Introduction
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments
U.S.-led Bombardment Challenges Islamic State’s Hold on Eastern Syria WP S But without Addressing the Roots of the Conflict, the Group Will Remain Hard to Beat Khaled Yacoub Oweis
In July 2014, the so-called Islamic State solidified its hold on large parts of the Euphra- tes river basin in eastern Syria, expelling its al-Qaeda rivals from the region, weeks after having captured the city of Mosul in neighboring Iraq and having declared a caliphate. The advance undermined the pro-Assad Shi’ite-dominated government in Baghdad and prompted Syrian regime forces to confront the group. In September 2014, a U.S.-led air campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq expanded into Syria. It was met by dismay on the part of Syria’s opposition about the lack of pressure on President Bashar al-Assad as jihadists feed on Sunni resentment against his minority Alawite rule. This has increased the urgency for forging an international solution to Syria’s civil war that not only ad- dresses the jihadist dimension but also includes a strategy to reclaim the east – namely one that provides an alternative to Islamist militancy and the Assad family’s reign.
Comprising the provinces of Raqqa and provided fertile ground for militant groups Deir al-Zor along the Euphrates river basin, there. Since its entry into Syria, the Islamic eastern Syria has been among the most State has used a mixture of cash and terror neglected parts of Syria for decades, despite to subdue and enlist local tribes in the east accounting for one-third of national gas and create a reputation for ruthless effi- and oil production and contributing signi- ciency in providing order. This tactic has ficantly to its wheat and cotton output. attracted recruits from other militant bri- Divide-and-rule tactics during the reign of gades and made it difficult to build local President Hafez al-Assad (1970–2000), father alliances to counter the group. At the same of current President Bashar, altered the time, the Islamic State itself is a product of region’s tribal structure by marginalizing fragmentation. The group, formerly known the traditional leadership in favor of several as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/ local power centers that were answerable Greater Syria (ISIL or ISIS), was formed in to the security apparatus. Indeed, decades April 2013 after a schism with the al-Nusra of neglect, corruption, and societal frag- Front, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. mentation under Assad family rule have
Khaled Yacoub Oweis is a fellow in the project „The fragmentation of Syria. Halting the slide towards a failed state“ SWP Comments 43 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and funded by the German Foreign Office. October 2014
1
tribal representatives also objected to fight- Facts on Eastern/Northeastern Syria ing fellow Sunnis without being offered help to bring down the Assad regime. Populatio n: Approximately 3 million (till A Sunni backlash against the political 2010) : 1.2 million in Deir al-Zor province; order on both sides of the border then help- 800,000 in Raqqa province; and 1 million ed the Islamic State to conquer territory in the mostly Kurdish province of Hasakah quickly, leading to the declaration of a self- in the northeast. Significant numbers of styled caliphate in July 2014 that covered Syria’s Kurds also live in the enclaves of an arc of territory from the city of Mosul in Kobanê and Afrin in the province of Alep- Iraq through to eastern Syria to the out- po, as well as in Kurdish neighborhoods skirts of the province of Aleppo. The group, of Damascus and Aleppo. at least in theory, aspires for a global reach Oil output: Syria’s total production was that harks back to the zenith of the Arab- 370,000 barrels per day in 2010, accord- Muslim empire. ing to official figures (actual production was estimated to have been significantly lower due to U.S. sanctions and deterio- Ripe for Militancy rating conditions of some fields). Hasakah A difficult socioeconomic situation, in accounts for approximately two-thirds of particular in Syria’s east, has provided the the output, with Deir al-Zor producing background for the Islamic State’s success the remaining one-third. there. The east had been hit by a drought Oil fields: In Deir al-Zor, the largest are al- that started in 2006 and lasted until the Omar, al-Ward, and al-Tayyem, which are run-up to the revolt. Mismanagement of near the Iraqi border. In Hasakah, the the water system and lack of investment, largest fields are situated in the province’s coupled with a dearth of rainfall, caused northeaste rn corner along the border water and food shortages, destroyed agri- with Turkey and Iraq. culture and grazing land, and drove hun- Wheat production: Raqqa and Deir al-Zor dreds of thousands of people from Raqqa, together produce one-quarter of Syria’s Deir al-Zor, and the mostly Kurdish prov- overall output, which totaled 4 million ince of Hasakah in the adjoining northeast tons in 2012. Hasakah accounts for one- to seek a living in the peripheries of Damas- third of the country’s total output. cus, Deraa, Hama, and Aleppo – outskirts that developed into slums. The number of Syrians living under what In a bid to stop the Islamic State and the the United Nations defines as “extreme less powerful al-Nusra, the United Arab poverty” – deprived of food, clean drinking Emirates convened a Western-backed water, sanitation, health, proper shelter, meeting for Eastern tribal figures and mili- education, and information – increased tary defectors from the region in Abu Dhabi between 2004 and 2010 from 2 million to in November 2013. The apparent aim of the as much as 3 million, out of a total popu- meeting was to explore the possibility of lation of 21 million. Most of the extremely creating an equivalent to the Sahwa (awak- poor were inhabitants of a territory starting ening) tribal alliances that had contained in Deir al-Zor and encompassing Hasakah, al-Qaeda’s gains in Iraq before the United Raqqa, and its neighboring Aleppo country- States withdrew its troops from the country side. It is no coincidence that these regions, in December 2011. The meeting came to with the exception of the Kurdish areas, nothing, mainly because the participants have formed a main support and recruit- lacked effective control over their tribes, ment base for the Islamic State and al-Nusra. and, unlike in Iraq, there were no U.S. Until the revolt broke out, it appeared troops in Syria on which to count. Some as if tribal loyalty and the emergency U.N.
