To Strengthen the Central Govemment in Tirana, Zog Also Improved Albania's Primi

To strengthen the central govemment in Tirana, Zog also improved Albania's primi- tive communication and transportation infrastructure, and increased the police and tax collectors' access to the remote mountainous regions of the country. Albania's army dur- ing Zog's reign became a model of building national unity and consciousness by taking recruits from all over the country and mixing them in different units to achieve a kind of social and cultural melting pot. World War II, the invasion of Albania by Mussolini's new Roman empire and then by Hitler's army, and the birth of Albania's resistance groups with regional agendas, brought the slow march to modernization and nation building to a screeching halt. The small communist party under the leadership of Enver Hoxha came to power in November 1944 and put an end to Zog's kingdom. The disagreements about Zog, writes Tomes, are "not so much about facts as about motives and criteria." And he is right to conclude that "the pro-Zog and anti-Zog lines converge to a point where the choice essentially lies between a pragmatic patriot obliged by severe circumstances to adopt some very questionable expedients and an unscrupulous egotist whose self-glorification produced incidental benefits for his country" (p. 285). One gets the impression reading the book that Zog was a little bit of both and more, namely, a sad, tortured man whose ambitions and circumstances got the better of him. Xing Zog ofAlbania is a wonderful, readable book that should be devoured by anyone interested in the history of Albania and of the region, or is simply interested in the story of a controversial, fascinating personality whose epitaph remains to be written and whose statue may or may not one day grace Tirana alongside that of the great Scanderbeg. Peter Gross The University of Oklahoma The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995. Edited by Branko Magas and Ivo Zanic. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001. xxxi, 383 pp. $62.50 (cloth); $26.50 (paper). Distributed by International Specialized Book Services, Inc., Portland, Ore- gon. This book, the result of a conference held in Budapest in September 1998, is a useful work that contributes valuable information on the wars in Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina (B-H). Writers' biases, always present in edited works from multiple authors, are particularly pronounced in this effort, which covers one of the most contentious subjects of this relatively iecent period. Yet, there is much fresh information and frank opinion that make this book a substantial contribution to understanding the wars that plagued Yugoslavia's disintegration from 1991 to 1995. The editors, Branko MagaS and Ivo Zanic, organize their work in an unusual fashion that requires some patience to follow. First, there is a foreword by Noel Malcolm; while valuable, it is perhaps too short considering the caliber of this respected scholar. This is followed by an interesting and somewhat more extensive introduction by the editors with the help of Norman Cigar, another excellent historian of the wars in Yugoslavia. The next two sections - one covering the war in Croatia and the other concerning the war in B-H - begin with individual articles followed by a discussion section among the participants. After these contributions, there is a third major section on international issues that covers the same chronological period as the first two parts of the book but from a different topical perspective. Finally, there is an addendum on soldier motivation and the media. In short, the book mixes chronological and topical structures with a format that is somewhat disjointed, but still contains helpful material. Part 1, conceming the war in Croatia, includes articles from Stjepan Mesic, Martin Spegelj, Anton Tus, Ozren Zunec, and Dugan Bilandzic. Mesic's piece examines the origins of the Croatian war, and he distributes blame evenly to Serbian President Milogevie, the Yugoslav Army (JNA), and Croatian President Tudjman for irresponsible actions which led to open war. Spegelj describes the pre-war preparations of the JNA and the Croatian Army (HV), as well as the initial stages of the fighting in Croatia. Tus' contribution also covers some of the early fighting, but it goes on to describe the later phases of the war. Zunec provides a fascinating chapter on Operations Flash and Storm, the last two major Croatian offensives of the war. His section is filled with excellent charts and statis- tical information. Finally, Bilandii� contributes a short piece that focuses more on the political (vice military) aspects of the,war in Croatia and views the ultimate Croatian tri- umph as a pyrrhic victory. The next major part of the book (the war in B-H) contains articles by Rusmir Mah- mutechajie, Jovan Divjak, Marko Attila Hoare, and Norman Cigar. Mahmutcehajic covers the origins of the war from a highly political-ideological approach, and he argues that forces outside of B-H were the chief causes of the conflict. Divjak's section, one of the best in the book, details the creation of the B-H Armed Forces and includes data on equipment and units as well as insights on the struggle to integrate paramilitaries, police, territorial units (TO), and ex-JNA members. The article by Hoare is another excellent contribution, which focuses on the complex civil-military relations between the fighting forces and the numerous factions that made up the Izetbegovic government. Cigar's effort covers the Serbian side of the conflict. Cigar, an American scholar, attempts to fill the void created by the reluctance of Serbian scholars to participate in the conference. The third part of the book contains contributions from Paul Williams and Warren H. Switzer on the international response to the Yugoslav conflict. This is the weakest section of the book. Williams' article is a rehash of the usual bashing of UN, NATO and EU responses to the conflict - there is nothing new here beyond the usual blanket condemna- tions of the West. Switzer focuses on the military aspects of the international commu- nity's response; it has more details than Williams' piece, but still tends to cover ground that has been argued extensively in other works. The final contribution to the book is an addendum that covers the call-up crisis of 1991 and media responses to this event. This is an intriguing article that has great value. However, it seems out of place in the overall context of the book; it focuses on individual soldier motivations and media perceptions while the rest of the book looks at the higher level of political-military decision making. In addition, the addendum lacks the related articles and discussion that accompany the other parts of the book. Finally, because the bbok lacks a conclusion or summary, the addendum seems an unusual way to end the book. The absence of a conclusion is one of several flaws in this volume. The lack of Serb and Bosnian-Serb participation in the conference leaves a void in the work, despite solid efforts by non-Serb scholars such as Norman Cigar to portray the Serb perspective. Some of the authors, even when contributing valuable insights, allow their political bias to color their writing, and they fall back on old rhetoric rather than solid argument to make their points. Finally, the disjointed format (particularly the often-heated "discussion" sections) lacks a unity, and this might discourage some readers. Despite its weaknesses, this book is well worth the read for anyone interested in the disintegration of Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995. First, even if many of the contributors .

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