Mass Evictions and Demolitions in Zimbabwe
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Canada Sanctions Zimbabwe
Canadian Sanctions and Canadian charities operating in Zimbabwe: Be Very Careful! By Mark Blumberg (January 7, 2009) Canadian charities operating in Zimbabwe need to be extremely careful. It is not the place for a new and inexperienced charity to begin foreign operations. In fact, only Canadian charities with substantial experience in difficult international operations should even consider operating in Zimbabwe. It is one of the most difficult countries to carry out charitable operations by virtue of the very difficult political, security, human rights and economic situation and the resultant Canadian and international sanctions. This article will set out some information on the Zimbabwe Sanctions including the full text of the Act and Regulations governing the sanctions. It is not a bad idea when dealing with difficult legal issues to consult knowledgeable legal advisors. Summary On September 4, 2008, the Special Economic Measures (Zimbabwe) Regulations (SOR/2008-248) (the “Regulations”) came into force pursuant to subsections 4(1) to (3) of the Special Economic Measures Act. The Canadian sanctions against Zimbabwe are targeted sanctions dealing with weapons, technical support for weapons, assets of designated persons, and Zimbabwean aircraft landing in Canada. There is no humanitarian exception to these targeted sanctions. There are tremendous practical difficulties working in Zimbabwe and if a Canadian charity decides to continue operating in Zimbabwe it is important that the Canadian charity and its intermediaries (eg. Agents, contractor, partners) avoid providing any benefits, “directly or indirectly”, to a “designated person”. Canadian charities need to undertake rigorous due diligence and risk management to ensure that a “designated person” does not financially benefit from the program. -
The Case for Imposing Targeted United Nations Sanctions Against Zimbabwean Officials
Fordham Law Review Volume 76 Issue 1 Article 8 2007 Operation "Drive Out the Trash": The Case for Imposing Targeted United Nations Sanctions Against Zimbabwean Officials Katherine Hughes Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Katherine Hughes, Operation "Drive Out the Trash": The Case for Imposing Targeted United Nations Sanctions Against Zimbabwean Officials, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 323 (2007). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol76/iss1/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Operation "Drive Out the Trash": The Case for Imposing Targeted United Nations Sanctions Against Zimbabwean Officials Cover Page Footnote J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law; M.A. Candidate, 2008, International Political Economy and Development, Fordham University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. I extend my deepest gratitude to the many Zimbabweans who welcomed me into their country. I would also like to thank Jim Leitner; Professors Rachel Vorspan, Jeanmarie Fenrich, and Susanna Chung; and Alasdair Ferguson for their invaluable support and comments. This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol76/iss1/8 OPERATION "DRIVE OUT THE TRASH": THE CASE FOR IMPOSING TARGETED UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWEAN OFFICIALS KatherineHughes * In May 2005, representatives of PresidentRobert Mugabe's government initiated a slum-clearance campaign entitled Operation Murambatsvina, which displaced nearly one million Zimbabweans. -
H. Res. 409 in the House of Representatives, U.S
H. Res. 409 In the House of Representatives, U.S., December 16, 2005. Whereas on May 19, 2005, the Government of Zimbabwe launched ‘‘Operation Murambatsvina’’, translated from the Shona language as ‘‘Operation Drive Out the Trash’’, in major cities and suburbs throughout Zimbabwe in an effort that it characterized as an operation to ‘‘restore order’’ to the country; Whereas hours after the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe called for an end to the parallel market, Oper- ation Murambatsvina began in the city of Harare and subsequently in other urban areas, such as the city of Bulawayo, ostensibly to oust illegal vendors and eliminate illegal structures; Whereas Operation Murambatsvina was carried out as an in- discriminate demolition of the homes and livelihood of thousands of Zimbabwean citizens already suffering from a protracted economic and political crisis brought on by poor policy directives by the Government of Zimbabwe that forced masses of rural dwellers to urban areas of the country for survival; Whereas in some communities that were victimized by the forced demolitions, including Cheru Farm and Killarney Farm where more than 20,000 people lived, Zimbabweans had lived in residences for over 20 years 2 and had well-functioning schools, health and HIV/AIDS clinics, orphanages for AIDS-affected children, viable businesses, places of worship, and other amenities; Whereas in 1993, the Government of Zimbabwe moved fami- lies from Cheru Farms to a new location, Porto Farm, which during Operation Murambatsvina was demolished by -
The Mortal Remains: Succession and the Zanu Pf Body Politic