SWP Comments 43 October 2014
2
food aid that was being distributed in the state ruled by Islamic law, or sharia. A crack- east to help mitigate the effects of the down on Hizb al-Tahrir in Syria took place drought, as well as the pervasive security only in the late 1990s, when the group tried apparatus, would keep the region quiet. to lure two army lieutenants into joining Farmers were grouped under a corrupt pro- its ranks. It resulted in the arrest of 920 of regime “Peasants Union,” which distributed its members across the country in 1999 and subsidies for the wheat and cotton crops. the (temporary) demise of Eastern Salafism. Land and water rights were used to buy loy- But the U.S. invasion of Iraq a few years alty. Indeed, army and secret police person- later prompted the Assad regime to open nel stemming from poor rural communi- another chapter with Salafists, this time of ties in the east, known as shawaya, were the jihadist variety, who were less interest- considered so reliable that they were in- ed in ideological nuances and more reliant cluded in the storm troops that overran the on the barrel of the gun to fulfill their reli- city of Hama in February 1982, killing up to gious vision. Hundreds of Syrian would-be- 40,000 of their Sunni brethren and quelling jihadists were allowed to go fight in Iraq in the insurgency led by the Fighting Van- 2003, just before the toppling of Saddam guard branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hussein, who had been an arch foe of the Drawing on the poor from the east has Assads. When Iraq’s Sunni insurgency gath- also worked for the Islamic State. The group ered steam a year later, clerics in Syria, has used a war chest, mainly financed by licensed by the authorities, began recruit- selling oil from captured wells, to recruit ing Syrian jihadists and sending them over young men who have known little except the border. Facilitating a jihadist move- poverty under the Assad regime, despite ment appeared worthwhile to the Assad living in the vicinity of energy sources that regime at the time to counter Western pres- were the regime’s main source of hard cur- sure on it with regards to Lebanon – where rency. Salaries of at least $400 per month it was accused of being behind the murder have attracted thousands of Syrians, who of statesman and former Prime Minister now constitute a majority of the Islamic Rafiq al-Hariri – and to keep the United State’s rank-and-file in Syria, in contrast to States occupied with Iraq. foreign fighters, who formed the majority Assad’s honeymoon with the jihadists, of fighters in the country when the Islamic however, began to sour in 2008 when a State was created and, to date, dominate its group of Iraqi-bound jihadists mounted an command structure. armed robbery on the offices of the Qad- mous Bus Company in Deir al-Zor city to help finance their operations in Iraq. Courting Salafists Qadmous is owned by the Khonda family, Another factor that has contributed to which is associated with the regime. At the the rise of Islamist militants since the out- same time, U.S. pressure was growing on break of the revolt is a legacy of the regime Assad to curb the export of jihadists to Iraq. strengthening Salafist influence and allow- Assad sent one of his most ruthless lieuten- ing militant Salafists to obtain military ants – Brigadier General Jamil Hassan – to expertise. For example, in the 1980s and deal with the situation in the east. Assad 1990s, the authorities allowed Salafists had already transferred another top en- returning from Saudi Arabia to preach in forcer, Jamea Jamea, to head Military Intel- Deir al-Zor city to help counter the influ- ligence in Deir al-Zor, after a U.N. investiga- ence of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were tion mentioned Jamea in connection with mostly members of the Salafist-leaning the Hariri assassination. Hizb al-Tahrir, a movement founded by a The two officials swiftly developed a ri- Palestinian cleric in the 1950s, which calls valry but still managed to mount a crack- for the reestablishment of a pan-Islamic down on Islamists. (Jamea was eventually
SWP Comments 43 October 2014
3
