Advanced Containment Systems for Next Generation Water Reactors
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IAEA-TECDOC-752 Status of advanced containment systems for next generation water reactors sL£_^ n M INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Uu~\P IAEe Th A doe t normallsno y maintain stock f reportso thin si s series. However, microfiche copie f thesso e reportobtainee b n sca d from INIS Clearinghouse International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse5 0 10 x P.OBo . A-1400 Vienna, Austria Orders should be accompanied by prepayment of Austrian Schillings 100, in the form of a cheque or in the form of IAEA microfiche service coupons which may be ordered separately from the INIS Clearinghouse. The originating Sectio f thino s documen IAEe th An i t was: Nuclear Power Technology Development Section International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse 5 0 10 P.Ox Bo . A-1400 Vienna, Austria STATUS OF ADVANCED CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS FOR NEXT GENERATION WATER REACTORS IAEA, VIENNA, 1994 IAEA-TECDOC-752 ISSN 1011-4289 Printe IAEe th AustriAn y i d b a June 1994 PLEASE BE AWARE THAT MISSINE TH AL F LO G PAGE THIN SI S DOCUMENT WERE ORIGINALLY BLANK FOREWORD The nuclear industry has always pursued excellence in enhancing and maintaining a high level of quality in plant design, manufacturing, construction, operation and maintenance. Because of this and because of developments in technology and public concern about the safety of NPPs a number of design improvements will take place for the next generation of nuclear power plants. Containment is a key component of the mitigation part of the defense in depth philosophy, since it is the last barrier designed to prevent large radioactive releases to the environment. Therefore, while containments of current NPPs are able to meet the objectives they have been designed for in the frame of the defense in depth approach, many improvements are proposed by designers to further reduce the probability of releases to the environment in a broader set of accident situations. In addition, since the containment system is responsible for a significant part of the entire station cost considerable effort is devoted to reduction of the costs associated with construction and maintenance. The current IAEA programme in advanced nuclear power technology promotes technical information exchange between Member States with major development programmes hopes i t I . d that this report on the status of advanced containment systems for next generation water reactors will be useful for further dissemination of information and for stimulating international co-operation between the Member States. EDITORIAL NOTE preparingIn this document press,for IAEAthe staffof have pages madethe up from the original manuscript (s). The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the governments of the nominating Member States nominating ofthe or organizations. Theof use particular designations countriesof territoriesor does imply judgementnot any by publisher,the legalthe IAEA, to statusthe as of such countries territories,or of their authoritiesand institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries. The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does implyintentionnot any infringeto proprietary rights, should construednor be it an as endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA. CONTENTS SUMMARY .................................................... 7 1. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 9 1.1. Objective Statue th f sso Report ..................................9 . 1.2. Extencontainmene th f o t t maisystes it nd mfunctionan s ..................0 1 . 1.3. Status of next generation water reactors development ..................... 10 1.4. Classificatio currenf no t containment design concepts ....................1 1 . 1.4.1. Singl containmeny edr t ...................................1 1 . 1.4.2. Dua containmeny dr l t ....................................1 1 . 1.4.3. Ice condenser containment .................................. 14 bubblin1.4.4R PW . g condenser containment .........................4 1 . 1.4.5. BWR pressure suppression containment ......................... 14 1.4.6. Negative pressure containment ..............................4 1 . 2. GENERAL SAFETY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS ........................ 15 2.1. General plant safety objectives ................................... 15 2.2. General design approaches and related issues .......................... 16 2.2.1. Defens deptn ei h .......................................6 1 . 2.2.2. Use of passive systems .................................... 16 2.2.3. Credi non-safeto t t y systems/components ........................8 1 . 2.2.4. Independence, reliability ................................... 18 2.2.5. Single versus double containment ............................. 