THE MORTAL REMAINS: SUCCESSION AND THE ZANU PF BODY POLITIC Report produced for the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum by the Research and Advocacy Unit [RAU] 14th July, 2014 1 CONTENTS Page No. Foreword 3 Succession and the Constitution 5 The New Constitution 5 The genealogy of the provisions 6 The presently effective law 7 Problems with the provisions 8 The ZANU PF Party Constitution 10 The Structure of ZANU PF 10 Elected Bodies 10 Administrative and Coordinating Bodies 13 Consultative For a 16 ZANU PF Succession Process in Practice 23 The Fault Lines 23 The Military Factor 24 Early Manoeuvring 25 The Tsholotsho Saga 26 The Dissolution of the DCCs 29 The Power of the Politburo 29 The Powers of the President 30 The Congress of 2009 32 The Provincial Executive Committee Elections of 2013 34 Conclusions 45 Annexures Annexure A: Provincial Co-ordinating Committee 47 Annexure B : History of the ZANU PF Presidium 51 2 Foreword* The somewhat provocative title of this report conceals an extremely serious issue with Zimbabwean politics. The theme of succession, both of the State Presidency and the leadership of ZANU PF, increasingly bedevils all matters relating to the political stability of Zimbabwe and any form of transition to democracy. The constitutional issues related to the death (or infirmity) of the President have been dealt with in several reports by the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU). If ZANU PF is to select the nominee to replace Robert Mugabe, as the state constitution presently requires, several problems need to be considered. The ZANU PF nominee ought to be selected in terms of the ZANU PF constitution. -
The Human Security Implications of Operation Restore Order on Urban Habitation in Zimbabwe
© Kamla-Raj 2012 J Hum Ecol, 38(3): 191-205 (2012) The Human Security Implications of Operation Restore Order on Urban Habitation in Zimbabwe Patrick Dzimiri1 and Tawanda Runhare2 1School of Human and Social Sciences, 2School of Education, University of Venda, Private Bag X5050, Thohoyandou 0950, South Africa E-mail: 1<[email protected]>, 2<[email protected]> KEYWORDS Operation Restore Order. ‘Murambatsvina’. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Human Security. Urban Habitation. Socio-economic Consequences ABSTRACT This paper examines how the 2005 Operation Restore Order, popularly known as Murambatsvina, impacted on the key facets of human security on urban habitation in Zimbabwe. Precisely, the paper examines the humanitarian consequences of the clean up exercise from the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and human security dimensions. By applying one of the key principles of the R2P mandate, namely, ‘the responsibility to rebuild’, the study explored the extent to which the government of Zimbabwe delivered its R2P mandate of protecting its people from the unintended consequences of the Clean Up exercise. Utilising the case study research strategy and guided by the R2P theoretical framework, the study sought to investigate and gather artefacts of the 2005 clean up exercise from four locations in the city of Harare. Purposive sampling was employed in order to gather primary data from people who experienced and were directly affected by Murambatsvina. Semi-structured interviews and structural observations revealed that the government of Zimbabwe did not fulfil its promises to Murambatsvina victims, as outlined in the R2P mandate. From the findings, we conclude that, in the absence of international intervention, operation restore order ended up inflicting more negative socio-economic consequences on urban inhabitants in Zimbabwe. -
MDC – Harare – Bulawayo – Council Elections 2006 – Gukurahundi
Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: ZWE31570 Country: Zimbabwe Date: 20 April 2007 Keywords: Zimbabwe – MDC – Harare – Bulawayo – Council Elections 2006 – Gukurahundi This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Questions 1. Does the MDC have an office in Harare? 2. How many branches are there in the province of Bulawayo? 3. How many wards are there? 4. Can you provide information on the leaders of the MDC in the province of Bulawayo? 5. Can you provide information on the activities of the MDC in the province of Bulawayo in 2006? 6. Can you provide information on council elections in Bulawayo around October 2006? 7. Did Zanu PF lose seats in the council elections in Bulawayo in October 2006? 8. Can you provide information about Gukurahunde? RESPONSE 1. Does the MDC have an office in Harare? The MDC headquarters are located in Harvest House, the corner of Angwa Street and Nelson Mandela Avenue in Harare. Angwa Street is parallel to First Street. Attached is a map of Harare, showing Angwa Street, First Street and Nelson Mandela Avenue (Africa South of the Sahara 2003 2003, Europa Publications, 32nd edition, London, p.1190 – Attachment 1; Mawarire, Matseliso 2007, ‘Police left a trail of destruction at Harvest House’, Zimdaily.com website, 29 March http://zimdaily.com/news/117/ARTICLE/1480/2007-03-29.html – Accessed 30 March 2007 – Attachment 2; ‘Harare’ 1998, Hotels-Tours-Safaris.com website http://www.hotels-tours-safaris.com/zimbabwe/harare/images/citymap.gif – Accessed 30 March 2007 – Attachment 3). -