killed in Deir al-Zor in October 2013). group active in the north – and Zahran Among those rounded up, jailed, and tor- Aloush, who would later become leader of tured in Deir al-Zor were hundreds of Sala- the Saudi-backed Jaish al-Islam (Army of fists who did not subscribe to jihad in Iraq Islam) and was the son of a Salafist sheikh and were more focused on religious prac- living in exile in Saudi Arabia. At least four tice, such as praying correctly or adhering other inmates of Sednaya became com- to strict personal habits. As a consequence, manders in the Islamic State. the indiscriminate nature of the crackdown Thus, most of those Salafists set free in fomented Sunni anger toward the regime. 2011 quickly turned against the regime and At the same time, a policy of favoring Ala- became leading figures in the more vocifer- wites for government jobs, such as school ous militias of the uprising before also feud- teachers, intensified, further inflaming ing among themselves. In another conse- local Sunni sentiment. Before the revolt, quence, moderate rebel units, led primarily across Syria, an estimated three-quarters by officers who had defected from Assad’s of all managerial jobs in the public sector army and grouped loosely under the Free were held by Alawites. In the military, the Syrian Army (FSA) banner, quickly lost sect dominated the officer corps by a simi- ground to better-financed Salafist jihadists, lar proportion. among whom the Islamic State and al- The crackdown on Islamists was accom- Nusra emerged on top. panied by an Iranian-backed drive to spread Shi’ism in rural areas of Syria, which result- ed in the conversion of up to 21,000 Sunni Jihadist Rivalry villagers in Deir al-Zor between 2008 and The Islamic State and al-Nusra have fought 2010. Their conversion was helped by pre- several battles against each other across ferential food aid and cash handouts. East- Syria but have kept mostly to their own fief- ern Shi’ites, however, appear to have re- doms since the U.S. air campaign began verted back to Sunni Islam following a mas- targeting both in September 2014. Al-Nusra sacre committed by the al-Nusra Front of has remained strong in the province of 60 Shi’ites – mostly members of a pro-Assad Hama and in the southern province of militia – in the town of Hatla in the prov- Deraa. In the east, the Islamic State was ince of Deir al-Zor in June 2013. able to expel al-Nusra in July 2014 after The policy of using Salafists for its own overrunning al-Shuhail, an al-Nusra strong- purposes came back to haunt the regime. hold 40 km south of Deir al-Zor city. Lack- With the apparent aim to scuttle the initial- ing the ruthless efficiency of the Islamic ly peaceful uprising, Assad released hun- State, al-Nusra became embroiled in dis- dreds of Salafists between May and July of putes with local tribes in the east over terri- 2011 from Sednaya Prison in the north of tory and oil fields without being able to Damascus as part of a pardon that was assert its authority. In contrast, the Islamic extended also to criminals, many of whom State has had fewer qualms about entering were later recruited into loyalist militia. into feuds with local communities and has Among the Salafists who were released was distinguished itself by firmly enforcing its Hassan Abboud, who went on to lead the own Sharia-inspired version of law and Ahrar al-Sham brigade, one of the most order. This approach has curbed theft and formidable Islamist units, which suffered armed robbery – such as on the road from a severe blow when Abboud and its leader- Raqqa to the town of Tel-Abiad on the Turk- ship tier were killed in an explosion in ish border – and won it a certain form of northern Syria in September 2014. Also respect from inhabitants exhausted by pro- among Sednaya detainees were Ahmad longed lawlessness. (Abu Issa) al-Sheikh, who subsequently Unlike al-Nusra, whose leaders have headed Suqur al-Sham – another militant engaged in tactical discussions influenced
SWP Comments 43 October 2014
4
by their al-Qaeda elders outside Syria about ist militia, soldiers, and intelligence agents, seeking as much popular support as possi- as well as seizing military hardware. The ble to establish an emirate, the Islamic State group eventually withdrew, thus keeping just went ahead and declared a caliphate, the lines of confrontation with the regime in a “build it and they will come” approach away from the main highway running without deep theological justifications. from the north to the south of the country, Also in contrast to al-Nusra, the Islamic which is crucial for the regime’s supplies. State has found no problem in treating Before, several leading Islamist rebels other Muslims as apostates deserving to be and activists from Homs had called on the killed if they oppose its domination. Islamic State to advance into the province The successes of the more radical “black and help avenge the destruction of Homs and white” approach, backed by military city, whose Sunni neighborhoods had been prowess and financing from the oil in the flattened in carpet bombings by the regime. east, drove hundreds of al-Nusra fighters to The Islamic State, however, has mostly join the Islamic State in July/August 2014, focused its military operations – since the after the Islamic State overran Shuhail. schism with al-Nusra – on “liberating the Recruitment also appears to have risen in liberated,” meaning seizure of territory the days immediately after the U.S. strikes. already captured from the Assad regime by the FSA, al-Nusra, or by other rebel units. Major confrontations with Assad’s forces Islamic State Approach mostly broke out in the east, and only after By late October 2014, stepped-up U.S. raids the regime’s air force bombed Islamic State will have dented the Islamic State’s self- positions following the group’s capture of propagated image of omnipotence, lowered the city of Mosul in Iraq in June 2014. It was its revenue from oil, and will have increased this capture and the proclamation of the calls among its leaders for reconciliation caliphate that prompted the U.S.