sign in sign up
<<
Home , All the Stations, British Rail, Great and Little Hampden, Greengauge 21, High Speed 1, Hitchin flyover

House of Commons Committee

High Speed Rail

Tenth Report of Session 2010–12

Volume III Additional written evidence

Ordered by the House of Commons to be published 24 May, 7, 14, 21 and 28 June, 12 July, 6, 7 and 13 September and 11 October 2011

Published on 8 November 2011 by authority of the House of Commons : The Stationery Office Limited

The Transport Committee

The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the and its Associate Public Bodies.

Current membership Mrs Louise Ellman (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) (Chair) Steve Baker (Conservative, Wycombe) Jim Dobbin (Labour/Co-operative, Heywood and Middleton) Mr Tom Harris (Labour, South) Julie Hilling (Labour, Bolton West) Kwasi Kwarteng (Conservative, Spelthorne) Mr John Leech (Liberal Democrat, Withington) Paul Maynard (Conservative, Blackpool North and Cleveleys) Iain Stewart (Conservative, Milton Keynes South) Graham Stringer (Labour, Blackley and Broughton) Julian Sturdy (Conservative, Outer)

The following were also members of the committee during the Parliament.

Angie Bray (Conservative, Ealing Central and Acton) Lilian Greenwood (Labour, Nottingham South) Kelvin Hopkins (Labour, Luton North) Gavin Shuker (Labour/Co-operative, Luton South) Angela Smith (Labour, and )

Powers The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at http://www.parliament.uk/transcom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume.

The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.

Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Mark Egan (Clerk), Jessica Montgomery (Second Clerk), David Davies (Committee Specialist), Tony Catinella (Senior Committee Assistant), Edward Faulkner (Committee Assistant), Stewart McIlvenna (Committee Support Assistant) and Hannah Pearce (Media Officer).

Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6263; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]

List of additional written evidence

(published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/transcom)

1 Neil Mathers Ev w1, Ev w3 2 North West Chamber of Commerce Ev w4 3 M Williams Ev w5 4 Mrs M Hammond Ev w6 5 I D King Ev w7 6 Geoffrey Simms Ev w8 7 Paul Atkins Ev w12 8 Dr Paul Thornton Ev w17 9 Adrian Hopkinson Ev w20 10 Jane Cave Ev w21 11 Stuart Porter Ev w23, Ev w28 12 Railfuture Ev w33 13 Malcolm Griffiths, Bluespace Thinking Ltd Ev w38, Ev w43 14 Liverpool and North West Chambers of Commerce Ev w45 15 North West Transport Roundtable Ev w48 16 Alison and Mick Tyler Ev w53 17 Chris Worker Ev w54 18 Catherine Calow Ev w58 19 Tony Bristow Ev w59 20 Milton Keynes Council Ev w61 21 Tony Bolden and Reg Harman Ev w62 22 Chris James Ev w66 23 Civic Voice Ev w67 24 Lichfield City Council Ev w68 25 Northumberland County Council Ev w69 26 WPCSTOPHS2 Group Ev w71 27 Professor John Whitelegg Ev w74 28 VoxOpp Ev w76 29 Scottish Association for Public Transport Ev w81 30 Rambler’s Association Ev w82 31 Limited Ev w84 32 Mr D J Tolley Ev w88 33 David Thrower Ev w91 34 Allan Whittow Ev w103 35 Kyn Aizlewood Ev w105 36 Gladwin Associates Ev w110 37 Chiltern Ridges HS2 Action Group Ev w116 38 Joanne Staton Ev w118 39 Richard Baldwin Ev w124 40 Stop HS2 Kenilworth Action Group Ltd Ev w124 41 Mr and Mrs Hart Ev w129

42 Antony and Carol Chapman Ev w129, Ev w130 43 Speen Area Action Group Ev w130 44 David Rayney Ev w134 45 Mo Smith Ev w137 46 Ruislip Residents’ Association Ev w140 47 Mr A Bobroff Ev w142 48 Middleton HS2 Action Group Ev w144 49 Keith Rosling Ev w147 50 Graham Earl Collyer Ev w151 51 Richard A Lloyd Ev w153 52 North East Transport Activists Roundtable Ev w155 53 Institution of Mechanical Engineers Ev w160 54 Robert Andrew Kemp Ev w163 55 Warwickshire County Council Ev w165 56 Stoneleigh Action Group Ev w167 57 North West Rail Campaign Ev w170 58 City Council Ev w173 59 Woodland Trust Ev w176 60 Mark Bostock Ev w178 61 Exeter City Council Ev w179 62 Andrew Bodman Ev w180 63 Transport Watch UK Ev w184, Ev w189, Ev w191 64 Guild of Travel Management Companies Ev w192 65 DB Schenker Rail UK Ev w194 66 Passenger Transport Executive Ev w195 67 Community and Regional Planning Services Ev w199 68 Terry Brennan Ev w204 69 Professor Mike Geddes Ev w210 70 Chiltern Society Ev w214, Ev w217 71 Travel Watch North West Ev w218 72 Craig Todd Ev w222 73 David Miles Ev w222 74 Ian Waddell Ev w225 75 Leslie Fawcett Ev w228 76 English Heritage Ev w232 77 Pamela Taylor Ev w233 78 Thomas Hart Ev w234 79 Messrs Edwards, King, Osborn, Rees and Sullivan Ev w236 80 Bow Group Ev w242 81 Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce Ev w257 82 Cheryl Gillan MP Ev w260 83 Glasgow Edinburgh Collaboration Initiative Ev w261 84 Gordon Pettitt Ev w266 85 Chartered Institute of and Transport in the UK Ev w270 86 Professor Peter Mackie Ev w273

87 County Council Ev w275 88 Institution of Civil Engineers Ev w281 89 Derwent London plc Ev w286 90 Jane Farley Ev w287 91 Civil Engineering Contractors Association Ev w288 92 Stop HS2 Ltd Ev w289 93 Pan-Camden HS2 Alliance Ev w296 94 Mike Vernon Ev w309 95 Henry Law Ev w311 96 Associated Society of Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) Ev w313 97 Leeds and North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce Ev w315 98 Greater Manchester Combined Authority Ev w319 99 National Farmers Union Ev w324 100 Sue Taylor and Christopher Boyce Ev w326 101 Nottingham City Council Ev w327 102 Association of North East Councils Ev w330 103 Warwick District Council Ev w335 104 PTEG Ev w336 105 Limited Ev w341 106 Highlands and Islands Transport Partnership Ev w341 107 Conserve the Chilterns and Countryside Ev w346 108 Local Government Yorkshire and Humber Ev w350 109 Six Statutory Scottish Regional Transport Partnerships Ev w352 110 William Summers Ev w356 111 Northern Way Ev w356 112 Leeds City Council Ev w361 113 ABTA Ev w363 114 Passenger Transport Networks Ev w364 115 Jonathan Tyler, Passenger Transport Networks Ev w371 116 SEStran Ev w372 117 T H Effendowicz Ev w376 118 B Bedford Ev w377 119 Steve Rodrick Ev w378 120 Transport Futures Ev w381 121 Atkins Ltd Ev w388 122 Campaign to Protect Rural , Warwickshire Branch Ev w393 123 Great Missenden Stop HS2 Ev w394 124 Star Alliance Services Ev w396 125 Socialist Environment and Resources Association Ev w399 126 Ltd Ev w404, Ev w423 127 Jeff Travers Ev w429 128 Taxpayers’ Alliance Ev w430 129 Glasgow City Council Ev w436 130 London Councils Ev w442 131 Angel Ev w444

132 Andrew Green Ev w445 133 Scottish Council for Development and Industry Ev w445 134 LaSalle Investment Management Ev w447 135 Ev w448 136 London (Heathrow) Airline Consultative Committee Ev w450 137 Staffordshire County Council Ev w451 138 Ev w454 139 Stephen Plowden Ev w459 140 Interlinking Transit Solutions Ltd Ev w463 141 HS2 Business Group Ev w469 142 Professor Robert Cochrane Ev w476 143 Marilyn Fletcher Ev w479, Ev w480 144 Airport Operators Association Ev w480 145 Friends of the Earth Ev w486 146 Chiltern Countryside Group Ev w491, Ev w502, Ev w509 147 Strathclyde Partnership for Transport Ev w511 148 William Barter Ev w514 149 Federation of Small Businesses Ev w518 150 Dr Sandra Tuppen Ev w519, Ev w524 151 Seven Statutory Scottish Regional Transport partnerships Ev w526 152 Birmingham Airport Ev w531 153 Robert H Parker Ev w535 154 Cardiff Business Partnership Ev w537 155 Dr Moshe Givoni & Professor David Banister, Transport Studies Unit, School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford Ev w541 156 James Russell Ev w546 157 Robert McDonald Ev w547 158 David Hodgson Ev w547 159 Reynolds Hardiman Ev w548 160 Mr and Mrs S Loosley Ev w549 161 Janusz Rawicz-Szczerbo Ev w550 162 Maurice Hopper Ev w553 163 Glenn & Steve Atkins, Centre for Transport & Society, University of the West of England, Bristol Ev w553 164 Dr Paul Hoad Ev w555 165 David Henderson and David Sawers Ev w563 166 John Killip Ev w566 167 Mr Geoffrey Toull Ev w566

cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [SO] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w1

Written evidence

Written evidence from Neil Mathers (HSR 01) —Present Consultation Bearing in mind there is no justification for statements in the recent Consultation I had to look elsewhere for corroboration. Alas I found no good news, but discovered details which fall woefully short of reality. Your proposals do not reflect current experience from high-speed lines operating elsewhere in the world. There is no justification regarding the paths or proposed speeds, or any revised requirements for rolling- stock. There is no information on the daily operation and performance of the new scheme from Euston to Birmingham and further north. Matters include: — Direct comparison with high-speed rail elsewhere. — Train path diagrams showing how it will operate. — Timetables supporting the train path diagrams. — HS2 load factors are not provided. While such data is missing and your proposals not fleshed out, it is not possible to review your proposals today and determine if the scheme is coherent and valid. How do you imagine it will operate?

Train paths per hour (see attached chart (Train paths per hour, High-speed Rail world-wide)) In the consultation you say: “The proposed new line to the West Midlands would initially provide 14 new train paths every hour for long-distance services, with developments in train control technology expected to see that rise to 18 trains per hour on a wider .” I reviewed a number of operating lines in Europe, and determined the traffic density averages 1.2 paths per hour, whilst the aggregate traffic is 12.1 paths per hour.

The HS2 figure of 18 train-paths per hour over a single is ludicrous You must develop accurate train-path diagrams to integrate the different routings, and to ensure the system does not snag up. This is another concern which has not been addressed.

Average trip speeds (see attached chart (Average trip Speeds, High-speed Rail world-wide)) I checked average trip speeds in Europe and elsewhere from timetables and plotted these against distance. You will notice these speeds are all less than 200km/hr. Proposed HS2 speeds to Birmingham Interchange, Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester are significantly higher; 16 to 30%. There can be no validation for such higher speeds over a shorter distance, and where the traffic intensity is so high. Without the necessary train path diagrams you cannot determine the ultimate capacity of the new scheme. And it seems likely several paths will be lost when you combine differing routings to/from the north.

Daily load factor (see attached chart (High-speed load factors, from )) In the Consultation you do not mention Load Factors on the HS2 scheme. Instead there is discussion on load factors and growth on other tracks such as West-Coast mainline, but that is largely irrelevant. To calculate “the efficiency” or otherwise of HS2, you must estimate the daily load factor/s. As those factors are applied to the ultimate capacity, you arrive at the ridership on a daily basis. And please remember as you operate more trains, more frequently, then the daily load factors fall away. Some data on HS2 load factor are found in the earlier Network Rail report “Comparing environmental impact of conventional and high-speed rail.” Here performance on high-speed lines in Europe is compared with estimates for HS2 north from London. The differences are indeed significant, with HS2 load factors lower by 33%. Imagine how HS2 would increase its ridership; by reducing its fares?

Summarising my Comments Regarding the Latest Consultation — HS2 train intensity (train paths per hour) is unbelievably high. Evidence is included. — Compared with Europe and Japan HS2 trip speeds are too high. Evidence is included. — HS2 load factors and ridership may be too low. Evidence is included. — There is no substantiation for your technical offering. Evidence is missing. Once the basic data is validated, train-path diagrams and levels of established, only then can system capacity be calculated, load-factors applied and possible cost-benefits established—but not before. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w2 Transport Committee: Evidence

With critical information still missing as to the operation and validity of the scheme, further engineering studies must be completed. Without that extra work there is little likelihood the project will be successful and the anticipated benefits accrue. Presently I consider this project is a pig-in-a-poke. 28 February 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w3

Further written evidence from Neil Mathers (HSR 1A) High Speed 2—Is Delusion Necessary to Get Projects Started? In my earlier letter of 23 July (HSR 1) I raised my concerns about the often quoted high speeds of 225–250 miles per hour. I had said the overall specification is still missing, and on the technical side: — HS2 train intensity (train paths per hour) is unbelievably high. — Compared with Europe and Japan HS2 trip speeds are too high. — HS2 load factors and ridership may be too low. — “Once the basic data is validated, train-path diagrams and levels of rolling stock established, only then can system capacity be calculated, load-factors applied and possible cost-benefits established”. I also attached the report “World Speed Survey 2009” by Dr Colin Taylor1 who stated: “Frequency wins over speed in the commercial stakes. Despite the launch of the world's first regular 350 km/h services, our biennial review of the world's fastest timetabled trains finds no faster average than 272 km/h. Jostling between recent entrants and traditional contenders has seen many countries change position in the tables.” As a result I am even more concerned regarding the quality of technical data and other figures drawn from a hat, and had said: “For instance HS2 documents indicate an ultimate frequency of 18 trains an hour. How is that figure arrived at? In an emergency will all 18 trains decelerate at the same time? And how far would the trains travel before they all come to a stop? Who has the appropriate experience? What physical separation is essential between following trains so they each have room to decelerate? Also how much of the track to Birmingham would be occupied by travelling trains and by those that have come to a halt?” Have you yet had the opportunity to address my serious concerns? 1 Not printed with this submission. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w4 Transport Committee: Evidence

Fatal Train Crash Since writing that letter I learned there had been a fatal high-speed train crash near Wenzshou, China. Of a total 1630 passengers on the two trains, 40 were fatally injured, and 210 needed hospital treatment. Details are given in the attached report2 “China’s high speed rail crash—What really happened”. Other reports indicate a fault with the Train Control System. Following the crash, China reduced its “Maximum Design Speed” from 350km/hr to 300km/hr, also operating its trains at lower speeds and frequency, presumably to increase margins of safety.

Operating Conditions And Headway In engineering terms I would expect “operating conditions” to range 65% -70% of “maximum conditions”. A recent analysis by epochepogue confirms this view, see attachment. Regarding HS2 what can we learn from recent data? Details speed, headway and trains/hour are given, see: www.greengauge21.net/wp-content/uploads/Final-Report-Appendices-B-J.pdf. In the attached chart some figures are highlighted3: At max speed 300km/hr and headway 11,600m, then trains/hr = 16.2 at 75% design capacity (peak) or 12.9 at 60% design capacity At 360km/hr (for HS2), and headway 18,400m, trains/hr = 13.1 at 75% design capacity (peak) or 10.5 at 60% design capacity Not one figure supports HS2 claim of 18 trains per hour on HS2 line from Euston to Birmingham.

No Substantiation Or Corroboration Previously I found no substantiation or corroboration for several technical aspects of the HS2 project; quite the contrary. I hope you will check and investigate government statements for operating speeds, frequency and required headways for the HS2 service to Birmingham and beyond. If the HS2 scheme doesn’t work properly, there will be no real return. It will simply go bust. 30 August 2011

Written evidence from the North West Chamber of Commerce (HSR 02) The Importance of High Speed Rail to The North West The Government is currently carrying out a consultation on the development of a High Speed Rail (HSR) network connecting London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds. This will be one of the largest building projects for a generation providing an opportunity to fundamentally reshape and improve the rail network. Based on current research and business opinion of Chamber members across the North West we highlight the scheme’s economic importance below and lend the support of sixteen regional chambers to the programme.

Over 40,000 jobs will be created Around 9,000 would be created on the route’s construction and a further 1,500 jobs in its operation. Regeneration around the stations would create 30,000 jobs.4

£44 billion of economic benefits The net present value of the economic benefits generated by High Speed Rail is forecast by HS2 Ltd to be £43.7 billion over 60 years.5

HSR will help close the North-South economic divide The North and the Midlands’ average GVA per head of the population is 16.3% below the UK average.6 A high-speed line would improve access to the North West, enhancing opportunities for investment and economic development.

Faster journeys Speeds of 225 miles per hour would transform journey times, bringing Manchester, Liverpool and eventually Preston and Blackpool to within 100 minutes of London and 80 minutes of Birmingham. This would allow businesses to access wider markets and a larger labour pool through more trains going to more destinations. 2 Not printed with this submission. 3 Only available in the PDF version of this document. 4 (The Daily Telegraph, 21 February 2011). 5 (DfT, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future—Consultation Summary, February 2011, p. 10). 6 (ONS, Regional, sub-regional and local gross value added 2009, 8 December 2010, p. 1) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w5

Modal shift This enhanced capacity and connectivity could see as many as six million air trips and nine million road trips a year shift onto rail, freeing up capacity on motorways and enhancing access to, and development of, regional airports.7

Additional rail capacity The is predicted to be at full capacity within the next 10 years. Without investment, travel between the North West and London will be restricted and become prohibitively expensive. A national high speed network would transform rail capacity enabling 14 or more additional train services per hour and be designed to accommodate larger and longer trains able to carry up to 1,100 passengers.8

Capacity released on existing lines A new line will allow for significant improvements to freight paths and an increase to commuter services on the existing network.

High-speed rail is cost effective A conventional new line will cost only 9% less than a high speed line but provide none of the journey time improvements, thus having a lower benefit-cost ratio.

Upgrading existing lines is not feasible The West Coast Main Line has recently been upgraded to enable trains to run at 125mph. This upgrade has provided only limited capacity improvements, cost almost £10 billion and caused a decade of disruption to train services. May 2011

Written evidence fromIMWilliams (HSR 03) I enclose comments relating to the proposals for HS2 together with a suggestion for an alternative route running from just south of Middleton to just north of Lichfield. It is my opinion that, on balance, all parts of Britain need a High Speed Train service. Moreover, that it should have been built years ago. Major works such as these will always require large budgets and such is the nature of public works that there will always be other demands on the funds available. If the decision to proceed had been taken many years ago, however, it is possible that far more goods would be transported by rail thereby greatly reducing the number of heavy goods lorries on our motorways. The consequence of the huge numbers of these lorries, is the need to keep spending, additionally large amounts, on the maintenance of our motorways and also further large sums expanding their width and numbers. Had we already built the railway, then as a result there would, probably, have been less demand for ever more motorway capacity, which would have offset the cost of building a High Speed rail system in the first place. Additionally had the system been built earlier there would, probably, have been a significantly smaller number of dwellings involved which limit the choice of route or add to the cost of compensation. As it is, I believe it essential that we finally bite the bullet, in the interests of the country’s commercial future, and press on with the building of the Nation’s High Speed Rail network. I understand that, in this densely populated country, it will cause great inconvenience to many. Proportionately, however, they are a small minority of the population, and providing they reeive fair and equitable compensation, I would hope those having to give up their homes and businesses understand that it is for the greater good of the Nation. The cost of the project is enormous (but would be even more if postponed again) and, as always for a project of this nature and magnitude, there are experts for each side who are able to argue the case both for and against the scheme. They are able to “prove” that on the one hand it will be a boon but put an equally strong case, on the other, that it is not viable. This, as always, leave the majority of us, as laymen, little the wiser and having to rely on our “gut feeling”. In my case, as I mention above, I believe it will be a benefit to our country’s trade, be it manufacturing or tourist, and might even product savings elsewhere (eg less motorway expansion). 7 DfT, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future—Consultation Summary, February 2011, p. 13). 8 DfT, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future—Consultation Summary, February 2011, p. 13 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w6 Transport Committee: Evidence

I enclose some maps showing my alternative route and other ideas together with an explanation of why I think this route would be better.9 March 2011

Written evidence from Mrs M Hammond (HSR 04) 1. What are the main arguments for this High Speed Rail Line I really thought this charade had gone away but no, the Government seems to be determined to devastate the lives everyone, devastate the countryside and its habitat in order to build a new railway line that no one will be able to use unless one lives in London, Birmingham or Manchester.

2. How does the HSR fit in with the Government transport plans? It is considered that we must have a railway line like Europe but the government seem to have forgotten several facts. This is a small island, over populated and the valuable farms and woodlands that we have, are essential to the wellbeing of this country. We need the woodlands and pastures which you plan to decimate with a noisy, high speed railway line—our ecology and the delicate state of our wildlife depends on it. Cutting a woodland in half does not make it two woodlands. Wildlife in a large area depends on that large area and many species of animals and insects would not survive. To mention but one, our bee population is in decline and to decimate our present fields and farmlands will only exacerbate the problem and more and more of our farmland fields and pastures will fail to flourish. We need to grow our own food. We simply cannot continue to import such large quantities.

3. Business Case I consider that the need for such high-speed travel from one major city to another will not be a major requirement in the future as the Government predicts. With communication in the form of video conferencing, the rapid increase in mobile telephone technology, I doubt very much that such a great expenditure of money can be justified on such a scheme. It is said that the HS2 trains will only take off a few minutes on the train journey. How on earth can all this disruption and cost be justified? We already have a speedier train service between major cities than most of Europe.

4. Strategic Route Yes, a good, frequent train service is required between the London train terminals and Heathrow. Perhaps it would cut out some of the car/taxi traffic on the roads in the area. However, when the West Coast mainline (4 tracking) was upgraded recently (with much disruption to the local towns, villages and business along the way) they failed to upgrade the existing signalling. My goodness what a mistake! I think that up-grading the existing rail network is a priority with up-to-date signalling enabling trains to travel faster, travel much closer together as well as having longer trains—thus eliminating the need for HS2. A few minutes on the journey from north to south is surely really not a problem. I personally know of one farmer whose bridge was demolished and rebuilt when “4 tracking” was implemented only a few ears ago. Now he finds that, should the proposed plans now go ahead, his bridge will have to be demolished again and re-erected elsewhere, with a 10 mile detour for him and the local residents in his area of Staffordshire—unbelievable—and only to take off a few minutes journey time of the privileged few on the train!

5. Impact You will be hard pressed to convince the general public that HS2 etc will be the answer. As far as I can see with the fare prices that have been mentioned only Bankers and MPs will be able to travel, on expenses, of course. For the rest of us, we will not be able to use the train as it will only visit major cities. My area of Staffordshire, like so many other areas of the country, will not benefit in any way. Just the disruption when the work is done and the continual noise of the proposed frequent trains (empty for the most part) imploding on our senses. The devastation of the fragile wildlife. The devastation of our farms and countryside. The devastation of recreational areas. I feel sorry for my grandchildren and future generations if our Government takes country of ours along an HS2/3 route as we shall not enjoy times of peace and tranquillity in the countryside of our green and pleasant land. 9 Enclosures not printed cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w7

I implore you to fully consider the impact HS2/3 will have on us all. March 2011

Written evidence from I D King (HSR 05) 1. Reason 1.1 As a former Area Manager for at both Birmingham and Manchester I have followed the various arguments put forward both for and against linking these two cities with London by High Speed Rail (HS2). There are however some basic facts from a purely “railway” point of view that could perhaps be considered and these are:

2. Timing 2.1 Comparisons have been made between the forecast journey time and that of the proposed high speed service. However the trains on the West Coast line, the Chase 390 or “”, were built to run at 140 mph. They are restricted to 125 mph due to the proposed parallel requirement of the line’s signalling system to allow 140 mph running being aborted. The coast of resignalling the line would be small change compared with that of building a new railway. At 140 mph the time difference would come to less than at 125 mph. 2.2 Resignalling the route would benefit every point between London and Glasgow. Conversely with HS2, towns and cities such as Coventry, and Stoke on Trent which achieve their level of service by being part of the Birmingham and Manchester services would see a reduction in quality. 2.3 The “tipping point” in creating demand between rail and air is always considered to be three hours and the present service is within that time band. Many passengers flying from Manchester to London are transfer or code-sharing who would be unlikely to change their mode of transport. 2.4 Lord Adonis has often quoted to as an example of the effect High Speed Rail can have on the transfer of passengers from air to rail. This is not a valid comparison as prior to the TGV fast service the fastest train—the Trans Europe Express Le Lyonnais—took three hours 50 minutes and the normal train service was over four hours. A more valid comparison, Lille to Paris, where the journey of just over two hours was reduced to one hour the increase in usage was reported as only five per cent due in part to a regular hourly service being introduced. 2.5 The introduction of services between London and Paris had a large effect on air travel demand but the reduction of the journey time of three hours with the opening of the High Speed Line HS1 did not, with the figures in the Financial Times showing London to Paris remaining the eleventh most popular in the World with around 1,061,000 passengers annually.

3. Access 3.1 Only a small proportion of passengers live in the centres of Birmingham or Manchester. HS2 will worsen access to London services to those changing platforms at Birmingham New Street or using Wilmslow or Macclesfield stations from the residential areas South of Manchester.

4. Capacity 4.1 It is far from clear how the figures for future demand levels have been calculated. However most of the stations on the line were built when fifteen coach trains were the norm and a sizeable increase in capacity can be obtained by lengthening the short trains running at present. Euston was designed so that the platforms can be extended Southwards which is why the escalator head to the Underground is position to the rear of the short suburban platforms rather than the more convenient East side as was originally proposed in .

5. Continental Connections 5.1 Some of the comments linking HS2 to HS1 and the Channel appear to envisage frequent services to mainland Europe. There are limited “paths” through the Tunnel for High Speed services many being already used by Eurostar apart from the proposed additional services operated by the German Railway Company.

6. Effects on the Network 6.1 Large expenditure on the construction and maintenance of HS2 is bound to effect expenditure on the rest of the system. There are lessons to be learnt from where the traditional network has suffered due to the cost of the LGV or High Speed line. In about April 2008 the Cour des Comptes, the Government Audit Office, issued an extremely critical report saying that 46 per cent of the traditional network was in urgent need of upgrading and trains were being forced to travel at low speeds due to the state of the track. April 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w8 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Geoffrey Simms (HSR 06) 1. A highly topical transport subject at the present time is the Government’s proposal to construct a High- Speed railway line (HS2) between London, the West Midlands, and the North, building its case on the prospect of a journey time of 49 minutes (originally 45) between London and Birmingham. In opposition, the Conservative Party declared its opposition to the incumbent’s plans for an additional runway at London’s , promising that: “We will scrap those plans and build instead a high-speed railway line to the Midlands and The North.” There has been no explanation forthcoming to link these two quite separate propositions or, how abandoning the one, which the users (the airlines), commerce and industry, and the Government agreed was essential to maintaining the country’s position as Europe’s leading intercontinental aviation nation (and would be privately funded), and substituting a purely domestic transport facility, whose economic credentials had yet to be properly examined, was justified, and would furthermore call on the public purse at a time when public expenditure has to be drastically reduced. At the present time the only substantial domestic airline routes from London’s five airports: London City, Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted & Luton, are those to Edinburgh, Glasgow and Belfast. Much of the domestic traffic into Heathrow and Gatwick feeds international flights. 2. England has an established main line railway network linking London with its major towns and cities: Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Newcastle. The case for a second railway between London, Birmingham and the North would be based upon two important considerations. The first would ask whether the present West Coast Main Line (WCML) capacity has reached, or is approaching, its limit or, is in need of replacement (through obsolescence or decrepitude) and would furthermore consider whether the current timings and fares are competitive against other forms of surface transport (coaches and private motorcars), and what benefits might accrue to reduced journey times, and how much traffic could be won from the roadborne sector. These I shall examine in some detail. 3. First of all though, we should be clear what we mean by the term “high-speed rail”, because when British Rail launched its high-speed—Inter City 125—services in the mid 70s, although based upon 125mph (200kph) maximum speed, it has yet to deliver a single 100 mph average speed service from London to a major city, mainly, but not exclusively, because the temptation to collect the maximum number of fares has taken precedence over the provision of non-stop services to cities such as: Bristol, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Leeds. Doncaster, Preston, Stafford, Warrington and York all enjoy 100 mph non-stop services to the Capital, but these are minor cities. Assuming that we wish to advance from our existing 125 mph trains, it is vitally important that in designing the railway of the future the project fulfils our expectation that high- speed means what it says (a high speed journey, rather than a high speed attained). Clear targets must be set so that the result is not simply a highly sophisticated stopping train; always keeping in mind that it is likely to be 15 to 20 years before the first trains could run. The current projection for the electrification of the , and the three years over-run on the WCML refurbishment give the clue. Moreover, those high-speed trains would, unfortunately, have to be imported from France, Germany, Italy, China or Japan. 4. HS2 would be built at public expense. The actual train services would though be the responsibility of the submitting the most favourable tender. The question for the Government is does it have the necessary powers to compel the successful operator to provide a reliable and regular 49 minutes non- stop service from London to Birmingham? This is a reasonable point for consideration, because certain train operating companies have recently extended their journey times to reduce the risk of punctuality sanctions. Apparently, voluntarily underperforming avoids statutory underperformance penalties. Should the Government decide that this might be a sagacious precaution to safeguard the viability of the HS2 scheme, might it not be wise to apply those powers now, to direct current operating companies into providing faster, non-stop services on existing lines; if that is in fact what the market is demanding? From my time as a passenger transport regulator, I recall disgruntled bus passengers complaining that what they most wanted was reliability. 5. Several prominent railway professionals have though questioned whether the choice of a brand new HS2 would offer better value than investing more modest sums in the existing railway infrastructure to achieve similar goals. It is a good point, because the projected journeys for HS2 passengers are not of long duration when compared to existing European services, such as those operated by the French and Spanish high-speed networks. Moreover, the measurement of expeditiousness is surely the elapsed door-to-door time in its entirety, rather than any single component of such a journey. 6. The suggestion is that a non-stop HS2 service from London to Birmingham could reduce the journey time from 82 minutes to 49 minutes. That though is not comparing like with like. A glance at the current Euston— Birmingham timetable shows a service operating a minimum of three intermediate stops (the lone exception being the 72 minutes non-stop 07.30 New Street—Euston service), which could be consuming 10 to 12 minutes of the overall journey time. A third of those trains ultimately terminate at Wolverhampton. Consequently, on a “like for like” basis, the time-saving offered by a hypothetical service over an established regime is 23 minutes. 7. Some observers foresee high-speed trains with 1,100 seats, about double the capacity of existing . If capacity is of equal importance to speed, we should perhaps be asking ourselves why we appear content with nine carriage formations. The French TGV, it is true, uses nine vehicle configurations (some of which are double-deck), regularly assembled as 18 carriage trains. The substance of the alternative argument in favour of further investment in the existing rail network to overcome a perceived shortage of capacity, cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w9

suggests that additional capacity might be provided with longer conventional trains, subject to existing stations’ capacity to accommodate them. Besides, we would need to know more of current passenger behaviour, such as—the proportion of existing passengers who travel the entire distance from London to Birmingham, and who might be prepared to pay a premium for a faster service—against those who travel into London and Birmingham from Milton Keynes, Coventry and Wolverhampton for example. And how might those passengers respond to HS2? A slightly reduced version of the present service pattern might be necessary to provide for passengers joining trains at intermediate stations, and travellers to and from Wolverhampton. 8. Having built HS2, there could well be two London (Euston)—Birmingham rail services (notwithstanding that such a situation already exists with Chiltern Trains services from Marylebone), making it rather important that Wolverhampton, Milton Keynes and Coventry travellers continue to enjoy a good quality train service to London and Birmingham. Otherwise, they are most likely to desert the railways in favour of their cars or long- distance coaches. An interesting prospect arises should the traditional Euston—New Street route be run by a separate company from that which gains the HS2 franchise, leading to a battle for custom. We already know that 72 minutes is possible by omitting intermediate stations. HS2 would provide a tangible incentive to reduce this time below 70 minutes. High-speed lines depend on users paying a premium—a further competitive advantage to the traditional route operator. 9. The high-speed commuter services over (HS1) to command a 20% premium over the traditional line’s tariff. Whereas the peak hours services offer an attractive reduction in journey times, off-peak trains are actually slower than those operating over the traditional tracks the year previously; summarised by one disgruntled user as an indifferent high-speed service, and a run-down, slowed-down ordinary service. 10. Expanding on the subject of capacity, perhaps it might be reasonable for Ministers to encourage current train operating companies to fully exploit the existing network by running higher capacity non-stop trains on selected services to enable the Government to make a comprehensive assessment of the case for HS2. Stafford and Stoke-on-Trent (cities far smaller than Birmingham) have regular non-stop trains to London, whereas Birmingham, our Second City has practically none. In the case of Stoke-on-Trent, for example, non-stop journeys to London, at an average of 105 mph, take exactly the same time as those for the three stop London— Birmingham services, although the distance is 33 miles greater. Even at an average speed of 100 mph, a non- stop London-Birmingham conventional train could complete its journey in 69 minutes. There is though a risk that by increasing maximum speeds beyond 125 mph commuter services operating over the same stretch of track might be adversely affected. 11. The existing rail route from London (Euston) to Birmingham (New Street) is 115 miles. The geographical distance is 105 miles, taking a line through certain conurbations. However, should it not be possible to reduce the existing 115 miles (the recently published plans suggest that the distance may actually be greater), that will require an average start to stop speed of 142 mph, compared to the fastest non-stop TGV services between Paris and both Lille and Lyon of 137 mph. An intermediate stop adds six minutes to the Paris-Lyon journey time, as it does to the London—Paris Eurostar service. Although an intermediate stops adds only four minutes to a Virgin Pendolino, that train is braking from a top speed of 125 mph as opposed to a TGV’s 186. Similarly, when accelerating a differential applies. I shall adopt the French experience. The French have not brought their high-speed lines into the heart of their major cities; using the existing tracks for the final stretch into Paris for each and every TGV service that departs from, or terminates at the French capital. We must assume that our extravagant tunnelling proposals justify themselves on a commercial test. 12. To spend a moment considering how the Government’s aspirations compare with current high-speed services elsewhere, we have the practical example of Eurostar trains departing St Pancras on HS1 scheduled at 30 minutes to Ashford—56 miles distant; an average of 112 mph over exclusively high-speed track. The French non-stop TGV service between Paris and Reims takes 45 minutes for 92 miles—an average of 122 mph, and the German high-speed service between Cologne and ; at 106 miles—slightly shorter than London to Birmingham—scheduled at 49 minutes—an average of 130 mph. The really spectacular non-stop average speeds, such as Paris—Marseille 151 mph, Madrid—Barcelona 148 mph, are achieved exclusively over those very long distances—469 miles and 388 miles respectively. Otherwise, it can be seen that as the distance falls so too do average speeds. 13. The SNCF case for the original high-speed Paris and Lyon line was built on the sound projection of halving the journey time from approximately four hours, by existing services, to two hours by TGV, as well as reducing the 512 km of the traditional route via Dijon to just 427 km; a saving of 81 kilometres, just over 50 miles. The crucial attraction was though the two whole hours saved; making a Parisian’s business trip to Lyon a comfortable single day outing, removing the cost of an overnight hotel as a bonus. Not only was it a gift to existing rail-users, but an irresistible temptation to habitual motorists to switch their mode of transport to enjoy the time and cost savings promised. In plain terms it has been a triumph. The result of this success though is the cessation of direct through services between Paris and Lyon over the traditional route. The question already posed is will Wolverhampton, Milton Keynes and Coventry lose their direct quality services to Birmingham and London as a consequence of HS2? Another line of argument might reason that if we are prepared to commit billions of pounds to improving and expanding our railways, what beneficial effect might adding to the existing track capacity over congested sections have on conventional London—Birmingham, Manchester services. From what follows there is a strong case for a detailed survey and appraisal of the existing network in the quest for faster journeys. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w10 Transport Committee: Evidence

14. Applying a similar test to the projected HS2, the maximum time reduction for a non-stop London- Birmingham journey will be 33 minutes—based on the existing pattern of three intermediate stops by a traditional train against a hypothetical average speed of at least 142 mph for a non-stop high speed train. As we have seen, a 72 minutes non-stop journey is possible under the existing regime. Moreover, there must also be some doubts that HS2 could actually deliver a reliable 49 minutes transit time between Euston and Birmingham. As a debating point, I am suggesting that the existing service could be run in about 66 minutes non-stop; a proposition supported by a report—Daily Telegraph 16 August 2010: “Virgin Trains believes some engineering work around Coventry would, within a couple of years, make it possible for a passenger to get to Euston [from Birmingham International] in about 50 minutes.” 15. We shall hear that Virgin Trains complains that the 140 mph potential of their Pendolini stock is currently restricted to 125 mph, yet a 50 minutes journey over a distance of 105 miles calls for an average speed of 126.5 mph. A more realistic time might be 60 minutes, a figure I shall adopt for the purpose of this paper, treating 50 minutes as lapsus calami. The current timetable sets an average 14 minutes (in the range of 12 to 16 minutes) from Birmingham International to Birmingham New Street for the London (Euston)—Birmingham (New Street) services, whereas in the opposite direction the schedule is 10 minutes. As I have argued, the untested HS2 service might be closer to 50 minutes into Birmingham if it were able to match the Paris-Lille average speed of 137 mph. Even that would be at risk were those trains to make an intermediate stop, which may, by itself, undermine the entire philosophy of high-speed rail travel. 16. In summary, HS2 is unlikely to reduce the actual distance of the rail route between London and Birmingham. Should the total distance remain at 115 miles that calls for an average speed of 142 mph start to stop to achieve a journey time of 49 minutes—an average speed unmatched by any current high-speed rail operator for journeys up to 270 miles. Projected time savings are, according to the promoters, at best 23 minutes on a direct comparison with a traditional non-stop service. These would be reduced to just 17 minutes (see below) should the vision of Virgin Trains lead to a Euston to Birmingham International journey of 60 minutes. 17. Virgin suggests that existing rolling-stock could offer a 60 minute non-stop London to Birmingham International journey provided certain works could be undertaken. If that became instead a London to Birmingham New Street non-stop service, a journey time of 66 minutes (60 Euston-Birmingham Int., plus 10 Birmingham Int.—New Street, minus 4—no intermediate stop), could become a possibility within two years. A high-speed service making an intermediate stop would add six minutes to the optimistically projected 49 minutes, making a total journey time of 55 minutes in perhaps 15 years time. Even then care would have to be exercised drafting the terms of the actual franchise requiring the successful operator to schedule its services in accordance with ministerial wishes. Otherwise, there remains the risk of the operator adding a margin as an operational safeguard. 18. The test that would normally be applied in assessing the benefits and viability of a vast civil engineering project such as HS2 would be to put the current position into perspective, remarking on its deficiencies and how shortcomings identified might be improved upon. Is half an hour (or 23 minutes) saved sufficient to attract the number of new rail users necessary to fill the tripled [source DfT] capacity this ambitious project would create? An intensive survey of those such as coach passengers and motorists who travel between London and Birmingham ought to tell us what the travelling public expects from its railways in assessing the market driver for HS2. Is it price, or is it speed? Otherwise, the question has to be asked from where will the additional passengers come. Moreover, is there in fact sufficient scope for a high speed, high cost, high volume rail service over such relatively short distances? 19. Long ago there was a popular song whose refrain went along the lines of… “It ain’t what you say it’s the way that you say it.”, which came to mind reading Richard Bowker’s (former Chairman & Chief Executive, ) “Everyone’s Railway—the wider case for rail—2003” in which he wrote: “Nearly half the population uses a train at least once a year.” Put another way, he tells us that most of the population never uses a train. 20. I have deliberately omitted cost and adverse environmental impact, because the most important issue is to decide what we actually want from HS2, and why these same objectives could not be achieved—perhaps within the lifetime of this Parliament—from improvement, innovation and practical measures being applied to our existing rail network at a tiny fraction of the projected cost of HS2. However, unlike a motorway, HS2 will bring no tangible benefit to those in its path. 21. Quite recently, HS1, and four substantial railway stations, built at public expense for £5.7 billion, have been sold to Canadian investors for £2.1 billion. Apparently, the wise invest their money in second-hand railways, rather than new ones. So, would it be surprising if Britons resent their precious taxes being used for the enrichment of foreigners? And how might Ministers dissuade them that HS2 is not a similar folly. Besides, we probably need safeguards binding the project itself to ultimately deliver a reliable and regular 49 minutes Euston-Birmingham service. 22. The initial proposal was a high-speed line to Birmingham and the North. From the most recent ministerial announcement it has become clear that what is actually proposed is a more commendable high-speed network, introducing an interchange between Crossrail & HS2 in West London, combined with substantial tunnelling to bring HS2 into Euston, and a connection to HS1; to be carried out in Phase 1. This supposes that the terms of cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w11

sale of HS1 permit such a junction. Northwards, Phase1 will link HS2 (which has a spur into Birmingham) to the WCML at Lichfield until its extension northwards. At present we do not know whether the high-speed trains will be limited to 125 mph on entering the WCML. Assuming that 125 mph is to be the maximum (otherwise we have the catching-up problem), the scope for time reduction on Manchester and Liverpool services will probably match the London-Birmingham 23 minutes, giving Mancunians a London service of about 95 minutes, and 98 minutes for Liverpudlians. Because Continental HS2 rolling-stock will be incompatible with WCML dimensions north of Lichfield, a supplementary fleet of “hybrid” stock will be necessary. Incidentally, it will not be viable to route London-Leeds services over HS2 until the high-speed route extends beyond Lichfield. This limb would create a route substantially longer than the traditional , creating further potential for inter-line competition. 23. Sadly, we do not, as a nation, have an outstanding record of successfully managing our conventional railways. Nine billion pounds (twice the original estimate) has been spent modernising the WCML, yet the train operating companies still complain of its shortcomings; especially the signalling constraints which deny Virgin the opportunity to exploit the 140 mph capability of its trains; limiting them to a maximum of 125 mph. London, Europe’s largest city, is the gateway to our single high-speed line, HS1, eventually built at enormous expense (and sold within five years of completion) to take advantage of a rail served linking England with Continental Europe’s high-speed rail lines, by which, after 15 years in operation, its single international train operating company, Eurostar, serves but three European destinations: Paris, & Lille, operating 26 trains per day in each direction. The occasional seasonal services to ski resorts and Avignon satisfy but a handful of travellers. Compare then London’s situation to that of Paris, with its direct high-speed rail—TGV—international connections to Brussels, , Luxembourg, Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Basel, Zurich, Lausanne, Berne, Geneva, Milan & Turin, besides, of course, London. 24. Forcing prospective British passengers to change trains in Paris (a change of station at the passenger’s expense, too), Brussels and Lille to reach the destinations, to which Parisians have direct access, represents a somewhat unattractive advertisement for high-speed rail. It is probably an unintentional bonus to British-based airlines serving the highly competitive European travel market. Can we imagine how an airline, whose flights from London to Lyon demand a change in Paris, might prosper in today’s sophisticated travel market. In fairness to the railways, the fault may lie with the UK Borders Agency. Nevertheless, this defect should have been foreseen. 25. The nation was committed to building HS1 once the choice of a rail-based Channel Tunnel was taken. This project could quite fairly be viewed as our contribution to Europe’s high-speed network, rather than the launch of our own version, for which HS1 represents an isolated limb, until such time as it connects with HS2. 26. The French and Spanish high-speed railway routes, in the main, pass through rural landscapes whose modest commercial values compare unfavourably with the prosperous pastures of Buckinghamshire, and Warwickshire. The wider dispersal of centres of population also allows for direct routeing, saving, as we have seen, as much as 50 miles on a traditional route. They have though yet to face the full force of domestic airline competition that deregulation is likely to produce. Easyjet plans to expand within Europe in competition with traditional style domestic airlines currently uncompetitive against SNCF and RENFE. Today, only 24% of French short-haul air travellers use a low-cost airline, in Britain the figure is 48%. 27. The author of a paper such as mine has to be ever vigilant for changing circumstances. Such an event was a question and answer session at the Conservative Party conference in October 2010, at which the Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond, informed his audience, in response to a question concerning HS2, that an intermediate station at Old Oak Common (West London) with parking facilities was planned to relieve the potential embarrassment to the Underground system of 900 passengers disgorging simultaneously at Euston. It is not reported whether anyone in the audience pointed out to the S of S that the arrival of a Eurostar service at St Pancras currently creates a similar requirement to disperse disembarking passengers. And, if 900 passengers per train are destined for London, then it must be assumed that Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, too, have to prepare themselves for the corresponding deluge. More intermediate stations? We must also wonder what is in Ministers’ minds when they plan to attract road traffic into the Metropolis, given that Government passenger transport policy favours rail. Besides, we are left to ruminate upon the fortitude of those who might be prepared to tackle the urban congestion of West and North-West London just to make a 49 minutes train journey, when they have an existing hourly service from Junction to Birmingham—offering a journey time of 68 minutes northbound and just 65 minutes southbound. 28. Now we know of the Crossrail interchange proposal, (and Crossrail, with its direct link with Heathrow, will precede HS2), is there not a strong case for a London Terminus sited at Old Oak Common, or even Paddington, rather than Euston—with its vast tunnelling and station reconstruction expense—since a fair proportion of trains from Birmingham and the North may proceed to Stratford, Ashford and Europe, further reducing the burden on a London terminus? 29. A typical passenger travelling from the south by train to Birmingham and the North frequently starts his journey at a station other than Euston. The system of through [London] ticketing means that someone in , or Guildford, or Maidstone, who wishes to take the train to Birmingham buys a ticket which includes the connecting Underground service. In fact it is most likely that few passengers boarding a cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w12 Transport Committee: Evidence

Birmingham-bound train at Euston have walked or cycled from home to that station. Most will arrive by Underground, bus or taxi. Consequently, it must surely follow that the creation of car parking facilities at Old Oak Common is to attract new business of the type that has hitherto favoured out-of-town parkway style stations, with easy motorway, or main road, access. A proper comparison of potential time-savings would usually take account of a passenger’s entire door-to-door elapsed time, rather than one component of that journey, even if that be a substantial proportion of the whole. 30. An intermediate stop on a line routed through Old Oak Common, means that a reduction in the current 115 miles between Euston and Birmingham New Street, appears unlikely. A journey time of 49 minutes from Old Oak Common to Central Birmingham seems feasible. Whereas, from Euston, the intermediate stop presents a serious challenge to the objective. A second stop is risible. 31. So far, freight has not been mentioned. Bulk commodities: coal, steel, aggregates, motorcars and maritime containers are goods most suited to rail movement. Consequently, do we know what studies have been undertaken to determine whether the construction of a supplement to the WCML might give the traditional route a commercial boost in the freight market. 32. It is commendable that the Government is actively planning for the future demands of domestic rail travel. Yet, that philosophy does not appear to extend to the pressing requirement to refurbish our rapidly disintegrating A & B Class roads, nor to safeguard Heathrow’s position as the world’s leading international airline hub. Emerging Asiatic countries (especially China) wish to establish links to this hub. Otherwise, Amsterdam, Frankfurt or Paris may gleefully grab this valuable growing business. Heathrow Airport is privately owned, meaning that risk capital can be raised in the financial markets for the construction of further runway capacity. The provision of the rolling-stock (the planes) lies with the airlines, whereas, not only does the immense cost of building the new high-speed railway burden the public purse, the importation of the rolling- stock will have an aggravating effect upon our unsustainable balance of payments deficit. Our privatised railways receive annual subsidies of £5 billion. In its final years, British Rail received £1 billion. Nobody flies from Birmingham to London. The railways already hold most of the public transport market between London- Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool and Manchester. The closer we look at the HS2 proposition the more important it becomes to carefully weigh in the balance the perceived advantages against a number of obvious reservations before a decision is made, taking all the project’s complexities into consideration. March 2011

Written evidence from Paul Atkins (HSR 07) The HS2 concept, particularly in its fullest form, appears to leave many questions unanswered:

1. To what extent is HS2 required? 1.1 While there is no doubt that rail passenger demand is rising across the UK, and on the London to West Midlands corridor in particular, some of the forecasts of patronage which would specifically transfer to HS2 if constructed are debateable (Local Transport Today No.567 dated 25 March). 1.2 The concept of HS2 as a continental-loading gauge line with Phase 1 stations only at London Euston, London Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street limits its use to just passengers who wish to travel between London and Birmingham. 1.2.1 Curzon Street is not a particularly central location for Birmingham and has no interchange with local transport services to act as feeders to it. 1.2.2 There would be an interim phase where longer distance high speed trains from cities in Scotland and the North of England could use the tracks of HS2 Phase 1 for part of their journey but would have to be built to UK loading gauge for those parts of their journeys over tracks of the current network. This will lead to a series of issues about new rolling stock which will either be unusable during this interim phase or not making use of the wider gauge in later phases if the new routes are to provide increased passenger capacity rather than just a high speed diversionary route for existing capacity. 1.2.3 Serious concerns have already arisen about finding any acceptable (in a political rather than environmental or geographic sense) route for HS2—particularly at the southern end through the Chilterns and into London. 1.3 It is also debateable as to whether higher speeds, in excess of 125mph, are capable of significantly reducing journey times between the major conurbations of England between London, the West and , Lancashire and Yorkshire where the passenger capacity issues are predicted to arise. A high speed rail line over the distances between London and the West Midlands to Scotland and would produce significant time savings, but not necessarily sufficient passenger demand to justify new construction. 1.3.1 Operation of trains much over 90 mph, and certainly over 125 mph significantly increases electric power or diesel fuel consumption. 1.3.2 Straight forward electrification of those core longer-distance routes which are still operated by cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w13

diesel trains will show some significant time savings as well as general operational cost reductions. Other cost effective measures could enhance the speed and train-capacity of existing routes by way of new signalling systems, grade-separated junctions and efficient scheduling of fast, semi- fast and slow trains to optimise track capacity to ensure that higher speeds can be maintained for longer periods rather than increasing the maximum speed. 1.3.3 Deliberate lengthening of journey times since privatisation to ensure punctuality, add extra station stops and reduce fuel consumption has masked that many journey times between major conurbations (excluding the West Coast Main Line) are longer now than in the early 1980s. Just one example is the extra 23 minutes it now takes between Swansea and London compared to when the current High Speed Trains were introduced over 30 years ago. 1.3.4 It should also be noted that commercial decisions were taken to boost patronage on the new domestic services along HS1 between London and Ashford, which is still well below its forecast level, by increasing journey times on the parallel conventional services—in some cases so that they are now longer than they were before their electrification over 50 years ago.

2. Are there other alternatives to HS2? 2.1 The motivation for HS2 appears to have come from predictions that, despite radical upgrades in recent years, the West Coast Main Line will not be able to cater for expected passenger growth. Removing the longer distance trains would give additional capacity for semi-fast and local trains. 2.2 While the new and enhanced West Coast Main Line timetable has proved very successful in creating modal shift from cars and planes by filling the extra capacity provided at peak periods (morning / afternoon on weekdays and Friday / Sunday afternoons at weekends), there are a lot of empty seats still to fill at off- peak periods. 2.2.1 Wherever possible, extra passenger capacity should come from lengthening existing trains rather than operating more trains. 2.2.2 It is difficult to make good business cases for many of the recent possible orders for new trains because so much of the stock will not be fully utilised except at peak periods. British Rail and its predecessors would rarely replace all the rolling stock required for a route at the same time (as happens now) but retain and refurbish older stock for use only during those peaks (morning / afternoon or weekends). 2.3 Ticket sales data and travel diaries for London and the “Outer” Home Counties suggest that there is significant demand for orbital services around London which cannot be met by the existing rail network so that travellers, if not forced to use a car, journey into London and then out again—adding to the pressure on the existing radial services. 2.3.1 The current journey times, frequencies, fares and train capacity of many cross-country links (such as to Birmingham via Peterborough and Leicester) are so much less attractive than travelling via London that potential passengers are drawn towards contributing to the congestion rather than alleviating it. These options should be reviewed and made more rewarding. 2.3.2 Studies are already underway, albeit with low priority, to reinstate the rail route from Oxford to Cambridge via Milton Keynes and Bedford. In addition to various suggested local services, the greatest effect on the national network (to draw passengers away from routing via London) would come from a fast service linking Bristol, Bath, , , Oxford, , Milton Keynes, Bedford, Biggleswade, , Cambridge and principal stations to Norwich. Much greater priority should be given to completing the necessary studies of the various options and properly costing them with a view to early implementation. 2.3.3 This route would be complemented by the reinstatement of another short length of disused former rail route between Bourne End and , thus permitting the introduction of an orbital service linking Reading, Maidenhead, High Wycombe, , Milton Keynes, Bedford, Biggleswade, Letchworth and Cambridge. 2.3.4 A new Bedford Parkway station, located at the existing Elstow Park & Ride site near the A6 / B530 junction and the intersection of the MML and the Bletchley-Bedford Line, would permit connections between the new through East-West route and services without the former having to divert and reverse into the current Bedford Station. 2.3.5 An extension of some Thameslink services beyond Bedford to Wellingborough, Kettering and Corby (replacing some MML services) would provide good connections between these growing settlements and destinations on the new East-West route. 2.3.6 The reinstatement of another “missing link” between Northampton and Leicester (either Northampton-Market Harborough or Rugby-Wigston) Wellingborough would allow the operation of other direct cross-country services between the East Midlands (Nottingham, Loughborough, Leicester, Market Harborough/Rugby, Northampton) and Milton Keynes then also continuing to Oxford, Bristol and Reading as shown in 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. A half-hourly frequency on each leg of the services proposed into Milton Keynes would seem appropriate. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w14 Transport Committee: Evidence

2.3.7 Each of 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.6 will open up direct rail travel opportunities between numerous major settlements through Milton Keynes and Northampton which are only possible at present by tortuous routes through London or Birmingham. As well as creating modal shift in its own right, this will reduce demand on several routes into London and Birmingham where capacity is becoming a serious problem. In each case the infrastructure can be provided at a fraction of the cost of driving a new high speed line through the Chilterns between London and Birmingham.

3. Additional capacity between London, Lancashire, Yorkshire and Scotland 3.1 The necessity for Phase 1 of HS2, as a completely new high speed line, appears to be based on needing to free up capacity for the increasing demand for outer suburban services on a number of existing routes out of London by diverting longer distance express services onto the new non-stop route between London and Birmingham. 3.1.1 While good in theory, this concept ignores the significant amount of passenger traffic which joins longer distance express services towards “The North” at outer suburban stations such as Milton Keynes (WCML), Luton or Bedford (MML) and Stevenage or Peterborough (ECML), which would not be served by the HS2 proposals. 3.1.2 Indeed, the HS2 proposals are likely to accentuate the existing capacity issues by causing cause more passenger traffic to use the suburban lines into London or Birmingham to catch the HS2 services rather than travel against the peak flow join the current express services at an outer suburban station. 3.1.3 The orbital services proposed in 2.3 would have a greater effect in dispersing that part of the passenger traffic from most of the significant conurbations to the north west of London which does not have to actually pass through London and would do so in a more attractive manner and at much lower capital cost. 3.2.1 Freight traffic from the Channel Tunnel for the West Midlands could be diverted via , especially once that route is electrified, and for the North West via the same route then Coventry to rejoin the WCML at Nuneaton. 3.2.2 Freight traffic from ports such as Felixtowe to the West Midlands and the North West can be routed via Peterborough once issues of electrification and enhancing the loading gauge for containers has been resolved. 3.2.3 Investment in such projects will also free up track capacity on congested routes in the London area in a much more cost-effective manner. 3.3 Extra capacity between London and Birmingham already exists via Banbury and could easily be enhanced by electrification of the route, upgraded signalling and short lengths of quadruple track at appropriate station locations to permit faster trains to overtake slower ones. 3.3.1 The already planned upgrades of the lines between Leamington Spa and Coventry and between Coventry and Nuneaton would complement this scheme. 3.3.2 Such a service could terminate at either Birmingham New Street or Birmingham Moor Street / Snow Hill or continue to other destinations in the West Midlands. There is platform capacity available at Moor Street and would be at Snow Hill if the trams were moved into the street as part of the Five Ways extension project. 3.3.3 A new connection would be required in the area to bring such services into London Euston. 3.4 The West Coast Main Line has, only recently, been extensively modernised. Track capacity beyond Rugby should not be an issue as the line is now quadruple track to Crewe and then mostly so as far as Preston. 3.4.1 Reducing the number of short passenger trains (such as by combining the Birmingham-Scotland and Manchester-Scotland trains at Preston) and rationalising the station stopping patterns should free up more paths between Preston, Carlisle, Carstairs and Edinburgh / Glasgow for both additional freight services and 125 mph limited stop WCML express services between London and Scotland. 3.5 The East Coast Main Line, which was originally built with high speeds in mind, is approaching capacity for most of its length south of Doncaster. It is only quadruple track as far as Huntingdon, with the exception of only double track through Welwyn and Viaduct and then some lengths of triple track between Huntingdon and Peterborough. 3.5.1 Potential traffic to Peterborough itself and the intermediate stations of Grantham, Newark and Retford before Doncaster as well as stations on the secondary routes to Lincoln, Grimsby, Selby and Hull is constricted by the number of trains which can be operated because of the double track formation and the mixture of express and stopping trains. 3.5.2 125 mph limited stop ECML express services between London and Scotland should continue using this route as it has the greatest potential for maintaining high speeds. They should comprise of the maximum permitted number of carriages. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w15

3.5.3 Semi-fast services, calling at the intermediate stations between Peterborough and Doncaster, whether provided by the ECML franchisee or Open Access operators, should also comprise of longer trains to optimise path utilisation. These can be created by coupling up two shorter trains from two separate outer destinations at locations such as Doncaster or Newark for the journey through to London. 3.5.4 Freight services from East Anglia (principally Felixtowe) to the North Midlands cannot follow the most direct route along the East Coast Main Line between Peterborough and Doncaster because of these capacity issues. The most likely scenario is for them to continue from Stamford to Leicester and then use the once enhancements have been made (see 3.2.2). The original route built primarily for these freight movements (from Ely to Lincoln and Doncaster) is now subject to a lengthy diversion via Peterborough following closure of the direct link between March and Spalding. This route also requires freight trains to cross the ECML at flat junctions north of Peterborough. There are also increasing concerns about the length of time the level crossing gates in Lincoln city centre are shut against road traffic.

4. So where can the growth be accommodated? 4.1 Instead of building a completely new railway from London to “The North”, why not fully upgrade and electrify the Midland Main Line? From London, it passes through the substantial conurbations of Luton, Leicester, , Nottingham and Sheffield before joining the ECML at York. Leeds and the West Yorkshire conurbations are not far from it. There are long sections which either are quadruple tracked but not intensively utilised or were quadruple tracked and the formation still exists next to the remaining tracks. 4.1.1 The Network Rail RUS for electrification confirmed that the MML had the most positive business case for investment of any line in the UK; ironically it was prioritised after the GWML purely because of complicated issues of cascading rolling stock. Completion of the MML electrification results in most of the Cross Country network north of Birmingham also being electrified. The most significant outstanding links being between Birmingham and Derby and between Leeds and York. 4.2 At each identified location for a station on the high speed section, it will need to be determined whether it would be more appropriate to have a city centre or a “parkway” site. In either case, there needs to be good interchange with local rail services and other local public transport as well as adequate car parking. 4.2.1 The likely station locations along the upgraded line, which would not necessarily be used by all services, are: London-St Pancras? Luton-Airport? / Town? Leicester. Nottingham Parkway—but should it be at East Midlands Airport, Trent Junction or on the Erewash Valley Line near Ilkeston? Chesterfield. Sheffield-Midland Station; a “parkway” option on the Barrow Hill Line near Woodhouse would not have sufficient public transport links to other parts of the South Yorkshire Conurbation. Ferrybridge Parkway—where the Sheffield-York and Wakefield-Goole lines cross and near the A1 / A645 junction. York. 4.2.2 Platforms at other intermediate stations would only be provided on the tracks for conventional services. 4.3 Admittedly, there would be congestion issues with the Thameslink services south of Luton—particularly in the peak hours when the increased numbers of semi-fast Thameslink services have to use the “fast line” platforms at St. Albans—and at London St. Pancras, where the existing MML platforms are almost fully utilised, even though there is spare capacity at those for the HS1 domestic services on “the other side” of the Eurostar platforms. Options for enhancing the capacity of this section of about 30 miles will have to be considered. 4.3.1 However, an almost high speed railway can be created by separating out a pair of tracks for the higher speed (125 mph) trains north of Luton from a pair for slower trains. Conflicting movements across the high speed tracks can be avoided by constructing grade separated junctions at all key locations. 4.3.2 Unless relatively expensive widening of the overall railway formation was undertaken, two track sections shared between existing and proposed services would remain between: Kettering and Wigston (ca 20 miles). Alfreton (ca 3 miles). Chesterfield and Dore (ca 8 miles). Sheffield and Brightside (ca 2 miles). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w16 Transport Committee: Evidence

Meadowhall and Masborough (2 miles). Swinton and Moorthorpe (ca 8 miles). Moorthorpe and Burton Salmon (ca 11 miles). Milford North and Church Fenton (ca 4 miles). 4.3.3 Within these lengths there may already be wider formations, to support separate higher speed tracks, where freight loops etc have been located in the past. North of the junction for Leeds at Moorthorpe, there will be less of an issue about track capacity, except around the Ferrybridge power station. 4.3.4 Existing services which could also use sections of these higher speed tracks, if not calling at other intermediate stations, include: East Midland services from London to Derby or Nottingham between London and Trent Junction. East Midland services from London to Sheffield and Leeds, including new extensions from Leeds to Carlisle and Glasgow, between London and Moorthorpe Junction. Cross Country services from the South Coast, South West and Birmingham to Leeds or Tyneside between Clay Cross and Moorthorpe Junction or York. East Coast services from London to Leeds between London and Moorthorpe Junction. East Coast services from London to Tyneside between London and York. Grand Central services from London to Teeside and Wearside between London and York. Grand Central services from London to the West Riding between London and Moorthorpe Junction. 4.3.5 This would free up capacity along the ECML between Huntingdon, Peterborough, Doncaster and York, which is both shorter than the MML and already engineered for high speeds, for more non- stop services between London, Tyneside, Edinburgh and other Scottish destinations.

5. The East Coast Main Line north of York 5.1 Whether higher speed trains from London via the North East to Scotland are routed via the current ECML or an upgraded MML, they will converge on York to follow the existing ECML northwards. 5.1.1 The ECML increases from two tracks to four at Colton Junction (ca 5.5 miles south of York) while the upgraded MML does so at Church Fenton (some 5 miles further south). Northwards from York, the ECML is already quadruple track as far as Northallerton (ca 30 miles). 5.1.2 York station is likely to be included as a stop on all but the fastest-timed trains. The track layout around York Station, between Holgate Junction and Skelton Bridge Junction, will need to be remodelled to separate out a pair of higher speed tracks and platforms from conventional services. 5.2 From Northallerton the ECML splits into two double track lines to serve Newcastle via Darlington and Durham or Teeside. 5.2.1 It may be more commercially attractive and cost-effective to switch the roles of these two routes so that the current main line via Darlington is used for freight and local passenger services (which could then be augmented) while the direct route to Teeside is upgraded as a higher speed line. This concept may require the reinstatement of the south-facing junction at Darlington off the Middlesborough line. 5.2.2 In the vicinity of Eaglescliffe, south of Stockton, the upgraded route (ca 15 miles) would run parallel to the tracks for conventional services between Darlington, Middlesborough and Hartlepool and a “parkway” interchange station for Teeside could be located here. 5.2.3 In the Stockton area, there may still be enough railway-owned land to contract separate higher speed tracks through the urban area, or it may be preferable to reinstate the disused formation to the west of the town. 5.2.4 From either course, the higher speed route would then follow the lightly used Stillington Line to Ferryhill (ca 15.5 miles) and then the disused Leamside Line to Junction (ca 21 miles), just short of Newcastle. The track layout approaching Newcastle, by both the High Level Bridge and the King Edward Bridge, would need to be revised to optimise speed, capacity and operational flexibility. 5.2.5 North of York, the higher speed line would have stations at: Teeside Parkway—north of Eaglescliffe near the A66 / A135 junction. Wearside Parkway—between Sunderland and Washington near the A1231. Newcastle upon Tyne. 5.3 North of Newcastle towards Edinburgh, neither speed nor route capacity are significant constraints on enhancing longer distance services at present although substantial improvements to local services between Newcastle and Morpeth would require further investment in infrastructure to maintain that capacity. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w17

5.3.1 Reconstruction of the more exposed sections of the electric overhead equipment to improve their robustness would enhance the reliability of the system.

6. Conclusion 6.1 The proposed concept of HS2 will not address the very real issues of capacity at the southern end of the WCML (particularly from Milton Keynes and Northampton) or much of the ECML. 6.2 Political concerns and objections to any route of HS2 through the Chilterns will delay construction and, if built, substantially add to the costs. 6.3 Capacity on a number of the radial rail routes into London can be freed up for other purposes by diverting significant demand onto an orbital route (built on currently disused railway formations) taking passengers directly to known major traffic attractors. This will also contribute to modal shift, away from the car, for these journeys around the congested Home Counties. 6.4 Other than London to Tyneside and Scotland, there are few end-to-end journeys of sufficient length and traffic demand to really benefit from the time savings which would accrue from the construction of a high speed railway. 6.5 The recent modernisation of the WCML has showed what time savings and modal shift can be achieved by this method. It also highlights that the expensive infrastructure and rolling stock provided has generated an increased peak against off-peak demand which is difficult to accommodate in a cost-effective manner. 6.6 North of Rugby there is now sufficient capacity on the WCML to grow the demand for long-distance, limited-stop rail services, as an alternative to domestic air travel, between London or the West Midlands and Glasgow. 6.7 Capacity on the ECML between Peterborough and Doncaster is a much more serious issue as the double track formation will be difficult to widen. As a route originally engineered for high speeds, it should be retained for long-distance, limited-stop services between London, Tyneside, Edinburgh and Eastern Scotland and more effective services to intermediate towns on the route. 6.8 The complete modernisation and electrification of the Midland Main Line with a pair of segregated higher speed (125 mph) tracks should be cost-effective since the formation for quadruple tracks already exists for much of its length. Serving many substantial conurbations along or near its route, this project will pull some existing traffic off the overcrowded ECML as well as giving the overall capacity to encourage modal shift for middle distance journeys. 6.9 Between York and Newcastle, the combined requirements of the ECML and MML for a higher speed formation can be accommodated by further upgrading of existing four track sections and reinstating disused lines. 6.10 Overall a much more effective and affordable concept. 30 March 2011

Written evidence from Dr Paul Thornton (HSR 08) The material I have submitted is directly pertinent to the committee’s current enquiry into the strategic case for High Speed Rail. The documents particularly impinge upon the questions as set out in the committee’s announcement of the inquiry:—Question 1, Question 2.1 and 2.2, Question 3.1, Question 4.3, and Question 6.2. I have to declare an interest. My home lies some 100 yards from the proposed line. It will however be enclosed at the nearest point by a “cut and cover” tunnel such that HS2 Ltd assures that the detriment to my quality of life will be negligible. Mr Hammond cannot therefore claim that my evidence is biased as nimbyism. My only similar prior experience of submitting evidence to a select committee related to concerns about the NHS national computer database scheme. That evidence has been vindicated as that scheme has been disastrous both in terms of cost and failed implementation. I recognise substantial parallels. Not least, Ministers have been persuaded to advocate a technological solution which is more grandiose than anything similar delivered elsewhere, and that is unsupported by technical experts other than those who are likely to benefit from the lucrative contracts that will follow. I hope the Transport Select Committee will be more assertive in dealing with the naked emperors in this scenario. However, the documentation I have submitted derives not from my own opinion but was obtained through the terms of the Freedom of Information Act. The documentation I have submitted confirms two key issues. 1. Guesstimated planning, and so costing, for the routes north of Birmingham: The HS2 Ltd cost estimates for the two branches of the railway to the north of Birmingham are based upon route plans that are so vague and unconsidered that HS2 Ltd claim not to be able to replicate them. Calculations of both construction and running costs are wholly dependent on clear knowledge of the route. As cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w18 Transport Committee: Evidence

such, the engineering, economic and business cases for the entire HS2 project must be regarded as intrinsically inaccurate with massive potential for underestimate of costs. 2. The real rail priority for Yorkshire Local Authorities: The local authorities to the north east, currently claiming support for the HS2 proposals, have previously documented alternative proposals as being far less costly while providing much of the advantage now claimed for the HS2 proposals. Even with the HS2 proposals in their sights, these same authorities have continued to press particularly for the upgrading of the Midland Main Line as a priority. The strength of their arguments has even been acknowledged by the Chief Engineer at HS2 Ltd in an unguarded personal comment made in an email revealed under the Freedom of Information Act.

Guesstimated Routes = Under-Estimated Costings On the 4 October 2010 High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd submitted a report to the Secretary of State for Transport that documented their proposals for the high speed rail lines in a Y configuration to the north of Birmingham, to Manchester, and to Leeds. http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/networkoptions/pdf/report.pdf At para 4.14, Table one, it shows the route lengths for the proposed corridor between Lichfield and the centre of Manchester broken down apparently very precisely by the type of terrain through which it passes— Rural flat, Rural Hilly, Urban length & Tunnelled Length. Similarly at Para 4.32, Table 5, equivalent figures are provided for the route from Birmingham to the East coast main line (ECML) via Leeds. Urban Tunnelled Rural Flat Rural Hilly length length Total From To (mile) (mile) (mile) (mile) (mile) Lichfield SW Manchester 28 30 0 1 59 SW Manchester Central Manchester 0 0 5 6 11 SW Manchester WCML (Warrington) 8 5 3 0 16 Total (miles) 86

Urban Tunnelled Rural Flat Rural Hilly length length Total From To (mile) (mile) (mile) (mile) (mile) Birmingham (Coleshill) Leeds Centre 69 21 8 5 103 South Leeds ECML 6 6 Total (miles) 109

The cost of the construction is very much determined by the overall track length and the type of terrain through which it passes. Small changes in overall length or shifts between type of terrain would result in substantial changes to overall cost. I submitted an enquiry to HS2 Ltd under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act. The full exchange is accessible on line at the link below. http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/terrain_type_measurements#incoming-128963 I requested the route from which these distances have been measured. In response, HS2 Ltd claimed that: — no map was used in this process. — “Broad route corridors, based on straight lines (with some basic movement to avoid significant and clearly identifiable landscape features) for both the S and Y”, were used. — they are unable to reproduce the location of those “broad corridors”. Against that background, the cost estimates of the HS2 proposals are wholly unreliable. The claim that as much as two thirds of the route from Birmingham to Leeds will be across land which is “flat” implies that the responsible authors have never been north of Leicester. High speed trains do not do curves or hills. Wherever there are hills they require high cost infrastructure-cuttings, embankments, bridges, viaducts and tunnels. The notion that this route can be built with just five miles of tunnels is implausible. A greater tunnel length is proposed just to get HS2 through the Chilterns. HS2 Ltd claim an overall route length from Coleshill to Leeds of 103 miles. Constrained to that distance no route can go far enough east to avoid the . The chief engineer at HS2 Ltd has advised one of my neighbours that track in a tunnel would cost approximately ten times the cost of the same length of track in flat countryside. The submitted documentation includes a further response from Sir Brian Briscoe, Chairman of HS2 to my MP, Mr Jeremy Wright, dated 11 April 2011. Sir Brian adds little new information and continues to obfuscate. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w19

The letter confirms that Sir Brian is completely unable to substantiate the claimed route mileage and terrain type information. As a consequence the provided estimates of cost for the routes north of Birmingham cannot be validated or independently corroborated or scrutinised. Sir Brian claims that “we undertook work that was at a sufficient level of complexity for the required degree of accuracy.” The committee might wish to know what he regarded as the required degree of accuracy? What margin for error does he regard as acceptable in this “high level estimate”? And can he substantiate that such a margin of error is realistic under his methodology? It would be entirely possible and appropriate for HS2 Ltd to replicate the previous work using “online maps and online distance measuring tools” and to publish that information as I originally requested. I shall continue to pursue this directly with HS2 Ltd under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act but I hope that the Transport Select Committee will also pursue this line of enquiry. Genuine analysis of the London to Birmingham section is wholly dependent on a proper cost benefit analysis of the entire project to Leeds and to Manchester. Sir Brian is explicit that more precise cost estimates will not be published until the end of the year, long after the closure of the Government’s consultation in respect of the Birmingham to London section. Indeed, even then, Sir Brian acknowledges that the estimates can only be vague—“high level”—until the routes for the northern sections are determined. This is a classic example of the wrongly ordered decision making that results in cost creep and gross overspending in respect of public capital projects. The northern routes must be determined and properly costed before there is a contractual commitment to commencement of any part of the HS2 route.

The True Rail Priority for the North East Authorities As a Yorkshireman living in exile, I am clear that if the economic benefit to the north of England came close to the claims made by the Department of Transport, the authorities in those areas would have been clamouring for just such a development for several years. While those local transport officials have jumped on to the HS2 bandwagon, even now the HS2 proposals are not their priority. “Leeds City Region”i and “Sheffield City Region”ii are umbrella bodies for the numerous local authorities within and around each of those cities. In August 2009 they published an overview report, “The case for High Speed Rail”,iii along with a detailed technical report “High Speed Rail to the Leeds and Sheffield Regions”.iv This latter includes an analysis of the economic arguments but particularly includes consideration of an upgrade to the existing Midlands Main Line, which runs north from St Pancras, (Co-terminus of HS1) Diagram attached. That route connects two important airports, as well as the major East Midlands (Leicester, Derby, Nottingham) and Yorkshire (Sheffield, Leeds) conurbations.10 This line has not been upgraded as have the East and West Coast main lines. Its journey times are correspondingly now very slow. An upgrade to the Midlands Main Line could therefore bring many of the benefits claimed for HS2. Accordingly in December 2009, the East Midlands Development Agency, Sheffield City region and South Yorkshire PTE co-authored with ARUP a further report presenting the substantial case for an upgrade to the Midland Main Line.v This report was submitted to HS2. A FOIA enquiry has revealed an unguarded response from the Chief Engineer at HS2 to that report in an email dated 23 December 2009 sent to the South Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive as follows: “Thank you. You will appreciate this has arrived a little late to be considered within our report however we will acknowledge that we have received it and will reflect on it to Government in the New Year as part of the discussions we will doubtless be having. On a personal note—this is purely me—I think there has to be care not to undermine a very strong business case for a proper high speed line by proposing an investment in an intermediate solution which gives a proportion of the benefits and potentially allows government to say ‘they have got part of what they wanted so the priorities now move elsewhere.’ As I say, this is purely my personal comment, not the view of HS2 Ltd which will only properly review your submission in January”. His recognition that that upgrading the Midland Main Line would provide an alternative to HS2 confirms that it merits substantial further investigation. His warning seems to have had a negligible effect. The four northern bodies omitted to mention the potential of the Midlands Main line when they wrote to the Secretary of State on 6 July 2010 urging that the east branch of the HS2 “Y” route be given priority over the inverted S, although they did reciprocate their claim by observing that the western side of the country has already benefited substantially from the huge investment in west coast main line.vi However, at the same time, in a public document they observed; 10 It is noteworthy that via the East coast main line, Leeds already has excellent existing fast rail links to London such that HS2 will reduce that journey time by just 20 minutes, but this differential will be eroded further by further improvements to the east coats main line in the interim. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w20 Transport Committee: Evidence

Shouldn’t we be focusing on improving existing rail lines?vii “It is unlikely the high speed rail network will serve Yorkshire before at least 2025, so there will be a need to deliver improvements to existing routes in the short to medium term. In the shorter term, a £560 million package of improvements is expected to be delivered by 2014 to address capacity bottlenecks. These measures, along with a revised timetable, could reduce journey times to London from Doncaster, Leeds, Wakefield and York by 10Ð15 minutes via the East Coast Main Line (ECML). Furthermore, a £70 million scheme could reduce journey times between Sheffield and London by around eight minutes. Previous analysis by Network Rail also demonstrated electrifying the Midland Main Line (MML) would produce a very strong business case, with lower operating costs and higher passenger revenues covering the infrastructure costs over a period of 60 years.” And having apparently secured the Y route to Yorkshire through Phillip Hammond’s announcement at the beginning of October 2010, Midland Main Line improvements were immediately back on their objectives as essential. The northern bodies again wrote to the Secretary of State on the 11 October 2010 “While welcoming the news for HSR to our area in the long term, some existing rail routes are in need of improvements now. Existing proposals to upgrade and electrify the Midland main Line, East Coats Main Line, Transpennine and Leeds-Sheffield links can deliver substantial benefits at modest costs. We would ask that you prioritorise these shorter term investments to support the regions’ economic recovery and growth. We will let you have details highlighting why these shorter term investments represent such good value for money shortly.”

Conclusion The main claimed justification for HS2 is not the effect on journey times between London and Birmingham but for journey times and rail capacity for destinations to the North. It is therefore bizarre that the High Speed rail proposal will be considered by parliament in separate components rather than as a coherent whole project. The Transport Select Committee should insist that the proposed hybrid bill does not proceed until the detail of the entire intended route is clarified and so can be properly and accurately costed. Only from that point can the committee exercise its obligations to properly test whether the marginal benefits claimed for the whole HS2 Ltd scheme, compared to existing line upgrade opportunities, really merit the enormous additional construction costs and then the massive subsidy costs into the long term. I hope these observations assist the committee. If I can provide clarification on any of these points please do not hesitate to contact me. June 2011

References i http://www.leedscityregion.gov.uk/ ii http://www.sheffieldcityregion.org.uk/ iii http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/stakeholdersubmissions/pdf/leedsandsheffield.pdf iv http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/stakeholdersubmissions/pdf/leedsheffieldtechnical.pdf v http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/stakeholdersubmissions/pdf/midlandmainline.pdf vi http://www.sypte.co.uk/uploadedFiles/Corporate/The%20Economic%20Case%20for%20High%20Speed%20 Rail%20to%20Leeds%20City%20Region%20and%20Sheffield%20City%20Region%20–20Summary%20 Report%281%29.pdf vii http://www.leedscityregion.gov.uk/uploadedFiles/Research_and_Publications/Transport/High%20Speed%20 Rail%20Benefits%20and%20FAQs%20July%202010%20Version2.pdf

Written evidence from Adrian Hopkinson (HSR 10) Economics of High Speed Trains Please accept my contribution to the debate about High Speed trains, as one who witnesses the operation of German High Speed trains most weeks. I commute to Dusseldorf from Birmingham (Warwick). My family used to live in Germany, and I have worked there for the best part of 30 years. As a financial analyst, my work analysing industrial success has taken me to every corner of that country. 1. General summary. It is not clear that an infrastructure of high speed trains helps those at the wrong end of the railway line! On the basis of travel inside Germany and observation of what is occurring in the different areas of the country, the correlation between the existence of high speed trains and the prosperity of the locality is the opposite of expectations. Three case studies follow. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w21

2. Good conditions for high speed rail in the Federal Republic. In most cases existing railway lines could be upgraded to achieve speeds of 200 kilometres or above. The process of smoothing out curves and gradients could be achieved because of the much wider spaces available. The incentive to do so exists because the distances from large town to large town are large, and aeroplane capacity not always convenient. On several routes speeds drop to conventional speeds: ICE trains are not always HS. They are often quite conventional. 3. Case study one. Cologne/Frankfurt. Some six years ago the high speed line between Cologne and Frankfurt (on Main) was completed. Trains can achieve over 300 kph on this brand new route and have reduced journey times between these two cities from 2.5 hours to 1 hour. The route was laid alongside an existing motorway: expensive but not too controversial, and it is a completely new train route. Previously it ran along the river past Koblenz which is why it took 2.5 hours. 4. But….since building the new line the consequences for the economy and employment in the Rhineland (at the western end of the line) do not seem to have been entirely as expected. Frankfurt goes from strength to strength. It is as much an industrial as a banking centre. But Cologne/Dusseldorf (capital of Germany’s most populous state Nordrhein-Westfalen) still appears lacking in economic impetus. 5. Indeed the situation is worse than that. Frankfurt’s strength as a financial centre within Germany has increased. The largest bank in Cologne, Sal Oppenheim, has been subsumed into Deutsch Bank during the credit crisis, and many of its activities moved to Frankfurt. The bank where the writer works, WestLB, has reduced its Dusseldorf workforce by around 20%, whilst maintaining its presence in Frankfurt (and London). Its shareholders are increasingly trying to develop a new role for the bank now that its regional relevance has been reduced. 6. It is hard not to believe the HS train contributed to the increased polarisation. Thanks to the new train services bankers from Frankfurt can attend in the Rheinland, so that local banks are not so necessary. Financial services have tended to centralise further. 7. Case study two. Munich and Stuttgart. In other parts of Germany, there are also some interesting straws in the wind as far as analysis of economic consequences is concerned. Munich, the economic powerhouse of Germany, is linked to Frankfurt by trains, which only achieve HS1 type speeds on part of the route. (Prosperity can be measured in GNP per head or in terms of levels of employment). The reason for this lies in the conservatism of the electors in Bavaria and Baden Wurttemberg who resist intrusive investments which damage buildings and the landscape. Baden Wurttemberg and Bavaria compete for highest National Income per head in D. Stuttgart is HQ for Mercedes Benz, and no slouch from an economic point of view. Possibly this has caused them to prioritise roads, but it certainly cannot be said that absence of HSR has impeded their economic progress. 8. Case study three. Hannover and Berlin remain a sharp contrast to the southern states. Both are joined by excellent HSR in all directions, but continue to be economic slow-coaches. Because of their previous situation close to the border zone between east and west Germany, they have always had excellent infrastructure of all kinds. Even so Berlin still only has one or two stock market listed companies. 9. Hannover itself is an interesting case, because it was host to the German celebrations of the new millennium in 2000. In preparation for the millennium celebrations (Expo 2000), all the transport connections were upgraded. Particularly the rail connections were improved with the construction of a brand new railway station to receive high speed trains from Frankfurt, Berlin and Hamburg. Hannover remains at the centre of a network of high speed trains. The Expo was a reasonable success, but subsequently the activity level in the city appears to have stabilised. I have not seen any reports that the excellent infrastructure has brought industrial rejuvenation to the area. Rather one suspects, the opposite has occurred. Lower Saxony of which Hannover is capital has an unspectacular economic performance. 10. It would be interesting to hear evidence from town councillors of Hannover, about the contribution made to them by HSR. They would surely be in a good position to advise whether talent from Leeds and Manchester might be sucked away to London. May 2011

Written evidence from Jane Cave (HSR 11) This letter concerns the proposed building of a new High Speed Railway across Britain. I have to ask whether the people who support the building of this new railway have a clear understanding of the size of and the extent in terms of area/kilometres acres of land to which this country has already been developed, especially in terms of transport links. Do they have a realization of what would be lost if this were to go ahead? After consideration I think they can have no appreciation of either. Is it possible that people supporting this High Speed link actually believe the addition of another means of transport, running an additional and new service (with greater carbon emissions than standard speed rail), along a different route newly built over much previously undeveloped land will improve Britain somehow and help reduce carbon emissions? cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w22 Transport Committee: Evidence

This is madness: It will be a source of short term financial gain to a minority of those closely associated with the HS2 company, but otherwise it will be disastrous as it will increase carbon emissions, further reduce the small amount of land we can call rural or beautiful or tranquil. As someone brought up and living now in a rural part of Northamptonshire I love everything the countryside has to offer, I personally feel this country is becoming an environment less and less pleasant to live in. I am currently unsure how much I will be directly affected in that my home is over a mile form the route, but I nevertheless feel appalled at the prospect. The M40 has already cut through the landscape in my area and this has added to noise pollution and changed the landscape for the worst but cannot be denied that the motorway was needed. I live less than eight miles from the M40 motorway and only seven miles from a major railway station at Banbury. I am also around 15 miles form the M1. Britain is already impressively linked by a rail network. Many existing rail services run off peak are not at all fully used. It is possible to develop high speed rail links by developing the existing network. We are not “the Continent” and we are not “Asia”. We are a comparatively crowded and far tinier country in terms of land area. How many alternative, unattractive, carbon emitting physical transport links do we need per 10 square miles of Britain, (on top of internet links, web conferencing, mobile phones and alternatives to travel at all). I can only think that people supporting this high speed rail link must actually dislike Britain , including its countryside, and could not care less care about climate change, the thousand of British people who would greatly suffer or how the quality of everyones environment and lives would be terribly diminished. To remind you of the evidence and supporting facts for calling a stop to this disastrous and tragic proposal. In 2007, the Department for Transport commissioned a report, Estimated Carbon Impact of a New North South Line, from Booz Allen Hamilton to investigate the likely overall carbon impacts associated with the construction and operation of a new rail line to either Manchester or Scotland including any expected modal transport shifts, and the comparison with the case in which no new high-speed lines were built. The report concluded that there were no carbon benefits in building a new line from London to Manchester. The additional carbon from a new rail route would be larger than the case in which no new line was built. The route will greatly damage the 47 kilometre-wide area of outstanding natural beauty, the Colne valley regional park on the outskirts of London, and other areas of green belt. (Does anyone who supports this scheme really appreciate what would be lost and spoilt? Do they hate this country? Do they view countryside as a waste of space and something only valuable if it is developed on?) The High Speed Rail Command paper published in March 2010 stated that in the worse case with no shift from aviation to rail and no reduction in carbon intensity of electricity generation, the scheme would result in an increase of emissions by 440,000 tonnes per year. (~0.3% of domestics greenhouse transport emissions in 2008). The Eddington Report cautioned against the common argument of modal shift from air to train as a carbon emissions benefit to high-speed rail—since only 1.2% of UK carbon emissions are due to domestic commercial aviation, and that rail transportation energy efficiency is reduced as speed increases. The Government White Paper Delivering a Sustainable Railway states trains that travel at a speed of 350 km/h uses 90% more energy than at 200 km/h; which results in carbon emissions for a London to Edinburgh journey of 14 kilogram per passenger for high speed rail compared to seven kilogram per passenger for conventional rail, air travel uses 26 kilogram per passenger for the same journey. The paper questioned the value for money of high speed rail as a method of reducing carbon emissions, but noted that with a switch to carbon free or neutral energy production the case becomes much more favourable

Noise HS2 Ltd stated that 21,300 dwellings would experience a noticeable increase in rail noise and 200 non- residential receptors (community; education; healthcare; and recreational/social facilities) within 300 metres of the preferred route have the potential to experience significant noise impacts. The Government has announced that trees planted to create a visual barrier will also reduce noise pollution along the route. Do you really believe that this will make a meaningful difference at all, in terms of what we will loose? I certainly do not. Does anyone supporting this scheme enjoy or appreciate what the British countryside can currently offer in terms of peace and tranquility or understand the huge value of this to everyone who lives there or visits.