Murambatsvina
NATIONAL AUDIT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ANGO N PVO 221/68 National Association Of Non-Governmental Organisations REPORT OF THE OPERATION GARIKAI/HLALANI KUHLE national audit Within the Context of Social Accountability by Edmore Mufema Institute of Development Studies Email: [email protected] / [email protected] 2 Other Explanations 15 The Impacts 15 Social and humanitarian impacts 16 Economic Impacts 16 Political Impacts 16 Institutional Impacts 17 The built environment 17 Concluding remarks 17 Chapter 5 18 Responses to Operation Restore Order 18 The United Nations 18 UNSE Recommendations 18 The West 19 SADC and regional 19 Civil Society 19 Concluding remarks 19 Chapter 6 20 Operation Garikai/ Hlalani Khuhle 20 Description 20 Objectives 20 The process 20 The results 21 Impact on different sectors 21 A SWOC analysis 22 Strengths of Operation Garikai 22 Weaknesses of Operation Garikai 22 Opportunities of Operation Garikai 23 Challenges of Operation Garikai 23 Contents Concluding Remarks 23 Chapter 7 25 Operation Garikai within the Context of Social Accountability 25 Chapter 1 3 Policy issues 25 Executive Summary 3 Conduct of operations 26 Accounting for the use of funds 26 Chapter 2 5 Concluding Remarks 26 Introduction 5 Terms of reference 7 Chapter 8 27 Outline of the report 7 Recommendations and Conclusions 27 Chapter 3 8 Appendices 29 Social Accountability Prior to Operation Appendix 1: Terms of reference 29 Restore Order 8 Appendix 2: Population displacements, 2005 30 Concept and Indicators 8 Appendix 3: Housing and SMEs Needs, Social Accountability in Zimbabwean History 9 Operation Garikai 30 Concluding remarks 11 Appendix 4: Houses built under Garikai model, 2006 30 Chapter 4 12 Appendix 5: Factory Shells and Vendor Operation Murambatsvina 12 Marts, June 2006 30 Introduction 12 Appendix 6: Serviced stands under Overview of operation Murambatsvina 13 Operation Garikai phase 2 30 Objectives of operation Murambatsvina 15 The official position 15 References 31 2 3 civil society. -
Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina
ZIMBABWE'S OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA: THE TIPPING POINT? Africa Report N°97 -- 17 August 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA.......................................... 1 A. WHAT HAPPENED .................................................................................................................1 B. WHY IT HAPPENED ...............................................................................................................3 1. The official rationale..................................................................................................3 2. Other explanations .....................................................................................................4 C. WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE?.....................................................................................................5 II. INTERNAL RESPONSE ............................................................................................... 7 A. THE GOVERNMENT: OPERATION GARIKAI ............................................................................7 B. ZANU-PF ............................................................................................................................8 C. THE MDC.............................................................................................................................9 D. A THIRD WAY?...................................................................................................................11 -
POLITICAL VIOLENCE REPORT March 2007
POLITICAL VIOLENCE REPORT March 2007 10 May 2007 A report by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Political Violence Report: March 2007 OVERVIEW In instances reminiscent of September 20061, Zimbabwe again witnessed despicable levels of politically motivated violence perpetrated by state agents including the ZRP, CIO, alleged ZANU PF supporters and in some instances suspected MDC supporters. The Human Rights Forum notes that this report does not even cover the whole length and breadth of the violence that occurred in March. However, the report does show that the epitome of the violence was on 11 March. This was when opposition political party leaders, supporters, civil society activists, church leaders and scores of the general Zimbabwean public were brutalised and arrested for converging at Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfield for an intended prayer meeting. A number of the victims on that fateful day were incarcerated in police stations dotted across Harare. Furthermore, the ZRP shot and killed one Gift Tandari, NCA member, allegedly for being the ‘ring – leader’ in the running battles that ensued between the police and the people intending to have the prayer meeting. Following the violence on 11 March, an orgy of violence and a resurgence in abductions ensued, mainly perpetrated against human rights defenders, MDC supporters and leadership reportedly by state security agents. Another disturbing trend has been the abduction of MDC supporters by suspected CIO agents usually driving unmarked vehicles. The abductees in most instances have been dumped outside Harare after having been tortured. Cases of lawyers being physically and verbally assaulted whenever they visited their clients at police stations have been recorded. -