-backed with al-Nusra. If such reconciliation occurs, counteroffensive by the pro-Iranian Shi’ite it would vary by region. For example, the government in Baghdad – a supporter of local al-Nusra commander in the Qalamoun Assad – and by Kurdish Peshmerga and Mountains along the border with Lebanon units of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). is more sympathetic to the Islamic State Paradoxically, while the United States than other al-Nusra units based around and its European allies backed up PKK fight- Damascus, which were attacked by ISIL/ISIS, ers in Iraq from the air, the PKK is consid- the predecessor of the Islamic State, in ered a terrorist organization by both the 2012, after having captured several neigh- United States and the EU. The PKK is also borhoods from the Assad regime. The air fighting the Islamic State in Syria along campaign will also test the seriousness of with its de facto subsidiary, the Kurdish tribal allegiances to the Islamic State, many Democratic Union Party (PYD). Keen to of which were announced through videos mend ties with Turkey, the Assad regime choreographed by the media division of the had cracked down on the PKK before the group prior to the aerial bombardments. revolt broke out in March 2011, but the At the same time, the strikes are likely regime and the PYD have since reestablish- to curb the Islamic State’s mobility and ed lines of communications and military ability to mount attacks, thus making it understandings; the regime has withdrawn difficult to repeat the kinds of raids that most of its forces from the northeast and have planted horror in the ranks of rebels allowed the PYD to establish self-rule in the and regime loyalists alike. In July 2014 the Kurdish enclaves. Islamic State had made a foray into Homs province, briefly capturing the al-Sha’ir desert gas field and killing up to 350 loyal-
SWP Comments 43 October 2014
5
Stopping Islamic State’s Advance? Further west, the U.S. airstrikes have also The airstrikes against the Islamic State in been targeting Islamic State forces that have Iraq, which began around the Sinjar Moun- attacked the Kurdish enclave of Kobanê (of- tains in August 2014, were a precursor of ficial name: Ain al-Arab) on the border with the Syria campaign. But the lack of U.S. Turkey, slowing the group’s advance into ground forces, even in a non-combat role the town. But the strikes have received only such as in Iraq, and a dearth of strong local lukewarm support from Turkey, which has allies make success in Syria unlikely. The differences with Washington on how to U.S. aerial bombings have made the frontier deal with the Syrian conflict and is wary of more difficult to cross and will thus pre- rising PKK strength. Reluctant to put troops vent fighters easily moving from one the- on the ground, Ankara maintains that the ater to the other. Indeed, foreign fighters best option to protect civilians would be had begun crossing from Iraq into Syria in the establishment of safe zones, in which a “facilitator” capacity in 2012 to provide the local population in northern Syria as bomb-making and suicide-bombing exper- well as refugees could be protected. At the tise. In turn, jihadists operating in Syria same time, Turkey made it clear that it crossed into Iraq simply to take a break would not go it alone to establish such a from fighting. Later, jihadists from Iraq safe zone but only with its Western allies. settled in Syria and inter-married. In Iraq, U.S. air cover has allowed Kurd- ish Peshmerga units and Shi’ite militias Control of Oil backed by Iran to roll back some of the By the end of September 2014, the U.S.-led Islamic State’s advances in northern Iraq air campaign appeared to have diminished that came close to Erbil, capital of Iraqi Kur- oil and gas production capacities in Deir al- distan, in August 2014, and to subsequently Zor, robbing the Islamic State of a main go on the offensive. But across the border, source of revenue and making it easier for in Hasakah province, the PKK/PYD has not the regime, or the opposition, to regain managed to fend off the Islamic State’s ad- support in the region through the use of vances since the U.S.