Geology and Water Supply Research presented by Dr Haydon Bailey, geological adviser to the Chiltern Society, showed that HS2 tunnelling could cause long term damage to the chalk aquifer system responsible for water supply for the North Western Home Counties and North London . Before concluding this letter I would like finally to mention how incredibly unimpressed by the governments public consultation website I am. It is in fact the most insulting website I have ever seen—No mention of or cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w23

detail concerning environmental impacts of any sort are even mentioned plus the detailed large scale maps are completely illegible! Please, please prevent the High Speed Railway. May 2011

Written evidence from Stuart Porter (HSR 12) 1. Since retiring as a Transport Planner seven years ago, I have retained a professional interest in transportation planning. 2. I welcome HS2 as long as its promoters are more forthcoming about (a) what other rail schemes are needed in the same time frame, (b) mitigation measures for the economic losers from the HS2 scheme and; (c) evidence that HS2 is an affordable part of a competent rail network, which can be completed within a reasonable 30 year period. That rail network needs to cover the whole of Britain with, (i) Some lines at 100mph and others at higher speed. (ii) HS2 services to Heathrow being brought forward by at least two years. (iii) The CrossRail 1 extensions advocated by Network Rail in the recent Route Utilization Study being completed before HS2 Phase 1 starts disrupting services at Euston. (iv) being developed so that its first phase could open at the same time as HS2 Phase 2. 3. I suspect the above shortfalls can only be addressed if HS2 opens a little later than 2026—now that the recession has reduced the money available for road and rail projects. A short delay would however (i) increase HS2’s Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR), (ii) increase the proportion of costs covered by fare revenue—a four year delay would change that ratio from 57% to 66% for HS2 Phase 1 and; (iii) allow headroom within budgets for other complementary projects. 4. We as a nation have so far built too little transport infrastructure, too late using too piecemeal approaches. To avoid repeating that history we need to develop an optimised combined programme with arrangements to accelerate the programme if long distance rail patronage growth is higher than expected at key decision points. The detailed arguments which have led me to the above conclusions are set out later in this letter.

Main Issue—What are the Main Arguments Either for or Against HSR 5. I see the key policy benefit of HS2 as being that it helps bridge the North-South divide that has limited growth outside London and the South East for almost a century. I want that to be delivered as soon as possible—but only after the disadvantaged areas in the South East have been identified and considered. 6. As part of the justification for HS2 there needs to be a debate about: (i) Whether we can justify keeping on building free motorways once we have exploited the spare capacity of hard shoulder running?—or (ii) Are we prepared to supplement the existing motorway network with tolled motorways whenever a new alignment is justified—or (iii) Is a major investment in the whole of our rail network an affordable alternative to both i) & ii), (iv) How are we going to solve the Heathrow problems? and (v) Is it a case of building extra runways or HS2? The Department for Transport (DfT) in the next round of reports needs to debate those issues. 7. HS2 or an independent consultant should be asked to produce a phased composite programme and identify which competing projects should be brought to the preferred route stage to the same timescale as HS2. If that analysis is commissioned now, the justification for HS2 would be stronger and there would be fewer objections at the parliamentary proceedings. If the analysis is not done design staff risk concentrating on the wrong aspects, while decision makers reconsider matters, as happened with CrossRail 1. 8. We have time to do those studies because of the hiccup in long distance rail patronage growth caused by the recession. A phased programme would need to be costed, but would be much more preferable than the unconvincing arguments in HS2’s Economic Case report (paragraphs 3.3.18/19) which say: “As a result of HS2, the number of passengers per day using Euston Mainline Station is expected to increase by 32,000…this would mean 5,500 additional passengers using Euston Underground Station in the morning peak period”. “Both the Northern and Victoria lines which stop at Euston are likely to be heavily crowded by 2043 even without HS2. Although....HS2 will add to this pressure, the number of cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w24 Transport Committee: Evidence

passengers added by HS2 is likely to be relatively small (around 2% compared to the number of passengers already forecast to be on services passing through Euston.”

9. As DfT has shown in Figure 2 of the Economic Case for HS2: (i) the rail and air market share of the domestic long distance travel market has increased markedly since 1995; and (ii) something—possibly the West Coast Main Line upgrade has reversed the growth trajectory for domestic air travel.

If there hadn’t been the deep recession, those trends would have been more likely to continue and money would have been available both for HS2 and other justifiable projects to cater for that growth.

10. Since the recession rail patronage growth will be less, but will still be enough for the peak capacity on all 3 main north-south rail routes out of London to be fully used over the coming decades. HS2 can solve the capacity problems of those three main rail lines, as HS2 Phase 1 relieves the West Coast Main Line (WCML), while HS2 Phase 2 relieves the Midland Main Line and East Coast Main Line (MML & ECML). However, the comparative stress on those and other lines needs to be reported clearly and concisely in a single document. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w25

11. Figure 6 of the Economic Case for HS2 report (shown here) reflects the reasonable assumption used by DfT and HS2 that long distance rail demand will grow at a slower pace to reach their previously assumed design demand in 2043 rather than 2033. Using that assumption it shows 50% higher benefits if HS2 phase 1 opens in 2033 rather than 2026.

12. Any delay would also improve the ratio of discounted revenues to total discounted costs and I have calculated that a four year delay would change that ratio from 57% to 66% for HS2 Phase 1. A 10 year delay might be sufficient for discounted revenues and discounted costs to be brought into balance—if the government underwrites the HS2 planning costs. The government already does that when building and upgrading roads.

13. That ratio and other information from Table 10 of HS2’s Economic Case Report is shown below. They have all been calculated in the normal standardised way and I have only one query—why have the carbon benefits not been calculated? (a) Business User Transport Benefits £11.1 billion (b) Other User Transport Benefits £6.4 billion (c) Other Quantifiable Benefits (excl Carbon) £0.4 billion—WHY Excl Carbon? (d) Loss to Government of Indirect Taxes −£1.3 billion (e) Wider Economic Impacts (WEIs) £4.0 billion (f) Net Benefits including WEIs £20.6 billion (g) Discounted Capital Costs £17.8 billion (h) Discounted Operating Costs £6.2 billion (total costs £24 billion) (i) Discounted Revenues £13.7 billion (2.25 times operating costs or 57% of total costs) (j) Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR) £2.0 (or 1.6 excl WEIs—as used in Figure 6.1 above)

14. Professor Glaister at his 24 February presentation11 explained that most of the costs are incurred before the scheme opens, whereas revenues arise later and depend upon the forecast usage materializing—an inevitable “characteristic of big infrastructure investments”. Professor Glaister argued that before starting a new project the government ought to set out (i) its understanding of the nation’s transport needs for the forthcoming decades; (ii) how it intends to meet them; and (iii) how High Speed Rail can contribute to this broader picture.

As that hasn’t been done “High Speed Rail [is little more than] an article of faith with insufficient evidence to support it.”

15. The government needs to answer those arguments by initiating the debate advocated in paragraph 6 above.

Issue 1.2—What would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network.. Issue 3.4—The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

16. The benefits of HS2 depend upon growth in long distance rail travel continuing. Some early enhancements of the “classic” network are needed to avoid discouraging that growth, perhaps by deploying HS2 classic compatible rolling stock while HS2 is still being built.

17. Extra benefits could also be available if more through rail journeys via London can be encouraged. A study of within the South East connectivity problems (including inter-airport connectivity) is needed to identify those opportunities and provide a full answer to question 1.2. Any such study should examine the opportunities presented by the HS1-HS2 link to improve domestic rail connectivity. It would complement Network Rail’s Route Utilization Studies (RUS) for London and the South East, which concentrates on the capacity enhancements needed in addition to HS2, to relieve the predicted over-crowding, but gives only limited consideration to within region connectivity.

18. To partly fill the above voids I have suggested in my Appendix, ways of sub-dividing the HS2 phases to coordinate HS2 better with other rail improvements. By sub-dividing both HS2 Phases 1 & 2 the gap between the HS1-HS2 link opening and the HS2-Heathrow spur opening can and should be minimised.

19. Both the link and spur reduce the need for some air travel and will bring some respite if Heathrow is disrupted—important policy considerations. The spur in particular would make Birmingham Airport only 33 minutes distant from Heathrow and could provide opportunities for integrated rail/air timetables to/from some destinations. Those opportunities must not be thwarted by inappropriate penny pinching. 11 presentation to the Chartered Institute of Highways and Transportation published on http://www.racfoundation.org/assets/rac_ foundation/content/downloadables/glaister%20on%20high%20speed%20rail%20-%20ciht%20cardiff%20-%20240211.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w26 Transport Committee: Evidence

Issue 5.3—Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 20. Business Users in London, Manchester and the West Midlands would be the main beneficiary of HS2 as shown in paragraph 13 above and Table 5 of HS2’s economic case report. Their gain would more than offset the relative disadvantages suffered by Leicester, Coventry and smaller towns nearer London. Those communities will become less attractive to inward mobile investment, because Birmingham is currently 84 minutes distant from Euston, whereas Leicester is 15 minutes quicker from St Pancras. With HS2 that hierarchy is reversed. Similarly affected places include Kettering where I live, Cardiff and Bristol. 21. Those relative disadvantages could be rectified by upgrading existing lines, building CrossRail 2 and the Inter-City Express proposals for Cardiff and Bristol planned by DfT. Some of those measures could be promoted as HS2 mitigation measures. If CrossRail 2 services were extended to Milton Keynes, some CrossRail 1 services could be diverted to serve Aylesbury instead. That would save around 10 minutes in journeys to Canary Wharf etc. from communities through which HS2 passes—an important policy consideration. 22. This type of blue sky thinking is needed before HS2 advance works and design decisions are finalised, to make sure reasonable longer term developments aren’t thwarted by the lack of flexibility inherent in the preferred options. In particular the length of single track provided for the HS1-HS2 link should be critically examined to see what flexibility limited dualing would offer. Operating plans during disruption at key stations also need to be produced to help evaluate other flexibility provisions.

Issue 6.1—What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? 23. The BCRs reported in Table 10 above exclude Carbon disbenefits—which are likely to be substantial if the electricity consumed is not from carbon neutral sources. The major benefits are reportedly for business users, which implies that different maximum speeds at different times of day may be justified—to optimise carbon emissions. Business use outside 7am–8pm on weekdays (65 hours per week) is likely to be minimal, whereas HS2 services are expected to operate 130 hours per week. Thus significant extra carbon benefits may well be justified by using lower maximum speeds for half the operating hours. 24. Air replacement services using HS2 and better airport connections can also help reduce UK carbon emissions and should be a key focus of the design process.

Conclusion 25. HS2 is capable of becoming a justifiable project on both policy and economic grounds if it opens a little later than 2026. One way forward could be to set up a further company to consider the above and to produce proposals competing with HS2 Phase 2 for the available cash and help convince decision makers that the necessary checks and balances are in place. 26. Pending such a study the suggestions in my Appendix reflect what I see as the relative priorities. They: (i) bring forward HS2 services to Heathrow by at least two years—possibly at the expense of HS2 Phase 2 services to Manchester and Scotland (item 10)—which benefit from Phase 1, (ii) relieve some crowding on WCML earlier than HS2 plan, (iii) build the CrossRail 1 extensions before HS2 Phase 1 starts disrupting services at Euston, (iv) open part of CrossRail 2 at the same time as HS2 Phase 2, (v) increase the BCR of HS2 Phase 1 from 1.6 to 2.0 by completing it in 2030,12 and (vi) recognise the Great Western Main Line (GWML) long term capacity problem approaching London Paddington identified in Network Rail’s London & SE RUS. 26 April 2011

APPENDIX SUGGESTED COORDINATED PHASING INCORPORATING RUS SUGGESTIONS ON CROSSRAIL 1 AND CROSSRAIL 2 A1 The following suggested coordinated phasing is based on Network Rail’s RUS ideas and my local knowledge—as a former commuter via St Pancras and reflect the relative priorities set out in paragraph 26. Item No. Year 1. 2018—CrossRail 1 opens as planned—and civil engineering resources become available. 2. 2022—Ideal target date for prototype running of Classic Compatible rolling stock as peak hour extra capacity between Ashford & St Pancras—potentially freeing some Javelin units for use elsewhere. 12 A similar increase in BCR could be possible if private finance for rebuilding Euston can be found—funded by future rental income from extra shops etc at Euston. The BCRs quoted exclude Wider Economic Impacts. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w27

Item No. Year 3. 2024—Ideal date for Network Rail’s suggested CrossRail 1 northern extensions to open to facilitate Euston rebuilding. (Network Rail’s South East Route Utilization Study Figure 8.1 shows the details). 4. 2024—Classic Compatible rolling stock introduced on West Coast Main Line (WCML) replacing shorter rolling stock and/or as extra shoulder peak services—bringing overcrowding relief. 5. 2028—HS2 Phase 1 opens using only Classic Compatible rolling stock during Euston station rebuilding—using rolling stock run-in via item 2 and perhaps interim journey times. 6. 2030—HS2 Phase 1 and Euston station rebuild completed—potentially increasing its BCR from 1.6 to 2.0.13 7. 2032 or earlier—HS2 services to Heathrow start using Classic Compatible rolling stock cascaded from the Euston to Birmingham services which hereafter use Continental Gauge stock. Eurostar services start alternating between Birmingham Interchange and Heathrow—both services calling at Old Oak Common. 8. 2034—HS2 services to Leeds start using Continental Gauge stock. 9. 2034—CrossRail 2 Phase 1 opens between Euston & Victoria/Clapham Junction to relieve Euston Underground services and improve connectivity. 10. 2036—HS2 Phase 2 completed and Manchester services start using Continental Gauge stock. Eurostar services start alternating between Manchester (via Birmingham Interchange) and Heathrow—calling at Old Oak Common to provide high frequency connectivity between more of the country and Europe. 11. 2036—Aylesbury to Old Oak Common connection provided and electrified leading to either CrossRail 1 or HS1-HS2 link—ideally using compatible (perhaps Kent to St Pancras Javelin) rolling stock. 12. 2038—HS1-HS2 link extended to Heathrow and Slough and perhaps dualled east of Old Oak Common.

A2 Network Rail’s latest Route Utilization Study (RUS) acknowledges the potential need for a CrossRail 2 station serving Euston and suggests extensions of CrossRail 2—to main lines north of Kings Cross/St Pancras and south of Victoria. Those suggestions (reproduced here) could spread the benefits of HS2 more widely across the South and could imply through services from South of Clapham Junction, to the Midland Main Line and Northampton line. That would enhance regional connectivity and network resilience substantially.

A3 The core of CrossRail 2 could be limited to Euston/Kings Cross to Victoria/Clapham Junction via a single station at Tottenham Court Road. The rest could follow, with eventually half the envisaged 24 trains per hour being assigned to a) the within and b) out of London services. The first phase: 13 A similar increase in BCR could be possible if private finance for rebuilding Euston can be found—funded by future rental income from extra shops etc at Euston. The BCRs quoted exclude Wider Economic Impacts. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w28 Transport Committee: Evidence

(1) would deal effectively with the crowding at Euston arising from HS2 Phase 2;

(2) bring central London closer to areas which don’t gain from HS2; and

(3) could benefit Chiltern residents by allowing some CrossRail 1 services to be extended to Aylesbury, saving around 10 minutes in their journeys to Canary Wharf etc.

Without CrossRail 2 or other mitigation measures Northamptonshire, Leicestershire and the area served by the southern end of the West Coast Main Line (WCML) are economic losers from HS2, but they, Aylesbury and a swathe of the South Midlands could benefit from the following potentially ‘HS2 branded’ mitigation measures.14

A4 Item 12 tries to recognise the opportunity to improve connectivity within the South East region (and network resilience) by providing through services reversing at St Pancras—by diverting some Bristol and Cardiff Inter-City Express services to St Pancras which then continue instead of Kent Javelin services. Regular services would allow Ebbsfleet to become a park & ride facility for Heathrow, but may require some Midland Main Line (MML) services to continue south of St Pancras via Thameslink or CrossRail 2 to increase platform availability at St Pancras.

Further written evidence from Stuart Porter (HSR 12A)

This submission updates paragraphs B1 to B14 of HSR 12

B1. DfT have got the detail of HS2 wrong. Complementary rail schemes are needed to make it work. Costs have been minimised, rather than benefits (BCRs maximised, allowing objectors to query its value for money. Greenguage and others have put forward similar arguments including that:

(i) The HS2 scheme has not yet been optimised, and consequently the scheme’s benefits are underestimated and the project costs could be reduced.

(ii) The Old Oak Common interchange is a £1.5 billion luxury arising from the last Government’s remit and better interchanges could be provided elsewhere.

(iii) An extra connection between HS2 and the Birmingham to Derby line should be provided as part of HS2 Phase 1 as it reduces journey times to Sheffield and Derby by half an hour and can relieve the capacity constrained Tamworth—Birmingham New St rail corridor.

(iv) The Birmingham Interchange station stops ought to be on the Glasgow, Manchester & Liverpool services—to make optimum use of the seating capacity and effectively introduce faster services from Birmingham Interchange to points north.

(v) The modal transfer benefits of Ebbsfleet to Midlands through domestic rail services have not been considered.

(vi) Operationally that could be possible using mixed Domestic/International services (by adopting one of the range of technical ideas Greenguage sets out in pages 19 & 20 of its report GG21 HSR Consultation Response Addendum 28 July 2011.doc).

I support their ideas, but am less sure of argument ii) than Greenguage pending further investigations.

B2. London Assembly observations on HS2 also criticise the detail of HS2. One of their key points is that “Additional tube capacity, in the form of a new line linking Chelsea and Hackney (‘Crossrail 2’) [as shown here] should be constructed during Phase 1 of [HS2] to ensure that local transport services are not swamped by the new passengers created by HS2”.

14 A combined Euston/St Pancras CrossRail 2 station might be cheaper and better if detailed design justifies that. Ways of funding CrossRail 2 Phase 1 could involve delaying the Euston rebuilding to an early part of HS2 Phase 2 to increase its benefit to cost ratio and gain economies of scale in procurement by buying only classic compatible rolling stock for HS2 Phase 1 and only continental gauge stock for HS2 Phase 2. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w29

Snaresbrook To Epping

Leytonstone

Dalston Homerton Junction Hackney Road Central Angel Euston King’s Cross St. Pancras Tottenham Court Road Piccadilly Circus Hackney Central

Victoria King’s Road

Parsons Green Putney Bridge

East Putney Chelsea – Hackney line station Euston - not part of safeguarding but would assist HS2 dispersal Southfields Potential core section Wimbledon Park Possible future extensions

Wimbledon

B3. Taken literally the above quote mimics Network Rail’s Route Utilization Study (RUS) recommendation that the core of Crossrail 2 is from Hackney to Chelsea, as shown in its Figure 8.2 (reproduced above). However, Greenguage argue that Crossrail 2 is only needed if Network Rail’s Crossrail 1 ideas discussed below are not adopted. Both arguments need further detailed study and the option of dividing Crossrail 2 into six sub projects as discussed here should be considered alongside both arguments. B4. Both ideas could allow Euston station to be rebuilt with reduced land take (another issue raised by the London Assembly) rather than HS2’s recommended site shown here. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w30 Transport Committee: Evidence

The Euston land-take shown here could be reduced from and south of the public open space if fewer services use the above ground station

That requires Crossrail 1 or Crossrail 2/3 to be connected to Watford DC (Crossrail 3b) & Lines (Crossrail 2a).

Crossrail 2/3 would be mainly a commuter line & would need fewer shopping/eating opportunities HS2 as commuters prefer a quick interchange to shopping.

Their platforms could be sited East of the main station below ground with subways to both Euston & Kings Cross/St Pancras tube stations (via the central concourse).

B5. As I see it, if Crossrail 2 is to be provided, the Euston to Victoria section is needed first (I call that Crossrail 2a) followed by through services from South of Clapham Junction, to the Northampton line (I call that Crossrail 2b). That would make HS2 much more accessible from the South East and leave the within London branches to be separately justified and financed. B6. In that event Crossrail 3a & 3b ought to run between Wimbledon (3a) and Watford DC lines (3b) and share the tunnels and platforms of Crossrail 2a & 2b—with lots of intermediate stations on 3a as shown above. Crossrail 2a, 2b & 3b should use what would be the low level part of Euston station. Crossrail 2 should cater for mid distance services to open up new markets for rail journeys by linking existing services (British Rail’s original idea) to spread the benefits of HS2 more widely across the whole country. B7. If the decision is taken to go ahead with HS2, radical options such as those set out above need to be fully evaluated before Parliamentary proceedings begin. The net effect of those suggestions is shown here. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w31

Crossrail 2a to Milton Keynes

and beyond (limited stops). Potential future Crossrail 3a Crossrail 4a from extension of to Watford (DC Tottenham Ct Rd Crossrail 4 stopping service)

Crossrail 1 to Paddington, Heathrow etc

Crossrail 1 to Liverpool St, Canary A Picadilly Circus

station may prove Wharf, Stratford etc

too costly.

Crossrail 2b

to Clapham Junction and eventually Crossrail 3b beyond

from 3a from 2a. Crossrail 4b via Trafalgar ie Watford DC lines For example Square & Portsmouth, Waterloo to Chessington South London

Reading & Staines

B8. Crossrail 1 also needs to be extended as shown next (from Figure 8.1 of Network Rail’s RUS) to help reduce congestion and land-take at Euston. However, it serves too many stations, outside its Old Oak Common—Canary Wharf /Stratford core—to significantly widen HS2’s catchment area beyond Stratford.

24 trains per hour 14 trains per hour 12 trains per hour Committed Cross Rail station 10 trains per hour Milton Keynes 6 trains per hour Bletchley Potential futture Crossrail station 4 trains per hour 2 trains per hour Committed route under construction Tring Potential future extensions

Line weight indicates number of trains per hour

Watford Stratford Shenfield Junction

Old Oak Tottenham Hayes & Common Court Road Whitechapel Maidenhead Harlington Liverpool Reading Heathrow Ealing Paddington Street Terminal 5 Heathrow Broadway Abbey fast service Terminal 4 stopping service Wood Canary Wharf

Staines

B9. As I see it there are four key aspects where HS2 needs to be changed: (1) Phasing needs to be tweaked—as a slight delay to the non-revenue earning elements of Phase 1 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w32 Transport Committee: Evidence

would increase the BCR by 20%. That tweaking could be achieved as shown in bold below. It brings forward HS2 services to Heathrow by two or more years. (2) Plan Bs are required in case passenger growth or signalling developments are slower than expected. (3) Long term aspirations for better rail connectivity to serve the rest of the country need to be set out. (4) The policy context for prioritising rail spending at the expense of roads needs to be much clearer.

B10. The ideal coordinated phasing which could be speeded up would be: (a) 2018 Crossrail1 opens as planned. (b) 2022 Prototype running of Classic Compatible trains. (c) 2024 Network Rails suggested Crossrail1 extensions to Bletchley/Milton Keynes open to ease Euston rebuilding. (d) 2024 Classic Compatible trains used on West Coast Main Line (WCML) replacing shorter trains & as extra shoulder peak services (overcrowding relief). (e) 2026 HS2 Phase1 opens using only Classic Compatible trains until 2030. (f) 2030 HS2 Phase1 & Euston station rebuilding completed. (g) 2030–32 HS2 services to Heathrow start using Classic Compatible trains. (h) 2034 HS2 Continental Gauge services to Leeds start. (i) 2034 Core of Crossrail2 opens from Euston to Victoria/Clapham Jct. (j) 2036 HS2 Phase2 finished & Continental Gauge services to Manchester start. (k) 2030–36 Reading & beyond to HS1-HS2 link through services—possibly accompanied by Aylesbury to Old Oak Common electrification so that Aylesbury can be connected to Crossrai1.

That phasing would increase the proportion of costs covered by fare revenue by 9% from 57% for HS2 Phase 1.

B11. A soft launch of High Speed services should be planned and a Plan B developed in case long distance rail travel grows is slower than predicted. The softest launch ONLY needs to provide the following services on launch day: — Three Classic Compatible Services/hr to Manchester (with two calling at Birmingham Interchange). — One Classic Comp Service/hr to Glasgow (calling at Bham Int). — One Classic Comp Service/hr to Liverpool (calling at Bham Int)

Euston station rebuild could be still underway. Supplementary fares (say £10/journey payable on the train) might be needed to manage demand during the soft launch period. That would: (i) allow 2 Manchester Pendolino services/hr to be used elsewhere or make extra station stops; (ii) increase capacity; and (iii) reduce overcrowding on all Euston routes.

Once the Heathrow station & spur is ready, the Birmingham Interchange stops could transfer to the Heathrow services with faster extra services introduced to other WCML stations.

B12. Changes to Cross-Country trains from south of Basingstoke to give their long distance passengers faster journey times via HS2 & the HS1-HS2 link also need to be considered.

B13. As capacity on the HS1-HS2 link is limited pre-planning for increasing frequencies is needed. That implies advance provision for some dualling of the link is needed and if 8 trains per hour are ever to reverse at St Pancras—some Corby—St Pancras peak hour services might need to operate to/from the St Pancras Thameslink platforms.

B14. All the above illustrates well how more passenger focused work could be undertaken to be sure that the benefits from HS2 are not at the expense of other parts of the country. Leicester, Coventry, Kettering where I live, Rugby, Cardiff & Bristol will be less attractive to inward investment if HS2 is built—as Leicester is currently 15 minutes quicker from St Pancras than Birmingham etc. With HS2 their relative accessibility is REVERSED unless it is revised as suggested by Greengauge or Crossrail 2 counter-balances those effects as set out above & London Midland trains interwork beyond Clapham Junction to Portsmouth, Chessington, Reading, Staines etc. September 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w33

Written evidence from Railfuture (HSR 13) This response is made on behalf of Railfuture’s Policy Committee. Railfuture is the campaigning name of the Railway Development Society Ltd., a not for profit company limited by guarantee. Railfuture has no connections whatsoever with any political parties, trades unions or commercial interests. Our members are drawn from all walks of life, shades of political opinion, and professions. The society is entirely voluntary and receives no funding from any source other than its members. Whilst we are pro-rail, we pride ourselves in being even handed and are most certainly not anti-car or anti-aviation.

Summary Whilst Railfuture supports in principal a new high-speed line between London, the Midlands and the North, it remains our view that the primary function must be the provision of new capacity and congestion relief on the three principal main lines to the North, not just the West Coast main line. Since the most effective way to maximise capacity is achieved by diverting long distance services away from existing main lines it makes sense to design new routes for high speed running. However, we are concerned that designing the new route for operating at up to 400 kmh (250 mph) is unnecessary and inappropriate for Britain`s needs, given our population density and the relatively short distances between major cities. Such a speed would create an inflexible route, which would fail to optimise connectivity and will increase energy consumption, seriously weakening the environmental case for HSR. We would also express concern about current proposals to operate 400 metres long trains built to UIC-c loading gauge that could only operate between London and a new station inconveniently sited at Curzon Street in Birmingham, therefore necessitating the construction of second train fleet built to UK loading gauge for operating services beyond the high speed route and into existing city centre stations. It is our belief that the entire train fleet should be capable of being fully integrated with the existing rail network and construction of a standard, go anywhere design, would reduce construction costs. The business case also appears to be weak on two counts. Firstly, the over emphasis on the value of small time savings, a much criticised aspect of appraisal methodology, and what appears to be over optimistic predictions for passenger demand, most of whom would simply be transferring from existing inter city services. Modal switch from domestic aviation would be modest since rail already dominates this market except for London-Scotland and cross-country routes. The need to provide a connection to Heathrow airport is contentious. Only five domestic air routes now serve Heathrow with the majority using Luton, Stansted and London City airports. Access to Central London by the shortest route would therefore achieve optimum mode switch from aviation. The proposed interchange station at Old Oak Common could indeed provide connections to and Crossrail but it would also narrow the route options to that through the Chilterns, which is already generating significant opposition. An alternative route using the M1 corridor would be far less controversial and provide superior connectivity to the east and west midlands and the north. High-speed services to Heathrow could be operated by use of the Dudding Hill loop, which would need to be electrified, and thence to the Great Western main line connection to the airport. We note that the current upgrade work being carried out on the LU Circle and Hammersmith & City lines will increase capacity by some 65% and Heathrow Express and Crossrail services would be available at Paddington station, only four stops away from Euston Square. We also note that Crossrail 2 (the so called Chelsea-Hackney line) will now have a station at Euston as well as Kings Cross/St Pancras. A link to Euston and St. Pancras by the has also recently been suggested by (TfL) and this would make the Euston station complex a major transport interchange. In our response to the questions below, we have tried to produce an objective view from a national standpoint and without local self interest bias either for or against HS2, with the aim of providing a balanced conclusion.

The Case for HSR 1.1 Driven partly by road congestion, growing environmental awareness and rising oil prices, Britain`s rail network is now carrying more passengers than at any time since 1928. This has been achieved on a network that is roughly half the route length that it was in 1928 and with a significantly smaller train fleet. As a consequence, overcrowding on many services is now endemic and the system is running out of capacity on many routes. 1.2 Demand for rail services is likely to increase still further as the population grows and modal switch to rail from aviation and road transport will continue to be driven by ever higher oil prices and growing environmental concerns and this will be in spite of recent statistical evidence showing that people are now travelling less overall. Mode shift from aviation would be limited mainly to the London-Scotland routes however, since rail already has 79% of the air/rail market between Manchester and London, 70% between Leeds and London and 100% between both Liverpool/Birmingham and London and 60% between Newcastle and London. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w34 Transport Committee: Evidence

1.3 In spite of recent upgrade work, the West Coast main line will be full to capacity by 2020 if current growth rates are maintained. In common with our other principal rail routes, the West Coast main line is a mixed traffic railway carrying fast inter-city services as well as slower regional passenger services and freight. It is the mixed nature of this traffic that constrains the capacity of our principal rail routes. 1.4 Without significant investment, the East Coast and Midland main lines will soon be full to capacity as well and there is a growing need for new routes. Since the most effective way to maximise capacity on the existing network for essential improvements to regional passenger and freight services is to narrow the speed differential by removing the fast inter city services, it would make sense to build new routes designed for high speed running which would also shorten journey times. 1.5 Shorter journey times and the extra capacity released on the classic rail network would enable rail to achieve further modal switch from short haul aviation and roads, providing environmental, economic and social benefits as a result. 1.6 Improved transport links provided by HSR help to improve the competitiveness of the areas served and can help boost local economies as a consequence. 1.7 The 1998 SACTRA (Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment) report on transport and the economy found that new transport links did not necessarily boost local economies but could also damage them by transferring jobs elsewhere. This is amply demonstrated by the effect of low cost aviation which is now estimated to be responsible for an annual tourism deficit (the difference between what money people take out of the UK compared to what other people bring in) amounting to over £18 billion and is also thought to have caused the loss of nearly 1m jobs in the UK tourist industry. Although HSR can help to improve competitiveness, success will ultimately depend on the ability of the areas served to take full advantage of the opportunity to rise to the challenge. 1.8 Continued growth in travel demand cannot be taken for granted however. Recent statistical evidence suggests that each one of us is now travelling less each year, both in terms of total distance travelled and the average number of trips made. HS2 Ltd.’s prediction that by 2033, the current 50,000 or so daily long distance passengers using the West Coast main line will more than treble to 165,000 on HS2 could prove to be wildly optimistic. It should be remembered that the number of passengers predicted to use Eurostar services have never been realised, even after 17 years of operations. There is also an overriding necessity to reduce the need to travel.

HSR Objectives 2.1 High-speed rail has the potential ability to enhance inter-urban connectivity but there are major concerns that the planned route for HS2 will fail to optimise connectivity in some areas (see 4.2 below) and it will be essential to get it right first time if HS2 is to achieve its objectives. The wider benefits of rail investment are far reaching, not least in helping to reduce road congestion. Conversely, investment in the road network can actually increase congestion through induced traffic, particularly to the detriment of town and city centres. 2.2 It is essential that funding for HS2 be NOT abstracted from investment in continued electrification and other enhancements to the existing rail network. Electrification of the Midland main line and the “Manchester Hub” scheme, for example, should be seen as high priority. A rolling programme of electrification will have growing importance as oil prices continue to rise and in view of the growing need for Britain to develop energy independency, particularly from volatile areas in the middle east. A study carried out for Invensys Group in 2007 found that, pound for pound, investment in modern and rolling stock procured more capacity than any other transport investment including motorway widening. The same study also found that for every 100 direct jobs created by rail investment, further 140 indirect jobs are created compared to only 48 indirect jobs from the same investment in roads. 2.3 There is ample evidence that HSR can achieve very high levels of modal switch from aviation and on some routes, for example Paris-Brussels, airlines have ceased operations entirely. However, Britain already enjoys frequent high speed inter city services and, as noted above, rail now dominates the air/rail market and air has the greater share only between London and Scotland and on cross country routes. Nevertheless, HSR would enable rail to achieve journey times of around three and a half hours between London and Edinburgh and Glasgow even without the route going all the way to Scotland and evidence suggests this would be good enough to raise rail’s market share on these routes to between 50 and 70%.

Business Case 3.1.0 There is no way to accurately forecast passenger demand, particularly over such a long time scale. For example, the 2003 Aviation White Paper had forecast continued passenger growth until at least 2030, and had assumed that by then some 500 metres of us would be flying into and out of UK airports each year. In reality, aviation demand peaked in 2007 and has been in decline since 2008 and rising oil prices are likely to constrain growth in the future. The “Predict & Provide” policy adopted for expansion of the motorway network has since been discredited and road traffic actually fell by about 3% last year. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w35

3.1.1 On the other hand, recent experience with reopened rail stations and routes such as Cardiff-Ebbw Vale and Stirling-Alloa and many others have seen passenger numbers far exceed predictions. However, HS2 Ltd. have assumed that passenger numbers will be over three times the number currently using long distance services on the West Coast main line, even though important centres of population such as Coventry and Wolverhampton would not be served by HS2. This assumption would therefore seem to be optimistic, particularly since recent evidence suggests people are now travelling less. 3.1.2 Most of the passengers using HS2 are likely to be those currently using Inter City services, most of which we assume would be switched to the new route. However, capacity released on the existing network could generate passenger growth on enhanced regional services. Modal switch from domestic aviation is likely to be modest since rail already dominates this market as noted above, but there could be significant mode switch from long distance car journeys, driven largely by rising oil prices. Unless fares are reasonably competitive, it is unlikely there would be significant mode switch from long distance coaches as this market is very price sensitive. 3.1.3 Over emphasis on the value of small time savings has been a major source of criticism concerning appraisal methodology and was roundly condemned by many consultants during the recent NATA Refresh consultation. 3.2.0 There is limited scope for further capacity enhancements on the West Coast main line but it has been suggested that completion of four tracking work in the Trent valley coupled with grade separation at a number of key junctions could raise capacity on the fast lines by another five trains per hour (tph) to a maximum of 16. However, the new route would provide at least 16 tph in addition to that already available. 3.2.1 However, investment in other existing routes could help relieve pressure on the West Coast main line. For example, the Chiltern route between London and Birmingham could be electrified and upgraded for 200 kmh operation and if trains were routed into Paddington station, journey times of a few minutes over 1 hour could be achieved, making this the principal route between London and Birmingham. Other opportunities exist such as provision of four tracks on sections of the Midland and East Coast main lines but these routes are likely to soon be full and require new capacity themselves. Loading gauge enhancements, particularly on the Midland main line, could help divert a number of freight services off the West Coast route. Construction of a flyover at Redhill would also enable freight between the West Midlands and the channel tunnel to be diverted away from the West Coast main line and avoid London by using the route via Banbury, Reading, Guildford and the instead. Network Rail already have plans for just such a viaduct at Redhill and this should be supported as it could help to develop rail freight through the channel tunnel to the West Midlands, South Wales and the South West. 3.2.2 As noted above, capacity on the existing rail network is constrained by the need to accommodate fast inter city services amongst slower regional services and freight. Creating a clear path for the faster trains consumes capacity and it therefore makes sense to construct new routes for high speed operation which also reduces journey times and makes more efficient use of rolling stock by cutting turn back times. However, construction of a new conventional line could enable UIC-c gauge freight rolling stock to access depots in the West Midlands and the North, a point not mentioned in the DfT HS2 consultation. 3.3 Suppressed demand for rail travel is already evident, caused by some of the highest fares in Europe and continued application of above inflation fare increases which could soon result in a downturn in passenger numbers. The practice of cramming in more and more seats into a given space, many of which have no view through a window, also creates an unpleasant travel environment and these factors conceal latent demand. Unless these issues are satisfactorily addressed, modal switch from rail to road could occur, increasing safety risk, energy consumption and environmental damage and reducing the chances of achieving Government carbon reduction targets as a consequence. The railway urgently needs more capacity, not only with new routes, but also with more rolling stock. 3.4 Cost control should be achieved by avoiding untried technology, like Maglev for example, employment of tried and tested construction techniques and the best people to do the job.

The Strategic Route 4.1.0 There are serious concerns about the proposed HS2 route, not only by those living in the Chilterns AONB, but it is felt by many that this route and the location of stations, particularly the one proposed at Curzon Street/Fazeley Street in Birmingham, fail to provide optimum connectivity with other rail services. The proposed “interchange” station at Birmingham International would also be located to the north side of the National Exhibition Centre, so far away from the existing station and the airport that it would have to be connected to them by means of an extension to the airport people mover system. 4.1.1 Euston station would seem to be the best choice for the London terminus but there are doubts about the proposed station at Old Oak Common, not least because this route would significantly lengthen journey times to Manchester, Yorkshire and the northeast. Whilst the benefit provided by a connection to Crossrail and Heathrow Express is acknowledged, it should be noted that Crossrail 2 (the Chelsea-Hackney line) will be provided with a station at Euston and would provide a direct connection with Crossrail 1. It should also be noted that Heathrow Express services at Paddington will be only four stops away from Euston on the upgraded cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w36 Transport Committee: Evidence

Circle and Hammersmith & City lines which will see capacity increased by about 65%. The rebuilt Euston station would no doubt be provided with a direct link to Euston Square station. 4.1.2 A further possibility, proposed by Network Rail amongst others, consists of a connection between the West Coast main line and Crossrail. This would enable outer London commuter services from Milton Keynes for example, to be routed into Crossrail, helping to reduce the need to widen Euston station. Another such enabler would be diversion of Watford DC line services to the . 4.2.0 A major concern about the currently proposed route centres on the lack of connectivity. Clearly, if the primary objective of HSR is to increase capacity on the existing network by transferring inter city services onto the new route, the new HS services will need to mirror the connectivity provided by inter city services as closely as possible. A notable failure of HS2 is its inability to serve Coventry and Wolverhampton and Phase Two would fail to serve Stoke on Trent, Crewe and Stockport as well as Leicester and Nottingham. This being so, some form of high speed inter city service resembling current service would still be needed on the West Coast main line and ultimately, the Midland main line as well, reducing some of the benefits provided by the new capacity. 4.2.1 It will therefore be necessary for the new HS route to be fully integrated with the existing rail network at strategic locations so that HS services can access existing city centre stations and, given the spread of major cities either side of the Pennines, a Y shape network would seem to offer optimum connectivity. Apart from current plans for HSR to reach Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds, HS services should also serve Liverpool, Preston, Carlisle, Darlington, Newcastle, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen. 4.2.2 However, if connectivity provided by current inter city services is to be closely matched, intermediate cities such as Derby, Durham, Stafford, York and Wakefield will also need to be served by HS services. 4.3 The Government is correct to build HSR in stages to the north of London but each stage should be planned with future extensions in view. 4.4.0 Linking HS1 to HS2 would enable services from the European mainland to reach destinations to the north of London but a market survey should be carried out before money is spent on providing costly new city centre stations equipped to handle rolling stock built to the larger UIC-c loading gauge which would also require new routes to be built into city centres. A more cost effective solution, at least initially, could consist of a below ground level pedestrian travelator linking Euston with St. Pancras/Kings Cross stations. Such a link would be very beneficial with or without HS2. There are concerns that the proposed HS1/HS2 link would create major congestion problems on the North London line which is already very busy with and numerous freight services, which are likely to increase once the new Thames Haven container port is operational. It should be remembered that Eurostar plans to operate through services from the continent to destinations north of London were cancelled due to lack of demand. 4.4.1 The need to connect HS2 with Heathrow is contentious. Only five domestic mainland air routes serve Heathrow airport with the majority now using Luton, Stansted and London City airports. As noted above, rail already dominates market share between London and Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Newcastle, leaving only Scottish destinations where significant mode shift from aviation could be won by HSR. There are no flights between Birmingham or Liverpool and London. However, the majority of passengers still flying to Heathrow are “inter lining” and they are likely to continue to fly even with a connection to HS2 because airfares are normally inclusive of connecting flights. 4.4.2 By far the biggest market is city centre to city centre and diverting HS services to Heathrow or Old Oak Common instead of central London would generate a significant time penalty for passengers wishing to travel to northern cities with the sole exception of Birmingham. Clearly, designing the shortest route between London and the north should be a primary objective if modal shift from aviation is to be maximised. 4.4.3 It would seem, therefore, that the principal benefit of a link to Heathrow would accrue from provision of HSR links to those cities that have no convenient link to international air services, but it should be noted that Birmingham International airport has been awarded planning approval for a runway extension which will enable it to handle a wider range of international flights.

Economic Rebalancing and Equity 5.1 As noted at 1.7 above, the SACTRA report found no evidence that HSR would automatically promote economic regeneration and it could even widen the north-south divide unless the communities served take advantage of the opportunity to become more competitive. 5.2 HSR could be used to aid regional regeneration but local issues could work to the disadvantage of strategic objectives and connectivity. This is apparent with the plan to provide a new HSR station in Birmingham that would be divorced from the main city centre station at New Street, thereby failing to achieve essential connectivity with other rail services. 5.3 We have chosen not to respond to this question. 5.4.0 With regard to the EU TEN-T Programme; before seeking support from the EU’s TEN-T fund the UK Government should seek a derogation from the rule that HS trains should be 400 metres in length and built to cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w37

UIC-c loading gauge as this will preclude their operation into a number of existing city centre stations, notably Birmingham New Street, and from being integrated with the existing rail network. 5.4.1 The rolling stock issue related to conditions for EU funding would also require Britain to procure two incompatible train fleets, one built to UIC-c loading gauge and a length of 400 metres that would be confined to operating only between the rebuilt London Euston and the new Curzon Street station in Birmingham, and the other built to UK loading gauge for operating into city centre stations over the existing rail network. A single train fleet built to the latter category would cut unit train costs and it should be noted that the original TGV fleet is not built to UIC-c gauge anyway. 5.4.2 Another proposal would require trains to be built to a length of 200metres, coupled together to make a full-length train, which could then be split so that each half could serve different destinations. Whilst there may be some locations where this could work, it would require stations with platforms long enough to facilitate the joining and splitting operation. However, most of the cities likely to be served by HSR are already served by nine car inter city trains that are longer than 200 metres and are about to be lengthened to overcome overcrowding. It would seem therefore, that a fleet of trains up to 12 cars or 300 metres in length would be more appropriate. Given the foregoing, unless the UK Government is able to obtain a derogation from the EU TEN-T conditions, it may be more cost effective to forgo EU funding contributions and design the route and train fleet to best suit our unique requirements.

Environmental Impact 6.1.0 Given the current power generation mix, there is considerable concern that current plans for HS2 to be designed for operation at speeds up to 400kmh would seriously weaken the environmental case for HSR. Since wind resistance increases with the square of the speed, it would require twice as much energy to propel a train at 400 kmh as at 300 kmh. It follows, therefore, that carbon emissions would also double at this speed. Taking into account the buried cost of carbon (that which is emitted during the construction process), it is doubtful if HS2 could provide any environmental benefits as it is currently proposed. 6.1.1 At 400 kmh, the minimum radius curve would be 7,200 metres (approximately 5 miles) and this results in higher construction costs and a very inflexible route, which would inevitably compromise the ability of the route to achieve optimum connectivity with the existing rail network. 6.1.2 Given Britain`s population density and the comparatively short distances between major conurbations, designing the route for operation at 400kmh is both unnecessary and inappropriate. Capacity and connectivity should therefore be accorded the highest priority. It is notable that even China is reported to be reducing its HSR speeds to around 300kmh. 6.1.3 Noise levels would also be greater at 360/400 kmh than at the normal HSR speed of 300 to 320 kmh. 6.2 Given the foregoing, we do not believe the environmental costs have been adequately accounted for in the business case. 6.3 The capacity released by diverting inter city services from the existing network onto HSR would enable significant increases for freight and regional services to be catered for. Modal switch of road freight to rail would generate strong environmental and congestion benefits and this factor must feature in the business case. 6.4 Given that HS2 is only at the consultation stage at the present time, disruption to existing services will depend largely on the eventual route agreed upon but the rebuilding of Euston station would be a major factor.

Key Points — The primary objective for new HSR routes must be the provision of extra capacity achieved by diverting high-speed inter-city services away from the existing rail network. — To achieve this, it will be necessary for HSR services to match as closely as possible the connectivity provided by those inter-city services. — Current HS2 plans would benefit Birmingham but to the disadvantage of Coventry and Wolverhampton and other cities to the North East and the East Midlands (Leicester & Nottingham could not be connected to HS2 under current plans). — Plans to operate trains at up to 400 kmh are unnecessary and inappropriate for Britain`s needs. — Designing the route for 300/320 kmh operation would produce a more flexible route better able to optimise connectivity and reduce the need for expensive tunnelling and noise mitigation. — Connecting London to an inconvenient new station in Birmingham in 49 minutes would be largely pointless if passengers are to be faced with a 10-minute walk to make onward connections at New Street station or to reach the city centre. — The need to serve Heathrow airport is tenuous and the proposed station at Old Oak Common would determine that the route would have to be through the Chilterns AONB, precluding other options. Should a route using the M1 corridor be adopted, high-speed services to Heathrow could be provided by upgrading and electrifying the Dudding Hill Loop in North West London and, thence to the airport via a connection from the Great Western main line. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w38 Transport Committee: Evidence

— A more flexible route would open up a wider choice of route options, notably the M1 corridor which, being more central, could provide a shorter route to Yorkshire and the north east and facilitate a connection into the existing route to Coventry and Birmingham New Street station. — We would earnestly advise the Transport Select Committee to recommend the UK Government to appoint an independent study, employing rail industry experts, to examine alternative route options for HSR including the above criteria in its Terms of Reference. May 2011

Written evidence from Malcolm Griffiths, Bluespace Thinking Ltd. (HSR 15) 1. Summary 1.1 There is not a strategic, business or environmental case for building a totally new 250mph UK High Speed Rail (HSR) network serving only major cities and “by-passing” 42% of the business population on the route. There is a case to progressively enhance the existing rail routes to form a reliable and comfortable 125–140 mph High Speed Rail network serving all areas of the UK. 1.2 The HS2 passenger forecasts are over estimated due to DfT Webtag guidance not being up to date and HS2 Ltd having ignored the guidance concerning growth capping. HS2 HSR proposals do not provide an effective solution to the increase in passenger demand forecast or flexibility in the event the demand predications are not correct. 1.3 There are alternative HSR solutions that provide sufficient capacity for the next 40+ years. The alternatives would cost about £27 billion less than the HS2 Y scheme leaving money to be spent on transport projects targeted to enhance economic regeneration. 1.4 Demand reduction on existing rail lines caused by HS2 will result in the need for increased fares, subsidy or the reduction of services. Splitting passengers and fare revenue between two systems will create inefficiencies, raise costs and complicate transport transfers. 1.5 HS2 Ltd. forecast that when complete 43,000 passengers/day will travel between Scotland and London on HS2, more than are forecast to travel to/from Birmingham—forecasts confirmed by HS2 Ltd and the DfT.15 The HS2 Y scheme utilises all available train slots on the new track but provides just 18 trains/day in each direction to and from Scotland about a third of the number required to meet the demand predicted

2. Introduction 2.1 High Speed Rail in the UK has become synonymous with the current HS2 proposals, Arguments against HS2 are its very high cost, the impact on the 350+ mile route to the local environment, its limited effectiveness in improving inter urban connectivity. These problems do not exist with other HSR solutions. 2.2 As well as highlighting the errors and omissions in the HS2 analysis this paper compares the 225–250mph HS2 proposals with an alternative scheme of improvements, on the existing lines, raising train speeds above 125mph, the EU definition of HSR, which increase capacity and reduce journey times.

3. HS2 Passenger Forecasts and Benefits Predictions are over Estimated 3.1 HS2 Ltd have reduced the “HS2 to West Midlands” passenger demand forecasts by about 40%, but they are still based on long distance elasticities. The DfT know that there are errors in the forecasts—quote “We agree that the PDFH 4.1 recommendations produced infeasibly large elasticities”. New analyses by DfT researchers and a revised version of the DfT guidance has not been approved for use by the Secretary of State.16 Current DfT guidance requires promoters to carry out sensitivities with specific elasticity caps, these have not been carried out on HS2. 3.2 Although WebTAG (Unit 3.13.1) specifies that rail demand forecasts should be capped at 2026 predicted levels HS2 Ltd initially allowed growth to continue until 2031, as the economic case has collapsed they have extended the growth to 2043 twice the period specified in the DfT guidance. 3.3 The principle economic benefits of ultra fast 250 mph rail is calculated to be business user time saved and assumes business users are not able to work on trains. The DfT have accepted that this assumption is wrong but say that because people can not work on overcrowded trains the overcrowding benefits should be higher. This will have the effect of substantially reducing the benefits of HS2 while increasing the calculated benefits of the alternative 125–140 mph HSR improvement schemes on existing lines. 3.4 The value of business user time saved is based on 2002 users socio economic profiles and salaries that are increased over the evaluation period to 2086 at about 2%/year (real GDP/capita growth) above inflation. The 2002 DfT analysis suggests that only the highest 10% of earners used trains for business travel, HS2 Ltd 15 HS2 Ltd Demand and Appraisal Report March 2010 16 DfT Webtag guidance 3.15.4 in DRAFT cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w39

forecasts assume this in-equality will continue even though they anticipate a tripling of business rail travel on the routes.17 3.5 Each of the four flaws (elasticities, growth capping, time saving and value of time) if corrected would bring the already low cost benefit ration of 1.6 nearer to 1, the point at which there is no benefit in doing the project. Combined they bring the NBR below 1, the project actually destroys value. In addition the HS2 comparison is made against an out of date “do minimum case” HS2 are claiming benefits for an improved frequency of trains that has already occurred on the West Coast Main Line. 3.6 The prescriptive nature of DfT Webtag guidance is in part to ensure that projects are evaluated on an equal basis, the extent of these flaws undermine this intent. All local, regional and inter regional transport projects would have substantially improved economics if 2026 growth capping was not applied, the other issues would impact projects in different ways.

4. HSR Alternatives to HS2 4.1 In 2010 2,200 passengers/day travelled by rail to or from Scotland to or from London,18 and 13,500 travelled by air to/from Glasgow/Edinburgh to/from all five London airports.19 Air travel has declined 20% since 2005 however HS2 Ltd predict that when HS2 is extended to Glasgow it will transport 43,000 passengers/ day to or from London. The Y scheme schedules show 18 trips/day to Scotland and utilises all the trains slots, 18/hour, available on the new line. 4.2 This shows that HS2 is not a viable solution for the demand predicted, while the high speed line will probably never be extended to Scotland if the demand predicted for Scotland and the North East is to be met services to Birmingham, Leeds, or Manchester would need to be reduced. 4.3 The DfT have published limited information about three alternative schemes to HS2, non of them are optimal however they show clearly that there are better solutions to the need for increased capacity.20 Their Scenario B scheme shows load factors of less than 51% can be achieved in 2043 on the existing routes, whereas HS2 to West Midland would have a load factor of 58% at this time.

5. Comparison of Costs, Benefits and Economics 5.1 Because the DfT benefits calculations are weighted heavily towards business time saving, rather than the provision of transport capacity where it is needed, and because it is sub optimal the predicted Net Benefit Ratio (NBR) for the DfTs Scenarios B scheme is 1.4, slightly below that predicted for the HS2 to West Midlands scheme. 5.2 The cost estimates for Scenario B includes projects that are already in the do minimum case, provide capacity that is not required and projects that would be required even if HS2 proceeded. The estimates for rolling stock and operating costs in the alternative schemes are also inflated to allow for contingencies as if they were un-proven technology trains. 5.3 The alternative schemes need to be compared with the HS2 Y scheme as they provide sufficient capacity to deal with all three North-South routes for the next 40–50 years not just the West Coast Mainline. 5.4 Based on the work carried out by Atkins for the DfT it is possible to develop a more optimal “Alternative scheme” that would meet the predicted demand at lower load factors than the HS2 Y scheme. This scheme can be developed for an infrastructure cost of about £8.3 billion, a day one rolling stock cost of about £1.7 billion and an initial annual operating cost of £0.28 billion.21 This compares with the HS2Y scheme having an infrastructure cost of £32.1 billion, rolling stock cost of £5.3 billion and annual operating cost of £1.1 billion. 5.5 As well as releasing £27 billion of investment funds for transport or other projects, with higher NBR returns and targeted specifically to support economic development, the Alternative scheme will need less ongoing subsidy or could be run with lower fares. 5.6 If the time saving predicted by HS2 Ltd is achievable, if the demand does exist, if it were true that business user can not work on trains and that their value of time does increase to £180/hour (un-inflated 2010 £s) by 2086 then HS2 is forecast to add £19.3 billion in journey time savings. 5.7 HS2 Ltd also claim that it will create about £4.1 billion in reliability saving. It is assumed that HS2 trains on the HSR track will on average be 6 seconds late versus 2–5 mins for conventional trains and that the value of time associated with trains being late is three times the normal rate. There is no technical basis for these assumptions, indeed the technical experts have doubts about the ability to run 18 trains/hour let alone do so with only an average six second delay. The value figure is acknowledged as a “perception of value” it does not translate to individual or community benefit but is included in the HS2 benefit calculation.22 17 DfT Webtag guidance 3.5.6 HS2 Ltd Model Development & Baseline Report April 2011 18 Office of the Rail Regulator Regional Trends 19 Civil Aviation Authority Statistics 20 DfT Strategic Alternatives to the proposed HS2 Y network 21 Based on the Atkins information provided. Further detail has been requested from the DfT by FOI request. 22 HS2 Ltd Demand Model Analysis Feb 2010. HS2 Ltd Valuing the benefits of Hs2 April 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w40 Transport Committee: Evidence

5.8 Assuming the HS2 analysis were correct Table 1 provides Present Value and the Net Benefit Ratio calculations for HS2 and the Alternative of substantial improvement to the existing lines.23

Table 1 ECONOMIC EVALUATION £ BILLION—PRESENT VALUES HS2 phase 1 HS2 Y Alternative only scheme scheme Consumer benefits £6.40 £13.10 £5.57 Business benefits £11.10 £25.20 £5.83 Other benefits £0.40 £1.70 £0.00 Tax reduction –£1.10 –£2.70 –£0.92 Revenue £13.70 £27.20 £9.49 Capital cost £17.80 £30.40 £6.95 Operating cost £6.20 £13.90 £5.06 Net Benefit Ratio (NBR) 1.631067961 2.18128655 4.149984684 Wider economic benefits £4.00 £6.30 Not calculated Funds available for investment £17.90 £0.00 £27.50 elsewhere

5.9 The Alternative meets the demand required, it can be carried out in stages and optimised to meet actual demand, it leaves £27 billion of funds to invest in public transport and urban roads de congestion projects that will have NBRs in excess of four. The Alternative with an estimated NBR over four is substantially better use of public funds. 5.10 If current evidence is used for the demand elasticities and value of time saving, and HS2 reliability assumptions were realistic, HS2 economics become substantially worse, however due to the impact of the DfT suggested transfer of value from time saving to overcrowding the Alternative scheme could have an NBR above six.

6. Transport Impact on Economic Regeneration 6.1 Estimates of wider economic benefits are provided for HS2 but have not been published for the alternative schemes. With the reduction in demand on the existing lines future services will require subsidy. This subsidy maybe included in the HS2 analysis but in 20 years time decisions will be based on the usage of the lines and, other than commuter lines, heavily subsidised services will probably be cut. If long distance travellers move to HS2 as predicted, mid to long distance connectivity for those not living in the major cities will be reduced. 6.2 HS2 Ltd predict that 42% of the schemes economic benefits will flow to London and the South East. In her evidence to the Select Committee the Rt Hon.Theresa Villiers cited Cross Rail as an example of a transport scheme predicted to add £50 billion to GDP, it is now clear that this number is based on TfL assumptions and is not in accordance with DfT guidance. DfT analysis predicts the impact of the £16 billion scheme will be between £7–18 billion “total” improvement in GDP24 Economic regeneration should not just be about London, commuter transport in regional urban conurbations and the improvement of interconnectivity between all major UK locations will provide greater general economic benefit. 6.3 Based on Office of National Statistics data London is the most economically productive location in the UK but it has the lowest level of business journeys (any length including within London, and by any measure eg /population,/employment,/GVA) of any area,. In contrast the West Midlands has the highest number of business journeys but has one of the lowest rates of GVA/capita, there is no evidence to suggest that increased numbers of business journeys translate to improved economic development.25 6.4 Developing calculations of wider economic benefits or GDP benefit based on differing local assumptions and unproven methodology may lead to seriously flawed conclusions. There is conflicting evidence and insufficient academic understanding of the modelling and analysis of these benefits and dis-benefits to expect that including them will improve decision making.

7. The Impact on Passengers from the West Midlands, Wigan, Glasgow and Edinburgh 7.1 Computer output of economics does not explain the detailed impact on individuals and communities of changes in transport services. We look at a few examples. 7.2 The West Midlands is currently served by 11 major stations with direct access to London. These are shown with their catchment areas as short black arrows on the map. Although direct services to these stations may continue the frequency of service will reduce and journey times will be longer. There are also three other significant rail catchments that go via either Birmingham New Street or south via Newport. 23 DfT HS2 Ltd Economic case for HS2 Feb 2011. DfT 24 Cross Rail Business case July 2010 TfL, Cross Rail, Mayor of London, DfT 25 Office of National Statistics accessed via popanalyser.com cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w41

7.3 HS2 Ltd assume that about 75%, of the West Midlands population travelling to London will travel to Birmingham to join HS2. HS2 trains will go from a new station at Curzon street or a new parkway station, those that want to join HS2 by train will need to change station with a 10–15 min walk or bus transfer. If the 3.6 million people who live outside of the Birmingham catchment travel by car to the HS2 stations this will add to the road congestion that already exists in Birmingham. Given that people will be substituting a 1 hour 40 mins train journey, where they can read, relax or work, for a combination of rail, car, bus, walking and waiting time, it is doubtful it will be more productive, even if it is marginally faster. The details of the HS2 analysis released 13 April 2011 show that for commuters, journey time will actually increase.26 7.4 Apart from those directly impacted by the HS2 route the West Midlands maybe the region with that will suffer most from HS2. Further North the impact of stopping at only a few major stations or parkways is less severe although our analysis shows that HS2 “by-passes” about 42% of people living on the routes. 7.5 The HS2 Y service planned for Wigan is similar to the current service, one direct train/ hour through the day, two at peak times, the service will be faster. The capacity of each train will be similar to those running at the time on the West Coast Main Line. However as the HS2 train to Wigan will be the only HS2 train serving Scotland it will be crowded. There is not capacity for additional trains, as the service becomes too crowded to operate it is probable that the direct fast service to Wigan will cease in favour of through trains to Scotland. While the capacity to run trains on the WCML will exist continued frequent direct trains from Wigan to London will be dependant on there being sufficient demand for the service without the more northerly passengers. It is not clear whether passengers from locations like Carlisle will continue to have a regular direct service to London. 7.6 The HS2 Y scheme does not show any direct trains to Edinburgh although it is possible that hourly trains will alternate between Glasgow and Edinburgh.27 Overcrowding will increase as demand builds up, in the event the HSR line is built to Glasgow then longer trains can be run but a more frequent service is not possible unless services to Birmingham, Leeds or Manchester are reduced. The direct Edinburgh service on the ECML will presumably continue although if the demand reduces due to travellers favouring HS2 it is possible that frequency will reduce or fares increase to limit the subsidy required. 7.7 We have asked both the DfT and HS2 Ltd how HS2 will provide an adequate service to Scotland to meet their demand forecast and what they believe will be the load factors on the service in 2033 both before and after the Y scheme is completed. They are not able to answer these questions. 7.8 We understand that the final report on “A High Speed Rail Network Strategy for Britain” published by (23 October 2009) by SYSTRA and MVA (two internationally recognised rail consultancies) advised that the maximum number of trains that could run at 225 mph was 17/hour at peak times 14/hour on 26 HS2 Ltd /www.hs2.org.uk/supporting-documents-temp 27 DfT Economic case for HS2 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w42 Transport Committee: Evidence

average through the day. (the report was published on the Greegauge 21 website but has been removed).28 We understand that HS2 Ltd are aware of the recommendation but are hopeful that new technology (braking and signalling) will enable the 18/hr peak and 16/hr average that they have assumed. They have however costed the rolling stock as off the shelf current technology HSR trains. In the event only 14 trains/hour can be run there will be little point in extending the service to both Manchester and Leeds as the section of line into London will not be able to cope with the number of trains required.

8. Impact on Climate change (CO2 emissions)

8.1 Neither the DfT or HS2 Ltd claim that HS2 will reduce emissions although if the shorter rail journeys reduce air journeys by 11,415/day, which is the assumption in the Y scheme, then the extra emissions caused by the increased speed are offset by the flight reductions. An alternative 125 mph scheme produces less direct emissions therefore has the same overall emissions without the need to reduce air flights, although the analysis shows a reduction in air flights will occur anyway. Assuming the Governments recently proposed 2030 floor price of £30/tonne, the CO2 emitted by HS2 or the Alternative equates to a cost of £4,000/day or £100 million (un-discounted) over the 60 year evaluation period.

8.2 It is possible to make assumptions about energy fuel mix, passenger demand forecasts and technology improvement to sway the argument either for or against HS2 but realistically the difference is minimal neither scheme makes a significant reduction in emissions. It would be far more productive both economically and environmentally to invest £100 million in carbon reduction schemes in developing countries or UK domestic insulation schemes than to try and reduce domestic flights between London and Scotland, beyond that which is already occurring, by investment in a new 225–250 mph rail system.

9. Noise

9.1 HS2 Ltd predict that 4,700 houses will be impacted by the noise from HS2 to West Midlands with 150 of them requiring sound insulation and noise protection,29 scaling up for HS2 Y about 10,000 homes may be adversely impacted in total. If the loss of property value and amenity, particularly the use of gardens and external areas, devalues house by 10–15% then the total impact could be about £500 million. This level of impact is not in the HS2 Ltd evaluation, it depends on the compensation scheme whether this becomes a cost to Government or whether private individuals suffer this as a personal loss.

10. Security

10.1 If, due to terrorism or mechanical failure, a train were to derail at speed onto the second line it is unlikely oncoming trains would be able to stop in time to avoid a crash. Apparently for HS2 no time has been allowed for passenger security checks to take place. Impact mitigation is best achieved by multiple transport systems and limiting damage as a result of fire, explosion or systems sabotage. The high profile nature and single route aspect of HS2 combined with the number of tunnels, extreme speed and frequency of trains are major concerns with regard to security and the impact of any failure.

11. Conclusions

11.1 Discussion about UK strategic transport needs has been been polarised by the HS2 proposals. HS2 Ltd and the DfT have substantially reduced their passenger demand forecast, accepted that the value of time savings from HSR are over stated and the HS2 economics show, at best, a low return.

11.2 Rather than conclude that the UK can not afford an improved HSR network it is time to promote lower cost HSR projects that can both add the required capacity to the UK rail system and improve, rather than fragment, inter urban connectivity. The money saved by this approach can be invested in other public and private transport improvements particularly urban congestion and strategic road bottlenecks.

Acknowledgement

The DfT and HS2 Ltd have been helpful in the provision of information to enable an evaluation of the proposals. HS2 Ltd issued further detailed information on the HS2 Y scheme on the 13 April 2011 which we have taken into account in our submission. We have requested further information on the alternative schemes from the DfT but do not anticipate receiving this prior to 16 May 2011. May 2011

28 MVA Consultancy www.mvaconsultancy.com/news/2009/high_speed_rail.html 29 HS2 Ltd Appraisal of Sustainability presentation March 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w43

Supplementary written evidence from Malcolm Griffiths, Bluespace Thinking Ltd. (HSR 15A) 1. Summary 1.1 The HSR Command paper presented to Parliament (March 2010) recommended progressing HS2 based on answers to a number of key questions. There is conflicting evidence for the conclusions, this paper sets out the issues and some of the questions requiring clarification.

Are the Strategic Alternatives to HS2 a better solution to meet the predicted demand? The Command paper concludes that moderate upgrades to the existing lines cannot meet the projected demand. However the Atkins work on which this conclusion is based suggests that the upgrades can meet the demand. I have requested further information from the DfT to get clarification on which view is correct. The DfT say that they have no details only the Atkins summary reports. The Information Commissioner’s Office are currently investigating to see if more information should be made publicly available.

Will reduced rail travel time to London increase economic activity in the regions? A graph of travel time to London versus economic activity (GVA/head) is used in the Command paper to show that regional economic activity will increase if travel time is reduced. It appears as if the graph is based on selective data, when full UK major conurbation data is used there is not a statistical correlation or any evidence to suggest the assertion is valid.

Are the CO2 emissions from HSR travel a lot less than travel by car? At the HS2 Consultation exhibitions and in the Command paper a graph of CO2 emissions by air, car and rail is used to demonstrate that HSR produces significantly less CO2/passenger km. This graph and possibly the detailed HS2 assessment of emissions does not take into account the emissions involved in travelling to the HSR stations. It is possible that emissions for many HSR journeys may be very similar to those made by car and significantly greater than by using the existing rail system.

2. Strategic Rail Alternatives to HS2 2.1 HS2 Ltd studies, assuming continued mode shift from car and air to rail, predict that demand for long distance rail travel on the HS2 Y routes will increase by 100% (double) by 2043. 2.2 Table 2.4 (p51) of the Command paper sets out the options to increase capacity on the West Coast Main Line. It shows that a mid-scale rail upgrade package would provide a maximum potential capacity increase of about 50%. A new HSR line is predicted to provide a 200% increase. With demand predicted to increase by 100%, one may conclude that a new line is needed. 2.3 However Atkins strategic alternatives reports show that with already planned improvements and the upgrade referred to in the Command paper the capacity would increase from about 88,000 seats/day to 253,500 seats/day, almost a 200% (tripling) increase. The upgrade appears more than adequate to meet the 100% increase in demand. 2.4 The Command paper appears misleading but the numbers can be explained. Assuming the planned improvements go ahead and increase the WCML to about 170,000 seats, increasing this further to 253,500 is about a 50% increase. In the same way the 200% increase from a new HSR line would increase the capacity to 510,000 seats/day. To maintain current “optimal” load factors of about 50% (balancing comfort with cost) 176,000 seats are required, 253,500 seems a few too many, 510,000 would be considerable, very expensive, over capacity. 2.5 The East Coast Main Line and The Midlands Main Line upgrades are more opaque. The Atkins Scenario B schemes increase the capacity so that load factors decline to 43% and 24% respectively. These levels would suggest the upgrades are providing too much capacity to be efficient and that there are probably more optimal solutions. 2.6 The information requested from the DfT is required to establish the cost and benefits of the optimal upgrade schemes for each of the existing lines. It is fundamental to deciding whether HS2 or upgrades to the existing lines are the best solution to increase capacity.

3. Regional Economic Growth 3.1 Section 3 (p55) of the HSR Command paper sets out to make the case that High Speed Rail will support growth in the regions. This assertion is based on a view that there is a statistical relationship between the time taken for rail travel to London and GVA/head. The report states “correlation can be seen between the rail journey time from London of British towns and cities and the value of the goods and services they produce (known as Gross Value Added (GVA) . Their figure 3.2 shows a relationship, for 36 towns, cities and conurbations, suggesting that as journey times to London reduce, GVA/head increases. The correlation (R2)is about 0.4. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w44 Transport Committee: Evidence

3.2 However the locations used include Swindon, Colchester, Torbay, Milton Keynes and Peterborough with populations less than 200,000 people, but exclude Aberdeen, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Swansea and all of which have populations above 200,000. Figure 1 shows the result using the largest conurbations in the UK, all above 200,000 people. The larger (yellow) squares on the graph are the 15 UK conurbations with populations above 400,000. For the full group there is no statistical correlation, for just the larger locations there would be a slight negative relationship, the further away the higher the economic activity but this is not statistically significant or sound. (Note: the longer journey times are capped to air travel times and GVA/head are the latest ONS data) Rail travel time to London vs. GVA/head R2=0 40 000 Glasgow Reading 35 000 Bristol Nottingham 30 000 Portsmouth Luton Liverpool 25 000 Edinburgh Leeds 20 000 Tyneside Leicester £ GVA/head 15 000 Brighton West Midlands 10 000 Greater Manchester Blackpool Medway 5 000 Wirral

0 0 50 100 150 200 250 Figure 1 Travel time minutes

3.3 The Command paper acknowledges other influences on GVA/head including education and skills. The correlation between qualifications and GVA/head across all UK local authorities is reasonably strong (R2 0.68). Skills (probably derived from education and apprenticeship) are a far greater influence on economic well being than travel time to London. 3.4 It is well known that the South has higher levels of economic activity so it is understandable that proximity to London is thought to impact on GVA/head, however if London data itself is removed there is a reasonably equal distribution of GVA/head across the UK. 3.5 The Command paper includes a sketch showing HS1 domestic HSR services to Medway and Kent. Medway with a population of 250,000 is much larger than Milton Keynes, Swindon or Peterborough the recognised high skills growth areas used in the DfT analysis. Medway’s GVA/head is only 63% of the UK average, similar to Greater Manchester North (Greater Manchester South is above average at 109%). 3.6 The latest Office of Rail Regulator’s data, with HS1 domestic services operating, shows that from 2008–09 to 2009–10 rail journeys from Kent, including Ebbsfleet and Ashford International, declined by about 5.6%, generally UK rail journeys reduced by less than 1%. Medway’s journeys to other regions declined by 8.2% one of the largest falls in the UK. 3.7 There are consultant predictions but little evidence that Medway and Kent’s economic activity will increase due to HS1. With jobs being drawn to London, higher fares due to HS1 investment and the reduction in services on the conventional lines it would be unlikely. Conventional rail from Medway to London takes about 45 minutes. If economic activity were correlated to travel time to London it is doubtful Medway would be in the bottom 15% of UK district authorities GVA/head. 3.8 Clarification of the relevance of travel time to London on economic activity is required to decide if the substantial cost of 250mph trains versus upgrades to the existing lines is worth while.

4. CO2 Emissions 4.1 The Command paper stresses the importance of reducing transport emissions and figure 2.3 p49 provides a comparison of emissions for various modes of transport. The graph shows a single occupant car uses 200 g CO2/km although current DECC emissions data combined with DfT car distance information shows that the figure is currently 175 g CO2/km, this years new car fleet averages 159 g CO2/km. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w45

4.2 Emissions from Eurostar (a surrogate for HS2) are shown at 20 g CO2/km probably due to French supplied nuclear power, there is no emissions figure predicted for HS2. Based on HS2 Ltd energy consumption predictions and current UK electricity generation fuel mix the emissions would be about 40 g CO2/km. Figure 2.3 was used at the HS2 consultation road shows and encourages the conclusion that HSR produces less than 20% of the emissions of average car use. With the more accurate figures above this almost doubles to 40%. 4.3 Of greater concern is that these numbers are for the station to station portion of the journey only and take no account of the travel to the station. Over 12 million people live within 15 miles of Birmingham, Nottingham, Sheffield, Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool the possible locations of the HS2 Y stations. However only 13% 1.5 million actually live within three miles of the centres. Journeys to the stations will be by car, bus, train or taxi and be much further than to the multitude of stations with current direct fast services. 4.4 If someone from Manchester makes separate visits to a typical business or social contact at each of the other locations the total average journey time by car would be about 14.5 hours. The time by train with the current schedule, assuming travel to the station by car, averages about 19.5 hours. This will reduce to 18.5 hours if HS2 is built. If public transport is used to get to the stations the journey times increase considerably. 4.5 Business travellers who use a taxi to get from the station to their visit end location will probably have combined CO2 emissions of the train and taxi similar to those if an average car is used for the entire journey. 4.6 Increasing peak time core city centre road speeds by the provision of improved bus public transport could save two to four minutes on every journey. This would reduce local commuter emissions and reduce the duration of both local and inter city connectivity car journeys. It could also reduce average intercity city rail door to door journey times by four-eight minutes. 4.7 According to the magazine Transport Extra some of the country’s leading transport modellers have recently told the DfT that the computer modelling underpinning the Government’s high-speed rail plan is inadequate and cannot provide a sound basis for proceeding with the project. As well as questions about journey time savings and mode & station choice it is concerning that HS2 Ltd and the DfT may not have included the CO2 emissions attributable to station access journeys and that the Command paper comparisons are possibly misleading.

5. Summary 5.1 Most of the UK public want Parliament to make the best decisions possible for the economic and social well being of the country. Obtaining clarification of the assertions made in the HSR Command paper will help Parliament make good decisions related to High Speed Rail. 18 August 2011

Written evidence from the Liverpool and North West Chambers of Commerce (HSR 16) Policy Liverpool Chamber welcomes the HS2 initiative as a key element of the Government’s stated commitment to achieving a spatial and sectoral rebalancing of the UK economy. We believe that HS2 will maximise value-for-money (vfm) and business confidence to invest outside London and the South-East. The Chamber would like to see a commitment to the construction of phase I to Birmingham, Phase II to the North-West and Phase III to Scotland. It is equally important to note that without the associated infrastructure improvements (ie enhanced connectivity with the rest of the network and the indirectly served cities/towns along the West Coast Mainline) the full value of investment will not be realised for UK PLC. The and East/West electrification projects are prerequisites of successful HS2 in the North West. An early and binding commitment to deliver these investments is essential so that complementary connections are in place from day one of HS2 operations.

Process The Chamber would prefer one rather than two hybrid bills since a single bill will take two years to pass through the system while two separate bills would take three years each. This would both complicate and significantly delay the mechanisms for delivering the programme.

Routeing HS2 Draft Proposals The current proposals indicate the strategic “Y”—one leg serving Manchester and the North West and the other serving the East Midlands and Leeds. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w46 Transport Committee: Evidence

North bound to Cumbria and Scotland

Manchester and onwards to Leeds Liverpool

As indicated on schematic at p.22 of DfT Consultation Summary.

Liverpool Chamber Draft Proposals

(i) To maximise the flexibility and connectivity of the proposed North West element of the network, the Chamber would advocate the provision of a high quality interchange station at or near Warrington—perhaps linking the WCML, HS2 and the Cheshire Line to Liverpool. This would ensure the maximum level of interchange and journey choice for users.

(ii) The creation of a pair of vees linking Liverpool and Manchester with a northbound HS2 is also an option. North bound to Cumbria and Scotland

Manchester and onwards to Leeds Liverpool

Possible Vees arrangement.

(iii) A realisation of the original Northern Way vision of east-west connectivity might see the crossing of the “Y” with a HS2 or Javelin-type service linking Liverpool with Leeds via Manchester. North bound to Cumbria and Scotland

Manchester and onwards to Leeds Liverpool

Refinement with high quality direct service linking Liverpool—Manchester—Leeds. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w47

Freight Appropriate (W10 gauge) clearance to link the Royal Seaforth Docks in Bootle and other WCML distribution hubs is essential in order to maximise the value of the freight paths released by HS2. The WCML RUS recommendations are noted and endorsed but we are also aware that the resurrection of the Freight Facilities Grant might play a key part in assisting industry to make best use of the opportunities presented by HS2. Railhead length vis-à-vis intended length of freight trains is also an issue—the privately- owned railheads are generally too short to allow the easy assembly of 775 metre trains necessary to optimise path capacity.

Frequently Asked Questions What impacts do you think HS2 will have on your area or region? It will provide an alternative for passenger travel while the conventional network is upgraded; reduce travel times between London and the North; and free up capacity on both the WCML and wider network for additional freight paths and localized passenger services.

Do you expect HS2 to encourage more new businesses to start-up in your area? Yes—particularly as the cost of living in London rises in the wake of rising property prices and congestion. A number of Government departments and high profile organisations such as the BBC are already relocating to the North in view of favourable property rents, reduced overheads and the quality of life offered to employers by regional cities.

Do you expect HS2 to create more jobs in your area? Yes—early estimates from the DfT suggest that over 40,000 jobs will be created during Phase I alone: around 9,000 would be created on the route’s construction and a further 1,500 jobs in its operation. Regeneration around the stations would create 30,000 jobs. As construction progresses north there will be significant supply chain opportunities for LCR-based companies such as RS Clare (greases for rail tracks) and Trend Rail (components).

Do you expect HS2 to increase business productivity in your area? Eg through reduced transport costs Yes—HSR would allow businesses to access wider markets and a larger labour pool through more trains going to more destinations.

Do you expect HS2 to draw jobs away from your area? No—on the contrary we expect that HS2 will be essential to supporting the predicted growth of Liverpool City region based on developments currently in the pipeline—eg Liverpool and Wirral Waters, Superport, Mersey Tidal Barrage Scheme, Offshore Wind Programme, Port of Liverpool Deep Water Container Terminal and the recently allocated Enterprise Zone. By reducing the overall time for travel between key cities of the UK and Europe, HS2 will also increase the spatial potential for agglomeration benefits across growth sectors identified below.

In what sectors will the biggest influence be felt? Built environment, knowledge economy, advanced manufacturing, financial services, low carbon energy development, culture and visitor economy.

What type of jobs will be affected? Skilled/Unskilled? Both—but relative proportions are indeterminate at this stage. We expect skilled workers to consider prospects offered by Liverpool City-region’s four universities and considerable knowledge assets viz. Daresbury, Liverpool Science and Innovation Parks etc to be increasingly accessible and attractive in the longer term—especially when viewed in light of wider quality of life and cost of living issues.

In your opinion, will there be any other redistributional effects caused by HS2? We believe that improved connectivity, mobility and accessibility delivered by HSR will result in net inward investment and enhance graduate retention across the City-Region.

In your opinion, is HS2 likely to widen or narrow the economic gap between London and your Region? We think that HS2 is essential for driving a spatial and sectoral rebalancing of the UK economy. It will also connect the cities north of London to the rest of Europe—particularly the Golden Triangle cities of Paris, and Brussels—without having to switch from HS trains to the slower conventional network. This will provide a significant incentive for travelers wishing to access cities north of London en route to Scotland cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w48 Transport Committee: Evidence

via the North West. It will also reduce congestion and pressure on property and services in the area as commuters will be able to live further north while maintaining jobs in London—and vice versa.

Are there any transport schemes which you would prefer to see funded instead of HS2? If yes, which schemes and why?

No. HS2 is an absolute priority since the West Coast Main Line is currently the busiest section of the conventional network for freight and predicted to be at full capacity within the next 10 years. Any improvements along the WCML aimed at longer term passenger and freight capacity will only be effective if HS2 is delivered. A national high speed network would transform rail capacity enabling 14 or more additional train services per hour and be designed to accommodate larger and longer trains able to carry up to 1,100 passengers. The enhanced capacity and connectivity made available by HS2 could see as many as six million air trips and nine million road trips a year shift onto rail, freeing up capacity on motorways and enhancing access to, and development of, regional airports.

Is there anything further you would like to mention on the issue of HS2 and its potential impacts?

We are currently supporting the “Yes to HS2” campaign led by David Begg and will be providing a Liverpool and NW regional response to the HS2 consultation currently in the field. We also aim to secure 500 business signatures in a petition to demonstrate support for the programme. May 2011

Written evidence from the North West Transport Roundtable (HSR 18)

Summary and Recommendations — The North West Transport Roundtable welcomes the House of Commons Transport Committee inquiry because we object to the fact there were no national consultations on alternative schemes, design standards or routes for HS2. Options must be fully assessed and should include examining what could be achieved with the same investment in the existing rail system and in small measures. Together they have the potential to deliver benefits more widely and fairly around the UK than HS2. — We advise an ongoing questioning approach to the claims for wider economic benefits being made for very high speed railway lines in the UK which assume phenomenal patronage based on an extra-polation of the high growth in rail journeys of recent years—despite warnings in a Government White Paper of only four years ago that growth rates are unpredictable due to lifestyle changes. — In the UK, very high speed rail can offer users only small time savings but has the potential to cause detrimental impacts on millions of passenger journeys, the existing rail system and the environment and would not reduce CO2 emissions. We point to the emphasis placed by public transport users on reliability rather than time savings yet again in the most recent national passenger survey. — We support the HoC Transport Committee in its call for a national transport strategy which will clarify how transport will be delivered at a sub national level and in a holistic manner now that Regional Spatial Strategies (and Regional Transport Strategies) have been scrapped. — We believe the findings of SACTRA (the Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment) in their report “Transport & the Economy”—in relation to new road infrastructure— apply equally to building a super fast strategic rail system. No automatic assumptions should be made that it would bring huge economic benefits to certain areas. It could just as easily suck workforces and investment away (in this case to London). We therefore query claimed economic benefits for the regions. — Greater emphasis is needed on environmental implications and on environmental capacity in relation, amongst other things, to parkway rail stations on Green Belt causing calls for new roads.

Who we are, why we were established and our approach to influencing policy

The North West Transport Roundtable (NW TAR) operates under the auspices of the Campaign for Better Transport (CfBT). We are an umbrella body that promotes sustainable transport, healthier lives and low carbon lifestyles. The regional roundtables came into being in the late 1990s to represent the opinions of organisations and individuals who believe in sustainable transport and to try to bring about more environmentally friendly transport and planning policies. We engage only on policy issues (we are not a direct action organisation) and we do so at a variety of different levels. Many of our recent outputs are viewable on our website www.nwtar.org.uk. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w49

Point of clarification

All the specific questions posed by the HoC Transport Committee for this inquiry refer to HSR (High Speed Rail) and not to HS2 (High Speed Two) but appear to be primarily about HS2. For the record, UK law defines the HSR network as consisting of the existing West Coast, East Coast and Great Western Main Lines as well as the High Speed One Line (HS1). But these questions clearly relate to the provision of new ultra high speed capacity. So, for the purpose of answering this series of questions in an uncomplicated manner, we answer assuming they are talking about new strategic rail infrastructure which is additional to/ faster than the existing high speed system.

