europe, it will have to take responsibility rates. In fact, Macron’s outstretched hand and do its own part in restoring confidence. is a sign of courage and political leadership For starters, it should wind down its in a time when such commodities are in disinformation and interference operations. scarce supply. In its turn, Russia must deal with Europe as it is, and not with Europe as it might be. Another reason to heed Macron’s initiative Even if Russia would signal a willingness is that it may undercut Europe’s populist to play along, Macron’s agenda remains right-wing parties, which maintain strong prone to disappointment. But given its ties with Moscow and are being instru- importance, the French President deserves mentalised to forge an ideological coalition our support, not our scorn. against the EU. Decisions on Europe’s future relations with Russia are far too important to be left to the political fringes.11

8 Judy Dempsey: Macron’s One-Way Street to 12 Tony van der Togt, ‘In Search of a European Russia Russia, available on https://carnegieeurope.eu/ strategy’, Atlantisch Perspectief 2020, available on strategiceurope/81102. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/search- 9 Speech of Emmanuel Macron at Jagiellonian european-russia-strategy. The 5 guiding principles, University in Krakow, 24 March 2020, available adopted by the EU Foreign Affairs Council in on https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel- March 2016, include the full implementation of the macron/2020/02/05/president-emmanuel- Minsk agreements; closer ties with Russia's former macrons-speech-at-jaguellonne-university-krakow. Soviet neighbours; strengthening EU resilience to 10 Speech of Emmanuel Macron at de Ecole de Russian threats; selective engagement with Russia Guerre, op. cit. on certain issues such as counter-terrorism; and 11 Andrew S. Weiss: With Friends Like These: support for people-to-people contacts. See the The Kremlin’s Far-Right and Populist briefing of the Foreign Affairs Council of 14 March, Connections in Italy and Austria, available on available on https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ https://carnegieendowment.org. meetings/fac/2016/03/14/.

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About the authors

Hugo Klijn is a Senior Research Fellow within the Security Unit of the Clingendael Institute. The main focus of his work is on Transatlantic security issues and arms control. He has a special interest in the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics.

Bob Deen is a Senior Research Fellow on Security and Defence at the Clingendael Institute. His research focuses on international security issues and geopolitics, with a particular emphasis on Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.