Zimbabwe at a Glance: 2001-02
COUNTRY REPORT Zimbabwe At a glance: 2001-02 OVERVIEW Zimbabwe will continue to suffer the most serious political and economic crisis in its 20-year history, and it now appears increasingly unlikely that the president, Robert Mugabe, will finish his current term which runs until April 2002. The EIU currently expects the MDC to call an extended national strike early in 2001, which will worsen an already poor economic situation and is likely to turn into such widespread protest that the president will be forced to resign. But there is a very real possibility that the protests could run out of control and turn extremely violent. Meanwhile the economy will remain in a steep downward spiral, with negative real GDP growth of 6.1% in 2000 and 3.3% in 2002, a huge fiscal deficit, rapidly rising inflation and a falling exchange rate. Moreover, the economy could be damaged in the long term as a result of the current “fast-track” land resettlement policy. The downward spiral is only likely to be broken after Mr Mugabe has left office, real reforms are introduced and external assistance is resumed. Modest real GDP growth of 1.8% is forecast for 2001. Key changes from last month Political outlook • The political situation continues to deteriorate as the government increasingly ignores court rulings. Economic policy outlook • The minister of finance presented the 2001 budget in parliament. It fails to address the real root of the huge fiscal deficit and highlights his political weakness. Economic forecast • The budget deficit for 2000 is now forecast at 28.4% of GDP. -
Police in Zimbabwe: Helping Hand Or Iron Fist?
Dispatch No. 296 | 6 May 2019 Police in Zimbabwe: Helping hand or iron fist? Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 296 | Nicholas Simpson and Matthias Krönke Summary In response to public protests against a drastic increase in fuel prices in January 2019, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) were joined by the army in a brutal crackdown that resulted in at least 15 deaths, 340 injured, and more than 1,000 arrests (Mwananyanda, 2019; Bearak, 2019). Just months earlier, the police were found responsible, along with the military, for the deaths of six people in the aftermath of the 2018 election, according to a commission of inquiry (Associated Press, 2018). Given the ZRP’s history as a tool of ruling-party power under former President Robert Mugabe (Hanson, 2008), how do the Zimbabwean people perceive their police? Previous Afrobarometer analysis has shown that playing a central role in Operation Murambatsvina, the state’s brutal 2005 clearing of selected urban areas in a bid to repress independent economic activity and dissent, cost the police dearly in terms of popular legitimacy (Bratton & Masunungure, 2007). This dispatch, based on Afrobarometer survey data from 1999 through mid-2018, tracks improvements, after the damaging effects of Operation Murambatsvina, in citizens’ trust in the police, perceptions of police corruption and performance in reducing crime, and support for the right to enforce the law. The latest Afrobarometer surveys were conducted before the bloody suppression of post-electoral and fuel-hike protests, and we do not contend that attitudes toward the police that prevailed in mid-2018 continue to prevail today. Instead, we raise the question whether observed improvements in public perceptions of the police could be lost through ZRP participation in political repression. -
ZIMBABWE COUNTRY of ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service
ZIMBABWE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service 25 March 2011 ZIMBABWE 25 MARCH 2011 Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE FROM 22 FEBRUARY 2011 TO 24 MARCH 2011 Useful news sources for further information REPORTS ON ZIMBABWE PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED BETWEEN 22 FEBRUARY 2011 AND 24 MARCH 2011 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 1.01 Public holidays ..................................................................................................... 1.06 Map ........................................................................................................................ 1.07 2. ECONOMY ................................................................................................................ 2.01 Remittances .......................................................................................................... 2.06 Sanctions .............................................................................................................. 2.08 3. HISTORY (19TH CENTURY TO 2008)............................................................................. 3.01 Matabeleland massacres 1983 - 87 ..................................................................... 3.03 Political events: late 1980s - 2007...................................................................... 3.06 Events in 2008 - 2010 ........................................................................................... 3.23