Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws*
MONOPSONY IN MANPOWER: ORGANIZED BASEBALL MEETS THE ANTITRUST LAWS* FOR over sixty years professional baseball clubs have disregarded with im- punity the mandate of the Sherman Act I that "competition, not combination should be the law of trade.' 2 By agreeing not to compete for players' ;ervices and by blacklisting those players who turn to higher bidders, a combinatio,, of 335 clubs, known as "organized baseball," has attained a monopsony, or "buyer's monopoly," 3 over the market for skilled baseball talent. Use of this monopsony leverage has enabled the combination to regulate player salaries, exclude *The scope of this Comment is limited to restraints on competition in the purchase of baseball players' services and the selling of professional baseball exhibitions. Because of space limitations, the industry's antitrust problems regarding radio and television will not here be discussed. At the behest of the Department of Justice, the major leagues rescinded agreements restricting competition in the sale of radio and television rights, October 8, 1951. Hearings before Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Serial No. 1, Part 6, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (hereinafter cited as HMAIUNGs), 1177-9. Organized baseball is, how- ever, watching the pending government antitrust suit against professional football's television restraints, United States v. National Football League, No. 12808, E.D. Pa., with more than casual interest. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1953, p. 30, col. 1. The problems created by unrestricted competition in the purchase of players' services appear to be common to all professional team sports.
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