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The Human Security Implications of Operation Restore Order on Urban Habitation in Zimbabwe

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The Human Security Implications of Operation Restore Order on Urban Habitation in Zimbabwe © Kamla-Raj 2012 J Hum Ecol, 38(3): 191-205 (2012) The Human Security Implications of Operation Restore Order on Urban Habitation in Zimbabwe Patrick Dzimiri1 and Tawanda Runhare2 1School of Human and Social Sciences, 2School of Education, University of Venda, Private Bag X5050, Thohoyandou 0950, South Africa E-mail: 1<[email protected]>, 2<[email protected]> KEYWORDS Operation Restore Order. ‘Murambatsvina’. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Human Security. Urban Habitation. Socio-economic Consequences ABSTRACT This paper examines how the 2005 Operation Restore Order, popularly known as Murambatsvina, impacted on the key facets of human security on urban habitation in Zimbabwe. Precisely, the paper examines the humanitarian consequences of the clean up exercise from the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and human security dimensions. By applying one of the key principles of the R2P mandate, namely, ‘the responsibility to rebuild’, the study explored the extent to which the government of Zimbabwe delivered its R2P mandate of protecting its people from the unintended consequences of the Clean Up exercise. Utilising the case study research strategy and guided by the R2P theoretical framework, the study sought to investigate and gather artefacts of the 2005 clean up exercise from four locations in the city of Harare. Purposive sampling was employed in order to gather primary data from people who experienced and were directly affected by Murambatsvina. Semi-structured interviews and structural observations revealed that the government of Zimbabwe did not fulfil its promises to Murambatsvina victims, as outlined in the R2P mandate. From the findings, we conclude that, in the absence of international intervention, operation restore order ended up inflicting more negative socio-economic consequences on urban inhabitants in Zimbabwe. INTRODUCTION Counselling Services Unit (CSU), Combined Harare Residents’ Association (CHRA) and the One of the most publicised post-independence Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) concluded that conduct of the government of Zimbabwe is the 20 per cent of the urban population were affected demolition of urban settlements in 2005 under an either in terms of loss of shelter or sources of in- operation code-named, Murambatsvina which come, especially in the informal sector. In a report means ‘drive out rubbish or clean out the dirt’ published in December 2005, Human Rights Watch (Bracking 2005; Potts 2006; Bratton and (2005) observed that according to the United Na- Masunungure 2007; Chari 2008; Mlambo 2008; tions estimates, 700,000 people – nearly 6 per cent Fontein 2009). Murambatsvina can also be liter- of the total population lost their homes, livelihood, ally translated to mean, refusal (by the govern- or both as a result of the evictions, while 2.4 mil- ment) to tolerate dirty living conditions for the lion people were either directly or indirectly af- people. The major objective for the clean up op- fected by Operation Murambatsvina. eration according to the government was to de- This study was therefore undertaken to stroy illegal urban structures that foster criminal gather primary data from people who were di- activities and stemming the black market trade in rectly affected, as victims of the much criticised foreign currency (Bracking 2005; Potts 2006; ‘clean up’ exercise. Masunungure 2007; Chari 2008). The July 2005 report produced by the UN Special Envoy on Hu- Literature Study man Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe, Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, and other sources concurred The official report by the July 2005 United Na- that over 700 000 people were made homeless by tions (UN) Special Envoy to Zimbabwe, Anna the operation (Tibaijuka 2005; Solidarity Peace Tibaijuka, reveals the humanitarian ramifications Trust 2006; Fontein 2009; Amnesty International of the ‘clean up’ exercise, which is popularly known 2010). An in-depth study on the impact of as operation Murambatsvina (remove the dirt). It Murambatsvina conducted in 2005 by Action Aid further spells that the operation took a particularly International (2005) in collaboration with the heavy toll on vulnerable groups, such as widows, 192 PATRICK DZIMIRI AND TAWANDA RUNHARE orphans, female- and child-headed households, the order to establish what exactly the government elderly and those people living with human immu- intended to achieve by embarking on such an ex- nodeficiency virus and acquired immune defi- ercise which received international condemnation. ciency syndrome (HIV and AIDS) (Tibaijuka 2005). What made Murambatsvina questionable It is reported that the operation displaced more was the involvement of the military in destroy- than 80 000 people infected with HIV/AIDS and ing houses and backyard industries in all the many of these were left without access to country’s urban areas. It is in the light of the antiretroviral (ARVs) pills (Poloch 2010:29). The military involvement that the UN, moved by hu- operation therefore impacted