FailSafe Forum Victorian Parliamentary Committee

Application of Fail Safe to Level Crossing Technology

Phil Sochon Deputy CEO Australasian Railway Association

www.ara.net.au Richmond Level Crossing 1884 Level crossing with gates, Cheltenham Terminology

¾ “Fail (to) Safe” – widely use to describe level crossing design and rail technology standards

¾ More accurate to describe the standard as “vital” - a very high standard of redundancy is built-in to optimise safety.

¾ Perfect safety is not realistically feasible although safety with high levels of redundancy is possible, obviously at increased cost. ARA’s view

¾ Train paths at level crossings need protection to a very high standard, a “vital” standard, as per the rest of the network.

¾ No. 1 consideration is to ensure the safe passage of all rolling stock

¾ In RLX environment, this is achieved at – Higher risk level crossings by lights, and booms and lights at “vital” standards – Lower risk crossings with traffic signs (stop and give way) obviously non-vital.

¾ Rail assumes responsibility for installing such infrastructure.

¾ Key issue - how to reduce the risk of collision with vehicles, people and other objects at level crossings. ARA’s view

¾ Problem - Efficacy of the infrastructure in place • what technology should be used and how effective it is, • what is the place of other means of control over road users such as behavioural initiatives, • Why booms and lights are in use at higher risk level crossings when other higher risk road traffic intersections use standard traffic lights (or give way/stop signs at lower risk crossings).

¾ There are two issues that need consideration here: • does the high cost of active crossing traffic controls contribute to reduced “network” safety i.e. across the whole range of higher risk crossings? • should the road authority be responsible for the traffic controls?

Reducing cost and enhancing network safety

¾ Scenarios: – Active crossings about twice cost of traffic lights – Limited budgets – Crossings that are upgraded are safer, a large number of other crossings remain less safe. ¾ High cost of active crossings actually limiting the total system safety

¾ Consideration needs to be given to a detailed examination of lower cost alternatives.

¾ A key issue is liability

¾ Government need to: – recognise that lower cost technology is a benefit to the overall system – Offer a measure of “protection” for infrastructure that has been installed to a nationally agreed standard. Changed responsibilities

¾ ARA proposes consideration be given to: – Road manager / authority is responsible for the traffic control measures (both engineering and behavioural in a systems based approach) \ – Rail is responsible for providing the “signal” indicating train “presence”.

¾ Benefits – Road manager’s expertise used most effectively – Improved “road system” benefit – Reduce the road risk at each crossing by utilising a range of engineering and behavioural measures

¾ It is time to involve road authorities more directly in level crossing traffic management. Recommendations

¾ Road Safety Committee consider proposal.

¾ The matter to be more fully examined via Rail Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) with Government and rail Industry involvement.

¾ Urges the Road Safety Committee to raise this matter at a national level esp. Road management and level crossing infrastructure options. Working for the Future of Rail

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