-led strikes expanded cash. Before supply disappeared from the into Syria, indicating that Kurdish forces in market, shortages had almost doubled the Syria might lack the military capability to price of gasoil sourced from Islamic State lead the fight against the Islamic State. territory in the east in September 2014 to Furthermore, the Islamic State has been $110 for 200 liters. Cooking gas bottled in able to capitalize on Arab tribal resentment the east had also doubled in price during of what is seen as overreaching Kurdish the same period, as aerial bombardment nationalism and territorial claims. Hasakah made continued production difficult. province, which has a large Arab population, Indeed, the Islamic State’s sweep of the remains broadly divided into territory con- east had concentrated control for most of trolled by the PYD, the Islamic State, and its the region’s oil fields – except those with allies, and Arab tribes allied with the regime. Kurdish militia – in the hands of the group, In late September 2014, when U.S. airstrikes ending a chaotic struggle between different were launched against Islamic State fighters rebel groups, armed gangs, and various in this part of Syria, the strikes were seen tribes. Thus, prior to the U.S. airstrikes, al- by many Arabs as a form of blatant support though industrial-scale production had for PYD dominance rather than a hit against mostly ended with the defeat of the regime terrorism. This has placed the mainstream in most of the east, the region witnessed National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and a relative oil boom based on free-flowing Opposition Forces, which has had delicate wells supplying crude and gas oil extracted relations with the Kurds and has boycotted with basic refining techniques. It provided the PYD, in a difficult position. the Islamic State with an estimated $80–
SWP Comments 43 October 2014
6
$100 million a month in revenue. Down- Nusra in particular appears to have risen, stream, the Islamic State has also been pres- whereas the Islamic State is seen as more of ent along the pipeline network connecting an alien force that might have to be neutra- the oil fields of Hasakah, which are largely lized – but only after the Assad regime falls. under Kurdish control, to the country’s two In the east, where Western-backed oppo- oil refineries in the regime-held cities of sition brigades have virtually disappeared Homs and Banias. No major attacks on the and regime loyalist forces are still entrench- pipelines have been reported since the Is- ed in the southern sector of Deir al-Zor, the lamic State took hold of the east, indicating regime has been trying to crawl back as a that oil might still be flowing through them. result of the continuing air bombings. In- This provides another twist to the apparent deed, emboldened by the U.S. strikes, re- tacit arrangements between the Islamic State gime representatives have been contacting and the regime, arrangements that seems tribal figures who have sided with the Is- to also cover electricity from the Tabqa lamic State, offering them money and hydroelectric dam in the province of Raqqa, weapons if they switch sides. Assad’s forces which is controlled by the Islamic State. also attempted to take advantage of the U.S. The importance of oil as a source of reve- strikes by making a foray into parts of Deir nue for the Islamic State was highlighted al-Zor in mid-October 2014, which was re- by killings carried out by the group against pelled by the Islamic State and other Islam- the Shueitat tribe, which attempted to re- ists. In retaliation, a residential quarter in sist the Islamic State’s takeover of oil wells Deir al-Zor was shelled, leaving seven civil- in territory associated with the tribe, near ians dead and dozens wounded. Thus, even the Iraqi border, which boasts some of the if the air attacks against the Islamic State biggest oil wells in the province of Deir al- curb the group’s advances, they will not Zor. In reaction, hundreds of Shueitat mem- halt a slide to more Sunni radicalization bers were executed by the Islamic State related to the underlying causes of the between July and September 2014. Appeals Syrian conflict and the crackdown on the by the Shueitat for help from neighboring revolt by Assad’s security forces. tribes went unanswered and the most the Still, the U.S. air attacks present a rare National Coalition could do was issue state- opportunity to advance progress toward an ments condemning the massacre. overall solution to the conflict and change Western taboos of avoiding military inter- vention at almost any cost. This non-inter- Conclusions and Recommendations vention mantra has emboldened Assad and The U.S.