Evidence

Q.1: What are the main arguments for or against HSR?

A: The main arguments in favour have been set out by the UK Government itself, but only in the last two years. They were initially promulgated latterly under the previous Government by the previous Secretary of State for Transport, Lord Adonis, who presented to parliament the 150-page “High Speed Rail” paper in March 2010 and more recently by the current Transport Secretary, the Rt. Hon Philip Hammond, M.P., whose department predicts wider economic benefits for HS2 of around £44 billion., plus revenues of £27 billion. and claims strategic journey times would be “slashed”. But, it should be noted, this approach and these predictions are at odds with the Government’s direction and opinion of only four years ago. The White Paper “Delivering a Sustainable Railway” of 2007—which looked 30 years ahead—ruled out a new high speed line due to the uncertainty of future passenger growth rates and the way that people will use rail. It said: “In future, when people have double today’s income and half today’s carbon footprint, behaviour patterns may change significantly”. NW TAR aligns itself with this cautious approach. We have adopted a very questioning attitude to ultra high speed rail in the UK and the benefits being claimed for it.

In terms of arguments against, in the first instance we take issue with the modus operandi adopted for HS2. Why were there no national consultations on alternatives (inc. design standards) and on routes? The DfT’s own WebTAG (Wider Economic Benefits Transport Appraisal Guidance) calls for a robust examination of possible alternatives to transport interventions. We share the doubts raised by leading commentators such as independent rail analyst and Andrew Gilligan of the “Sunday Telegraph”. The latter, in an article on 6 March 2011, describes HS2 passenger projections as “quite heroic” in view of the plan to start from day one with 14 trains an hour each way between London and Birmingham, rising to 18 an hour each way or 342 daily in each direction. This compares to 10 non-stop TGV trains a day each way between Paris and each of Lyon, Valence and Avignon on France’s LGV Sud-Est.

Based on HS2’s own documentation, the “Telegraph” calculates that up to 750 trains every day to places not on the new high speed line would be slowed down or scrapped and almost 40 million passenger journeys a year, on current figures, would be affected. If rail travel usage rises as expected, the number deleteriously impacted could grow to 60 million by the time the line opens in 2026. And time savings would not be as great as claimed because: (a) the best journey times now are better than stated and (b) rail connections would be poor. On the second point, the city centre HS2 stations in both Birmingham and Manchester would have to be specially built, separate from the existing principal mainline stations. The article, which also points out that over 70% of any regenerative impacts are forecast for London and not the regions, goes into much greater detail than has been replicated here, can be viewed at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail- transport/8364407/High-speed-rail-running-rapidly-right-off-the rails.html.

One of the government’s main arguments in favour of HS2 is time savings but NW TAR would point to the fact that in survey after survey, public transport users rate reliability above journey time. Passenger Focus report again in their Spring 2011 newsletter that the latest National Passenger Survey shows “punctuality is the biggest driver of passenger satisfaction”. The Transport Committee will also be aware of debate amongst transport planners about the value the transport appraisal system places on time savings. Many have been calling for some time for a down-grading in the way time savings are evaluated in cost-benefit analyses, especially as it has been shown travellers themselves tend not to notice modest time savings.

In addition, NW TAR have concerns about proposals for parkway rail stations, which would create massive parking lots on open countryside and generate new traffic movements and calls for new/up-graded roads. We question why the government has opted for such a very high speed system that requires near straight rail lines with maximum noise and other impacts on communities, tranquillity, wildlife and landscapes. (Phase 1 alone would damage 10 SSSIs, 50 ancient woodlands and four wildlife reserves). Meanwhile, it would appear there would be no reduction in CO2 emissions as originally claimed because of the amount of power demanded by the super-fast trains. We also share the concerns of many other organisations and individuals that investment in the existing rail system would be seriously compromised. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w50 Transport Committee: Evidence

Q.2: How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? (i) HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? (ii) Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around cities? (iii) What are the implications for domestic aviation? A: NW TAR, in common with the HoC Transport Select Committee, finds it difficult to grasp where the government is headed in terms of transport policy or to understand how policy will be enacted in an holistic manner at a sub national level. We note the Committee’s report, ‘Transport and the Economy’ and its call for a White Paper on transport strategy which would explain how spending on transport will deliver economic growth and plug the holes left by the scrapping of Regional Spatial Strategies. Mechanisms to deliver sustainable transport at the sub-national level have been removed and we fear that, along with them, so have many sound ideals and concern for wider environmental impacts. Following the Comprehensive Spending Review, the go-ahead was given for a list of road schemes and the “Plan for Growth” paper launched along with the Budget flagged up a weakening of the planning system per se and the creation of 21 Enterprise Zones, all measures which will encourage and increase car travel. To date the Coalition Government have produced one Transport White Paper which has two key government objectives. “Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon”, published in January 2011, cites these as: “to help create growth in the economy and to tackle climate change by cutting carbon emissions” (Foreword by Norman Baker, MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the DfT). On the first objective, the White Paper says, in view of the fact that most journeys are short ones, it wants to make short journeys by public transport more attractive. However, as explained in response to Q.1, many local rail journeys would actually suffer if HS2 was built and experience in other countries where there has been an emphasis on very high speed rail has often been that the traditional rail system has deteriorated. (France is a prime example). Consequently, there is the potential for many local economies to suffer. But, in any event, we would point to the fact that no detailed comparative work appears to have been carried out of the alternative of investing the same amount of money in the existing rail network. It might well prove to be the case that if there was more electrification, more passing loops, longer and better quality rolling stock, longer platforms, high quality stations, line re-openings and spurs, signal and track upgrades, improved rail freight facilities and better ticketing systems for passengers that the benefits to the economy would not only be greater but more fairly distributed across the country. Re. the second objective. The faster the high speed trains, the more power they demand and the increase in power required is exponential. The system envisaged is a very high speed one. Not only would CO2 emissions not decrease, they could increase if the projected switch of air passengers from short haul flights fails to occur or if it does happen and the slots those planes occupy are taken by longer haul flights. Also, we would draw attention to the fact that there are no Birmingham-London domestic flights.

Q3: Business Case (i) How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? (ii) What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? (iii) What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? (iv) What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? A: The assumptions being used make a leap of faith that rail passenger demand will continue to grow at the rate it has been doing in recent years. And, just as the original case for road building had more to do with declamations by political figures that “the economy needs them”, there appears to be a large element of similar assumptions in respect of a high speed railway and the effect it might have on the West and East Midlands and the northern regions. We would point out that Japan built the world’s first high-speed line in the 1960s but has struggled economically for decades and we would remind the HoC Transport Committee of the findings of SACTRA (the Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment) in relation to roads. In their report “Transport and the Economy”, published in 1998, they made the point that highways work in two directions (as do railways). SACTRA concluded that providing new highway infrastructure does not necessarily bring investment to an area, it can make it easier to out-commute and therefore suck investment away from a targeted area. The same could apply to HS2 which could make it easier for people to live in Manchester and Birmingham and work in London. Effectively, the regions might merely become dormitory zones for the capital. It also needs to be appreciated that the cost of the project would fall on the taxpayer but they would not necessarily benefit in the long term. The high speed line to the Channel Tunnel which cost taxpayers more than £6bn. has been sold to a Canadian pension fund on a 30-year lease for a third of its cost because it has generated insufficient income. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w51

Re. the value of time in the transport appraisal system. Many experts in the field are now seriously questioning the current approach to this. At the UK Transport Appraisal Summit in early April even the key speaker in defence of the New Approach to Appraisal, independent consultant John Bates, acknow-ledged there was scope for improving valuations and that transport schemes fuel land use changes. The leading speaker calling for reform was David Metz, visiting professor at UCL’s Centre for Transport Studies and a former chief scientist to the DfT. He warned that faster journeys translate into more longer distance commuting and consequently pressure for more house building, higher land value and property prices.

As far as the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network is concerned and being able to properly evaluate the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, these matters must surely be the subject of studies to be funded by government? Such studies should have been carried out before the route for HS2 Phase One was announced and before the current nationwide consultation was launched.

On the matter of managing travel demand—be it for rail or other modes—there has been much emphasis in recent years on reducing the need to travel by having sustainable communities, access for all to fast broadband, making better use of facilities such as video and telephone conferencing, more home working and the provision of homes that are better designed to accommodate home working. The case for these measures has not altered because there has been a change of government. As to using price to control demand, we would baulk at this suggestion because of its implications for social exclusion and the fact it would work against reducing unemployment. In any event, public transport fares are too high now.

Rather than concerning itself with getting major transport infrastructure projects built on time and to budget, the government should consider instead the benefits to be gleaned from carrying out a whole series of smaller measures which it has been shown can cumulatively have considerable effect. In the recent past the DfT has accepted that this approach can reap widespread benefits.

Q.4: The strategic route (i) The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? (ii) Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed “Y” configuration the right choice? (iii) Is the Government right to build the network in stages moving from London northwards? (iv) The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

A: The five questions under the “strategic route” heading assume that the case has been made for HS2 and also that the correct route has been chosen for Phase One. NW TAR do not agree that this is the case.

In addition, we would highlight the point that the number of stations now proposed for HS2 has the effect of nullifying one of the Government’s key arguments for building it, ie. time savings. Just as initial claims about reduction in CO2 emissions have proven to be unfounded, we note that claims about time savings are also constantly being eroded. A stop at Old Oak Common is regarded as essential by the promoters of the scheme in order to achieve connections in Greater London, but it would not be possible to achieve connections in Birmingham or Manchester city centres because access to New Street and Piccadilly stations cannot be achieved. In the time that would be lost travelling between the existing stations and the new ones, all time saved on the inter-city journey would be lost. Meanwhile, there is a perverse case being argued for having parkway stations at Birmingham and Manchester Airports which would involve significant areas of Green Belt being given over to parking, despite the Government having declared its determination to protect Green Belt, and despite the fact that local rail connections between and the strategic rail system are very poor and the positioning of an HS2 station at Manchester Airport would foster calls for the network of SEMMMS roads to be built (affecting yet more Green Belt!)

As the current proposals stand, HS2 would not be accessible to the majority of the communities it passes through. If there were less, it would be even less accessible. If there were more, the case for a new high speed rail system effectively disappears altogether and the discussion might as well be about building new and improved conventional rail infrastructure which can be more easily adapted to consider the environment. NW TAR would welcome more and more detailed discussions about this.

NW TAR calls on the Government, through the Transport Select Committee, to take a step back and re- assess the whole case, this time fully factoring in environmental considerations. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w52 Transport Committee: Evidence

Q.5: Economic rebalancing and equity (i) What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south divide? (ii) To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? (iii) Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? (iv) How should the government ensure all major beneficiaries of HSR (inc. local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? A: The first two economic rebalancing and equity questions are asked from a positive rather than a neutral perspective. Instead of only looking for evidence of how HSR will promote economic regeneration, the Transport Select Committee would be well advised to also look for evidence of how it might not. On that front, we would point to Ashford in Kent. It is 38 minutes from central London—the same time distance it is claimed Birmingham would be from London if HS2 were built. Christian Wolmar points out that whilst unemployment has come down in Ashford since the HS1 line opened, it has fallen by less than the Kent, South Eastern and British average and house prices have risen by less than the Kent and South Eastern average. He also draws attention to the Dutch new high speed line rail line that opened last year. It is failing to attract sufficient patronage due to high fares and technical problems. Teething problems push up costs and deter users from the outset. The system that the UK is proposing involves a high-tec specification. This means it would be more susceptible to teething problems and cost escalations. It might take some time to bed in and along the way create a large army of disappointed customers. As far as “supporting local and regional regeneration” is concerned, we would re-iterate the first paragraph of our response to question three on page four, where we quote the findings of SACTRA. The actuality could be that London sucks economic benefits away from the north—whatever the shape of the network. As to which locations and socio-economic groups would benefit from HSR, it apparent that London and groups A and B (who can either afford to pay the fares themselves or are in the type of employment that pays for their travel) would be the main beneficiaries. Almost certainly, there would be a premium for using trains domestically on HS2 as there is on HS1. This being the case, it is difficult to see that too many average UK citizens would reap any noticeable benefits other than for the very occasional leisure trip. It is unclear to us how local authorities could be made to bear the costs of the project, particularly as the government is committed to “Localism” and giving local authorities more autonomy and especially as some authorities such as Staffordshire have already declared they are against it. Re. the TENS programme. The NW TAR has long been sceptical of the lack of evidence behind TENS— the Trans European Networks. TENs have always appeared to be more about aspiration than reality. We are reminded that only a few years ago, an origin and destination survey carried out on the M62 established that less than 1% of the drivers using it travelled the full distance from Liverpool on the west coast of the UK to Hull on the east or vice versa. Yet the M62 is officially part of a “TEN” that crosses Europe. That said, we can see that there is a much stronger case for very high speed rail services across the continent of mainland Europe than there ever will be for them in the UK where the distances are so much smaller and the dense populations in many areas make strategic projects so much more difficult to bring forward.

Q.6: Impact (i) What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? (ii) Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? (iii) What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? (iv) How much disruption will there be to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the re-building of Euston station? A: Perusing the documentation provided by the government, it is apparent that HS2 would be at best carbon neutral and has the potential to increase carbon emissions. We do not believe environmental costs and benefits are adequately assessed by the present transport appraisal system and the issue of environmental capacity is often totally overlooked. Values placed on small time savings account for a disproportionate amount of cost-benefit analyses both generically and in this specific case. Also, whilst the preferred route for Phase One of HS2 recognises the need to protect landscapes with highly rated designations by placing part of the route in tunnels, designations such as Green Belt are clearly given little weight. There is also a major issue around the noise impacts of the very high speed trains. Here we would flag up the charter drawn up by nine environmental NGOs about the best way to make HS2 work if it does become a reality (“The Right Lines: A Charter for High Speed Rail”).

Regarding rail freight. This has the potential to produce 70% less CO2 than equivalent road journeys but there is a land use issue which must not be overlooked. To encourage it investment in the “classic” system would still be required as well as in freight loading facilities and the National Planning Policy Framework and the National Policy Statement on national roads & rail networks need to be helpfully worded. But,itis cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w53

imperative sustainability is the over-riding criteria to ensure rail freight depots are not used as stalking horses for further expansive development on greenfields/ in Green Belt, as has happened in the past. In respect of disruption to the “classic” system during construction of HS2, we view with horror the knock- on effects of re-building Euston. Millions of people would be forced to use cars for their journeys and many would probably not return to public transport, particularly after such a long time span away from it, and a generation of young people would be discouraged from making rail travel part of their lifestyles. We hope our comments are of some value and we hope that the entire project will be reassessed. May 2011

Written evidence from Alison and Mick Tyler (HSR 19) We are writing to state our opposition to the proposal to build HS2 from London to Birmingham. We do not believe there is a sound business, economic or environmental case to back this proposal nor do we think that there is enough money to fund this “vanity” project. Our arguments against HS2 are as follows:

The Business Case The demand forecast is based on a projected growth in demand of 267% by 2033 (from 45,000–145,000 per day) This is an unrealistic estimate of potential passenger numbers. Forecasts in the past have been incorrect as in the case of Eurostar which is carrying 50% fewer passengers than forecast. HS2 Ltd has assumed that time on a train is wasted and that therefore to save time on the train is to save money. This is not true. The majority of business people use the journey time to work. They use laptops, mobile phones and have discussions with follow business travellers. Reducing travelling time between London and Birmingham, which at present is only 1 hour 20 minutes, will reduce the amount of time for working. Trains from Coventry to Euston run three times an hour at present and take 1 hour 5 minutes. This excellent service will be cut to one train per hour. Business people currently travelling from Coventry station will have to travel to Birmingham to catch a train to London thereby negating any time saved on HS2. The development of IT over the next 15 years will reduce the necessity for people to travel to meetings. Even now many companies have cut the costs of travel and use IT to hold meetings. The cost of fares on HS2 will double, according to forecast projections, which would make it prohibitive for individuals, small and medium business to use this service. HS2 will be for a few large companies with executives paid well over the national average salary.

The Economic Case This project will cost £24 billion, increasing to £34 billion and could cost each household in Britain more than £1,000. In an era of spending cuts and economic downturn it is not justifiable to spend such a massive amount of money when the public sector is facing huge cuts to its budget. Some of the billions of pounds could be spent on public services which would benefit the whole country not just a small number of highly paid business people. There is more likely to be a decline in the economy of cities bypassed by HS2. The train will not stop at Milton Keynes, Northampton, Coventry or any other towns or cities between Birmingham and London. The prospect of economic growth for these places along the route will be damaged and businesses could relocate rather than generate income which will lead to many areas becoming economically inactive. The existing West Coast line has 45,000 passengers per day and HS2 Ltd predicts that of its estimated increase of 100,000 passengers, 38,000 people per day will use HS2 ‘just because it is there, which is quite ridiculous. With up to 18 trains per hour in each direction it cannot be economically sound to expect that so many people will travel between Birmingham and London every day when we should be conserving energy. It makes more sense economically to improve the existing West Coast and East Coast lines which would significantly improve the transport network for far more people. Extending platforms and increasing the number of carriages these routes would prove to be economically beneficial to the whole country and stimulate growth around cities with rail stations. RP2 is a more sound economic proposal. HS1 has not proved to be the overwhelming success it was forecast to be. It is being sold at a loss.

The Environmental Case HS2 is only going to be carbon neutral so will not create the low carbon economy claimed. Natural areas of beauty through Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Warwickshire will be ruined and the protected Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty will be irreplaceably damaged. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w54 Transport Committee: Evidence

It is believed that fewer than 2% of those using motorways between London and Birmingham will switch to HS2. Since there are no flights from Birmingham to London there is no potential for HS2 to replace air travel. Carbon emissions generated by construction of power stations and the line will be huge. HS2 could consume four times the energy of existing high speed trains. Noise levels will be unacceptably high and cause distress to people and animals. Areas of countryside along the route will be permanently scarred. A rigid route will not fit with the English landscape. Animal and bird habitat will be destroyed. Historic woodlands will be lost and water tables will be adversely affected. Agricultural, leisure and recreational areas will be destroyed which are intrinsic features of the British landscape.

The Alternative Case Upgrade the existing train network and public transport so that the benefits of an improved travel service will be available to the whole population. The Coalition Agreement policy is to create “A truly national high speed rail network for the whole of Britain”. HS2 will link only two cities in the first phase. Rail Package 2 makes more economic and business sense because a wider proportion of the population would benefit from upgrading the existing rail network for much less cost than HS2. Concentrate on stimulating growth of all towns and cities in Britain so that efficient, effective and economic transport services are available for individuals, families and business travellers. Examine the alternative options of developing the existing transport corridors such as the M1 and M40.

Conclusion A high speed rail does not need to travel at 250 mph. It is without precedent. Engines, track and technology have not been developed to cope with this excessive speed. We think the proposal for HS2 should be subject to a public enquiry before any final decisions are made. We want a rail service that serves us, one that we can use to places other than London and one that we can afford and that the whole country can use. May 2011

Written evidence from Chris Worker (HSR 20) AN ALTERNATIVE HIGH SPEED RAIL PROPOSAL 1. I believe High Speed Rail (HSR) is a vital element in enhancing the capacity and performance of Britain’s rail network to support socio-economic growth over the coming decades. However HS2 is the wrong approach to HSR, and is narrowing the scope of the analysis of HSR’s socio-economic benefits. 2. HSR calls for huge investment, so Britain needs to gain the maximum benefit from any such investment. HSR offers the greatest gains over long distances and where the reduction in journey-time is greatest. However rail services into London are already the fastest in Britain, and the distances between London and the closer key centres (such as Birmingham) are relatively short in HS terms. Therefore the gains HS can offer on such routes are, at best, modest. 3. Rail journey times to mainland Europe from regional centres beyond London are so poor that rail is little used for such journeys. The challenge of getting across London (and the congestion zone around it) is probably a far more significant factor than line-speed. The emphasis for HSR should therefore be on direct travel between the regional centres of Britain and mainland Europe passing London. This is what air travel does, and is a significant part of its attraction. The socio-economic benefits of such a concept to the regions of the UK beyond London should be fully examined before HSR is ruled out. A similar analysis should also be undertaken in respect of direct freight provision. By offering a new set of routes, such an approach would increase the market share taken by rail while reducing transport’s overall carbon footprint. Capacity issues in and approaching London are a separate matter, but would be eased by diverting through traffic past the capital’s “congestion zone”. 4. The optimum continuation from HS1 would be north from Stratford up the Lea Valley, passing north of Hertford and across the East Coast Main Line (ECML) to a junction just west of Stevenage. These might be called the HSTrunk and Icknield Junction respectively. Icknield Jct. would be engineered to the maximum speed for negotiating point-work (approx 140mph); hence HSTrunk line speeds could be profiled for steady cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w55

acceleration from Stratford to 140mph at Icknield Jct. Such a steady speed progression profile would be very energy-efficient, and would minimise track engineering costs. 5. High Speed trains can operate on conventional electrified track up to the current ceiling of 125 mph if HS-format platforms and gauge clearances are provided. This has already been demonstrated on many Continental routes and by the use of Waterloo International. However, the main lines north and west of London have much higher line speeds than Waterloo—Ashford, and the alignment of the ECML offers considerable potential for much higher speeds. The “Waterloo crawl” should not be seen as the only outcome of mixed- mode operation of HS trains. 6. The first function of HSTrunk would be to join the ECML near . This would provide for direct services between mainland Europe and Doncaster, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh etc. as soon as HS platforms were built at key stations. The line could then be progressively upgraded, or new HS tracks built alongside it, to form HSNorth. This would create the sort of multi-track route SNCF has recommended. A link to Manchester could be built from a 140 mph Rossington Jct. (south of Doncaster) through the continental loading gauge Woodhead tunnel on a steady speed progression profile similar to that proposed for HS Trunk. This would give, for example, a Manchester—Paris journey time over an hour quicker than is suggested for HS2, with Stratford as the only UK stop. HS upgrades would continue north to serve Leeds, the Tees/Tyne area, Edinburgh and Glasgow. The Scots might want to explore the possibility of an HS extension from Eryholme Jct (south of Darlington) to a junction near Gretna. 7. From Icknield Jct, a Midlands line (HSMid) would join the M1 corridor near Luton, initially joining the West Coast Main Line at Roade Jct (just south of Northampton). As for HSNorth, this would provide direct services between mainland Europe and Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Crewe etc. as soon as platforms were built; HS tracks could be progressively extended. HSMid should also provide, as a minimum, a single track, bi-directional freight route between HS1 and Daventry International Rail Freight Terminal (DIRFT). A conventional line from the Rugby/DIRFT area to Leicester could carry both freight and HS. 8. A third route from Icknield Jct. would initially form a spur to and the Midland Main Line (MML). In the longer term, HSWest could be built from Luton along the Vale of Aylesbury to the Great Western Main Line (GWML) just west of , taking advantage of the GWR’s broad loading gauge to provide for services to Cardiff, Bristol and beyond. Electrification and speed enhancement of GW lines west of Didcot might thus become an HS project. As with the ECML, the superbly engineered Great Western track formations have considerable potential for higher speeds. A chord between Luton and Hitchin could provide a direct HS link between The South-west and The North, bypassing London. 9. Developments described in paras 6 to 8 should be subject to rigorous market and economic benefit testing against journey times already achieved; 200mph should not be the presumed target for all cases. 10. Stratford International (enlarged) should be the principal station for long-distance traffic passing London. This would minimise journey times for the longest distance travellers. Links between Stratford, The City and Canary Wharf/Docklands are already good and could readily be improved. Most of the benefits of Crossrail identified in the HS2 consultation would apply equally to Stratford. 11. A chord north of Stratford would make St Pancras International the central London terminus for trains from the Midlands and North. Such trains would stop briefly before returning, or continuing onto HS1. 12. The advantages of completing Crossrail to Continental rather than British specifications should be considered. If this were adopted, trains from HS1 could join Crossrail at Stratford, serve central London, and terminate at Heathrow. This could provide a link to the electrified GWML in the shorter term. 13. An HS line could be built from Ashford to Gatwick (HSSouth) mainly alongside the (dead straight) Ashford-Redhill line. Services from Waterloo International could then be re-started via Gatwick. Links could be progressively extended to the west-facing main lines at Guildford, Farnborough etc. 14. As aviation fuel costs rise, the demand to shorten flights between N. America and Europe will increase. Manchester, Birmingham, Luton, Heathrow and Gatwick airports could take advantage of this trend if they had good HSR services direct to mainland Europe. Without such HS links, Paris will probably become the entry point of choice, and British business opportunities would be lost. 15. In terms of funding, I believe building London—Birmingham is far too big to be a single phase of work, and the long-term debt burden accrued would hold back further progress. Each phase should be small enough for realistic funding over a few years, and should be put to work earning revenue from mixed—mode services before the next phase begins. Stratford—ECML is a realistic first phase, Icknield Jct—Luton a second, Icknield Jct—WCML a third, and so on. It is unfortunate that at least ECML—Stratford could not be constructed in time for the Olympic Games. 16. The strong Continental links of this proposal would offer greater potential than HS2 to attract funding from the EU. Stations beyond HS railheads might be part-funded by local, regional and devolved financing initiatives, thus broadening financial engagement. 17. Great Britain's HS routes should be an integral part of the Trans European Network, able to send trains deep into Europe and host trains from there. We should embrace the idea of seeing, for example, German and cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w56 Transport Committee: Evidence

Spanish HS trains in Cardiff and Exeter, or Scottish HS trains gliding to a halt in Rome and Budapest. Of course short-haul trains between London and the regions could operate between these, but the basis of operation must be Trans—European. HS2 lacks that vision, and is basically a stand-alone “middle-England shuttle” with a link to HS1 as a retro-fitted afterthought. Its revenue and economic performance could end up reflecting that poverty of vision. 18. Future economic growth will depend heavily on efficient, sustainable movement of products and consumables across the EU. The rising cost of diesel fuel and climate change concerns will increasingly put Britain at a disadvantage both internally and across Europe unless provision is made for switching to sustainable long-distance on land. Freight route development should be integrated with HS provision, both for conventional traffic and for transporting HGVs “piggyback”. The latter is common across North America, and is increasingly used in Europe, eg the Gotthard Base Tunnel and the Channel Tunnel itself. There should be a number of “piggyback” depots across Britain; indeed Great Britain might lead the way in opening up longer distance routes across Europe. This would have significant road safety benefits by reducing the number of tired long-distance HGV drivers on British roads. 19. After much deliberation, HS1 was mainly built along existing transport corridors, thus achieving a good financial case and reducing environmental and 'blight' costs. The great railway engineers of the past followed the lie of the land wherever possible, thus minimising gradient and engineering challenges and the financial, human and environmental cost of cutting through landscape features. We should not lightly supersede these principles. In addition, wherever practical, land use and structures for HSR should incorporate electricity generation (wind, micro-hydro etc) landscape and nature conservation benefits. May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w57

Glasgow Edinburgh Alternative High Speed Rail

Existing HS1

Primary AHS Phase Gretna Jct Subsequent AHS phases Newcastle Use of existing conventional network.

Darlington Additions to the conventional network, including electrification

EryholmeJct Heathrow Express + Crossrail

Possible Scottish HS extension

Other

Leeds Stations shown are a minimum. Doncaster Non-stop HS Junctions named in italics Manchester Rossington Jct Sheffield

(HSNorth)

Leicester

Birmingham

DIRFTJct

(HSMid)

Roade Jct.

Luton Icknield Jct.

(HSWest) (HSTrunk) to Cardiff Didcot Stratford St.Pancras I. Bristol Ebbsfleet Heathrow to Exeter etc.

(HSSouth) Gatwick Ashford cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w58 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Neil Coulson (HSR 21) I wish to submit my views on the proposed construction of HS2. I will confine myself to addressing the Business Case (Question 3) and in particular the robustness of the model employed. I note first that even the Department’s own paper declares the model employed not to be robust. It has the following failings: 1. The model seeks to attach a monetary value to the time saved by different classes of rail traveller. That value is then equated to the increase in national economic benefits derived where a saving in time travelled is achieved. It is notoriously difficult to calculate economic benefits enjoyed by a range of unidentified businesses by changing a factor such as travelling time. Indeed, a very strong Benefit Cost Ratio would need to be obtained to justify such a huge investment of the nation’s wealth. 2. It is my experience when travelling by train on business that nearly all those also travelling on business use the time to work on papers or laptops. Your paper on the economic case acknowledges this phenomenon, but ignores it in the calculations. If this very observable factor were taken into account in the figures, it would remove nearly half of the benefits assessed. (The Department has suggested that it is often hard to work on a train where the traveller has to stand. I understand that the high-speed trains will have a smaller capacity than conventional trains and to that extent this argument falls away.) 3. The model employed is out of date and suited to relatively short term projections. In this case the appraisal period is 60 years and a difference in growth assumptions makes a substantial difference to the BCR. This was recently demonstrated when the Department had to change its assumptions. One factor which needs to be taken into account is the trend towards working from home as technology makes this possible and more efficient. This trend could totally invalidate the projections. Like economic benefits, long-term growth rates are equally difficult to predict and it is likely that the hitherto automatic assumption of continuous long-term growth in the UK and other economies is no longer valid. 4. In the revision of the BCR on 31 March 2010 the BCR stood at 3.24. On 28 February 2011 that had already been revised to 1.6. Without the extension in the growth cap from 2033 to 2043 it would have been 1.0. This is before the so-called Wider Economic Impacts are taken into account; and rightly so, because these impacts are far more difficult to assess, if indeed they exist. No search seems to have been made to wider economic “disbenefits”. These figures demonstrate the fragility of modelling and therefore of the economic case for HS2. 5. The Government is considering a project of colossal magnitude at a time of heavy economic restraint, when a high range of important services to the nation are being cut. The case for expenditure on this scale would need to be strong indeed even in a favourable economic climate. However, the economic case presented is very weak with a high sensitivity to changes in assumptions it cannot control. It would be far more inexpensive and effective, without damaging the environment, progressively to enhance existing travel corridors to give travellers the service they need and can afford. In short, there is no economic case. May 2011

Written evidence from Catherine Calow (HSR 22) I am writing to you not as an expert but as a voter who has put a lot of time and effort into gaining an understanding of the issues of concern here. My home will not be affected by the proposed route of the HS2 line and I prefer here to consider whether there is a case for HS2 at all. I would like to comment on some of the points I understand you are covering:

1. Impact on Domestic Aviation I have looked at all the flights that are currently scheduled between all the UK mainland airports that may be affected by HS2. It seems a good argument that HSR will reduce domestic flights. However, I have found that apart from a small number of flights between London and Manchester and Newcastle, there would only be a point to HSR if it reached Edinburgh or Glasgow, to which there are a high number of flights a day. But there is no plan to extend beyond Leeds or Manchester. So, there is hardly any benefit in reducing domestic flights.

2. Impact on Driving between London and Birmingham and further North For journeys to and from town centres rail is an excellent solution, it resolves problems of car parking, inner city congestion and is less stressful. I am sure most business people do take the train when possible. However, I cannot see that the demand figures used in the forecasts can be accurate. For example, visits that are anywhere much outside the centre of town require one to take taxis etc and it doesn’t take much to make a car journey still more viable. Eg I am HR Director for a large industrial company in the UK and we have a lot of national and international travel. However, unless you are going into central London for a meeting you take the car. We cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w59

are based in High Wycombe and have a sister company in Birmingham—but it’s in West Bromwich—the car is the only viable way to travel and if there is more than one person it is by far the cheapest. If you need to carry anything you will also go by car.

3. Value of High Speed (a) The whole idea that businesspeople don’t work on the train is archaic. I am sure MPs’ work on the train as do most people now. So, the need for a quicker journey time is redundant, and hence the need for a special high speed solution that is a straight line. As time progresses businesses are more and more using video and telephone conferencing. As the true cost of their carbon footprint becomes measured by including travel there will be more pressure for this. Professional people are increasingly working from home. The need for excessive business travel should be reducing. (b) The notion that leisure travellers will spend more money by arriving in Birmingham (or more likely in London) quicker is illogical—people only have a certain amount of money so will just get a later train or go home earlier. (c) The only benefit of speed that I can see is that rich commuters will be able to consider living in Birmingham and working in London, thus benefiting from cheaper house prices and London levels of pay. This will further enhance London at the expense of cities further north. (d) I suspect that the whole notion of a high speed rail line is to compete with the neighbours. This has already been considered by the committee. However, I cannot believe that tourists don’t visit the UK because we don’t have a high speed rail system. They may stay predominantly in London but that is more to do with our heritage and marketing than anything else. As long as people mostly fly into a London airport they will continue to stay in London. Please recognise that England is a small and crowded country. We are not like France or Spain with vast areas of empty land and a small population. So what if we get low scores on some international rating?—we get low scores for areas that are much more serious like crime, teenage pregnancies etc.

4. Opportunity Costs The projected cost of the HS2 line is around £33 billion. Therefore, it is likely to be close on £50 billion from normal project experience. In a time of austerity is this really the best use of our money? HS1 was sold off for a loss so there is no track record that HS2 will ever be financially viable. This is a white elephant project that was devised by Labour. Some of them are now walking away from it. Please take this opportunity to have a long look and decide to spend the money on something else—eg improving congestion in the northern cities, improving links between the northern cities. Don’t allow London to get even bigger. We need more sustainable centres in the north and better networking there. Take advantage of the plans to improve the WCML that are already in existence and which could give the capacity and most of the speed at a much lower cost.

5. Environment From a carbon footprint perspective a 250 mile an hour train cannot be efficient. The massive works to build a new line with all the digging and concrete required must be taken in to consideration when calculating energy efficiency. I do not see any evidence that a high speed rail line will be environmentally friendly and will reduce other forms of transport in any significant way. There will be no impact on domestic aviation if it doesn’t reach Scotland and if it did then the airport authorities would give the slots to long distance routes. The line is planned to cross the widest point of the Chilterns, an AONB. What is the point of establishing protected areas if they are they ruined? A far better environmental approach would be to improve the WCML which already exists and don’t be seduced by the concept of trains at this ridiculous speed. I do hope that you will take my arguments into account in your deliberations and come to a decision that is logical and realistic. 8 May 2011

Written evidence from Tony Bristow (HSR 24) THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST HIGH SPEED RAIL (HSR) AS PROPOSED FOR HS2 1. Introduction and basis for Submission I believe that the case as presented in Ref A is weak in the first place, unsubstantiated by the evidence adduced and fraught with too much risk for the country to contemplate this huge financial investment. The evaluation of alternatives is superficial and dismissive, especially since the DfT’s Rail Package Two (RP2) has been suppressed by omission. At £32 billion, the capital cost is enormous for a project which could not even start to deliver any benefits at all for half a generation. My work has given me considerable experience of European rail travel, high-speed and “classic”, and I make my submission with that in mind. HSR/HS2 is a cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w60 Transport Committee: Evidence

fiendishly expensive project that does nothing for the overwhelming majority of UK rail passengers, other than the inevitability of investment starvation on all other lines.

2. The Strategic Case as presented in Ref A30 2.1 The summary strategic case (p12 col 2 of Ref A) merely claims “could benefit thousands of businesses by improving access to the .... markets of London and the South East..” and that “HSR would act as a catalyst for regeneration...” The identified beneficiaries are stated to be businesses although the productivity claims are based on unrealistic thinking on the value of communications technology on the move. The example of regeneration is given of 40000 jobs for Phase 1, yet most of these are in the retail sector in London, thus reinforcing not reducing the North-South divide. 2.2 Business cases relying on traffic increases have a history of error, notably for the Channel Tunnel, for HS1 and especially for Eurostar links North of London, even resulting in the disposal of some Eurostar train sets early in the concession! 2.3 Unquantified regional prosperity is claimed for modest journey time reductions to/from London (never improved by more than 60 minutes per Fig 2) or to/from Birmingham (mostly 34–47 minutes, Leeds 55 minutes, per Fig 2.1), whereas the quoted example of Lyon gained a benefit of 2 hours to/from Paris so cannot be validly used as a comparator. If businesses were really convinced, they would be clamouring to fund HS2; the silence is deafening.

3. Environmental Impact 3.1 Ref A as good as admits that there is no carbon or environmental benefit whatever from building HS2; in fact there is every likelihood of carbon increase. Ref A admits “..without any overall increase in carbon emissions..” (para 2.52), “..carbon impacts...broadly neutral..” (para 2.55) and, extraordinarily, “..carbon emissions associated with the construction of the new line totalling around 1.2 million tonnes...many of [which] would be offset by reductions elsewhere under the EU Emissions Trading System.” 3.2 Experts agree that energy use by a train at 225 mph is more than double that at 125 or 140 mph. The greenest way to increase capacity is to add additional coaches to classic trains at conventional speeds. As for any projected modal shift from domestic air to rail, HSR is not proven to be more carbon efficient than air, and any airport slots released by discontinued domestic flights would be seized for use by longer distance services using heavier aircraft at great carbon penalty. 3.3 Ref A fails to present environmental realities to the public, yet asks a question about sustainability the facts of which have been omitted. The construction period of eight years for Phase 1 alone would cause immense intrusion, disruption, nuisance and delay to millions of people, irrespective of the route selected; the extent of this has again been cynically hidden from the consultation document.

4. Alternatives 4.1 The case presented for HSR in Ref A dismisses new conventional-speed lines as saving little cost (just over £3 billion) for lower calculated benefit; I do not disagree with this. However, enhancements to existing networks are discounted in just three pages of unsubstantiated assertions that manage to bury RP2 for the WCML, despite that package being capable of providing the 135% capacity increase by tackling seven infrastructure pinch points and providing 11-car Pendolino trains at a fraction of HS2’s net cost (or +165% capacity if all trains 12-car). 4.2 Table 1 of Ref A lists the works that could be considered to improve the Midland and East Coast main lines as well; this combination should be evaluated to the same depth as HS2 for anyone to make informed decisions. RP2 and/or the projects in Table 1 represent value-for-money viable alternatives which can be implemented earlier, separately and in a phased programme to provide progressive relief for a wider travelling community; each of the 15 listed works provides benefit without waiting half a generation for an all-or-nothing project such as HS2. 4.3 If we actually have £32 billion to spend on our railways (HMG’s fiscal pronouncements very much suggest otherwise), we the taxpayers should be presented with the alternative of investing as much of that as we can actually afford on the whole railway network, not just on a prestige project on one Y-shaped route which will only carry just 4% of the UK’s current annual passenger journeys (50.8 million out of 1.3 billion). The strategic case should address the alternative of spreading investment to relieve the lot of all rail passengers, not just a small business minority. 4.4 It is widely stated (evidently driven more by pride than hard economics) that we need to catch up continental Europe in the field of HSR. The dominant industrial player in the EU, Germany, has significantly chosen to adopt HSR selectively for isolated stretches to bypass pinchpoints or slow alignments in their network, some at line speeds lower than 300 kph which “classic” trains can share at their own speed, typically 200 kph; this strategy should be looked at as a progressive alternative, applicable to any main line in the UK. France has far greater distances to deal with and a largely empty country in which to build HSR. 30 Reference A: HSR: Investing in Britain’s Future—Consultation February 2011 (DfT) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w61

4.5 Finally, we have Pendolino and Mark 4 coaches originally designed for 140 mph operation, but limited to 125mph by signalling under-investment; we should have a national ambition for 140 mph conventional lines across the country. Interestingly, the South-East High Speed services on HS1 have a maximum service speed of 140mph yet are hailed as a breakthrough.

5. Conclusions 5.1 The business case presented in Ref A relies on the timely achievement of unrealistic high-end forecasts, an all-or-nothing project to improve just 4% of annual passenger journeys by rail, all with a brazen acceptance that modal shift from air would be limited to just 8% of HS2 traffic and that no carbon savings would be achieved in operation after a massive carbon-producing and environmentally-damaging construction phase lasting half a generation. 5.2 For all the commitment of £32 billion, there will be no benefits before 2026 whatsoever, the Y-shaped network will not come into use until 21–22 years from now and projections have been needed to 2043 to manipulate optimistic BCRs. 5.3 Alternatives are available which overcome all such shortcomings and the consultation should be totally revised to present a balanced picture. Moreover, the DfT consultations are only being offered at locations on- route, cynically leaving the rest of the population completely in the dark. Our railway infrastructure needs continuous improvement for the benefit of all rail travellers over the whole of the UK not just for a selected few. Nowhere has the essential commitment that all necessary rail infrastructure investments outside HS2 will be maintained intact. There are far more standing passengers off the WCML than on it; capacity is the problem on many other lines. 5.4 Each family in the land is effectively being asked to contribute £1,000 from their taxation for the benefit of a small minority of rail users a long time in the future despite environmental damage for so many. The Select Committee will doubtless consider the unenviable task facing the vast majority of MPs in explaining to their constituents why rail improvements in their area will have been denied because of the prestige project of HS2. 5.5 Finally, the fundamental and unforgiveable weakness of the HS2 proposals is the absence of any credible risk assessment for such a costly project. I hope that the Select Committee will be able to delve deeply into the strategic case, its costs and risks in a balanced scrutiny of an unbalanced proposal. 9 May 2011

Written evidence from Milton Keynes Council (HSR 25) 1. This is a submission by Milton Keynes Council to the Transport Select Committee Inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail (HSR).

2. Relating to Question—(How does HSR fit with the Government’s Transport Policy Objectives?), Sub-Question 1 Milton Keynes is the fastest-growing urban area in the country and has a strong economy with lots of potential for growth (see Centre for Cities reports); and the Council therefore recognises the importance of inter-urban connectivity to maximise Milton Keynes’ economic potential and meet rising demand. Milton Keynes Council would therefore be interested to explore the implications of any proposal for an intermediate station on High Speed 2 (HS2) in this area. Such a station, if served by some of the trains to/from places north of Preston, including Glasgow, would add to the inter-urban connectivity achieved by HS2.

3. Relating to Question 2, Sub-Question 2 The rapid growth of Milton Keynes also means that remaining capacity on the West Coast Main Line will be used up in trying to meet the resulting increased demand ahead of the opening of HS2. There is therefore a need for early West Coast Main Line train service improvements, achieved through infrastructure, operational and other changes, to ensure Milton Keynes’ continued and improved connectivity with other major centres in the years up to the opening of HS2. These improvements should then be able to be built upon to take advantage of the capacity released by the opening of HS2 to ensure and expand inter-urban connectivity between Milton Keynes and other major centres. In particular, Milton Keynes will need more trains to/from London and the West Midlands, as well as new all-day through services to and from North West England and Central Scotland.

4. Relating to Question 3 (The Business Case) Part of the business case for HSR, specifically HS2 at the moment, must include the capacity released on the West Coast Main Line for the introduction and expansion of fast train services for those major centres on it not served by HS2, including Milton Keynes. The draft timetable currently in circulation for an HS2 era West Coast Main Line shows for Milton Keynes a slower service to/from the West Midlands with no increase in frequency, retention of the hourly Manchester service, and possible loss of the hourly fast Crewe (for cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w62 Transport Committee: Evidence

connections to/from north) and Chester service to HS2. The additional services proposed are an hourly fast service to Crewe, then on to Lancashire, Cumbria and Glasgow, and additional semi-fast services to the West Midlands and Trent Valley. However Milton Keynes really requires more fast services to/from the other major centres of the West Midlands, Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow, as inferred in paragraph 3. Also, more fast services to/from London will be needed. Advantage should be taken of the benefits of implementing such a fast train timetable on the West Coast Main Line to improve the business case for HS2. Should an HS2 station be built in this area, the improved business case made for HS2 by providing fast trains between Milton Keynes and Central Scotland via the West Coast Main Line might be at least partly replaced by an improvement to the business case for HS2 based on the new station.

5. Relating to Question 4 (The Strategic Route) Paragraph 2 above mentions the inter-urban connectivity effect of a possible station in this area. The positive impact of such a station on the economic growth of the area could also be taken into account. With reference to the connection with HS1, the decision to locate the London terminus at Euston strongly suggests that a passenger connection, eg, a travelator, should be built between it and Kings Cross/St. Pancras. Similarly, Birmingham’s HS2 station at Curzon Street could be better connected to the rest of the West Midlands rail network, eg, by being served by the Cross- and some other suburban and regional services.

6. Relating to Question 6 (Impact) Any disruption to train services and inconvenience to passengers caused by the rebuilding required of Euston station to accommodate HS2 must be minimised. We do not know how the rebuilding of Euston and its approach tracks will be managed and scheduled, but would be very concerned if this involved reduction of train services, or even a lack of improvement of them, at a time of growth. 7. Should there be any queries relating to this submission, the contact at Milton Keynes Council is Steve Mortimer at Civic Offices, 1 Saxon Gate East, Milton Keynes, MK9 3EJ. May 2011

Written evidence from Tony Bolden and Reg Harman (HSR 26) Introduction 1. We are independent consultants and commentators on transport matters. We have a particular interest in modern railway strategy and practice and in how railways should be developed to play an effective role in the wider economic, environmental and social context. We have written a number of joint articles and papers on this topic, including two items on high speed rail in the recent past (see references). The views set out in this submission reflect in good part the thoughts developed in these papers. 2. We have tried to structure our submission to address the questions the Committee has set out. These are wide ranging, reflecting the large, complex and sometimes controversial topic that high speed rail forms. We have sought to respond briefly while seeking to be clear and cohesive. We hope that the resulting submission proves useful to the Committee.

The Need for High Speed Rail in Great Britain 3. We strongly support the concept of one or more high speed rail lines between London and the major city centres of the midlands and north of England and of Scotland. Great Britain’s economic development has suffered gravely over decades from excessive pressure on land use and transport in the South East while resources are poorly used in the north of the country. Addressing this imbalance requires effective transport links between the two ends of the country. Overall the current links are liable to congestion and delay and do not provide the fast mass connections necessary as part of a national strategy to redress the north-south divide. 4. A major element in this overall problem is the shortage of capacity against demand on the main north- south railway lines. The HS2 consultation document forecasts demand rising steadily, resulting in serious problems with capacity within a decade. This complements the Network Rail consultative RUS for the West Coast Main Line (Network Rail, 2010), which shows that line capacity is already fully used up between London and Wolverton and that load factors well in excess of seating capacity are already found on many intercity and London regional trains. Current forecasts indicate that this will become much more severe in future years. Similar pressures on capacity exist for the East Coast Main Line, and for other radial routes too. 5. The HS2 consultation rightly identifies the scale of the problems but it does not do justice to their currency or nature. Because the use of line capacity is already at a premium, this puts constraints on provision of additional services. Yet extra services are vital to the present and future economies of our cities. As an example, London is currently the “powerhouse” of the national economy through the provision of international commercial and financial services. These rely on a skilled workforce, of whom many live well beyond the bounds of greater London, and on good links to other major commercial cities. Yet it is now very difficult to cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w63

create any further capacity for more commuter or inter-city trains. In addition the high occupancy rates of current train paths means that quite minor disturbances can seriously reduce reliability of travel.

Relationship of High Speed Rail to Transport Policy Objectives 6. The UK Government does not appear to have a coherent forward looking transport strategy in the way that most European countries do. Inevitably, since the current Government took office, it has concentrated attention on restoring the UK’s financial health, but for the medium to long term this approach should embrace proper investment in infrastructure and services needed for long term economic stability and growth. We believe that revitalising the economy, while meeting serious environmental and social challenges, requires an effective transport strategy, in which use of the railway network must be play a key role. Development of a high speed rail network should be a crucial component in this, as it provides a high level of connectivity and accessibility that various parts of Great Britain need to have in the 21st Century. Investment in high speed rail should be complemented by further improvements to the “classic” rail network, such as further electrification projects, station and rolling stock improvements, if the railway network is to remain attractive. 7. The construction of a high speed rail network will have direct implications for domestic aviation. There is strong evidence from mainland Europe that high speed train services have changed the passenger market share considerably towards rail usage in the corridors they serve. A rail market share of c.70% is not uncommon; we would expect the same change to occur in the UK. It also provides an opportunity to link long haul international air services and domestic rail services more closely through strategically placed airports.

The Business Case Benefits of a new route 8. Previous upgrading of the West Coast Main Line has now been largely achieved, but only at a high cost in disruption to all services, and also to the urban areas and their residents along the line. Yet it has not brought a real long term solution. Further improving the existing network is likely to bring further disruption whilst only offering small gains in capacity and in journey times. 9. Therefore we see the real answer as the provision of substantial new capacity through a new line on a separate alignment. There would inevitably be some controversy over any such project; but building a new route would not disrupt existing lines nor cause further problems for the many urban areas through which these pass. By designing and using it strictly for high speed travel, it could convey a significant number of trains per hour, leaving the existing network to offer much greater capacity for other services. In parallel the new line would be able to provide significant reductions in journey time.

Economic aspects of route choice 10. Any new route must, of necessity, focus on connecting city centre to city centre, and the routeing will be largely determined by topography and cost issues. But the opportunities for serving other main centres, without detracting from the operating times of nonstop trains, would enable the benefits of faster rail travel and better connections at regional level to be created, complementing the better regional services possible on the existing network. In this way, the new line would provide stronger support for urban development throughout the corridor served by it, bringing gains in economic, environmental and social terms. In short, it needs to be developed as part of a strategy for the network in its wider context rather than in any degree of isolation. 11. The HS2 approach is heavily founded on measuring economic gains in conventional cost benefit terms. This form of assessment does not fully reflect the wider impacts which we consider are vital to the case, particularly those of spatial planning and its implications for access, connectivity and economic activity patterns. The weaknesses in the current cost benefit approaches have been criticised by the Omega Centre (Omega Centre, 2010). The Centre’s report on risk factors in project appraisal recommends a multi criteria analysis (MCA) framework; this is much closer in practice to the approach of other European countries such as France. 12. Furthermore, the HS2 proposal focuses almost exclusively on travel between the two city termini and thus assumes construction of the whole line before it can come into effective use. If parts of the line were to be built ahead of others, this would bring benefits in transport and economic terms earlier, provide a quicker gain from investment, and allow progress in line with available finances and changing priorities. Such an approach has been a feature of much of the high speed line development on the European Continent. 13. The HS2 proposal assumes that construction of the line and its termini will attract job creating development, primarily around the termini of the line. This seems very unlikely in itself. For example, on the existing HS1 line, the new stations at Stratford International and Ebbsfleet have not brought any real economic development as yet. In mainland Europe, however, most cities connected to European high speed lines have benefitted considerably from this, but only through implementing strong and consistent strategies for urban development and public transport in association (Harman, 2006). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w64 Transport Committee: Evidence

14. We agree that the maximum speed of 400 km/hr (250 mph) should be aimed at, as top operating speeds continue to rise across mainland Europe and Japan. However, the Birmingham line at least will be relatively short, built through complex urban patterns and varied topography, and thus the top speed for any one section needs to be balanced against disruption of existing structures and settlements, topography and cost. End to end journey time and connectivity should form the principal determinants for design of the line rather than a rigid adherence to a high maximum speed.

The Strategic Route Route alignment 15. We consider that the proposed HS2 alignment through the Chilterns would be economically weak, as well as creating very serious environmental problems. We suggest instead that the route should be taken northwards out of the London terminal on the Midland main line, routeing it to Birmingham via Milton Keynes along the M1 and M6 corridors. This would support development opportunities and growth along the corridor with new transport infrastructure, especially the major development in the Milton Keynes sub region. The new line could also be linked clearly with the existing rail network in London, at Toddington (north of Luton), Milton Keynes and Birmingham. This could enable provision of services from Northampton through Milton Keynes to London, with through working to Stratford, and Ashford by linking up the existing Kent to London fast services on HS1; this would connect together all the major development areas of the “greater South East”. 16. A particular benefit of this alignment is that it could be opened in sections and thus start providing benefits to users and the regions served, as well as a return on the investment, before the line is completed through to Birmingham. It would certainly allow links to lines other than the West Coast Main Line, allowing gains on services to Yorkshire and Humberside and to the North East as well as to the North West, and freeing up some capacity on the East Coast and Midland Main Lines for regional passenger and freight services.

Stations 17. We consider that the proposed location of a new station at Curzon Street in Birmingham is a poor choice. There are no links with other public transport services, which are heavily concentrated around New Street, in the heart of the city centre, and some distance from the Curzon Street site. This means that those arriving or departing on HS2 services will need more time and effort to reach or come from commercial premises in the centre of Birmingham and will not be able to readily interchange with local rail, light rail or bus services. They may well lose some of the time they would have gained by the faster rail journey! 18. In our view, a high speed London–Birmingham service must use New Street as its Birmingham station, to offer the optimum level of access and interchange. This does pose a challenge: the current station is already heavily congested and ill-equipped to deal with the number of passengers using it. We are aware that there are plans to rebuild it, and this opportunity must be used to provide the capacity and quality to equip it as terminus for high speed trains. Clearly this requires strong and focused planning by all agencies involved. As a through station, it would permit flexibility in using nearby stabling and servicing facilities, to avoid unnecessary platform occupation. Some high speed—and other—trains might work through to / from Wolverhampton, as with the current service, thus expanding the connectivity within the West Midlands. Other trains could go further beyond the West Midlands, to serve the main centres of the North West and Wales, if the relevant market and operating case could be made. (Extension of some trains beyond the main cities served is a normal feature of the TGV service pattern in France, where it forms an important component in spreading the connectivity benefits to other areas within the region.) 19. At the southern end of the proposed route, we are very doubtful about an expanded Euston. It is well linked to the London Underground system and near to regional rail systems, but it would involve massive reconstruction and disruption to the immediate local area. St Pancras has very good London Underground links and direct access to the Thameslink regional rail services (currently being upgraded). It is also the terminus for HS1, thus providing direct connections where through trains are not available. Thus St Pancras should in our view be the terminus for HS2. It also has significantly more room for expansion than Euston.

Shape of the Network 20. We support the proposed “Y” shaped network for the expansion of high speed rail. The network needs to serve other cities in the North such as Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds. It also needs to be connected into the existing rail network, so that high speed trains can proceed on to other destinations like Newcastle, in order for such cities and areas to enjoy the benefits from high speed travel as early as possible. The high speed network must not become an exclusive network in which only certain places because of their location can benefit from faster rail travel.

International Links 21. We believe that it is essential for the HS2 network to connect with HS1, so as to allow operation of through trains to / from mainland Europe. With HS2 Birmingham would then be within three hours’ travelling cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w65

time to Brussels and Paris, ie within the range at which rail travel can make a critical difference in determining modal choice to favour the train rather than air. As indicated earlier, there is plenty of evidence from mainland Europe to suggest that there would be a marked transfer from air to rail. Indeed emerging findings suggest that, with increased problems for air travellers, four hour rail journeys might become competitive with air: for HS2 this could include Birmingham– / Koln and Manchester–Brussels / Paris. 22. In comparison, we see no point in building a specific link to Heathrow off the proposed HS2 line— whether it is part of phase 1 or phase 2. Most of Heathrow’s catchment lies in the South East, especially in London, and London regional and Underground services already provide for these. Other connections to the rest of the South East would not be improved by HS2.Through rail services to/from Birmingham and indeed other midlands and northern destinations, could be run along a high speed line down the M1 corridor. In any case pressure on Heathrow would be reduced if our proposed through services between Birmingham, Brussels and Paris reduced cross Channel air travel demand significantly. There are also question marks about the long term viability of Heathrow, if it is not going to be expanded.

Economic Re-Building and Impact of High Speed Rail Regional links 23. A key feature is the scale of development pressures and plans for and the West Midlands. On existing planning commitments, the “greater South East” (the former planning regions of the South East, the East of England and Greater London) is expected to have an extra two million people and one million extra jobs over the next decade or so. Previous Governments designated four major growth areas, which remain a focus for substantial development. These include Milton Keynes and the South Midlands, whose growth will result in the area becoming a major conurbation in its own right and equivalent to the city regions that the intended high speed network is seeking to serve. To function, therefore, effectively as part of the national and regional economy, these need to be connected to neighbouring sub regions and also to the wider world as part of a fast inter-city network. 24. The West Midlands is also seeking to boost its economic performance by improving opportunities and competitiveness; connecting it by improved transport links with London and the South East would help bring important benefits. High Speed rail can provide a boost to a resurgent West Midlands economy to enable that area to share in some of the economic fruits of London and the South East. For all of these regions, direct links to continental European centres would bring even greater benefits.

Carbon impact 25. The High Speed Route network will be electrified, bringing significant advantages. Electric trains offer better environmental performance, emitting between 20 and 35% less carbon per seat kilometre than diesel equivalents on the basis of the current electricity generation mix (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2007). This advantage will increase over time as our generation mix becomes less carbon intensive. Passenger rail CO2 emissions are significantly below those of road transport and air. While high speed trains would emit more emissions than conventional electrified services the new rolling stock required for the trains will be more energy efficient than existing stock and should have the advantage of capturing more passengers from more polluting forms of transport.

Conclusions 26. We support the need to develop the proposed HS2 high speed line, but with the following caveats: — The HS2 network must be designed and developed as part of a national railway strategy. This should be framed in the light of national transport, spatial, environmental and economic planning strategies. — The Birmingham high speed line should form part of a wider “Y” shaped network that would also serve Manchester and Leeds and major centres in Northern England and Scotland. — The HS2 line to Birmingham should be routed along the M1 and M6 corridors. This would enable the Milton Keynes / South Midlands conurbation to have fast inter-city and regional services. — The network should be opened in phases, with links to the existing rail network. In this way, it can carry high speed trains that work through to the main cities in the Midlands and the North, thus providing some relief to capacity pressures on all three radial main lines north of London. This would generate economic and financial gains for the investment ahead of completion of the whole line. — There should be a direct link to HS1 so that high speed and fast domestic trains may be operated. These would include services from Birmingham to Brussels / Paris. — The Birmingham terminus should be New Street. Its redevelopment should enable high speed and other trains to work beyond to serve other centres, within the West Midlands and beyond. — The London terminus should be at St Pancras. May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w66 Transport Committee: Evidence

References Bolden, T & Harman, R (2009), New development: Fast track to Birmingham. Public Money & Management (January) European Environment Agency (2008), Beyond transport policy—exploring and managing the external drivers of transport demand. EEA Technical Report No: 12/2008 Harman, R (2006), High Speed Trains and the Development and Regeneration of Cities (Greengauge21, www.greengauge21.net) Network Rail (2010), West Coast Main Line: Route Utilisation Strategy—Draft for Consultation (www.networkrail.co.uk) Rail Safety and Standards Board (2007), Study on further electrification of Britain’s railway network (www.rssb.co.uk/pdf/reports/research/T633_rpt_final.pdf) UCL Omega Centre (2010), The RAMP Study—Final Report (ICE, www.ice.org.uk)

Written evidence from Chris James (HSR 28) Summary of Main Points The business case is seriously flawed. The main benefits, business time savings are incorrectly evaluated, the impact on the environment has not been properly completed prior to a decision, the proposed routes and investment have not been properly reviewed against other alternatives eg RP2. It will also have no impact on economic rebalancing as according to HS2 data most of the economic advantages accrue to London and the South East.

1. HSR Fit with the Government’s Transport Policy Objectives Based on the data that has been presented I don’t believe it does for the following reasons: — Rational increases in demand can be met by developing the West Coast Main Line under Rail Package two proposals which will cost less than 1/10 the cost of HS2, create minimal environmental impact and provide a scaleable solution for the future. — Rail Package 2 offers a cheaper alternative to addressing reasonable estimates of future demand, therefore this high speed rail network does not provide the best value for money, which it must do, particularly in the current economic climate and with the general issues of government debt. — As the Consultation does not provide sufficient details of alternative solutions and different scenarios for future demand growth—simply taking an extreme growth case, by definition it is not possible to determine whether this is the best value for money. — Overall domestic travel shows signs of saturation for short and long distance journeys, the DfT’s rail demand forecasts are excessive and take no account of impacts from high speed internet connectivity on future travel trends. — Alternative scenarios have been not been developed to evaluate the benefits of this investment, for example versus improvements in commuter services or road transport. — Large scale enhancement to the rail network should only be done in a way that ensures the rail network will cause significantly lower carbon emissions after the enhancement takes place—HS2 is carbon neutral.

2. Business Case — The business case is flawed and provides no supportive basis for investing such a large sum of money. — The benefit is based on business people not doing productive work when travelling, which is absolutely wrong. Everyone uses the internet for business during travel. — There are cheaper alternatives that have not been properly evaluated versus HS2 eg RP2. — The passenger demand is seriously overstated, although already it has been significantly reduced from the original estimates. The HS1 demand was also very overstated and proved to be wrong. — Costs are understated eg Interest charges are not included. — It is likely to lose money and require subsidy over time, not factored into the case. — The trains schedules are not proven at the proposed speeds so capacity estimates may be wrong. — Detailed environmental costs and impacts have not been provided or costed at a realistic level in the data available and will only be complete after the decision. — The current business case is for the London to Birmingham phase only. That business case is flawed. There should be a business case for the entire HS2 programme before decisions to commit £bns are made. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w67

3. The Strategic Route — International experts agree that for high speed trains to be really worth building, the distance between stations should be at least 150km. Britain is a small island compared to other European countries with high speed rail and its major cities are closer together. By the time the proposed route has got out of London to an area where trains can run at maximum speed, the distance will be far less than 150km. Hence the route chosen by the DfT and HS2 Ltd is not suitable for Britain. — A better value approach would be to leverage the existing rail network like RP2 suggested. — Less disruption if the route follows existing major transportation routes eg M1 or M40 corridors. — The route ignores AONB, green belt, farming land, footpaths, ancient monuments and listed buildings.

4. Economic Rebalancing and Equity — I have seen no evidence this will help bridge the north south divide. — Most new jobs will be created in the South, and even then will be re-distribution of existing roles. — Economic investment in the North would be a much better way of addressing this. — It is likely to increase commuting into London from further out.

5. Impact — Chapter 5 of the Consultation has a short summary of the Appraisal of Sustainability: the actual document is extensive. However, despite the length of that document the Environmental Impact Assessment has not yet been published. It is therefore inappropriate to proceed with a major infrastructure project without such detailed assessment, particularly as it is already known that HS2 threatens 160 wildlife sites; there will also be loss of 21 ancient woods, in existence since 1600 AD, and huge swathes of agricultural land. — Vibration will impact on a further 27 woodlands. The HS2 route goes through 4Wildlife Trust reserves and 10 Sites of Scientific Interest. There will be irreparable damage to the Chiltern aquifer which supplies water to millions of homes in London and the South East. — There are no proven savings in CO2 emissions because of the speed and resultant power consumption of the trains, and despite the rhetoric, as accepted by HS2’s Sustainability Report; there will be no significant modal shift from air or car travel to trains. — The new trains will use around three times the amount of power of existing trains and cause more pollution than any other form of travel other than air. — The construction period and its aftermath will have a significant, detrimental and permanent impact on the leisure and tourism industry along the entire route. — I have not been able to find a detailed “noise map” of the proposed routes and there is no information on the effects of vibration on properties locate on or close to tunnels. — There is no information on how noise, dust, and vibrations will be controlled during the construction process. — Construction traffic congestion will cause major disruption through small towns and villages all along the route. May 2011

Written evidence from Civic Voice (HSR 29) 1. Civic Voice is the new national charity for the civic movement. We champion and support a network of hundreds of volunteer-led and community based civic societies and other groups across England who work to make the places where everyone lives more attractive, enjoyable and distinctive and to promote civic pride. We have been joined by over 275 civic societies with c71,000 individual members in our first year. Civic society volunteers are the most numerous participants in the planning system and take a close interest in transport and development issues. This submission is informed by their practical experience and local outlook. 2. The Government’s proposals for a new high speed rail link between London and Birmingham, and beyond, have profound implications for the communities and places along its route. They concern dozens of civic societies and have been a stimulus for community action. Major infrastructure projects of this kind can be intimidating and the procedures for participating can be daunting for the individuals and communities most affected and it is all the more important that their views are effectively addressed. Civic Voice has brought local voluntary civic societies together to discuss the HS2 proposals and hosted visits for civic volunteers, HS2 staff and others to view the experience of HS1 through Kent. 3. Civic Voice is a signatory along with a wide range of voluntary transport, environmental and conservation groups to the Right Lines charter (enclosed). This reflects our view that there may be a case for high speed rail but the current proposals fall well short of what is required. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w68 Transport Committee: Evidence

4. We recognise the benefits that can be provided by strategic investment in rail services but any proposals need to be underpinned by a robust business case and to demonstrate they can: — support urban regeneration over greenfield development; — integrate with transport policy to support investment in other rail services, increase rail freight and shift trips from air and road to rail; — support moves to a low carbon economy; and — provide maximum protection for the local environment and heritage and maximise opportunities for enhancement. 5. We believe it is paramount that any proposals for high speed rail engage people at the earliest possible stage when genuine options are on the table and choices and assumptions can be tested. This is also a requirement of the Aarhus Convention. We have been disappointed by the limited nature of the current process of public consultation on HS2 which falls well short of both what is required and what is expected of a Government that places such an emphasis on localism. 6. We recognise that there will be circumstances where the national interest is served by the development of major infrastructure. In developing such proposals, however, it is essential that people are engaged meaningfully in strategic as well as local issues. We also recognise the concern over blight which may result but this should not be allowed to stymie effective public engagement and a much less risk averse and transparent approach should be adopted. We encourage urgent action to address this as part of the current debate over HS2 to Birmingham and much more effective public engagement over the choice of whether and how to extend any line north of Birmingham is a necessity. To do otherwise not only runs counter to public expectations of meaningful engagement and political commitments to localism but also risks causing further delay and controversy later on in the process. 7. We ask the Committee to address the need for more effective public engagement as a priority. This should combine consideration of both strategic and local issues in the range of engagement techniques adopted and take place at a point where the public’s contribution can make a meaningful difference. We also urge the Committee to recognise the case for making public funds available to support community engagement as part of the process for any high speed rail proposals. 8. In the light of the experience with HS2 we also urge the Committee to consider a series of further requirements for any proponent of high speed rail. There is a need to: — Demonstrate a robust business case based on a variety of scenarios—this should be much less volatile and susceptible to small changes in the assumptions than the evidence which underpins HS2. — Adopt a more bespoke and flexible approach which reflects the sensitive English landscape and townscape through which any new high speed line would need to pass—this should avoid in particular any rigid assumptions about design speed and take a strategic approach to mitigation from the start. — Undertake a full audit of the cumulative impacts on undesignated townscape, landscape, heritage, wildlife, tranquillity and valued buildings and on the rights of way network at the earliest stages to shape the initial route assessment and inform early discussion on mitigation—this work remains incomplete for HS2. — Maximise opportunities for positive enhancement, including creating new rights of way networks, opening up new green space, compelling design of new structures and providing a long term endowment to manage and care for the local environment in perpetuity. — Develop a design brief for the route which reflects local distinctiveness and ensures design considerations are on an equal footing with engineering considerations in development of the proposals. — Locate station where they support and avoid “parkway” stations on greenfield sites. May 2011

Written evidence from Lichfield City Council (HSR 30) 1. Introduction 1.1 Lichfield City Council, at its meeting on 11 April 2011 confirmed its support in principle for High Speed Rail and in doing so recognised that the revisions published in December 2010 were an improvement on the original proposals. However, the Council remained convinced that further improvements would still be required to deliver the quality of rail service which is being proposed. 1.2 This submission is specifically intended to raise issues for the Committee to consider in relation to the business case and strategic route. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w69

2. Business Case 2.1 Lichfield City Council believes that the suggested time savings for most journeys will not be achievable because of the proposed locations of the stations. Any time saving on the high-speed element of a journey would subsequently be lost at either end. 2.2 Actual journeys do not start and end at a high-speed station but include getting to and from the station itself. In determining the time saving on a high speed journey you must therefore look at the whole journey, not just at the high speed part of it. This is crucial to the time saving part of the economic case; and the location of stations and their connections are therefore critical. 2.3 It is claimed that HS2 is necessary because increased use of railways will make the existing system inadequate. However, HS2 will join the existing West Coast Main Line a few miles north of Lichfield and making space for high speed trains will therefore reduce its capacity. This section of line was recently widened from two to four tracks (the TV4 project) to increase its capacity. The widening works gave years of misery to some Lichfield residents, but since completion there has been an improved Lichfield service on this main line. 2.4 There is a further disadvantage with this junction. The proposed high-speed trains do not tilt; the existing Pendolino trains do. Since the line north of Lichfield is curvaceous, nowhere more so than the approaches to Stafford, high-speed trains will be slower than existing trains for the rest of their journey to Manchester, Glasgow or wherever. This certainly affects that part of the economic case which is based on time saving.

3. The Strategic Route 3.1 A mile before the end of the Lichfield to Birmingham New Street railway journey, and on the right hand side of the line, is an empty space with a dour classical building next to it. The Grade I Listed classical building was built for Birmingham’s first railway station—Curzon Street—which was closed to passengers in 1859 when a better station site—New Street—was found. New Street is still a better site because it is in the City Centre, because most of Birmingham’s railway services use it, and because buses and taxis are nearby. The empty space is the proposed site of Birmingham’s high speed railway station. 3.2 The plans for Birmingham’s high speed railway station appear to show only one way out—this would be highly inconvenient and time consuming for travellers. On leaving the station there seems to be a very long walk—the length of the platform; then the length of the concourse; then the bridge over the inner ring road; then a descent to ground level. There appears to be no pedestrian link to Moor Street or New Street stations, no taxi ranks, no car park, not even a bus stop. All the time saved getting to Birmingham Curzon Street will then be spent getting to the final destination. No saving in total journey time. 3.3 Another disadvantage with Curzon Street is that there is no railway connection with the rest of the network. Trains cannot run on to serve Wolverhampton or the Black Country or anywhere except Curzon Street. On the continent high speed trains often do just that. HS2 in Birmingham is surely a waste of money unless it gets to New Street. And once there, it could continue northwards to Manchester. 3.4 The proposed Birmingham International high speed station is similarly flawed—it isn’t at International, it is a mile away. So the time saved in getting to the high speed station is going to be wasted in getting to the airport, NEC or other final destination. No saving in total journey time again. 3.5 No Heathrow station is proposed in phase 1. This is surely a mistake as there is no satisfactory way of getting from the West Midlands to Heathrow—no planes, no through trains, not even a through train from London Euston station. 3.6 Heathrow should be included in phase 1. Its main international competitors as a hub airport for Europe (Paris, Amsterdam and Frankfurt) have all got busy stations with high speed railway services. May 2011

Written evidence from Northumberland County Council (HSR 31) Background The following points make the case for a “High Speed Rail Network” particularly the benefits for Northumberland, although it is appreciated that the Commons Transport Committee will also have to consider the wider implications for the Government’s transport policy objectives. The main case for high speed rail links to Northumberland is: — Reduced Journey times. — Increased rail capacity. — Increased economic development resulting from the first two points. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w70 Transport Committee: Evidence

The Case for High Speed Rail

Northumberland County Council sees the development of a high speed rail network as good news for the economic prosperity of the North East region and Northumberland. However the authority would to see the completion of the whole of the Government’s proposed High Speed Network to reap the full benefits for Northumberland. This includes the proposed section to Leeds.

While journey reductions of over 30 minutes from London to Newcastle, and 40 minutes from Birmingham to Newcastle on the proposed High Speed Rail Network will help the economic competitiveness of the North East Region, equally important is the increase in rail capacity as the existing rail network becomes increasingly congested. Network Rail predicts an increase of more than 70% in long distance rail travel from 2007 to 2036 on the East Coast Main Line. If rail capacity to the North East Region is not increased during this period this could act as a deterrent to economic growth.

At the recent seminar hosted by Theresa Villers MP, Minister of State for Transport, in Newcastle on 24 March, it was clear that the Government is committed to the development of a high speed rail network. However, it appears that little work has been done so far on how the high speed line to Leeds would link into the existing East Coast Main Line and on to the North East region. It is vital that the more detailed technical aspects of the route are progressed, as this is will ultimately determine time savings from London to the North East, and also from the West Midlands.

The Government’s proposed High Speed Network will run from London to Birmingham with branches off to Manchester and Leeds. It is important that the construction of the branch to Leeds is built at the same time as the one to Manchester. Any delay could put the North East Region including Northumberland at a disadvantage economically. There could also be a danger that through traffic from London to Edinburgh that presently travels via the East Coast Main Line through Newcastle and Northumberland could be diverted via Manchester and the West Coast Main Line. This would be a great loss to the region, and could deprive stations in Northumberland such as Morpeth, Alnmouth and Berwick of through services to London and Scotland. There would also be a danger that the line beyond Newcastle would become an essentially local route with limited inter-regional trains operating between Newcastle and Scotland. This could also increase costs for local trains still operating on the route, further threatening the loss of service to Northumberland stations.

As stated earlier, the High Speed Network would run as far as Leeds with speeds of around 225mph. Beyond that the trains would run along the East Coast Main line at 125mph to the North East and Scotland. In addition to the difference in speed, the new High Speed Network would be built to the UIC continental loading gauge. This would mean that trains serving the North East beyond Leeds would have to be built to the smaller British loading gauge. This would of course increase costs because two different designs of trains would be required for the respective loading gauges. This could discourage through trains from Continental Europe to the North East and could restrict the potential to provide more frequent trains from London to the region. The long term solution would be to extend the new High Speed Lines beyond Leeds to the North East, or at the very least investigate the potential for the East Coast Main Line to be upgraded to the UIC Continental Loading gauge.

The projected date of 2032 for high speed rail to arrive in the North East would appear to be slow by the standards of such projects in Europe. This could put the North East region at a disadvantage economically compared with other regions which may benefit earlier, the timescale for construction must be reduced. In addition there must be a long term aim to extend the High Speed Lines beyond Leeds to the North East Region for the reasons already outlined.

In relation to Northumberland, the arrival of high speed rail will of course bring great economic benefits to the County. These benefits will be greater if trains originating from the High Speed Network make some stops in Northumberland, as trains to and from London do at present at Morpeth, Alnmouth and Berwick.

Conclusion

Northumberland County supports the Government’s plans for a “High Speed Rail Network” to support economic regeneration in Northumberland and the North East Region. The economic benefits of high speed rail have clearly been demonstrated in continental Europe. The upgrading of existing main lines to the north has clearly been demonstrated not to be a viable option, by the complexity, timescale and cost overruns on the recent West Coast Main Line modernisation.

The County Council would urge the Government to proceed with the construction of a High Speed Rail Network as soon as possible, and reduce the timescale for construction from the current completion date of 2032. In the longer term the County Council would like to see high speed rail extended beyond Leeds to York, Newcastle and Scotland to reap further benefits for the North East Region. Overall high speed rail would be a major boost to the economic prosperity in Northumberland and the North East Region. May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w71

Written evidence from WPCSTOPHS2 (HSR 33)

1. Introduction 1.1 This submission represents the views of the WPCSTOPHS2 Group, a group formed amongst residents of Whittington and Lichfield District to consider the impact of proposals for High Speed Rail (HSR). As our name suggests, our group was initially formed in opposition to HS2, not unnaturally given our proximity to the proposed route. However this vantage point has enabled us to study the proposals in much more detail than other UK residents have felt necessary, and it is very clear to us that the proposals make little overall sense for the UK as a whole. We therefore remain firmly opposed to the project. 1.2 We welcome the review by the Transport Select Committee, and agree with many of the issues and questions the Committee are planning to pursue. We comment specifically on some of the issues raised in our evidence below. In general however, our overriding concerns about the proposals for HSR are as follows: (i) The huge project cost, and the net public subsidy (£17.1 billion for the “Y” phase alone) are an unnecessary waste of public funds and do not address the shortcomings of public transport in the UK. We are not convinced by the demand or benefit case as presented by the Department for Transport (DfT)—if the benefits really exist, why is a public subsidy required? (ii) Much better, more flexible and cheaper alternatives exist to satisfy demand for intercity travel, which have not been properly represented by the DfT. These can give much earlier relief for overcrowding, and the lower cost would give scope to address other weaknesses in transport infrastructure. (iii) The proposals will mean unnecessary destruction of the environment and cause hardship and blight to local communities. This has not been properly considered and is ignored in the business case. (iv) We are concerned about the role of HS2 Ltd, and the lack of process for managing consultation responses. We have found HS2 Ltd analysis to be unclear and selective in favour of the project, and consultation questions to be carefully crafted for a positive response with no clear procedure for review. It is disingenuous for a consultation to be conducted about High Speed Rail in general whilst so little has yet been published for routes north of Birmingham and there has been so little engagement of the general public beyond the HS2 route. Whilst we recognise this may not fall within the Committee’s normal line of enquiry, we strongly believe that a much more independent public consultation process is necessary for a project of this importance.

1.3 We have tabled our specific comments below to reference the issues being addressed by the Committee.

2. Issue 2: HSR Fit with Government Transport Objectives 2.1 We are concerned at the apparent lack of a comprehensive transport strategy and the failure to develop rail as part of an integrated approach. We share the desire to improve inter-urban transport links in the UK, and recognise the important place that fast, efficient rail services have in this infrastructure. Our major concern however is that the scale of expenditure proposed on HSR will soak up all available transport funding, starving other transport services of maintenance and development for many years to come, as appears to have been the case in France. This will benefit relatively few travellers on HSR and deprive many more on other routes.

2.2 There are a wide range of transport needs that are not adequately provided at present, and these vary by region and individual. From our local station at Lichfield we currently have a very good peak time service to London, with a fast journey time of 69 minutes. Our rail needs are to improve station facilities and to improve journey times to other destinations (currently 126 minutes to Bristol, 170 minutes to Cambridge etc). Instead, HSR will bypass Lichfield, leaving us with fewer, slower rail services to London or the environmentally damaging prospect of driving to Birmingham to join HSR. Many other cities and towns are also in this position, with HSR not addressing real issues and creating worse services despite rising demand.

2.3 The reality is that we already have fast rail connectivity with London in the UK, comparing favourably with Europe. Our major problems are capacity (addressed by HSR but at great cost) and the wider transport network (not addressed by HSR, and probably damaged by it). Average journey times between the capital and each country’s five largest cities are:31 Germany 4hrs 04m; France 3hrs 41m; Italy 3hrs 04m; Spain 2hrs 31m; UK 2hrs 25m.

2.4 A real alternative to HS2 is available and was initially developed for the Department of Transport by Atkins as part of the March 2010 case for HS2.32 We believe that this alternative, known as RP2, has not been adequately presented or had the consideration by the DfT that it merits, receiving only cursory review and rejection when reappearing in part as Scenario A in the latest consultation papers.33 In effect, RP2 represents an upgrade to the existing WCML by extending trains and removing pinch points, thereby meeting capacity demands and generating the same fare income at a fraction of the cost of HS2. Furthermore, this approach can be evolved as demand rises, delivering benefits sooner, and to take advantage of new signalling 31 Source: More Capacity on WCML : an alternative to HS2, prepared by HS2 Action Alliance February 2011 32 Source: HS2 Strategic Alternatives Study, Strategic Outline Case, prepared by Atkins March 2010 33 Source: Strategic Alternatives to the Proposed Y Network, prepared by Atkins February 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w72 Transport Committee: Evidence

technology as this becomes available to increase speeds and capacity further. Information on this alternative has been presented by HS2 Action Alliance,34 has never been refuted, and deserves full and detailed consideration. 2.5 We would also add an obvious point that transport needs in the UK cannot be met by inter-urban train services alone. A more integrated efficient infrastructure is required. In the West Midlands there are many areas where business is inhibited by traffic congestion that could be relieved by improvements to the road network, and many opportunities to relieve congestion through improvements to local transport facilities (such as local bus and train services, or expansion of Birmingham Airport to avoid journeys to Heathrow). The Government transport strategy should be providing a lead, and funding, to support regional schemes.

3. Issue 3: The Business Case 3.1 We find the business case presented for HSR to be deficient and surprisingly uncommercial. It is puzzling that the proposals are presented with so little detail on sections north of Birmingham, without reference to a realistic alternative, and without a full examination of a downside case and sensitivities. We note that the base demand forecast has already been substantially reduced by HS2 Ltd, but that this reduction has been masked by extending the demand growth assumption by 10 years until 2043. We doubt the justification for this, and question the outdated modelling assumptions used to estimate and value the potential benefits. We fully support the analysis prepared by HS2 Action Alliance to review the updated business case.35 3.2 We believe the committee should probe deeply into the costs and affordability of HSR. There is a history of underestimating the cost of infrastructure projects, and at this early stage of HSR we believe there should be greater clarity on the future overall cost. Whilst the DfT talk in terms of £32 billion construction cost, we also see estimates of £112 billion36 for the whole network. In addition, the DfT seem to accept that the opportunity for grants or private funding is relatively minor, such that virtually all funding and risk will be met by the public finances, at a time of very high national debt. We find it surprising that the Government should wish to commit to a long term strategic venture that forces the country to an ongoing subsidy of selective rail services, estimated at £17.1 billion for the “Y” route alone. Is HSR such a poor commercial venture, or such a vital strategic project, to require high public subsidy and leave such a legacy of debt? 3.3 We also believe the Committee should probe the demand case, which appears to us to defy common sense. We wonder what research has been done to understand why people want to travel, and why travel to London is something this nation wants to encourage. We have seen in previous projects (eg HS1 and the M6 Toll) serious overestimation of demand, and a failure to consider the competitive reactions to major projects. We know that other transport modes are striving to become greener and cheaper. We see a rapid advance in the impact of technology and communications reducing the need for business travel. We see also the issue of price dominating so many discretionary purchases, and consumers seeking real value. Yet it is proposed to commit huge expenditure for a 60 year project which relies on a doubling of demand in a mature and saturated market. We are particularly concerned about the impact of rail fares, which are critical to demand levels and return on investment. We are told that the HS2 analysis has been based on the concept of fares rising at RPI +1% pa, yet that demand is so sensitive to price that a fare rise of RPI +2% pa will reduce demand by 24%, and lower the Benefit Cost Ratio from 1.6 to 0.9.37 This is a massive sensitivity and risk. With uncertainty over demand, fares and construction costs, it is uncommercial to opt for the high risk, expensive fixed system solution of HSR when more flexible alternatives exist. 3.4 The evaluation of the purported benefits of HSR is subjective and fails to convince on many levels. Whilst the notion of valuing time savings from faster journeys has some logic, no attempt has been made to justify this in real fares. In addition we see little detail given to explain figures, the use of out of date data, and simple errors such as not recognising that time spent on trains can now be very productive, using modern technology, and not wasted. We also find it incredible that the benefit case should introduce subjective user benefits such as agglomeration, whilst the costing completely ignores widespread hardship, blight and environmental damage. We trust that the Committee will examine the benefit case in more detail, or force the DfT to accept that the Benefit Cost Ratio analysis is largely meaningless and that the more robust numbers to focus on are the gross expenditure and the lifetime public subsidy. At the end of the day, if the benefits presented by the DfT were real, customers would be prepared to pay higher fares; HSR could operate without subsidy, and could be funded by the private sector. 3.5 Most importantly, we believe that any analysis should be undertaken against a direct and meaningful comparator (see 2.4). A comparator based on evolving the RP2 package, upgrading existing facilities at lower cost, would be a more relevant alternative against which to properly judge HSR. This would enable real 34 Source: More Capacity on WCML : an alternative to HS2 prepared by HS2 Action Alliance February 2011 35 Source: Review of the February 2011 Consultation Business Case for HS2 prepared by HS2 Action Alliance and updated May 2011 36 Source: Staffordshire County Council quoting HS2 Ltd 37 Source: Economic Case for HS2 (section 7.2.18) published by Department for Transport February 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w73

incremental costs to be compared against real incremental fare revenue, and a conventional commercial financial evaluation to measure this project in the real world.

4. Issue 4: The Strategic Route 4.1 Our existing train network has been developed over many years to meet our population needs and is already largely a best fit solution, which can easily be modernised to provide links to Heathrow, HS1 and Crossrail. The proposed route is irrational in that it fails to link into existing stations at Birmingham New Street (with links to the rest of the West Midlands) and Birmingham International (with excellent links to Birmingham Airport and other facilities). We have no information on how local services will connect with the new Birmingham stations, or of the cost to provide adequate links. It is also irrational that the proposed route doesn’t immediately take in Heathrow, that it overloads Euston and does not easily link to HS1 and Europe. 4.2 We are concerned that the proposed route will significantly worsen regional services. We currently benefit from long distance services which stop in our region—these will bypass us on HSR, and with usage of the remaining WCML being more than halved (on HS2 Ltd estimates) our service will disappear without a significant increase in subsidy. Whilst central Birmingham may welcome the new route, all other areas of the midlands (where most people live and work) will be worse off, with longer journeys, more car usage and environmental damage. We see little consideration of the impact HSR will have on the viability of existing services, and no substance to support the notion that extra investment will be attracted to regenerate facilities that are disadvantaged by HSR. 4.3 A significant lesson from rail travel over the years has been that twin track routes are very inflexible. Trains need to travel at the speed of the slowest. We have benefited from the four tracking and modernisation of the WCML in recent years, and we see the same approach working for roads. To consider building a new HSR facility with only two tracks seems old fashioned and short sighted.