18 2.2.6. Occupational doses reduction ................................ 19 2.2.7. Containment filtered venting ................................ 19 2.2.8. Accident management ..................................... 20 3. OTHER GENERAL OBJECTIVES FOR NEXT GENERATION PLANT CONTAINMENTS .............................................. 21 3.1. Simplification .............................................. 21 3.2. Standardization ............................................1 2 . 3.3. Plant availability ............................................ 22 3.4. Maintenance, inspectability and testability ............................ 23 3.5. Plant design life ...........................................3 2 . 3.6. Handlin removad gan largf o l e components ..........................4 2 . 3.7. Decommissioning ........................................... 24 3.8. Acceptability by public opinion ................................... 25 3.9. Cost considerations .......................................... 25 4. DESIGN BASES ............................................... 27 4.1. Current design bases .........................................7 2 . 4.2. Extensio desigf no n bases .....................................7 2 . 4.2.1. Categorie challengef so consideree b o st d .......................8 2 . 4.2.2. Strategies and associated solutions to cope with the challenges ........... 29 4.2.3. Selection criteria .......................................3 3 . EXAMPLE5 CONTAINMENF SO T SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTATIONS ............4 3 . 5.1. Measures to prevent fuel-coolant interaction (FCI) ....................... 34 5.1.1. In-vessel corium cooling ................................... 34 5.1.2. Ex-vessel corium cooling .................................5 3 . 5.1.3. Systems which allow floodin cavite th f ygo ......................5 3 . 5.1.4 cory eDr . catcher concept deviced san s .........................6 3 . 5.2. Contro reductiod an l pressurf no temperaturd ean e ......................6 3 . 5.2.1. Decay heat removal systems ...............................8 3 . 5.2.2. Conceptual designs ...................................... 42 5.2.2.1. Containment propose Kernforschungszentruy db m Karlsruhe (KfK2 4 . ) 5.2.2.2. LIRA ........................................4 4 . 5.2.3. Direct containment heating (DCH) ............................4 4 . 5.3. Hydrogen control systems ...................................... 44 5.4. Source term reduction system .................................... 44 5.5. System componentd san improvo st e leaktightness ......................6 .4 6. EXAMPLES OF PROPOSED CONTAINMENTS .......................... 49 6.1. Overall considerations ......................................... 49 6.2. AP-600 .................................................9 4 . 6.3. SBWR .................................................. 49 6.4. European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) ..............................0 5 . 6.5. PIUS .................................................. 53 7. ISSUES RELATED TO RULES AND REGULATIONS, COMPUTER CODES AND RESEARCH .............................................5 5 . 7.1. Harmonization of requirements set by utilities and vendors with licensing requirements ....................................5 5 . 7.2. Available computer codes ...................................... 55 7.2.1. Thermal-hydrauli fissiod can n product transport codes ...............6 5 . 7.2.2. Code structurar sfo l assessment .............................7 5 . 7.3. Experimental research ......................................... 57 7.3.1. Behaviou f containmeno r t component structured san s under severe accident conditions .................................. 57 7.3.2. Phenomenological research ................................8 5 . 7.3.3. Syste componend man t testing ..............................9 5 . PHENOMENOLOGICA8 L RESEARC SYSTEM/COMPONENTD HAN S NEEDS .....0 6 . 8.1. Phenomenological research ...................................... 60 8.2. System/components tests needs ................................... 60 9. CONCLUSIONS ..............................................2 6 . APPENDIX A: CLASSIFICATION OF CURRENT CONTAINMENT SYSTEM DESIGN CONCEPTS ................................... 63 APPENDIX B: MAJOR CONTAINMENT CODE DESCRIPTIONS ................ 73 REFERENCES .................................................. 77 ABBREVIATIONS ................................................ 79 CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW ........................... 81 SUMMARY While current plant containment able meear o set objectivee th t s they have been designer dfo and provide a substantial contribution to the defense in depth approach, many improvements are proposed for future plants to further reduce releases to the environment for a broader range of accident conditions and also to reduce costs associated with construction