-led airstrikes have driven the Is- allowed his forces to turn Syria into killing lamic State to move fighters and hardware fields, and helped to further Islamist radi- into residential areas of Deir al-Zor and calism, which will only deepen if the aerial Raqqa, taking the shine off the group’s bold bombings against the Islamic State and al- image but apparently not denting the ap- Nusra are seen as propping up Assad or as peal of militant Islam among rural Sunnis, waging a battle on his behalf (and in tacit who have been at the forefront of the Syr- alliance with him). Expectations that the ian revolt and increasingly subscribe to a U.S. bombing campaign will benefit the sectarian understanding of the conflict. Assad regime has helped strengthen the These communities do not support the kill- Syrian pound following it decline in value ing of fellow fighters who have dealt mili- in the weeks before the campaign on fears tary blows to a minority Alawite regime, that the regime would also be targeted. which they see as using massive force indis- At the same time, the regime is unlikely criminately to hang on to power and pre- to risk thrusting its Alawite fighting core vent the political ascendency of the majori- into a far-reaching campaign against out- ty Sunni population. Sympathy with al- lying Sunni regions to stamp out the jihad-
SWP Comments 43 October 2014
7
ists and potentially incur large losses. Assad countries of origin. In addition, the inclu- therefore has little to offer the U.S.-led alli- sion of regions inhabited by Alawites and ance. In the absence of an immediate politi- other minorities into long-mooted safe cal settlement, strengthening moderate reb- zones would provide an alternative to these els appears to be the only available option, parts of the population rather than them since cooperation with Assad would feed betting on protection by the regime. Safe the Sunni backlash that is helping foster zones would also allow the opposition gov- jihadism. The U.S. military, which has start- ernment, operating in exile from southern ed training moderate rebels, says a rebel Turkey, to set up a foothold inside Syria. force of 12,000 to 15,000 would be needed The establishment of such safe zones to defeat the Islamic State in the east with faces a major challenge. In order to offer American air support. And indeed, if the effective protection against regime bomb- airstrikes sharply weaken the Islamic State ings, including from artillery, a no-fly zone in eastern Syria, there is a strong risk of a would not be sufficient. Yet, so far, no coun-
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und vacuum developing that would be filled by try has been willing to provide the neces- Politik, 2014 regime forces rather than by an alliance sary intervention on the ground. In October All rights reserved of Free Syrian Army and Islamist brigades. 2014, the Turkish government obtained These Comments reflect Still, even if such a force were assembled, authorization from parliament for possible solely the author’s views. outside personnel would be needed to pro- military intervention in Syria and Iraq and SWP vide logistics, engineering knowhow, main- to allow foreign troops to be stationed in its Stiftung Wissenschaft und tenance, and tactical support. That would territory for the same purpose. But in light Politik German Institute for significantly change the offhand approach of continuing differences with the West International and that the Friends of Syria – the international over priorities in the fight in Syria, Turkey Security Affairs pro-opposition alliance – have adopted to- will likely avoid military engagement and Ludwigkirchplatz 34 ward Syria. focus on defending its own territory. A raid 10719 Berlin Indeed, distrust of international support by Turkish warplanes on PKK bases in Iraq Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 has driven many defectors from Assad’s in mid-October appeared to be in line with www.swp-berlin.org military to sit on the sidelines, as previous this approach, as was Ankara’s lukewarm [email protected] efforts to strengthen the opposition mili- support for U.S. airstrikes on the Islamic ISSN 1861-1761 tarily were marred by disagreements among State. At least one of Turkey’s concerns – the Friends of Syria and ended in debacles. that a safe zone would strengthen Kurdish But the defectors have maintained much autonomy in northern Syria – could be al- of their networks. They could help identify layed by joint positions adopted by the PYD Further reading: competent personnel to set up a more for- and the National Coalition on the future midable force that could fill the void in the unity of the country as well as a joining of Guido Steinberg country’s east and increase pressure on the forces in the fight against the Islamic State. The New “Lions of Syria”. Salafist and Jihadist Groups Assad regime to compromise with regard It is clear that genuine stabilization can Dominate Insurgency to local ceasefires and once international only be achieved through a political settle- SWP Comments 19/2014, peace talks are revived. ment that allows for a democratic-based
SWP Comments 43 October 2014
8