5. Issue 5: Economic Rebalancing and Equity 5.1 We see no evidence that HSR will assist economic regeneration and help to bridge a north south divide. If anything, we believe it will lead to further dominance of London and possibly a few large cities which are directly on the route, to the detriment of the regions. This is confirmed in a paper published by Greengauge 21 in July 2009 which states the need for complementary action (for which we believe there are no plans, processes or funding in place) without which “HSR on its own could increase the dominance of the Greater South East within the UK”.38 5.2 We have seen suggestions that more jobs and services will be created in the West Midlands, but on deeper analysis it appears that these will largely depend on yet further unspecified investment. The DfT Consultation Summary is at least clear in suggesting that 22,000 of the 30,000 jobs that could arise from regeneration following HS2 would be in London. There are surely many better and less expensive ways, in a modern society, to regenerate regions and improve national prosperity. 5.3 There does seem to be evidence, confirmed from what we understand of the DfT benefit case, that the major beneficiaries of HSR will be more wealthy individuals who are able to afford a leisure trip to London. In essence this will mean the public subsidy for HSR benefiting the wealthy at the expense of the poor. 5.4 We are aware that there are supporters of HSR and, to some extent, we can understand the point if such a facility is provided free of charge. Recognising the challenge in the Committee’s question 5.4 we would propose that: — HSR should be forced to operate without public subsidy—ie fares should be set to meet development and operating costs. Adopting this principle could potentially allow full privatisation of the route. — Local authorities should be required to meet the cost of new HSR stations built in their area, so that they can integrate local redevelopment and contribute to regeneration. Should such financing not be viable, we need to understand better why we are meeting these costs from public funds.

Summary 1. This is an unnecessary high risk project with doubtful benefits and requiring permanent public subsidy which will leave a legacy of debt. 2. Better alternatives exist to meet rail passenger forecasts and wider transport priorities which can be introduced sooner, more flexibly, and at much lower cost. 38 Source: Complementary measures to facilitate regional economic benefits from High Speed Rail prepared by Urban & Regional Policy for Greengauge 21 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w74 Transport Committee: Evidence

3. We do not understand the strategic imperative of this project and the business case is weak. We suggest that, if the proposed benefits were realistic, the project could be undertaken in the private sector without the need for public funds. 4. We welcome the scrutiny of the project provided by the Select Committee, but remain concerned by the lack of clarity in detail provided by the DfT and by the lack of independent review and impartiality in the public consultation process. May 2011

Written evidence from Professor John Whitelegg (HSR 34) 1. The purpose of my submission is to alert the Transport Committee to evidence and arguments that demonstrate the flaws in current proposals for High Speed Rail (HSR) in the UK. 2. My interest in HSR goes back to the early 1990s and to the time when I was a member of staff of the Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Traffic in the German State of North Rhine Westphalia based in Duesseldorf. At that time we organised an international conference on HSR and then published a book “High Speed Trains: fast tracks to the future”, Leading Edge Press, 1993, edited by John Whitelegg, Staffan Hulten and Torbjorn Flink. 3. I am happy to appear in person, answer questions, provide supportive evidence and help the Transport Committee in any other way I can. 4. The case for HSR in the UK is deeply flawed, represents a very significant misallocation of resources and will not achieve its objectives in economic regeneration or carbon reduction. 5. In what follows I will concentrate on six points: — The fundamental nature of the relationship between speed, time saving and demand for transport. — The evidence on new transport infrastructure creating jobs. — The evidence on high speed rail supplanting domestic aviation. — The evidence on electronic media (video-conferencing, teleconferencing etc) substituting for physical travel. — The HSR project is contrary to official DfT “Transprt Appraisal Guidance”. 6. The fundamental nature of the relationship between speed, time saving and demand for transport. Transport researchers and planners have frequently noted the relationship between saving time, going faster and going further. As technology improves and speed increases we tend in aggregate to compensate for that time saving by travelling further. I have written about this under the title “The conquest of distance by the destruction of time”. Other authors have called it the “Marchetti Wall” and David Metz, former chief scientist at the DfT has written about it in his 2008 book “The limits to travel: how far will you go”. Marchetti was the first scientist to note the law-like relationship between time, distance and speed and he discovered the law of constant travel time. In aggregate all human beings will spend just over 1 hour each day travelling and will maintain that time allocation in the face of technology changes and changes in speed. If they can travel at 300/400/500kph they will still travel for just over 1.1 hour, effectively consuming the time saving as extra miles. Marchetti, C (1994). Anthropological Invariants in Travel Behaviour. Technical Forecasting and Social Change 47(1): 75–78. The implications of this fundamental relationship in the context of HSR are very significant indeed. Current plans envisage that we will spend £32 billion of public cash on HSR and the result will be that users of the service will save time on their journeys and will then use the same amount of time up by travelling further and more often. The £32 billion simply increases the amount of physical travel and shifts society as a whole to a more distance intensive and energy intensive level. To use an ungainly phrase the money spent to achieve this result is a waste of time.

The Evidence on New Transport Infrastructure Creating Jobs 7. UK transprt planning and thinking asserts the existence of a clear and virtuous link between investments in new infrastructure and jobs, regeneration and economic growth. This assertion stands in stark contrast to the published literature on this subject. This literature is clear that there is no direct evidence of regeneration and economic gain after the construction of a new road, railway line or other transport link. This was the conclusion of the UK Government study (SACTRA) in 1999 “Transport and the Economy”: “Improved accessibility between two countries (and similarly between cities, areas or regions) may sometimes benefit one of them to the disbenefits of the other.” cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w75

On wider economic impacts the report concludes: “Empirical evidence of the scale and significance of such linkages is, however, weak and disputed”. Rarely has £32 billion of public spending been based on such a flimsy evidence base.

The Evidence on High Speed Rail Supplanting Domestic Aviation 8. All countries with well-established HSR system already in place have seen a growth in domestic aviation over the same period that HSR services have increased their passenger numbers. Often quoted cases of the demise of a specific air service (eg Paris-Lyons or Madrid-Seville) are consistent with the aggregate increase in flying as aviation adapts to the new situation and creates new routes aided by aggressive low cost and marketing strategies. The degree of transfer from aviation to HSR is trivial, domestic aviation still grows and there is little comfort for achieving carbon reduction targets in this aspect of modal transfer.

The Evidence on Electronic Media (Video-Conferencing, Teleconferencing etc) Substituting for Physical Travel 9. Videoconferencing and other forms of electronic substitution for physical travel have grown rapidly in the last 10 years. The technology is now very high quality and both private and public sector organisations are aware of the benefits of using these communication media as an alterative to physical travel. The advantages of this substitution include reductions in travel costs of businesses, quality of life benefits to executives and managers, reductions in CO2 emissions and an increased probability of bringing together staff from many dispersed offices and from far flung corners of the world far more often than would be possible with physical travel. The use of electronic communications reduces the need for physical travel and reduces the need for increases in capacity on road and rail links. It would be foolish to embark on a very expensive increase in capacity on rail routes to London at a time when high quality and tested alternatives exist. The 2004 DfT study “Smarter Choices” (Reference 1) reported a case study of BT which showed that in one year BT avoided over 900,000 journeys though the use of video and teleconferencing. A case study of Hannover Housing Association which manages property in 175 local authority areas showed that the organisation “saved” 72 working days in a three month period by using videoconferencing as an alternative to physical travel. The future will see less need for expensive physical infrastructure and a greater use of electronic media and smarter working practices.

The HSR Project is Contrary to Official DfT “Transport Appraisal Guidance” 10. Official transport appraisal guidance (now known as WebTag) is very clear about the steps that have to be taken to arrive at solutions to transport problems that are cost effective, value for money, environmentally and ecologically efficient and meet transport policy objectives including economic stimulus. The main steps are: — A clear definition of the problem that has to be solved. — A scoping exercise to identify a range of possible solutions. — A rigorous and structured appraisal of all theses solutions to come out with the best performer. The HSR project has not followed this procedure. It is still not clear what the exact nature of the problem is that has to be solved. It appears to be a moving target involving different elements of regeneration, carbon reduction, increasing capacity and stimulating economic growth and the mixture is not stable. WebTag is owned by DfT and explains its purpose as follows:

Transport Analysis Guidance—WebTAG This is the Department for Transport’s website for guidance on the conduct of transport studies. The guidance includes or provides links to advice on how to: — set objectives and identify problems; — develop potential solutions; — create a transport model for the appraisal of the alternative solutions; — and how to conduct an appraisal which meets the Department’s requirements. The website also includes advice on the modelling and appraisal appropriate for major highway and public transport schemes. The guidance should be seen as a requirement for all projects/studies that require government approval. For projects/studies that do not require government approval TAG should serve as a best practice guide. Source: http://www.dft.gov.uk/webtag/index.php One example will illustrate the nature of my concern about the HSR project’s serious departure from official guidance. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w76 Transport Committee: Evidence

There is a problem in Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and other northern cities in that GDP per capita is much lower than EU comparator cities, there are large numbers of NEETS (Not in Employment Training or Education) in the younger age groups and there are large numbers of residents who are on welfare benefits of various kinds. It would be a “good idea” to address these problems and bring about a happier outcome. If this is the problem that has been identified then what are the solutions? Solutions would include major improvements in local transport so that public transport, walking and cycling are at least as good as those in a 50km radius of the centres of Frankfurt, Hamburg, Vienna and Rotterdam. All these comparator cities perform much better than the northern cities in the UK and one of the factors that contribute to better performance is excellent integrated public transport giving excellent access to education, training, jobs and other facilities at a low cost. This increased labour market efficiency, would stimulate economic growth and would increase the GDP per capita of these cities. It is a potential solution. It has not been examined, and has not been compared with HSR. £32 billion would bring about a long overdue and much needed improvement in the economic performance of northern cities. There is a similar story to be told about capacity. If capacity on existing rail routes is a problem then there are several ways of addressing this problem and they have not been examined and compared with HSR. This lack of clear problem definition, clear scoping and identification of alternatives and rigorously transparent analysis of all alternatives to come up with the best solutions is a public policy failure.

Conclusion 11. The HSR project is a strange beast. It has not emerged from a rigorous process of problem definition, scoping of possible solutions to these problems and formal appraisal of all possible solutions to identify the best performer. It will not regenerate northern cities, it will not make a respectable contribution to carbon reduction, it will not bring about enough modal transfer from road or air trips to deal with capacity or value for money problems in dealing with demand in those modes and it ignores the reality of technological advance that clearly demonstrates the growing importance of electronic communication substituting for physical travel. At a time of extreme difficulty in delivering enough public expenditure to meet the demands of citizens across a wide range of services it is unacceptable to embark on a project that is so deeply flawed and lacking in substantiation. 13 May 2011

Reference 1 DfT (2004) Smarter Choices: changing the way we travel. Volume 2. Case study Reports http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/sustainable/smarterchoices/casestudy/ terchoiceschangingtheway5765.pdf page 63

Written evidence from VoxOpp (HSR 35) VoxOpp (Villages of Oxfordshire Opposing HS2) is an association of local people representing Oxfordshire villages most affected by the plans for HS2. We recognize that the Transport Committee does not intend to examine the issues that affect individuals. However, while investigating the proposal for HS2 in order to inform the people we represent, we have gained knowledge and insight about both it and HSR generally. We welcome the opportunity to submit our views to the Committee.

Summary As transport develops it progressively gets faster. VoxOpp opposes ultra high speed rail, such as HS2. It does not oppose HSR generally. By now, the HSR debate should have led to development of a more detailed overall plan for the future needs of Britain and its people. Priorities for future acceptable levels of fares, journey time, reliability, frequency, comfort, environmental effects and other criteria should have been established for the whole system. Instead, Government has focused on a very costly ultra high speed train with limited access. The opportunity should be taken to plan a more accessible system providing more people in Britain with wider benefits. This would better enable prioritisation of rail projects and HSR’s place in them. Existing and developing HSR systems elsewhere should have been examined more critically. While development of HSR generally would bring Britain further into line with other countries in Western Europe including France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, it should be noted that all of these countries have experienced serious problems arising from HSR, the main ones being: — Prosperity—results have been variable. The notion that all cities connected by HSR should increase in prosperity has been disproved. — Development costs—in both France and Germany the high investment in their HSR systems has led to inadequate investment in their other rail systems. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w77

— Usage—France, the Netherlands and Spain all have routes that are loss-making. In Holland one route is used so little that the whole system is now at risk.39

1. The Main Arguments Against HSR The main arguments against HSR development as currently proposed are: — high cost for HS2’s very limited coverage and limited additional time saving; — high energy consumption of ultra high speed trains;40 — experience elsewhere shows investment on existing networks tends to suffer;41 — uncertain profitability; — unpredictable economic outcomes along HSR routes generally; and — alternative solutions exist which are better in a number of ways in a small country with low potential for modal shift.

2. How does HSR Fit with the Government’s Transport Policy Objectives 1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy? Statistics from DfT42 indicate the relative sizes of the three main forms of transport we wish to compare in terms of person/kilometres travelled (and person/trips made): — car journeys are by far the highest used at about 85% (and 82%); — rail journeys account for about 8% (and 3.4%); and — domestic air travel about 1.1% (and less than 1%). The estimated spend on major road improvements over the whole of Britain for the period 2000 to 2017 is around £14 billion.43 Against this, the £17 billion cost of constructing just HS2 Phase 1 that would link only London and Birmingham is huge. In the context of transport costs this cost is excessive for such little substantiated benefit.

2. Implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network France and Germany have found that the high costs of investing in their HSR systems has led to a reduction in the money available for maintenance and development of the rest of their railway systems. In both countries their classic non-HSR system are falling into some decay. A more fully classic compatible system would help avoid this pitfall.

3. What are the implications for domestic aviation? There are no scheduled flights between London and Birmingham. Looking further into the future, there are only around 15 scheduled flights daily from Manchester to London,44 carrying around 2,000 passengers. As far as modal shift is concerned, the numbers would be insignificant to HS2. There could be a small loss of business for domestic aviation but they have 15 years to consolidate their market share if they wish.

3. Business Case 1. Robustness of assumptions and methodology At the technical seminars we attended last year it appeared that most assumptions made in HS2 Ltd documents are largely extrapolations on past statistics. There seems to have been little significant use of market and other types of research to establish future travel patterns. The “estimates” of likely usage made may be little better than guesses. The business case relies heavily on a half hour saving being made by each business traveller on each journey, and on that time being monetised, ie additional money being realised (at a rate of £50 per business person/ hour).45 This is nonsense. It assumes that journey times will not be reduced within the next 15 years anyway and that all time spent travelling is wasted time. Also, and confusingly, the Secretary of State for Transport has recently said that 70% of travellers on HS2 would be leisure travellers.46 39 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/01/netherlands-rail-idINLDE71025P20110201 40 http://www.voxopp.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Energy-usage-against-speed-graph1.ppt 41 http://www.voxopp.org.uk/422/the-heavy-price-of-the-tgv-on-frances-non-hsr-railway/ 42 http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/statistics/datatablespublications/modal/—see modal charts 43 http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/roads/nicholsreport/nicholsreport.pdf—section 2, page 5 44 http://www.routesonline.com/news/36/the-hub/99197/bmi-cancels-domestic-link-to-boost-overseas-schedules/ 45 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77834 para 3.5 46 http://news.uk.msn.com/features/articles.aspx?cp-documentid=157137340 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w78 Transport Committee: Evidence

Fares need to be high to make a profit for such an investment but this seems to be at variance with the Government’s aim of attracting more people to travel by rail. The Government appears to be arguing against itself.

2. Pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways Solutions other than HS2 could resolve existing problems and increase inter-urban connectivity. More consideration should have been given to projects such as: — Rail Package 2 (improvements to the WCML which could increase its capacity by 135%);47 — Northern Hub plan (improvement in connectivity of rail services across northern England which would include faster, non-stop trains between northern cities); — East West rail (a new line linking east and west of England, relieving routes through and around London and improving freight connectivity between ports). Removal of existing pinch points and remedying other current infrastructure problems which require trains to slow would reduce journey times and enable an increase in the number of trains on the WCML. Work such as these three projects would not only resolve capacity issues but would deliver a good result more quickly than HS2 could, at less cost and in a more environmentally friendly manner. A new HSR system may still be required but the benefits of a non-ultra high speed line over a dedicated ultra high speed line would be that: — It could be designed to fit better into its surroundings (whatever the route) as the need for such straight lines and level track would be reduced at the lower speed. — A new non-dedicated line could incorporate stations along the route, thus making the line a viable alternative to the car for more people (or could link with the existing infrastructure to allow some interchange). — It could include places, perhaps at the additional stations, where HS non-stop trains could pass slower ones, as is intended with the Northern Hub project. — Existing rolling stock and freight could use the line giving greater flexibility. — Power consumption would be less, making the trains more environmentally sustainable which would sit well in a sustainable low CO2 transport policy.

3. Pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel Transport policy is for sustainable green solutions for all our transport needs. Managing demand for any rail system by price where high occupancy is achievable would be counter-productive. We should be working towards a rail network which has affordable fares and maximum usability. Managing demand for travel at all is a separate matter. The Government is, for example, promoting working from home and web-driven meetings. Country wide fast broadband would enable this and better support companies developing this approach.

4. Lessons the Government should learn from other major transport projects The Government should take more seriously the problems encountered with HSRs in other countries. The information is available and the positives should not be seized on without paying even greater attention to the negatives. Downsides must be recognised in both effect and scale when decisions are made. Britain does not need to risk building the fastest HSR. The Government should be careful about embarking on what may become an emblematic project where national prestige is seen as just as important as the delivery of a cost- effective transport solution.

4. The Strategic Route 1. Suitability of planned locations of HS2 stations A new line designed to promote inter urban connectivity should connect the urban centres that it is designed to serve. Out of town hubs like those proposed at Birmingham and Old Oak Common (and later at Manchester) are likely to encourage car usage rather than reduce it. The France/German approach of high speed trains running to many destinations, not just on special high speed lines, and reaching into the hearts of cities would be better for Britain. The DfT dismissed the idea of classic compatible trains yet a need to change trains to reach a city centre is apparently acceptable. At the London end, Euston is the least well connected of all the north orientated main line stations yet has been chosen for a multi billion pound makeover. To encourage modal shift from car and air to rail, the rail option must terminate at a main line London station which would immediately connect to HS1 and/or the Heathrow express. 47 http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/hs2capacity.pdf—page 5 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w79

2. Cities which should be served by an eventual high speed network The full HS2 plan includes dedicated ultra high speed lines to connect London to Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds and a station each in East Midlands and South Yorkshire. Trains going on to Newcastle, Edinburgh, Glasgow, etc. would have to be classic compatible anyway as they will have to travel along existing classic lines. The HS2 configuration with dedicated ultra high speed trains connecting just a few of Britain’s richest cities to London mainly benefits London (see working paper referred to in paragraph 5.3). London is hogging it. There are no current plans for further high speed lines of any sort linking the East and West of the country. Despite their current rail problems, France’s approach of using only classic compatible trains has been successful for thirty years. A similar approach in Britain, using trains that could reach many destinations by use of the classic network would allow lines to be updated and improved on a more incremental basis. Other destinations (Bristol, Cardiff, etc) could be included earlier enabling wider inter-urban connectivity.

3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? The value of time saving on the shorter HSR journeys is more questionable than for longer journeys and yet the maximum possible time saving was one of the reasons that the classic compatible train option to Birmingham (and Manchester and Leeds) was dropped. These already well-linked cities are the only destinations to which dedicated high speed trains will go.

4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? HS1 terminates at St Pancras and HS2 would terminate at Euston. A link is necessary only because of the decision to use separate London termini. If more thought had been given to the future of the whole network earlier a different approach to the linking of any new lines, HSR or otherwise, might have been possible

5. Economic Rebalancing and Equity 1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? Even pro-HS2 organisations admit the HSR cannot deliver regeneration, it can only help support it. There is little evidence for any other conclusion. HS2 Ltd confirms the line only links places for which regeneration is planned or is already underway, although the DfT has also claimed there will be strategic benefits which are “unquantifiable”.48 Lille, with its HSR link to Paris, and despite its claimed regeneration, has a level of unemployment49 which is considerably higher than that of France as a whole. In fact, unemployment in Lille has risen in the period since the TGV link was built. The Northern Hub project is a much more credible plan than HS2 to contribute to regeneration in the north by enabling easier access to jobs through increased mobility between the big cities of the north and a large and mobile workforce across the region to draw from which might encourage companies to locate there.

2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? We believe that all HSR should be on an integrated classic compatible basis designed to spread benefits across the country more widely, rather than restricting them to a few selected cities.

3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? A working paper50 from the University of Barcelona indicates that when two large towns/cities are joined by HSR, both may benefit but there is a tendency for the larger city to be the bigger winner. The main beneficiary of HSR in France has been Paris. The same is likely to happen here with most benefit going to London, not the regions. The paper also reports that while some locations served by the lines benefit, others inexplicably do not. Large towns and cities in the vicinity of, but not served by, an HSR line may suffer a negative impact where the city which is linked feels a positive impact. This may indicate that in some instances increased prosperity for one is merely a reallocation of prosperity on a local basis. HS2 Ltd appears to be assuming, in monetising the half hour saving per business person/trip, that the average business person travelling on HS2 would be earning about £65k p.a. The Secretary of State for Transport has stated that “fares will be unaffordable for many”51 and has suggested the possibility of using fares to control usage of the line. Since then, he has added that leisure travellers could get cheaper fares provided they book 48 http://www.dft.gov.uk/press/speechesstatements/statements/hammond20110228 49 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/apr/06/france.angeliquechrisafis 50 http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2010/201003.pdf 51 http://news.uk.msn.com/features/articles.aspx?cp-documentid=157028201&ocid=tweet cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w80 Transport Committee: Evidence

them well in advance but inevitably business users would be from the higher socio-economic groups. This proposed HSR would not at all be a train for the people.

During the build phase, work is available for people in the construction business who are likely to be from wider socio-economic groups. However, this is equally true for any large-scale development of the railways.

4. Financial contributions and risk-sharing of major beneficiaries

Out of our scope.

6. Impact

1. Overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions and size of modal shift from aviation and roads needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

It is clear from the Booz & Co report in the appendix 2 to the AOS52 that insufficient information exists to make a sound forecast of likely carbon emissions due to HS2. More work should be done before proceeding.

As power consumption increases with speed,53 significantly higher carbon emissions would be produced by HS2 than for a conventional or even a classic compatible HSR train on the same route. HS2 Ltd. and the DfT promote HS2 as being progressively greener as the source of the power it uses becomes less dependent on fossil fuels and moves to nuclear driven power stations. Plans for a sustainable transport system should take account the fact that power does not come for free and wanton squandering of power cannot be sustainable. It has been claimed that HS2 could last 100 years. In that period prodigious amounts of power would be used to reduce journey times over a 120 mile route for a relatively very small number of people.

We do not believe the HS2 estimates of modal shift are accurate. The estimates were made largely by modelling an extrapolation of past travel statistics supplemented with a small amount of market research into the future.

2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

On 14 October 2010 Andrew McNaughton, Chief Engineer HS2 Ltd, stated at a Technical Seminar that “in all likelihood the route and profile of the proposal line will change significantly as a result of the Environmental Impact Assessment”. The EIA has not yet been carried out (we understand it will be done only after the consultation process). Environmental impacts and costs are therefore not fully accounted for in the business case.

Noise information provided by HS2 Ltd is inadequate and misleading.54 They have used a best-case scenario for modelling noise. They averaged noise levels over a 19 hour period ignoring the WHO recommendation that both average and peak noise levels (Lmax and SEL) should be used to assess impacts.55 The difference between peak (97dBa) and average (81dB(a) noise levels is 16db which means that HS2 Ltd are using a measurement which is about 1/40th of the actual noise level from a train.

No noise profile maps have been published with the consultation documents, contrary to standard practice. According to HS2 Ltd, they have not been produced. (FOI request FOI10–153). This is another indicator that not enough work has been done to assess objectively the impact of HS2 noise.

Finally, there is no evidence that HS2 Ltd. has researched the effects of the type of noise or the effect of the frequency of trains passing on people (despite the existence of published evidence covering increased blood pressure, risk of strokes, cardiovascular disease and cognitive effects).56

3. What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network?

The WCML currently has capacity to run some 60 freight trains per day but currently runs only 36 trains per day south of Rugby and 44 trains per day north of Rugby57. Broadly, a third of existing capacity currently remains unused. An ongoing upgrade on the Felixstowe–Nuneaton cross-country route is likely to take a further 20 trains a day off these totals. Any freeing up of the WCML due to HS2 would be of no short-term benefit to freight on the existing network. 52 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/appraisalofsustainability/pdf/ summary.pdf 53 http://www.voxopp.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Energy-usage-against-speed-graph1.ppt 54 http://www.voxopp.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Working-Paper-on-Noise-Bernie-Douglas.doc 55 http://www.who.int/docstore/peh/noise/ComnoiseExec.htm p.9 56 http://bmb.oxfordjournals.org/content/68/1/243.full.pdf+html 57 Chris Stokes cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w81

4. How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? Works at Euston station will take eight years. A representative of HS2 Ltd stated that during construction six of the 18 platforms will be closed and substantial re-jigging of the timetable would be necessary. Disruption to existing services is likely to be extensive.58 May 2011

Written evidence from the Scottish Association for Public Transport (HSR 36) Background to SAPT Our Association was formed in 1962 to campaign for better public transport, and has for many years strongly supported the case for High Speed Rail in Britain. We organised a major “Fast Track North” conference in Glasgow in 2005, jointly with the Railway Forum. We also initiated regular meetings of the “HS2S” Group (High Speed to Scotland). This group included Scottish Financial Enterprise, Scottish Chambers of Commerce, Edinburgh and Glasgow City Councils, Strathclyde and South-East Scotland Regional Transport Partnerships. Our short submission focuses on the long term strategic need for High Speed Rail in Britain, and the need to include Glasgow and Edinburgh fully in HS2 planning. We leave technical and financial issues to organisations more qualified to provide this information.

1. Arguments for High Speed Rail Technology Anglo-Scottish Travel 1.1 Scotland is far from other UK centres of population (400 miles Edinburgh-London). 1.2 Scotland is dependent on air travel for most Anglo-Scottish journeys, with around 80% of London journeys from Glasgow and Edinburgh made by air. Rail journeys of 4 hours 30 minutes are not regarded as competitive by most business travellers. 1.3 But the cost of air travel is rising due to oil costs and environmental taxes. 1.4 Future oil reserves, and the balance between oil supply and demand, cannot be predicted with certainty over the long 20 year period needed for HSR construction. (Oil prices have quadrupled in the last eight years, from $25 to over $100 per barrel). While road and rail transport have alternatives to oil, there is no such option for air. 1.5 Scottish business, particularly the important Financial and Tourism sectors, depends on easy accessibility to and from other centres.

European Travel Comparison 1.6 Development of High Speed Rail throughout mainland Europe since 1984 (when the first were introduced) has given Europeans fast transport links which do not depend on oil. The European HSR network is still expanding. 1.7 Brussels and Paris are now around two hours from London by Eurostar. 1.8 From 2013, Amsterdam, Cologne and Lyon are expected to be closer in time to London by train than either Edinburgh or Glasgow.

Conclusion Failure by the UK to adopt HSR technology that is now widespread in Europe and Japan will have a particularly bad affect on Anglo-Scottish travel in the long term, and is likely to hinder the Scottish economy and widen the North/South gap.

2. HSR and Government Transport Policy As it is understood HS2 would follow the budgetary spending pattern of CrossRail and Thameslink in London, it would not necessarily impact on other transport projects. Indeed, HS2 would represent a welcome re-allocation of spending from London to the eight largest cities north of London, revolutionising intercity travel speed and capacity to Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds, Liverpool, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow. Surely this must be the most strategic national transport project in British history?

3. Business Case Building a new conventional line would do nothing to reduce Anglo-Scottish rail journey times towards the European HSR norm of under three hours for 400 mile journeys. It would also not significantly reduce local 58 http://www.voxopp.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/DW_A1388.wav HS2 Ltd engineer at MK road show—audio recording cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w82 Transport Committee: Evidence

impact or capital cost. Upgrading existing rail routes has been shown on the WCML to be costly, highly disruptive, and much less effective than building new High Speed Lines.

4. The Strategic Route The HSR route should be planned all the way from London to Glasgow and Edinburgh. Network Rail’s “New Lines” analysis showed that inclusion of Glasgow and Edinburgh in a proposed HSR would improve the business case, due to the high level of additional revenue transferred from Anglo-Scottish flights, and corresponding reduction in CO2 emissions. The proposed “Y” configuration is consistent with an Anglo-Scottish route, but the Manchester-Scotland route strategy should be planned simultaneously with the Midlands-Manchester/Leeds routes, with planning targeted for completion by the end of 2011.

5. Economic Rebalancing Economic analysis of HSR must, to be relevant, attempt to predict transport conditions over a very long timeframe, taking into account a range of probable future fuel price trends, road and rail congestion growth rates, and environmental restrictions on aviation. There is a danger that rejection of HSR technology in Britain, when it is already widespread in mainland Europe and Japan, will have a serious long-term economic impact from the Midlands northwards. Economic growth could instead be concentrated on the London-Paris-Frankfurt triangle, which is served by a network of intercity High Speed Lines. Britain won economic dominance by being at the forefront of the industrial revolution. We risk losing competitiveness if we reject the 21st century HSR transport revolution.

6. Impact Comparison of carbon emissions between HSR and conventional trains should factor in the generally much higher load factors achieved on High Speed trains. The environmental cost of HSR train noise needs to be compared with the reduction in noise from domestic flights at all London airports, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Manchester, Newcastle and other airports where the number of take-offs and landings are likely to reduce. People who live in densely populated regions affected by aircraft noise deserve just as much consideration as those lucky enough to live in affluent areas of the country near London. May 2011

Written evidence from the Ramblers’ Association (HSR 37) 1. The Ramblers’ Association (“the Ramblers”) is a registered charity and a company limited by guarantee registered in England and Wales, founded as a voluntary body in 1935. Its registered office is at 2nd Floor, Camelford House, 87–90 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7TW. It has approximately 115,000 members and is the largest organization concerned with the interests of walkers. By “walkers” we mean anybody who walks for any legitimate reason, such as, for example, ordinary transport from home to work or amenities; thus we are not concerned solely with recreational walking or with rural locations. 2. The Ramblers’ charitable aims include, in summary: the protection of public footpaths and other routes used mainly for walking; the protection of the beauty of the countryside; the improvement and enhancement of the walking environment; and the promotion of walking for health, recreation and as part of an integrated system of transport. This submission will focus chiefly on matters relevant to these objectives and thus on issue 6, “Impact”, and especially on question 2 of that section. Our objectives can be viewed in full at: www.ramblers.org.uk/aboutus/charitableobjects. 3. The Ramblers supports the principles of “The Right Lines Charter—A Charter for High Speed Rail”, published on 7 April 2011 by the Campaign to Protect Rural England. We urge the government to adopt them. We believe that the government’s proposals and consultation procedures do not meet these principles and believe they should be implemented before construction of any high speed rail project commences. 4. However, with regard to issue 2, the Ramblers supports improved public transport, in particular insofar as it advances our object of promotion of walking, i.e by taking people to places from which they might wish to walk. It is not clear that a system designed for rapid transport between cities is relevant to this criterion, unless by allowing for improved local services to intermediate destinations. Before supporting the current proposal on these grounds we would need to be convinced: (i) that the same objective could not be achieved by a less environmentally damaging scheme; and (ii) that resources would still be available for improved local services. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w83

5. Our direct answer to issue 6 question 2 is that we do not believe that anything in the documents published by the government demonstrates that environmental costs and benefits have been correctly accounted for. Very little weight appears to have been given to environmental considerations.

6. The proposed route crosses the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. AONBs are expected to enjoy special protection except in rare circumstances. It is not clear that a case that such circumstances apply has been made. While it is true that a direct route from London to the West Midlands would almost inevitably pass through the AONB, the constraints imposed by the underlying assumptions about speed and route have precluded less damaging options.

7. It has been claimed that the route through the Chilterns uses an existing transport corridor. However the impact on the environment, and on the enjoyment of the area by walkers, of a conventional, half-hourly rail service on the Chiltern Line and of traffic on the only moderately busy A413 are not in the same league as the potential impact of HS2.

8. Similar considerations apply to the impact of the scheme on the London and West Midlands green belts. The constraints that limit choice of route have not been adequately balanced against the impact on hitherto undeveloped landscape.

9. The countryside traversed by other parts of the route, even if it does not enjoy special protection, is generally tranquil. Here too the constraints imposed by seeking to achieve the highest possible speeds, without consideration of whether this is the best all-round option, appears to have ruled out the environmentally preferable option of a route alongside existing railways or motorways.

10. It is a matter of particular concern to us that the impact on footpaths, bridleways and other rights of way on foot appears to have received little attention. These are highways, in law, as much as roads. Diverting a footpath causes a user of that highway considerably greater inconvenience than a road diversion of similar length would cause a driver. We estimate that 150 paths will be crossed by the proposed route, but the Appraisal of Sustainability mentions only 27 of them—those referred to by HS2 Ltd as “promoted routes” or “strategic routes”. HS2 Ltd have explained to us59 that it is only the effect on these routes, and not the effect on the likely 120 other rights of way affected, that has been taken into account. So the effect on most public rights of way has not been considered. This aspect of the consultation is therefore fundamentally flawed.

11. We have received assurances from HS2 Ltd that it is their intention to avoid path closures (other than temporarily during construction). However it appears from what we have been told by HS2 Ltd—see previous paragraph—that little thought can have been given to how this will be achieved; and we are concerned lest the assurances should prove impossible, or too expensive, to deliver.

12. Even if all paths remain open, public enjoyment of them will be severely reduced by the noise levels on bridges over, or paths close to, the route. Once again we return to the point that the route traverses currently tranquil countryside, whereas if it could be sited alongside existing major railway lines or motorways the impact of additional noise would be more acceptable. We suppose that in some cases, it will be necessary to divert public paths to convenient crossing-points. For example, where a farm is severed, and provision is made for an accommodation crossing such as a bridge or cattle-tunnel for the benefit of the occupier, such a provision could also be the means of crossing the line by nearby public paths, provided the resulting diversion to the path is reasonably convenient without significant adverse effect on enjoyment. In our view, provision must be made so that diversions follow desire-lines away from the railway; they should not simply be routes within the limits of deviation which run as unnatural, “dog-leg” diversions hard alongside the line from the point of severance to the new crossing-point.

13. In summary, we do not consider that the government has made a convincing case to the public, or allowed sufficiently wide-ranging public consultation under the principles of The Right Lines Charter, that the current HS2 proposals are so much better than possible alternatives as to override the greater impact, compared to such alternatives, on enjoyment of nearby footpaths and on the beauty of the countryside.

The Ramblers asks the Committee to take these concerns into account. May 2011

59 E-mail from HS2Enquiries to Adrian Morris, Head of Walking Environment at the Ramblers, 12 May 2011: “All of our work at this stage in the route development is based at a strategic level assessment. We would not undertake further, more detailed local assessments until we have confirmation that the Government agrees to continue its strategy for high speed rail and that it plans to continue with the proposed Route for consultation alignment as described.... Therefore, if this project progresses, HS2 Ltd would be required to undertake detailed localised assessment and would work with the local highways authority on the rights of way detail detailed in definitive maps.” cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w84 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Gatwick Airport Limited (HSR 40) Introduction 1. Gatwick Airport Limited (Gatwick Airport) welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Transport Select Committee’s inquiry into High Speed Rail. Gatwick Airport is well placed to respond to this inquiry given that it is the UK’s second largest airport and best connected UK airport. We are the busiest single-runway airport in the world, with more than 31 million passengers to over 200 destinations in 90 countries for short haul, long haul and charter airlines. 2. Gatwick is a major economic driver for the South-East region, directly contributing around £2 billion annually to the UK economy,60 in addition to £360 million that our passengers currently pay in direct tax on their journeys. The airport supports 23,000 on-airport jobs and a further 13,000 jobs through related activities. In addition to the direct economic wealth that we generate, we also support 9% of the UK’s inbound tourism market.61 Our £1 billion investment programme is already underway and will directly improve the overall passenger experience, and in turn enhance the airport’s contribution to national, regional and local economic growth. Gatwick is the best connected major airport into the heart of government and City of London. It is situated 28 miles south of London with excellent public transport links, including the award winning . Gatwick is owned by a number of international investment funds, of which Global Infrastructure Partners is the largest shareholder.

Summary — Gatwick supports the construction of HS2, but we would also urge the Government to focus on the provision of current generation of rail infrastructure that is needed today, particularly in the South East and on the , where no additional line capacity is currently proposed to meet surging future rail demand. HS2 will not address this need and will only form a part of Britain’s future rail requirements. — The construction of HS2 is not a valid reason to restrict new runway capacity at airports in the South East. Government forecasts show that 70 million passengers will want to travel to and from South East airports by 2030. They will not be able to do so without that capacity. HS2, and the connectivity that it may provide to Europe via new high speed rail links is no effective substitute for the shortfall in airport capacity in the South East hat the UK faces. — Gatwick serves the largest number of domestic locations of any UK airport. We do not see domestic aviation as a primary market for growth. Placing an element of the business case for HS2 around a perceived growth in demand for domestic aviation, and a policy objective to curb it, does not reflect our understanding of current market conditions. The view that HS2 would automatically lead to a wholesale move away from the use of air travel to short haul European destinations requires further scrutiny. — The Government’s proposals for the strategic route for HS2 are generally sound, but should also seek to improve access to international gateways, including Gatwick airport as well as Heathrow. This would not require any change to the currently proposed HS2 route and could be accommodated using existing or already planned rail infrastructure. — The correlation between the reduction of carbon emissions from aviation, and the construction of HS2, is less clear than the Government envisions. In the long term, the best way to reduce emissions from aviation is not through moving air passengers on to high speed trains, but through a constructive approach by Government to incentivising the up-take of low-carbon technology by UK airlines.

The Case for High Speed Rail 3. There is an urgent need to promote improved regional connectivity between different parts of the country. High Speed Rail is essential to meeting this need. Major cities in the Midlands, the North of England and Scotland should be able to derive more of the benefits that the economic strength of London generates for the UK. We concur with the Eddington Transport Study (2006) that “a comprehensive and high-performing transport system is an important enabler of sustained economic prosperity”. HS2 will be an important step in meeting the criteria that Eddington laid down. HS2 will be a necessary in the course of promoting the greater regional connectivity essential to future economic growth, and we fully support its construction. 4. The aviation sector contributes £53.3 billion (3.8%) to UK GDP.62 For the West Midlands region alone, HS2 is projected to provide £17 billion of economic benefits.63 Together, these transport modes will form the UK’s future critical transport infrastructure. Much of the debate on the case for and against HS2 has focused on a perceived need to transition from air to rail. There is a danger that these two transport modes are seen purely competing against each other. 60 The economic benefits of Gatwick Airport. Tribal Consulting July 2009 61 Ibid 62 Oxford Economics, The Economic Benefits from Air Transport in the UK (2011) 63 Department for Transport/HS2, Summary of HS2 Economic Case (2011) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w85

5. Air and High Speed Rail are not necessarily competing modes of transport. The complementary capabilities of these two modes together can satisfy principal requirements of passengers.64 We urge policymakers to recognise this and exploit the potential of both to promote growth. HS2 and a future strategy for air travel should be part of a wider national transport strategy. They should not simply be juxtaposed as “one mode over another” either in the context of domestic, or short haul international travel. This focus applies not just to HS2, which will not be complete until the middle of the next decade, but on the rail network as it exists today. 6. In geographical terms, Britain will always require a comprehensive network of air services as rail will remain unattractive for destinations in southern or eastern Europe (see paragraph 12). The development of the rail sector needs to be considered alongside the development of the aviation sector. A truly integrated air-rail network should be a primary goal of the overall HS2 project. The HS2 network should be seen as complementary to existing transport modes, rather than isolation of them.

The HS2 Business Case and Implications for Aviation 7. The committee have indicated that they would like to focus on the potential implications for domestic aviation from the construction of HS2, and how that impact might support the overall business case for HS2. As the airport with the largest number of domestic routes in the UK, we feel well qualified to comment on these particular assumptions. 8. Gatwick does not see domestic aviation as a primary market for growth. We have seen a number of our airline customers take the decision to either cancel or reduce frequency of domestic routes in recent months. Those decisions have been taken entirely by the operators concerned for commercial reasons. For example, domestic routes from Gatwick to Leeds/Bradford and Plymouth were recently cancelled. We see our primary areas for future growth being short haul and long haul—primarily point to point—international destinations, rather than domestic routes. 9. Our most recent forecasts indicate that the total proportion of domestic flights operating to and from Gatwick will fall over the next 10 years, while the total number of long haul flights will double by 2025. These calculations do not take account of whether there may or may not be a new high speed rail network in place in that period. The overall proportion of domestic flights to and from Gatwick is already falling. The projection that there will be an overall increase of 178% in the number of domestic aviation passengers by 203365 exceeds the trends that Gatwick sees in terms of future traffic to and from domestic locations. We believe those forecasts may be revised in the light of future air travel forecasts to 2043. But these are not currently in the public domain. 10. The Civil Aviation Authority illustrate the same trend, that overall domestic air traffic to and from London is already falling, and has done so since 2005. The issue of whether the business case for HS2 should in part be based on a policy objective to, either in part or whole, curb a projected growth in domestic aviation deserves further scrutiny. 11. From a “short haul” international perspective, we note Ministers recent statements to the effect that the Government see the further introduction of high speed rail services as a way of reducing the number of flights taken to European destinations66 from the South East, and that that “the development of a high speed rail network has been a key factor in our decision on additional runways at London’s airports”.67 12. We would urge the Government to take account of credible and thorough research that suggests that, Europe wide, a journey distance of between 500 to 800 km68 is the maximum range within which a passenger might choose high speed rail over a direct air travel alternative. Whilst this research was conducted some time ago, and focuses on a Europe-wide rather than a UK-centric view, we believe it would be prudent for the Government to review all available research to consider whether its current view reflects the evidence-base. Documents that outline the economic case for HS2 only appear to consider the potential impact on domestic air routes. 13. We have seen no evidence that a thorough and independent review of the impact that HS2 might have on short haul international air travel from London’s airports has taken place. Ministers have publicly stated that the Governments support for HS2 is based in part on a modal shift from aviation to rail for such short haul routes. Evidence of why passengers are likely to make such choices should be produced. The business case for HS2 would be strengthened by an updated analysis being undertaken and placed in the public domain. 64 Anna Coksova, EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre and University of Zilina, Passengers Choice Between High Speed Train and Air Transport (2005) 65 HS2 forecast 66 The Rt Hon. Theresa Villiers MP, Speech to the Westminster Energy, Transport and Environment Forum (17 March 2011) 67 The Rt Hon, Phillip Hammond MP, Ministerial Statement on High Speed Rail, (20 December 2010) 68 Relevant studies include: Rietveld, P & Brons, M (2001). Quality of hub & spoke networks; the effect of timetable coordination on waiting time and rescheduling time. Journal of Air Transport Management 7 (2001), p. 241–249, All about high-speed, Definition of High Speed Train (2002), (http:/www.uic.asso.fr), Moore, P (2001). High speed rail as a solution to airport congestion. Sierra Club—Loma Prieta Transportation Committee, California, —European Cooperation in the field of Scientific and Technical Research (1996). Cost 308. Interaction between High Speed and Air passenger Transport. April, Ellwanger, G (2002). Successes for high-speed rail. Rail International, UIC September 2002, Brussels cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w86 Transport Committee: Evidence

14. For example, Ministers have publicly stated that the impending introduction of High Speed Rail routes from London to Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Cologne could effectively mean that there would no need for the 140,000 flights a year that currently serve these three destinations from airports in the South East69. This is by no means the case. Substantive analysis indicates that there would only be a 16% shift from air to rail on a direct Amsterdam-Paris-Brussels-London high speed rail route70. Likewise, Both Frankfurt and Cologne are within a distance range from London where a passenger choosing high speed rail over air is by no means automatic. 15. We would also seek further clarification, and the publication of a clear evidence base, to support the Ministers statements to the effect that passengers travelling by currently air to short haul European destinations, or a proportion of them, would transfer wholesale to rail following the completion of HS2. 16. In the course of clarifying the basis and origin of this view, the Government must recognise that there are a range of other factors that impact on passengers’ choice of travel mode, over and above time, distance and speed. Baggage, queuing, security, comfort and safety are all key issues that determine the choice that they make. The South East Airports Taskforce, under the direction of Ministers in the Department for Transport, is rightly considering how major airports in the South East can improve the provision they are making to improve the passenger experience in these areas. 17. Since it changed ownership, Gatwick has invested nearly £1 billion on facilities that will improve the passenger experience. This investment is already bearing tangible results. Our passengers wait less than five minutes to clear airport security 97% of the time. Likewise, on airport check-in, we have successfully introduced a new approach that gives passengers complete control of the check-in process. Through it, passengers can check-in and tag their own bags, dramatically reducing the potential for queues to build up. In the first five months of the service, take-up by customers of the airline that use it has up the system has increased from 35% of passengers to 85% and transaction times have reduced from 2 minutes to just 20 seconds. Other airlines are introducing the system in recognition of its success. The view that high speed rail offers a better passenger experience in terms of queuing times and overall passenger care needs to be re-examined. 18. We would suggest that while HS2 would be of benefit to the UK as a whole, a new network is not in of itself a substitute for satisfying the increasing demand for additional capacity at London’s airports. The Department for Transport still projects that air passenger numbers in the UK will grow to about 455 million passengers a year by 2030. 250 million of them would use airports in the South East.71 As matters stand, there will inevitably be substantial suppressed demand for runway capacity in the South East. By 2030, 70 million air passengers will want to fly to and from the South East but will not be able to. 19. We remain unconvinced that the needs of these 70 million passengers will be wholly catered for by a new High Speed Rail network. The Government has stated that HS2 will lead to six million air passengers transferring to rail from air travel.72 We understand those six million passengers to be domestic in nature, although no actual clarity is provided around where they might have considered flying to and from in this scenario. Regardless of the specifics of this forecast, the fact remains that providing scope for six million passengers to move from air to rail through building HS2 still leaves 64 million air passengers who want to travel by air but cannot, because of limited runway capacity in the South East. 20. Since the Governments consultation was published in February, further documents have been published by HS2 Ltd. which outline that by 2043, of “the total passengers forecast to use HS2, 6% will switch from air”.73 We are unclear as to exactly what forecast this number refers to, as the document concerned only provides a clear forecast for projected number of passengers on the London to West-Midlands element of the HS2 route, on which no air routes (either from Gatwick or elsewhere) currently operate. 21. Ministers have, more generally, stated that “providing a viable rail substitute for even a modest proportion of [flights in the South East] could release significant capacity at our crowded airports”.74 Departmental forecasts for future air passengers, Gatwick’s analysis, and a significant body of research around passenger behaviour show the accuracy of that view to be in some doubt. Gatwick have no current plans for additional runway capacity at our airport. Gatwick is party to a legally binding agreement that no such runway capacity will be built before 2019. We intend to adhere to that agreement. Despite this, we continue to believe that HS2 is should not be seen as a direct substitute for additional airport capacity in the South East in the long term.

The Strategic Route 22. The Government has taken the right approach to integrating the new High Speed Rail network with the UK’s airports. The fact that Birmingham, Heathrow and Manchester will all have direct links and stations is recognition of the view we express in paragraph 5. Broadly, a Y-shaped network built using “London upwards” approach using the phasing described appears appropriate. 69 The Rt Hon Theresa Villiers MP, Speech to the Westminster Energy, Transport and Environment Forum (17 March 2011) 70 Peter Jorritsma, Substitution Opportunities of High Speed Train for Air Transport, Transport Business Journal (Issue 43) 71 Department for Transport, Air Passenger Demand and CO2 Forecasts (January 2009) 72 Department for Transport, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future—Consultation (February 2011) 73 HS2 Ltd, Demand for Long Distance Travel, (April 2011) 74 The Rt Hon Theresa Villiers MP, Speech to the Westminster Energy, Transport and Environment Forum (17 March 2011) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w87

23. Nevertheless, we believe that there is potential for the Government to take this approach further, and ensure that, in the course of the construction of HS2, all the potential economic benefits from the truly integrated air-rail transport infrastructure that HS2 heralds are maximised. Currently, there are no proposals for either a direct, or indirect, link between Gatwick Airport, which is the second largest airport in terms of passengers in the country, and a future national High Speed Rail Network. 24. We accept that the provision of a direct link, through a change in the currently proposed HS2 route, is likely to be unfeasible and financially prohibitive. However, the proposals fail to consider how Gatwick can be accessed by a connecting rail service to the Old Oak Common interchange in a way that has been proposed for Heathrow Airport. Opportunities for the nation’s two largest airports to be connected to HS2 are essential in the course of promoting encouraging sustainable access to UK airports by the general public, and maintaining a positive competitive environment between the two largest airports in the country. 25. We believe that it would be relatively simple, and comparatively inexpensive, for Gatwick to be indirectly linked to HS2 via a rail service to the proposed new station at Old Oak Common. The existing track infrastructure for such a link already exists. In order to support a direct link between Gatwick and Old Oak Common, track infrastructure at Clapham Junction and on a section of the would need to be enhanced to support longer trains and greater service capacity. Incorporation of such a service requirement into the overall design plans for the new station at Old Oak Common would also need to be facilitated. This could take the form of some additional terminating platform capacity at the proposed station over and above that which is already planned as part of Network Rail’s London and South East Draft Route Utilisation Strategy. Through initial informal discussions with Network Rail, it is our understanding that initial estimated costs of the necessary line upgrades would be in the region of £15 million. 26. Network Rail is including, within its proposed spending plans for 2014–19 (known as CP5), some funding to provide improved service performance on the West London Line. We would urge the committee to consider, as part of its assessment of the strategic route for HS2, a recommendation around the potential for an inclusion of the required funding in a further funding round75 to amend the design of the proposed station at Old Oak Common so that it can accommodate a direct, half-hourly service from Gatwick Airport as well as serving Heathrow airport. In this way, the projected 40 million passengers a year that we may be carrying by the time that HS2 is operating would be able to effectively access a future HS2 route. 27. We believe that such a link would have substantive benefits over and above Gatwick Airport passengers enjoying an indirect link to HS2. Over one million passengers use the airport rail station every year who are not air passengers, with 900 trains arriving and departing every day. The station is a local rail hub in is own right and is the busiest airport railway station in the UK. The potential for those living in major cities on the South Coast such as Portsmouth and Brighton to make use of HS2 would be improved by Gatwick having indirect link to the HS2 network. There would be substantive benefits to an entire region of the UK through an indirect link from Gatwick Airport to the proposed HS2 station at Old Oak Common. 28. Whilst the requirement for such a service would ordinarily be considered as part of future Rail Utilisation Strategies (RUS) and new rail franchises for the London and South East Region, we believe that in the context of constructing an integrated air-rail transport infrastructure that is fit for the 21st Century, the committee should examine how access to HS2 from airports over and above Heathrow, Birmingham and Manchester could be facilitated within the scope of its report and how HS2 can support airports in delivering their Surface Access Strategies.

Impact 29. As stated, we do not believe that the construction of HS2 will lead to the modal shift from air travel to rail that the Government appear to envisage. For Gatwick, other elements of the business case for HS2 are more compelling. In the long term, demand for further capacity at South East airports will continue to grow. Even if, in some way, it was shown to be feasible for that capacity to be provided at airports outside the South East,76 it is apparent that unless the Government takes an innovative approach to incentivising new technology that might lead to a reduction in overall levels of carbon emissions generated by aviation, those emissions may continue to increase regardless of whether HS2 is built or not. 30. Public policy that seeks to reduce overall carbon emissions through encouraging a modal shift away from aviation through the construction of HS2 is unlikely to be effective, and should not be justified on that basis. In a recent submission to the Environmental Audit Committee Inquiry “Budget 2011 & Environmental Taxes”, we outlined our view that, in the long term, we believe that the most viable long term option available to the aviation sector to drive real carbon savings is through the further development of and widespread deployment of bio-fuels amongst major airlines. This is a concept that has been largely proven to be technically feasible. 31. Measures to promote a transition to bio-fuels must be considered in a global context. The industry is after all, global in scope. Worldwide, existing airlines fleets are thought total around 23,000 aircraft. Total investment in this fleet is thought to in the region of billions or even trillions of dollars. Aircraft have a typical 75 CP6 (2019–24) 76 In a written answer to the Rt Hon Caroline Flint MP (dated 6 September 2010) The Government confirmed that it has in fact conducted no assessment of the capacity for regional airports to expand in order to cater for additional demand for air travel. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w88 Transport Committee: Evidence

life of 25 to 30 years, meaning that significant fraction of the current fleet will be operational to 2020 or even 2030 and beyond. This long life cycle and high cost, coupled with stringent certification requirements for fuels, mean that airlines are generally not willing to consider any fuel that is not an immediate, or drop-in, replacement for current, petroleum-derived jet fuel.77 32. A significant amount of research and development activity on whether biofuels could be a “drop in” replacement for conventional jet fuel has been undertaken. It is apparent that, in principle, it is possible they could be. However, widespread installation of the infrastructure required to bring the fuel to the aircraft is necessary before biofuels could be considered as the “drop in” replacement for conventional jet fuel that is necessary before a mass conversion could take place. Gatwick is working closely with onsite fuel providers to put that infrastructure in place at our own airport. We already have some capacity to deliver it on site. But there is currently no real financial incentive for our airlines to move towards using it on a significant scale. There is a role for Government, in the tax system for incentivising this transition. May 2011

Written evidence from D.J. TOLLEY (HSR 41) A submission in general terms confined to the itemised questions set out in the announcement of 18/3/2011.

1. Main arguments An overall case has already been submitted by letter to the Committee although inevitably some of the arguments will be repeated under the specific headings here. As regards the remit statement, it is a matter of concern to read that issues regarding impact assessment and property rights affected by the proposed route of HS2 “would be dealt with in due course by a hybrid Bill committee”, which the writer hopes is conditional not implying what many people already believe to be the case. The project is referred to here as HS2 rather than HSR, since it can hopefully be assumed that even if built, there is unlikely to be an HS3; one “lesson” that has been “learned” is that that there has been no successor to Concorde, imposed by a previous government against reasoned argument. As previously outlined, [letter] the main arguments against are economic disadvantage, minimal contribution to transport capacity, higher travel costs, higher energy demand and widespread environmental destruction.

2. How does HSR fit in with Government transport policy objectives? 2.1 HS2 is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity? Initially it would link only London and Birmingham centres with possible extensions to Leeds and Manchester and ultimately perhaps, Glasgow. This is of no benefit to the many other urban centres around the country, including the proposed “enterprise zones”, which rather suggests that government/DfT transport policy is not joined up with other objectives. The alleged purpose of HS2 is to provide high speed travel between limited centres which, in the case of London-Birmingham is relatively marginal, especially as present routes are already planning to shorten journey times. As repeatedly pointed out, at a fraction of the quoted costs, significant improvements could be made to the road and rail networks with increased economic/environmental benefit to the country as a whole, not to limited “centres”. 2.2 On the presumption that there is a substantial economic deficit, HMG cannot spend money twice. Even the initial quoted cost of HS2 for stage 1, which surpasses cancelled defence projects and essential security services, obviously prejudices any extensive improvement in the existing rail network. 2.3 The main advantage which HS2 appears to offer over domestic aviation is that it is presumably more environmentally acceptable. This conflicts with the government’s case which is to have high-speed travel: if speed alone is the main criterion, on longer distances air is likely to be faster. This raises the fact that the entire project is only justifiable by executive travel. Business class is probably the sector which has a need to travel comparable with air, or could afford the premium fares that must apply if the project is not to lose even more money operationally. Another class might be foreign tourists, but in this connection, I reproduce the faxed comment of an American visitor to UK who travels from Scotland to the south of England and London. 77 Report for the Climate Change Commission, Review of the potential for biofuels in aviation, (August 2009) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w89

The project has Chambers of Commerce support: it is well known that business people like to travel quickly and in comfort, an argument previously advanced for Concorde. The committee should take note of comments by Sir Philip Green, that he expects his people wherever possible to use video conferencing which, if speed is the real criterion, cannot be beaten.

3. Business Case 3.1 These questions are impossible to forecast: although it is likely that apart from diversion of government funding to support the existing network the impact on network travel will be relatively small. 1(a) The public outside of the proposed centres will not want or be able to pay the premium fares of HS2 1(b) No-one in their right mind, for example, is going to want to travel, say, to Birmingham from Coventry to visit London, which would be longer and costlier for them to do. 3.2 This addresses capacity: obviously the West Coast line is a strong candidate for improvement. Whether new “conventional” lines are necessary is open to question. Apart from upgrade of the existing rail network, another option would be to look at the possibility of reopening previously closed cross country routes of which a number exist and could be brought back into use, if only for freight. If this question has been properly understood, it implies managing capacity by price. In relation to itself, HS2 will take care of this, unless some governmental fudge subsidizes the project to an unbelievable degree. As regards the rest of the network, the writer was under the impression that it was generally the policy of all parties to encourage people to use public transport, wherever possible. Thus the exclusion of people from rail travel makes no economic sense: it needs to be understood by any government that travel, and other component costs, needs to be kept as low as possible because these reflect ultimately on the nation’s economic performance and inflation. 3.4 This question implies that there will be other high speed rail projects. As stated above, if this project is ever completed, it is likely to be another case of retrospective “lesson learning”. As may be inferred from the general tone of this submission the writer is greatly unimpressed by government departmental costing, of which there have been many unfortunate examples.

4. The strategic route Despite the disclaimer in the cover document, questions 4.1 to 4.4 are all route related. The sequence of questions seems to imply that the project is regarded as “a done deal” as some objectors have described it. As this writer clearly regards the whole project as financially and environmentally irresponsible these questions do not apply, but it is pointed out that as regards 4.1, if “speed” is the basic justification, then intermediate halts, while servicing more people, negate the purpose of the project.

5. 5.1/5.2 Regeneration? Self-evidently a non-mass transit premium service, carrying no freight can make negligible contribution to economic performance, compared with that already provided by the motorway network. As indicated in 3.2 above, a better option would be the development of rail freight services. As regards non freight business see Sir Philip Green’s comments on the use of electronic media. Drawing another example, from air travel, the committee should compare the economic results from the high-cost “prestige” project Concorde against the substantial success accruing from so-called “jumbo jets” developed by USA. The UK, it seems has “learned no lessons”. As regards the “north-south divide”, it needs to be explained how a high-cost, non-mass transit system, carrying no freight, can change what the motorway network is presumably seen as having failed to do. 5.3 Substantial communities by-passed along the route corridor will gain nothing, but may lose if the constraints placed on government infrastructural funding resulting from HS2 prejudicially affect these areas. HMG cannot spend money twice over. The business class is the only identifiable beneficiary which is why the project is supported by CoC’s, whose record in this field is not good. 5.4 As the main beneficiary the business class, which as usual expects others to fund it, including those communities and interests penalised, should be challenged to bear the overall cost, which may temper its enthusiasm for massive expenditure. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w90 Transport Committee: Evidence

This question also suggests that local authorities will be among the “major beneficiaries”. A mistaken assumption: presently, County councils and other affected local authorities along the proposed route do not see it that way and are pledged to oppose the project. The presumption of the question may be that local authorities are likely to change their minds, which raises the subject of what inducement or pressure may be applied by HMG for them to do this. Reference to the EU Ten-T programme, adds a new dimension to the debate: It is well known that outside of the permanent way, UK is not fitted to provide the hardware for this project, which is likely to come from France. SNCF is reportedly seeking to supply HSR projects to Australia and the USA, where space and distance may make such projects viable. In order to sugar the project in the USA, the SNCF management found it necessary to apologise for having transported Jews to Germany during WW2, even though the present management can have no responsibility for that tragic event. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that there are no ethical limits to this kind of promotional activity, which should be taken into account.

6. Impact 6.1 Probably impossible to predict, although doubtless some consultancies or university-based studies will provide a series of predictions, depending on the provenance of their commissioning. The DfT should be challenged to provide substantive figures, to show where they come from and how they are arrived at. To date, no-one seems convinced by the vague predictions, plucked out of the air to justify this project. Even without data, it is certain that the energy demand to supply this project will be enormous. Where is the electricity coming from? This again questions the consistency in government policy by the fact that in the not far distant future UK is going to face electricity generation problems, to which high speed rail is certain to add. France, the leader in high speed rail, is strongly provided with nuclear power but the future nuclear power provision for UK is presently uncertain. Unless this project is to be as exempt from the professed Low Carbon economy as it has so far proven to be from public spending restraint, the committee must ask DfT to calculate how many wind turbines the network will have dedicated to it and where they will be sited. Again, where’s the energy coming from? 6.2 This writer has not seen any substantive “business case” nor, according to many concerned people, has anyone else. The public is subjected to unsubstantiated predictions. An example of this was provided in an interview given by Birmingham Chamber of Commerce to Richard Savage of Radio Northampton which harped on about the “economic benefits,” claiming something like 20 or 25 billion, which left the interviewer understandably incredulous. A public meeting presentation in Leamington by a Birmingham based supporter claimed 20 billion: 20 billion on a forecast (!) of 17 billion, does not sound like a reasonable return, given all the disadvantages of such a destructive project. This return would look better if it could be established if it was after construction and operating costs were met, neither of which can be absolutely predicted, probably accounting for the vagueness of the case.

6.3 Impact on freight services This is not understood. HS2 will carry no freight. Is it thought that enough passengers will transfer from the classic network to enable these lines to reduce passenger traffic thereby increasing freight capacity? This is unlikely unless HMG is considering a kind of “introductory subsidy” on fares, to initiate the project. Otherwise, Fares will be too high, only those people with immediate access to destination points will travel anyway. It should be noted that the present Transport minister has significantly raised fares across the rail network, presumably as means to decrease demand, without regard for social or economic consequences.

6.4 Disruption: [to existing Network] Impossible to predict, disruption to the classic network would only be temporary, but the disruption and damage done to people’s lives and businesses in the corridor areas, will be serious, costly and, unlike Concorde, consequentially irretrievable. This is a situation which should never be allowed to arise. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:09] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w91

Even without the deficit, this country has greater priorities than a mere vanity project instigated as the result of lobbying and a seriously mistaken sense of priorities by the present and preceding governments. 2 May 2011

Written evidence from David Thrower (HSR 42) Overview 1. Rail passenger use is rapidly growing. Between 1994–95 and 2009–10, total passenger miles on the main line (Network Rail) system rose from 18 billion to nearly 32 billion (+78%). The total number of long-distance journeys by rail more than doubled between 1994–95 and 2009–10. Some of the UK’s key rail routes, including the WCML, are forecast to be completely full in peak hours in the next 20 years. (source: Department for Transport). Further growth on London-Manchester services alone is expected to be 60% by 2024 (source: Network Rail). Long distance travel (all modes) in the UK is forecast to increase 46% by 2033. Key drivers are income, regional interdependence, employment, land-use, and population increases. 2. Although total freight moved on the UK rail system has fallen (freight moved in 2009–10 was down 7.6% on 2008–09), this is due mainly to a sharp fall in coal tonne-kilometres moved (mainly in the North and Scotland), and a small reduction in oil and petroleum. However, even during the economic recession, several elements of rail freight (including flows in the South of England and WCML) have steadily increased. For example, in 2009–10, domestic intermodal freight grew 6.5%, metals by 6.8%, international freight by 5.7% and construction by 3.0%, compared with 2008–09 (source: Office of Rail Regulation). 3. The need for greater and more reliable north-south transport capacity is already apparent, and deferral will only result in the problems of future rail congestion having to be re-addressed at a later date, possibly at greater ultimate expense. 4. The solution of providing wholly new high-speed rail capacity is well established in many other countries. There is nothing about the UK that makes it a specially-unsuited case for such a solution, and indeed, as a “crowded island”, the need is arguably all the greater. The need for high speed rail has already been grasped with the successful Channel Tunnel Rail Link (now known as High Speed 1). 5. High Speed 2 is not just about providing greater capacity and shorter journey times for long-distance travel. The southern end of the WCML already conveys a contradictory cocktail of non-stop, semi-fast and stopping passenger trains plus heavy freight trains, and further growth in all these sectors is anticipated. The Midland Main Line and East Coast Main line face similar problems. Strong growth in demand for WCML capacity is expected to continue, and growth by 2036 on the Midland Main Line and East Coast Main Line is expected to be more than 70% greater (source: Network Rail), with even higher growth on specific services. Population and housing growth will be additional key drivers, but the need for increased freight capacity is also critical. 6. HS2 will be the M1 motorway of the rail network. Because of the long lead time in creating a full high speed rail network over the next two decades, starting with the HS2 London-Birmingham/Lichfield section of HS2, a firm resolution to proceed needs to be taken now. This will constitute an historic decision. 7. This submission: — Deals with the Committee’s questions in the order that they set them. — Briefly summarizes some recent support for High Speed 2 (Appendix I). — Sets out some of the policy backdrop to High Speed 2 (Appendix II). — Summarizes other High Speed Rail route study findings (Appendix III).

Background 8. In the 1960s, as demand for travel increased, rail capacity on the UK’s north-south axis was paradoxically severely cut back. In the past 15–17 years, these serious transport planning errors in terms of lost capacity and services have been belatedly realised. Some £9 billion was invested in upgrading the West Coast route, with accompanying upgrading of the Chiltern route. Although this significantly improved these routes, it has still not led to a commensurate increase in capacity on the WCML, which retains significant inherent problems, particularly in accommodating traffics of varying speeds and stopping patterns. 9. Attempting to squeeze more and more services conveying different traffics of varying speeds onto an already very busy railway will gradually act against the growth of each, and against many Government policies. 10. The WCML route’s speeds on the urban approaches to cities also remain particularly low. Timetabling fast and semi-fast passenger services, commuter services, stopping services and freight, to provide for anticipated growth, is already extremely challenging, and will progressively become impossible without adverse effects upon customers, including logistics firms. The prospects (without HS2) are for increased overcrowding and a gradual worsening of all services. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w92 Transport Committee: Evidence

11. The Government’s HS2 proposals, for a 335-mile Y-shaped network will: — Restore the rail capacity previously lost from Britain’s north-south axis, providing adequate resources for future generations’ needs. — Assist in rebalancing the UK economy, encouraging investment in the Midlands and North, improving accessibility, aiding efficiency and the ability to move freight reliably (on the classic network) and providing sustainable transport for a very significant proportion of the UK population. — Provide a 21st-century-standards high speed link to connect the majority of the UK’s major Midlands and northern cities—either directly or with onward running—to London and the South East, to Heathrow and to Scotland (at a later stage) and to High Speed 1 and the European high speed rail network.

HS2 Issues Identified by the Transport Committee Issues identified by the Committee are summarized in turn below, with brief answers.

How Does HSR Fit In With Government Transport Policy Objectives? 12. How does improving inter-urban connectivity compare in importance to other transport policy objectives/ spending programmes?—HS2 fits in extremely well with other programmes. It will greatly improve UK inter- urban connectivity, essential to the efficient functioning of the UK economy. A very significant proportion of population and economic activity is centred upon the major English and Scottish (and Welsh) urban areas, and it is this which is threatened by serious and growing inter-urban (and urban) highway congestion and the new and growing phenomena of rail congestion. HS2 will give much of the network the capacity it needs to accommodate additional passengers and freight. 13. For speed, critics have claimed that HS2 will reduce journeys by “only a few minutes”. This is factually incorrect. The following journey times will be achieved by the full “Y” network to Manchester and Leeds, of which the London-Birmingham/Lichfield section in consultation during 2011 forms the first, essential, phase: — London-Birmingham, cut from 84mins to 49mins. — London-Manchester, cut from 128mins to 80mins. — London-Liverpool, cut from 130mins to 96mins. — London-Sheffield, cut from 129mins to 75mins. — London-Leeds, cut from 140mins to 80mins. — London-Newcastle, cut from 189mins to 157mins. — London-Glasgow/Edinburgh, cut from 270mins to 210mins (source: HS2Co). 14. In addition to dramatically improving London-Birmingham/Manchester/Leeds journey times, HS2, when extended to Manchester and Leeds, will offer major reductions in journey times between Midlands/Northern city regions, compared with 2011 times. Examples are Birmingham-Manchester, cut from 95 minutes to 54 minutes (reduction of 43%) and Birmingham-Leeds, cut from 120 minutes to 65 minutes (reduction of 46%). This will bring further user/regeneration benefits. 15. HS2 will also dramatically improve connectivity between WCML locations and Heathrow Airport, Crossrail (including the West End, City and Canary Wharf), and High Speed 1 and the Channel Tunnel. Interchange with Crossrail will (with one change) bring Manchester within just over 100mins of Canary Wharf, compared with 170–180mins today. Also, a regular direct UK-regions-to-Europe train service, perhaps Birmingham-Stratford-Ashford-Lille-Paris, would become a realistic potential option. 16. What would be the implications of HSR expenditure on the “classic” network?—Concern has been expressed by critics that the classic network could be neglected. But there is no evidence of this to date in recent Coalition Government announcements. In contrast, there has been a recent succession of major infrastructure project announcements (North West electrification, Great Western electrification, Reading re- modelling, Birmingham New Street reconstruction, Swindon-Kemble doubling, Ordsall Curve, Nuneaton chord, Hitchin flyover). The Midland Main Line electrification north of Bedford is awaiting progress with the HS2 consultation exercise, but an early start on simultaneous MML electrification during GW electrification (or vice versa) was always unlikely anyway. 17. Vitally, construction of HS2 will offer a major boost to the classic network, by freeing-up capacity on the latter for: — Greatly-improved semi-fast services serving important intermediate centres such as (on the WCML) Crewe, Stafford, Lichfield, Tamworth, Rugby, Northampton and Milton Keynes, (on the Midland Main Line) Leicester, Kettering, and (on the ECML and associated routes) Doncaster, Retford, Newark, Grantham, Peterborough, Hull, Lincoln and Cambridge. — Additional commuter stopping services from important intermediate stations southwards from Rugby/Northampton, Kettering, Peterborough, Cambridge. — Wholly new services such as Milton Keynes-Aylesbury-London. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w93

— Improved half-hourly frequencies on existing stopping services such as Milton Keynes-Watford- Olympia-Clapham Junction-East Croydon and services in the Midlands such as Northampton- Coventry-Birmingham and Trent Valley stopping services, plus better local services on the Stafford-Crewe-Stockport-Manchester, Stoke-Stockport-Manchester and Sheffield-Leeds corridors. — Greatly-improved regular-interval links between local intermediate WCML, MML and ECML stations, eg as Rugby, Stafford, Newark, Doncaster. — More CrossCountry services from the South and South-West to the North-West/North-East. — Additional domestic (UK) freight services from Southampton, Thamesport and Haven Ports to the Midlands, North and Scotland, and services from other terminals. — Additional international freight services via the Channel Tunnel. 18. It is notable that the above includes very significant intermediate beneficiaries along the present London- Birmingham corridor. That HS2 will not call between Birmingham Interchange and Old Oak Common does not mean that no location between Birmingham and London will benefit—quite the reverse. As explained above, there will be similar local beneficiaries all along the London-Nottingham/Derby (Midland) and the London-Leeds/York (ECML) corridors. 19. Planning for HS2 is already well-integrated with that for the classic network, with the 2010 Network Rail Draft Route Utilisation Strategy including the following: — “Continued development of HS2 between London and Birmingham, and then to Manchester and Leeds, to release fast-line capacity on the classic WCML for additional commuter and other services”. — “Provision of additional fast peak commuter and off-peak long-distance ‘classic’ services, including additional capacity into London Euston”. 20. Work by Greengauge 21 has identified the opportunity for two new semi-fast regular-interval hourly (combined half-hourly) classic WCML services, bringing new travel and connectional facilities to a number of significant towns that at present have poor WCML services (with no other hope of improvement): (a) Manchester, Stockport, Macclesfield, Congleton, Kidsgrove, Stoke, Stafford, Lichfield, Tamworth, Nuneaton, Rugby, Milton Keynes, Euston. (b) Crew, Stafford, , Lichfield, Tamworth, Atherstone, Nuneaton, Rugby, Northampton, Euston. 21. The work by Greengauge 21 identified that these would be supplemented by: — An even-interval half-hourly service from Wolverhampton and Sandwell & Dudley or Walsall to Birmingham New Street, Birmingham International, Coventry, Milton Keynes and Euston, offering similar journey times from Birmingham and Coventry to today’s services. — Enhanced half-hourly regional semi-fast services between Birmingham, Northampton and London. — Half-hourly Northampton-London services serving principal stations. — A Tring-London outer-suburban stopping service. — A doubling of the Milton Keynes-Olympia-East Croydon stopping service. 22. The above is detailed to help refute the allegation that Coventry, Rugby, Milton Keynes and other stations will somehow “lose out” when HS2 is built. The very reverse is the case. And HS2 will additionally permit new services to link Walsall, and Mid and North-East Wales with London. Elsewhere, other wholly new services could equally be provided on the Midland Main Line and ECML. 23. It will also be particularly important to provide additional north-south capacity (through construction of HS2) so that the classic network can (a) serve the rapid population growth envisaged for the Milton Keynes- South Midland sub-region, and (b) meet future freight growth resulting from shifting more international freight from road-ferry-road or road-Le Shuttle-road to rail haulage throughout (or as far as inland UK terminals). 24. Investment in HS2 will therefore significantly reduce the need for massive capacity investment in some of the classic network’s trunk line sections, enabling other essential schemes (Northern Hub, Trans-Pennine electrification, Watford stations rationalisation, East-West Rail, Blyth & Tyne, etc) to be brought forward more quickly. 25. What are the implications for domestic aviation?—It is suggested that there will be further significant reductions in domestic air travel on the HS2 corridor, particularly because HS2 will offer a significantly better working/travelling environment with city-heart penetration at each end of many of the journeys. 26. At present (2010 data), rail has a good market share for London-Manchester traffic (79%), and a reasonable share for London-Newcastle (64%). However, for cross-country traffic that could in part use HS2 it is much lower (Birmingham-Glasgow 30%, Birmingham-Edinburgh 31%), and for Anglo-Scottish traffic it is lower still (London-Edinburgh 27% and London-Glasgow as low as 20%). Clearly, there is considerable scope for rail’s further market-share expansion into former domestic air markets, particularly if HS2 also eventually serves Heathrow. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w94 Transport Committee: Evidence

27. Extension of HS2 to Manchester and Scotland will bring very significant reductions in Anglo-Scottish rail journey times, and even further reduce carbon emissions from UK air travel. HS2Co has estimated that almost two-thirds of forecast HS2 traffic from Scotland will have switched from air. HS2 will also permit faster and better cross-country services, again reducing air emissions.

Business Case 28. How robust are the HS2 assumptions and methodology?—It is always difficult to accurately predict future demand precisely for very many years ahead. But reasonably accurate rail passenger forecasting is relatively well-established in the UK, and has been refined over many years, although recent experience has been that demand for new localised schemes such as new stations has sometimes erred on the cautious, reflecting the difficulty of accurately modelling human behaviour when many variables are present. Rail forecasting methodology when used by others (other than the Department for Transport) must be agreed in advance with the DfT. 29. The forecasting for HS2 is thus firmly rooted in past research and experience, and gives significant confidence, although obviously there will be some uncertainties associated with some of the major long-term external variables such as world economic climate, oil prices and emerging climate-change science. 30. It is understood that rail forecasting has also progressively taken account of technology such as video- conferencing, homeworking, mobile phones and laptop computer use. There is no evidence to date that presently-anticipated technological advances will lead to unexpected step-changes in travel patterns. 31. The quantified costs and benefits of HS2 Phase One, London-Birmingham/Lichfield, calculated as part of work commissioned by HS2Co, are summarized as follows: — Transport user benefits (business), £11.1 billion. — Transport user benefits (other), £6.4 billion. — Other quantifiable benefits (excluding carbon) £0.4 billion. — Loss to Government of indirect taxes (£1.3 billion). — Net transport benefits £16.5 billion. — Wider economic impacts £4.0 billion. — Net benefits inc wider economic impacts £20.6 billion. — Capital costs £17.8 billion. — Operating costs £6.2 billion. — Total costs £24.0 billion. — Revenues £13.7 billion. — Net costs to Government £10.3 billion. — Benefit/cost ratio without Wider Economic Impacts 1.6. — Benefit/cost ratio with Wider Economic Impacts 2.0. (source: HS2Co, 2009 prices, figures are rounded) 32. It is understood that the economic case for London-Birmingham/Lichfield is positive with or without the eventual full “Y” network onwards to Manchester and Leeds. But the full Y network to Manchester/Leeds, including links to HS1 and Heathrow would: — cost £44.3 billion (including operating costs); — generate fares revenue of £27.2 billion; — give a net cost of £17.1 billion; — with a net present value of benefits of £43.7 billion; and — giving a benefit/cost ratio of 2.6. These and the above calculations incorporate “central case” assumptions for variables. 33. It is further understood that sensitivity testing by HS2Co has considered: — Changes to assumptions regarding the cost of travel. — Whether large changes in road use costs or air fares would be needed to have a significant effect on the benefit/cost ratio. — That a 50% increase in road fuel duty and a 37% increase in air fares would increase the benefit/ cost ratio (even excluding wider economic impacts) to 2.7. — Whether lower road or air charges would reduce the economic case of HS2. — Whether slower growth (but still an increase) in road/air travel will again reduce the benefit/cost ratio of HS2. — Whether no growth in road/air travel would result in the benefit/cost ratio (excluding wider economic impacts) reducing to 1.4. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w95

— Whether changes in HS2 costs (higher construction and other costs) would have an impact upon the economic case for HS2. It is understood that the range of HS2 cost scenarios tested produce a range in benefit/cost ratios of between 1.5 and 2.0. 34. What the above means, as HS2’s critics have repeatedly emphasised, is that if all the components of these calculations worked against HS2, then the scheme’s case would be weakened to the point where it became marginal. But this is completely artificial and unrealistic. It is extremely unlikely that in the 2030s the UK would be facing most or all, in simultaneous combination, of the following: — Much lower than predicted road costs (note that we have just seen Brent Crude oil rise from $83 per barrel in October 2010 to $114 per barrel by May 2011). — Extremely low air fares. — Low rates of road and air travel increase. — Very high HS2 construction costs, outside the estimates compiled by HS2Co. — Very high rail fares and charges. — A low value placed upon time savings. — Lower than predicted rail passenger and freight use. 35. Those promoting HS2 have thus carefully attempted to rationally predict demand by various modes and to cautiously assess costs and benefits, using a “middle case” approach that attempts to be as realistic as possible. HS2Co states that cost estimates have also been calculated cautiously, using a bottom-upwards approach, based upon detailed assessment, rather than excessive optimism. Costs for Phase One have been estimated at £16.0 billion–£17.8 billion, including a plus 64% allowance for “optimism bias”. In other words, assumed costs already include an allowance—and a very generous one—for any excessive optimism. 36. Recent work on UK infrastructure projects (across-the-board) has identified opportunities for reducing costs by 15%. If such a reduction could be realised for HS2, then the benefit/cost ratio (excluding wider economic impacts) would rise to 2.0, with a higher-still ratio if wider economic benefits were to be included. 37. The full cost of the “Y” network identified by HS2Co, that would serve not only London-Birmingham but also Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds and other cities (with onward running to Liverpool and to Scotland) is estimated at £32 billion (2009 prices): — Over a 60-year timeframe, the Y network would generate benefits with a net present value of £43.7 billion. — The net present cost to Government over the same period for building and operating the Y network would be £17.1 billion. — The above would comprise total capital and operating costs of £44.3 billion, less fares revenue of £27.2 billion. — A “cautious” estimate by HS2Co, including allowance for wider economic impacts, is for a benefit/ cost ratio for the Y network of 2.6. 38. Much has been made by critics of the value placed upon working time in these calculations. Critics have argued that time spent on trains constitutes valuable working time, and therefore that journey time reductions (time savings) are not valuable. But if this were true: — It would actually be desirable to have long journeys, say two or three hours rather than one hour. But commonsense suggests that businesspeople and others do not seek to maximise the length of their journeys in such a way—indeed, the reverse is true. If long journeys were preferred by businesspeople (so as to enable them to work on the train) then there would have already been an even greater switch from air to rail than has been the case, although the modal-switch watershed has undoubtedly already moved (eg on Manchester-London, post WCML upgrading). — Locations would not suffer peripherality disadvantages from being accessed via long journeys. In other words, it would be no more disadvantageous in peripherality terms to locate one’s business in (say) Stockport or Stafford than it was in Milton Keynes, Reading or Woking. Whilst Stockport or Stafford may have advantages in terms of property prices, it is counter-intuitive to suggest that being more peripheral to London and the South-East is in some way beneficial. 39. It is understood that appraisal of HS2 has used values of time consistent with DfT appraisal guidance. Values reflect current prices and incomes (an individual’s “value of time” is not the same as “salary earned”). Valuation of business travellers’ time by HS2Co has assumed that users would otherwise be unproductive during their journey. This approach has been questioned by HS2 critics, but it is reported (by HS2Co) that there is very little hard methodological evidence to support any alternative approach. 40. Investment in a HSR corridor on the north-south UK axis is relatively “low-risk”, as it self-evidently links very major (in European terms) conurbations with each other, with Heathrow and with the Channel Tunnel/Europe, tapping into heavy existing demand and meeting projected future additional demands, including passenger and freight on released capacity on the classic-network routes. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w96 Transport Committee: Evidence

41. The extremely long lifespan of HS2 (effectively infinite) also gives considerable comfort in terms of the long term business case. Modal shift may even ultimately exceed predictions due to aspects such as travellers more actively disliking congestion, or showing greater-then-hitherto concern for the environment. 42. Critics have alleged that past forecasts for High Speed 1 proved inaccurate. But the following numerous significant factors need to be allowed for: — The impact (now slowly reducing) of low-budget airlines in the 1990s was not foreseen. — The Channel Tunnel’s operation has been seriously disrupted by two major beneath-Channel lorry fires and events such as asylum seekers and French rail and port strikes (and not helped by snow disruption and the handling of it). — Tunnel train-operator charges have until recently been excessively high, constraining service development. — Regional daytime and night-sleeper services, although forming part of the original plan to spread the benefits of the Channel Tunnel more widely through the UK, were never introduced (despite the rolling stock being built and tested). — A contestable (multi-operator) market in Channel Tunnel high-speed passenger train operation— which may ultimately lead to regional services—is only now beginning to develop, as part of European open access arrangements that have been slow to develop effectively. — Safety-case rules (or the interpretation of them) for operating modern high speed rolling stock designs through the Tunnel have been excessively restrictive, creating a barrier to entry for new operators. — Despite the Channel Tunnel opening in 1994, High Speed 1 only opened in 2007, and has since very considerably boosted demand. — The westward links between HS1 and the WCML (the triangular junction north of St. Pancras), which permit onward running beyond HS1 to the English regions and Wales/Scotland, were not in place until 2007. — The Schengen Agreement, making inter-European-state travel extremely easy and convenient, has not been adopted by the UK. — There has been a threat (albeit indirect) from international terrorism, affecting some international travel, plus a recent very deep European-wide recession. — Europe-wide integrated rail ticketing is still very seriously deficient compared with airlines, and full-load operation of trains still lags far behind airlines. 43. Despite these problems, which have had a major collective impact, the use of international high speed services on HS1 has steadily grown until it is now approaching 10 million passengers per annum (9.5 million in 2010), with further first-quarter growth in 2011 of 8%. The route, and its terminal at St. Pancras, are regarded as extremely successful, and will benefit the UK for many decades to come. HS1 was successfully delivered on time and on budget. 44. Post-HS2, there will be some lost passenger revenue on the classic WCML, MML and ECML routes, but this will be very significantly offset by operational and maintenance savings and the development of a significantly greater classic-network market through the additional passenger and freight links listed earlier. 45. What would be the advantages of upgrading the existing WCML or building a new conventional-type line? (assumed 125mph)—Further upgrading of the existing WCML could be undertaken, but at very great cost. A number of flyovers/diveunders and numerous major works such as station upgrades and track re- instatements and re-alignments would be required. These would be individually extremely costly (as recent cost yardsticks, Reading remodelling is £850 million, Airdrie-Bathgate upgrade/re-opening £300 million, the single-track ECML Hitchin flyover scheme £62 million, Southampton-Birmingham gauge clearance £71 million, Swindon-Kemble re-doubling £45 million, Paddington Fourth Roof Span £40m, the short £85 million, New Street Upgrading £600 million and Farringdon Crossrail station £375 million). Additional tracks and rail noise from a new conventional route would also impact upon nearby properties, and in some cases require demolition of residential and business properties. When finished, it would have incurred much of the costs of a new line, but far fewer of the benefits. 46. Significant major rebuilding of city terminal stations such as Euston would still be required, even without HS2. The Euston-Bletchley corridor would be particularly difficult to upgrade, especially at tightly-constrained locations such as Berkhamsted. In some places, complete (and costly) sections of new route would still be required. Similar additional works would also be required on the Midland Main Line and the ECML, as these routes, too, would be congested if HS2 was not built. Again, upgrading on these routes would be extremely costly. 47. Network Rail has concluded: “By 2024, the WCML, particularly at the southern end of the route, is effectively full, and subsequent additional capacity could only be provided by exceptionally expensive infrastructure solutions.” Already, bids for additional services which would benefit passengers are being refused, including in 2011 new Blackpool services, open access operations and London Midland’s extension cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w97

of services to Liverpool and Preston. Freight operations are also currently seeking additional slots at times that suit the logistics industry. 48. It would be possible to build a wholly new conventional railway for freight only, (or freight and passenger) to European clearance standards, but again this would be very costly (more than a high speed passenger railway) due to the need for a gentle ruling gradient. Although welcome for freight (and permitting Euro gauge operations), it would not generate more than a moderate proportion of passenger benefits, due to much lower speeds/longer journey times. It is most unlikely that freight potential, and much lower passenger benefits, could finance such a route. 49. There would seem to be only limited gains to be had from building a new conventional passenger-only railway. It would have many, or most, of the costs of a new high speed line, would cost more to operate, and whilst it would ease capacity problems it would not offer the reductions in journey time that HS2 would offer. Each of the above alternative-to-HS2 options has been demonstrated by HS2Co and consultants to be less good value for money, compared with HS2. Mainland European Governments notably continue to invest funds in new truly high speed lines, rather than new conventional lines, for this very reason. 50. What would be the pros and cons of managing demand, eg by price?—demand management would raise serious ethical/equality issues, as it would effectively force the less well off to travel at very quiet times (late evening, or at night) or not at all. It would also be difficult in practical terms to manage overall travel demand in a balanced way across all modes, given the lack of road pricing and other factors such as the lack of duty on aircraft fuel. 51. Lessons to learn from other major projects?—there is evidence that recent UK projects are being significantly better managed now than a generation ago. The HS2 costings also allow amply for optimism bias. There is a wealth of experience available from other Western European countries regarding HSR construction.