negatively on the manitarian concerns, decided to investigate the unemployed urban inhabitants who depended on aims and objectives of the cleanup operation. the effective and efficient operation of the non- Furthermore, the timing of the operation was formal sector. This included the backyard industry questionable because it was launched in June workers in high density suburbs like Glen View, when the winter season was at its pick and many Budiriro, Warren Park, Highflieds, Chitungwiza, victims were without shelter in the freezing cold. Hatifield among other areas in the case of Harare Also, more interesting was that this took place (Tibaijuka 2005; Fontein 2009). when the people of Zimbabwe were just taking a The government’s justification for launching breath from the violent 2005 Parliamentary elec- operation Murambatsvina was to get rid of the tion in which the ruling party had lost in all ur- economic saboteurs in the informal sector, such as ban centres in the country. The coincidence that money laundering, the black foreign exchange the ruling party lost the 2005 elections in the market and illegally built backyard industries, flea- cities and that Murambatsvina was confined markets and kiosks (Potts 2006; Bratton and only to urban sector resulted in the allegation Masunungure 2007; Mlambo 2008). However, that the operation was the government’s Mbeki (2010) refutes this view by claiming that the scotched-earth policy against urban dwellers for government’s post-colonial economic policies per- abandoning Zimbabwe African National Union- petuated exclusion of people with skills which could Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and mass protests not be accommodated in formal employment sec- over the growing economic crisis (Poloch 2010). tor because of slow growth. Statistically, it is esti- From a humanitarian point of view, indiscrimi- mated that between 1986 and 1987, the formal sec- nate destruction of houses, especially on the tor employed only 20 percent of the labour force, country’s poor urban dwellers had a cata- 27 percent in 1991 and 40 per cent in 2004 (Coltart strophic impact. Most of the victims were taken 2007; Vambe 2008). This implies that around 60 against their will to police-run camps such as percent of the urban population in 2004 had either Caledonia and Hopley farms, in the case of to work as casual labourers or adopt the informal Harare victims (Amnesty International, Zimba- path in order to survive. This therefore did not bwe Annual Report 2007). The Amnesty Inter- only promote socio-economic exclusion in the for- national report revealed that the conditions in mal sector, but promoted a culture of informal sur- these camps were dire, lacking adequate water, vival. shelter and basic latrine facilities for the popula- The government’s economic policies and ini- tion of the affected victims. tiatives between 1980 and 1988 accommodated a Realising what it called the inhuman conse- significant portion of skilled Zimbabweans within quences of Murambatsvina’, the government the informal sector, which to some extent converted quickly launched a reconstruction initiative the informal sector into a formal sector (Vambe 2008; called ‘Operation garikai/hlalani kuhle’, which Mlambo 2008). However, from 2000, due to eco- means ‘to live well’. The intention of operation nomic meltdown emanating from an unstable po- garikai/hlalani kuhle was to construct new litical conduct in the country, the government houses as a compensation for the victims of blamed and targeted the informal sector through Murambatsvina (Chari 2008). While the objec- operation Murambatsvina, which to some schol- tive was in line with the R2P principle of national ars is some type of window dressing of political governments’ responsibility to rebuild, the pro- gimmicking meant to cover up the government’s posal was however not only ambitious, but a poor economic policies (Bratton and wishful thinking given the fact that the country Masunungure 2007; Fontein 2009). This again by then, the repetition was already facing the calls for further interrogation of the operation in economic meltdown which led to further loss of THE HUMAN SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF OPERATION RESTORE ORDER 193 popularity of the ruling party in the post 2000 Commission was tasked with the duty to find a national elections (Kamete 2006; Bratton and common ground for responding to crises of hu- Masunungure 2007; Fontein 2009). The 2006 re- manitarian nature. This was raised against the port compiled by Solidarity Peace Trust entitled, backdrop of controversy surrounding the praxis Melt Down Murambatsvina One Year On, al- of humanitarian intervention. The commission leged that the few houses that were constructed in its report watered down the language of ‘right’ were largely seized by the police, soldiers and to humanitarian intervention to ‘responsibility members of the ruling party (Solidarity Peace to protect’ (ICISS 2001; Evans 2008; Thakur Trust 2006). These are some of the allegations 2007). According to the ICISS report, the R2P which this study sought to verify by gathering principle entails that state sovereignty implies data from primary sources, namely the actual that “the primary responsibility for protection victims of operation Murambatsvina.
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