December 17, 1947 Cable, Terebin to Stalin [Via Kuznetsov]

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December 17, 1947 Cable, Terebin to Stalin [Via Kuznetsov]

Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified December 17, 1947 Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov] Citation: “Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov],” December 17, 1947, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, F. 39, Op. 1, D. 31, L. 26. Reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaia and Vladimir Miasnikov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Vol. 5, Book 1, 1946-February 1950 (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005), p. 378. Translated for CWIHP from Russian by Sergey Radchenko. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113617 Summary: Terebin (Andrei Orlov) returns Kuznetsov's (Stalin) cable concerning a visit to Moscow by Mao. Terebin gives Mao's response to the invitation and tells of a discussion that took place between himself and Mao after Stalin's message was relayed. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation To Com[rade] F. Kuznetsov Reporting: 1. Received the telegram at 00:35 on [17 December] local time (19:35 [16 December] Moscow). 2. On 17 December at 07:30 personally, without an interpreter, passed the received [information] to Mao Zedong. 3. Mao Zedong was exceedingly glad about the [information] conveyed. [He] immediately said: “Very good, now I will be able to live there for three months, half a year.” Said that he is 54 years old, he has long wanted to go, almost all the leading persons had been there, naming many: [CCP CC Member] Zhou Enlai, [CCP CC Member] Ren Bishi, [CCP Deputy Commander in Chief] Peng Dehuai, [CCP General] Ye Jianying, [CCP CC Secretariat Member] Wang Ming and others. Asked me whether there are instructions that I go with him. To my question what else should be inquired [from Moscow], [and] regarding his suggested dates for the trip, he said that there was no need to inquire about anything else. Touching on the dates—after taking Pingsuilu, when one can get through. Now one cannot give a break to CKS [Jiang Jieshi], one should strike him. Then turned to the local questions. The conversation ended at this. During the conversation [he] was fairly lively and very content. Offered me to stay here somewhat longer. Terebin. 17.XII.1947.

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