The Strategic Route 52. Are stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International/Interchange and Birmingham Curzon Street the best possible locations?—In my view, these are all correct choices. Euston is the vital Central London railhead for the North, North Wales and Scotland, with excellent local TfL connections, although limited residential demolition will regrettably be necessary. Old Oak Common will give interchange with Crossrail/Heathrow and other services, and constitutes the “trump card” of the Chilterns alignment. Birmingham Interchange will serve the WCML, Birmingham Airport and the NEC, and Curzon Street is extremely well placed for Birmingham city centre, and is well worth the very modest cost in property demolition. It is also adjacent to the re-expanded Moor Street station. 53. Regarding Phase One intermediate stations, it is strongly suggested that there should be none, other than Old Oak Common and Birmingham International. Further intermediate stations would add cost, slow-up services and use precious capacity on what will be an intensively-used long distance line. The criteria for all stations should be use and distance from London and other station stops. 54. I believe that the decision not to route HS2 via Heathrow, and to provide Heathrow (and Crossrail) connections at Old Oak Common, with a loop or spur through/to Heathrow (as recommended by Lord Mawhinney), is correct. 55. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network?—the proposed network will serve the major cities of London, Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds and Leicester/Nottingham (this latter through a parkway-type station). With onward running over existing lines, services will serve Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow. It is further strongly recommended that Manchester should be the main intermediate stop between London and Glasgow/Edinburgh. 56. It is suggested that the main deficiency in the current Y-network proposals is the lack of a high speed spur to serve Merseyside. An early-construction spur from HS2 Phase One to Derby and Sheffield is also justified. The high speed spur to Liverpool (possibly via Liverpool Airport) should be planned so that Merseyside is not economically disadvantaged in relation to Manchester and Leeds. Under present plans, Merseyside-London travel will take 95mins, 15mins longer than Manchester-London. This could act as a significant deterrent to businesses considering locating in/near Liverpool city centre. A spur to Derby and Sheffield would cut Sheffield journey times ahead of HS2’s eventual extension to Sheffield. 57. It is understood from the work of HS2Co that there is a potentially strong business case for extending the Y-shape route to Scotland. This makes the early progressing of the initial London-Birmingham/Lichfield section all the more vital. 58. Should the network be built in stages?—Yes, but significantly more rapidly extended to Manchester/ Leeds than is currently planned, by 2025 rather than 2033. Building the network in stages is the only option capable of being funded. There is no reason why the Scottish Government (construction of new lines in Scotland is a devolved decision) cannot commence “HS2S” in Scotland whilst the English sections are under construction, providing there is a viable case. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w98 Transport Committee: Evidence

59. Links to HS1 and Heathrow?—As noted above, I believe that the Government’s decisions to build the HS1 link at the outset, and the Heathrow direct link several years later, are correct, given funding availability, although in an ideal world the Heathrow spur/loop would come at the earliest subsequent opportunity.

Economic Rebalancing and Equity 60. What evidence is there that HS1 will promote economic regeneration?—a number of studies have identified (and attempted to quantify) the regeneration effects of high speed rail elsewhere in the world These are referred to in Appendix III. It is difficult to apply these findings with absolute precision to the HS2 corridor to the North and Scotland/North Wales, as comparative circumstances involve a number of variables, but HS2, by connecting up a number of major conurbations/areas, will benefit very large numbers of people. 61. Wider Economic Impacts calculated by HS2Co include benefits from improved links between different firms, which can lead to greater efficiency and cost savings to business (“agglomeration effects”). It is believed by HS2Co that there may be further potential beneficial economic impacts if HS2 results in changes in the spatial patterns of economic activity. It is understood that HS2Co are carrying out further work on HS2’s wider economic impacts. Clearly, the latter are of very significant interest to the UK regions and to Scotland and North Wales. 62. The Government believes that HS2 will be a catalyst for economic regeneration, stating: “A British high speed rail network could contribute strongly to regeneration in our major cities…….A London-West Midlands line alone could support the creation of around 40,000 jobs. Successive generations have sought to bridge the north-south divide. A national high speed rail network could provide a unique opportunity to finally ensure it happens.” 63. It should be stressed that HS2 is a very long term investment, and thus that very significant benefits will flow for many decades (and several centuries) to come. 64. Should the shape of the network be influenced in order to support local and regional regeneration?—A careful balance must be struck between meeting travel needs and achieving regeneration gains. SNCF planners have warned UK planners against acceding to requests for non-essential intermediate stations for purely regenerative reasons as these will delay the majority of travellers. 65. HS rail stations should therefore be kept to a minimum, and routes should be as direct as topography allows. But the network can be further shaped to aid regeneration, eg by making Manchester the major intermediate stop between London and Scotland, and building a western high speed spur from Cheshire to serve Merseyside, as long as this does not damage overall network use. 66. Locations and socio-economic groups that could benefit from HS2?—the locations that benefit will be the city regions directly served, and those served through onward running onto the classic network. But other areas/locations can benefit too, through good connections to HSR stations, and those centres on the classic network (such as Stafford, Nuneaton, Rugby, Milton Keynes) should receive a major boost through improved regular-interval semi-fast services. 67. All socio-economic groups will benefit from regional economic rebalancing, and through jobs directly created by the construction and operation of the new line. It is also imperative that all groups should be able to afford fares on HS2. The large number of seats offered daily will ensure that very attractive discounts are provided, particularly at off-peak times. All groups will also benefit from reduced congestion, greater reliability, fewer accidents and lower emissions. All groups would also benefit from job opportunities, including significant construction jobs. 68. It is recognised that the routeing of HS2 through the Chilterns is very controversial for local residents, and consideration should be given to linking WCML outer-suburban services into Crossrail to bring a very significant associated planning gain to at least the eastern edge of the Chilterns area. 69. How should Government ensure that all major beneficiaries make an appropriate contribution and bear risks, and should EU support be sought?—the major contribution to funding will be made in the long term by users over succeeding decades. Local authorities could make a part-contribution to stations (but should not be permitted to “buy extra stations”), and could assist in funding complementary schemes such as local rail and bus networks. Business interests and individuals could buy shares in operators of passenger and freight services. Developers could contribute significantly to the costs of stations, but again must not be allowed to “buy extra stations”. The Scottish Government could contribute to a future Scottish extension of HS2. Support should be sought from EU funding pools. Rolling stock owning companies could support investment in new trains. 70. Maximising the spread of contributions will spread risk. But this is a major long-term strategic scheme, and Government should remain in the leadership role.

Impact 71. What will be the impact on emissions? How much modal shift would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?—the answer to these questions is considerably complicated by uncertainties over (a) future power generation in terms of emissions, (b) future air and road pricing, whether through carbon taxes or other cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w99

mechanisms, and (c) the successful development of future technologies, especially improved hybrid or battery vehicles. 72. Clearly, in an environment where fuel costs, fuel taxes (including carbon taxes, legislative changes, technical advances and rail fares and charges are all variables, it is therefore difficult to precisely forecast this area. As noted, there will be significant modal switching when HS2 (and released capacity on the classic network, for other passenger traffics and freight) is available. It is understood that HS2’s forecasts take a “middle” prediction stance on carbon. 73. A future power-generation strategy for HS2 will need to increasingly employ “green” sources such as wind, tidal and hydro-electric power. Should this be the case, then an electrified HS2 could have relatively low at-source emissions. 74. In contrast, the already significantly reduced emissions from motor vehicles (including HGVs) and aircraft, as older vehicles/aircraft are scrapped, will be difficult to reduce further unless there is a major breakthrough in battery or some other technology, and this will offer a very large residual transport emissions base that could thus bring emission-reduction gains through modal switching to rail. 75. The extent to which modal switching to reduce carbon can be effected has been carefully measured as part of HS2Co’s and other’s studies. HS2Co estimates that for the “Y” network, 6m air trips and 9m car trips per year could switch to rail. This estimate may ultimately prove cautious, particularly for car trips. 76. HS2Co has estimated that the overall carbon effects of HS2 would be broadly neutral, with an annual range between −0.41m tonnes to +0.44m tonnes, plus temporary (but not significant) emissions during construction. Should power generation be “greened”, as above, these estimates may prove cautious, with a net overall reduction after modal switching (passenger and freight) is allowed for. Passenger switching as part of the HS2 package should include new commuter, semi-fast and cross-country services on the classic network. 77. It may be possible to increase modal switching even further (over and above HS2Co predictions) in favour of rail. Factors that may assist this include greater environmental awareness/responsibility of travellers, further increased awareness of the waste of time that driving and congestion create, ever-greater parking difficulties, the expectation that fuel will become more expensive as world demand intensifies and wholesale prices rise further, and improved marketing of rail in conjunction with more attractive/simpler fares and easier booking. 78. HS2’s trump cards are that it will make the trunk part of longer-distance journeys effortless and delay- free, will offer immense capacity for lower-carbon passenger trips and freight movement, and will offer many new journey opportunities. 79. An understated key part of HS2’s value is the release of capacity on the existing WCML, Midland Main Line and ECML for additional freight use, reducing the carbon impact of heavy lorries. Transport is the fastest- growing source of carbon, with road transport accounting for 26% of all-sources UK emissions. HGVs are estimated to account for 23% of carbon emissions from domestic transport. Rail is very significantly more energy-efficient than road haulage, which per tonne carried consumes between four and seven times more energy. Released capacity on the classic network will further reduce freight carbon emissions. Overall, I therefore believe that HS2Co’s assumptions on carbon emissions are relatively cautious. 80. The announcement of the European Commission in March 2011 to reduce Europe’s dependence on imported oil and cut carbon emissions by 60% by 2050, including a 50% shift of medium distance intercity passenger and freight journeys from road to rail and waterborne transport is clearly relevant. 81. Are environmental costs/benefits (including noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?—as noted, environmental costs of HS2 include additional carbon from power generation, until cleaner sources are brought on-stream. However, the external environmental costs of power generation pre-clean-up should not be debited against the long-term environmental benefits of HS2. 82. Some noise footprint will be generated by HS2, but experience in Kent and elsewhere shows how the noise footprint of HSR trains can be mitigated. Overall, noise generated by HS2 needs to have future very significant noise reductions of road and air traffic subtracted from the calculation. High speed rail also has safety benefits (reduced death/injury from road accidents). 83. In the medium and long term, the noise impact of HS2 will become less of an issue, as population changes occur (births/deaths) and people locate close to HS2 as a matter of free will. The Committee may wish to note this point. It will be vital to compensate all those immediately affected by noise and severance. 84. For emissions costs, it is difficult to place a precise value on these, partly because future carbon savings may have been understated, and partly because it is very difficult to place a precise value on lowered carbon emissions when the science linking emissions to environmental damage is relatively young. 85. Impact Of HS2 Upon Freight Services On The Classic Network?—This is one of the most important aspects of HS2. It is suggested that the major strategic benefits of HS2 to freight using the classic network has been under-appreciated to date. At present, there are a very limited number of freight paths available on the WCML, Midland and ECML. Already, the development of efficient fast freight links via the classic routes is cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w100 Transport Committee: Evidence

constrained by the need to accommodate intensive fast passenger services and carry out essential maintenance at night. The WCML alone forms a key section of the following three freight corridors: — Haven Ports-Nuneaton or Stoke-NW-Scotland. — Southampton-Reading-West Midlands-NW-Scotland. — Channel Tunnel and London-NW-Scotland.

86. The longer-term forecasts for freight on the north-south axis are for continued growth. This is partly due to UK landmass and European coastal geography (relative positions of northern conurbations, south coast and east coast ports and the Channel Tunnel). But growth is expected to develop further still as port throughputs increase and as competition for freight through the Channel Tunnel is at last freed from excessive charges/ restraints, and benefits from a deregulated and more competitive mainland European rail freight sector.

87. Subject to economic recovery, UK rail freight (including domestic traffic, linked to new distribution warehousing) is forecast to increase from 23.5 billion tonne kilometres (btk) in 2006 to 31.0btk in 2015 and to 50.4btk in 2030 (source: Rail Freight Group/FTA, MDS Transmodal study 2009). Increased rail-connection to ports and warehousing, and forecast transfer by the logistics sector of non-bulk commodities to rail for reasons of cost/reliability, is predicted to expand domestic non-bulk traffic from 1.0btk in 2006 to 14.8btk by 2030, and port-based non-bulk traffic from 4.9btk in 2006 to 19.9btk by 2030, with lesser increases in construction, automotive and petrochecmicals sectors. Percentages of tonne-kilometres (rail as % of all modes) could increase from 12.6% in 2006 to 20.7% in 2030.

88. A specific example of a source of freight growth is cross-Channel traffic, currently running at a very poor annual rate of only 1.2m tonnes (was 3.1m tonnes in 1998). The cross-Channel market for unitised goods (all land-based modes) is an estimated 90m tonnes per annum (source: Eurotunnel). Eurotunnel estimates that of this,15m tonnes is suitable for rail-throughout movement. The annual market for cross-Channel rail freight space sold to forwarders is estimated at 1.8m tonnes, and cross-Channel containers destined for the UK but unloaded from ships at European ports is a further 1.2m tonnes (source: RAIL, 4/11). At present, most Channel Tunnel freight growth is on HGVs (numbers up 30% in the first quarter of 2011 compared with 2010). These HGVs add both to UK motorway traffic levels and emission levels.

89. Based on the above, future growth in rail freight (both international and national) within the UK, including deep-sea, bulk and intermodal traffic will require very considerable additional capacity on the UK’s north-south axis, if efficient transits are to be offered by rail freight operators. Switching freight to rail has near-universal public support, but continued growth in passenger traffic, both long-distance and regional and commuter flows, will be in direct conflict with this freight growth unless passenger capacity is expanded by building HS2.

90. Some additional capacity could be provided on the classic rail network through additional running lines, passing loops and grade separation, but this would only buy time and (as already noted) would require very significant investment. The creation of a new dedicated passenger route (HS2) will free-up capacity on the existing WCML, Midland Main Line and ECML for additional freight services, and (as previously mentioned) much-needed additional capacity for cross-country, commuter and local passenger services.

91. HS2 itself could potentially carry some premium European-clearance freight. The drawbacks are that, for heavy freight use, the curvature and gradients would have to be more moderate than for passenger use. It would, of course, be impossible to operate freight and high speed passenger at the same times, as a mixed- traffic railway. Notwithstanding this, HS2 could still, in my view, open-up the opportunity for a very limited premium service of through Channel Tunnel (Euro gauge) freight services late at night, providing this could be accommodated within route infrastructure maintenance and gradient/curvature requirements.

92. Disruption To Services On The Classic Network During HS2’s Construction?—When the WCML upgrading was carried out, services were very seriously disrupted over long periods, and much business was lost from rail. There were particular problems with freight and mails. As noted, further major upgrading of the classic network would be required on the WCML, Midland Main Line and ECML, at many locations over many years, with serious and protracted disruption to passengers/freight customers and excessive compensation to train operators.

93. In dramatic contrast, the construction of HS2 will largely not impinge on the classic network at all, except at the few locations where the trackwork of both physically connect or intersect. Construction of new stations such as Birmingham Curzon Street and Interchange would also proceed without disruption.

94. The exceptions (for the London-Birmingham/Lichfield phase) would be at Euston and at Old Oak Common. However, there are already strong arguments for major reconstruction of Euston anyway, even without HS2. The creation of a new short link near Old Oak Common between WCML local London services and Crossrail would remove many local services from Euston and permit a careful phasing of works (across a newly-expanded site) to avoid serious disruption. Overall, given the scale of the HS2 project, disruption would be kept to an acceptable minimum. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w101

Appendix I—Support for High Speed 2 95. The case for HS2 has received widespread support in the Midlands, North and Scotland, within the business community, the transport/logistics industry, the media, and from local government and from a number of national politicians: — The Confederation of British Industry stated: “We support the business case for a high speed rail line linking London with Birmingham and the North of England, and we continue to make this case to the Government.” (quoted in RAIL, 3/11) — “By pressing ahead with a high speed rail network, we can ensure sufficient rail capacity for the foreseeable future. Some opponents have argued that upgrading the existing main line networks would deal with any capacity constraints, but that would only address the problem in the short term.”—John Leech MP (Manchester & Withington, debate, Westminster Hall, 3/11) — Gary Williamson, chief executive of Leeds, York and North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce, recently stated: “High speed rail is a vital part of the long-term vision for the UK economy…..The protests of the few are jeopardising the prosperity of the many, and the propagation by some rural communities that the business case for HS2 is flawed is incorrect.” — In 3/11, some 90 Yorkshire business leaders signed an open letter to the Secretary of State in support of HS2. They were backed by 21 MPs, 14 Council leaders and the major Northern universities. — “The other countries that have developed high speed rail networks—Spain, Germany, France, China and Japan—cannot all be wrong.”—Iain Stewart, MP (Milton Keynes South, Westminster Hall, 3/11) — The Derby and Rail Forum stated (3/11): “We believe (HS2) will boost business, create jobs and make passengers’ lives easier. It will not only benefit our region…….but will be for the good of the country’s future.” — Greengauge 21 Campaign stated: “HS2 will provide much-improved links from the great cities of Scotland, the North and the Midlands to London and the South-East.” (quoted in RAIL, 3/11) — Julian Smith MP (Skipton & Ripon) stated: “It’s becoming more and more evident that there’s a chasm between north and south, and I believe high speed rail will play a major role in addressing that.” (Yorkshire Post, 3/11) — The North West Business Leadership Team stated in late 2010: “The (High Speed) network must be extended to the North and eventually to Scotland and Wales if the whole UK economy is to benefit, and the economic disadvantages of peripherality and poor connectivity are to be overcome.” (High Speed To The North West—Grasping The Opportunity, NWBLT) — The Association of Train Operating Companies stated (3/11): “By deploying the best of British design and engineering in the construction of the high speed line in Kent in the 1990s, we struck the right balance between national and local interest. We can do the same again with High Speed 2”. — Andrew Palmer, CBI Yorkshire said: “We see real benefits from having a high speed line…….The Government must commit to the full network, not just the initial trunk route to Birmingham, and ensure that the network is adequately connected to international gateways such as Heathrow and HS1.” (Yorkshire Post, 3/11). — The Campaign For Better Transport stated in early 2011 that high speed rail should form part of a broader national transport strategy to increase capacity on the rail network, but that existing (classic) lines should not be neglected. — David Higgins, Chief Executive of Network Rail, said in early 2011: “West Coast (upgrading) has been a tremendous success…….But within 10 years, and probably six years, the route will be at absolute capacity, and that’s with additional carriages…….Then the only way left to cope with demand (without HS2) will be to push the prices up.”

Appendix II—Policy Backdrop to High Speed 2 96. There are a number of policy backdrop documents to High Speed 2, and a very brief sample, by no means comprehensive, is given here in chronological order: — “Proposals for a European High Speed Network”, Community of European Railways, 1989, which looked towards a pan-European network being created. — The call by the North West Channel Tunnel Group in 1990 to construct a new high speed main line on the West Coast corridor in the early 21st century (“Capitalising on the Channel Tunnel— Action for North West England”). — Work by the West Coast Rail 250 Campaign in the early 1990s, which identified the opportunity for new cut-off (by-pass) lines for locations such as Stafford. During the mid-1990s, the opportunity for a new high speed line was further recognised, and adopted as part of long-term North West regional development planning. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w102 Transport Committee: Evidence

— Extensive work by Greengauge 21 during the past decade, which has found a clear positive financial case for an initial UK high speed rail network. — Work undertaken in recent years by consultants working for the Department for Transport and Network Rail, which again found a clear case for a high speed network. — The Stern Report, 2006 (Stern Report on the Economics of Climate Change). — Delivery of a Sustainable Railway, Department for Transport, 2007. — High Speed Rail, Department for Transport, March 2010. — Major work undertaken by and on behalf of the Government’s High Speed 2 company during 2009–11, which has further confirmed the case for high speed rail, and recommended an initial Y- shaped network linking London, the West Midlands, North West England and the East Midlands, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire, with services continuing to other destinations including Liverpool, Lancashire, Glasgow/Edinburgh and to . — The National Infrastructure Plan, 2010. — High Speed Rail—Investing In Britain’s Future, Consultation Summary, DfT, March 2011. — The European Commission’s Transport 2050 Strategy, seeking a 50% shift of medium-distance intercity passenger and freight journeys from road to rail/water, with the majority of medium- distance passenger traffic (300km-plus) using rail. — The same strategy delivering a fully-functional EU-wide core network of transport corridors (TEN- T core network) by 2030, with by 2050 all core network airports connected to rail, preferably high-speed rail.

Appendix III—Some Study Findings from Elsewhere of Regenerative Effects 97. A number of studies elsewhere have generally confirmed that high speed rail investment brings significant regional economic benefits. A small selection of these studies’ findings is briefly summarized below. 98. Study by R Vickerman, International Connections by High Speed Rail—Metropolitan and Inter-Regional Impacts, published by Centre for European, Regional and Transport Economics, University of Kent, , (based on a paper presented at the World Conference on Transport Research, University of California at Berkeley), 2007: — Creation of new accessibility opportunities. — Direct impact on productivity, competition, and competitiveness. — Changes in patterns of agglomeration, leading to gains in productivity. — Improved workforce participation (access to jobs). — Possibility of one to two days per week commuting/homeworking (access to new jobs). 99. Study by P M J Pol, The Economic Impact of the High Speed Train on Urban Regions, published by European Regional Science Association, August 2003: — “Relevant regions” become larger. — Improved quality of life and accessibility of city centres. — Catalysing effect of HSR on regional economies. — Cities can obtain higher position in European city hierarchy. — HSR can stimulate weaker regions to improve economic competitiveness. 100. Study by G De Rus, The Economic Effects of High Speed Rail Investment, Joint Transport Research Centre, University of Las Palmas, published by OECD and International Transport Forum, August 2008: — Case for investing is strongly dependent on existing traffic base. — Also depends on time savings, generated traffic, willingness to pay. — Also beneficial release of capacity on congested alternatives. — High speed rail has very long asset life. 101. Study by K Kamel & R Matthewman, The Non-Transport Impacts of High Speed Trains on Regional Economic Development—A Review of the Literature, published by Locate In Kent, November 2008: — Increase of accessibility, and importance of changed perceptions. — Changes in commercial rents, house prices and reduced vacancy rates. — Effects on decision-makers when new businesses are located. — Enlarged labour markets. — Attractiveness to businesses with strategic/international contracts/linkages. — Catalyst for investment in other key transport infrastructure. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w103

102. Study by S Randolph, J Haveman and E Egan, California High Speed Rail—Economic Benefits and Impacts in the San Francisco Bay Area, published by California Bay Area Council Economic Institute, San Francisco, October 2008: — Business/job creation, congestion, development, climate change. — Will enlarge reachable workforce. — Helps retain businesses that might otherwise move away. — Stimulates tourism and support hotel/restaurant sector. — Releases capacity at key airports. — Catalyst for urban infill, more compact development. — HSR uses one-third of air trip carbon and one-fifth of car trip carbon. 103. High Speed Train Impact Study Final Report, published by HST Impact Consortium, 2008: — High speed rail contributes to the economic importance of cities/regions. — HSR investment draws-in other investment, and tends to contribute to regional economic growth. — HSR exploits the benefits of reduced journey times. — Connection into HSR routes plays a major role in the urban development of cities, and regenerates deprived areas. — Land price levels increase in the areas around HSR terminals. 104. Report of Kent County Council, Study of Kent and High Speed 1 Domestic Rail Services, Kent County Council, January 2009: — HSR services can be catalyst for future development. — Local authorities should encourage development and facilitate regeneration. — Mostly favourable effects on property (higher demand). — One-hour (approx) travel time is important (for HS2, this will benefit London, Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds). — Connectivity is important to retaining businesses. — There should be integration with local public transport. 105. Study by H S M Sanchez-Mateos (Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha) and M. Givoni, Accessibility Impact of New HSR Line in the UK—Preliminary Analysis of Winners and Losers, Working Paper No. 1041, Transport Studies Unit, University of Oxford, December 2009: — Main justification for HSR in UK is economic and environmental. — May not always be large switch from air to rail. — Environmental case could be undermined by non-green electricity. — Additional (non-travel) benefits are employment, agglomeration, economic development. — Significant reductions in travel time, for cities served. — Will “shrink” the UK. 106. Study by J Willigers, H Floor and B van Wee, High Speed Rail’s Impact on the Location of Office Employment within the Randstad Area, 45th Congress of European Regional Science Association, Amsterdam, 2005: — Centrality and connectivity effects of HSR are important. — Reducing travel times increases accessibility for business travel. — Connectivity (in this study) is most important for international services. — Increased concentration of offices around HS stations raises accessibility effect. May 2011

Written evidence from Allan Whittow (HSR 43) Role of High Speed Rail The behaviour of the DfT and their wholly owned subsidiary HS2 Ltd raise a number of important issues which I am sure your Committee will wish to consider. If we want the best transport strategy, short and long term, for the nation, it would be logical to start from the problems that need to be addressed. Since 90% of the passenger and freight transport is by road, you might expect spend to reflect this pattern—perhaps using comparative Benefit/Cost Ratio to prioritise between road and rail. Further, both road and rail use is mainly relatively short distance—well under 50 miles. So the natural startpoint might be that long distance rail should be allotted perhaps 5% of the transport budget. With a few notorious examples UK has a good long distance travel infrastructure. Market research suggests the main cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w104 Transport Committee: Evidence

problems are local, eg commuter distances, including congestion, potholes and distracting traffic deterrents. These are generally soluble by non-glamorous incremental works, and we must welcome those that can be implemented most quickly and cheaply—in every case the solution follows from the identified problem.

If someone wants to start from a particular “solution” they will try to make the problem fit solution, discourage review of alternatives, and generally put barriers in the way of objective analysis. A symptom is to keep switching the rationale for the trophy project they have set their heart on. And any “consultation” will be handled not by the DfT but their agents who have information on just one option rather than the whole range. Obfuscatory documentation can help deter intelligent interest by those who will later find they are to over-pay for the wrong solution.

Which scenario rings true for HS2 and the present Consultation?

The DfT’s attempt to justify their HS2 proposal was originally based on the economic or business case, but that collapsed because of the unrealistic traffic forecasts and unrealistic valuation of time “saved” by business passengers. As a simple example, HS2 Ltd incurs no extra cost for staff working late at their roadshows, let alone for their time travelling home afterwards. Mr Andrew Tucker of HS2 Ltd, who claims to be an economist familiar with the analysis, confirmed to me that the project does not depend on the business case. He also confirmed that the cost/benefit analysis has been made from a government perspective, not a national case (though he was not familiar the difference)—why else would he include fares as a benefit for the case ? From a national cost/benefit perspective every economist should know that fares are a benefit for the government but a cost for the passenger, so drop out of the figures. My Tucker even began to claim that HS2 would cost extra because it would follow on from the massive Crossrail spend—almost as though keeping that construction force employed is the real justification for HS2!

Environmental benefits were DfT’s claim for justifying the project, but even on a carbon basis HS2 does not reduce carbon because higher speed is very wasteful and extra travel offsets the small number transferring from (increasingly frugal) cars and the handful from air. Mr Tucker claimed HS2 was very open about not including in their assessment any of the environmental disbenefits, but could not point to a single phrase acknowledging this in their massive display. No value has been put on the environment for flora and fauna, let alone humans and national priorities like AONB. Why do their noise calculations show only the average rather than peak noise? This may make sense for continuous road traffic, but is ludicrous for trains and planes which are intrusive but random—would they claim that a nuclear explosion every decade is inaudible, on average?

Healing the North/South divide might be nice, but HS2 is almost totally useless as a way to do so. In HS2 Ltd’s analysis 95% of all benefits go to travellers (the rich few, or those on expenses) and only 5% to wider economic benefits—two thirds of which go to London and the South East anyway. Apart from a few retail parks round the very few stations, the main area of redevelopment is in Royal Oak, but enlightened MPs should know that is not very far north.

The need to increase the capacity of rail is their latest claim for a compelling reason. But if we are desperate for extra capacity, we cannot wait till 2026 or 2033. Fortunately there are well developed plans for the West Coast Main Line prepared at DfT’s request which can increase capacity by the same amount as HS2 with speeds of 120–150 mph—gradually to match growth, but starting now and potentially in place by 2015, costing roughly one tenth of HS2, and serving the real needs of the population with plenty of interchanges to and from more local services. Speed is not our main priority in our small island. WCML RP2, and the equivalent on ECML, should be put in hand now.

If there is a need for even further capacity beyond, it might make sense to consider plans for a new route to more distant destinations, eg Newcastle and Scotland, using mid-speed (therefore more environmental) trains, and not adding 35 miles by going via Birmingham ! But even this would be hard to justify compared with increasing (to six tracks ?) the ECML to keep the interchanges with existing trains. High Speed is relevant in UK only if we are integrated with Europe, and have joined the Shengen Agreement. This is of course speculation, so should be considered only when the strategic objectives are agreed, but it does illustrate the sort of question that should be addressed before spending hundreds of millions on consultants working detail on a single scheme that is only one, unpromising, option.

I wish you every success in establishing the changes in approach needed to ensure we make the right transport decisions. Just think how let down people would feel if they were forced to commit their £1K per household (NPV @ 2009 prices !) for a new speed toy they would never use that, by 2026 would almost certainly no longer be enough to impress the world. May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w105

Written evidence from Kyn Aizlewood (HSR 44) Introduction The Department for Transport [DfT] has published plans to invest in a new High Speed Rail [HSR] network across England including an Economic Case and Business Case for HS2, the next stage of investment. However the reports published do not address many key areas highlighted in the Treasury’s Green Book approach re the “Five Case Model”, which sets out an approach to ensure value for money from public sector investment projects. This approach considers public sector investment proposals, seeking assurance that a compelling case is made, justifying the use of taxpayer money, under five headings: 1. The strategic case [Paragraphs 1–7] 2. The economic case [Paragraphs 8–35] 3. The financial case [Paragraphs 36–39] 4. The commercial case [Paragraphs 40–47] 5. The management case [Paragraphs 48–54] I have presented analysis in regard to the “Five Case Model” as it may apply to HS2, also drawing upon the experience and lessons learned from HS1.

Summary and Conclusions If there is a robust Business Case for HS2, it has not yet been made by HS2 Ltd or by DfT. In terms of the Treasury’s Five Case Model, the proposals to date are substantially deficient. Instead, the evidence suggests that HS2 is an investment programme built on shaky foundations and offers nothing for 15 years. More modest, incremental investments that match new capacity to demand have been discarded in favour of a Grand Design, a loss-making project beset with huge risks and provided at enormous cost to the taxpayer. Without a valid business case and in almost any other walk of life, the proposals for HS2 should/would be rejected.

The Business Case for HS2—The Five Case Model The Strategic Case 1. In presenting the business case, at the HSR Business Debate, 29 November 2010, the Rt Hon Phillip Hammond MP and Minister for Transport declared a range of “strategic” benefits of investment in High Speed Rail eg: — [it will become] “the preferred mode of travel for the overwhelming majority of passengers between London and its hub airport and Britain’s great provincial cities”; — “High speed rail will be an unbeatable option for inter-urban travel”; — “Achieve a step change transformation of our economic geography”; — “lead to huge regeneration opportunities…in Birmingham, in London and in due course in Manchester, Leeds and South Yorkshire”; — “deliver a transformational change to the way Britain works”; — “tackling the North-South divide in economic growth rates more effectively than half a century of regional policy”; and — “High speed rail will merge our great population centres into a single economic hinterland”. 2. Clearly, as the plan for HS2 is to attract the majority of its passengers from existing inter-city, high speed lines, if it goes ahead it will, de-facto become the main way of connecting a small number of English cities ie a faster connection to London from Birmingham and, latterly from Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds. However most people do not actually live in these cities and it is likely that most people, most taxpayers, will never travel on HS2. 3. The original business case for HS2, prepared by HS2 Ltd and published March 2010 is far more modest in terms of its contribution to wider economic transformation, offering an estimate of £3.6 billion “wider economic benefits”. This assessment looked at three areas: — Agglomeration benefits ie benefits of improved linkages between businesses. — Labour market impacts ie benefits to commuters. — Imperfect competition ie benefits to consumers of higher output, caused through investment in HSR. 4. HS2 Ltd’s analysis using DfT guidelines indicated potential Agglomeration benefits of £2 billion and £1.6 billion arising from imperfect competition, with hardly any benefit on labour markets. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w106 Transport Committee: Evidence

5. HS2 Ltd also commissioned further work from the Centre for Transport Studies, Imperial College to ascertain any further benefits and DfT concluded that “this suggests there may be some additional benefits that are not included in our estimates of wider economic impacts, it is unlikely that they will change the conclusions presented in this report”. 6. Subsequently in the Economic Case, DfT has increased this projected benefit to £6.3 billion, reflecting the impact of the Y network. Whilst there has been much talk in the media of “new jobs created”, this DfT estimate for wider economic benefits only represents 5% of the total benefit claimed in the Economic Case and it is a modest return on the £30.4 billion capital investment required to create the infrastructure. 7. It is also likely that many “new” jobs—in areas close to new HS2 stations—simply represent a re- distribution towards these centres of investment and away from towns and cities further from the line.

The Economic Case Distributional analysis 8. One of the first questions for government about a new, major investment programme is “who benefits; who pays”? Some public sector projects easily gain public support because people can see the “public good” or they can recognise some indirect benefit eg in provision of free education [for the next generation], the NHS [we may all become ill one day], defence and policing [we collectively benefit from living in a safe environment]. 9. We already have a good transport infrastructure in the UK, however the proposal for HS2 develop a new “super system” on top of the existing network. 10. The cost benefit analysis argues that most of the benefits of HS2 will be from passengers who use the service; the wider economic benefits, as described earlier, are quite modest given the scale of investment. However HS2 offers a new choice, as the cities to be part of the y-network are already served with relatively quick, subsidised, rail transport links to London eg few major cities in Europe can access their capital city within two hours, as we can in the UK. 11. So, unlike with health, education and other “public services”, the proposal for HS2 is to provide an upgraded service, heavily subsidised by the general taxpayer, from which a relatively small percentage of the general population will benefit; most people living in the UK and paying the taxes to fund HS2 will never make use of the service. 12. The Business case argues that HS2 will “free capacity” on other parts of the network, allowing non-HS2 users to gain benefit. However [1] this only represents another small part of the population and [2] the train operators run a business and they will need to close down “spare capacity”, if passengers switch to HS2, as speculated.

Option Appraisal 13. No systematic appraisal of wider transport options has been presented in the Economic case i.e. does a £30 billion investment in the rail network add more value than an equivalent level of investment in road? In the development of super fast broadband networks? In integration projects for existing metropolitan areas? 14. Assuming the answer is “yes”, details of option appraisal work found in supporting papers to the Business Case indicate that an option termed “Rail Package 2”, a major transformation programme of the existing WCML route achieved a significantly higher benefit to cost ratio than HS2, at a fraction of the cost. This was rejected because it did not provide the spare capacity offered by HS2 and therefore was insufficiently transformational. How to put a value on “spare capacity”?! 15. The criteria used in the option appraisal on alternative routes for HS2 placed little value on local amenity or environmental factors. For example, an earlier route considered, using an existing transport corridor [M40] would achieve substantially less degradation to the environment and probably much lower levels of compensation to land/property owners affected. This was a lesson from HS1. Instead, the route chosen is the quickest, by about three minutes, through the Chilterns, based on a highly questionable methodology used by DfT which [somewhat ironically, given the positive spin placed on “modal shift to rail”] values time spent on a train at nil.

Demand forecast 16. The economic case rests upon a complex, long-term econometric model, predicting a future level of demand for long-distance rail travel into London. The modelling is over 75 years and we might say that the parameters of uncertainty around this “best guess” get wider with every year. 17. In its White Paper, Delivering a sustainable railway [2007], DfT identified a more progressive approach: “While the Government must plan 30 years ahead, it recognises that it is impossible accurately to forecast demand that far into the future. Some cities and regions will grow faster than others. People and firms are cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w107

likely to respond to the challenge of cutting carbon emissions by changing travel patterns and re- engineering supply chains. The pace of technological change is equally unpredictable. “Forecasts have been wrong before, and any strategy that tried to build a rigid investment programme based on fixed long-term forecasts would inevitably be wrong again. Such an approach could well deliver additional capacity in the wrong place. “To overcome this challenge, the guiding principles in this strategy are: To invest where there are challenges now, in ways which offer the flexibility to cope with an uncertain future; and to put in hand the right preparatory work so that, as the future becomes clearer, the necessary investments can be made at the right time” 18. These principles, which seem sound if unexciting, appear to have been dropped in favour of a vision founded on a straight line econometric forecast. 19. In estimating demand for HS1 i.e. the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, the DfT failed to give consideration to the potential for competition from low cost airlines and the ferry companies, which had spare capacity. The House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, in its 38th Report of Session subsequently reported in May 2006: “In bidding for the project in 1996, LCR forecast that passenger numbers using Eurostar would reach 21.4 million in 2004 but actual passenger numbers were only 7.3 million. Where future income from passengers is expected to provide a major element of the revenue needed to repay the cost of constructing transport infrastructure, it is crucial that realistic forecasts are prepared from the start. Downside risks need to be given due weight, drawing on both UK and international experience, in considering future projects”.

Pricing 20. There is little consideration given in the Command Paper or by HS2 Ltd to pricing policy, other than assumptions that pricing policy would be “optimised” between the new HS2 route and the existing West Coast Main Line route and that passenger fares will increase in real terms, year on year above the rate of general inflation 21. Rail services are already heavily subsidised by the taxpayer, a balance that the Coalition government has recently pledged to change. In his speech of 14 September 2010, on Sustainable Transport, the Rt Hon Phillip Hammond declared “We have one of the most expensive railways in the world . . . That is not acceptable. The taxpayer is contributing almost as much as the farepayer”. 22. The Coalition Government has since announced plans to reduce the level of fare subsidy it offers to the rail industry: fares for Year 1 of HS2 Ltd’s 30 year revenue projection will rise by 5.8% and from 2012 fare increases will be based on “inflation + 3%”. 23. If this new rule is applied to the business case for HS2, the cost of a return, off-peak fare would be the equivalent in today’s money of £210, with a peak-time day return fare at £360. Are these pricing assumptions— summarised below—consistent with a 267% increase in demand? Is a doubling of demand for rail travel consistent with a doubling of passenger rail fares? Usually, more people are likely to buy a service if the price falls. 24. Ticket Pricing Assumptions: Birmingham New Street to London Euston 2010 2043 2043 Inflation + Inflation + 1% pa 3% pa Peak, return fare £140 £200 £360 Off peak, return fare £82 £120 £210 Notes All prices at 2010 levels Based on current, published West Coast Main Line [WCML] fares Birmingham to London, see www.nationalrail.co.uk 25. The assumption used in the Economic Case is that the “inflation + 3%” formula will revert to the earlier “inflation + 1” after three years, restoring the principle of continued high levels of public subsidy. Table 3 is indicative of a range of future ticket prices. It is likely that HS2 prices would be based on a “premium service”, resulting in higher rail fares for passengers eg reflecting the experience of travelling HS1 in Kent. 26. Supporters of HS2 agree that demand for long-distance rail travel is more than proportionately sensitive to changes in income; an average demand elasticity of about 1.5 is used by HS2 Ltd in the business case and this provides the basis for the unusually high demand forecast of 267% growth discussed earlier. By the same token, if government decided to reduce public subsidy on rail ticket prices, this would be expected to have a disproportionately large impact on forecasts of future revenues from HS2. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w108 Transport Committee: Evidence

27. Herein lies the basis for the accusation that HS2 is potentially a White Elephant ie it is so expensive that government will be required to sustain high levels of public subsidy in order to keep ticket prices low enough to generate viable levels of effective demand.

Income, substitution and competition effects 28. The business case for HS2 combines an assumption of a big increase in the demand for the service with rising fare prices. However, the calculation of demand has been based upon modelling a trend of rising incomes and takes no account of the increasing real price of rail fares. It therefore over-predicts demand for two reasons: — an income effect of a price rise—some consumers choose not to travel eg they choose to take a shorter journey elsewhere, use the internet or video-conferencing; and — a substitution effect, customers switching to an alternative, cheaper mode of travel eg as we saw with HS1, consumers switched to cheaper alternatives such as low-cost airlines or the cross- channel ferries. 29. The overall conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the Economic Case over-estimates the future demand for HS2, as it did for HS1. This over-estimate is a consequence of ignoring the impact of potential competition and by not modelling the impact of higher rail prices.

Cost Benefit Analysis 30. HS2 Ltd has rigorously applied DfT methodology for cost-benefit analysis. However, does the methodology make sense in the context of HSR? At first glance the Benefits appear to easily justify the cost. However how much is your time really worth? 31. HS2 Ltd’s model puts a premium on business travel, based on a generous assumption that the average business traveller has a salary of £70,000 per year. A lower value is put on leisure time, and a value of nil is assigned to time spent on a train. 32. Now, many passengers read a newspaper, a magazine or book on the train; others work on a laptop, listen to i-pod players, make phone calls, send texts, play computer games and so on, all of which, if they were not on a train, would be termed either business or leisure activities. But because passengers choose to do these things on a train, they are assigned “nil value” ie DfT assumes that 100% of time spent on a train is 100% wasted time. This provides the basis for calculating huge “benefits” arising from shorter journey times: when people stop travelling their activities are given value! 33. Clearly there is some wasted time in making a train journey, mostly near the start and end of a journey, the transfer points eg getting to the station, buying tickets, waiting on the platform, finding a seat etc. However by reducing a journey from 84 minutes to 49 minutes, there is good reason to think that passengers are losing the most productive 35 minutes of that journey! 34. Furthermore, the impact of mobile technology means that people increasingly utilise their travelling time, engaging for much of the journey in some activity, business or leisure, which they would otherwise do if not on a train. 35. Whilst the detailed CBA is complex, the assumption that all travelling time is wasted is empirically not true and therefore the “conclusion” that taxpayers will get a £2 benefit for every £1 spent on HS2 is without foundation.

The Financial Case 36. The level of investment required to support the implementation of HS2 is summarised in the table below, taken from the DfT Command Paper, updated by the Economic Case report. HS2 Cost Summary Net Present Value—£ billion HS2 HS2 + Y network Capital cost 17.8 30.4 Operating cost [net] 7.6 13.9 Total Cost 25.5 44.3 Additional revenue −15.0 −27.2 Indirect tax 1.5 included Net cost to government 11.9 17.1

37. To develop HS2 + Y network, Government requires taxpayers to find the equivalent of £30.4 billion in capital cost at current prices. 38. To put this into an everyday context, the National Statistics Office estimate that in 2010 there were 30.2 million individual income taxpayers; each would be required to contribute the equivalent of an additional one- off tax premium of about £1000, now, to enable the project to go ahead, with the first trains scheduled between London and Birmingham from 2026. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w109

39. The biggest risk to the financial case ie the affordability of HS2 lies in the assumption of £27.2 billion [NPV] of revenues, with: — none forecast for 15 years; — revenues based on highly speculative assumptions about growth in demand; — a substantial real-terms increase in rail fare prices; and — the value of the NPV substantially inflated by the use of discount factors that does not fully reflect long-term commercial risk.

The Commercial Case Commercial feasibility 40. It is clear from the outset that HS2 loses money; there is no business case for HS2 in commercial terms. The sum of capital and revenue costs, discounted over time, is nearly twice as high [£44.3 billion] as the projected stream of revenues from ticket sales [£27.2 billion]. Therefore, in commercial terms, if the project went ahead as planned, and people behaved as predicted over the 75 year time horizon, the project would achieve a present value financial loss of £17.1 billion. 41. It has been widely reported that London and Continental Railways Limited [LCR], the company that operates the lease for HS1, has been sold for about £2.1 billion to Borealis Infrastructure and Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, approximately 40% of the £5.8 billion estimated to have been invested in its development.

Commercial risk The reliability of revenue forecasts 42. From a commercial perspective, the risks around financial projections grow as the parameters of uncertainty widen. The revenue forecasts for HS2 do not even kick in for 15 years, making these hugely uncertain. The commercial approach to this uncertainty would be to adjust the forecasts through a discounting approach. DfT has actually reduced the discount factor from 3.5% to 3% for later years of the forecast; neither rate represents anything close to a commercial discount rate in these circumstances. Consequently the revenues from estimates of future ticket sales included in the Business Case are vastly over valued. 43. With regard to HS2, there are only two certainties: firstly, that the precise econometric forecast will not be accurate and secondly that HS2 will achieve nil revenue for the next 15 years, as the service will not operate before 2026, at the earliest!

Spare capacity and competition policy 44. The Economic Case for HS2 + Y network predicts that more than one in five passengers who will use HS2 will be new passengers, people attracted by the prospect of shorter journey times, who would not have travelled by train before. However, when HS2 enters service this is likely to create substantial spare capacity, at least in the short-term, a key issue in the development of HS1. 45. It is not clear what the competitive impact of this may be. At a meeting on 17 August 2010, officers from HS2 Ltd confirmed that the forecasting model treated HS2 and WCML demand “as one”, therefore assumed no price competition. Potentially government might seek to franchise the WCML and HS2 together, to create a single, monopolistic rail provider on the route. Alternatively, government may prefer to see competition between HS2 Ltd and WCML operatives, which with spare capacity would serve to drive down rail prices. 46. Whilst this is conjecture, we might recall the PAC review of HS1 and note that the lessons to be learned focussed on issues of price competition and alternatives not considered by econometric modelling. This failure resulted in fare-paying revenue targets being substantially missed and further loss to the taxpayer. The costs of HS2 + Y network dwarf HS1, so this is potentially a key point of discussion in assessing the “strategic” decision to invest in HS2.

Procurement strategy 47. There is no procurement strategy published at this time. The Hybrid Bill will provide powers to acquire land and buildings for compulsory purchase, however the land / property owners living near the route have not been contacted to confirm which land / property would be subject to compulsory purchase, should the project proceed.

The Programme Management Case 48. A business case involves assessing risks to the investment programme and developing a strategy to manage those risks: what are the risks to achieving the benefits? Are costs robustly assessed? What strategies will help with these? Neither HS2 Ltd nor DfT offer any serious, quantified analysis of the risks or a risk management strategy as part of a plan requiring £30.4 billion capital funding from the taxpayer. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w110 Transport Committee: Evidence

49. Achieving most of the benefits is closely linked to the reliability of the demand forecasts discussed earlier. HS2 Ltd include a sensitivity analysis that concludes that if demand is 20% below its predicted level, the Net Benefit Ratio of HS2 falls from 2.7 to 1.5, a level generally interpreted by DfT as a marginal investment. It is clear that: — the demand forecast is a very critical assumption; — there is considerable uncertainty over the estimate of future demand; and — passenger revenue, based on demand, is related to the fares that passengers will be asked to pay, which is scarcely considered. 50. For these reasons the sensitivity analysis undertaken seems wholly inadequate for the purposes of assessing programme risk. 51. The extract below from 3.2.5 of the Economic Case summarises the government’s uncompromising stance: “One of the key uncertainties for forecasting is the future level of demand. There are different views of the future—how the economy will grow, and how that will drive growth in demand. However, the rate of growth in demand actually defines when, rather than whether, a scheme such as HS2 would be justified. Slower growth would not necessarily mean that HS2 would not be a worthwhile investment, though it might suggest that the opening year of HS2 should be later and/or that a lower level of service should be provided in the early years of operation. A higher growth rate, by contrast, would argue for the project to be accelerated if that were possible”. 52. Government and the Treasury would not countenance a Business Case for a hospital building programme based on this premise! With the pace of technological change, HSR may be redundant technology in 50, let alone 75 years time and technological risk has to be a consideration for any long-term programme of this size. 53. Given that the demand forecast starts in Year 15 and runs to Year 75, the parameters of uncertainty over the reliability of future income forecasts are very large indeed. Conventionally, in the private sector, this would be reflected in the level of interest rate used, higher rates reflecting higher levels of perceived risk. Perversely DfT uses a 3.5% “discount factor” reducing this after 30 years to just 3%. Whilst this is standard practice for public sector transport projects, the impact of this is to substantially inflate the discounted value of future revenues against the projections that the private sector would make for the same project. From a commercial perspective this seems an entirely inadequate approach to assessing risk. 54. Any investment carries risks that the purpose of the investment will not be realised, so a risk analysis may be useful in comparing the relative risks of one project against an alternative. Almost every other alternative investment strategy eg Rail Package 2 offers: — greater flexibility and therefore a much closer matching of capacity to future demand; and — delivers benefits sooner than HS2. 55. Other commentators eg the HS2 Action Alliance have noted, that “Rail Package 2” meets the DfT predicted growth in demand, through a staged approach to investment and does so at considerably lower cost. This option was dismissed by DfT for not providing the spare capacity that HS2 might offer. It is unclear what benefit the DfT attaches to taxpayer investment to produce spare capacity, particularly when spare capacity will impact upon prices, revenue forecasts and potentially future levels of taxpayer subsidy. 56. HS2 provides an all or nothing solution to the demand forecast for 20 + years hence and nothing beforehand—if the demand forecasts are correct, HS2 implies a sustained degradation of the WCML service for at least the next 15 years. May 2011

Written evidence from Gladwin Associates (HSR 45) Summary Our main conclusions are that: 1. There is a need for a National Transport Infrastructure Plan, which covers air, road and rail. This would provide the opportunity to balance growth and investment, taking into account opportunities for regeneration, providing a modern transport system for the whole country. In particular, we believe that a strategy for freight is urgently needed. Currently the majority of freight is moved by road, which results in noise and congestion on motorways, plus substantially increasing the wear & tear on the slow lanes. The latest HS2 reports show that anticipated growth is now much lower, with the cap being applied in 2043 instead of 2033. Rail Package 2 provides an incremental programme of improvements as demand changes. Thus there is time to develop a National Transport Infrastructure Plan. 2. High Speed Rail may well prove to be part of the solution, however the route chosen has a number of disadvantages in meeting the Government’s desire to heal the North South Divide: cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w111

(a) The timescale to reach the North is too long: (i) Birmingham 2026. (ii) Manchester/Leeds 2033 (probably 2036). (iii) Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow? (b) The route is difficult to future proof ie increase to 4 tracks. HS2 Ltd admit this themselves. (c) HS2 Ltd’s proposal of a single tunnel (with three trains per hour each way) to link to HS1 and the continent is hardly a 21st century solution, and begs the question of what happens if demand increases sharply. (d) The route does not follow accepted practice of running alongside motorways, where the noise envelopes of HSR and the Motorway can be merged. The land around motorways is already blighted to a certain extent. The increase in blight and environmental damage from an HSR is substantially less than building through open country. (e) An alternate route following the M1 would reach Leeds and Manchester in 2026, and give the opportunity to reach the North East and Scotland significantly earlier. This has the advantages that: (i) with faster travel times, the majority of people travelling to London would choose rail, and flights could be cut significantly. (ii) The majority of cities in the East Midlands and South Yorkshire could be connected, and those in the West Midlands by a link following the M6. (iii) There would be a long fast track, which with the use of acceleration / deceleration tracks would enable significantly more cities to be joined to the HSR network. 3. The economic case presented by HS2 has declined substantially between March 2010 and February 2011. On a like for like basis the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) has dropped from 2.6 to 1.6 for the Birmingham London proposal. A significant amount of this was due to the correction of errors as well as a reduction in demand. To get the BCR to 1.6, the cap on growth which is normally applied has been extended to 2043 from 2033. Without this extension, the BCR would be 1.0. 4. There are a number of deficiencies in the costs, in particular no disbenefits have been included for: (a) the impact on commuters into Euston during the rebuilding period; (b) the impact on businesses along the line for loss of profit from walkers and cyclists; and (c) The impact of not spending any further funds on the classic rail system after 2015, an assumption that HS2 Ltd makes. 5. The cost of building a new power station, which will only be needed if HS2 goes ahead, has not been included. This alone is estimated at £2.8 billion. 6. HS2 Ltd has admitted that errors have been made in the calculation of spoil that will need to be removed in the Chilterns. In calculating a figure of 658,000 cubic metres, they only included one tunnel instead of two. In addition they have omitted the expansion factor of 50% for spoil removed compared to its compacted form. The Chiltern Conservation Board has calculated that the correct amount is 12,000,000 cubic metres. A cost adjustment will be needed for this. 7. Classic compatible trains will run on the WCML north of Litchfield. Due to the bends in the current track, they will need to run slower than the existing Pendolino’s. At the moment we have not been able to resolve whether the slower times have been reflected in the business benefits. Should they have not been reflected, considering that 11 of 14 trains per hour will originate north of Lichfield, there would be a considerable reduction in the benefits arising. 8. In our opinion there is evidence that there are a significant number of errors in the business case which need to be resolved to determine whether the proposed route is viable.

Answers to Questions 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR The arguments advanced for HSR are: — Lack of Capacity. — Need to close the North South Divide. — To contribute to Carbon reduction through transfers from road and air, and from the “greening” of power generation. The arguments against HSR: — Capacity can be adequately met through improvements to existing lines. These can be phased in as demand develops. — Demand from business travelers over the next 15 years will be impacted by IT developments, reducing the need to travel. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w112 Transport Committee: Evidence

— The argument for closing the North South Divide is based on research that relies on HSR creating economic conditions which will create new employment. That evidence shows that where two economic units are linked the larger unit will gain the most employment. HS2 Ltd has admitted that 70% of the jobs created will be in London. The same research shows that the main gain to the smaller unit is a transfer of jobs from neighbouring regions, which do not have as good a transport connection. — HS2 are forecasting only marginal transfers from road and air. The majority of transfers will be from classic rail and from new travel. — The existing railway with improvements will use substantially less electricity, and will therefore be greener that HSR.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? HSR will improve inter-urban connectivity between the cities it is linked to, but will seriously weaken the prospects for intermediate cities not on the HSR network. For the North, significantly improving the rail links from Liverpool to Newcastle and Teesside with intermediate access in Manchester, Leeds, Doncaster and Sheffield would cost significantly less and yield higher returns significantly earlier. 2. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? HS2 Ltd states that they expect no further improvements of the classic rail system from 2015. This leaves a period of over 10 years where, the risk of overcrowding will increase substantially, whereas Rail Package 2 sets out a series of improvements, which can be implemented as and when the need arises to increase capacity. No account has been taken of the disbenefits that will arise during this period. 3. What are the implications for domestic aviation? Domestic aviation from the North of England to Heathrow comes from, Manchester, Newcastle, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen. The key to a passenger transferring to rail is whether they are interlining at Heathrow or going to London and the South East. As total journey times by train shorten compared to total journey times by air, one would expect to see the continued decline in air passenger volumes. The key issue is whether HS2 will deliver significantly faster services than the classic railway. From Manchester, Virgin WCML claim to have 80% of the Manchester / London traffic. The domestic flights from Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow are currently declining, and, with the new reducing the time to four hours from Edinburgh to London, can be expected to decline further.

3. Business case 1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? The poor quality of HS2 Limited / DfT figures are demonstrated by: — The drastic reduction in the forecast demand as published in March 2010 and Feb 2011, requiring a capacity cap to be extended from 2033 to 2043 to bring the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) to 1.6 from 2.9. Without this cap extension the BCR would be 1.0. — The DfT forecasts for demand on HS1 produced when the project was approved are currently approximately double the current level of demand. — The valuation of time savings for business at £46 per hour, is based on the assumption that business people’s travel time on trains is unproductive. With WiFi, laptops etc, most business people are very productive on trains. Elimination of this valuation reduces the Benefits by £17 billion, and the BCR to. — HSR trains at 360kph use three times the power of a Pendolino at 200kph. With the forecast number of trains the HS2 preferred route will require an additional power station to be built. This would cost an estimated £2.8 billion as at Q3 2009. This has not been included in the capital costs. If HS2 is not built there would be no need to build this power station. Therefore £2.8 billion should be included in the Cost numbers. In discussions with HS2 officials during the Roadshow, there are other errors coming to light: — The calculation of the spoil generated from crossing the Chilterns: — used only one tunnel instead of two. — The deepening of the cuttings by 5m from to Wendover appears not to be in calculation. This alone creates 2,600,000 cu metres of spoil. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w113

— When spoil is dug up it creates 1.5x the volume of the compacted earth. This has apparently been ignored. — The figure for spoil given by HS2 Ltd is 658,000 cu metres., compared with a conservative estimate of 10,000,000 cu metres, all of which needs to transported and disposed of. — It is apparent that no account has been taken of this cost in the Economic Case. — The rebuilding of Euston station is scheduled to take eight years. During that time the lives of millions of commuters will be affected, with delays overcrowding etc. At the Roadshows, it was established that no disbenefit has been deducted from the benefits for this impact. — The impact on businesses along the line, whose trade is currently impacted by blight, and those that will impacted during the construction phase have not been included as disbenefits or compensation. In the Chilterns, this will impact all those businesses dependent on visitors, and will be severe with footpaths and cycle tracks cut. — Between Amersham and Wendover 23 Rights of Way will be disrupted and currently only four are shown to reconnected or diverted. At the Roadshows, officials were unaware of this. One claimed they would reconnected by diverting them, but as there are few roads crossing the proposed line and the cutting is mainly up to 15 metres deep, the only solution would be bridges or tunnelling the whole way. No cost has been included in the Economic Case for bridges or the additional cost of tunnelling. Nor has the cost of providing solutions to reconnect over 100 Rights of Way north of Wendover.

2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

The benefits of upgrading the existing WCML are substantial in that Rail Package 2 (RP2),developed by National Rail, can be implemented incrementally, thus matching upgrades to demand as it occurs, rather than building for a 50 year anticipated demand.

We agree with HS2 Ltd that developing a new conventional line offers no significant benefit over HSR.

Interestingly, the DfT, led by Norman Baker, is currently working on reducing the demand for travel by promoting developments in IT, such as Skype, video conferencing, improved data networks, etc. The impact of this at the moment is small at present but the potential reduction in demand is significant.

3. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

The benefit of managing demand by price would be that rail infrastructure costs could be reduced, but the reality is that people will still want to travel, and the impact could be to see an increase in road or air traffic, with a consequent increase in other transport infrastructure costs. Effectively, demand is managed by price today. The railway companies use the “Budget Airline” model to optimize capacity and price, thus if one books a long time ahead one gets a good price.

4. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

The first lesson the Government needs to learn is that the Country needs a National Transport Infrastructure Plan. Currently we have no overall plan for rail, air or road. Passengers and Freight can modally shift easily, depending on the marginal cost of each mode. We believe that the biggest single challenge for the country is to develop a strategy for moving freight. However to do this one needs to take into account passenger movements. Moving a significant amount of freight from the roads to rail or water would relieve congestion on the roads, reduce noise pollution on many major roads and reduce substantially the wear and tear on the motorways and major roads. HS2 correctly suggest that more freight could be run on the WCML. However one freight train over Shap uses three pathways for . Thus increasing significantly the freight on the WCML could substantially reduce the number of intercity trains on a particular route. Developing a well thought out National Transport Infra structure Plan would resolve such conflicts, and would almost certainly change the infrastructure spending priorities. The southern part of the WCML is currently 4 tracks, but there are crossovers between fast and slow lines. Resolving the pinch points offers the opportunity to have a dedicated freight line and a dedicated fast train line.

4. The strategic route

1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

Not responded to. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w114 Transport Committee: Evidence

2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? The proposed “Y” is not the best solution to meet the Government’s objectives of: (1) reducing Carbon Emissions; (2) healing the North South Divide See Q 5.1; and (3) allowing access to HSR for the maximum number of people. A route which follows the M1, and serves Glasgow, Edinburgh, Newcastle, Leeds and Manchester, would also be able to serve Sheffield, Doncaster, Nottingham and Luton. This configuration would serve more than 70% of the current travelers to London. The length of the line, with appropriate acceleration and deceleration tracks would enable HSR trains to run at full speed over most of their journey, thus creating more capacity if needed. The faster a train runs, the straighter the track needs to be. This reduces the flexibility of design to follow contours, avoid Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty and villages and towns. Running trains at lower speeds offers both carbon benefits and the ability to materially reduce the damage to countryside and communities. It also enables an HSR track to follow the contours of a motorway more easily. One of the decisions we need to make on this small crowded island is between speed and the environment. As business people are able to work on trains, taking slightly longer has some significant advantages. This has been borne out recently by the Chinese announcement that they will limit their HSR to 300kph both to reduce cost and to improve safety. Mr Hammond and Prof MacNaughton, HS2’s chief engineer are well documented as wanting to run HSR the way the Chinese do. 3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? Once we have a National Transport Infrastructure Plan, building an HSR in stages would be possible. This would give the opportunity to build it in areas such as Manchester to Leeds and Newcastle earlier providing both an immediate economic boost locally, but also improving the connectivity significantly earlier. 4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? The electrification of the Great West Main Line (GWML) offers the opportunity with some planning to link HS1 and HS2 to Heathrow, via London, with the creation of a station at Heathrow. This would also improve the links from Cardiff and Bristol to Heathrow. Network Rail has already looked at moving the Heathrow Express from Paddington to Euston. Such a development would offer an earlier connection with the opportunity to reduce flights from the North.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? There has been a lot of debate over economic regeneration. In our opinion HS2 has not researched regeneration thoroughly. What is clear is that when you join two economic units together, the larger unit takes the lion’s share of the job creation. HS2 has confirmed this by showing that 73% of the jobs created will be in London. Lille is held out an example of regeneration from HSR. I have worked in Lille, and certainly the centre has benefited, but the suburbs are still badly blighted. Comparisons of unemployment levels show that Lille has not improved it’s overall unemployment rates compared to France overall. The effect of HSR is at best a redistribution of employment from surrounding to communities to the community best served by HSR. When one looks at economic growth points in the UK e.g. the Thames Valley and Leeds—Manchester, the clear link is improved connectivity with the M4 and M62 acting as catalysts. Economic growth in the North would be better served by improving links between Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds—Bradford, Sheffield, Doncaster, Newcastle and Teesside. Certainly Manchester and Leeds have been urging an HSR link. The M1 route would provide this more easily than the “Y”, particularly as the necessary tunnels already exist, but are not currently used. We believe that the issue of connecting to Edinburgh and Glasgow also needs to be addressed to provide certainty for investment in Scotland. 2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? We believe that this is one element which needs to be considered. We are of the opinion that this should be part of the remit of a National Transport Infrastructure Plan. This would give the opportunity to use the appropriate transport solution. In urban areas, this might be to give priority to commuter centric solutions, whether train, road or bus. 3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? With regard to locations, please see the answer to 5.1. The beneficiaries of HSR will change depending on the fare structure and the capacity available. In general the wealthier would benefit more. However looking at cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w115

HS1, many of the users going to Disneyworld Paris are from a broad socioeconomic background. Because of the relatively low capacity utilization, competitive rail/hotel packages are available. 4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? The issue of financing HSR needs to be addressed once the economic decision to build is proven. I there is a clear cut benefit to the Country as a whole, then the Country as whole should bear the cost. If local regeneration through HSR proves successful, then local business will pay it’s share through increased rates, rents and Corporation Tax. Funding from the EU may be sought, but the pathetic link proposed between HS1 and HS2 would lead the EU not to regard the proposal seriously.

6. Impact 1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? With regard to Carbon emissions, HS2 is correct in saying that it will rely on the carbon footprint of the Electricity Generating industry to reduce its carbon usage, assuming that more nuclear, wind and wave power is generated. There is however another factor which needs to be considered. Trains traveling at 360kph use approximately three times the power of trains operating at 250kph. Thus whatever the UK Electricity Generating industry’s carbon footprint is, classic rail will use substantially less carbon that HSR. HS2’s own figures show HS2 to be broadly neutral in Carbon emission terms, with an assumed shift of 8% from road and 8% from air. There would need to be a substantially higher shift to make a significant impact. The dhift from air will help to free up slots at Heathrow, but these will be taken by long-haul flights, which have a higher carbon footprint. 2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? There are costs relating to noise reduction included in the business case. Whether these are sufficient will only be able to be determined when an Environmental Impact Assessment is completed. However there are no disbenefits included for the damage to the environment, loss of tranquility, impacts on rural businesses or disturbance to wildlife, loss of ancient woodland. 3. What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? Theoretically removal of train services from the “classic” network would free up more capacity for freight. However there are also opportunities to improve commuter services. The development of a National Transport Infrastructure Plan would give the opportunity to resolve these conflicts. 4. How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? We believe that there would be considerable disruption. The disbenefit arising from this has been included in the business case.

APPENDIX RESTATEMENT OF ECONOMIC CASE 2010 AND 2011 ON THE SAME PRESENTATION BASIS Per 2010 2010 in New 2011 Description Assessment Format Assessment Transport user benefits—Business 17.6 17.6 11.1 Other 11.1 11.1 6.4 Total 28.7 28.7 17.5 Other quantifiable benefits excl carbon .4 Loss to government of indirect taxes (1.5) (1.3) Net Transport Benefits 28.7 27.2 16.6 Wider economic impacts 3.6 3.6 4.0 Net Benefits incl WEIs 32.3 30.8 20.6

Capital costs 17.8 17.8 17.8 Operating costs 7.6 7.6 6.2 Total Costs 25.5 25.5 24.0

Revenues (15.0) (15.0) (13.7) Loss to government of indirect taxes 1.5 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w116 Transport Committee: Evidence

Per 2010 2010 in New 2011 Description Assessment Format Assessment

Net Costs to government 11.9 10.5 10.3

BCR without WEIs 2.4 2.6 1.6 BCR with WEIs 2.7 2.9 2.0

May 2011

Written evidence from the Chiltern Ridges HS2 Action Group (HSR 46) 1. This note is specifically directed to paragraph 6 (Impact) of the issues to be addressed by the Transport Select Committee (TSC) and in particular subparagraph 2 of paragraph 6 as follows.

Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 2. Given that, on the recommendations of HS2 Limited, following their own recommended terms of reference,* on which the consultation paper on HS2 is based, HS2 Ltd indicate that there was no real alternative to avoiding the Chilterns AONB, the Committee are requested to examine in particular why the policies laid down in Planning Policy Statement 7 (PPS7) were not included within the terms of reference and why DfT accepted those recommended terms of reference** without requiring PPS7 to be included and taken into account or why DfT itself did not take them into account. More importantly, with particular reference environmental costs and implications, the Committee are further requested to consider the implications had the consideration of PPS7, a required public policy, been an absolute requirement of HS2Ltd’s terms of reference, as it should have been, and why the policies laid down in PPS7 were not reported on or formed part of HS2 Limited’s deliberations or of DfT’s subsequent report and recommendations.

3. Planning Policy Statement 7—Sustainable Development in Rural Areas The following paragraphs from PPS7 are relevant in this respect Nationally designated areas 21. Nationally designated areas comprising National Parks, the Broads, the New Forest Heritage Area and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB), have been confirmed by the Government as having the highest status of protection in relation to landscape and scenic beauty. The conservation of the natural beauty of the landscape and countryside should therefore be given great weight in planning policies and development control decisions in these areas. The conservation of wildlife and the cultural heritage are important considerations in all these areas. They are a specific purpose for National Parks, where they should also be given great weight in planning policies and development control decisions. As well as reflecting these priorities, planning policies in LDDs and where appropriate, RSS, should also support suitably located and designed development necessary to facilitate the economic and social well- being of these designated areas and their communities, including the provision of adequate housing to meet identified local needs. 22. Major developments should not take place in these designated areas, except in exceptional circumstances. This policy includes major development proposals that raise issues of national significance. Because of the serious impact that major developments may have on these areas of natural beauty, and taking account of the recreational opportunities that they provide, applications for all such developments should be subject to the most rigorous examination. Major development proposals should be demonstrated to be in the public interest before being allowed to proceed. Consideration of such applications should therefore include an assessment of: (i) the need for the development, including in terms of any national considerations, and the impact of permitting it, or refusing it, upon the local economy; (ii) the cost of, and scope for, developing elsewhere outside the designated area,or meeting the need for it in some other way; and (iii) any detrimental effect on the environment, the landscape and recreational opportunities, and the extent to which that could be moderated. 23. Planning authorities should ensure that any planning permission granted for major developments in these designated areas should be carried out to high environmental standards through the application of appropriate conditions where necessary. This is also repeated in the Development Management Policies: Policy NE8: (taken from the draft Policy Statement for March 2010 entitled “Planning for a Natural and Healthy Environment”) Policy principles guiding the determination of applications in relation to the natural environment; cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w117

NE8.5 Nationally designated areas, comprising National Parks, the Broads; and AONBs, have the highest status of protection in relation to landscape and scenic beauty. The conservation of the natural beauty of these designated areas should be given great weight in planning policies and decisions. In National Parks and the Broads, their wildlife and cultural heritage should also be given great weight, whilst in AONBs they are important considerations. Planning permission for major developments should be refused except in exceptional circumstances. Major development proposals should be demonstrated to be in the public interest and subject to the most rigorous examination. Consideration of such applications should include an assessment of: (i) the need for the development, including in terms of any national considerations, and the impact of permitting it, or refusing it, upon the local economy; (ii) the cost of, and scope for, developing elsewhere outside the designated area, or meeting the need for it in some other way; and (iii) any detrimental effect on the environment, the landscape and recreational opportunities, and the extent to which that could be moderated. NE8.6 Planning permissions granted for major developments in nationally designated areas should be carried out to high environmental standards through the use of conditions where necessary. 4. These policies reflect Government policy in implementation of the statutory protection measures of the provisions on Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 which reinforced the protection which already applied to Areas of Outstanding Beauty (AONB) and accordingly all Government Departments including DfT and HS2 Ltd, are subject to and are required to comply with this Public Policy Statement and the principles set out therein. These therefore applied for the purposes of examining and reporting on the High Speed Rail proposals and on the alternatives. 5. Despite this, when HS2 Ltd established its terms of reference, including its absolute requirements,* and when DfT responded to and accepted those suggested terms of reference,** PPS7 was never included or referred to, let alone included as one of the absolute requirements—indeed the other required elements virtually excluded proper consideration of PPS7—so that the environmental implications involved in breaching and violating, in a material way, the protective principles for the AONB, including in particular those affecting the Chilterns AONB, were never, or were not able to be, properly considered or taken in to account in the context of the PPS7 requirements. 6. It is submitted that was not appropriate for DfT or HS2 to ignore, and not take into account those requirements, and, even if it might have been considered that HS2 was in the public interest, it was not appropriate for HS2 Ltd or DfT to decide that this was the case, as PPS7 requires this to be rigorously examined and clearly demonstrated and, in any event, also requires careful examination of the cost of, and scope for, developing elsewhere outside the designated area, or meeting the need for it in some other way. It is only Parliament that can decide, after detailed consideration of the issues and an assessment of the possible alternatives that, notwithstanding the other factors, such a project as HS2 is in the national interest. 7. Instead, HS2 Ltd set itself, and DfT had accepted, a brief which assumed the need for high speed rail as a new line without reference to the requirements of PPS7, which should itself have been one of the absolute requirements, but with, instead, an absolute requirement to provide an interchange with convenient access to Heathrow* which meant that, for this to be feasible, there was no realistic alternative but to breach the principles of PPS7 and cut through some part of the AONB. However there is now no commitment to create a high speed link to Heathrow as part of the consultation although a spur link is indicated a possibility. Furthermore, the value benefit of time saving claimed as justification for the high speed requirement has now been accepted as not valid given the increasing use of technology on the trains themselves during a journey. Thus the business case and claimed cost benefit put forward by DfT falls away once it was (grudgingly) admitted that time on the train can be and is now used productively, which meant that the predication for this preferred route was not relevant, so that any justification for breach of PPS7, by passing through the protected AONB, has been undermined and PPS7 now more than ever calls for detailed consideration of the alternatives. 8. From the outset, there was therefore a conflict in the HS2 Ltd Brief, which limited and indeed prevented them from considering the alternatives as required by PPS 7. However, whilst DfT separately considered this, it was not done in the context of PPS7 either. And whilst they did nevertheless examine the alternatives, which in turn offered the ability to address the incremental passenger traffic problems, particularly those arising before the HS2 project would be completed, and also addressed the projected increases over time, all at considerable lower financial and more importantly considerably less environmental cost, all these have been subsumed to the DfT requirement for a newly built HS2 line, notwithstanding the potential financial and environmental cost benefits offered by the alternatives. 9. It is true that other routes were considered by HS2 Ltd, but they were only considered by them as alternative High Speed lines, not in the context of PPS7, but in the context of the DfT requirements for a new line and the then required element of a high speed link to Heathrow, notwithstanding that this is now deferred and not now considered to be critical, so that all this coloured the alternatives, which were rejected mainly on financial and other grounds not related to the requirements of PPS7. In particular therefore neither HS2 Ltd nor DfT fully examined the real implications and costs involved in moderating the detrimental effect of the proposals in the AONB. Thus, for example, the question that appears not to have been asked or addressed is cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w118 Transport Committee: Evidence

that, if the new line had to go through the AONB, how would the environmental cost of tunnelling right through the whole of the AONB, in order to seek not to breach the principles of PPS7, affect the overall cost and therefore the consideration of the preferred route as against the alternatives? Indeed, in this respect, HS2 Ltd have already admitted that they materially miscalculated the amount of spoil to be extracted, including because they calculated the tunnel spoil on the basis of a single bore not a twin tunnel. All this therefore affects the environmental costs which the TSC intends to examine.

10. It is submitted that, in this respect, cost is not the only determining factor, except to the extent that, if the cost of HS2 through any route is prohibitive, or non commercial, then it should not be allowed to proceed at all in its currently projected form, particularly as there are other realistic alternatives which are themselves capable of further improvement to meet and address all the projected incremental rail transport requirements at a considerably lower overall cost.

11. In terms of the accounting for the environmental cost and implications, there is separately a further concern about the lack of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) as part of the consultation exercise, as there are a number of additional matters which this will address and which are not part of the current consultation exercise, nor is there currently any relevant information as to the extent to which this will impact on the environmental costs The DfT claims that these issue are included as part of the Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) as currently issued, but this Appraisal directs itself much more generally to the wider range of sustainability issues than the specific environmental impact issues that an EIA would address and therefore only in part considers these issues. Thus for example, noise contours and noise implications (a factor specifically mentioned in subparagraph 6) are not considered in the context of a full environmental impact assessment, The problem here is that, whilst DfT accepts that this assessment will be required pursuant to the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (85/337/EEC), it only intends to produce the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) later on, as part of the Hybrid bill process. This will therefore be well after the current consultation will have been concluded, so that it will not have been possible for those consulted to have responded to or taken that information, and the environmental costs and implications, into account and these will undoubtedly prove to have been material factors to have considered as part of the overall consultation, particularly in relation to the overall environmental costs and implications. This is of concern to a number of bodies including the Chilterns AONB and the National Trust, in particular. Indeed the National Trust has already expressed the view to DfT and HS2 Ltd that, in their view, the Government should stop the consultation until the detailed environmental assessment and mitigation measures are made available. The Transport Select Committee is accordingly requested to make enquiries regarding the EIA and its likely impact and to consider recommending that the consultation process should be extended to enable the effect of any EIA and the environmental costs and implications to be considered as part of the current consultation process, particularly bearing in mind the commitment to an produce an EIA in any event.

12. In relation to environmental cost, given that the Article 2 of the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive applies to plans and programmes subject to preparation at national, regional or local levels and which are required by legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions, the TSC is also asked to consider, separately in this respect, whether, given the regulatory requirements of PPS7 and the statutory protection of AONB, an SEA is required in any event pursuant to such Directive and, if so, what additional environmental cost and implications would result from complying with the requirements of any such SEA, in addition to the EIA as outlined above. Equally important is the timing of the same, given, in particular, that DfT have accepted that, as a minimum an EIA will be required. The problem is that whilst this EIA will inevitably throw up substantial additional environmental costs and implications, many of which could well be critical, the current position is that, apart from the very limited AoS environmental information, none of this will have been taken into account or responded to as part of the main public consultation and, given the now substantially undermined business case, these factors could well have finally tipped the overall balance against this current HS2 project. May 2011

Written evidence from Joanne Staton (HSR 47)

Q1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

A1.1 In my view, as a Chartered Mechanical Engineer (Imperial College, London) who has studied, with an open mind, a vast array of documentation produced by the Government and other organisations, detailing the HS2 proposal, I can see NO arguments FOR HSR in our country.

A1.2 However, the arguments against it are numerous and so blatantly apparent, I cannot believe this proposal is being pursued. For me, this puts into question the Government’s motives to back this proposal—is it a “vanity” project linked to “political legacy” or is it trying to play catch up with our European neighbours? Or is it linked to influential vested interests in the construction and other industries that would benefit from the project going ahead? Either way, these reasons are short-sighted. There is no doubt that developing HSR would be at great detriment to our country. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w119

A1.3 The main arguments AGAINST HS2 include: — It is not required: — We already have fast frequent intercity network that connects our capital to its top five cities faster than many European countries that have HSR (refer to paragraphs A2.1.1–2). — There are far less expensive, less disruptive and substantially more environmentally friendly alternatives to meet the predicted increased demand (refer to paragraphs A3.2.1–4). — There has been a failure to assess these alternatives properly (refer to paragraphs A3.1.6 & A3.2.1). — Environmental argument: — The arguments on environmental impact are flawed. The project will certainly NOT reduce carbon emissions but actually be a large contributor and it will have a substantial detrimental affect on the environment (refer to paragraphs A6.1.1, A6.1.2–6 & A6.2.1). — The Department for Transport (DfT) are not conducting a proper Environmental Impact Analysis until after the decision has been taken which underlines that they are not taking the environmental issues seriously. — Demand/Business Case: — The arguments used in the Business Case are flawed (refer to paragraphs A3.1.1–6). — National Interest: — This appears to me to be a new argument developed when it became clear that the business and environmental cases were fundamentally flawed. — Additionally, the arguments for North/South divide and regeneration are also clearly flawed (refer to Paragraph A5.1.2)

Q2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives Q2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? A2.1.1 The UK already has a fast frequent intercity service, superior to those between capital and principle cities in other major Western European countries that have high speed rail. Services on the East Coast, West Coast and Great Western are so fast that lines up-rated to their existing maximum speed (125mph or 201km/ h) can qualify as high speed railways under the European Directive. A2.1.2 As the Eddington Study found, our rail network already provides journey times comparable to or better than those of the four largest West European countries. In 2010, the average quickest journey rail connections between the capital city and their five largest cities were: — 145 mins for UK. — 151 mins for Spain. — 184 mins for Italy. — 221 mins for France. — 244 mins for Germany. A2.1.3 A modern signalling system (already under development in the UK and planned for implementation from 2014) would allow trains to travel faster on the existing UK track in some places. A2.1.4 Also, travel between the locations to be linked by HS2 represents less than 1% of all rail travel in the UK and 7% of all distance travelled, and therefore the introduction of HS2 does not contribute significantly compared to the substantial outlay required, when considering the Government’s overall Transport Policy Objectives. A2.1.5 Considering all of the above, the objective of improving inter-urban connectivity seems far less important than many other transport policy objectives and spending schemes. Surely investing in the NHS, School Building Programmes, other Educational Programmes, maintenance and upgrade of the existing road and rail networks, would be of far more benefit, with substantially less disruption, to the people of the UK, as they focus on sustainable jobs and maintenance of an existing strong transport system.

Q2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? A2.2 The evidence suggests to me that the introduction of HS2 would be detrimental to the funding of our “classic” network. The business case is fundamentally flawed, as detailed in Paragraph A3.1.1, therefore overall costs are certain to be higher than predicted, which is likely to drain funding from existing transportation. France has experienced exactly the situation described above. Currently their TGV is running a debt of €29bn cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w120 Transport Committee: Evidence

plus 1% of GDP to subsidise it. This has been vastly detrimental to all other Rail Services which have been starved of funding as a result.

Q2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? A2.3 There is no London/Birmingham air market and rail already has 80% of the Manchester-London flow. HS2 Ltd/DfT project a 178% increase in domestic air passengers by 2033. This assumes the third runway at Heathrow. It ignores the reality of the declining domestic air market for London. There has been a decline in domestic air passengers flying from Heathrow since 1997. Domestic passengers from all London airports to the North West and Scotland (lowlands) have been declining since 2004, and total domestic passengers have been reducing since 2005. The forecasted volumes expected to transfer to HS2 (11,000 journeys/day—8% of all HS2 journeys) could not occur. It is agreed amongst experts that passengers may switch from air to rail when journey times by train are less than about 3 hrs (excluding domestic air flights from northern Scotland). Domestic air routes that are poorly served by rail or road connections may well continue to grow (for example Aberdeen-Exeter was started in 2006 and has grown rapidly), and will not be affected by a high speed rail network. Therefore, considering all of the above, I believe there is unlikely to be any implications for domestic aviation, which adds further doubt to the Environmental Arguments for the project as HS2’s only means of reducing emissions is winning traffic from air (refer to Paragraph A6.1.4 for more details).

Q3. Business case Q3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? A3.1.1 In my opinion, HS2 does not have a sound business case. It: — Has no commercial case and it is justified on a partial cost benefit analysis. — Relies on excessively high demand growth of 267% now amended by HS2 Ltd. to the still excessive 100%. — Relies on exaggerated time saving benefits (that presumes all travel time is currently wasted). — Ignores the effects of competition. — Is inferior to some of the alternatives considered in cost benefit terms. A3.1.2 No commercial organisation would consider HS2 without subsidy. The “business case” shows that the incremental fares (£15 billion) do not cover the (£25.5 billion) total costs it absorbs. HS2 is in fact justified on a partial cost benefit analysis, where the uncharged consumer surplus (£28.7 billion) arising from faster journey times and less congestion, and the “wider economic benefits” (£3.6 billion) are put forward to justify the cost. The analysis is partial as it does not include either the damage to the environment of its route, or the reduction to property values from its negative impacts. A3.1.3 Growth in rail demand within the Business Case is overstated. In the initial months of the proposal, growth was estimated at 267%. HS2 have now reduced this figure to 100%. But to maintain an acceptable benefit ratio they increased the forecast period by 10 years (2043 instead of 2033)! Even so, the benefit ratio for Phase 1 has fallen from 2.4 to 1.6, which would be very marginal even if true. Not only does this appear strongly of manipulating the figures, the new growth figure exceeds all “reasonable” current forecasts including those of Network Rail—except those of the Dft/HS2 Ltd. Additionally, the growth figure does not take into account any effect from increasing use of technology or reducing propensity for business travel due to cost. Without such a major demand, as clearly there is not, HS2 will be underutilised and make even larger losses. I strongly believe the lessons of HS1 on overestimating demand have not been learnt. A3.1.4 The largest benefit attributed to HS2 is the time savings to travellers (£13 billion, or nearly 40% of the benefits). This is plainly overestimated: It assumes that all time on a long distance train is wasted and uses out of date data on business travellers. It neither takes into account current practices and improving information systems, nor changing patterns of employment. It is apparent, even today, when travelling by train, mobile technology is making on board time useful. With the inevitable advances in mobile technology over this extended time frame, how can the Business Case argument of time wasted during train travel be expected to apply when HS2 begins in 2026 (the first phase), let alone by 2033 when the Y route is planned to be fully operational? A3.1.5 The case for HS2 takes no account of competition between HS2 and conventional rail services. Competition will result in lower prices for high speed and conventional rail, lower passenger volumes for HS2 or both. HS1 experience is relevant, where apparently no account was taken of cut-price airlines. A3.1.6 Finally, the handling of the alternatives to HS2 that were developed is unsatisfactory. Two packages of alternatives (Rail Package 2 and Road Package 2) had better Net Benefit Ratios than HS2 (3.63 and 3.66 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w121

respectively). DfT neither recommend the options with the best Net Benefit Ratio, nor used these options for assessing the incremental costs with incremental benefits of HS2. If they had, the case for HS2 would be exceedingly weak.

Q3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? A3.2.1 There are substantial benefits with the Rail Package 2 compared to High Speed 2. However, I believe DfT have hidden and misrepresented the facts. I can only conclude that this option has not been taken seriously because it does not provide a political legacy and it is not as glamorous as a new railway—both of which are certainly not valid reasons to dismiss the best solution for the UK. A3.2.2 The advantages of RP2 include: — RP2 provides all the capacity DfT say is needed (RP2 provides 135% extra capacity, extendable to 176%) and has less crowding (51% load factor on RP2 compared with 58% on HS2). — RP2 is cheaper than HS2 (£2 billion net cost not £11.9 billion—on DfT’s 2010 figures). — RP2 can be delivered more quickly (no waiting until 2026) and without major disruption. — RP2 takes a risk free incremental approach, which can be flexed around true demand (the forecasts for which are dubious, as detailed in Paragraph A3.1.3). — RP2 is better value for money (50% better than HS2, on DfT’s figures). A3.2.3 A major argument for HS2 is the need to create more capacity. But extra capacity does not require a new railway, nor one capable of speeds of 400km/h, nor does it have to mean disruption on existing lines. If more capacity is needed it can be created at a small fraction of the cost of HS2, and incrementally without having to gamble on demand forecasts. The capacity needed to meet the demand that HS2 Ltd forecast for conventional rail (133%) could be met for a little over £2 billion—as compared to £11.9 billion (£25.5 billion less incremental fares, etc) for HS2 (with just over £1 billion to be spent on planning for it in this term of parliament). This alternative also meets the requirement to be high speed, as under the EU Directive high speed rail is 125mph (201km/h). To a great extent capacity can be increased without disruption to existing services. There is potential to increase the number of carriages per train following minor infrastructure improvements that are already underway and planned to be complete within two years (permitting a 65% increase in WCML capacity, almost half what is said to be needed). A3.2.4 Furthermore, the largest part of the £44 billion benefit predicted from HS2 comes from the erroneous assumption that time is unproductive on trains (as detailed in Paragraph A3.1.4), so time savings become highly valuable. As already discussed, modern technology allows those who wish to work to do so very effectively whilst travelling by train. Also, much of the other benefits of HS2 are solely because DfT have assumed that without HS2 there will be no economic growth. In fact, the evidence that improved intercity performance has any beneficial economic effects is very weak: reductions in journey time cannot be expected to yield material productivity benefits; and faster rail travel has not been shown to deliver other economic benefits. Therefore considering all of the above, if HS2 is compared with RP2, the bulk of the HS2 benefits are eliminated.

Q3.3 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? A3.3 The Government should learn from the HS1 project (currently running at less than 50% its capacity) not to continue pursuing high speed rail. As mentioned above, HS1 was justified with vastly overestimated demand figures (exactly the same thing has occurred in the HS2 Business Case as detailed in Paragraph A3.1.3) ultimately ensuring its fate as a major loss-making enterprise. The Government should also learn from other countries experiences with introducing and operating HSR, such as France and Spain, where the results have been far from economic success stories.

Q4. The strategic route Q4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? A4.2 As previously stated in Paragraphs A2.1.1–4, the UK already has a fast and efficient rail network, bettering many of our European neighbours with HSR. Using only a small proportion of the HS2 budget to upgrade existing lines (the RP2 alternative is discussed in detail in Paragraph A3.2.2), ALL cities and towns would benefit and continue to be served via the existing network. A4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? A4.4 In my mind, the Heathrow and HS1 direct services make no economic sense. There is not enough demand to justify frequent direct services. HS2 Ltd demonstrated this in their analysis for the 2010 White cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w122 Transport Committee: Evidence

Paper. Although HS2 Ltd now forecast greater potential traffic, it is still inadequate to support a sufficiently frequent service for it to be viable. In addition the 18 trains per hour planned for peak Y operations make no allowance for trains to Heathrow and HS1 which is likely to both reduce total line capacity and reduce service availability for London Services, undermining the delivery of the claimed benefits.

Q5. Economic rebalancing and equity Q5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? A5.1.1 In conducting my research to respond to this Transport Select Committee Inquiry, I have found that this is an area rife with poor analysis and inapposite analogies. In addition, it appears to me that this is a new argument which was developed when it became clear that the business and environmental cases did not make sense. A5.1.2 On HS2 Ltd’s own analysis, HS2 itself, leads to very limited economic growth: — The agglomeration growth benefits that come from faster connectivity between two centres are tiny (ie about £10m/a as Imperial College work commissioned by HS2 Ltd demonstrates). — HS2 Ltd ascribes £3.6 billion to wider economic benefits, of which £2.0 billion is for agglomeration and does not depend on high speed but the re-use of freed-up conventional capacity to run more local services. Such additional local services could be provided without HS2. — The demand forecasting work implies important redistributive effects that favour London not the West Midlands—this is inconsistent with Government’s stated objective to reduce the North/South divide. The demand elasticities used in the HS2 Ltd forecasts show the major growth in travel will be in journeys into London—not starting from London—with nearly three times as many having London as their destination. This implies that expenditure will move from the regional centres to London—not the reverse—with more passengers taking trips to London and spending in London shops and amenities. This tendency to reinforce the dominance of London is confirmed by other work and is a consequence of London being an exceptionally large city (more than twice the size of other West European capitals). London is also seven times the size of the next largest UK city— other major West European capitals are about twice as big as their next largest city. In fact, DfT say 73% of the 30,000 regeneration jobs will be in London. Also, there is little evidence of high speed rail redressing regional imbalances. For example, unemployment rose in Greater Lille relative to the French average after high speed rail arrived. Transport links (Motorways and existing rail) have never been major factors in solving N/S divide, they have made matters worse. — OECD report concluded that there was no evidence in Europe of regeneration resulting from High Speed Rail investments. Interestingly, “Paid-for” vested reports support regenerative effects (eg Centro), academic reports (eg Imperial College, Warwick University, OECD) do not. — It has been claimed that 40,000 jobs will be created. However more realistic figures state 1,500 new rail jobs are expected along with 9,000 temporary construction jobs. The rest are “regeneration” jobs such as in shopping malls by new stations. These are just mainly relocation of existing jobs, and not a net increase to the country. I strongly believe we should invest in sustainable industries such as manufacturing and technology. I have heard it estimated that if the £34 billion for HS2 was invested in IT/broadband, 700,000 jobs (as opposed to the 40,000 above for HS2) would be created, of a type which would be easier to distribute and set up throughout the country, going much further to distribute wealth across the UK, perhaps really contributing to addressing the North-South divide issue.

Q6. Impact Q6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? A6.1.1 The work undertaken for HS2 Ltd concludes that HS2 is “broadly carbon neutral”—ie makes no contribution to reducing carbon emissions. This is inconsistent with the official Government line that repeatedly states HS2 is part of a low carbon economy. I strongly believe that HS2 is not “green” because: A6.1.2 Speed is not “green”. Most of HS2’s forecast passengers (ie 57%) would otherwise be travelling on less energy consuming conventional rail (on HS2 Ltd’s own forecasts). A6.1.2 Encouraging more travel is not “green”. 27% of the 145,000/day journeys on HS2 would not otherwise have happened (on HS2 Ltd’s own forecasts). This increase represents 87% of the 2008 total of long distance journeys on the southern end of WCML. A6.1.3 HS2’s only means of reducing emissions is winning traffic from air. However as already discussed in Paragraph A2.3, total domestic passengers have been reducing since 2005. There is no London/Birmingham cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w123

air market and rail already has 80% of the Manchester-London flow. The forecast gain from air exceeds the entire of the current flow of air passengers between these places and Heathrow. Despite the proven steady decline, to achieve the quoted shift from air, internal UK flights would have to increase by 178%. Also, any flight slots which are released will transfer to carbon-hungry long-haul travel. A6.1.4 HS2’s “broadly neutral” assessment is based on the carbon emissions from electricity generation on the characteristics of total average electricity production rather than the daytime demand characteristic of a railway meaning they have been under-estimated. Also, their figures are based on new power generation technology coming on stream. However Nuclear power generation has been severely impacted by the Fukushima disaster and it is well known that wind and wave power only have limited potential in this country. A6.1.5 The most shocking oversight that I can see in the HS2 analysis is that the millions of tons of carbon generated during the construction have not been accounted for.

Q6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

A6.2.1 The fact that HS2 Ltd and the Department for Transport are not conducting a proper Environmental Impact Analysis until after the decision has been taken underlines that they are not taking the environmental issues seriously. A6.2.2 I have four main areas of concern: — Carbon Emissions (detailed in Paragraphs A6.1.1–6). — Noise: — The Appraisal of Sustainability is misleading on noise as the noise contours previously promised were not provided, making it impossible to properly assess the likely noise impact of HS2. — Noise was assessed against inappropriate standards. For example, an average measure of noise exposure has been used, which is inappropriate where the noise is against a tranquil background, for which peak emissions are appropriate. — Because of the very high speeds, aerodynamic noise becomes the major source, against which conventional noise barriers are largely ineffective. — The mitigating efforts for the noise produced by HS2 will produce unsightly walls and barriers across the countryside. High noise levels will be inflicted on residents both during the construction and then operation. The noise maps provided fail to show the true impact of the proposal and there is no information as to how the noise targets will be policed and controlled if exceeded. — Destruction of the Landscape and the Impact on Chilterns and Green Belt: — All of the proposed routes ignore the ANOB, green belt, farming land, footpaths, ancient monuments and listed buildings. It impacts national paths (for example the Ridgeway) and closes 79 rights of way in Bucks alone. Other protected areas and historic buildings may be at risk if the Route goes further North. — Route selection seems to have been based on speed and straightness. As my previous statements convey, HS2 Ltd principles were flawed with the overriding emphasis on speed and time saving at the expense of all aspects of the environment. — Biodiversity and the eco-system: — Destruction of habitat will threaten rare species and result in losing many trees. It will cut through 23km of high grade farmland. It will have a huge visual impact—the track is 75m wide including a 25m non-vegetation zone on each side which is in stark contrast to the propaganda pictures displayed by HS2 Ltd, showing sleek trains running along green fields. Most worryingly, the AoS fails to address potential local impacts, for example the effect on the Chiltern Aquifer.

Q6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? A6.3 None. HS2 ignores freight and the opportunity to remove freight from the roads.

Q6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

A6.4 HS2 involves the complete rebuilding of Euston Station whilst it remains in use with predicted disruption for the significant term of eight years. Furthermore HS2 will increase road congestion and cause severe disruption during its lengthy construction duration and over its entire route due to the major nature of cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w124 Transport Committee: Evidence

the works creating the brand new infrastructure. Whilst the RP2 alternative will inevitability cause disruption, it would not be on the same scale as that created by the HS2 project. May 2011

Written evidence from Richard Baldwin (HSR 48) 1. I am responding to the Transport Select Committee (TSC) consultation on the strategic case for HSR on behalf of my family. Your invitation to comment covers a number of areas which I am not going to address in detail. I intend to provide only a few general comments on some of those areas which I hope will help you conclude that HSR is not a project that this or any other Government should pursue. Our national resources, such as they are, should be focussed on improving the other sorely neglected methods of transport in the UK such as our road network which I can say from first hand experience having travelled to five countries in the last three months is of a Third World standard. 2. Whilst I note that your enquiry does not seem to specifically concern the proposal for HS2, I must point out that never have I known a Government project produce such anger and antagonism from those all along the proposed route particularly within the Chilterns including local residents and Local Authorities. 3. Whatever the outcome of the consultation on HS2 you should recognise that whatever route is chosen, if any, the Electorate does not support the concept of HSR wherever it goes. The reasons for this are principally: (a) there is no business case for it; (b) there is no environmental case for it—it will cause a huge adverse environmental impact; and (c) there is no money to pay for it—with a huge public sector deficit resulting in reductions in public services such as healthcare, education, care for the disabled and elderly and roads that are more like cart tracks from the early part of the last century—how can we afford it? 4. In terms of Transport policy any available spending for transport should firstly be on our crumbling road infra-structure not “pie in the sky” rail schemes that have been poorly thought through. Secondly a perfectly adequate solution to the “rail problem”, if indeed there is one, would be to upgrade existing lines not build costly new ones for which there is no business case. 5. I strongly object to the whole concept of HSR—we do not need it nor can we afford it! Given the financial mis-management of many major public sector capital projects in the past by successive governments one wonders what the real motivation is behind those in Government promoting HSR. In a time of financial crisis Government should be concentrating and spending the little money we have on more important matters. May 2011

Written evidence from The Stop HS2 Kenilworth Action Group Ltd (HSR 49) Executive Summary 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? The Kenilworth Action Group contends that there is no case for HSR per se. There is a clear need to manage the rail system, as part of an integrated transport policy, to achieve specific objectives. HSR is, in itself, not a credible objective and can only be considered where it is clearly the optimum solution to defined objectives. This has not been demonstrated.

2. How does HSR Fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? The terminology HSR is misleading and encourages a simplistic analysis. The UK needs a rail system that is fast, reliable, capacious, environmentally sensitive, comprehensive and affordable. HS2 satisfies only some of these and is in direct conflict with a number of Government and International policies and commitments.

3. Business Case The business case for HS2 is not robust against the majority of the criteria defined by the Committee. Specifically, passenger forecasts are optimistic compared with other, credible, estimates with no learning taken from eg HS1 forecasting. Cost estimates have not been revised since the original costs were published despite significant changes in the route. The basis for comparison is fundamentally flawed and is based on a “do minimum” analysis rather than a comparison of options. The choice being presented is do nothing (unacceptable) or do HS2. There needs to be a clear and transparent evaluation of the potential solutions to meeting the nation’s needs for rail travel. This is not being done. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w125

4. The strategic route The strategic route presupposes HSR, with all its attendant restrictions. The question should therefore not be about the route as proposed but about what the nation’s strategic requirements are and what the optimum solutions to these requirements are.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity The evidence provided in the Consultation documentation explicitly confirms that HS2 will not resolve the north south economic divide with the majority of permanent new jobs being created (or relocated) in London. There have been many claims of economic benefits along the length of the proposed line by Government and HS2’s supporters. None have provided any substantive analysis to support those claims. There will be a direct benefit only to those groups or business whose proximity to the limited number of planned stations will result in a net journey time saving compared to existing rail infrastructure and who will be able to afford the fares. This will be a relatively small number.

6. Impact Using the mean of the range of CO2 emissions projections, HS2 would appear to be inherently carbon neutral. However, when the support of major international airports (Heathrow, Birmingham, Manchester) is taken into account, HS2 is actively supporting the growth in long haul air travel with a consequent deterioration in CO2 emissions. The impact on wildlife, natural habitat and amenity value has not been fully incorporated in the published analyses. Neither has the loss in property values by those people along the line (as distinct from those in the vicinity of the proposed stations who might conceivably benefit) been taken into account.

Discussion 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 1.1 The Kenilworth Action Group recognises the changing transport requirements of the UK population. An effective transport system is a pre requisite for a healthy, effective and dynamic economy. Developments in the transport infrastructure need to be sensitive to environmental, economic and human requirements. 1.2 The current road and rail systems need to keep pace with the nation’s needs and the rail system specifically has limitations in capacity and reliability which need addressing now and which will become exaggerated if no action to address them is taken. 1.3 The current HS2 proposal fails to adequately address the challenges faced by the current rail system, the objectives the Government is aiming to achieve on behalf of the Nation and the options to do so. As a consequence, the issue of defining the optimums solution is unaddressed. Primary issues that need to be evaluated include: — Effectiveness of proposal vs objectives. — Timeliness of proposal relative to demonstrated needs. — Benefit to the Nation and the economy in particular. — Costs expressed in, human, environmental, ecological and cultural terms. 1.4 The consultation documentation does not include a clear, stable definition of the requirements to upgrade the rail system based on a focussed analysis of current and future needs leading to a clear recommendation via a careful and objective assessment of the potential alternatives. 1.4.1 This lack of focus and vision, which has changed frequently since HS2 was announced has seriously brought into question the validity of HS2 as an appropriate response to satisfy the interests of the nation. 1.5 The HS2 proposal appears to be a disingenuous attempt to force a conclusion on the result of the consultation ie it poses the proposition “ If the current rail system does not meet the needs of it’s users, then something must be done. The only proposal being considered is HS2, therefore HS2 must be done”. 1.6 HSR gives advantages in terms of time savings and capacity. The true value of time savings is overstated and intangible. The capacity requirements can be satisfied by a number of means. In every other respect, HSR is demonstrably much worse. It is far too expensive relative to value, delivered too late (even if on time) and necessitates too great a cost in financial, human, environmental, ecological and cultural terms. 1.7 In short, it is too much, too late.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 Disregarding the concerns over whether HS2 is a credible, optimised solution to rail transport needs, it is not part of coherent transport, economic and environmental policies. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w126 Transport Committee: Evidence

2.2 As presented, it is difficult to rationalise what the public is being consulted on. HS2 is presented as a costed plan for the route between London and Birmingham, with suggestions about the route to Leeds and Manchester but no detail. There is an uncosted proposal for a Heathrow link (reportedly a minimum cost of £7.3–7.7 billion according to an unpublished ARUP report—Uxbridge Gazette, 11 May 2011). There is a hint of the ultimate goal with the lines running to Edinburgh and Glasgow but no information at all. Yet this is intended to be and integrated strategy. In reality, once Phase 1 is committed to, the whole strategy is committed to but the consultation is not on the whole scheme. 2.2.1 Without being able to consider the entire proposal for HS2, even if not all phases of the proposal are fully developed, it is impossible to arrive at a rational and considered conclusion. 2.3 HS2 bases it’s justification on increased demand for travel with 22% of journeys undertaken simply because HS2 exists. Whilst arguable that this demand will be created, it is in direct conflict with the Government’s own Carbon Plan which aims to reduce demand for travel in order to support the UK’s commitment to reduce CO2 emissions. Paragraph 5.30 states “Modern technology” can provide fast and effective alternatives to travel, and can also provide greater flexibility, resulting in a number of benefits to staff and businesses” This is completely ignored in the HS2 analysis. 2.4 Also ignored are the increased energy requirements as a result of the significantly higher speeds than current (energy usage increase with the square of speed). The UK is still dependant to a significant degree on CO2 generating fuels. Renewable energy will not provide more than a small percentage of the UK’s energy needs for the foreseeable future. The UK’s energy policy is currently being reviewed in terms of generation sources. This means that the increased energy requirements of HS2’s high speed will inevitably increase CO2 at a time where there is a commitment to seriously reduce it. 2.5 The small number of stations proposed by HS2 will inherently only directly benefit people in the immediate vicinity of the stations. By definition, this will be a small and finite number of people (HS2 Ltd have not been able to provide an analysis of this). Anybody outside of the catchment zones, by definition, will experience longer journey times as a result of increased travel to the limited number of HS2 stations ie will not benefit from the USP of HS2, it’s increased speed. 2.6 Attempting to channel the projected passenger numbers (if true) through just four stations will significantly increase congestion in already congested areas and increase CO2 through longer journeys to the stations. 2.7 In addition, HS2 is geographically focussed, there are many areas not along the route which will not benefit at all from HS2, for example the South West and HS2 has a polarised effect. Indeed many areas along the HS2 route, not in the vicinity of the HS2 stations, will see no benefit. Many of these areas are suffering from lack of investment in both local and long distance rail travel. 2.8 Benefits of releasing capacity on the classic rail system have been clearly claimed but without quantification or definition of how those benefits will manifest themselves. 2.9 Arguably a more cost effective solution would allow the finite amount of available funding to be used in a more geographically diverse fashion, benefiting more people and regions. 2.10 Given the minor amount of modal shift from road transport, HS2 is unlikely to have any tangible effect on reducing road congestion taking into account the location of congestion vs the HS2 route. As already stated, there will be a significant increase in congestion in the vicinity of the four stations. 2.11 Perhaps the largest conflict of policy is air travel. Much is made of the modal shift from air to rail travel for domestic journeys being part of HS2’s green credentials. It is therefore incomprehensible that HS2 is proposed to link up at least two and potentially more international airports with a view to promoting increased long haul travel. Even more so when Birmingham Airport has just received a grant to help it expand. Equally incomprehensible is that there currently is no domestic air travel between London and Birmingham and yet this modal shift is included in the overall analysis of benefits. 2.12 Most telling of all is the Appraisal of Sustainability report indicates that for the vast majority of parameters assessed, HS2 has a neutral or negative impact. For the very small number of positive benefits identified, these all relate to questionable or undemonstrated benefits (AoS Main Report, Volume 2 Framework Summary Table pages 1–4).

3. Business Case 3.0 The business case is flawed or at best questionable for a wide variety of reasons including the following: 3.1 The case is based on a comparison vs a “Do Minimum” scenario, when any credible business evaluation would specifically compare all of the available and credible options. 3.2 The business case as presented for consultation is extremely confused, the scheme is essentially one integrated high speed system up to Scotland, yet only being consulted on 1 phase out of three. 3.3 HS2 is a high risk strategy—essentially it is a single decision based on a suspect and highly incomplete analysis with tenuous long term projections—but with huge ramifications cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w127

3.4 Taking an incremental approach would be a safer and more rational approach—all potential gains on existing infrastructure should be exploited before big bang approach—many are low cost, low impact and importantly available immediately—when the problem exists not in 15 years time. 3.5 If an incremental line is genuinely required at some stage, need to consider design brief ie: — It does not need to be highest planned speed in the world—as current 400kph proposal. — Reducing design speed will increase route flexibility and environmental impact while reducing cost. — Reduced design speed increases potential to use existing transport corridors. — Could be used to target & bypass only the bottlenecks on the current system. — Take learning from other Countrys’ experiences eg China downgrading top speeds due to safety & practical considerations. 3.6 Passenger forecasts used are at odds with other reputable forecasts and increasingly incoherent with respect to associated projections on the Classic system. 3.7 It is impossible to forecast with any degree of certainty over the projected time periods. 3.8 Passenger forecasting methods are not correlated with most recent similar benchmarks eg HS1 to ensure confidence. 3.9 Fare levels assumed to be equivalent to current levels yet the net cost of Y network to Gov’t (ie Taxpayers) is between £14.1 billion to £20.2 billion & £10.3 billion for London—Birmingham (P12 & p43 of Economic case for HS2) This has to be funded by subsidies (apparently contrary to current Gov’t direction) or by higher fares if the user bears the cost—which will result in lower passenger figures and undermines the business case. 3.10 Phase 1 benefits amount to £20.6 billion (comprising £11.1 billion business user time value, £6.4 billion other user time value, £0.4 billion other quantifiable benefits, −£1.3 billion loss of indirect taxes, £4.0 billion WEIs)—85% of this benefit is derived from a highly questionable assignment of the value of time. Additionally this is compared with the current Classic system not one enhanced with the possible and highly cost effective improvements. (eg Virgin Trains identify potential to upgrade current WCML to within 11 minutes of HS2, compared with the 35 minute saving currently claimed). Without this, there would be no business case. 3.11 The assumptions used in assessing the time value are incorrect because: — Much time on trains is productive. — More would be productive if capacity issues were resolved. — The value attributed per minute is questionable. — No distinction is drawn between commuting travel (savings being unlikely to result in increased working time but increased leisure time) and business travel during working hours (where there could arguably be a financial benefit). 3.12 If there genuinely are more tangible economic benefits as currently being claimed—why do they not appear in the business case? 3.13 The government need to decide whether it’s policy is to suppress demand for travel or encourage it to ensure a coherent policy and once the ambiguity is eliminated, modify the business case as appropriate. 3.14 Suppressing demand by pricing on the current system has the benefit of potentially limiting major capital investment and would make the users accountable for covering the costs of the service they use (a principle applied to road and air travellers currently). It would also have to disbenefit of making the service more unaffordable for lower income people. (c46% of long distance rail journeys are undertaken by those in the top income quartile). 3.15 Other tactics eg deliberately restricting capacity could be effective but undesirable. However, the Gov’t should advise on how it plans to implement it’s own policies. 3.16 HS2 is demonstrably not the best means to generate growth eg £94 million allocated to the Midlands from the Regional Growth Initiative is said to generate the same number of jobs as HS2 at a fraction of the cost (40,000—of which 9,000 are temporary in the case of HS2))—repeating this around the Country could not only be more effective at addressing economic imbalances but could reach all areas of the country, not just those along the line. 3.17 65% of HS2 passengers are predicted to switch from classic rail, freeing up capacity with an implication of reduced services—naively assuming that competitive action is not taken by Classic rail operators. This also leaves Classic (therefore the whole system) severely over capacitised. Mr Hammond is now also claiming that the freed up capacity on classic rail will generate more demand and more services on classic rail this is highly implausible, illogical and inconsistent. 3.18 22% of HS2 travellers are only travelling because HS2 makes it attractive to do so—highly implausible and if true is in conflict with Gov’t policy on reducing travel demand. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w128 Transport Committee: Evidence

3.19 The costs have not been modified despite major changes in the route since the original proposal, especially in the vertical alignment which does not seem credible.

4. The strategic route 4.1 The strategic route presupposes that the HS2 decision has in effect already been taken (as no other options have been put forward). This should not be the case, although it is difficult to believe otherwise. 4.2 Birmingham Curzon Street and especially Birmingham International are not ideal sites as they will have a limited catchment zone (defined as being people who live/work closely enough to benefit from a NET reduction in overall, not rail, journey time) This has not been factored into the analyses ie by limiting the number and position of stations, a large number of potential passengers will have a longer journey to the station and a potentially longer overall journey time. As stated this will severely increase congestion in the vicinity of the stations. The Birmingham Interchange area, for example, is poorly served by public transport. 4.3 Presuming that a major objective is, as stated to reduce the North- South divide, a structured and targeted analysis needs to be conducted on which areas require and can generate growth, what will promote that growth (ie is HS2 an effective means of doing so vs eg Regional Growth Initiatives). 4.4 It is also required to take a long term strategic view of the country’s economy eg should we be less dependant on financial services and more on manufacturing etc both of these points will determine which cities should be connected. This is not explicitly evident in the analysis.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 There is no evidence presented in the consultation documents to support significant economic regeneration. The only data presented relates to 40,000 jobs being created of which 9,000 are construction (ie temporary), 1,500 are running HS2 (“not clear…what proportion would represent new job opportunities in the rail sector”) and 30,300 new jobs around the High Speed Stations. 5.2 It is questionable whether the jobs losses at eg The National Agriculture Centre have been taken into account. 5.3 The evidence in the consultation documents refutes the suggestion that HS2 will bridge the N-S divide— ignoring construction and operational jobs, c 73% of the new jobs created are in London. 5.4 The shape of the rail network (not just HS2 as proposed) should be determined entirely by the needs of the population as a whole, including the requirements to regenerate certain areas to ensure a balanced overall economy. 5.5 If a new rail system is required, Government is correct to build it in stages. However, it is entirely wrong to determine an overall long term strategy a piece at a time as it is currently doing. By definition, that is a tactical proposal, not a strategy. The whole must be considered if the strategy is to be robust. 5.6 We agree that beneficiaries should contribute but doing anything other than covering costs in the fares is fraught with problems. We do not see an effective and equitable means of allocating costs and risks to local authorities/business interests, particularly given the limited involvement in decision making of those stakeholders, not to mention the widespread opposition of local authorities along the route—nb based on HS1 experience, the economic risks are high. 5.7 There is a real risk that some people will pay multiple times (business costs/profitability, council tax, negative effect on property values, loss of amenity, disruption etc) without potentially getting any benefit. This needs to be taken into account alongside the benefits to HS2 passengers, though is not currently included. 5.8 Funding should not be sought for the EU TEN-T initiative unless it can be guaranteed that by doing so, the funding agreement will not place requirements on the UK that will fundamentally compromise the ability to meet it’s objectives, including the costs effectiveness of any resultant schemes.

6. Impact 6.1 Based on DfT data, the average of HS2 projections is that it is carbon neutral. This is based in part on a claimed modal shift from air to rail (despite there being no air travel on the equivalent route to phase 1). 6.2 Taking into account support for the UK’s international airports (and their long haul growth plans) as part of the plan, it is clear that HS2 will therefore support an increase in CO2 generation. 6.3 High speed rail will by definition require more energy that one running at lower speeds (400 kph cruising requires four times as much energy as 200kph etc) for trains of an equivalent technology level—a significant proportion of UK energy comes from fossil fuels. Recent events are reportedly causing the Government to reconsider it’s nuclear policy (Sunday Times 30–4-11). 6.4 HS2 is therefore not supportive of the legally binding requirements of the Climate Change Act 2008 to reduce UK greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050 (HS2 will have an adverse impact on the cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w129

associated target of reducing CO2 by at least 26% by 2026 due to the construction derived CO2 although it is impossible to evaluate this against the alternatives with available data). 6.5 Specific details of noise mitigation have not been defined and cannot be specifically identified. 6.6 The environmental, social and ecological impacts do not appear to have been included in the business case—many elements are such that a monetary value does not apply and yet there is a real and tangible value that can be assigned. 6.7 Loss in property values have not been included in the business equation (eg Knight Frank are currently indicating a 15% reduction in property values along the length of the line). As yet, details of the full compensation scheme are not available, only the temporary Extraordinary Hardship Scheme. May 2011

Written evidence from Mr and Mrs Hart (HSR 50) We believe that the case for HS2 has not been made and there are many areas we wish to query and we wish to put forward some opposing views to statements held to be proof of the need for this High Speed line. We believe that much of the case for building of HS2 would be covered more than adequately by using the recommendations made in the upgrade to the West Coast line developed for the Department for Transport, for the west Midland phase. The RP2 is less expensive than HS2 using the DfT’s own figures 2010. This upgrade would be delivered more quickly. It would be a risk free incremental approach, and is better value for money. RP2 would provide all the capacity that the DfT say is needed [about 135%] and would be less crowded. The assumption that time saving generated by HS2 is a major benefit is erroneous. Modern technology allows work while travelling to be so incredibly effective and that £44 million savings to be generated does not stand up. RP2 will certainly be less disruptive than HS2. The upgrading of existing railways will be far less disruptive than HS2. HS2 seems to involve the total rebuilding of Euston station, with eight years disruption. HS2 is not green High speed train consume far more energy than conventional trains. The production of the infrastructure and cement necessary to build HS2 will increase our carbon footprint enormously. It cannot make green claims for HS2. The North South divide has many road and rail links over the last 100 years and these have made little difference. Why should one more rail line help in any way? There is no reason to have to keep up with Europe, their railways are a financial disaster, needing an increasing input from their tax payers to maintain. The Governments materials during their consultation have shown numerous inconsistencies in new and old documentation. On the above grounds we would like to object to the building of HS2. May 2011

Written evidence from Antony and Carol Chapman (HSR 51) Business Case May I urge your Committee to look into the actual cost of the proposed HS2 scheme. HS2 Ltd says that the cost of the first phase from London to Birmingham would be £17 billion. They describe this as being at 2009 values. They also say that this is the present value, but they refuse to say what the future value would be, that is the actual cash cost to be paid to contractors. It is impossible to have a present value without a future value from which it is derived. Alison Munro, Chief Executive of HS2 Ltd, justifies refusing to give the future value/actual cash cost on the grounds that the Treasury does not forecast inflation for more than two years ahead, and that they have to rely on Treasury figures. It would be easy for them to carry out their own calculations, but they refuse to do so, or if they do, to make them public. However, for other aspects of the Business Case they forecast many years ahead, often forty years or more. The important figure for the general public to know is the actual cash cost which would be paid to the contractors. A simple calculation shows that, assuming inflation of 3% per annum, this would be at least £23 billion for phase one, a significant increase on £17 billion. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w130 Transport Committee: Evidence

HS2 Ltd says that the cost of phase 2, from Birmingham to Manchester and Leeds would be another £17 billion. On the same basis as above, and taking into account the much longer timescale, the actual cash cost paid to contractors would be in the region of £27 billion. The total for both phases would therefore be £50 billion, not the £34 billion stated by HS2 Ltd. Thus the actual cash cost would be half as much again as the HS2 Ltd figures. These are highly misleading, and a serious misrepresentation, which I hope your Committee will rectify. 15 May 2011

Additional written evidence from Antony Chapman (HSR 51A) I am writing further to my letter of 15 May, in which I told you that Alison Munro, Chief Executive of HS2 Ltd, had been unwilling, or possibly unable, to give me the actual cash cost of building HS2 which would be payable to contractors. Andrew Tucker, also of HS2 Ltd said the same. At a recent Consultation Roadshow I came across a DfT leaflet “Summary of the HS2 Economic Case”. This says, on the front page under the heading The Economic Case for HS2 (London to West Midlands), “The economic appraisal of a transport scheme seeks to cover its full economic costs and full economic benefits, and to quantify these in monetary terms. In order to compare costs and benefits occurring at different points in time, our appraisal brings all future year values to a “Present Value” (PV) in 2009. This is done by adjusting future year values, discounting at 3.5% for the first 30 years from 2009 and 3% for the rest of the appraisal period, in order to reflect the fact that benefits and costs today are valued more highly than those in the future”. It would therefore appear that what Mrs Munro told me was incorrect. It would also mean that the actual figures would be higher than suggested in my earlier letter. I hope your Committee will be able to elicit from Mrs Munro the actual cash cost which would be payable to contractors, so that the general public may be aware of the true figures. 18 May 2011

Written evidence from Speen Area Action Group (HSR 52) Introduction SAAG was formed in May 2010 to represent the views of local communities against the Government’s High Speed 2 proposals, and to proactively take action and campaign against the project. The Group is based in Speen, Buckinghamshire (on Alternative Preferred Route 2.5) and includes the communities of , , Speen, North Dean and Great and Little Hampden—over 1,100 households in total. Our primary reason for opposing HS2 is that we do not believe that there is a credible demand case, there are numerous false and misleading assumptions behind the project and as a result, the business case is fundamentally flawed. In addition, the project will not have any positive impact on carbon emissions, and will irretrievably damage areas of the country which are designated as Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty. The only justification for such desecration would be if the project was overwhelmingly in the Public Interest—and the case for this has not been made. All that has been produced is political rhetoric. SAAG sincerely hopes that the Transport Select Committee will be able to take a more realistic and measured view on High Speed 2, and recommend that the project does not proceed.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR SAAG believe that the main arguments for HS2, as currently, presented are invalid and fallacious. The key arguments are: A. The UK needs HS2 to solve capacity problems on the West Coast Main Line. The Government say there is a major capacity issue that only HS2 can solve. This is not so: (a) The “best”option is to make incremental changes against demand; make low cost rolling stock and capacity changes first; address pinch-points when demand is strong enough. (b) DfT’s own option solves the WCML’s capacity issue through Rail Package 2(RP2) which provides more than the required capacity at one tenth of the cost in a much shorter timeframe. (c) Other alternatives have not been properly considered eg Government’s own initiative to reduce travel (by faster connectivity with broadband, videoconferencing); rail pricing option. B. The London to Birmingham HS2 service along with the extension of HS2 to Manchester will divert passengers from aviation: (a) It is highly unlikely that HS2 will produce a significant shift in passenger journeys from domestic air services. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w131

(b) HS2 can only replace domestic air journeys served by its route. No one flies between London and Birmingham, and rail already has 79% of the Manchester market. (c) Overseas experience shows air could be decimated if HSR delivers very big reductions in journey times and rail gets below the three hour journey threshold. Given the 2011 timetable already shows Edinburgh can be reached in four hours, albeit by just one train, the HS2 promise of about 3:30–40 mins 21 years later (in 2032), makes any impact on air look marginal, at best. Please see our response to Question 2. C. HS2 will help to deliver a low carbon economy: (a) The Government say HS2 will be “broadly neutral” for carbon. But it is unlikely to even be that. Please see our response to Question 6 below. D. HS2 will deliver economic benefits and will help to bridge the north/south divide: (a) Government claims for transformational benefits are based on belief, not evidence .The evidence on regeneration (where HS2 acts as a catalyst) points to London winning therefore producing entirely the opposite result to that intended. (b) The evidence for the wider economic impacts (of the HS2 investment itself) is also small. Pleases see our responses to Question 5. E. HS2 is a sound investment and provides value for money: (a) HS2 is not a sound investment providing poor value for money and is supported by a business case that is flawed. (b) There is no commercial case for spending over £30 billion on HS2. (c) The benefits are overstated. (d) The demand forecasts are excessive. (e) There are flaws in the models utilised. (f) Phase 1, on the DfT own figures only returns a CBR of 1.6 (well below the Treasury requirement of 2. They are consulting only on Phase 1, Phase 2 may never happen, there is little time benefit. They can therefore only take Phase 1 Benefits in the Business Case otherwise they should consult on the whole Route. Please see our answers to Question 3. F. UK does need to catch up with Europe—many major European countries have high sped rail networks. The UK—unlike Europe—has had a fast national railway system for a long time. As Sir Rod Eddington said in 2006 “….with [rail] journeys between London and other UK major cities performing particularly well relative to journeys from other European capitals.” We also have routes capable of 200km/h (125mph)—and still have quicker rail journey times between the capital and the five largest cities than in other major West European countries: (a) Averaging 145 minutes in UK (or 148 mins using the same five cities as Eddington). (b) 151 minutes in Spain. (c) 184 minutes in Italy. (d) 221minutes in France. (e) 244 minutes in Germany. Even Frankfurt/Cologne, which is a comparable distance and often quoted as a high speed rail success story, is in reality more like an intercity railway: while it halved its journey time it brought it down to little less than the fastest train we already have from Birmingham to London.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives SAAG believes that it is highly unlikely that HS2 will produce a significant modal shift in passenger journeys from domestic air services to HS2: (a) HS2 can only replace domestic air journeys served by its route. No one flies between London and Birmingham, and rail already has 79% of the Manchester market. (b) For Phase 1 the relevant air market is the 3 million per annum who fly the NW/Scottish lowlands route using Heathrow (just 15% of all passengers), and 6 million per annum for all London airports (30% of total). (c) The full “Y” adds Leeds and Newcastle, but scheduled flights to Leeds ended in March 2011, and HS2 in 2032 only matches the current fastest train from Newcastle to London. The February 2011 business case has fewer people switching from air to HS2: (a) DfT say 6% of HS2 trips (8,166/day or 2.9 million per annum for Phase 1 switch from air—25% less than before (11,000/day)—and 6 million per annum for the full “Y” ie twice the relevant Heathrow route traffic. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w132 Transport Committee: Evidence

(b) To generate even 6% modal shift DfT have to assume the domestic air market will grow—they say by 128% by 2043 (last year DfT said 178% by 2033)—and their forecast is no longer constrained by supply, meaning it’s not even real air journeys that switch to HS2. That much real growth could not occur without extra runway capacity for London. (c) The NW/Scottish lowlands air route has been shrinking (by 32% from its 2004 peak), not growing. Some domestic air routes have grown (where surface transport links are poor, eg Aberdeen to Exeter), but overall domestic passengers have fallen by 22% from 2005 peak. (d) Overseas experience shows air can be decimated if HSR delivers very big reductions in journey times and rail gets below the three hour journey threshold. Given the 2011 timetable already shows Edinburgh can be reached in four hours, albeit by just one train, the HS2 promise of about 3:30–40 mins 21 years later.

3. Business case

SAAG believes the business case is flawed for the following reasons: (a) Benefits are overstated by about 60%—they total more like £19 billion not £44 billion for the full “Y”. The largest benefit (time savings) is based on all time spent on trains being wasted, with DfT disregarding this fundamental error on spurious grounds. (b) Demand forecasts are excessive, they misuse (through projecting growth for too long—35 years) an out of date forecasting model (with discredited forecasting factors). This gives a doubling in background demand to 2043—47% higher than it should be. (c) Appraisal uses an unrealistic “do minimum” comparator with virtually no improvements for 35 years and so inflating the benefits such as reduced crowding and shorter waiting times between trains. They disregard valid alternatives to improve the existing railway. The overall effect of this is to greatly worsen HS2’s value for money. So HS2 in fact delivers just 30pence to 60pence benefit for every £1 of subsidy spent!

The economic case for HS2 also: (a) Fails to learn the lessons of HS1 on demand forecasting and competition. (b) Takes no account of new technology or Government’s own initiative to reduce travel. (c) Fails to develop the “best” alternatives, and repeatedly misrepresents the alternatives it does develop (including in the March 2010 Command Paper). (d) Fails to properly explore the uncertainties in the long term forecasts, despite HS2’s sensitivity to the level of demand forecast.

There is no commercial case for spending over £30 billion on HS2 or justification for its subsidy: (a) The extra fares (£27 billion) don’t cover the capital (£30.4 billion) and operating costs (£13.9 billion), even for the full “Y” network, so it needs a subsidy—£17 billion. (b) The subsidy actually encourages travel (10 million per annum new journeys for Phase 1 alone) despite DfT’s other initiatives to reduce travel, and in particular business travel. (c) Existing rail services will worsen—this is proven in Government’s own case for HS2. (d) It benefits the affluent—47% of long distance rail travel is by the top 20% earning families.

The Government say there is a major capacity issue that only HS2 can solve.

This is not so: — The “best” option is to make incremental changes against demand; make low cost rolling stock and capacity changes first; address pinch-points when demand is strong enough. Rail experts say the “best” WCML option is: (a) Rebalance first and standard class; add more carriages (ultimately to 12 car except for Liverpool). Just this delivers 67% more capacity (112% in standard class), need not wait to 2026 and may be possible without any subsidy. (b) Eliminate the acute crowding problem on the Northampton/Milton Keynes to Euston commuting services by modifying Ledburn Jcn without delay. (c) Do other low cost infrastructure changes as needed, with the potential for a total of 177% extra standard class capacity providing an increased train frequency from 9 to 11/hr. This is against DfT’s forecast background demand increase to 2043 of 102%, and delivered at greatly less cost than HS2. — Rail experts also say there are low cost “best” solutions for ECML and Midland Main Line too. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w133

— DfT’s own option: even the rail options developed for DfT solve WCML’s capacity issue: (a) Rail Package 2 (RP2) involves more rolling stock and removing seven pinch-points. This delivers 151% more capacity against DfT’s background demand growth of 102%, not the 54% as Government misleadingly claim .in addition RP2 has less crowding. (b) RP2 looks like being over twice the value for money of HS2 for just one sixth the net cost, and this is despite Government latest attempts to distort and bury RP2. (c) RP2 won’t be disruption-free but neither is it comparable with the wholesale replacement of WCML under the last upgrade, or the eight-year rebuild of Euston that HS2 requires— described as like “open heart surgery on a conscious patient”. (d) Other alternatives: these are not properly considered eg Government’s own initiative to reduce travel (by faster connectivity with broadband, videoconferencing); rail pricing option.

4. The strategic route The question of the stations along the proposed route is a secondary consideration in the opinion of our group, as this pre-supposes that the scheme in its entirety has any merit, which we believe it does not. Similarly, considerations of the cities to be served by HS2 is a question that cannot be answered in the context of: (a) The lack of need for a new railway. (b) The fact that unlike the majority of our European neighbours whom we seem desperate to emulate with high speed rail, this country already has an extensive and effective rail network in place. Government money on the railways would be better spent on improving local services for commuters and to create new links using classic rail technology (for example, to provide a link between Oxford and Cambridge). Government decisions on linking HS1 to either HS1 or Heathrow are flawed: There is no evidence to substantiate this level of investment based on either modal shift or expected levels of European travel. The experience of HS1, where traffic levels are at a fraction of those forecasted, and which resulted in a very critical report to the DfT insisting that more realistic forecasting was undertaken in future (it has ignored this entirely in the development of the HS2 case), should provide a salutary lesson that no-body seems to want to learn.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity — Evidence on regeneration (where HS2 acts as a catalyst) in fact points to London winning: (a) DfT say more than seven out of 10 of the 30,000 jobs created by HS2 around stations will be in London ie not the Midlands or the North. (Old Oak Common, with 20,000 jobs wins most). (b) Most of the jobs claimed will not be genuinely new jobs but ones that have moved from other areas in the region. HS2 Ltd concluded this, after consulting respected academics. (c) DfT say 59% of extra HS2 trips are for leisure; given DfT assume trips to London grow at twice the rate of those from London, so more people and more money will go to London. (d) HS2 impacts on the service sector, in which London is dominant. So work is more likely to move to London, not away from it—therefore it is more likely to re-enforce the North/South divide and not help to bridge it. — The evidence for the wider economic impacts (of the HS2 investment itself) is also small: (a) The productivity benefit from shorter journey times is the key benefit, but it’s already in the business case (and is overstated now DfT admit that time-on-board is not wasted). (b) The Wider Economic Impacts of better connectivity are relatively small, £4–£6 billion, and are mainly driven by use of freed-up capacity, which will need a new further subsidy to realise. (c) HS2 Ltd asked Imperial College if faster connectivity had any further direct benefits—they said “very little” (max £8 million per annum)—but their conclusion was left out of the White Paper and not even referred to in the consultation materials.

6. Impact — The Government say HS2 will be “broadly neutral” for carbon. But it is unlikely to even be that: (a) Trains that travel at 360km/hr use three times the energy of 200kmph trains. (b) 87% of journeys on HS2 indisputably create more emissions—all the brand new journeys (22%) and all those switching from existing rail services (65%). (c) DfT say just six in every 100 travellers on HS2 switch from flying. But this assumes the decline in relevant air routes reverses, and satisfying “suppressed” not real air demand. (d) The air emissions savings depend on the freed-up slots not being used for long haul, which BAA say they will, and the use of out of date numbers on the modal switch from air. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w134 Transport Committee: Evidence

(e) HS2 Ltd’s “Carbon neutral” assertion requires electricity generation to be significantly “cleaner” than at present and will rely heavily on alternative sources of electricity, such a nuclear, wind or wave power. There are no clear plans in place to achieve the low-carbon electricity generation required, and recent events with Fukushima in Japan will have a severe limiting effect on nuclear adoption. 15 May 2011

Written evidence from David Rayney (HSR 53) THE APPLICATION AND EFFECT OF THE RAYLEIGH WAVE SPEED PRINCIPLE ON HIGH SPEED RAIL TRAVEL Executive Summary 1. I wish to draw the attention of the committee to a phenomenon of physics that will impact uniquely upon the business and economic cases for the proposed High Speed Rail system HS2. 2. HS2 relies on the trains running at an intended speed of 400km/h (235mph), faster than any other High Speed Railway anywhere else in the world. That speed determines the capacity of the line—18 trains per hour in each direction and must be sustained for the full journey. 3. We are all familiar with the concept of the sonic boom. When a military jet flying through the air reaches and passes the speed of sound in air a highly destructive high energy pressure wave is created. 4. The HS2 trains will not go through the same sound barrier (the speed of sound in air), But, the heavy train running on rails at speeds approaching the speed that the vibration waves travel through the track, infrastructure and ground, will set up pressure and vibration waves which are analogous to an sonic boom. The dynamics of such vibrations are such that the anticipated speed for HS2 compared to established high speed railways elsewhere can be expected to be disproportionately detrimental in this regard. 5. Concerns about these severe vibrations are not simply restricted to their effect on the local living environment. Rather these waves will have a substantial destructive and fatiguing effect on nearby buildings, on the infrastructure of the line—the rails, the bridges, the tunnel supports—and on the trains themselves. 6. At best the consequences of the pressure wave will substantially add to the requirements and costs of construction, and/or maintenance, and/or the associated disruption to service for repair. At worst, given the speed and number of passengers on each train the failure of a component of the system could lead to a potentially catastrophic failure of the system. 7. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the economic and business case put forward by HS2 Ltd, they are both founded upon an engineering design which because of the speed can, at best, only be described as experimental.

Introduction The Rayleigh Effect: The Physics 8. The particles within the structure of any given material can move. The theoretical maximum or ultimate speed at which the particles can move is dependent upon the mobility of those particles. This phenomenon is known as the “Rayleigh Wave Speed”,78 and is an accepted principle that Sound travels through a material at a rate known as the Rayleigh wave velocity. 9. The speed of sound in a material is significant in the design and development, manufacture and construction of any and all engineering applications. It is of significant importance in design of HST track systems, as the increased speeds sought to make these trains viable, have raised new problems, in particular greater levels of train-track vibrations, and this is of particular relevance to HS2 with its ultra-high speed requirement. 10. A key research paper by Krylov et al describes the phenomenon thus: “Unfortunately the increased speeds of modern trains are normally accompanied with increased transient movements of the rail and ground which may cause noticeable vibrations and structure born noise in nearby buildings. For modern high-speed trains those transient movements are especially high when train speeds approach certain critical wave velocities in the track-ground system. There are two main critical wave velocities in the track-ground system: The velocity of the Rayleigh surface wave in the ground and the minimum phase velocity of bending waves propagating in the track supported by ballast, the latter velocity being referred to as the track critical velocity. Both these velocities can easily be exceeded by modern high speed trains, especially in the case of very soft soil where both critical velocities become very low. 78 John William Strutt 3rd Baron of Rayleigh—Theory of Sound 1877. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w135

As has been theoretically predicted by one of the authors (6, 7) if a train speed V exceeds a the Rayleigh wave velocity Cr in supporting soil, then a ground vibration boom occurs which is associated with a very large increase in generated ground vibrations, as compared with the case of conventional trains. This phenomenon is similar to a sonic boom for aircraft crossing the sound barrier and its existence has recently be confirmed experimentally (8). The measurements have been carried out on behalf of the Swedish Railway Authorities when there West coast main line from Gothenburg to Malmo was opened for the X2000 high speed train. The speed achievable by the X2000 train (up to 200 km/hour can be larger than Rayleigh wave velocities in this part of south western Sweden, which is characterized by very soft ground (see also reference (9)). In particular, at a location near Ledsgard, the Rayleigh wave velocity in the ground was as low as 45m/s, so that the increase in train speed from 140 to 180km/hr, lead to an increase by a factor of about 10 in the generated ground vibration level (8). The above mentioned first observations of a ground vibration boom indicate that it is now possible to speak about “supersonic” or (more precisely) “trans- Rayleigh” trains (10–12). The increased attention of local authorities and railway companies to ground vibrations associated with high speed trains has stimulated a growing number of theoretical and experimental investigations in this area (see, eg, references (13) to (16)). If train speeds increase further and approach the track critical velocity, then rail deflections due to applied axle loads become especially large. Possible very large rail deflections at this speed may even result in train derailment, thus representing a serious problem of train and passenger safety (9.17–19).” 11. This is corroborated by to research being carried out at the Heriot-Watt University79 and the School of Engineering at Edinburgh University.80 This phenomenon is brought about by the fact that the characteristic wave speeds of the track components are dependant upon the Rayleigh Wave Velocities of the underlying track sub structures, [embankments and the subgrade] and the natural flexural wave velocity of the rail. 12. As previously stated, the ultimate speed of the material[its Rayleigh wave speed] is critical: When train speeds approach this critical speed the track structure and supporting ground undergo excessive dynamic changes, [motions] and therefore can become inherently unstable. These motions can cause rapid deterioration of the sub- rail components [ballast, sub-ballast] and the track itself which can ultimately lead to catastrophic failure. It is obvious therefore that to overcome any threat of derailment or to the safety of the train caused by the theoretical constraints placed on the system by Rayleigh’s wave speed principle, it would be necessary to significantly reduce the speed of the train. 13. The above paper by Krylov et al documented concerns in 2000 in respect of established trains with the speed of the French TGV and the Eurostar. Since then there has been little increase in maximum operating train speeds. Existing High speed train speed statistic Country Max Rail speed Fastest average speed for a timetabled limit journey France 320 279.3 Japan 300 255.7 Taiwan 300 244.7 Germany 300 233.5 Spain 300 227.6 China 250 197.1 South Korea 300 193.2 UK 200 173.3 Sweden 200 172.9 Italy 250 170.3 USA 240 161.1 Finland 200 158.5 Austria 200 153.4 Norway 180 151.2 From Railway Gazette Speed Survey 2007. http://www.railwaygazette.com/fileadmin/user_upload/railwaygazette.com/PDF/ RailwayGazetteWorldSpeedSurvey2007.pdf 14. Certainly there have been record breaking runs in the interim at which speeds substantially greater that that planned for HS2 were achieved. But these one off events were undertaken on specifically selected sections of straight track with significant adaptations of the infrastructure creating circumstances that have not been used in a sustained environment. 79 Woodward Dr P, Lagrouche Dr O, Medero Dr G: Development of Design Guidelines for High-Speed Railway Track Including Critical Track Velocities and Track Mitigation Strategies: School of the Built Environment, Heriot-Watt University [ongoing 2010–13]. 80 Forde Professor M, Giannopoulos Dr A: Development of Design Guidelines etc. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w136 Transport Committee: Evidence

15. It is also necessary to determine the effect of the applied stabilization methods have on the dynamic response of the railway track. 16. The dynamic response of the track is a complex issue but the theoretical application is well documented in research carried out by Krylov et al, for the Institution of Mechanical Engineers.81 17. The dynamics involve the interaction between the train wheels, the rail itself, and the components of the rail supports [pad, sleeper, ballast, formation and subgrade], and in order to provide a safe, reliable high-speed system accurate predictions of the track response up to and including critical track velocities [CTRV], is of vital importance. 18. A further consequence of these issues is that CTRVs can lead to significantly increased ground vibration transmissions to adjacent structures with their attendant stress waves. This is significant in this instance due to the close proximity of this line to dwelling and industrial structures.

Further Questions 19. The questions I wish to raise are: (a) Given the research being done, and the already accepted research findings on this phenomenon which indicate that these transients can be extremely high when train speeds approach the Critical Wave Velocities of both the rails and the supporting ground and sub-structure and can therefore cause large rail deflections as well structural vibrations and noise in nearby dwellings, has the government taken the noise, vibration and safety issues raised by this research into account in its promulgated forecast of costings? [Bearing in mind that all costs were done using the Ministry formulae based on 2009 structures and costs and applicable to a system supporting trains moving at almost half the projected speed of HS2]. (b) Secondly the research by Krylov is of particular importance where the rail is to be built over soft ground where wave velocities are much lower. HS2 is faster, heavier and longer than any other rail-guided vehicle in use: as such it is an unknown quantity, furthermore, its path from London to Birmingham crosses flood plains, soft alluvial ground etc: The research would indicate that extra measures are required to ensure the safe operation of this train in such areas particularly, and an enhanced design to cope with the transients in all other areas. Have HS2 covered or even planned for such contingencies in their proposed planning and costing documents? (c) Thirdly, if and when the statutory blight conditions are enforced, have HS2 made allowance for the possible increased effects of ground wave transmission and the subsequent increase in vibrations etc brought about by the higher speeds required by HS2 on private dwellings etc, given that HS2 will be moving through a far more densely populated track than any of its other HS counterparts in Europe and beyond? (d) Lastly have HS2 made full account of the additional research and development costs and made allowances for overruns etc bearing in mind the extra costs that will almost certainly be incurred owing to inflation and other fiscal measures introduced since their original costings were promulgated? 20. There is certainly no evidence that these questions have been addressed in any of the HS2 ARUP documents available to the public. Certainly in the HS2 document of August 2010 HS2 Route Optimisation of Route 3 there appears to be no mention of special needs or particular issues arising from the above research, nor any allowance for cost overruns should any such issues arise. 21. In the ARUP Document of February 2011 “HS2 Route Engineering Report”, the section on Geotechnical Assumptions makes no allowance, or contingencies for, nor recognises any specific problems or issues with rail design, ground wave transmissions, critical wave speeds or any of the problems being researched. 22. There is a complete lack of research regarding the effect of these vibrations in respect of the exacerbation of mining subsidence, and, vice versa, of the effect on the pressure waves of additional track bed reinforcement that might be needed in areas that are vulnerable to mining subsidence. This is not a factor for the London to Birmingham sector but is a key attribute of the terrain for both branches to the north. 23. HS2 Ltd has not yet undertaken the soil and geological analysis that they acknowledge is needed. Such analysis is not planned until after the government has made a commitment to undertaking the HS2 project through the introduction of the hybrid bill. 24. An equivalent analysis of the possible routes to the north of Birmingham will not be undertaken until after the Government is bound in to contracts for the London to Birmingham section. This is putting the cart before the horse. 25. In conclusion, I can do no better than draw the attention of the committee to a successful research funding bid submitted to the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council by Professor PK Woodward 81 Krylov V, Dawson A R, Heelis M E, Collop A C—Rail Movement and Ground Waves caused by High-Speed Trains approaching Track-Soil Critical Velocities: Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and 214 pp107–116: Published Professional Engineering Publishing 2000 http://pif.sagepub.com/content/214/2/107 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w137

of the Heriot Watt University School of the Built Environment in Edinburgh.82 Professor Woodward recently hosted an engineering study day attended by the Chief Engineer for HS2 Ltd and colleagues. The application for a project entitled states: “Apart from the 186mph Channel Tunnel Railway Line (CTRL) the maximum speed of trains in the UK is generally 125mph. In France the TGV now operates at 200mph, but a land speed record of 356mph was recently set on the Paris to Strasbourg line. An increasing demand for higher train speeds is therefore clearly evident. Introduction of high-speed systems to the railway network across the world has however brought new problems in terms of railway geotechnics, namely the significant amplification of train-track vibrations at high train speeds. This phenomenon has been attributed to the characteristic wave speeds of the track, which mainly depend on the Rayleigh wave velocity of the subgrade, underlying embankments, and the natural flexural wave velocity of the rail. When train speeds approach this critical speed the track structure and supporting ground experiences excessive dynamic motions. These motions cause rapid deterioration of the track, ballast and sub ballast, including possible derailment and ground failure. These may threaten the stability and safety of the train and hence lead to significant line speed restrictions, causing significant delays to the network. It is therefore evident that in order to increase line speeds in the UK (and overseas) it is necessary to not only be able to model and predict critical velocity affects, but also how to stabilize them. However research needs to be targeted to determine what affects stabilization technologies have on the dynamic response of the railway track. The dynamic behaviour of railway track is a very complex three-dimensional problem with instantaneous interactions occurring between the wheel, rail, pad, sleeper, ballast, formation and subgrade. In order to provide a safe and reliable high-speed railway it is necessary to be able to correctly model and predict the track response, including speeds leading up to and including critical track velocities. In addition critical track velocity issues lead to significant ground vibration transmission to adjacent structures. The principal objective of the proposed work is to investigate the three-dimensional dynamic behaviour of railway track up to and including critical track velocities using the advanced three-dimenional finite element railway track model D.A.R.T.3D (Dynamic Analysis of Railway Track, three-dimensional) and by looking at the stress wave patterns using a purpose built test track bed. The secondary objective of the research is to look at the available methods for track stabilization in order to access the affect of localized stiffness increases on the Rayleigh stress wave, the critical track velocity and hence the overall improvement in the dynamic track behaviour. The work is highly relevant to the future strategic development of both the UK rail industry and the rail industry world wide.” 26. I congratulate Professor Woodward on the success of his research funding bid. Unfortunately, the research project is not scheduled to report until 2013 by which time construction is already scheduled to have commenced. 15 May 2011

Written evidence from Mo Smith (HSR 54) 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR Autumn 2010 National Passenger Survey show record overall satisfaction levels at 84%, with 85% satisfied with their scheduled journey times ie.speed. A high speed rail network is necessary in the U.K. and we already have one, travelling faster than some of our European neighbours, at 125 mph. which in Europe qualifies as high speed. We currently have quicker rail journey times between our capital city and the next five largest cities than in Spain, Italy, France and Germany (larger countries!!). This speed is only limited on some existing routes by safety standards that require in-cab signalling for speeds above 125 mph. Therefore with investment (lower than HS2 spend), current and accurately assessed future needs can be accommodated, at greater value for money. (A DfT requirement—see Secretary of State for Transport, Decision Making 27 April 2011)

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives 1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for strategic road network? HS2 represents selective inter-urban connectivity, with a number of large cities and local journeys not on line, having a reduced service. It is questionable whether it is “inter-urban” as the stations are outside the major conurbations eg HS2 goes to Water Orton (West Midlands Interchange) outside Birmingham—given the speeds required it cannot go into the city, therefore a new station is proposed in Birmingham.There are already three stations in the city (Birmingham New Street currently undergoing a major refurbishment costing millions of pounds) and the proposed site of the fourth station is not in close proximity to the other stations—where is the “inter-urban” connectivity? Whilst there is limited information available on the “Y” route- here too is mention of a “Manchester outskirts” station—where is the connectivity? Additional road journeys will be required to reach few and far between stations on the proposed HS2 route— will this require greater investment in the road network to handle increased car journeys? 82 http://gow.epsrc.ac.uk/NGBOViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/H027262/1 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w138 Transport Committee: Evidence

2. Focussing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? Current plans eg doubling of commuter capacity planned for Milton Keynes–London c 2016, service improvements from Rugby not progressed, Lichfield (where HS2 will not be travelling at proposed speeds), Tamworth, Nuneaton, Stafford, Crewe- potential service improvements not taken forward.

3. What are the implications for domestic aviation? HS2 projects that only 6% of journeys will be transfers from air travel. There are no air journeys between Birmingham and London, so unclear how this can be achievable in Phase1. Phase 2—flights between London, the North-West and Scotland have been in decline since early 2000. Should air space be freed—BAA have publically stated that it will be replaced by more long and medium haul flights out of Heathrow.

3. Business Case 1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shift, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions(eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? Long distance travel has not increased in the past 15 years and is now approximately the rate of population growth (Evidence supplied and accepted by the Select Committee for Transport, October 2010). HS2 has used the Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook which is more appropriate for short term forecasting. In any event the DfT have used an out of date PDFH—version 4.1 which was superseded in August 2009 by version 5, explaining that they did not want to change methodologies. However the time frames were changed from March 2010 (forecast year 2033) to February 2011 (forecast year 2043), therefore “methodology” can be changed. The calculation for modal shift is questionable with HS2 predicting air shift of 6% and car at 7%, whilst the biggest shift (65%) is from existing rail passengers. If this is the case it will be to the detriment of income on the “classic” network that can be expensive and is already heavily subsidised. No account has been made for time on train journeys as “working” time, nor for the additional time taken on car journeys to reach the few HS2 railway stations ie door to door. There is no recognition of technological advances which negate the need for personal face to face interaction.

2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional railway? There is no requirement for a new conventional rail network. The DfT assess alternatives on a “do minimum” basis which would be fine for short timescales; however they have extended the period by 10 years, 2043! Note—HM Treasury “National Infrastructure Plan 2010” puts the best use of the extensive assets already in place, at the top of a new hierarchy for infrastructure investment—is this compatible with HS2? The HS2 Business Plan has no recognition that improvements in train journeys are happening this year and there needs to be serious consideration given to reducing first class compartments, increasing numbers of platforms, in-cab signalling etc. RP2 can deliver the capacity improvements even when using the same base as HS2–2008. Changes to WCML can be incremental without major disruption to trains and passengers.

3. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? Experience has shown that the demand and increase in train travel has been due partly to the availability of airline style pricing with internet booking—”overcrowding”on cheaper train journeys—the cheaper the price, the busier the train—hence demand can be predicted.

4. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new lines are built on time and to budget? The World Bank “High Speed Rail: The fast track to economic development” July 2010 “high-speed projects have rarely met the full ridership forecasts asserted by their promoters and in some cases have fallen far short”. HS1 is such an example, and we only have to look abroad to much larger countries such as China and at least three American states, who have abandoned future plans for high speed rail.

4. The Strategic Route 1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? The more curve to the line, the slower the train, HS2 stating that it will be “high speed” to Birmingham International—not so, passengers will have to alight at the West Midlands Interchange Station and board an Automated People Mover. The Government has already pledged money to Birmingham Council to improve cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w139

road facilities around the “proposed” location of the West Coast Interchange Station—is this in preparation? Birmingham Curzon Street will be the fourth station in Birmingham with no connection to the other three and the furthest out of the City Centre. Given the curvature of the line from the West Midlands Interchange, it will not be able to achieve “high speeds”.

2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? This is difficult to assess as little has been published on the Y route until 13 April, well after the publication of the Consultation. It is invidious therefore to seek comment or include the Y route in a public consultation. Communities and Local Authorities (or have HS2 already contacted councils up the line?) north of Birmingham are possibly uninformed or at worst, unaware. There are issues with service assumptions and benefits. How can the project aim to reduce overcrowding, whilst the areas that arguably require regeneration and connection to other cities have no overcrowding issues? In any event, stations in Phase 2 may not serve cities- merely the outskirts of cities, and require further travel either by foot, car or people carrier.

3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? Regardless of how the programme would be managed it would cause severe disruption, not only the actual build but the transfer of materials, spoil etc.

4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are these the right decisions? It is an expensive solution (in cost and for the environment) to supplying a “fourth runway” for London Heathrow—as Birmingham airport has been dubbed. It is debatable whether this is actually required given the DfT changes to air passenger demand.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? HS2 predict 30,000 new jobs, however these will mainly be in the vicinity of the new stations and seven out of 10 jobs will be in London. It is thought that it will be service sector jobs that are affected. London is the major player in the financial services market so travel to London will continue. HS2 anticipate growth in leisure trips to London due to the high speed line, outstripping trips from London—widening the North- South divide.

2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? Certainly this should be a major consideration, however in areas that require this e.g. the Potteries, it would not be feasible due to the need for the line design to achieve speeds, and limited stops, which again would impact on proposed speeds/times.

3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? Almost 40% of HS2 perceived benefits attribute to business time and reliability savings. Long distance travel is made predominantly by the more wealthy (calculated by HS2 as households with an income in excess of £70k per annum) and this is where HS2 assess the most benefit—the business users. Should the U.K. taxpayers subsidise the high earners? There is a dichotomy in that the Government has initiated a review into how people, in particular those in the business sector, adopt alternatives to travel.

4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? The cost of HS2 will be met by the UK taxpayer, with private funding requested for rolling stock (who will supply this as there are no manufacturers in the UK?) and stations. Businesses and Local Authorities seem to be very vocal in supporting HS2, as a means to regeneration and perceived increased business opportunities. However to ensure that they share the responsibility, they should be charged with earmarking funds towards the cost (if necessary held in escrow) to ensure that they pay for the benefits which they believe HS2 will bring to their business/community. (Put their money where their mouth is) EU’s TEN-T programme aims to improve transport for “goods and people to circulate through member states”. Would HS2’s published Business Case meet these criteria? cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w140 Transport Committee: Evidence

6. Impact 1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? See 2.3 BAA have publically said that released short—haul slots (including those to Europe) would be re- used for more profitable medium and long haul flights. There is no recognition in the Business Case for innovations in the automotive industry, to reduce carbon emissions for the period up to 2043! HSR will use daytime electricity consumption (18 hours) however HS2 continue to use overall total 24 hour electricity generation in their calculations. HS2 acknowledge that it is “carbon neutral”—that is inequitable when as a country we are planning to conserve energy.

2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? As with carbon emissions, there are inaccuracies in the way HS2 measure noise pollution. HS2 are using a measurement system which looks at average noise over an 18 hour period (Leq)—standard occupational noise exposure for public places, such as high streets. This is inappropriate for HS2—short bursts followed by quieter periods. Part of the planned timetable is what is deemed as “night-time” (World Health Organisation)—these do not appear to have been acknowledged.

3. What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? There is an already an excess on the W.C.M.L. Network Rail is currently upgrading Felixstowe-Nuneaton cross country which will create greater capacity. Capacity north of Nuneaton can be increased—not by HS2 but by infrastructure investment to relieve specific pinch points. Increasing freight movement is correct; however it can also bring an increase to short road journeys. The containers at the rail depot, still have to be transferred to their end destination.

4. How much disruption will there be to services on the “classic” network during the rebuilding of Euston? HS2 acknowledge that work will take eight years and “possibility of some disruption to both services and the station concourse”. The WCML and its passengers will be affected for this period, unnecessary as there are alternatives to reducing disruption in shorter timescales and at less cost. May 2011

Written evidence from the Ruislip Residents’ Association (HSR 55) I write to you on behalf of Ruislip Residents’ Association. We represent the people of Ruislip, a London suburb in the Borough of Hillingdon, with over 8,000 households. The proposed route for HS2 passes through Ruislip and causes great concern to our members. We recognise that your Enquiry is concerned with the broad issues surrounding the proposals. We wish to submit the following such factors that appear of particular significance to us, or cause local concern.

1. Enquiry Question 3—Business case (i) Electricity supply The proposals do not identify the source of electricity for HS2. We regard that as a priority factor that must be resolved before HS2 decisions are taken.

(ii) HS2 Fares The proposals are based on increased demand from leisure usage, but that will only be achieved if fares are attractive to this market. Otherwise the necessary traffic volume will not be achieved. Projected estimates of income are therefore considered over-optimistic by our members.

(iii) Impact on national social factors A policy of using local labour, local materials and British components would benefit the local and national economy, impacting on both employment and welfare benefit factors and in part justifying the heavy financial burden of implementing the proposals. An avowed policy of buying British when possible could be a powerful spur to British innovation and invention, to meet the EU competition rules. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w141

(iv) Hybrid trains If the proposals go ahead we urge that hybrid trains are the norm, in order to permit seamless interchange with domestic and continental routes. Although initially an expensive option, a policy of gradual introduction across all UK lines would promise the high volume necessary to reassure manufacturers and reduce unit costs.

(v) Training courses for young people Again, if the proposals go ahead, we urge the early introduction of training courses for young people in skills related to high speed networks, both to provide a trained workforce for implementation of HS2 and similar developments, and to provide young people with worthwhile careers.

2. Enquiry Question 4—The strategic route (a) Stations (i) Heathrow There is strong local support for the alternative Heathrow route, Route 1.5, which we urge should be re- examined because: — It should be a priority to include Heathrow from Day One to boost the national economy. increase flexibility of operation, Heathrow should be on a through route, not a spur or terminal. That is supported by evidence from continental experience. — Incorporation of Heathrow from Day One would reduce both total costs and local disruption in the Northolt-West Ruislip corridor.

(ii) Old Oak Common We urge that if a station is built at Old Oak Common it should allow interconnection with the London Underground’s Central Line as well as HS2, GWRML and Crossrail—which would greatly enhance rail travel options for people of West London and reduce strains on Euston Station.

(b) HS2 and HS1 linkage We believe that this link should be introduced as soon as possible, to reinforce the vision of HS2 as part of an international network and as a boost to tourism in Britain, an important source of national income and employment.

(c) Routing through residential areas We believe that the personal impact on residents living near a high speed line has been under-considered and that the consequent financial impact would be much higher than admitted in the business case.

(i) Personal impact — Disruption during line construction: Even if personnel and materials were conveyed by rail rather than road, the rebuilding of road bridges in suburban areas would cause huge public inconvenience during the HS2 line-construction phase. In Hillingdon in general and Ruislip in particular, in consequence of east/west railway lines from central London, there is poor road access between the north and south of our Borough, and we already suffer regular and severe traffic problems on our major highways. The prospect of the proposed HS2 route requiring bridges to be rebuilt across all our major north/south access routes causes widespread dismay. Reconstructing any one bridge would hugely exacerbate existing traffic problems on alternative routes and since it would be essential to limit construction to one bridge at a time the total construction period would run into years of misery for local people. — Noise and vibration caused by operation of high speed trains: Noise and vibration factors are expected to have far reaching impact on those who live near the route. It is stated policy that compulsory purchase will be applied to the minimum of properties. In consequence, if the proposals go ahead, large numbers of families will continue to live in their current homes, trapped there since no one will want to buy their properties, a consequence which is already seriously reducing property values. — In Ruislip, a densely populated area, this means that large numbers of local people are threatened by the HS2 proposals, since noise and vibration factors impact on properties a substantial distance from the line, threatening a reduced quality of life for occupiers, and a reduction in the financial value of properties acquired from a lifetime of investment. — Many residents of all ages expect to have to stay indoors behind triple-glazed windows, even in summer, with adults unable to relax in their gardens and children unable to play outside. Sleep patterns are likely to be disrupted, particularly for children. These and other chronic stress factors cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w142 Transport Committee: Evidence

can lead to poor mental and physical health, poor educational attainment, and can contribute to breakdown of families. — Visual impact of the line and its noise barriers: Poor visual outlook, loss of light and sunshine are all depressing factors, with potential for adverse impacts on health. Large numbers of mature trees are threatened and they must be replaced by suitable alternatives which are compatible with the overhead power lines required by HS2. — Community response: Fear of the above factors has already caused the formation of very volatile and assertive community groups along the suburban section of the proposed HS2 route through London. Increased public anger and disquiet is to be expected if the proposals go ahead as the local populations become increasingly aware of the threats. Whether that has the potential to boil over into civil unrest is unclear. Political consequences should be expected.

(ii) Financial consequences of routing through suburban areas We believe that a number of financial factors have not been adequately considered or costed: — Extension of compensation: In order to placate community fears it would be necessary to very considerably extend the compensation packages for residents continuing to live near the line, who would suffer permanent problems related to the operation of the line as well as loss of property values. We believe that the number of suburban homes in this category has been grossly underestimated. — Mitigation of noise, vibration and visual factors: Here too we believe that community unrest would make it necessary to spend considerably more than envisaged on both mitigating physical factors and compensating those for whom no satisfactory mitigation could be provided. — Extension of compulsory purchases: The total number of compulsorily purchases envisaged for the whole route is unbelievably small. Large numbers of appeals are to be expected from people who believe they should be enabled to vacate their properties without financial loss. Also out-of- date maps were used in initial assessments of which properties would need to be demolished, and in our own area there have been recent expensive developments along the route, which would almost certainly also qualify for compulsory purchase.

(iii) Alternative options In view of the factors outlined above, we believe that there should be re-evaluation of the options for routing HS2 through the London suburbs. — A tunnelled route: This, at a stroke, would remove the majority of adverse personal impacts noted above and the additional costs of a tunnelled route would be offset in part by the unconsidered financial costs also noted above—as well as bringing substantial community benefits. — Heathrow route: We have noted elsewhere our support for HS2 to be routed via Heathrow from Day One. We believe there is a strong case for that option in its own right but, since that options always accepted that the route would run in a tunnel out of London to beyond Heathrow, if it were accepted it would also deal with all the separate issues arising out of the currently preferred surface route through London suburbs. That option seems to us to have huge combined attractions and we ask that it is given very serious consideration if the underlying justification for HS2 is agreed by the Transport Select Committee. May 2011

Written evidence from Mr A Bobroff (HSR 56) This is the first time I have ever submitted evidence to a Select Committee, but given the fact that I believe that this is the biggest single investment ever undertaken in the UK and the huge implications in terms of cost, pollution and sacrifices having to be made in other areas to pay for this grand vision, a planned legacy of political vanity, I feel compelled to do so on this occasion. 1. The main argument for HSR is to solve the capacity problem on the West Coast Main Line … if this is the case the best way to solve the problem is to implement RP2, the upgrade of WCML, by way of Longer Trains, better Rolling Stock, no first class, longer Stations, better signalling and some track addition to bypass pinch points. This would generate well over 100% extra capacity at a cost of £2 billion, 10% of the HS2 Phase1. It would have the additional benefit of being implemented incrementally and effective a lot quicker than 2026 when HS2 would be operational, by which time WCML will have grounded to a halt. So this actually needs to be done anyway and HS2 will simply divert funds away from the real problem. 2. Another factor mitigating against investment in 20th Century technology of High Speed Trains is the advent of the 21st Century internet. Video Conferencing is growing expedentially at no cost with easy facilities to multi conference at the same time all over the world (this is new, 10 years ago companies were having to spend hundreds of thousands of pounds on Video Conferencing, now every laptop has it with an easy download, this is why Microsoft have just bid £5 billion for Skype). Business Travel will reduce to those occasional cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w143

necessary face to face meetings. We should be investing in super fast Broadband to reach every one in the country for instant Connectivity to our colleagues and overseas markets and suppliers. 3. HS2 will not divert passengers away from Air Travel. There are no flights from London to Birmingham and only 20% of Passengers fly from London to Manchester. So the Passengers Transferring from Air to Rail would be few from Scotland and even by HS2 Ltd optimistic claims, this would account for 8% of HS2 Passengers, if the Y were to be completed. 4. HS2 will not help us deliver a low carbon economy. Not even HS2 Ltd suggests this. They claim that it will be carbon neutral. So in actual fact this is probably a best case scenario. 5. The UK Transport infrastructure is in desperate need of modernization, however the building of a High Speed Rail link between London and Birmingham, thereafter to Leeds and Manchester, at an estimated initial capital cost of £32,000,000,000, of dubious benefit to 7% of the Population, will do nothing to solve the problem. 6. The UK Challenge, unlike France and Spain, is not to bring distant cities closer together; instead to deal with the density of Urban Transport demand. 7. The fares will be prohibitive to the majority of people and it will therefore only be of use to a small number of wealthy business people. 8. High Speed Rail beyond Birmingham will not be at over 200 mph, since north of Lichfield the HSR will use existing track. Further more HSR trains are not designed to go round bends, and therefore they will actually be slower than the existing Pendalino Trains that service Manchester and Leeds. 9. We have a perfectly good High Speed Rail to Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester, and to save 15–20 minutes against today’s journey times, hardly seems worth £34 billion, especially when by the time this is built, existing rolling stock and signalling will have been upgraded. The net time saving beyond 2026 on the journey to Birmingham will be about 10 minutes! As against the Chiltern Line or Virgin West Coast Main Line. Passengers will need these 10 minutes to get from The New Birmingham HSR terminal to Birmingham New Street. 10. There is a far more cost effective alternative available “Rail Package 2” proposed by Network Rail which can provide all the capacity we need into the foreseeable future (20 years) for a tenth of the cost of building a new high speed rail line half way to Scotland—HS2 is not a cost effective solution to a capacity issue. 11. Rail Package 2 proposed an upgrade on the existing West Coast Main Line, modernized signalling, longer trains, upgraded rolling stock, longer platforms, increasing capacity by between 135% and 178%, more than sufficient, even based on the exaggerated assumptions published by HS2 Ltd. NB High Speed Rail planners have a history of overestimating demand to build a business case need. HS1, the Channel Train in 1996, was forecasting a 300% passenger increase by 2004, this turned out to be a 50% increase! Continual over forecasting, led to a need for continual financial restructuring in 1998, 2001 and 2004. 12. HS1 has just been sold off the 30 year lease for a £1½ billion, a fraction of the cost to build of £5 billion. 13. The Financial viability of High Speed Rail has been shocking. In 2008 US Amtrak’s Inspector General reported that six European nations’ operations required a subsidy of $42 billion per annum. 14. In France the taxpayer has to subsidize HSR at a cost of 1% of GDP, about 20 billion Euros per annum, plus the accumulated debt of 29 billion Euros. The Dutch High Speed Train Operator is facing Bankruptcy. None of these schemes succeed in attracting private finance. The taxpayer will therefore have to pay the deficit, at an estimated net cost to each of us of £1,500. 15. Over half the £44 billion of benefit claimed is calculated on the basis of value of the number of minutes saved by businessmen on HS2 versus existing trains. The value of time is calculated at £70,000 per year (hardly an average), besides which I’ve always found time working on the train my most productive. 16. HS2 is planned to stop nowhere between London and Birmingham, so that anyone wishing to travel either way has to get into the hub at either end to catch the train. This will be totally counter productive to people living in the huge conurbations in between Birmingham and London. Places like Coventry, Warwick, Northampton, Milton Keynes, Aylesbury or Watford will actually find their services being cut. It is no coincidence that all these County Councils are opposed to the scheme. The government is already cutting funding to our existing train services. 17. The proposed hub at Old Oak Common, which is envisaged as a major interchange, will actually slow down the 5 million passengers a year into Paddington, who will be forced to stop there. 18. The regional regeneration argument is spurious, of the 44,000 jobs that HS2 estimate will be created 10,000 are as a result of the building and of the balance 73% are in London, which is totally contrary to regional regeneration. 19. In France, the Lille area, which is often quoted as a beneficiary of HSR has 50% higher unemployment than the National average and Clermont Ferrant, which is nowhere near High Speed Rail, is 50% lower. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w144 Transport Committee: Evidence

20. Our Regions need investment in Industrial Infrastructure to generate real growth. It is not getting to London 10 minutes faster that will generate sustainable jobs, and those that are created will only be transferred from other areas, not on the line. Would Corby want a steel mill kept open, or the facility to get to London quicker? 21. This proposed High Speed Rail Project does nothing for the vast majority of millions of commuters who are increasingly squeezed on their daily compulsory journey to work. Nine of the 10 most crowded routes in the country will not be effected. Take a poll on the Guildford or Reading Line. 22. This is a classic example of a Government faced with a huge transport problem, deciding to side step the actual issue, and build a vision of a shining new Engineering Structure. This is a legacy project similar to the Millenium Dome, but 40 times more expensive! 23. The state of our roads is despicable, our cycling lanes laughable, our trains are overcrowded, old and increasing their fares by up to 12% per year. 24. The average cut in Public expenditure is 25%, and in higher education by 80%. Councils are closing Care Homes, Libraries and Hospitals up and down the country. Our armed Forces are risking their lives without the necessary equipment. 25. £32,000,000,000 could buy 150 University College Hospitals, run an average council for 115 years or pay for 750,000 students for four years at Universities charging the top rate. 26. The Y HSR Network, links neither Birmingham nor Heathrow Airports and less than 8% of the Passengers transferring onto the train are estimated to come from Air travel. There are indeed no flights from London to Birmingham. 27. As for road trips, HS2 Ltd foresees very little transfer from road to HSR, since 56% of all road journeys are short distances and commuters. It is estimated that HS2 will reduce the traffic on the M1 by 2%. 28. Contrary to Fashionable Spin, HSR is more polluting than every other form of Transport per passenger mile except for Air. In Summary High Speed Rail solves none of our problems, quite the reverse, it will make London even more concentric. Getting somewhere a few minutes quicker does not in itself generate economic growth. The alternatives have been dismissed out of hand, which I suppose is not surprising when the company researching is called HS2 Ltd and already has 54 full time employees. They are also being advised by engineering companies who will be bidding for the business in due coarse. Rail Package 2, electrification, modern signaling, and new rolling stock for of all our train lines are a perfectly viable, incrementally deployable alternative. We have a good rail infrastructure, it needs progressive investment, not side lining in favour of a polluting rocket train, which stops nowhere and serves few. Government’s role is to plan for the long term, to build the foundation for sustainable long-term economic growth. This is the way to bridge the North South Divide not shifting spurious numbers of people around faster on the basis of forecasts 35 years in the future. The first ever PC was sold in 1982, and has dramatically changed our lives in less than 40 years. This HS2 proposal feels rather like the rearranging of the deckchairs on the Titanic. Let’s solve the underlying problems of our Country; this is not one of them. May 2011

Written evidence from the Middleton HS2 Action Group (HSR 57) 1. Introduction In responding to the general invitation to submit “evidence” to assist the enquiry into HS2, Middleton HS2 Action Group have submitted it’s concerns on the impact of noise (your section 6.2) to emphasise the importance and to request that a full and proper enquiry is undertaken. Looking at the evidence produced so far, it is far from clear that proper consideration and research has been done on this vital element. Clearly this is an area which is only pertinent to those on and close to the route and, along with visual impact, should be a major consideration comparable to the findings of the benefits or otherwise of the business case and other countrywide arguments. It is essential therefore in determining the pros and cons of HS2 that noise and visual impact is taken into account. The main issues are: 1. Speed—excessive, inflexible and uncompromising at the proposed 400kph/ 2. Route—The inflexibility of the route allows for no compromise to allow curves in the track to avoid villages and rural homesteads and businesses. 3. Landscape—the inflexibility means that it is not possible in many areas to mitigate noise to an acceptable and aesthetic level, owing to the landscape determining the vertical alignment. This cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w145

means that in many areas (like Middleton) the tracks runs at ground level or on embankments and viaducts which, apparently, cannot be changed, decreasing the ability to effectively mitigate noise. 4. Compensation—how can compensation for tranquillity, peace and quiet be adequately determined and how will it be applied? 5. Lack of evidence of work done on limiting noise impact for all areas—not just a choice few. We are not engineers and this submission does not seek to add technical data, assuming that this will be readily available and easily accessible from far more experienced sources. This submission aims to highlight concerns pertinent to all residents and businesses in rural areas that are directly affected by the rail track in the trust that these will be taken into account.

2. Main Issues 2.1 Speed Speeds of 400kph in a small country are not necessary. The high speed designed to save minutes on journey times are of little value when end to end journey times is what matters. — Already proposed along the route is a mix of speeds ranging from 350–400kph suggesting “brakes on/acceleration on” scenario causing even more noise at those pinch points. — The higher the speed the greater the noise from aerodynamics and track noise, not to mention the wearing away of the tracks.

2.2 Route Due to the speed, the uncompromising route whilst devastating the countryside and wildlife creates unacceptable levels of noise, particularly in rural areas. Without any compromise in the curvature of the track, the track inevitably runs close to rural conurbations where the impact of noise would be greater than those say, living in urban areas or towns. People choose to live in rural areas for peace, quiet and tranquillity. Tranquillity attracts residents, visitors and promotes tourism. Devastating this would have a huge impact on these communities and could greatly affect the economy of the area. Areas to be impacted would be the following: — Local businesses such as animal and equestrian centres, hotels and conference centres, small business units, golf and leisure parks. — Farms. — Villages. The potential noise change of HS2 if not effectively mitigated at source, will impact greatly on the reasons to live in and work in a rural community. For these rural communities currently enjoying noise levels of 50dB, a ‘US’ source indicates that 59dB not 73dB is the maximum noise level to avoid severe impact. The impact of noise the new line creates needs to be considered in the context of the location. The quieter the area the greater the impact.

2.3 Landscape Inevitably, the lack of inflexibility with the route, landscape determines to a greater or lesser degree the vertical and horizontal alignment. In some areas the route has been tweaked to accommodate an improved visual or noise impact. This “tweaking” only goes to highlight that in other areas that have not been “tweaked” it is either not possible or, more likely, has been considered not economically justifiable to accommodate the real requirements of others. This is simply not fair. HS2 Ltd have stated noise mitigation at source has been looked at and addressed in 108 miles of the 140 miles of track. That leaves 32 miles where noise mitigation has not been addressed.

2.4 Compensation How can we ensure compensation is given fairly to all those affected by noise or blighted over the lifetime of the railway, not just the first year of operation? In the first year of operation it is understood the plan will be to run the trains at lower speeds (so less noise) and that the timetable will not reach full frequency for some considerable time. So less peak noise made by fewer trains per day than the planned final capacity will equal a low average noise in the first year, precisely the timescale indicated for calculating compensation. The case for determining the impact of noise in the communities and any compensation needs to be carefully investigated and we would respectively suggest cannot be made on arbitrary max or average noise levels cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w146 Transport Committee: Evidence

The potential noise change of HS2 if not effectively mitigated at source, will have a devastating effect on these communities who currently enjoy little or no noise. It is not acceptable to simply consider that noise can be mitigated by insulating dwellings/properties. This does not allow people to have open windows or to enjoy the outside and reduces the ability to use their gardens. Quality of Life will be severely affected. This is unacceptable. Noise mitigation needs also to be aesthetic. It is simply not acceptable to lay unsightly 3 metre or 5 metre high barriers. Also to be taken into account is the effect noise levels have on health. In noisy atmospheres there is stated a potential for higher number of cases of stroke and heart attack victims. From an extract from Science News it has been gleaned that ‘no other environmental hazard comes anywhere near the effects of noise and air pollution. The most dramatic effects are in heart disease because noise has been shown to raise blood pressure and increase concentrations of stress hormones and fatty materials, even when people are asleep. These can accumulate over time to block blood vessels and trigger a heart attack. No compensation can allow for that.

2.5 Lack of Evidence Information from the US document “High Speed Ground Transportation Impact Assessment” produced by the Federal Railroad Administration () has enabled the data overleaf. Average noise is cross referenced against the government’s own PPG24. That suggests that anything above 66dB is deemed uninhabitable and a problem whereas HS2 Ltd assures us that it is only above 73dB that it is an issue. Clearly this is an area of contradiction and one which goes against established policy. This needs investigating. It seems wholly irrational if not preposterous, that based on such figures HS2 can suggest only: — 10 dwellings along the entire route will experience high noise. — 150 would be likely to experience noise levels which would qualify for noise insulation. — 4,700 would experience noticeable noise change. Little comfort is offered that an appropriate scheme to assess the noise level damage is being undertaken and there does not appear to be anything for assessing trains at speed of 400kph, with all references being 360kph. HS2 NOISE CALCULATIONS—18 TRAINS PER DAY Single train pass Distance (m) SELdBA Leq(h) dBA Speed 350k 400k 350k 400k 50 feet 104.0 106.0 84.0 86.6 25 101.8 104.4 81.8 84.4 50 98.5 101.1 78.5 81.1 100 94.9 97.5 74.9 77.5 150 92.5 95.1 72.5 75.1 200 90.7 93.3 70.7 73.3 250 89.1 91.7 69.1 71.7 300 87.7 90.3 67.7 70.3 400 85.3 87.9 65.3 67.9 500 83.1 85.7 63.1 65.7 600 81.1 83.7 61.1 63.7 700 79.3 81.9 59.3 61.9 800 77.5 80.1 57.5 60.1 900 75.8 78.4 55.8 58.4 1,000 74.1 76.7 54.1 56.7 1,100 72.5 75.1 52.5 55.1 1,200 70.9 73.5 50.9 53.5 1,300 69.4 72.0 49.4 52.0 1,400 67.9 70.5 47.9 50.5 1,500 66.4 69.0 46.4 49.0 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w147

PPG MAP BASED ON “AVERAGE” NOISE OTHERS ON WHAT IT MIGHT EQUATE TO AS THE TRAIN PASSES Trigger values: Existing Leq (population 300 to 999) 45dBA Interstate Highway with 4 or more lanes that permit trucks, with traffic at 60 mph (ie Motorways) Distance from road Leq Leq Leq Metres Day Evening Night 3–15 75 70 65 16–30 70 65 60 31–61 65 60 55 62–121 60 55 50 122–253 55 50 45 254 and up 50 45 40

PPG24 B Noise should be taken into account when determining planning 55 to 66 applications and, where appropriate, conditions imposed to ensure an adequate level of protection against noise. C Planning permission should not normally be granted. Where it is 66 to 74 considered that permission should be given, for example because there are no alternative quieter sites available, conditions should be imposed to ensure a commensurate level of protection against noise. D Planning permission should normally be refused. >74

UK Government Noise Insulation Regulations 1996 limit 300m HS2 high noise 73dBA

Jackhammer 88dBA at 50 feet Bus 80 dBA at 50 feet Lawnmower 70 dBA at 50 feet Hearing protection 85dBA Possible stroke risk 60 dBA Heights 3m barrier–5dBA 8m barrier–10dBA

Written evidence from Keith Rosling (HSR 58) Introduction My primary reason for opposing HS2 is that I do not believe that there is a credible demand case, there are numerous false and misleading assumptions behind the project and as a result, the business case is fundamentally flawed. In addition, the project will not have any positive impact on carbon emissions, and will irretrievably damage areas of the country which are designated as Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty. I hope that the Transport Select Committee will recommend that the project does not proceed.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR I believe that the main arguments for HS2, as currently, presented are invalid and fallacious. The key arguments are: A. The UK needs HS2 to solve capacity problems on the West Coast Main Line. The Government say there is a major capacity issue that only HS2 can solve. This is not so: (a) The “best” option is to make incremental changes against demand; make low cost rolling stock and capacity changes first; address pinch-points when demand is strong enough. (b) DfT’s own option solves the WCML’s capacity issue through Rail Package 2(RP2) which provides more than the required capacity at one tenth of the cost in a much shorter timeframe. (c) Other alternatives have not been properly considered eg Government’s own initiative to reduce travel (by faster connectivity with broadband, videoconferencing); rail pricing option. B. The London to Birmingham HS2 service along with the extension of HS2 to Manchester will divert passengers from aviation: (a) It is highly unlikely that HS2 will produce a significant shift in passenger journeys from domestic air services. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w148 Transport Committee: Evidence

(b) HS2 can only replace domestic air journeys served by its route. No one flies between London and Birmingham, and rail already has 79% of the Manchester market. (c) Overseas experience shows air could be decimated if HSR delivers very big reductions in journey times and rail gets below the 3hr journey threshold. Given the 2011 timetable already shows Edinburgh can be reached in four hours, albeit by just one train, the HS2 promise of about 3:30–40 minutes 21 years later (in 2032), makes any impact on air look marginal, at best. Please see my response to Question 2 C. HS2 will help to deliver a low carbon economy: (a) The Government say HS2 will be “broadly neutral” for carbon. But it is unlikely to even be that. Please see my response to Question 6 below. D. HS2 will deliver economic benefits and will help to bridge the north/south divide: (a) Government claims for transformational benefits are based on belief, not evidence. The evidence on regeneration (where HS2 acts as a catalyst) points to London winning therefore producing entirely the opposite result to that intended. (b) The evidence for the wider economic impacts (of the HS2 investment itself) is also small. Pleases see my responses to Question 5. E. HS2 is a sound investment and provides value for money: (a) HS2 is not a sound investment providing poor value for money and is supported by a business case that is flawed. (b) There is no commercial case for spending over £30 billion on HS2. (c) The benefits are overstated. (d) The demand forecasts are excessive. (e) There are flaws in the models utilised. (f) Phase 1, on the DfT own figures only returns a CBR of 1.6 (well below the Treasury requirement of 2. They are consulting only on Phase 1, Phase 2 may never happen, there is little time benefit. They can therefore only take Phase 1 Benefits in the Business Case otherwise they should consult on the whole Route. Please see my answers to Question 3. F. UK does need to catch up with Europe—many major European countries have high speed rail networks. The UK—unlike Europe—has had a fast national railway system for a long time. As Sir Rod Eddington said in 2006 “…. with [rail] journeys between London and other UK major cities performing particularly well relative to journeys from other European capitals.” We also have routes capable of 200km/h (125mph)—and still have quicker rail journey times between the capital and the five largest cities than in other major West European countries: (a) Averaging 145 minutes in UK (or 148 mins using the same 5 cities as Eddington). (b) 151 minutes in Spain. (c) 184 minutes in Italy. (d) 221minutes in France. (e) 244 minutes in Germany. Even Frankfurt/Cologne, which is a comparable distance and often quoted as a high speed rail success story, is in reality more like an intercity railway: while it halved its journey time it brought it down to little less than the fastest train we already have from Birmingham to London.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives I believe that it is highly unlikely that HS2 will produce a significant modal shift in passenger journeys from domestic air services to HS2: (a) HS2 can only replace domestic air journeys served by its route. No one flies between London and Birmingham, and rail already has 79% of the Manchester market. (b) For Phase 1 the relevant air market is the 3m per annum who fly the NW/Scottish lowlands route using Heathrow (just 15% of all passengers), and 6m/a for all London airports (30% of total). (c) The full “Y” adds Leeds and Newcastle, but scheduled flights to Leeds ended in March 2011, and HS2 in 2032 only matches the current fastest train from Newcastle to London. The Feb 2011 business case has fewer people switching from air to HS2: (a) DfT say 6% of HS2 trips (8,166/day or 2.9 million per annum for Phase 1 switch from air—25% less than before (11,000/day)—and 6 million per annum for the full “Y” ie twice the relevant Heathrow route traffic. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w149

(b) To generate even 6% modal shift DfT have to assume the domestic air market will grow—they say by 128% by 2043 (last year DfT said 178% by 2033)—and their forecast is no longer constrained by supply, meaning it’s not even real air journeys that switch to HS2. That much real growth could not occur without extra runway capacity for London. (c) The NW/Scottish lowlands air route has been shrinking (by 32% from its 2004 peak), not growing. Some domestic air routes have grown (where surface transport links are poor, eg Aberdeen to Exeter), but overall domestic passengers have fallen by 22% from 2005 peak. (d) Overseas experience shows air can be decimated if HSR delivers very big reductions in journey times and rail gets below the 3 hour journey threshold. Given the 2011 timetable already shows Edinburgh can be reached in 4 hours, albeit by just one train, the HS2 promise of about 3:30–40 minutes 21 years later.

3. Business case

I believe the business case is flawed for the following reasons: (a) Benefits are overstated by about 60%—they total more like £19 billion not £44 billion for the full “Y”. The largest benefit (time savings) is based on all time spent on trains being wasted, with DfT disregarding this fundamental error on spurious grounds. (b) Demand forecasts are excessive, they misuse (through projecting growth for too long—35years) an out of date forecasting model (with discredited forecasting factors). This gives a doubling in background demand to 2043—47% higher than it should be. (c) Appraisal uses an unrealistic “do minimum” comparator with virtually no improvements for 35 years and so inflating the benefits such as reduced crowding and shorter waiting times between trains. They disregard valid alternatives to improve the existing railway. The overall effect of this is to greatly worsen HS2’s value for money. So HS2 in fact delivers just 30pence to 60pence benefit for every £1 of subsidy spent!

The economic case for HS2 also: (a) Fails to learn the lessons of HS1 on demand forecasting and competition. (b) Takes no account of new technology or Government’s own initiative to reduce travel. (c) Fails to develop the “best” alternatives, and repeatedly misrepresents the alternatives it does develop (including in the March 2010 Command Paper). (d) Fails to properly explore the uncertainties in the long term forecasts, despite HS2’s sensitivity to the level of demand forecast.

There is no commercial case for spending over £30 billion on HS2 or justification for its subsidy: (a) The extra fares (£27 billion) don’t cover the capital (£30.4 billion) and operating costs (£13.9 billion), even for the full “Y” network, so it needs a subsidy—£17 billion. (b) The subsidy actually encourages travel (10 million per annum new journeys for Phase 1 alone) despite DfT’s other initiatives to reduce travel, and in particular business travel. (c) Existing rail services will worsen—this is proven in Government’s own case for HS2. (d) It benefits the affluent—47% of long distance rail travel is by the top 20% earning families.

The Government say there is a major capacity issue that only HS2 can solve.

This is not so: — The “best” option is to make incremental changes against demand; make low cost rolling stock and capacity changes first; address pinch-points when demand is strong enough. Rail experts say the “best” WCML option is: (a) Rebalance first and standard class; add more carriages (ultimately to 12 car except for Liverpool). Just this delivers 67% more capacity (112% in standard class), need not wait to 2026 and may be possible without any subsidy. (b) Eliminate the acute crowding problem on the Northampton/Milton Keynes to Euston commuting services by modifying Ledburn Jcn without delay. (c) Do other low cost infrastructure changes as needed, with the potential for a total of 177% extra standard class capacity providing an increased train frequency from 9 to 11/hr. This is against DfT’s forecast background demand increase to 2043 of 102%, and delivered at greatly less cost than HS2. — Rail experts also say there are low cost ‘best’ solutions for ECML and Midland Main Line too. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w150 Transport Committee: Evidence

— DfT’s own option: even the rail options developed for DfT solve WCML’s capacity issue: (a) Rail Package 2 (RP2) involves more rolling stock and removing seven pinch-points. This delivers 151% more capacity against DfT’s background demand growth of 102%, not the 54% as Government misleadingly claim .in addition RP2 has less crowding. (b) RP2 looks like being over twice the value for money of HS2 for just one sixth the net cost, and this is despite Government latest attempts to distort and bury RP2. (c) RP2 won’t be disruption-free but neither is it comparable with the wholesale replacement of WCML under the last upgrade, or the 8-year rebuild of Euston that HS2 requires—described as like “open heart surgery on a conscious patient”. (d) Other alternatives: these are not properly considered eg Government’s own initiative to reduce travel (by faster connectivity with broadband, videoconferencing); rail pricing option.

4. The strategic route The question of the stations along the proposed route is a secondary consideration in the opinion of our group, as this pre-supposes that the scheme in its entirety has any merit, which we believe it does not. Similarly, considerations of the cities to be served by HS2 is a question that cannot be answered in the context of: (a) The lack of need for a new railway. (b) The fact that unlike the majority of our European neighbours whom we seem desperate to emulate with high speed rail, this country already has an extensive and effective rail network in place. Government money on the railways would be better spent on improving local services for commuters and to create new links using classic rail technology (for example, to provide a link between Oxford and Cambridge). Government decisions on linking HS1 to either HS1 or Heathrow are flawed: There is no evidence to substantiate this level of investment based on either modal shift or expected levels of European travel. The experience of HS1, where traffic levels are at a fraction of those forecasted, and which resulted in a very critical report to the DfT insisting that more realistic forecasting was undertaken in future (it has ignored this entirely in the development of the HS2 case), should provide a salutary lesson that nobody seems to want to learn.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity — Evidence on regeneration (where HS2 acts as a catalyst) in fact points to London winning (a) DfT say more than seven out of 10 of the 30,000 jobs created by HS2 around stations will be in London ie not the Midlands or the North. (Old Oak Common, with 20,000 jobs wins most). (b) Most of the jobs claimed will not be genuinely new jobs but ones that have moved from other areas in the region. HS2 Ltd concluded this, after consulting respected academics. (c) DfT say 59% of extra HS2 trips are for leisure; given DfT assume trips to London grow at twice the rate of those from London, so more people and more money will go to London. (d) HS2 impacts on the service sector, in which London is dominant. So work is more likely to move to London, not away from it—therefore it is more likely to re-enforce the North/South divide and not help to bridge it. — The evidence for the wider economic impacts (of the HS2 investment itself) is also small: (a) The productivity benefit from shorter journey times is the key benefit, but it’s already in the business case (and is overstated now DfT admit that time-on-board is not wasted). (b) The Wider Economic Impacts of better connectivity are relatively small, £4–£6 billion, and are mainly driven by use of freed-up capacity, which will need a new further subsidy to realise. (c) HS2 Ltd asked Imperial College if faster connectivity had any further direct benefits—they said “very little” (max £8 million per annum)—but their conclusion was left out of the White Paper and not even referred to in the consultation materials.

6. Impact — The Government say HS2 will be “broadly neutral” for carbon. But it is unlikely to even be that: (a) Trains that travel at 360km/hr use three times the energy of 200kmph trains. (b) 87% of journeys on HS2 indisputably create more emissions—all the brand new journeys (22%) and all those switching from existing rail services (65%). (c) DfT say just 6 in every 100 travellers on HS2 switch from flying. But this assumes the decline in relevant air routes reverses, and satisfying “suppressed” not real air demand. (d) The air emissions savings depend on the freed-up slots not being used for long haul, which BAA say they will, and the use of out of date numbers on the modal switch from air. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w151

(e) HS2 Ltd’s “Carbon neutral” assertion requires electricity generation to be significantly “cleaner” than at present and will rely heavily on alternative sources of electricity, such a nuclear, wind or wave power. There are no clear plans in place to achieve the low-carbon electricity generation required, and recent events with Fukushima in Japan will have a severe limiting effect on nuclear adoption. May 2011

Written evidence from Graham Earl Collyer (HSR 59)

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

Answer Question 1 — The benefits that HSR is alleged to deliver are completely and fundamentally flawed. The supporting evidence for my statement can be found by looking back at the way HS2 Ltd in conjunction with the DfT have consistently changed their way of “selling” the project to the tax payers of this country (of which the vast majority will see NO benefit). How can the public take this major transport project seriously if the organisations actively involved in delivering the project are having so much trouble substantiating and promoting it. — If there were outstanding business benefits, amazing environmental benefits irresistible trade and economic benefits for the country, I’m sure there would be great public support for such a scheme, but this couldn’t be further from the truth. — The alternative RP2 proposal has in my option been almost completely overlooked, despite the enormous cost benefits it offers, whilst still delivering almost all the requirements of HS2. Of course there are much greater benefits for RP2 than just financial. One of the greatest being to protect our environment from irreparable and significant destruction. — One thing that HS2 cannot be accused of and that is being environmentally friendly. How can you propose a project of the magnitude of HS2 and “forget” to take into account the environmental impact of construction?

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

Answer Question 2.1 — We already have a rail network that serves our major cities, and which could I believe be improved by the implementation of RP2. — The general underinvestment and lack of maintenance on our road network has massive cost, business and other detrimental implications. I believe that investment in our road network would be far better use of funds, would benefit many more people more and have greater long term economic rewards when compared to HS2.

2. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

Answer Question 2.2 — It is inevitable due to the vast sum of money that the HS2 project would consume, even if it were to come in on time and budget (which on past performance of major construction projects would be very hard to visualise) that there would be a detrimental “knock on” effect to funding of the “classic” network. Which, in itself would have a negative impact on business and economic growth for the future.

3. What are the implications for domestic aviation?

Answer Question 2.3 — I believe the implications for domestic air travel due to HS2 are minimal, as 80% of the Manchester to London movements are currently by rail. In addition there has been a steady decline in domestic travel especially from Heathrow for a considerable amount of years. I cannot help noticing that this decline co-insides with the explosion of IT services and the inevitable “new” ways of conducting business. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w152 Transport Committee: Evidence

3. Business case 1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? Answer Question 3.1 — The fundamental business case assumes some very impressive facts and figures to help build an “acceptable” argument. In the initial months of the proposal, growth was estimated at 267%, this figure has now been downgraded by HS2 to 100%. Unfortunately this upset the benefit ratio figures for HS2, so to counteract this they increased the forecast period by 10 years. — One would have to question any models and forecasts on any aspects put forward by HS2 if they so readily amend and manipulate figures and data.

2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? Answer Question 3.2 — As highlighted elsewhere in this document I believe RP2 addresses the requirements that HS2 are setting out to provide, but at far less cost both in financial, environmental impact, noise and disruption terms.

3. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 4. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? Answer Question 3.4 — Contract assignment and strict budget and time constraints from construction companies are the most obvious way to bring any major transport project in successfully and within budget. But all to often especially when spending tax payers money there seams to be an open cheque book policy.

4. The strategic route 1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 5. Economic rebalancing and equity 1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? Answer Question 5.1 — Even HS2 Ltd own forecasts show that the major growth in travel would be into London, so how does this help bridge the north-south divide?

2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? Answer Question 5.3 — Examples from the French TGV shows that locations that were thought initially to benefit do not always do so. — As for the socio-economic groups that would benefit most, this would predominately be high earning business people as stated by HS2 Ltd. Therefore the minority not the majority of the population. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w153

4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 6. Impact 1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? Answer Question 6.1 — As previously mentioned, the construction of HS2 has NOT taken into account ANY carbon emissions, so without this data it is very hard to asses the shift that would be required from air and roads for HS2 to reduce carbon. Of course what we do know is that HSR is by definition a high carbon producer when compared to say other forms of rail travel.

2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? Answer Question 6.2 — No the environmental costs have NOT been correctly accounted for as a complete and thorough assessment of the environmental impact will not be conducted until AFTER the consultation period is completed. — I believe the noise assessment is also flawed, as the standards used appear to be deliberately misleading as they don’t take into account the background setting in the most rural areas of the route, and the fact that aerodynamic noise is the major problem with high speed of which conventional sound barriers are mostly ineffectual.

3. What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? Answer Question 6.3 — As HS2 has been conceived with NO freight consideration (it would obviously spoil the proposed 20 minute time saving that HS2 is supposed to deliver) I believe that the impact on freight services on the “classic” network would be negligible even taking into account the “freeing up” of the “classic” network offered by HS2.

4. How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? Answer Question 6.4 — The disruption caused by the rebuilding of Euston in particular is almost immeasurable. Again this is another example of the benefit of RP2. Whilst there would still be major logistical and disruption issues, I believe they would be no where near the scale that HS2 would represent. May 2011

Written evidence from Richard A Lloyd (HSR 60) 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR Every mode of transport has an optimum speed at which energy consumption, productivity, environmental impact, safety, construction cost, and operating cost are balanced. For road transport, speeds much above 100–120 km/h produce significant impacts with little benefit in the real world. For rail, using steel on steel technology, the break point seems to be 200–250 km/h, above which the penalties are disproportionate, again with little benefit when all factors are considered.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives Inter urban connectivity is of little concern for most people. By definition, a city will have all the facilities of a regional centre, and in most cases, making other centres more accessible will have a negative impact on facilities and thereby increase the need for travel with its attendant pollution and wasted time. For occasional journeys—cultural, business, medical, judicial etc—the concern is with the door to door journey, and its timing, comfort, security, and cost. Rail systems work best when origins and destinations are crowded around the stations. Personal rather than shared transport systems are the most effective end to end solution in most cases, the main constraint being the lack of adequate parking in “town” situations. The strategic road network is of far more general use and importance than HSR, because of the way it can interface seamlessly with local access. Unfortunately, in recent years, the network of Trunk Roads and A roads has received little attention, and measures to reduce speeds and noise in towns have diverted flows onto cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w154 Transport Committee: Evidence

longer but quicker routes. (These comments do not apply to Scotland, where upgrading roads seems to remain a priority.) Given the parlous economics of the rail industry, any further subsidy should be directed to where there will be most benefit, and this means local radial and cross-country services, rather than high-cost express services for a few. HSR will have little if any impact on domestic aviation. The route planning appears to be heavily influenced by aviation interests, linking major airports rather than population centres. This negates the local connectivity advantage enjoyed by conventional rail systems. A specific example is the siting of the West Midlands HS2 station at Bickenhill, where only car access is practicable. Because of the cost of HSR and the connecting monorail to Birmingham Airport, little diversion of domestic aviation can be expected. Similarly, neither will there be any stimulation of long range flights, because HS2 provides no improved access for the whole of the natural catchment area for Birmingham Airport.

3. Business case The same hugely exaggerated claims as were made for HS1 have been repeated with HS2. It’s not only cost that will deter new users—all the stations (except Euston) are inconveniently located, and without quick and economic transport for the last few miles, trains are unattractive. HSR will have the added disadvantage of security measures to deter terrorist attacks. The measures will not be so intrusive as at airports, but would clearly be an encouragement for private car use, in the same way as airlines have seen migration to private aircraft. The capacity issues on the West Coast Main Line are very localised. Very few trains are overcrowded, and the tracks are not fully used for much of the route. In the West Midlands (Birmingham to Rugby and Northampton), there is plenty of scope for adding carriages and services without any need for work on the track. The present peak-hour schedule is divided up by mixing local and fast trains. By segregating them, much more resilience can be provided against delays, and the available time can be better-utilised permitting many more expresses. In addition, if the demand really was there and the additional services provided, it would be possible to have long distance trains stopping at “local” stations rather than Birmingham International. This would have a dramatic effect on overall journey times and comfort, and would do much to raise the attractiveness of rail travel. With the mixed traffic on the WCML, an increase in the speed of express trains is predicated on improving the transit times of local services. This can be done with higher performance rolling stock. Freight services are to be moved off the line in the near future, but are less of an issue because they are non-stop and can operate off peak. Managing demand by price has some attractions, but needs to be closely regulated to avoid abusive practices. No-one is fooled by the sort of add-ons and subterfuge used by the low-cost airlines. It would be more honest to have reserved seating and first-class accommodation available at more sensible prices—or else increase capacity by going to one class throughout. There is no prospect that HS2 will be built on time and budget. There has been no detailed design work, or investigation, done for most of the route, and the proposals for all four stations and the HS1 and Heathrow links are deeply flawed with regard to interfacing with existing railways and maintaining services during construction. Any changes here, or any mitigation measures elsewhere on the route, will have a major knock- on effect. This process is all too familiar in the defence industry, and the remedy is blindingly obvious: don’t develop your plans in secret by discussion with vested interests, and don’t try to rush a half-baked scheme through Parliament.

4. The strategic route The route for HS2 is nonsensical. There is no schedule or capacity need to come to the West Midlands, and the selection of Euston as the terminus is driven by the unnecessary Heathrow connection. While the costs of HSR look distinctly unattractive, the only way to confirm the suitability for the UK is to do a detailed study of a realistic route—from HS1/St Pancras directly north to Manchester centre. Adding massive infrastructure like this, after the towns and cities have been built, can only be done by massive demolition work or extensive tunnelling—but shouldn’t we do a study to find out? It is ridiculous to start construction on the high-cost section which has little need. If (and only if) the costs of HSR can be brought down, the obvious first application would be Glasgow to Manchester. The Heathrow link is completely unnecessary. Local rail links across the south east into Heathrow are far more important (eg the proposed Airlink from Guildford). However, no work on rail should be done until the overall airport issues are resolved. If it’s true that Heathrow is at its limit, then no money should be spent on additional rail links. Stansted or Thames Estuary locations would be far more accessible from the north of the country, and would justify major rail construction (only if operating costs could be brought down). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w155

5. Economic rebalancing and equity There is no cogent reason to expect HSR to reduce inequalities. Construction work will boost employment, but that’s true of all such projects. However, with major borrowings and no economic return, the diversion of money from more productive projects, and high on-going running costs, the long-term effects could be disastrous. To answer the question about locations and socio-economic groups, Think Concorde! Heathrow and New York may have benefited, but so did Bristol and Toulouse. The problem with HSR is that most of the materials will be imported. Yes, local authorities should make an appropriate contribution: nothing. Particularly in the West Midlands, massive disruption and intrusion for large numbers of people is bad enough—expecting them to pay for it could result in civil-disobedience or more direct unrest. One should be perfectly clear about this: if the proposal was from a private company to build and run a new transport system, and they were seeking permission to do so, it would be an entirely different process of evaluation. Depending on the details, it might be found proper for the public purse to assist and facilitate some aspects of the project. However, with HSR, it seems taxpayers will carry the whole risk while private contractors are guaranteed a return in perpetuity.

6. Impact

The effect on CO2 emissions will be detrimental, during construction and afterwards. HSR depends on peak- time electricity, which will be fossil fuelled for the foreseeable future. It is entirely wrong to go for a new system that uses three time the energy of known and satisfactory current systems. By the time HSR is widely in service, road traffic will have hugely reduced carbon emissions. Local personal transport will be battery- powered, charged off-peak from renewables or nuclear. In twenty years time, aircraft will be twice as fuel efficient, and could be more so if it was international policy to reduce cruise speeds. One only has to look at the ultra-efficient military UAVs which can stay airborne for tens of hours. Moreover, aviation isn’t going to go away or go into a serious decline. Synthetic liquid fuels will be developed and produced by countries with sufficient foresight. As CO2 concentrations rise, yields from plants and algae will improve anyway. Sadly, there has been no proper accounting of environmental impacts. Compensation won’t be payable except for property valuations. Sustaining the quality of life is vital in the national interest, and can be quantified by considering the cost of substitution of resources. For instance, there is the CAVAT methodology for assessing the financial value of amenity trees. May 2011

Written evidence from the North East Transport Activists Roundtable (HSR 61) NECTAR, the North East Combined Transport Activists Roundtable, is an open, voluntary, umbrella body, established to provide a forum in which the many organisations with an interest in sustainable transport in all its forms can develop a co-ordinated view on contemporary transport issues. NECTAR provides opportunity for the exchange of news, studies and information. Membership of NECTAR is open to organisations which: — support the use of sustainable transport and sustainable changes to the transport infrastructure; — broadly support integrated transport and land use policies which reduce the need to travel; — promote better provision for public transport, walking and cycling; and — seek to minimise any negative environmental or social impacts of transport, whilst maximising accessibility, safety, good health and quality of life for all. NECTAR is one of a national network of Transport Activists’ Roundtables working together with the Campaign for Better Transport, railfuture northeast and similar national bodies that share the core aim to promote sustainable transport. NECTAR executive committee members currently include Campaign for Better Transport (Tees Valley), Chester-le-Street Station, Campaign to Protect Rural England (North East), Cyclists Touring Club, Durham Coastliners, Friends of the Earth (North of England and Newcastle/), Living Streets Tyneside Area, railfuture northeast, Tyne & Wear Older People’s Transport Forum and the Tyne Valley Community Rail Partnership, but all are welcome to participate.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR We strongly support HS2 in principle. The main argument for high speed rail is that the status quo is unsustainable, by which we mean will not be able to continue as at present. Passenger numbers, already cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w156 Transport Committee: Evidence

commonly in excess of the available capacity, are set to rise significantly according to route utilisation strategies prepared by Network Rail. UK transport is heavily dependent on fossil fuels, contributes significantly to UK carbon emissions, and is responsible for serious air quality problems in places where there is traffic congestion. Increasing capacity for road traffic and aviation is not a strategy that can be guaranteed to deliver the UK’s transport needs. There are also major economic benefits to be gained, particularly the agglomeration benefits for the Midlands and Northern towns and cities. For Great Britain to benefit fully from high speed rail requires it to be integrated into the European high speed network. Failing to invest in high speed rail or integrate it into the European network runs the risk of isolating the majority of the country that lies outside London. Britain needs a rail network as effective as the best in Europe to be able to compete. Finally there are improvements to health (resulting from reduced air pollution) and safety (as accidents and injuries from rail travel are so much less than on the roads).

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives We are not sure what are the Government’s transport policy objectives: there has been no white or green paper from DfT since the coalition government took office. Secretary of State Philip Hammond has outlined long term challenges in a speech delivered in September 2010 as follows:(1) For long-distance, inter-urban journeys, our challenge is to make the train the mode of choice. For short-distance urban travel, our challenge is to make public transport or low-impact modes such as walking and cycling the most attractive options. The Secretary of State goes on to suggest that medium distance complex journeys will still be made by car, although it will be electrically driven. We agree with the general thrust of this statement, interpreting public transport to include local rail, metro, tram and bus, all electrically powered. An alliance of environmental organisations (Campaign for Better Transport, Campaign to Protect Rural England, Chiltern Society, Civic Voice, Environmental Law Foundation, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace UK, RSPB, The Wildlife Trusts, Woodland Trust) has pointed out that the High Speed Rail proposals do not form part of any comprehensive long term transport strategy.(2) They suggest the following objectives for such an overall strategy: reducing the need to travel, improving rail capacity and connectivity throughout the country, reducing regional economic disparities and ending dependence on oil. We would agree broadly with these objectives. We believe that high speed rail should form part of the strategy, delivering a national rail network that provides attractive transport links between major centres of population throughout Great Britain.

2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? Transport networks in the UK are necessary for the movement of people and goods, and these networks at present are often congested resulting in delays and inefficiency costs to individuals and businesses. Investment in transport networks is therefore necessary to ensure the continuing prosperity of the country. It is true that the majority of traffic is carried by the road network (largely because of the road building policies of previous decades and the construction of facilities only accessible by car), and that the existing network must be well maintained. Nevertheless, experience has shown that new road construction leads only to more traffic and increased congestion elsewhere. We believe that the railway is better suited to a future in which carbon emissions must be reduced and in which fossil fuels may not be available in the quantities in which the world has become used to consuming them. It therefore follows that investment in the classic rail network and in high speed rail is a priority, not least because the primary fuel source for rail traction does not have to be oil or indeed fossil fuel dependent. The increasing availability of non-combustion driven transport provides an opportunity to ensure that the polluter pays.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? The present plans for HSR do not anticipate serious levels of expenditure before 2015, but the key expenditure programmes on the classic rail network need commitment now. The classic rail network is already seriously stretched throughout the country. A much smaller proportion of the network is electrified than in other European countries. Wales is almost unique in Europe in having no electrified rail or light rail services. Despite considerable investment in new trains, much of the fleet, particularly in the North of England, is old and increasingly unreliable (witness the current Rail Accident Investigation Branch investigation of an incident at Durham (3) in which part of the drive shaft from a class 142 train dropped on to the track, something that turns out not to have been an isolated instance). To meet the challenges of the future, considerable investment will be required in the classic network now. Many opponents of high speed rail believe that HS2 will starve the classic network of investment funds. The Government can show that this is false by continuing cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w157

(and even expanding) its plans for electrification and new rolling stock either within or outside franchise contracts.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? In other European countries, the introduction of high speed rail services has resulted in declining passenger numbers for domestic aviation and the consequent withdrawal of services. On environmental grounds, we are entirely comfortable with this outcome.

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? The business case has been contentious, criticised on the one hand by those opposed to HS2 as depending on unrealistic numbers of passengers and on the other by supporters as being unduly pessimistic. We do not have the capability to make a detailed assessment of the business case, but would say that in many other parts of Europe patronage of high speed rail has met or exceeded projections. Nearer to home, HS1 now delivers around 80% of all ticketed journeys between London, Paris and Brussels. The track record of forecasting passenger numbers in this country is one of seriously underestimating use almost immediately after a new line is opened. Recent examples include Bathgate to Airdrie, Stirling to Alloa, and the Ebbw Vale line. Improved forecasting techniques have been developed by Network Rail (see for example the East Coast Main Line 2016 Capacity Review and the draft Northern Route Utilisation Strategy). The latest rail passenger figures show a marked increase, which has been attributed to increasing fuel prices and consequent higher cost of motoring. This is a continuing trend despite disproportionate fare increases imposed by Government. Rail travel in Britain is already the most expensive in Europe. HS1 shows that it is possible to deliver a high speed rail project on time and on budget. Extensive economic modelling has shown that high speed rail has overwhelming economic benefits for the national economy.(4) We should also reiterate the fact that time spent driving a vehicle is time lost to any alternative activity: time spent as a passenger can be used for other purposes, to suit the needs or wishes of the passenger. It is therefore likely that the business case rests on reasonable economic assumptions and that estimates of passenger numbers are more likely to be pessimistic than optimistic.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? High speed rail fits badly with other trains on mixed use lines. The greater disparity of speeds reduces capacity. Signalling requirements mean that every other train using the line has to be fitted with dedicated equipment. This argument was rehearsed in the early stages of the last West Coast Mail Line upgrade, when other operators balked at the cost of equipment that would allow Virgin West Coast trains to run at 140 mph. The West Coast Main Line upgrade concluded in the last decade was an object lesson in how not to go about increasing capacity: the process resulted in serious disruption to passengers, massive cost overruns, and convulsed the rail industry and government during the years that it was underway. High speed rail will remove one class of long distance trains from some of the classic network. This will allow expansion of regional and commuter services on the routes concerned. There is already discussion of how stations on the West Coast Mail Line can benefit from the extra timetable space.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? UK rail fares are already the most expensive in Europe and are set to increase by RPI + 3% for the next three years. Making an already expensive railway even more costly is unreasonable, especially for taxpayers who are compelled to support the system but cannot afford to use it. It must be remembered that through Government intervention rail travel has been made increasingly expensive over the past four decades, while the cost of motoring has been held flat in real terms. Recent examples include the 1p reduction in fuel tax this year whilst imposing RPI + 3% increases in rail fares. The inevitable consequence of these price signals is the levels of road congestion that we currently experience. The increasing Government funded availability and artificially constructed cost advantage of road transport (including the differing fares and taxes already alluded to, together with the recent subsidy for trading-in old cars) has also led to high levels of car dependency. The adverse impact resulting from this dependency is well documented, but in this context the financial consequences are widespread. The cost to the health service alone in dealing with obesity, respiratory disease and road traffic accidents is considerable. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w158 Transport Committee: Evidence

There is a role for decreasing demand for travel overall. Business is increasingly using techniques such as teleconferencing. Promoting alternatives to travel is a recent addition to DfT’s agenda. Nevertheless, if road traffic is to be reduced then capacity on the railway must increase significantly. Given the current modal shares of road and rail transport, even small shifts from road to rail will mean that minor reductions in road traffic will correspond to large demands on rail capacity. This points to the need for a modern transport strategy that takes these factors into account and provides a context for the contribution expected from high speed rail.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? Consult widely, agree the specification in detail before work begins and don’t change it. HS1 sets a good precedent.

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? High speed rail ceases to deliver significantly shorter journey times if there are too many stops en route.We are not otherwise concerned to debate the merits of alternative station locations, but note that the key strategic link required is with HS1 to bring Britain into the European network (see 4.4).

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? The proposed Y configuration is far better than the alternative reverse S route, which would have seen journeys between London and Leeds going via Manchester. However, the key word is network; as in France, Germany, Spain Italy, Japan, China and elsewhere, the eventual network should link all the main towns including but not necessarily limited to Aberdeen, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Newcastle, Middlesbrough, Leeds, Hull, Sheffield, Derby, Nottingham, Leicester, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Cardiff, Bristol, Exeter, Plymouth and Southampton. The Y route is a good core southern line but a national network is an imperative. High Speed 1 delivers London/Brussels in 2 hours 15 minutes; the indicative HS2 time for London Newcastle is 2 hours 37 minutes, hence the need for a high speed network. Britain has a lot of catching up to do.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? The lengthy planning, consultation and parliamentary phases of the project mean that building HS2 in stages is likely to reduce the time taken to get the first stage finished. Nevertheless, we believe on the basis of continental comparisons that a high speed network could and should be constructed and in operation very much more quickly that the present plans suggest. Opponents of HS2 who live in areas affected by the current alignment claim that there is no need for high speed rail because the UK is a small country. This is not true in terms of distance: for example London is further from Edinburgh than Paris is from Zurich. It also ignores the benefits of faster journeys and extra capacity on the network. There is a pressing need for greater capacity between cities of the North of England, where overcrowding on services between Leeds and Manchester is severe. Existing transpennine services are slow and follow circuitous routes. We believe that high speed rail might have got off to a less contentious beginning if a route linking Newcastle, Leeds, Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham had been proposed.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? Yes, it is important that HS2 links to HS1 from the start in order to encourage through travel to Europe by train from regions of Britain outside the South East. It is important to project the concept of a European high speed rail network; the feeding of intercontinental flights by rail is less important.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? International comparisons suggest that destinations linked into a high speed network experience a significant increase in prosperity. The classic example is the transformation of Lille. It should not be forgotten that Ebbsfleet International station was built on HS1 specifically to regenerate the surrounding area. We would hope to see this effect in the North of England. The agglomeration benefits of high speed links from Birmingham through the Midlands towns to Teesside, Tyneside and Edinburgh would develop a “centre” (measured as journey time) of population as large as London with the associated impact on regional output. To this end, it is essential that Leeds station is developed as a through station from the start and not as a terminal. The cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w159

increasing integration of Edinburgh and Glasgow through the current frequent rail service gives a small indication of what could be achieved.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? It is unrealistic to expect local regeneration directly from a high speed rail network. However regional regeneration is a highly desirable consequence, that is implicit in the forecasts of classic rail travel growth across the north seen in the Northern RUS. To that end, the high speed network should link the nation’s major centres of population, particularly along routes that are not currently served by fast services, eg, Birmingham, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Hull. Just as Broadband has transformed electronic communications, high-speed rail has the potential to transform physical connectivity.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? Locations directly served by the new line will benefit most directly, but there will be indirect benefits for others. These include locations on the classic rail network that benefit from better services, as well as those areas that suffer from road congestion or heavy goods traffic where these movements can be attracted to rail. The benefit is likely to be seen across the socio-economic spectrum either directly or indirectly through the jobs created in manufacturing, tourism and the service industries. Labour movement would be more effective and travel more efficient. University and science based businesses would be brought more closely together for the benefit of all.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? As a central government scheme, the core funding and risk should be carried centrally. However, there are major opportunities for local authorities and private businesses to contribute to specific projects such as stations and station environments both in the construction and operation phases. The consultation makes no mention of TEN-T funding. In principle, the Government should seek funding from any source, European or otherwise, willing to provide it.

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? Overall, the impact would be a reduction in carbon dioxide and other pollutant emissions: any shift from air or road would make a positive contributi0on. However, quantification of the impact on UK carbon emissions of high speed rail (and the existing network of electrified railway which is planned to increase with the electrification of lines from Paddington to Cardiff) will depend on how the required electricity is generated. A detailed discussion lies outside the scope of this response, but without doubt the low carbon technologies and green economy manufacturing capabilities of the North East would benefit, thus building on the region’s unique balance of trade surplus and contributing towards a relative growth in the economic output of the north of England.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? It is hard to quantify non-economic costs and benefits. It must be acknowledged that some areas will suffer from noise and other disruption. It must also be acknowledged that other areas experience noise, disruption and air pollution from road traffic congestion and noise from domestic aviation, all of which high speed rail will diminish. So far as we can tell, these effects have been taken into account in the business case, but others are better placed to discuss the detail. The experience of HS1 is that fears expressed before its construction have mostly not been realised.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? The impact of high speed rail on freight services will be wholly beneficial because of the extra capacity made available by the rerouteing of fast passenger services to the high speed network. The effect would be of two-fold benefit to freight in that the timetable space released by the services removed could be made available to freight and the resultant nearer match in speed of the traffic using the classic line would increase the capacity overall.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? Precedents for this exist in the construction of the original channel tunnel terminus at Waterloo and the subsequent construction of the High Speed 1 terminus at St. Pancras. Given this experience gained, it can cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w160 Transport Committee: Evidence

reasonably be predicted that the disruption would be proportionately reduced. However, the proposal for Euston station is for it to be completely rebuilt and hence, as with all construction projects, disruption to existing passenger services is inevitable. The consultation document specifies the final shape of the station and states that careful planning will mitigate as much as possible the adverse impacts. Outside the station areas, a major benefit of the new railway concept is that there will be minimal disruption to users of the existing network. May 2011

References (1) Sustainable Transport, Speech by Philip Hammond to the IBM START Conference Business Summit, 10 September 2010 http://www.dft.gov.uk/press/speechesstatements/speeches/hammond20100910 (2) The Right Lines—A Charter for High Speed Rail, CPRE, April 2011 http://www.cpre.org.uk/resources/transport/item/download/531 (3) Investigation into an incident at Durham station, 10 April 2011, Rail Accident Investigation Branch http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/current_investigations_register/110410_durham.cfm (4) The Economic Case, YES to High Speed Rail http://www.campaignforhsr.com/the-economic-case

Written evidence from the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (HSR 62) 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR Arguments For The main arguments for High Speed rail (HSR) are economic. The Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IMechE) has consistently supported the development of HSR as an integral part of a sustainable transport infrastructure as in the UK’s long term economic interests. It will enable regional development as part of a broader socio-economic policy. Modern economies rely heavily on cities, and cities rely on good communications for access to them, between them, and movement around them. The global shift is towards greater use of railways because of their inherent strengths: — The capacity for high volume movements between urban centres. — The environmental advantages which include: — Low land take per unit of capacity. — Low reliance on fossil fuels (subject to electricity generation mix). — No significant emissions at point of use. — Low energy requirement per passenger kilometre. There is nothing special about the UK cities and demographics that nullifies these advantages. Additional factors which support HSR are: Proven technology Sustainable efficient movement of passengers in high volumes does not depend on any technological breakthrough. All of the technologies required to achieve HSR levels of performance are already in proven operation. This brings high levels of certainty and lower risk into decision making. Europe and network benefits The UK has a direct rail connection to Europe, where rail and HSR are an important and growing part of the transport infrastructure. Experience shows that rail is an attractive option for travel between the UK and near European cities. Presently this impact is restricted to London and the South East but HSR will significantly spread this opportunity. Capacity where it’s needed Recent growth in the attractiveness of rail has taken the existing network to the limits of its capacity in key flows. The growth has been despite a perception of relatively high fares. HSR provides the capacity the system needs on a prime routes key to the development of the UK economy and demographics. Journey time is an important factor in modal competition. Continued movement towards rail as an efficient mode in applications that play to its strengths (eg Inter-City travel) depends on development of high quality public transport services. It is clear that HSR is part of this development. The competitive position of the rail mode will decline and its advantages will be lost to the country unless the quality of the rail offering continues to improve through suitable investment. Longevity Laying down railway infrastructure is a long term investment and decision. The benefits are inherent and sustainable. It is not possible to imagine a role for London as a world city without the rail cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w161

infrastructure that serves it. This infrastructure was built largely by the Victorians and has already lasted 150 years. As we lay down new rail infrastructure it is important that we do not restrict its future flexibility in speed and capacity. The plans developed for HSR are in line with global and European standards.

Arguments Against The faster the travel, the more energy is consumed, the greater the noise, and all other factors being equal, the safety risk is higher. The energy and noise issues are fundamental to the physics of air resistance. They can be mitigated by good aerodynamic design but cannot be eliminated except by speed reduction. The IMechE has consistently argued that our trains should go as fast as they need to, not necessarily as fast as they can. Nevertheless it follows that a flexible infrastructure allows for them to go as fast as is safe and efficient to achieve the necessary economic benefits. This speed is currently around 350kph, but can be expected to rise towards 400kph over the life of the investment. The safety risk can be designed out to such an extent that the Japanese HS system has operated in a densely populated corridor for 50 years without a single passenger fatality from a train collision or derailment. HSR should have a dedicated infrastructure with the same design elements.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? The policy objectives are driven by the government’s socio-economic and climate change objectives: (a) The proven ability of good rail communications to revitalise and regenerate regions and cities provide an excellent fit with the socio-economic objectives. (b) The key 2050 climate change objective is indirectly met through: — Modal shift from less sustainable modes. — Release of capacity on the existing network to meet shorter journey length needs. — The attractiveness of the rail mode through high quality service provision.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? Compared to London, other UK cities have less dense use of their railway infrastructure. It follows that increasing this density makes economic sense. In general this is achieved first by longer trains, more frequent services, and electrification. These improvements require less capital than building new capacity and infrastructure. Both new lines and improvements to the “classic” network will be required in future with a balance to be struck on socio-economic grounds. The needs and the solutions are complementary, not mutually exclusive.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? To a limited extent, HSR will reduce the level of internal domestic air travel which will release airport capacity for essential longer flights. The UK aerospace industry therefore has an opportunity to retain its position as a global power in technology and manufacturing and service delivery. By way of contrast the UK railway engineering industry will further suffer if its home market does not participate in the global and European rail shift to HSR.

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? The IMechE’s position in relation to this question is related to our competence on the issue of engineering costs. We believe the assumptions and methodology to have had an appropriate level of peer review and professional input. This is coupled with recent (HS1) experience that gives a great deal of confidence in the cost side of the business case presented.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? By way of contrast with the positive HS1 experience mentioned above, upgrading the West Coast Main Line (WCML) has been likened to “open heart surgery half way up the Matterhorn”. The financial costs are high and relatively unpredictable. Such a project on a key route would inevitably involve completely unacceptable cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w162 Transport Committee: Evidence

levels of disruption that damage the attraction of the rail mode and delay its full contribution to the government’s transport objectives. Building a new conventional line would not necessarily be cheaper or quicker, but would artificially limit the future flexibility of the route as part of the network. The land take and visual impact would be near identical. In the limit, trains on a High Speed line can always slow down for environmental reasons if required to do so. On the other hand, signalling or curvature constraints built into a railway are expensive to remove, as is witnessed by the recent WCML upgrade experience.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? There is a logical case for travel pricing to be related to the full cost of provision including all external costs. On the other hand, constraining the achievement of socio-economic goals through artificially raising the price of any mode does not make sense. Taxation policies need to support the overall strategy. Indirect beneficiaries (e.g. property developers, affected landowners, growth businesses) should also bear their share of the costs. Some subsidy of non-economic transport activities (eg high peak operation) may also be necessary to meet economic and demographic objectives.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? Recent experience suggests that the UK has the skill base and know-how to deliver major rail infrastructure projects on time and to budget, even when they have some involvement with the existing infrastructure (eg HS1 and St Pancras). The major delay for UK plc lies in a planning regime that injects uncertainty and delay.

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? There are no overriding engineering based reasons that make the IMechE question the proposed route or build phasing strategy. Nevertheless engineering costs will be contained to a minimum if the government can provide the confidence in a rolling programme that will support private investment in the skills and equipment required for highly mechanised and efficient production of new railway in a competitive environment.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? We have no response for these economic questions.

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? We understand that the overall impact of HS2 on the country’s Carbon emissions by the key date of 2050 to be limited or broadly neutral. It will provide extra capacity with the potential for it to be low or even zero carbon. The degree of modal shift required will vary depending on the speed with which each mode improves its Carbon efficiency relative to the other modes. Nevertheless, a half-full train running on green electricity has the lowest carbon emissions per pass. km of all land transport, by a significant margin. This position does not need new evidence to support it. The IMechE has always argued that the UK energy policy needs to reduce the Carbon emissions in the generation mix. When this has been achieved the Carbon penalty associated with cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w163

higher speed rail travel will be largely eliminated. Electric trains operation in Sweden has emissions per pass.km several thousand times less than the UK average due entirely to this factor.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? The IMechE has no evidence to question the accounting for environmental costs in the business case. It would appear from the lack of complaints related to HS1 operation that the noise impact can be overrated by objectors at the planning stage. The external costs of all transport modes based on fossil fuel use need to fully reflect the health effects, including for example, the respiratory affect of poor air quality in cities.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? Increasing the available capacity on the “classic” network delivers the opportunity to increase those services which will contribute most to the government’s transport related socio-economic objectives. In some cases these will be freight services designed to produce the optimum modal mix between coastal shipping, trunk rail and local road distribution networks.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? The building of a new line implies that the majority of the disruption will be to other modes and city life in the affected areas. The recent experience of HS1 at St Pancras suggests that this can be contained by good construction practice and engineering design. May 2011

Written evidence from Robert Andrew Kemp (HSR 63) 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR The arguments for HSR are based on claims taken from the Department of Transport document “Consultation” dated February 2011. We believe a national high speed rail network from London to Birmingham, and onward to Leeds and Manchester, can transform the way Britain works and competes as profoundly as the coming of the original railways in the19th century. A far cheaper and more environmentally friendly method to transform the way Britain works would be to invest in high speed communication lines to allow increased use of technology such as video conferencing by businesses, thereby reducing the need for business travel. There can be no doubt that the coming of the railways transformed the economy of the country primarily by the movement of freight from one part of the country to another. This is clearly not part of the HSR strategy as it is not planned to carry freight traffic. HSR has the potential to help bridge the North-South divide that has for too long limited growth outside London and the South East. The DFTs figures estimate that 70% of jobs “Created by HS2” will be in London. Most of the jobs that are claimed to be created will not be genuinely new jobs, but will have moved from other parts of the country. A high speed rail network has the potential to generate a massive £44 billion of benefits. It would directly deliver thousands of jobs constructing and operating new lines, development of our world class engineering talent and regeneration of key areas of our inner cities, including in West London and Birmingham’s Eastside. There is little evidence that higher “performance” trains support economic growth. While it is true that thousands of jobs will be created constructing the new line, these will only short term contracts whilst the line is being built. There are clearly more sustainable methods of investing money to generate jobs and regenerate inner city areas. Other infrastructure improvements are likely to provide a better investment to support economic growth and can be achieved sooner. High speed rail is also an important part of our plans for a low carbon economy, helping us meet our climate change targets by encouraging millions out of their cars and off the planes onto the train. It is estimated that high speed rail will use approximately twice as much energy as a conventional train and therefore create greater emissions of greenhouse gases. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w164 Transport Committee: Evidence

The HSR proposal estimates that 2% or less of motorway traffic would switch to HSR so carbon emission savings form car journeys switching to trains will be minimal. Domestic air travel is currently in decline. Few, if any people fly form London to Birmingham, and rail already has 79% of the Manchester market. For phase 2, scheduled flights to Leeds ended in March 2011 and HSR in 2032 only matches the current fastest train from Newcastle to London. Today’s railways face a huge capacity challenge. Rail passengers are familiar with overcrowding, used to long queues and are almost certain to have found themselves standing on a long distance journey at some point. And demand is set to rise sharply in the years to come. On the West Coast Main Line, in particular, new rail infrastructure will be essential. The additional capacity requirements can be met very easily and achieved much more quickly by investment in the existing infrastructure and rolling stock. It is likely that most people would prefer improvements to their existing service. The DFT has produced its own solution to this issue in the Rail Proposal 2 (RP2) documents. Our competitors already recognise the huge benefits high speed rail can bring and are pressing ahead with ambitious plans. Britain cannot afford to be left behind. Across the globe we have seen how high speed rail can revive and regenerate cities. We must ensure that the UK’s principal population centres benefit from this high speed effect. The UK, unlike other European countries, has had a fast national rail system for a long time. The average journey times between the capital and five major cities in the UK are faster than journey times in other European countries. For example 145 minutes in the UK compares with 221 minutes in France to 244 in Germany. The Government believes high speed rail is crucial to Britain’s future success. Our plans have the support of political and business leaders across the . There has also been opposition expressed in writing to the HSR proposal. The following lists a small number of those opposed: Patrick Barbour (Former chairman, Microgen plc); Toby Baxebdale (Founder, Direct Seafoods); Chris Kelly (Chairman, Keltruck); Lord Lawson of Blaby; Sir David Naish; and Matthew Sinclair (Director, Tax Payers’ Alliance).

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives Because of the extremely high cost of this project, it is likely that less finance would be available for other transport projects. It seems foolhardy to spend this amount of money on a single project. A more even distribution of funds to various transport schemes would seem to be a more sensible use of limited funding. An alternative scheme for increasing capacity of the existing network has already been mentioned in paragraph 1. The implications for domestic air travel have already been mentioned in paragraph 1. The station at Birmingham International will be located next to Birmingham International Airport which is currently running well below full capacity. This is very likely to mean an increase in international flights from this airport adding further carbon emissions.

3. Business case The business case assumes that rail travel will increase by 100% over the next 35 years without HSR. The demand for long distance train services is overestimated by some 47%. The demand does not take account of the improvement in telecommunications negating the need for business travel It seems likely that leisure travelers will use HSR “because it is there”. This seems to be at odds with the Government’s travel reduction policy. Do we build transport infrastructure to satisfy demand or to stimulate demand? cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w165

Over 40% of the estimated benefits of HSR are based on the assumption that all time on trains is wasted. Anyone who has travelled by train recently will see that this is not the case. The use of laptops and mobile communication devices is already widespread

4. The strategic route The proposed route passes through the middle of an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (The Chiltern Hills). This has the same status as a National Park and there would clearly be a severe impact on the environment. Much of the route through this area would be above ground. There is no indication of a tunnel under this area of countryside used by very many people each year as an area of recreation. The tunnelling that is proposed is of the “cut and fill” type. 24 areas of woodland would be affected by HSR including nine ancient wood land sites. The total area of woodland destroyed would be around 17.75 ha. 13,700m of hedgerow would be destroyed with obvious implications for wildlife. With the exception of Old Oak Common, there are no stations proposed between London and Birmingham. For residents living in Berks, Bucks, Herts, Middlesex etc, it will actually take longer to reach Birmingham by HSR than travelling using an existing rail route as the journey will involve travelling to central London to catch the train. This clearly provides no local benefit to any of these areas.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity As explained in paragraph 1, the impact on the North South divide is likely to be minimal. There is evidence that it will actually benefit the London area to a greater extent. It is important to provide a transport infrastructure for the whole country. This scheme is clearly of little or no benefit to Wales, the West country and East Anglia. It seems likely that this scheme will only benefit the wealthy socio-economic groups. There is no mention of proposed fares but it not envisaged that this will be a cheap form of transport. On a personal note, on planning a recent trip to Germany, the cost of travelling by HSR worked out at approximately twice the cost of travelling by air.

6. Impact The impact on UK carbon emissions is not expected to be significant. This has already been covered in paragraph 1. The environmental impacts are covered in the proposals “Appraisal of Sustainability”. This is misleading and contains incorrect information. It is misleading on carbon emissions as stated above. Noise contours are not provided. Impact of noise is measured incorrectly and does not conform to World Health recommendations. It uses average measure of noise exposure rather than more appropriate peak emissions. It is estimated that the rebuilding of Euston station will take eight years to rebuild which will clearly cause disruption to existing travelers using this station. May 2011

Written evidence from Warwickshire County Council (HSR 64) 1. Introduction 1.1 This statement does not prejudice the formal response of Warwickshire County Council (WCC) to the Government’s consultation, which will be submitted before the closing of the consultation 29 July 2011. 1.2 WCC is part of the 51m Local Authority network opposed to HS2 and endorses the evidence submitted on behalf of the 51m group to this Select Committee, covering all six issues which the Committee is to examine. In addition WCC wishes to bring the following specific matters to the attention of the Transport Select Committee. 1.3 WCC’s meeting of the full council on 14.12.10 resolved: “that, as there can be no environmental or economic benefits for Warwickshire, this Council: (1) Opposes the proposed High Speed Rail 2 scheme. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w166 Transport Committee: Evidence

(2) Recommends that the consultation be deferred until all information is made available. (3) Instructs the Leader to write to the Secretary of State for Transport (copy to Warwickshire MPs) expressing these views. (4) Agrees to work with the other local authorities affected by the planned HS2 route, and with the Action Groups established throughout Warwickshire, to provide coordinated opposition to the current scheme”.

2. The Business Case

(i) How robust are the assumptions and methodology used?

WCC considers there are several shortcomings in the methodology used: (a) Concerns around the techniques used for long term forecasting and whether these are reliable, or give rise to extrapolation which increase risk & viability issues. (b) An assumption that there is no further investment to the rail network for a considerable period, beyond current commitments, which is questionable.

(ii) What are the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways?

WCC consider that the consultation does not provide sufficient information to examine other alternatives comparable with the HS2 proposal, to enable this question to be answered. A key question should be what else could be achieved on the existing rail network, with the same level of funding and how would these pros and cons compare with HS2?

3. The Strategic Route

(i) Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the Y configuration the right choice?

The consultation does not include details of the Y route, or alternatives to the Y, nor station choice on the Y and therefore this cannot be properly considered. If the over arching aim is to reduce the north/south divide then further detailed consideration needs firstly to be made of direct benefits for key cities—which and how much, versus identifying more limited benefits for those cities/urban areas in between.

(ii) Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

No. The approach is flawed in not covering both networks, phase 1 & 2 together. Warwickshire is possibly the only County which may be affected by both networks, with a third of the HS2 phase 1 route within Warwickshire and potentially the northern part of the County affected by HS2 phase 2, but we are unable to examine the proposals for both simultaneously. The true costs and benefits of HS2 cannot therefore be examined.

4. Economic Rebalancing and Equity

(i) What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north—south economic divide?

WCC considers that the evidence to date does not adequately justify a reduction of the north/south divide. Rather the consultation material is based on high level evidence that HS2 will lead to increased economic growth, at a level which will produce economic benefits to the north, which will in turn help reduce the north/ south divide. This is based on assumptions that improvements from HSR can lead to greater efficiency, through improved linkages between firms and between firms and their workers. It is clear however from the consultation information, that in terms of jobs growth from phase 1, half of the predicted 40,000 jobs will be in the SE. London and its hinterland will remain the magnet and major beneficiary from HS2 phase 1. The degree to which HS2 could help bridge the north/south divide should be examined in much more detail. Economic regeneration benefits will be localised to those areas and immediate hinterlands abutting new stations.

(ii) To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

If the aim is to support local and regional regeneration, then more detailed consideration needs to be made of intermediate nodes and impacts on other major areas, prior to a final route being approved. Warwickshire’s economy is closely linked to Coventry’s and the impact of HS2 on Coventry has yet to be determined. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w167

5. Impact (i) Are environmental costs & benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? No. The business case and Appraisal of Sustainability do not go far enough. No local data has been used to consider the environmental costs and benefits, only national data sets. Nor has consideration been given to community impact. For example: HS2 Ltd has recognised the EU and UK legislation to protect listed sites and species. However HS2 Ltd has only used part of the data that is readily available and without conducting any survey work. Only data on Birmingham and London’s Local Wildlife Sites (LWS) has been used despite Warwickshire’s being publicly available since the summer of 2010. This is considered to be a substantial flaw in the business rationale. Within Warwickshire, HS2 will directly impact on 30+ LWSs, 13 UK & local Biodiversity Action Plan (UKBAP) and Local Biodiversity Action Plan (LBAP) habitat types. The indirect impacts (hydrological, vibration, noise, light and general disturbance) could include a further 91 locations plus a further five Sites of SSSI (Special Scientific Interest), none of which are in the consultation information. Significant areas of ancient woodland will be affected. The proposed route is well populated with European, national and county important species none of which are appraised in this report. The impacts on geology and geomorphology (apart from in hydrological terms) have not been assessed. The approach in this area is contrary to current government strategies and policies. Among the historic environment the sites affected include: medieval earthworks, 17th century Dunton Hall, a Grade II listed farmhouse at Coleshill, remnants of a mediaeval settlement at Stoneleigh, a mill race, Stoneleigh Abbey Park and Deer Park (Grade II listed), World War II bridge defences plus 80 sites within 500m of the proposed route; and a number of unique Warwickshire landscape character types along the route could be adversely affected, altered or lost. The Appraisal of Sustainability report takes no account of any data from the Historic Environment Record for Warwickshire. The Historic Landscape Characterisation has been ignored. In addition the environmental costs and benefits associated with the proposed circa 7,000 space car park at the Birmingham International Interchange Station need to be taken into consideration and examination made of the impacts on the existing road network and community impacts. May 2011

Written evidence from Stoneleigh Action Group (HSR 65) TRANSPORT SELECT COMMITTEE TERMS OF REFERENCE 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR 2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives 1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? HSR is to be considered a negative feature of an overall rail programme. Negative because it is likely to drain financial resources from other low key but essential developments. Should the focus be on inter- urban connectivity per se, or should it be directed towards an overall enhancement of the rail network? Again looking at transport as a whole, there is a danger that other projects will be shelved in favour of HSR. What overall vision is there for HSR, ie after HS2, will there be HS3 etc and might it not be an idea to consider this? If we can provide an example from our own area, Kenilworth our local town, has a population of approaching 30,000 people, no station (closed in the ) and may get two railway lines within its boundaries if HS2 goes ahead. To get onto HS2 would involve a 11 mile commute to Birmingham International or a commute to Coventry or Leamington main line stations. Both of these activities rely on carbon fuel. We understand that a possible subsidy for a station in Kenilworth is now severely in doubt, but these are the sort of interventions we would rather see, not politically brash, but essential. 2. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? We understand that HSR would drain financial resources from classic rail as above. The danger then is that the classic rail network then starts to fall apart as evidence from France. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w168 Transport Committee: Evidence

3. What are the implications for domestic aviation? Between London and Birmingham there are no flights, a search of Birmingham Airport’s website reveals no flights to London, so HS2 will achieve no modal shift here. There is the possibility that if modal shift occurs for flights over longer distances, the tendency is for airport operators to attempt to replace these with even longer flights, so any environmental objectives will be compromised.

3. Business case 1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? We would just wish to comment that time on a train now with technologies cannot be considered to be time lost. The only point to stress here is that seating capacity must be provided but that would not matter whether classic or HSR. We will leave others to comment on robustness of models but there is always the danger that models can be fitted to support an argument pro or anti. Have the proposals taken into account the nature of future work. We are educating our secondary school children today for jobs that do not exist now but will when they leave school seven years later. What is the likely impact of technology on business travel? Why travel when you do not need to? We are then looking leisure/personal travel. 2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? We would urge the Committee to look at the implications of RP2a. Its critics have said that this is not future-proofed, but if the predictions turn out to be true, the network cannot wait for the advent of HSR in 2025, so some form of RP2 will need to be implemented. Has that been factored into any financial equation? 3. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? Since the rail companies have introduced an airline style of pricing this has undoubtedly increased demand, especially for leisure travel. It is fair to say that leisure travel is more price sensitive than business travel and that the latter will always be a primary market. This will not achieve any modal shift of sufficient quantity. If business travel is well catered for and classic rail then starts to unravel, there is a danger that mass market movements will revert to road. 4. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? Employ independent companies to carry out review, pricing etc without political restraint, and publish the results without any adaption. Set realistic timescales and prepare thoroughly before starting. These proposals seem rushed especially the proposal of the Y network north of Birmingham which “feels” like an unresolved afterthought to counter opposition to a London to Birmingham route which does not offer any significant time savings, one of the chief arguments for HSR. We would argue that reliability, safety and cost are more important.

4. The strategic route 1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? It seems a very complicated route structure and these intermediate stations counter the desire for high speed, but acknowledge the difficulties of putting HSR into established urban areas. More stations would again slow trains so the argument for very high design speeds is weakened. However, if HSR is successful it creates economic winners and losers, eg Birmingham wins Coventry loses as classic inter-urban rail travel diminishes. Our view is that a reduction in the design speed allows for a better alignment of the track and also allows the opportunity to reroute it along an existing transport corridor. 2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? Evidence suggests that the busiest transport corridor is north-west from Birmingham, so this is a probable priority. Once again the case for High Speed Rail is weakened by the close proximity of cities in the north west of England. So the question again is: will HSR and its high design speeds provide the right fit? We think not. 3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? If it is so badly needed, which we dispute, then what timescales are on offer? cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w169

4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? Certainly there is a common perception of being able to board one train in say Manchester and getting off in Paris. This is not the case and many people remain unaware of this. What is the point in surcharging Heathrow, an airport we are told that is already under heavy load? Other regional airports exist and have capacity, but does the Government want to encourage air travel or can we believe that the so called modal shift is being done for environmental reasons?

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? Limited. What other incentives will there be to spread economic activity away from London as opposed to creating a super economic hub in London? 2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? What evidence is there that this will help at all? We have a rail network with good inter-urban connectivity so will this really be a seismic shift? We doubt it. We see a proposal which will aid regional pockets and which is not inclusive. 3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? It seems to us the South East and white collar and professional/ management groups. Does a rail line have a greater priority for the movement of goods than of people? This would then favour manufacturing which can then locate where conditions are favourable. 4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? Yes they should. This is the only equitable way to distribute a partial way of generating wealth. This could be in the form of a percentage tax on economic activity. What is the role of the Local Authorities with regard to emergency provision on the section of track within their area? If they have to make provision as is likely, what will this provision consist of and how will it be funded: (a) in implementation; and (b) in ongoing costs. If we take the case of Warwick District Council, or local authority, there is the potential for an economic liability for no economic return, so they will require subsidies.

6. Impact 1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? We have already commented on what appears to be a confused set of objectives. We have our commitments to Kyoto Earth summit etc. What consideration of the following carbon costs has been allocated in the proposals: the embedded carbon cost from construction and the construction carbon consumption, eg construction traffic, deliveries etc? the size of the electricity demand and its generation? 2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? No we believe not. It appears to be a net loss to the physical environment without obvious gains. If we concentrate on acoustics, there is no data available for trains running at the maximum speed (400kph), data only goes up to 360kph and although responses stated are typically that trains will get quieter and initially trains will not run at that speed etc, then reconsider the track alignment. There appears to be no modeling for trains passing each other. It is clear that airborne noise dominates above 300kph and since we have been running high speed trains for 30 years, the nose design must have been optimized, so there is no apparent magic solution waiting to be discovered to reduce the train-in-motion noise. 3. What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? If we are to believe this there will be more slots for freight but there is also talk of improving local train routes so the two may be incompatible. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w170 Transport Committee: Evidence

4. How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? This is not something we wish to comment on. Clearly there will be disruption and Euston is a pinch point. May 2011

Written evidence from North West Rail Campaign (HSR 66) Introduction The North West Rail Campaign (NWRC) is a partnership of organisations from both the private and public sector. The overarching aim of the campaign is to achieve economic growth in the North West in line with the Government’s first stated priority in the coalition agreement of May 2010 of rebalancing the economy outside of the South East. In transport terms, this means investment in projects that will connect people with jobs, cities with each other, and increase the productivity of the labour market in the North West through the enhancement of infrastructure to solve the problems of capacity, specifically around the Northern Hub and on the West Coast Mainline. We believe that HSR addresses our priorities for releasing capacity around the West Coast mainline and increasing inter- urban connectivity, ultimately helping rebalance the North West economy with that of the South East. The following paper seeks to address the issues that the Transport Select Committee wishes to examine and does so following consultation with a wide range of stakeholders in the North West—civic leaders, Local Authorities, the Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce, the North West Business Leadership team, trade unions, Transport for Greater Manchester, and the Manchester Airport Group.

1. The Main Arguments for High Speed rail The case for high speed rail is primarily driven by the huge increase in passenger demand seen over the past 10–15 years and the projected need over the next 20–30 years for more transport capacity, rather than a “need for speed”. The West Coast mainline is due to become saturated in the next 10–15 years and this saturation will have negative economic impacts for the North West and UK as a whole as time progresses. Increasing capacity through high speed rail has real benefits for the economy, improving journey times for passengers, and improving the connectivity of the UK. Releasing capacity on the classic network has additional benefits for the movement of freight to/from the North West and local travel. HSR will have particular benefits for inter- urban connectivity in the North West, whose economy is knowledge and high- tech based and dependent on high quality intercity links. Current poor inter- city connectivity in the North, particularly around the “Northern Hub” will act as a major constraint to narrowing the North/South productivity gap if allowed to continue. The costs of doing business and attracting labour in the North West are also higher than they need to be.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does this objective compare to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? HSR meets the Government’s first priority—to rebalance the economy outside of the South East. As the largest economy outside of London, the North West is well placed to address this challenge. Linking businesses in the North West with other markets in both the United Kingdom and Europe will provide a significant and sustained impetus to the regional economy. Freeing up space on the existing rail network will also create significant capacity for local and freight services. It is also generally accepted that existing road capacity cannot meet the forecast increase in demand, is not an environmentally sustainable solution. and that other solutions have to be found. There are also physical constraints to how much road building would be feasible (especially into our urban centres) and it has been accepted by successive Governments that no one solution in itself is the answer and that an integrated approach to transport investment is the best solution to meet demand, mitigate environmental impact and encourage modal shift to more sustainable transport.

2. Focussing on rail, what would be the implications on expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock in and around major cities? For HSR to be effective, the classic rail network serving the North West needs to get people to and from the new high speed services. Early investment in the Northern Hub, for example, is needed to address the capacity and connectivity constraints in the North West that currently act as blockage to economic growth—these problems need to be addressed well before HSR services begin. Government has already recognised this and the announcement of the £85 million investment in the “Ordsall Chord”, connecting Manchester Victoria with Manchester Piccadilly is the first of a series of projects that will free up capacity on the Transpennine routes and allow better connections between Liverpool, Manchester and Leeds. Services such as this will be essential to support the new high speed line. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w171

3. What are the Implications for Domestic aviation? The advent of the Virgin Pendolino from Manchester to London, connecting the two cities within just over two hours, has already seen modal shift from domestic airlines to train and this would be expected to continue and increase with HSR. Elsewhere, the Spanish high speed network, AVE, has hugely reduced air travel from Madrid to Barcelona. In addition, this type of modal shift should take pressure away from the need to build more runways in the South East, freeing up slots at South East Airports and generating long term carbon savings.

3. Business case for HSR 1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the classic network? NWRC believes that the assumptions made by HS2 Ltd are conservative and have recently been revised in line with updated data. Estimates of cost have been derived from a detailed assessment of the needs of the scheme and comparisons with costs of construction of HS1 and other rail schemes. There is also a Treasury- inspired “optimum bias” built in which adds 64% to infrastructure capital costs—these costs have been tested with HS2 and a panel of independent experts. Within these estimates there are ranges to reflect different views of the risks and performance of the rail network. There is an underlying assumption that the scheme would be entirely Government funded, but the Secretary of State has already made it clear that there is an expectation of private sector contributions, particularly where station locations would offer specific local economic benefits. Private sector contributions would increase the benefit:cost ratio (BCR), lowering the costs to Government.

2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast mainline or building a new conventional line? The West Coast Mainline saw completion of a major upgrade in 2008, having taken 10 years, cost of £9 billion, and caused significant sustained disruption to rail services over much of that period of time. This level of disruption was a major cause of concern to businesses across the North West of England over most of the last decade—it led to significantly extended journey times, very poor weekend services, and major periods of bus replacement both on local and longer distance services, and rail diversions. The House of Commons Public Accounts committee concluded in 2007 that some parts of the West Coast mainline were already near or already at peak capacity, and that by 2015–2020 the line may not have enough capacity to meet demand. Building a new conventional line is estimated to cost only fractionally less (9%) than building a high speed line. The small additional cost to Government of a high speed line over a conventional upgrade yields significant extra benefits. The BCR for a new classic line is estimated to be around 1.6—conversely for HS2 London to Birmingham it is 2.0.

3. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? There is a logic for variable pricing, eg charging higher fares for peak time travellers. Generally speaking, though, pricing passengers off trains and onto roads for long journeys would only serve to increase road congestion and act as an impediment to economic growth—it would also give no advantage in terms of the speed of journeys.

4. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? It is important that when planning major transport projects that Government does the detailed engineering and planning analysis well in advance, so that adjustments to stations, track etc are thought out well in advance in order to avoid the mistakes of previous projects. We are concerned that without proper planning for the North West services in phase one that expenditure might be wasted as happened in respect to investment in Waterloo station in the HS1 project. It is therefore vital that any modifications to the infrastructure between Birmingham to Manchester to accommodate the phase one services is planned for as part of phase 1 (London to Birmingham).

4. The strategic route 1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? Linking two of Britain’s main cities, London and Birmingham, has major economic benefits in terms of agglomeration. In the longer-term the high speed network will also release capacity on the Midland Main Line and East Coast Main Line, both due to reach peak capacity by 2030. In assessing whether fewer or more stations should be considered, time consumption in slowing down and then speeding up in and out of stations should be taken into account, as adding longer journey times starts to decrease the benefits of high speed rail. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w172 Transport Committee: Evidence

The selection of interchange or intermediate stations should consider both the best usage of the HS2 line and the onward connections from any intermediate station onto the classic network. A few key nodes need to be identified on both networks where interchange can take place effectively. Any station opportunities should also link to wider economic development plans to ensure the investment captures the wider GVA benefits. For example, in the North West, Crewe is a key node on the classic rail network, so enhancing connectivity there would benefit a large number of other North West towns and cities. With its strong rail heritage, it also provides a potential site for an HS2 maintenance base which would be consistent with existing plans for its role to grow as a key economic growth point.

2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y the right choice? It is important that the major cities of Britain are served by High Speed Rail, to give the benefits of agglomeration and to start the rebalancing of the economy outside of the South East, in line with the Government’s first stated priority. As the North West region has the second largest economy outside of London, high speed rail will help to grow the economy of this region, greater connectivity will be an impetus to further growth. In Manchester, in particular, and has the potential to attract further investment, being well connected to a major international airport. The extension of the high speed rail network to Glasgow and Edinburgh offers those cities the economic growth potential and agglomeration benefits of Manchester, Birmingham and London. Conventional services between the northern cities need to be much better developed through the hub programme and further electrification. . High speed rail will also free up existing rail networks for local commuter travel and freight services. The logic of Manchester International Airport as an interchange station, is strong. This airport provides for good inter modal connectivity, being currently served by rail, bus and major motorway links.

3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? The Government is correct to propose building in HSR stages, but we question why there is such a proposed delay in the construction between phase 1 and 2, given that the development work for phase 2 is only 18 months behind that of phase 1. As noted above it is vital that proper planning is done for services to Manchester, and infrastructure that might be needed north of Lichfield, as part of “phase one”.

4. The Government proposes a link a link to HS1 as part of phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? NWRC supports the proposals for a link to HS1, as part of phase 1 construction, as access to European markets will allow North West businesses to achieve economic growth through direct access to the channel tunnel. We agree that a future HSR link to Heathrow is needed, making Heathrow more accessible to North West passengers as part of Phase 2 plans. The investment into Manchester International Airport as an interchange station would provide a good link between HSR phase 2 and Heathrow.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the North- South economic divide? Evidence that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the North-south economic divide comes from other areas in which HSR schemes have been integrated with a range of transport modes, enabling modal shift quickly and efficiently and enabling easy access to job markets and major cities. Agglomeration benefits are achieved when travel between cities brings them ‘closer’ together in terms of accessibility, eg Paris and Lyon, the latter having seen significant economic growth since the introduction of a high speed link. Early local estimates are that approximately 10,000 jobs would be created in the North West by the introduction of HSR, generating almost £1 billion of economic output (GVA).

2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? The shape of the network should be influenced by the need to support regional and local economies. The proposed “Y” shape achieves this, linking London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool and Glasgow.

3. Which locations and socio economic groups will benefit from HSR? The city centre station locations will likely benefit from HSR, with the expected creation of economic growth around station locations and therefore local job markets and increased productivity. The benefits of HSR are not limited to these areas, however and it is expected that the “ripple” effect of HSR-related growth will be felt across the region. Freeing up capacity on the classic network will also allow for expansion of local train services, connecting people with those job markets. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w173

4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? Through the careful development of the Hybrid Bill, the Government can ensure that steps are in place to extract appropriate financial contribution from the major beneficiaries of HSR, in order to reduce the burden on the taxpayer. For example the Crossrail Bill included the use of a supplementary business rate to levy funds from the private sector, drawing in £150 million. The private sector could be involved in Section 106 style planning agreements where businesses will directly benefit from development around stations on the new line.

6. Impact 1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on the UK’s carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? HSR could significantly reduce carbon emission levels in the UK as faster modes of land travel will naturally encourage modal shift from car and air travel (see section 2 above). Research by the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) concludes that HSR travel produces only 1/3 of the carbon emissions of car travel and ¼ of the emissions of an equivalent trip by air, bearing in mind the different loads on each mode. It is estimated that the line between London and the West Midlands alone will provide carbon savings of 5 million tonnes of CO2 over 60 years—if that line were extended up to Scotland, the CO2 savings would be approximately one million tonnes each year by 2055. De-carbonisation of the UK’s electricity generation facilities should reduce carbon emissions even further.

2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? NWRC believes that assessments of environmental costs and benefits are conservative and based on both detailed assessment of demand in the future and future carbon environmental. Significantly they exclude long term effects that might accrue from impacts on housing location through wider shifts in future transport patterns. The impacts of HS1 and other rail schemes have also formed part of these assessments.

3. What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? It is essential that some of the classic network capacity is freed up for freight, in order that connectivity can be improved to ports and airports. Volumes of freight are due to increase by 140% by 2030, according to Network Rail’s Route Utilisation Freight Strategy and it is essential that this demand is met by increasing capacity, or this will have a negative impact on the North West’s economy.

4. How much disruption will there be to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly in the rebuilding of Euston? There is bound to be disruption to the classic network during the construction phase, but not nearly to the extent seen in the upgrade of the West Coast mainline. This phased upgrade was more complex and expensive than predicted and saw journey times increase and modal shift move away from rail to car and air during and after construction. North West businesses feel it is important that these problems are not repeated. The disruption caused by the upgrade of the West Coast mainline is in itself a strong argument for the construction of a brand new rail line. The North West has many areas of high environmental value and the commitment to building an HS2 line to the highest possible standards of environmental protection is essential to minimise the impact on residents and communities and the natural, historic and built environments. The use of cuttings, cut and cover and box tunnels for example can go a long way to mitigating against negative environmental impacts. May 2011

Written evidence from Birmingham City Council (HSR 67) BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL’S POSITION ON HIGH SPEED RAIL DEVELOPMENT 1.1 Birmingham City Council unanimously welcomes the Government’s plans for HS2. At its meeting of 11 January 2011, the Council voted to welcome plans to bring High Speed Rail—HS2—to the centre of Birmingham and resolved to work with other local authorities to promote the benefits of the proposals, noting: — its potential to free up capacity on the West Coast Main Line, creating new routes such as Walsall to Birmingham International; — that an independent economic study has suggested it could generate 10,000 to 22,0000 extra jobs in the West Midlands conurbation and an increase in economic output of between £600 million to £1.5 billion; — that the benefits of improved transport links will flow to the wider region, especially member authorities of the Birmingham and Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership; cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w174 Transport Committee: Evidence

— that the success of the project will require improved connectivity in the city centre, especially linking New Street, Moor Street and the proposed new Curzon Street station, to make the centre a friendly and convenient interchange for passengers from throughout the region; — that HS2 will provide a swift land route, not only to London and other strategic commercial and industrial centres, but to Europe as well. 1.2 The Council further welcomed government commitment to continued investment in other major city centre projects such as New Street Gateway, and called upon the Executive to: — set out proposals for a step change in connectivity at the time of High Speed Rail beginning operation; and — continue to ensure that Birmingham plays a full part in preparing the way for HS2 by working practically and strategically with Centro (Integrated Transport Authority), operators and other relevant agencies/bodies on, for instance improving City Centre transport links and encouraging HS2 passengers to use public transport and walkable routes, recognising that a city Congestion Strategy is essential if journeys to the new station are not to be longer than the HSR’s 49 minute journey time to London. 1.3 Officers and Members of the Council have been working with Greengauge 21, the Department for Transport and HS2 Ltd over the past three years to initially promote the concept and to develop the proposals. 1.4 There are regular meetings, led by the City Council, of the West Midlands Regional High Speed Two Steering Group. This was established by the Regional Development Agency, Advantage West Midlands in 2009 in order to bring together metropolitan and shire local authorities, both for and against HS2, to exchange information and ensure promotion of the issues in an even handed manner.

2. The strategic significance of High Speed Rail to economic development in Birmingham 2.1 Birmingham has long recognised that its commitment to driving economic growth in the Midlands is dependent upon maintaining and enhancing its strategic location at the heart of the UK transport networks. The strategic significance of this connectivity is reflected both in Birmingham’s Big City Plan and the emerging Growth Strategy for the Greater Birmingham and Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership. 2.2 Evidence from Network Rail’s Route Utilisation Strategies and from forecasts prepared for the Department of Transport suggests that the West Coast Mainline will reach full capacity by the mid 2020s, and that there is a compelling case for enhancing the inter-city rail network to deliver substantially increased capacity and improved performance. 2.3 Failure to invest would result in a very real risk that local and regional services will be pushed off the West Coast Main Line to make way for more profitable intercity services and that would hit hundreds of thousands of regional commuters and shorter distance travellers. It would also damage local economies and stifle economic growth and job creation. 2.4 Building HS2 will, however, release badly needed capacity on the classic rail network. In the West Midlands, this would allow increased service frequencies to local destinations such as Lichfield and Tamworth, supporting the emerging Growth Strategy of the Greater Birmingham and Solihull LEP which envisages enhanced internal connectivity as being key to harnessing the collective economic strengths of the area and driving forward productivity. HS2 will also open up opportunities for more regional rail services, linking towns currently without direct services. 2.5 We are mindful of the Centre for Policy Studies Report “Conditions for Growth” which focuses on how government policy can help to improve the UK’s emergence from recession. It highlights that whilst public investment in the UK is planned to be around the OECD average for 2010 onwards, it was historically among the lowest from 2000–07. This study highlights the importance of not cutting investment in areas such as infrastructure, which will help facilitate growth in the future. As a “global city with a local heart”, Birmingham feels strongly that investing in the international competitiveness of UK PLC is critical to securing good quality of life for our residents. 2.6 We believe that the business case published by the Department for Transport provides a conservative estimate of the benefits of the scheme. For example, we are aware that long-distance intercity travel has grown at 5% a year, more than doubling between 1994–95 and 2009–10, whilst the Department for Transport business case is based upon projections of an increase in passenger demand of only 1.4% per year.83

3. Why the alternatives are not acceptable 3.1 A national high-speed network would provide the best value for money solution to the capacity challenge. A new railway will deliver a step-change in capacity and reliability that cannot be matched by upgrading the existing network. Providing a high-speed railway line will substantially reduce journey times between our major cities, benefiting passengers and thereby delivering a much better economic return than lower-speed alternatives. 83 Greengauge21, HS2—why the critics are wrong 2010 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w175

3.2 In this matter, we share the view set out in the findings of research undertaken by Atkins for the department of Transport in 2009 and 2010; for the Strategic Rail Authority in 2003; Network Rail’s New Lines Programme and Greengauge 21’s 2009 Fast Forward Programme. 3.3 The modernisation of the West Coast Main Line, which cost £8.8 billion, resulted in nine years of delay and disruption, and still failed to deliver the level of enhanced capacity needed, is still fresh in our minds. As we strive to promote Birmingham as the best place to do business, this is a scenario we do not wish to see repeated. 3.4 In contrast, HS1 was built to time and to budget. 3.5 Other modes of transport—air and road—cannot deliver the additional capacity needed without environmental costs and increased carbon emissions.

4. Why commitment is needed to a national high-speed network 4.1 Birmingham supports the findings of Greengauge 21’s research that there is an excellent case for a national high speed rail network which will deliver economic benefits and improved connectivity across all parts of Britain, and that there should be a long-term strategy for its delivery and implementation in phases, along the lines of the planning and development of the national motorway network from the 1950s onwards. 4.2 As an active member of the Core Cities network supporting HS2, Birmingham, along with Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield, recognise the collective potential of UK cities to drive Britain’s economic recovery. A step change in the speed and quality of rail connections between our cities is a key ingredient in achieving this potential. 4.3 Recent independent forecasts84 have demonstrated that the new Core Cities’ Local Enterprise partnership areas are capable of producing an additional 1 million jobs and £44 billion of Gross Value Added over the next ten years, dependent on influencing a number of growth factors, including infrastructure.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity—why High Speed Rail is needed to bring prosperity to the Midlands 5.1 The enhanced connectivity to London and the South-East; and to the northern cities is critical to giving our local economy a boost. HS2 will reduce journey times between major cities to below the critical one hour, enhancing leisure, business and commuting activities. At present, London is well connected to the continent by HS1 and to several international airports. Birmingham City Council wishes to see through services to HS1, making continental trips by rail more attractive and delivering significant carbon savings. 5.2 The opportunities for concentrated development around the station sites will be grasped. Both the Birmingham City Centre location and the Birmingham Airport/M42 location are encompassed by the Greater Birmingham and Solihull LEP’s emerging Growth Strategy. Whilst the jobs which come to these locations will attract applicants from a wide area, we will take specific measures to ensure that opportunities are accessible to people from local communities where worklessness is high. 5.3 Local investment will be needed in access infrastructure, people movers and feeder services. The cost of this should not fall solely on local tax payers and we believe that it is appropriate that the Government should seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme, especially given the European Union’s commitment to the development of a Trans-European High-Speed Rail Network.

6. Wider Impacts 6.1 We share the Government’s commitment to reducing carbon emissions from transport. Whilst we believe that more needs to be done, for example in reducing the carbon emissions associated with electricity generation, to reduce the carbon footprint of future rail travel, current projections would appear to suggest that moving one seat one kilometre at 225 mph creates no more carbon than the current Pendolino fleet at 125 mph. Decarbonisation of the UK’s electricity supply will bring further benefits. Creating a step change in rail capacity to accommodate future growth is essential. Analysis by ATOC for Greengauge 21 has demonstrated that a journey by high speed rail today would generate only one-third of the CO2 emissions of a comparable car journey and one-quarter the emissions of a comparable journey by air; the advantages of HSR will only improve in future. 6.2 Ensuring that local transport networks are developed to ensure that door-to-door journey times by public transport and active modes will contribute to realising these benefits. 6.3 Noise impacts on people and properties close to the line of route remain in some measure uncertain. HS1’s impact has been masked to some extent by the route passing close to existing busy roads—similar to the proposed HS2 route into Birmingham. Noise is, understandably, a source of concern to local residents. Joint working between HS2 Ltd and the Highways Agency will be needed to understand and mitigate the combined train and traffic noise. May 2011 84 Oxford Economics “Our Cities, Our Future” Core Cities 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w176 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from the Woodland Trust (HSR 69) The Woodland Trust welcomes the opportunity to respond to this consultation. The Trust is the UK’s leading woodland conservation charity. We have three aims: to enable the creation of more native woods and places rich in trees; to protect native woods, trees and their wildlife for the future; to inspire everyone to enjoy and value woods and trees. We manage over 1,000 sites and have 300,000 members and supporters.

Summary — The Woodland Trust is concerned that the HSR project being proposed by the Government fails to meet appropriate environmental standards as the route will lead to the loss and damage of 48 ancient woodlands. These sites represent an irreplaceable habitat that public policy aims to protect through Planning Policy Statement 9: Biodiversity and Geological Conservation. — Many of the environmental impacts of HSR have not been considered in the Government’s consultation document and there is a distinct lack of information on the alternative routes. — During the public debate over the future of the Public Forest Estate the Government moved to address concerns about the loss of ancient woodland by promising to ensure that the habitat would continue to be protected in the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) being drafted by the Department for Communities and Local Government. In its current format HSR undermines this commitment.

What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 1. Climate change represents the greatest threat to our native woodland heritage. Consequently the Woodland Trust supports the concept of a greener transport infrastructure. The Trust believes that transport should be efficient, of benefit to the majority of the public and not represent a threat to the nation’s most valuable wildlife habitats. In the case of HSR, the proposed route casts serious doubt on the green credentials of the overall scheme because of its impact on the environmental heritage that green polices are designed to protect. 2. Moreover, the route for HSR detailed in the consultation document fails to meet reasonable environmental standards as the proposals will directly impact on at least 21 ancient woods. Even PPS 9 recognises that ancient woodland is an irreplaceable habitat—it is considered the UK’s equivalent to the rainforest—therefore compensatory tree planting will fail to ameliorate its loss. As a result the Government should re-consider the planned route if it is genuine in its desire to create a green transport network worthy of the name.

How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 3. No comment.

Business case 4. The business case outlined in the consultation document fails to evaluate the full impact the loss of ancient woodland will have on the natural environment and the wider damage the route may inflict on the countryside. At a time of heightened awareness of the benefits arising from the natural environment and the forthcoming publication of the first natural environment white paper for twenty-years this is a significant omission. 5. Development located near to woodland has been proven to cause severe damage to tree roots, increase surface water run-off and cause soil erosion and compaction.1 At the minute HSR has not evaluated its impact on irreplaceable habitats and therefore both the direct and indirect impacts to woodland should be evaluated as part of the consultation process. This evaluation should include the impacts of HSR in regard to the following points: fragmentation, noise pollution, soil compaction and vibration emanating from the rail tracks.

The strategic route 6. The Trust believes that the route should avoid damaging vital environmental assets such as ancient woodland. As the route proposed by the Department for Transport fails to do this it is difficult for the Trust to support HSR in its current format. 7. It is noteworthy that the route appears to have been selected on the grounds of cost and speed alone. The methodology adopted by the Government assumes that all environmental impacts can be mitigated. However, in the case of ancient woodland this is simply untrue. By only avoiding designated sites, the consultation also misrepresents the environmental impacts of HSR (paragraph 4.21 of the consultation). This approach has shortcoming as it assumes that all important habitats are designated whereas 85% of the country’s ancient woodland are without any national or international designation. This format also overlooks the cumulative impacts on non-statutory sites and the wider biodiversity of the area. 8. It would also have been preferable if the consultation document had published a variety of options with all the environmental impacts assessed, including information on any loss or damage to ancient woodland. By doing so respondents would have been able to offer a fulsome commentary on each option rather than having to estimate the multitude of possible impacts. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w177

Economic rebalancing and equity 9. No comment.

Environmental impact 10. Regrettably the environmental impacts of HSR are not correctly accounted for at this present time. GIS analysis undertaken by the Trust shows that 21 ancient woods will be directly affected due the construction of the track and a further 27 woods could be damaged as they lie within 200 metres of the proposed route. From this data the Trust has calculated that 135.57 hectares of ancient woodland (48 woodlands in total) will be directly affected by HSR. Notably there has been no environmental information published on the conservation value of ancient woodland; indeed it is not clear whether any ecological studies have been carried out at all. Similarly, little has been said about the mitigation proposed other than vague statements about “tree planting” and “green tunnels”. This offers none of the vital information—such as the location of the track and timescales for completing the project—needed to provide an informed assessment. 11. Losing ancient woodland contradicts the Coalition’s aspiration to be the “greenest government ever”. Ancient woodland has developed naturally with the long continuity of these woods ensuring that they became a valuable natural habitat for wildlife. The UK Biodiversity Action Plan highlights broadleaved woodland because it supports almost twice as many species of conservation concern compared against any other habitat. For instance, ancient woodland has more than twice as many species as chalk grassland and almost three times as many as lowland heathland. Ancient woods support an impressive 232 species as outlined in the UK Biodiversity Action Plan.2 As a result of development pressures, agricultural intensification and the planting of conifers, the UK has only 50% of the ancient woodland it had in the 1930s and today only 2.4% of the UK’s land cover comprises of this unique habitat. 12. Despite the suggestion that translocation might be a viable option, the proposed planting of up to 2 million trees does not diminish the reality that ancient woodland cannot be recreated. The circumstances that allowed ancient woods to form were unique (for example the centuries of undisturbed soils and tree cover), and such conditions are no longer available. 13. Moreover, independent scientific research does not support translocation. A study for WWF3 identified that it is not possible to attribute outright success in any case of translocation due to the inadequate recording of results and the number of reported failures. They concluded that the genuine costs are simply unknown. Meanwhile researchers at Wye College4 concluded that as a technique for re-locating displaced habitats, translocation of soil from woodland is especially problematic owing to the sensitivity of vegetation and the loss of tree canopy cover. Ancient woodland contains many thousands of species of plants, animals and fungi; and any success in ensuring the survival of one or two charismatic species should not be seen as representing translocation of a complete habitat. The stability of an ecosystem is related to its diversity,5 and a serious reduction of that diversity is likely to lead to the ecosystem in its previous form collapsing. 14. One of the strongest features of the debate over the Public Forest Estate earlier this year was the importance of addressing the need to afford ancient woodland special protection. Over 160, 000 people have signed the Woodland Trust’s petition calling for the issue of ancient woodland protection to be addressed in its own right. Given the Government’s responsiveness to this public concern as evidenced by the Ministerial assurance that ancient woodland will be protected in the new National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF),6 the Trust believes it is unfortunate to have a situation where one arm of Government is pledging protection of ancient woodland in recognition of its value whilst another—the Department of Transport—openly admits in HS2 London to West Midlands. Appraisal of Sustainability that “in total, up to 19 ancient woods could be subject to land take.”7 In our view the route for HSR should be altered so as to ensure that there is no further loss of ancient woodland; a conclusion which is supported by more than 4000 members of the public who have now expressed their concern about the loss of this precious habitat as a result of HSR. May 2011

References 1 Corney, P M Smithers, R J Kirby, J S, Peterken,GFLeDuc, M G and Marrs, RH. Impacts of nearby development on the ecology of ancient woodland (2008) at: http://www.woodlandtrust.org.uk/ SiteCollectionDocuments/pdf/policy-and-campaigns/woodwatch/impacts-development-on-ecology-ancient- woodland.pdf 2 For further information about the value of ancient woodland please refer too the following report: Woodland Trust, Woodland Biodiversity: Expanding our Horizons (2000) at http://www.woodlandtrust.org.uk/ SiteCollectionDocuments/pdf/policy-and-campaigns/woodwatch/impacts-development-on-ecology-ancient- woodland.pdf 3 Gault C on behalf of WWF, A moving story—species and community translation in the UK—a review of policy, principle, planning and practice (1997). 4 Hietalahiti M K & Buckley GP. The effects of soil translocation on an ancient woodland flora. Aspects of Applied Biology (2000). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w178 Transport Committee: Evidence

5 Shear McCann, K. The diversity—stability debate, Nature, May 2000 (2000). 6 House of Lords, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, 28 Feb 2010. When concluding a committee session of the Public Bodies Bill Lord Taylor assured the House that “protection for ancient woodland in the existing planning guidance will be carried over into the national policy framework.” 7 Department for Transport (2011), HS2 London to West Midlands Appraisal of Sustainability, p91.

Written evidence from Mark Bostock (HSR 70) I am responding to the Transport Committee’s request for written submissions. I hope my submission will be the basis for me giving oral evidence. 1. I personally was involved in identifying the alignment for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link adopted by Government in October 1991. In his statement to the House on 14 October, the Secretary of State for Transport, Mr. Malcolm Rifkin stated: “… we have decided that a route on the lines put forward by Ove Arup which approaches central London from the east, via Stratford, is to be preferred. It would satisfy our transport objectives by providing additional capacity when it is needed. Moreover, it would minimize the impact of the line on the environment and on residual property. British Rail estimates that 38 km will be in tunnel on the easterly route (The Arup Alignment), as against 25 km on the southerly route (The British Rail/Department for Transport route). Only two domestic properties would be acquired and none demolished, as against 127 acquired and 24 demolished on the southerly route (The British Rail Alignment). British Rail further estimates that only five properties would be within 100 m of the line and 115 within 200 m against 1,900 and 5,900 respectively on the southern route (British Rail Alignment). The impact on the landscape, too, would be less, with fewer kilometers of the easterly route in ancient woodland, on the surface in areas of outstanding natural beauty, or in green belt… Finally, in preferring a route on the lines put forward by Ove Arup, we recognized the substantial potential that it offered for development along the east thames corridor… etc.” Hansard Volume 196 No 154 Monday 14 October 1991 pages 22/23 2. Securing the right line for the CTRL raises many issues which I think are relevant in planning the appropriate alignment for HS2. Some of these are listed below: — The need for clear objectives right at the start of any new major transport investment. In the case of HS1 this was the need to link the Chunnel Tunnel portal with the national rail network to link the European and British systems. This objective was easily translated into an overriding national imperative which we were able to discuss with local interests as we were developing our alignment. This minimised any outright objections to the need for our developing alignment which was discussed and debated at length as we walked our proposed route adjusting it at the margins to meet specific local issues. Our approach contrasted with that of BR which caused outrage in Kent when they announced their southerly route. — Utilizing existing motorway corridors whenever possible and avoiding AONBs. — Providing links with the existing classic railway to enable through running services thereby creating a degree of “return” for those affected by the new alignment. — Moving away from a solely rail solution to more of a transport/regeneration investment opportunity by proposing intermediate stations at Ebbsfleet, with its links to the national road network and at Stratford, creating it as one of the best connected locations in the country (hence the Olympic Project). — The lack of any national transport strategy thwarted our plans for a high speed link to “beyond London” and for accepting the need for a four track formation from the Medway River into London (and beyond). 3. I was involved in developing a transport/development solution to the country’s first high speed railway rather than a rail-only solution and a similar approach is much needed in developing HS2. As we develop further the high speed rail network we need a proposition with clear transport objectives to maximize the economic benefits to the UK Plc from any private and public investment made by the inter-related aviation, rail and road sectors where there is an appropriate balance between speed, cost, benefits and impacts. This was at the heart of HS1’s success and I do not think it has been achieved with the present proposals. 4. My experience will hopefully help the members of the Transport Select Committee in its deliberations and I would be interested in giving oral evidence. Nicholas Faith in his book “THE RIGHT LINE: The Politics, The Planning and the against-the-odds gamble behind Britain’s First High-Speed Railway” (Segrave Foulkes, 1997) gives an interesting insight into the role of the private sector in securing the alignment and the inability of the public sector to deliver it! May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w179

Written evidence from Exeter City Council (HSR 71) 1. How this evidence has been compiled This evidence has been prepared with the approval of the Council’s Portfolio Holder for Sustainable Development and Transport.

1.1 Introduction Our purpose in submitting this evidence is not to express a view on whether high speed rail is in principle the correct policy decision (since Exeter is nowhere near the proposed high speed line). Instead, our evidence concentrates on issues of relevance to Exeter and the wider South West. In summary: — We support investment in transport (and rail in particular) as a core element of the National Infrastructure Plan. — We wish to highlight the importance of investing in the rail system as a whole, in order that the benefits of high speed rail, if adopted, can be distributed throughout the whole country. Specifically, investment in local rail in Exeter and Devon is essential to underpin the growth provided for by our emerging Core Strategy. — If High Speed 2 comes to fruition, we strongly support the proposed inclusion of an interchange with the Great Western main line at Old Oak Common, and a connection to High Speed 1.

1.2 Our evidence We have used your numbering, although we have not provided evidence in response to every question.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives (2) Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.1 We are concerned about the implications for funding the “classic” network. While we support a strategy of enhancing the capacity and performance of Britain’s inter-city rail network, this should apply to the network as a whole, not just the routes between London, the Midlands and the North. We welcome the separate announcement that the route from London to Bristol and Cardiff will be electrified, and urge the Government to pursue progressive electrification of the remainder of the Great Western inter-city network, including the lines to Exeter. 2.2 Use of local rail services in Devon has increased by at least 10% annually between 2001 and 2010,85 with minimal increase in capacity86 and consequent overcrowding. No new infrastructure south west of Bristol is proposed by the Great Western Route Utilisation Strategy, despite recognising that by 2026, Exeter and its immediate surroundings expect to see an additional 18,500 dwellings, 37,000 inhabitants and between 22,300 and 28,500 jobs.87 2.3 We make this point because it is crucial that development of a high speed system to serve the Midlands and North is not achieved at the expense of investment in rail in other parts of the country. On the contrary, complementing the significant investment in high speed rail with relatively modest sums for local rail will add value to the overall system by enabling seamless journeys by train from one part of the country to another. 2.4 To address the proposed growth in and around Exeter, Devon County Council has worked up proposals for a “Devon Metro” which include improved frequencies and additional stations, including three within the city’s boundaries. Their Appraisal Report, submitted in support of our Core Strategy, costs two of the stations (each comprising a single platform) at around £4 million each, and the third (two platforms) at around £6 million. While it is anticipated that significant funding for the stations will come from developer contributions, including a Community Infrastructure Levy, this is unlikely to meet the cost of all three stations, or the additional (not included in the above figures) which is necessary if all of the stations are to be delivered. A passing loop and associated station improvements at Penryn, , were recently provided at a cost of £8.5 million. 2.5 The increased frequencies, necessary because our lines are already overcrowded during the peaks, will be dependent both on funding and the availability of rolling stock. Developer funding is not going to be sufficient to pay for additional trains. In terms of rolling stock, it does not appear that sufficient diesel multiple units (DMUs) will be available nationally to enable increased frequencies to be operated on our local lines. While some DMUs will be displaced by electrification (for example around 57 trains are to be released by electrification of the Thames Valley network), we fear that there will not be sufficient diesel stock nationally to replace the 140 substandard and ageing “Pacers”, let alone allow for increased services here and in other parts of the country which are experiencing significant growth. 85 Figures from Devon County Council 86 Increased frequency on the Barnstaple-Exeter line has been achieved with County Council support 87 GW RUS Figure 5.1, page 114 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w180 Transport Committee: Evidence

2.6 Between them, the stations and enhanced services proposed as “Devon Metro” would make a significant contribution to serving the development proposed in and around Exeter by our Proposed Submission Core Strategy. Without them, the city’s roads, which are already operating at capacity during the peaks and near capacity for much of the day,88 will become even more congested. The Core Strategy proposes that this development is concentrated near rail lines, which will facilitate train travel as long as the necessary stations can be provided. Exeter has a successful track record in this respect—Digby and Sowton station opened in 1994 to serve a major area of new development, and now caters for over a quarter of a million passengers annually. 2.7 Although the sums needed to pay for these improvements are dwarfed by the £32 billion price tag for HS2, they are massive sums for us to raise locally. Whether or not HS2 goes ahead, this investment in “classic” rail is essential if the rail network as a whole is going to have the capacity to cater for anticipated growth across the country.

4. The strategic route (1) Are the proposed stations in the best possible locations? (4) Is the link to HS1 the right decision? 4.1 If High Speed 2 is implemented, we support the proposed interchange with the Great Western main line at Old Oak Common, and the link to High Speed 1. 4.2 In our view, it is particularly important that if high speed rail is adopted as a national strategy, the high speed network should be fully integrated with the existing system. This integration would be enhanced by enabling travellers from west of London to connect with high speed trains at Old Oak Common, rather than having to travel via Paddington to St Pancras and back again. 4.3 This connection would admittedly be of more benefit to travellers from towns nearer to (but west of) London than it would to travellers from Exeter, who have direct services to Birmingham and the north via Bristol. However, the proposed connection to High Speed 1 would be of great benefit to the entire South West, potentially enabling travellers from Exeter to connect directly with HS1 trains. We strongly support this proposed connection.

(2) Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.4 We would make the point that the high speed rail network described (the Y network) is not a “national” high speed rail network, despite being described as such in the DfT’s Consultation Document. However, we recognise that improvements are proposed to other parts of the national inter-city network, including partial electrification of the Great Western lines, which we welcome on the basis set out in paragraph 2.1 above. We support the policy of progressive electrification of the rail network,89 and would welcome an extension of the wires to Devon at the earliest opportunity.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity (2) To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and economic regeneration? 5.1 There is a risk that in attempting to balance the economy between the north and south, imbalances are created elsewhere. For example the DfT’s Consultation Paper refers to HSR bringing both Manchester and Leeds within 80 minutes of London.90 The fastest journeys from Exeter to Paddington take around 130 minutes. It is imperative that the rail links from London to the South West are upgraded, including by the introduction of electric trains, if the competitiveness of cities and towns in the region is to be maintained. May 2011

Written evidence from Andrew Bodman (HSR 72) What are the main arguments for or against HSR? 1. The net benefit ratio for HS2 lies between 0.3 (phase 1) and 0.6 (phases 1 and 2) when corrected figures are used for demand and benefits (Source: HS2 Action Alliance). That is well short of HM Treasury requirements where the minimum value is 2. The UK economy (GDP) flatlined between October 2010 and March 2011. Its growth in the first quarter of 2011 was 0.5%, which was below that for Greece (0.8%) and the eurozone (0.8%).The European Commission has downgraded its forecast for the UK’s economic growth to 1.7% for 2011. In these circumstances the 88 Exeter Infrastructure Planning: Baseline Traffic Evidence Base Report—Devon County Council, February 2011 89 As per the statement of The Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, 1 March 2011 90 At paragraph 1.6 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w181

Government must seriously question spending £33 billion on a project particularly when there are much better value for money alternatives available. HS2 offers poor value for money. At a cost of £130m per mile for phase 1, it will cost more than four times as much as the average European high-speed line. (Source: Financial Times editorial 28/2/11) HS2 is likely to require an ongoing subsidy based on the fact that there are only two profitable high-speed rail routes in the world: Paris—Lyon and Tokyo—Osaka. (Source: http://www.newgeography.com/content/ 001344-high-speed-rail-toward-least-worst-projections) The operators of the recently opened high speed rail systems in the Netherlands and Taiwan have run into serious financial difficulties. (Source: Reuters and International Journal of Business and Management). As the UK rail system already receives an annual subsidy of £5 billion per year, I consider it inappropriate to consciously add to that. The design is fatally flawed because there will be a bottleneck on the Birmingham—London section of HS2 once the high speed lines to Leeds and Manchester are opened. See my response to section 4.2 on page 4. The focus of the HS2 project appears to have been on reducing journey times rather than increasing passenger capacity; in my view, increasing passenger capacity is the more important priority. A train running at 225 mph for most of its journey from London to Birmingham will save 10 or 11 minutes over a train running at 160 mph. Is that 10 minutes so important? In my opinion it is not. One of the biggest issues facing our rail system is seriously overcrowded trains at peak times travelling into major conurbations such as London, Leeds and Manchester. HS2 addresses a very small proportion of that problem as it focuses on one route (West Coast Mainline) and provides some additional relief on another route (East Coast Mainline). It does not address the serious overcrowding that has existed for years on other routes into London, as well as routes into Leeds, Manchester, etc. which affects season ticket holders, regular commuters and other rail users some of whom regularly have to stand for their journeys every day. It will be 15 years (Birmingham) and 21 years (Leeds and Manchester) before HS2 brings any solution to existing and future train overcrowding. It is unacceptable to wait all those years when there are much cheaper solutions available in a few years time, ie Rail Package 2. During HS2 phase1, Manchester and Stockport will have a reduction in seat capacity on their routes despite this route being forecast to have the highest passenger growth. Some stations such as Coventry, Stoke-on-Trent and Shrewsbury are expected to experience a reduction of train services. For HS2 phase 2, the following stations would see no passenger capacity increase: York, Darlington, Durham, Newcastle, Berwick on Tweed, Edinburgh. (Source: HS2 Action Alliance). In 2006 Sir Rod Eddington was commissioned by the Government to examine the long-term links between transport and the UK’s economic productivity, growth and stability. In volume 3 of his report, you will find the following: “4.166 Upgrading rolling stock and lengthening trains on congested rail links, combined with changes to timetables to increase frequency can significantly increase the effective capacity of existing rail lines. Evidence of illustrative interventions to increase variable capacity on inter-urban links into London by investing in new rolling stock, for example, suggests strong returns are possible from well-targeted interventions, with wider BCRs ranging between 1 and 13 and costs between £50 and £500 million but more typically between 1 and 3.28 The higher returns are largely driven by the ability to add variable capacity with minimal infrastructure requirements”. That describes Rail Package 2 very neatly, a much cheaper option the Government is now choosing to overlook. The compensation arrangements are completely unsatisfactory. Homeowners whose houses will have to be destroyed have not been contacted by DfT or HS2 Ltd. The principles on which compensation will be based have not yet been determined, even though many homeowners have suffered property blight for more than one year. One of the compensation schemes being considered will not provide any compensation until 2027 (phase 1) or 2033 (phase 2). One is hardly encouraged by the workings of the Exceptional Hardship Scheme when 60% of the applications made so far have been rejected (Source: Guardian, 15 May 2011). The compensation arrangements are quite unacceptable. HS2 is claimed to be broadly carbon neutral; that is unlikely given that 87% of passengers will either be making new journeys or be switching from lower carbon “classic” rail. Even if it is carbon neutral, that is not compatible with a government objective of reducing carbon emissions by 80% by 2050. It is also routed through an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty and is opposed by many organisations such as the Campaign to Protect Rural England, Green Party, Institute of Economic Affairs, National Trust, Ramblers, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, The Wildlife Trusts and Woodland Trust. The Kent Criteria for HS1, established by Kent County Council, do not appear to have been adopted for HS2. It appears that the cost of the link to Heathrow has been omitted from the consultation material. That would add at least £7 billion making a total cost of approximately £40 billion for phases 1 and 2. (Source: costing by Arup engineers, printed in Uxbridge Gazette 11/05/2011). Hence the business case for HS2 becomes even worse and the public consultation is taking place with incorrect costs. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w182 Transport Committee: Evidence

How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.2 It is likely there will be adverse effects on rail investments in other parts of the UK. For example, an announcement was made on 25 November 2010 that 650 additional rail carriages would be introduced between 2010 and 2014. However this represented a 50% reduction from 1300 of the number of carriages previously announced to be added in that time period. (Source: RMT.) 2.3 The majority of passengers currently travelling between Manchester and London use rail in preference to air travel. Those who may switch from air to rail if HS2 is built are more likely to be based in Glasgow or Edinburgh. If any slots are released at Heathrow or Gatwick then these will almost certainly be used for long haul flights instead (Source: BAA), which will increase not reduce carbon emissions.

Business Case 3.1 While the DfT’s latest forecasts for HS2 now show a rail passenger growth of 216% (was 267%) by 2043 (was 2033) for HS2 routes, the forecast is flawed for several reasons. Eddington has said that the model used should not project forecasts for more than 10 years. Out of date forecasting factors have been used; PDFH v5.0 should have been used. The historic base 2008 base numbers have been changed. Demand for travel is saturating; this has been ignored. The above information comes from HS2 Action Alliance. In 2006 Aalborg University made a study of 210 infrastructure projects in 14 countries; they found 90% of rail projects had overestimated passenger forecasts. The average overestimate was 106%. By 2009, Channel Tunnel rail passengers (9.2 million) had reached approximately one third of those originally forecast for 2006 (25 million). Fare levels have not been provided in the HS2 consultation documents. However they have a very direct bearing on whether a user chooses to travel by high speed rail or classic train. On HS1 in Kent, the high speed fare premium appears to be 20%. (Source: The Trainline for fares from Ashford to London). This has discouraged a significant number of regular commuters from switching to HS1 from classic trains. Consequently South Eastern Trains have taken a number of the Javelin carriages out of use as demand has not met their expectations. (Source: http://www.metro.co.uk/news/824624–140mph-train-service-is-reduced-after- complaints http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/8423638/High-speed-rail-Britains-first-link-hasnt- worked-as-planned-say-critics.html). Kent rail travellers on conventional trains have been very upset by the slower trains (more stops), less frequent service and higher prices since the HS1 Javelin service was introduced. Over 2,000 of them signed a Downing Street petition and their MP Roger Gale even asked questions in the House of Commons. http://www.kentonline.co.uk/kentonline/news/2010/march/11/trains_in_the_commons.aspx In making the case for HS2, it has been assumed that business travellers do not work on trains. Therefore it is argued that any time saved by a reduced train journey is an economic benefit. The logic applied is clearly wrong as anyone travelling on rush hour trains will see passengers using laptops, mobile phones or preparing for meetings by reading through presentations. This error seriously undermines the business case. The impact of lost revenue on the classic network is likely to mean that it will require increased subsidy (in addition to that required for HS2 itself). 3.2 Rail Package 2 (London—Birmingham) provides a 177% increase in standard class capacity which is far in excess of the 102% background growth forecast by HS2 for 2043 (Source: Chris Stokes). It has a cost of £4.3 billion rather than £17 billion (2009 prices). RP2 can be delivered in a few years rather than waiting for 2026. It provides a risk free incremental approach (rather than the HS2 all or nothing). It has a net benefit ratio of 3.6 rather than the HS2 net benefit ratio of between 0.3 and 0.6, using corrected figures from HS2 Action Alliance. Rail Package 2 would provide an increase in capacity by lengthening existing WCML trains to 12 carriages (except Liverpool trains which would have to be limited to 11 carriages) and by refitting one first class carriage per train as standard class. It also involves removing seven existing pinch points. Similar principles could be applied on ECML and MML. (Source: HS2 Action Alliance and Chris Stokes). I attach no credibility to the recently revised costings for RP2. To suggest the cost of rolling stock has increased by 100% in 13 months is simply not believable. The DfT also said that the uplift for risk and optimism bias had been omitted and therefore needed to be added to make it comparable to HS2. However I would suggest that it was already included; see “High Speed Two Strategic Alternatives Study, Strategic Outline Case” by Atkins March 2010 on page 56, there is a breakdown of the costs for Rail Package 2; this includes a 60% uplift for risk and optimism bias. Hence we appear to have a case of double counting for RP2. A conventional line would not require such a straight route and therefore there would be more possible choices of route. In addition its rolling stock would be cheaper (engineered for lower speeds) and it would be greener because its energy consumption would be less. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w183

3.3 Rail travel should be encouraged as an alternative to air or road as it is generally considered to be a greener form of transport. Therefore reducing demand for rail by significantly increasing rail fares will almost certainly increase carbon emissions. If the government want to reduce travel, one of the ways of doing so would be to provide a better broadband service. Compared to many other countries our broadband service is slow; we need to use fibre cables to improve broadband speed. Rural areas must be included. This will make video conferencing more accessible, assist businesses in many ways and facilitate more working from home.

The Strategic Route 4.1 Birmingham Interchange and Birmingham Curzon Street are stand alone stations which are not integrated into the existing rail network. Passengers arriving at Curzon Street will either need to make a 10 minute walk to New Street station to connect to the rest of the rail network or perhaps queue for a long time for a taxi. The design is unsatisfactory because some of the stations are not integrated with the existing rail network. 4.2 The UIC (The international Union of Railways) has indicated that the maximum number of trains which may run per hour is 16 where the maximum speed is 350 kph (217 mph). Greengauge 21, the pro-HS2 lobby has admitted that the maximum is 15 trains per hour. In Europe the maximum scheduled frequency of high speed trains on any one track is 12. (Source: HS2 Action Alliance). On page 61 of the Economic Case for HS2 (Source: DfT), it indicates a peak hour schedule of 18 trains per hour on the section between Birmingham and London once the high speed lines to Leeds and Manchester are completed. It closely reflects the existing frequency of services at peak hours to the destinations listed. The HS2 schedule on page 61 does not include any trains for Heathrow, Europe (via HS1), or Edinburgh. The consequences of this are as follows: — Some cities may suffer a reduced train frequency with HS2 at peak hours compared to that which they currently experience. — The existing peak hour train frequencies (WCML, ECML) may have to be further reduced on HS2 to cater for trains to Heathrow, Europe and possibly Edinburgh. — There is absolutely no room for expansion (for more trains per hour) once the high speed lines have been built to Leeds and Manchester. This is a monumental shortcoming. — Any train failure or breakdown on the section between Birmingham and London will have major knock on effects with trains separated by approximately three minutes and carrying up to 1100 passengers. Unlike on a classic rail line, there are unlikely to be convenient alternative tracks to pass a stricken train. The Atkins report “Because Transport Matters” (published in 2008) contained the following remarks: “By contrast, the Full Network option is likely to require additional capacity on the southern core section of the route relatively quickly (Figure 2.3). This reiterates the conclusion that a single HSR trunk connection to London is unlikely to provide the necessary capacity” (my italics). The “Full Network” is virtually identical to HS2 as far north as Leeds and Manchester, and then has a single high speed route to Scotland up the east side of the country. I think the design of HS2 is fatally flawed for these reasons. A better solution for the planned capacity would be to have another high speed line linking East Midlands to Kings Cross or St Pancras to reduce the loading on the Birmingham—London HS2 section. It is also questionable whether the underground rail services at Euston will be able to cope with an additional 10,000 passengers per hour at peak times, which is more than double the existing volumes. (Source: possible passenger volume from HS2 Ltd Route Engineering Report). 4.3 The planning for phase two will run in parallel with the construction of phase one. Construction of phase two may start before phase one is open. So phase two construction may well be underway before we know whether the forecast passenger demand is going to be achieved.

Economic Rebalancing and Equity 5.1 HSR is likely to increase the north-south divide not decrease it. The HS2 consultation report indicates that over 70% of the anticipated new jobs created will be in the London area (22,000 out of 30,000). A study by Greengauge 21 indicated that annual growth in London by 2040 is likely to be at least twice that in the West Midlands with or without HS2. (Source: Consequences for Employment and Economic Growth, 02/2010). The Research Institute of Applied Economics at the University of Barcelona made a study of high speed rail in five countries and found that any increase in jobs was more likely to occur at the larger/largest city with a possibly negative effect at any smaller city connected to the high speed rail network. 5.2 It is desirable to support local and regional regeneration, and this can be achieved partly through improving local transport infrastructure. HS2 is not the way to achieve that (see 5.1 above). 5.3 The location that will benefit from this is London in terms of job creation. The users who benefit will mostly be affluent and hence least in need of subsidy. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w184 Transport Committee: Evidence

Impact 6.1 HS2 has been described as being broadly carbon neutral. Bearing in mind that the Government has committed to achieving legally binding targets of reducing carbon emissions by 80% by 2050, then HS2 is an unsatisfactory solution. The government cannot expect to achieve such a target unless it makes very significant changes to carbon emissions in its long term strategy. 6.2 The DfT is currently conducting a consultation process with the public for HS2. The process cannot be valid if the environmental impact assessment has not been made available, noise contour maps have not been made available and the method of compensating homeowners has not been decided. It appears the Government does not want to compensate homeowners until 2027. That is both unacceptable and indicates that compensation has not been properly accounted for. 6.3 There will be enormous disruption to Euston during construction of HS2 and additional disruption for users of the Great Western and Chiltern services for approximately eight years. Euston’s reconstruction has been likened to “open heart surgery on a conscious patient”. There will also be significant disruption to road and rail users (where bridges have to be built), local inhabitants and businesses which lie on the route of HS2 during its construction. It is not clear whether all public footpaths and bridleways interrupted by HS2 will be reconnected. May 2011

Written evidence from Transport Watch UK (HSR 73) In this note HSR means the proposed High Speed line from Euston to Birmingham, known as HS2, plus the extension to Leeds and Manchester illustrated in the DfT’s Consultation document.91 HS2 plus the extensions are known as the core network, or “the Y”.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 1.1 Without providing any real evidence the Consultation document claims the proposal will transform the economic geography of the nation, provide a once-in-a-generation opportunity, will be a catalyst for growth, will cut the north-south divide, has unique potential etc. 1.2 Part 1, under the heading “The Case for High Speed Rail”, carries the inspirational sub-heading “The Fast Track to Prosperity”. There follows a clarion but baseless call that HSR can play a key strategic role in delivering economic growth, creating the right environment for private enterprise to flourish and rebalancing the economy. The propaganda is relentless and typical of the railway industry—France, Spain, Germany and Japan are called on in support—we must not be left behind. “The central role played by the country’s rail links cannot be overstated” and so on without end. 1.3 However, the truth is that national rail’s contribution is trivial. It carries less than 2% of the nation’s passenger journeys and less than 6.5% of its passenger-miles. The figure below, taken from the DfT’s Transport Statistics Great Britain, illustrates the point. Appendix 1 provides other devastating comparisons which demonstrate the extent to which the nation’s belief in the efficiency of rail is misplaced.

91 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, February 2011 DfT cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w185

Passenger Transport by Mode, 1952 to 2009 (TSGB web table TSGB0101)

900 All modes 800 All road Cars, vans and taxis 700 Bus and Coach Rail 600

500

400

300 Billion passenger kilometres 200

100

0 1952 1959 1966 1973 1980 1987 1994 2001 2008

1.4 Further the claim is made that the West Coast Main Line is running out of capacity and that HS2 is the best solution. 1.5 The arguments against are: (a) The flamboyant claims cited above are unsustainable. (b) The shortfall, if any, in capacity on the West Coast Main Line could be made good at a fraction of the cost, and incrementally, by Rail Package 2, RP2. That is one of the options examined by the DfT. It delivers a better net benefit ratio than HS2 (3.63) and costs about £2 billion instead of £17 billion. It would have the advantage of delivering the benefits incrementally and of enabling demand to be tracked as it increases, rather than having to rely on long range forecasts. (c) HSR would cost tens of billions of pounds and would make a loss in the tens of billions. (d) HSR would be used overwhelmingly by the better off. (e) The business case is deeply flawed, see below. (f) The passenger forecasts are unbelievably high, see below.

2. How does HSR fit into the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 The Government’s transport objectives should be to benefit the nation as a whole, to maximize the benefits per pound spent and to benefit the many rather than the few. 2.2 Trips by rail in excess of 100 miles amount to only 5% of all rail trips and to less than one in a thousand of all motorised trips.92 Optimistically, half of those rail trips may use the HSR. 2.3 Likewise, 50% of national rail journeys are less than 20 miles long and, as above 95% are less than 100 miles long. The corresponding distances by car are 6 miles and 20 miles.93 It is those relatively short journeys that support the nation, not the one in 2,000 that would use HSR. It is not the distance travelled that matters. Instead it is the action or production achieved on arrival. 2.4 Against that background it seems extraordinary that HSR has been seriously considered.

3. Business case 3.1 The construction cost of HS2 plus the first cost of the trains is £19.6 billion.94 That should be inflated by the market prices adjustor of 1.20995 yielding £23.7 billion. The £23.7 billion is equivalent to £900 for 92 National Travel Survey 93 Op cit 94 Tables 7 and 8 of The Economic Case for HS2: The Y Network and London—West Midlands Feb. 2011, DfT 95 Paragraph 4.2.5 of the WEB TAG http://www.dft.gov.uk/webtag/documents/expert/unit3.5.9.php cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w186 Transport Committee: Evidence

every household in the land. The loss to the government, after accruing fares and costs over a 60 year evaluation period ending in 2085, is £10.3 billion at the 2009 price and discount base.96 Rolling that up at the Treasury discount rate of 3.5% to the opening year of 2026 provides £19 billion, or over £700 for every household in the land, yet it could only be those within reach of the stations in Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow who could possibly benefit. 3.2 The “Y” is to cost £37.5 billion including the trains.97 Multiplying by the market prices adjustor of 1.209 yields £45.3 billion, equivalent to over £1,700 for every household. The financial loss, after 60 years ending in 2092, is £17 billion at the 2009 discount base.98 Rolling the latter up to the 2030 base (the Extension is to open in 2032–33) yields £37.5 billion, or £1,440 per household. 3.3 Nobody denies that the HS2 and the “Y” will make losses in the tens of billions of pounds. Nevertheless, the economic analysis shows that the social benefits, in terms of time savings etc., outweigh the costs to the Government by a factor in the range 1.5 to 3.5 according to whether wider economic benefits are included and according to whether it is HS2 or the “Y” that is considered. 3.4 However, that analysis contains a fatal and fundamental flaw, namely: it is the loss, instead of the resource cost, that is compared with the supposed benefits. The loss amounts to the cost minus the so called incremental rail fares. Those incremental fares are the HSR fares minus those lost by the rest of the railway. However, the theory reduces to the absurd when it is realised that the incremental fares can be varied by arbitrarily altering the economic boundary. 3.5 For example, widen the boundary to capture the losses to the airlines and filling stations and the incremental fares fall correspondingly. Alternatively, presume the railway is privatised. The losses to rail would then be ignored, as are the losses to airlines today. The fares revenue subtracted from costs would then be the full fares taken by HSR, thereby greatly reducing the “loss” and improving the “economic” case no end. I comment, an analysis that produces a different answer every time an administrator strokes his pen is indeed absurd, but it is just such a system that supports HSR and other rail expenditure. 3.6 The correct place to draw that economic boundary is not round the railway, or the Government, but around the nation as a whole. When that is done the incremental fares fall to zero and the economic case collapses. 3.7 Putting it otherwise, the mere transfer of fares from customer to the railway does no more to create wealth than if the reader were to give a £100 note to his neighbour. Instead there is a zero sum transfer that has no place within an economic analysis. 3.8 The present theory, known as the “willingness to pay calculus”, is the child of Professor Sugden of the University of East Anglia. I comment, if customers were “willing to pay” then rail as a whole, and HSR in particular, would make a profit in the financial sense of the word. Probably this “willingness to pay” theory has been cooked up because, without it, and in Phillip Hammond’s words, “no railway scheme would ever see the light of day”. 3.9 All that is before considering the cascade of improbable assumptions to do with the value of time and its exponential growth, the 60-year evaluation period and above all the passenger forecasts which underpin the business and economic case. For example: (a) The forecasts for the year 2043 with the “Y” in place require a train every 3 minutes 20 seconds in both directions all day throughout the year. That is four time as many as those currently using the railway and who would use HSR if it existed now. The number seems entirely unbelievable. Probably it is on target to beat the forecast made for the channel tunnel rail link. That forecast was three times too high. (b) The forecasts depend largely on assuming that growth in rail use will continue exponentially until 2043 and that that growth is driven by growth in GDP. However, between 1950 and 1995 GDP grew by 200% but there was no growth in passenger rail whatsoever whereas between 1995 and 2010 GDP grew by 36% and rail usage by 70%. That suggests that the relationship between GDP and rail use is weak or non-existent. Instead the growth since 1995 is probably due to improved services. It follows that rail use may well flat-line rather than continuing to grow. The consequence for the HSR business and economic case is dire. (c) The value of time is inflated exponentially within the analysis, which spans the 60 years ending in 2085 for HS2 and the period ending in 2092 for the remainder of the “Y”. If that growth is set to zero then the supposed benefits are nearly halved. (d) If the evaluation periods were shortened to 30 years then 40% of the computed benefits would be lost. Even a 30 year time horizon takes us to a future which we can only guess at. (e) Whereas costs are inflated for risk and optimism bias no such factors are applied to the passenger forecasts or to the benefits computed. Prudently those should be divided by at least two. 96 Table 10 of The Economic Case op cit 97 Paragraph 2.2.6 op cit 98 Table 2 op cit cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w187

3.10 Any of the above would see HSR abandoned. Taken together they are overwhelming. If the nation continues to pour tens of billions of pounds into loss making projects on the basis of such analyses then the economy will be weakened and employment in that part of the economy that makes a genuine profit will be lost. 3.11 As for the European comparisons, France and Spain have higher unemployment than the UK and Lille and Marseille, both served by High Speed rail, have higher unemployment rates than France as a whole. Perhaps those countries would have done better if they had left the vast resources required to fund HSR projects in private hands.

4. Economic rebalancing and equity 4.1 The costs and losses set out above have to be borne by the taxpayer. Nowhere in the analysis is any reference made to the number of jobs that such vast financial losses will destroy. Instead there is the unsubstantiated claim that the “first phase” may create over 40,000 jobs99 and that HS2 alone will create 22,000 jobs in London and 8,000 in the West midlands,100 a total of 30,000. These are trivial numbers compared with the costs. For example, dividing the cost of HS2, £23.7 billion, by the 30,000 jobs yields over £800,000 per job—perhaps the most expensive job creation scheme that can ever be conceived. 4.2 Furthermore, since most of the “created” jobs would be in London it is difficult to maintain that the proposal would reduce the north-south divide. In fact the data suggests precisely the reverse. Worse still, the jobs may in fact be relocated from other areas rather than wholly new ones. 4.3 As to the passengers, (a) 99% of the population will use the system less than once a year101 and (b) those from the top quintile of household income travel four times as much by rail as do those from either of the bottom two quintiles.102 Consequently the vast subsidies required will benefit a minute proportion of the population and the better off rather than the poor. 4.4 Hence, far from rebalancing the economy, promoting equity and generating jobs this project will achieve precisely the reverse.

5. Impact (Emissions) 5.1 Even on the optimistic assumptions of the proposers HSR would be carbon-neutral. Nevertheless, on the basis of attracting 6% of its passengers from air and 7% from cars, the pretence is made that the proposal is indeed green or supportive of cutting carbon emissions. Worse still, if HSR reduced the demand for domestic flights the slots vacated at airports would be taken by the international ones of longer distance, thereby increasing rather than decreasing emissions. 5.2 If large-scale electricity consumption extends the life of coal-fired generation then the emissions from the coal-fired should be used in calculations rather than the industry average. Subject to carbon capture, coal- fired generation emits double the industry average. If that point is taken then HSR would be an “emissions disaster”. 5.3 The truth is that the continued pretence and appeal to the Green lobby is shameless propaganda with no basis in fact.

6. Conclusion 6.1 The case made for HSR by the railway lobby is a marketing exercise masquerading as an in-depth analysis by parties acting in the interests of the nation as a whole. Not only do the underlying principles of the economic analysis lead to absurdities but (a) the passenger forecasts upon which the supposed benefits depend are unbelievably high and (b) the underlying assumptions to do with the value of time and the evaluation period are difficult to defend. 6.2 The truth is this project can do nothing for the nation beyond satisfying vanity. If built it will be a millstone round the necks of taxpayers for ever, destroying jobs in that part of the economy that makes a real profit and doing nothing to reduce the North-South divide and nothing to reduce carbon emissions. 6.3 The alternatives to HSR is Rail Package 2 or to raise fares. The latter would balance supply and demand whilst reducing subsidy enjoyed by the better-off. Rail package 2, would be far less costly than HSR and would allow an incremental approach that would greatly reduce risk. 6.4 At a more general level the Government should shed itself of the sentimentality that is used to support rail. Only then will a sensible Transport Policy emerge. 6.5 Appendix 1 illustrates that the gap between reality and the railway myth is so large as to beggar belief. For that reason the truth is ignored. The consequence is nowhere more apparent than in expenditure on safety 99 Page 7 of the Consultation document, High Sped Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future February 2011 100 Page 22 op cit 101 National Travel Survey data shows (a) 45% of people use rail less than once a year (b) 5% of rail journeys are over 100 miles long. The implication is that 2.3% of people use rail for the longer journeys more than once a year. Optimistically half would use HS2 and the extensions to the north. Hence circa 99% will use the system less than once a year. 102 National Travel Survey. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:10] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w188 Transport Committee: Evidence

where over 50 times as much may be spent to save a life on the railways as is spent on the roads. The consequence for the nation is misplaced expenditure in the tens, if not hundreds, of billions of pounds. May 2011

APPENDIX 1 DIAGRAMS AND COMMENT WHICH SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES MODAL SPLIT DATA

100% 100% 93.7% 80% 88.6% 90% 66.8% 90% Fig 1a. Passenger-km 70% Fig 1b. Tonne-Km Fig 1c, Tonne-km 80% 80% 65.3% 70% 60% 70% 56.2% 60% 50% 60% 50% 50% 40% 40% 28.4% 40% 32.4% 30% 30% 20.5% 30% 20% 20% 20% 6.3% 11.4% 10 % 8.6% 10% 4.1% 10% 0% 0% Rail Str ate gic Othe r All roads 0% Rail Str ate gic Othe r All roads Roads roads Pipe line Rail Water All roads Roads roads

USE OF TRACK

20 Fig 2. Average Daily flows 17.47 18 per track or lane (Freight in tonnes) 16 14 12.01 12 10 8 6.50 5.46 6 4.79 4 1.71 2 Flow per tack or lane (000)s (000)s lane or tack per Flow 0 Rail M and Rail M and Rail Road T T

Passengers, P Freight, F P plus F cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w189

PROFITS AND LOSSES

30 Fig 3 Profits 24.7 25 and losses Profits from motorways and trunk roads 20

15

10 5.1 5.6 3.9 5

0

-5 -2.0

-10 £ hundreds £ ten K per Pence per -7.0 Pence per per track or lane -9.9Passenger- pa ss + tonne - -15 household km km km -14.9 Losses from rail -20

Sources are Transport Statistics Great Britain and related Government publications.

Further — The strategic road network uses its resources five to six times as intensively as does rail. The aptly named professor Remy Prud’homme of Paris 12 found similarly for France. The calculation which demonstrates the fact is to divide the capital or maintenance costs for rail track by the passenger- km or tonne-km carried and to do the same per lane-km for the strategic road network. The unit costs for rail turn out to be five to six times those for the strategic road network—and that is before taking account of the relatively low value of rail freight, most of which is bulk raw materials. — In central London and in the peak hour the surface rail network is, in highway terms, used to between only one fifth and one seventh of its capacity. The calculation is simple and impossible to overturn: 500,000 surface rail passengers alight at central London terminals in the three hours 7 am to 10 am. Hence 250,000 is a generous estimate of the peak hour arrivals. There are 25 pairs of tracks. Hence the peak hour passengers per track number 10,000. They would all find seats in 200 50-seat coaches or in 150 75-seat coaches. The capacity of one lane of a motor road is at least 1,000 coaches per hour (at 60 mph, 100kph, the headways would average 100 metres). A practical example is the contra flow lane serving the New York bus terminal. It carries 700 45-seat coaches in the peak hour, offering over 30,000 seats. In comparison the trains carrying the 30,000 crushed rail commuters that arrive at Victoria Main Line in the peak hour require four inbound tracks. — To appreciate the inefficiency of rail consider the motorway and trunk road network paved with railway lines. The place would be at a near standstill as is the railway in highway terms.

Further written evidence from Transport Watch UK (HSR 73A)

In this note HS2 means the link from Euston to Birmingham and the “Y” means the network out to Leeds and Manchester.

The Costs

The headline costs at 2009 prices are £17 billion for HS2 and £32 billion for the “Y”. Those exclude the trains and tax. Adding the missing elements yields £24 billion and £45 billion, amounting to £900 and £1,700 respectively for every household in the land.

The Losses

The cash loss attributable to HS2 at the 2009 price and discount base is £10.3 billion after accruing fares and cost out to 2086. Rolling that up at the Treasury discount rate of 3.5% to the opening year of 2026 yields £18 billion or £700 for every household in the land.

The cash loss attributable to the “Y”, which has an opening year of 2032, and a last evaluation year of 2092, is £17.1 billion again at the 2009 price and discount base. Rolling that up to the opening year yields £37.7 billion or £1,450 for every household. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w190 Transport Committee: Evidence

Employment and the North South Divide HS2 is said to generate 40,000 jobs. However, circa 9,000 would be during construction, and 1,500 for operating the line. Of the remaining 30,000 over 70% would be in London. Dividing the £24 billion cost by the 30,000 yields an incredible £800,000 per job. Worse still, many of these jobs may be relocated from elsewhere, rather than new. Nowhere is there an estimate of the number of jobs that will be lost as a result of the vast public expenditures and financial losses, summarised above, most of which will be born by the taxpayer.

Equity 99% of the population will use the system less than once a year. Furthermore, those from the top quintile of household income travel four times as much by rail as do those from either of the bottom two quintiles. Consequently the vast subsidies required will benefit a minute proportion of the population and the better off rather than the nation as a whole.

Optimism Bias Optimism bias is applied to costs but not to the passenger forecasts or to any of the other assumptions to do with the schemes’ benefits. If it were then benefits would be at least halved and the projects would never be considered. The need for such caution is obvious. After all, the forecasts for HS1 were three times too high and the uncertainties within the analysis are overwhelming.

French Rail One of the worst reasons for spending tens of billions of pounds on an HSR network is that France, Spain and Germany have them. Firstly, the distances in Europe are much greater. Secondly, there is no evidence, beyond the claims of politicians and the promoters, that the vast expenditures have aided the economies. Indeed it may very well be the reverse. After all, Spain has the longest of the networks coupled with 20% unemployment. As to France, it claimed the SNCF was running into profit at a time when, according to Professor Remy Prud’homme of Parris 12, the subsidy was actually approaching 1% of GDP. It would be naïve to assume subsidies on that scale did not destroy jobs in that part of the French economy that makes a genuine profit. Worse still, the pretence to profit in the face of loss, sabotaged the development of sensible transport policies and casts doubt upon any official statement about the SNCF. The same tendency, namely to exaggerate benefits and ignore losses, is, we submit, the generality among supporters of UK rail and of the UK’s high speed network in particular.

The Economics In purely financial terms the proposal makes massive losses, see above. In contrast the economic analysis compares costs with the cash value of time savings, relief of overcrowding, improved punctuality etc. That analysis suggests that for every pound spent by the Government there will between £1.6 and £2 of benefit from HS2 and between £1.8 and £3.4 of benefit from the “Y”. However, well known weaknesses and contentious assumptions include: (1) Time is entirely wasted when travelling on a train. (2) The value of time will rise exponentially at circa 2% for ever, an assumption that doubles the benefits. (3) The evaluation periods end 60 years after opening, far beyond the horizon at which any forecasts can be made. If that were shortened to 30 years, which is still too long, 40% of the supposed benefits would be lost. (4) The forecasts are unbelievable in that they require a train every three and a half minutes in each direction all day throughout the year. Those forecasts depend largely on assuming that growth in passengers is driven by growth in GDP. However, between 1950 and 1995 GDP grew by 200% but there was no growth in passenger rail whatsoever. In contrast, between 1995 and 2010 GDP grew by 36% and rail usage by 70%. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w191

That suggests there is little or no relationship between passenger growth and GDP. Instead the recent growth is probably due to the short term razzamatazz of privatisation. (5) There is a fundamental flaw in the analysis, namely fares are subtracted from costs when they should not be. Such payments no more increase wealth than would passing £100 to one’s neighbour. The transaction is of course of financial interest but has no place in an economic analysis designed to compare the resource cost of a scheme with the supposed social benefits. Striking out the fares would destroy the economic case.

Sources The primary source for the data in this note is Department for Transport’s publication “Economic Case for HS2”, February 2011 For Greater detail see items 6a and 6b here: http://www.transport-watch.co.uk/transport-committee.htm (terms of reference and evidence accepted by the Transport Committee) July 2011

PRO-RATA COSTS AND LOSSES FOR METROPLITIAN AREAS £(BILLIONS) 2009 PRICES Costs £billions Losses £billions Population HS2 The Y HS2 (a) The Y (b) Great Britain 60,000,000 24 45 18 37.7 Greater Birmingham. 3,680,000 1.472 2.760 1.104 2.312 Birmingham 1,030,000 0.412 0.773 0.309 0.647 Greater Manchester 2,240,000 0.896 1.680 0.672 1.407 Manchester 483,000 0.193 0.362 0.145 0.303 Liverpool urban area 838,000 0.335 0.629 0.251 0.527 Liverpool 440,000 0.176 0.330 0.132 0.276 Greater Glasgow 1,770,000 0.708 1.328 0.531 1.112 Glasgow 592,000 0.237 0.444 0.178 0.372 Greater Nottingham 700,000 0.280 0.525 0.210 0.440 Sheffield 550,000 0.220 0.413 0.165 0.346 Sheffield urban area 1,000,000 0.400 0.750 0.300 0.628 Leeds 771,000 0.308 0.578 0.231 0.484 Newcastle 290,000 0.116 0.218 0.087 0.182 1,119,500 0.448 0.840 0.336 0.703 Edinburgh 486,000 0.194 0.365 0.146 0.305 Edinburgh commuting area 1,000,000 0.400 0.750 0.300 0.628 Totals of above Metropolitan areas 13,118,500 5.247 9.839 3.936 8.243 London 8,000,000 3.200 6.000 2.400 5.027 Rest of UK 38,881,500 15.553 29.161 11.664 24.431 (a) 2026 opening year discount base (b) 2032 opening year discount base (c) Very few people indeed living in “the rest of the UK” will ever use the proposals. Even those from the key metropolitan areas listed will seldom benefit personally. If the regular users number as many as 1 million the cost is £24,000 per user for HS2 is and £45,000 for the “Y”. The corresponding present value losses at the named discount bases are £18,000 and £37,700. In reality, or according to the forecasts, in 2043 there will be only circa 70,000 daily arrivals at Euston. Hence regular users are likely to be below 150,000. The costs per regular user then spiral to the entirely unrealistic levels of £160,000 and £300,000.

Further written evidence from Transport Watch UK (HSR 73B) At the Transport Committee meeting of 12 July the Committee pointed out that it had heard unalloyed support for High Speed Rail from the Europeans and from businessmen in the North. The support from Europe was voiced by those committed to building and running the systems. Those people would have taken care not to allow committee members to meet sceptics. As an illustration of the dangers of believing what one hears from such sources I note that, at a time when the SNCF was said to be running into profit, the aptly named Professor Remy Prude’homme of Paris 12 found the subsidy was running at nearly 1% of GDP. Heaven knows how many jobs were thereby sacrificed in that part of the French economy that makes a genuine profit. Spain, with the longest network, has over 20% unemployed. Perhaps that would be lower if the vast expenditures on loss-making projects had remained in private hands. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w192 Transport Committee: Evidence

In any event the anecdote calls to mind the remark made by Stewart Joy, previously Chief Economist to British Railways. He wrote in his book “The Train that Ran Away” that there were those in the British Transport Commission and the railways “who were cynically prepared to accept the rewards of high office in exchange for the unpalatable task of tricking the Government on a mammoth scale. Those men,” Joy wrote, “were either fools or knaves.” There were no libel actions but Joy had been forced out, too honest to work with railway men. The support of business men and politicians in the North will, I believe, crumble when they appreciate (a) the immensity of the costs and (b) the risk that the supposed benefits have been vastly overestimated. In that context please find attached a (sample) letter that I have sent, along with the attached note, to the local press, councillors and MPs in Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Nottingham, Sheffield, Leeds, York, Newcastle (Tyne and Wear) and Edinburgh; also to the Evening Standard in London. I anticipate publication of the letter in most of those places and will follow up with the same in the national media. (The note supersedes the version previously sent to you). As to the proceedings of the 12th, I was astonished to find how little interest committee members seemed to have in the numbers. For example, the fact that 90% of movement is by road, mostly to destinations that are difficult or impossible to serve by bus let alone the train, was batted aside as though it did not matter. The truth is rail carries 2% of passenger journeys and only 7% of passenger miles yet it absorbs vast subsidies and the imagination of the nation as though it were pivotal. The reason for that is the sentimental memory of the Great Age of Steam coupled with decades of shameless propaganda by the railway lobby. It will not do. July 2011

Written evidence from the Guild of Travel Management Companies (HSR 74) Introduction 1. The Guild of Travel Management Companies (GTMC) welcomes the Committee’s inquiry into High- Speed Rail, an issue of considerable interest to our members and to the UK-based business travellers whose interests they represent. 2. The GTMC is the UK’s leading professional body for corporate travel management companies. Our diverse membership accounts for over 80% of UK expenditure on managed business travel, delivering value for money and extensive services to business travellers in the private, public and not-for-profit sectors. As such we are the voice of business travel. 3. This submission addresses only those questions which directly concern UK business travellers. It draws both on exclusive GTMC member transaction data (produced each quarter) and on two annual surveys of business traveller opinion conducted by the GTMC in late 2009 and late 2010.

What are the main arguments for and against? 4. Business travellers, judged both on how they actually choose to travel and on their expressed preferences, increasingly favour rail travel where it is a viable option. This applies both to UK domestic journeys and to travel to the near- Continent. For example, between the GTMC’s 2008 and 2009 annual transaction surveys, the only area of activity which showed an increase in the number of transactions booked by the GTMC member companies was rail travel (13% increase). Other categories such as air travel and hotel bookings fell by roughly the same proportion. To some extent this reflects the post-crash economic downturn. But it also reflects a growing readiness to travel by rail in the UK and to Paris and Brussels by Eurostar, especially following the opening of HS1 and the consequent reduction in journey times. 5. In both the GTMC Business Traveller Surveys (2009 and 2010), High-Speed Rail was ranked first among 7 or 8 possible infrastructure improvements which would “make the biggest difference for business travellers in your organisation”. It was judged significantly more important than both Crossrail and airport expansion in the South-east. The full tables are below; Option 2010 2009 High Speed Rail link 1st 1st Major motorway improvements 2nd NA Expansion of UK regional airports 3rd 2nd Mainline rail station improvements 4th 3rd London Crossrail including link into Heathrow 5th 4th Expansion of South East airports 6th 7th Building a 7th 8th

6. All of this strongly underpins the contention that business travellers see High-Speed Rail as the major priority for transport infrastructure investment in the UK. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w193

What are the implications for domestic aviation? 7. The overwhelming barrier to modal shift of business travellers away from air to rail is journey times. In the GTMC’s most recent business traveller survey (2010), exactly half of respondents gave “Air is quicker than rail travel” as the main reason why they sometimes chose to travel by air rather than rail within the UK. (The same conclusion would undoubtedly apply to near-Continent journeys also.) The complexity of journeys and timetabling challenges were the only other factors to be widely mentioned. Frequent high-speed city centre- city centre services are likely to attract significant numbers of business travellers away from air to rail. 8. The big prize in modal shift terms is of course to substitute significant numbers of Glasgow and Edinburgh to London flights with rail journeys. The envisaged journey times of 3 hrs 15 mins (saving around 45 mins) from both Scottish cities to London would achieve this, provided that there is a frequent, reliable and affordable service. 9. There is always likely to be a need for England—Scotland flights, not least for connecting to flights at Heathrow (though this is partially dependent on the decision made regarding a Heathrow connection to HS2). However, provided that HS2 is continued beyond Birmingham to Glasgow, there would be reductions in flights with consequent reduced emissions and the freeing-up of slots at London airports. In theory this would enable expansion of air services to global business destinations within existing airport capacity in the South-east. 10. Of key importance however will be how affordable the service is. Cost remains an imposing consideration when it comes to business travel choice (37% of Business Traveller Survey respondents identified cost of travel as the most important factor). Equally our data shows that the vast majority of business travellers by train use standard class as further evidence that they continue to factor in price when deciding on modal choice. If trying to break the habits travellers used to using air routes within the UK ensuring that the price of high speed rail services is competitive will be key.

Business case 11. As should be clear from the above, it is journey times which dictate rates of modal shift for business travellers. Upgrading the WCML further or building additional conventional capacity would be most unlikely to achieve significant reductions in journey times and would therefore do little or nothing to entice business travellers away from domestic flights. Indeed, given the challenges in building any new rail line at all, there seems little point in overcoming these difficulties only to build a conventional line. 12. Managing demand by increasing fares would seem to be a throwback to the bad old days of rail planning. What is badly needed now is investment in the rail network. Passenger figures indicate that there is an increased appetite for rail travel. As the road and especially motorway network becomes ever more congested, travellers, both business and leisure, will want to turn in increasing numbers to rail. Increased rail fares on conventional services would certainly push business people back into their cars or leave them flying domestically, with consequent adverse environmental impacts. 13. Furthermore, it is questionable how much room for fare increases exists. The GTMC’s surveys of business travellers suggest that they are broadly satisfied with the cost of advance tickets, but in 2010 54% of those surveyed were “not very” or “not at all satisfied” with the cost of tickets booked near to the time of travel. Any increase in “walk-on” fares would be like to push more short-notice journeys onto planes or into cars or perversely prove an additional burden on UK business people who often have to embark on journeys where there is little notice and consequently reduced ability to access low fares.

The Strategic Route 14. It will already be apparent that for the business traveller journey time is all-important. Accordingly, whilst accessibility has to be balanced with speed, the fewer stops there are outside the main business centres, the better. The GTMC would not therefore support additional intermediate stations. Equally it is important that the vocal, and politically sensitive, opposition along the proposed route is respectfully engaged with but is not allowed to undermine a project that is of national importance nor to compromise the key factor of journey time in order to bypass such opposition. 15. Business travellers supported the WCML option for HS2 over the ECML by a margin of more than 3 to 2. If a decision were to arise regarding prioritisation of build the GTMC would most strongly support completion of the London-Glasgow route as the priority. 16. In support of this strategy, the GTMC would therefore like to see an early start on the Glasgow end of HS2, and urges the Committee to recommend that DfT begin discussions now with the Scottish Government to help bring this about. GTMC is concerned that HS2 might end at Birmingham or Manchester and that the vital link to Scotland might not be built or only after decades of delay. 17. GTMC’s 2010 Business Traveller Survey directly asked respondents how important it would be for HS2 to link directly into Heathrow in order to encourage modal shift. The results showed that there was a distinct preference (64%) for a network which linked directly into Heathrow. Based on this clear steer the GTMC cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w194 Transport Committee: Evidence

strongly urges the Government to make the transition from HS2 to Heathrow as seamless as possible and include a direct link. May 2011

Written evidence from DB Schenker Rail UK Ltd (HSR 75) 1. DB Schenker Rail is pleased to submit evidence to the Transport Committee’s Inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail. Our evidence focuses on: (a) The experience of freight and High Speed One. (b) The strategic importance of additional UK rail capacity for rail freight growth. We would be pleased to provide oral evidence to the Committee if required. 2. DB Schenker Rail is the largest UK rail freight operator. DB Schenker Rail moves around 80 million tonnes / 10 billion tonne kilometres of freight a year and employs 3500 staff in Great Britain. Besides transporting coal for electricity generation, steel and petroleum, we move stone, deep- and operate international freight services through the Channel Tunnel in connection with our open access freight business in France and Spain. DB Schenker Rail is wholly owned by AG, the second largest logistics provider in the world. 3. Rail freight produces between three and four times less CO2 per tonne moved than road haulage and up to ten times less polluting emissions. Whilst rail must continue to reduce its own carbon footprint, its primary contribution to Climate Change is to continue to attract traffic from more polluting modes. 4. Rail freight in Britain has been one of the success stories of privatisation and has grown by over 60% in the last fourteen years, increasing its surface market share from 8% to 11.5%. At the same time the industry has become more efficient with DB Schenker Rail having reduced key asset numbers and costs by over 30% in the past five years. Although rail freight volumes reduced during the recession, the industry continues to invest in the firm expectation that absolute growth, as well as increased market share, are achievable. 5. Rail freight industry forecasts, endorsed by the Department for Transport and Network Rail, suggest a doubling of rail freight activity by 2030. The rail industry’s “Planning Ahead” document anticipates an increase in rail freight’s market share from 11.5% to 20%. Growth in rail freight will form a key input to the rail industry’s Initial Industry Plan that will inform both the forthcoming Periodic Review by the Office of Rail Regulation and be part of the industry’s response to the McNulty Value for Money report. 6. Increasing rail’s market share is perfectly feasible—critical to this will be both the development of both new terminals and the Strategic Freight Network (see http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/strategyfinance/strategy/ freightnetwork. ). The West Coast Main Line is a key artery of the Strategic Freight Network and growth on the WCML is vital to achieving the growth forecasts for freight. The experience of rail freight and High Speed One.

The Experience of Rail Freight and High Speed One 7. The proposals for freight on High Speed Two are similar to those that have applied to High Speed One: (a) The infrastructure was designed to accommodate some level of continental gauge freight traffic (eg freight loops, connections at Dollands Moor & Barking). (b) Potential traffics were assumed to be higher speed than conventional international rail freight, for example mail or express traffic. (c) Operation of freight trains would be only at night, possibly under single line working conditions, whilst the infrastructure was maintained. 8. Technical barriers to the operation of freight on HS1 are finally in the process of being overcome and one Class 92 locomotive has been successfully modified to operate on HS1. Trials are underway and it is anticipated that some level of night-time continental gauge freight service will commence between the Channel Tunnel and east London during 2011. 9. These are likely to be at a conventional speed of 75mph initially and possibly at a lower speed of 60mph in due course. There have been technical issues to overcome with the cab signalling system to operate at these speeds, but with the assistance of EU Marco Polo funding these are being overcome. 10. One lesson from HS1 is that High Speed Lines may turn out to offer genuine opportunities for conventional speed freight (75mph or even 60mph) as well as higher speed freight and it would be unwise to rule these out at this stage. 11. DB Schenker Rail therefore supports: (a) making the infrastructure of High Speed 2 freight-compatible and ensuring there is passive capability provision for freight; cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w195

(b) making operations on High Speed 2 compatible with those on High Speed 1 and the Channel Tunnel wherever possible—for example the cab signalling system; and (c) physically linking High Speed 1 to High Speed 2 to offer continental gauge freight opportunities from the Channel Tunnel to the Midlands and, potentially, the North.

Freight and High Speed Two 12. DB Schenker Rail agrees that the most significant benefit for the UK rail freight industry and its customers from High Speed Two would lie in the capacity a new line would release to support growth in freight operations on the West Coast Main Line and other existing routes. 13. Whilst we welcome the prospect of additional capacity being made available through the construction of HS2, this will be of less use if it does not align with paths through to north west England and Scotland. Although we expect growth in services on West Coast south, particularly in the domestic sector, growth from the deep sea ports at Southampton and Felixstowe joins the corridor in the West Midlands area and is unlikely to benefit significantly until HS2 is open as far as Manchester. 14. However without significant additional capacity on the WCML, the industry’s plans for modal shift will be severely constrained. Each intermodal freight train on the WCML replaces up to 112 lorry journeys—the equivalent of up to 30,000 lorry journeys per annum for each train. 15. Modal shift between road and rail using the released capacity on the WCML can therefore play a key role in promoting sustainable transport and helping the UK meet its carbon reduction targets. May 2011

Written evidence from the South Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive (SYPTE) on behalf of the South Yorkshire Integrated Transport Authority (ITA) and Sheffield City Region (SCR) (HSR 77) 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 1. We believe the main argument for High Speed Rail (HSR) is economic—that it would help the continued growth of regional cities by widening produce and labour markets, and attracting inward investment. Analysis indicates that to the eastern city regions of the North East, Tees Valley, Leeds, Sheffield and East Midlands, HSR is worth over £70 million103 per annum in productivity benefits alone. 2. Our analysis also shows that the Eastern Network provides a further contribution to the national economy of £4.2 billion104 in productivity, imperfect competition and capacity release benefits. This level of contribution demonstrates that building HSR is imperative to the economic future of the UK. 3. We also agree with the Government’s analysis that without further inter-urban capacity, rail overcrowding will undermine connectivity and agree that new rail lines offer a better solution than upgrading existing lines. 4. Current rail connections between Sheffield and other major cities are slow compared to other regional cities and London. The introduction of high speed links to Sheffield would significantly enhance the rail offer to London and other key cities.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 5. Sheffield City Region (SCR) has made a commitment to facilitate the delivery of HSR in our city region’s third Local Transport Plan (LTP3). 6. However, to ensure the benefits of HSR are maximised we want to see HSR fit within a coherent strategy to deliver economic objectives, strongly supported by a sound evidence base.

2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 7. High speed, inter-urban connectivity is an essential requirement for economic productivity. The SCR LTP3 argues that the most significant improvements to business connectivity (both in terms of speed and capacity) are only possible via rail As such; inter-urban rail connectivity forms a key policy focus, whilst for roads the focus should be on reliability. 8. Connectivity between major centres which form the gateway to wider connectivity is also an essential requirement. This is also reflected in our LTP3, which highlights the key role that the “classic” rail network (and public transport services and the strategic highway) will play in providing access between the key major centres in SCR. Again, only rail can offer significant speed and capacity improvements. Road investments should be focused on improving reliability and maximising use of the existing assets. 103 Data from “Eastern network Partnership” forthcoming report, providing evidence for the HSR Eastern network. To be published in July 2011 104 [See Ref 1] cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w196 Transport Committee: Evidence

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 9. HSR and investment in the “classic” network should complement each other. There should be no reduction in funding on the “classic” network because of HSR. Indeed, investments in the classic network will be essential before HSR is built, therefore spending on northern rail infrastructure should be increased if the benefits of HSR are to be maximised: — to provide interim enhancements, such as electrification of the Midland Main line, potential improvements to Sheffield Midland station or release of bottlenecks on the East Coast line; ahead of HSR; — and to maximise use of the “classic” network, if it is to benefit from the released capacity that HSR brings. 10. Our analysis shows that the capacity benefits released on the Eastern Classic Networks total £0.8 billion105 It is vital that a strategic network is provided and can efficiently cater for the different journey types. This means that early consideration must be made to the overall timetable shape of the whole northern railway in the light of HSR. Innovative solutions to connect up more towns (such as Huddersfield—Barnsley— Rotherham—Doncaster—Peterborough—London and/or London—Nottingham—Sheffield—Barnsley— Wakefield) must be considered, and service paths on the East Coast Mainline (ECML) and (MML) to the north must be protected and enhanced. 11. Our emerging analysis indicates that 30%106 of economic benefits relate to inter-regional connectivity throughout the Eastern Network when integrating HSR with the Classic Network. HSR must be complimented by a Classic Service which: — Retains long distance services. — Uses the spare capacity to enhance the existing service and offer additional intermediate destinations. — Secure improvements to existing routes so that long distance and regional services can be enhanced.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? 12. No response to this question.

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 12. The appraisal methodology used by HS2 for quantifying all economic benefits makes conservative assumptions, which HS2 acknowledge means the business case is a cautious estimate. 13. The evidence from Asia and other European high speed rail projects107 demonstrates that if the methodology for the UK north-south HSR links considers the job creation, regeneration and business relocation and expansion then the business case would be significantly enhanced. For this, it is essential to capture the dynamics of land use and employment over the time period through employing the Land-Use Transport Interaction or computable general equilibrium type models. 14. In addition to land-use changes, the likely increase in land and property prices including public realm should be included in the appraisal methodology. The consideration and valuation of important non-monetised benefits/costs on the environment and communities must be taken into account in the appraisal process. 15. The potential “transformational” benefits of the HSR are not captured in the business case. In our response to the Government HSR consultation we are urging the Government to consider these impacts so that a stronger and more rounded economic case for regional growth and “rebalancing the economy” is presented. 16. The HSR link delivers a range of benefits (including connectivity, travel time and frequency enhancements). The modeling methodology utilised should consider all these benefits in the short and long term. 17. The modeling approach should also focus on the relationship between the HSR network and regional and local transport networks. HSR benefits are likely to be substantially higher with aligned investment in local transport to support efficient access and egress, and supportive land use policies. 105 [See Ref 1] 106 [See Ref 1] 107 Vickerman, R and A Ulied (2006). Indirect and wider economic impacts of high speed rail. Paper given at the 4th annual conference on Railroad Industry Structure, Competition and Investment, Madrid. C Nash (2009). High Speed Rail Investment: an overview of the literature. Report to Network Rail New Lines Programme. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w197

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 18. The SCR view is that upgrading the “classic” network or building a new conventional line would fail to secure the Government’s objectives in the long term, as set out in our answer to question 1. 19. Investment in the “classic” network alone could potentially be more rapidly achieved in comparison to the timescales for HSR. However, in isolation this would only form a temporary solution. Such interim improvements, however, would be essential as set out in question 2.2. 20. Another method of managing over-crowding would be to increase prices, however, this could potentially stifle economic growth, or isolate northern economies from London and each other, and hence reducing effective connectivity. 21. Failure to adequately invest in rail runs the risk of forcing people onto less sustainable modes of transport, encouraging poor travel habits and increasing carbon emissions.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 22. No response to this question.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 23. HSR would be a substantial project. It is therefore important that all partners are able to plan accordingly. Political, financial and programme planning certainty is critical. Though the network is to be phased, a project plan which gives detailed key milestones for the whole network will give the north the confidence and certainty to plan for the future.

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 24. SCR has no detailed view on the locations for stations between London—West Midlands. 25. However, the criterion for option appraisal for stations further north is important to SCR. The number of stops on the HSR network has an effect on the business case. The direct transport benefits require the service to have minimum disruption to the speed between the major UK cities. These wider economic benefits will be enhanced by the higher catchments HSR serves. A balance therefore must be struck, which we believe favours city centre (or close to city centre) locations on the main line.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 26. We believe that the proposed Y is a sensible starting point, but cannot be the aspiration for the full network. Ideally we would want to see all regions connected by high speed rail. 27. We understand the rationale for the Y, and the need for a single London terminus to reduce costs. However, we are concerned that the capacity (18 trains per hour) is based upon signal technology not yet in existence, and with a risk that it is not achievable. For reasons we discuss later, we would want the paths to the eastern arm of the Y (already only six of the 18) protected as a priority. 28. It is important that the East Coast Mainline receives planned upgrades throughout the coming years. Any released capacity could be utilised to serve new destinations along the route. 29. In 2010, studies undertaken by Arup and Volterra on behalf of the Leeds and Sheffield city regions demonstrated that the new Y shaped network presented a BCR of 2.46108 compared with 1.88 for the “reverse S”. This was due to the overwhelming rationale of the increased population served on the eastern side of Pennines. We are therefore content that the Y outperforms other alignments that only have a single London terminus. 30. The Sheffield City Region has a population of 1.6 million people and 650,000 jobs. Being able to connect SCR with regions on the Eastern Network such as East Midlands, Leeds and the North East would serve more than 8.7 million people and 3.6 million jobs.109 108 Economic case of HSR to LCR and SCR [September 2010] 109 [See Ref 1] cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w198 Transport Committee: Evidence

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 31. For such a substantial project, in principle, Sheffield City Region understand the need for the procedure for bringing separate Hybrid Bills forward for London-Birmingham and the wider network in order to make the process manageable. However, we would want as much commitment as possible to the whole network in the first Hybrid Bill and associated Government policy. At the very least this commitment should include the full network in any planning statements and “National Infrastructure Policy Statements”. 32. Analysis has determined that the Western Network has a BCR of 2.6, whilst the Eastern Network provides a BCR of 5.6.110 Additionally the Arup & Volterra studies in 2011 demonstrate that Wider Economic Impacts follow a similar pattern. The productivity benefits of bringing businesses closer together for the eastern part of the network (£2.6 billion) are around 20% higher than those for the western part (£2.1 billion).111 This evidence suggests that there is a much stronger case for taking the northern arms of the Y ahead in parallel, or with the Eastern arm first, given the higher BCR of that arm, and the larger economic markets that would be served. 33. DfT consultation indicates six trains per hour from London would service the Eastern Network. Our analysis demonstrates that 70%112 of the productivity benefits of the Eastern network are created by faster journeys to London, with at least six trains per hour required. Therefore, this level of service on the Eastern Network should be kept as a minimum specification for the HSR network.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 34. We would like to see more details about the service patterns that would result from the HS1-HS2 link. Our understanding is that the current plan does not include through services from northern cities. Instead continental bound trains would depart from Old Oak Common. While the logic relating to demand and security on international services is understood here, a better understanding of the details would be helpful. 35. SCR welcomes a direct link to Heathrow as part of HSR’s overall long term strategy, and our businesses indicate that a direct link to Heathrow would be highly valued. Again, more details on the service patterns would be essential before a measured view can be taken. 36. We believe that Government should consider the merits of linking the HS2 line to the Midland Main Line. This would balance out the current regional imbalance in the HS2 proposal, which would see HS2 trains serving the North West (on the existing WCML) some seven years before the North East. We welcome Government consideration of this issue.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 37. As we believe the main rationale for HSR is economic growth, we would like to see more national macro-economic consideration and evidence of how the scheme may bridge the north-south divide from a national perspective. 38. Locally, work undertaken by the Leeds and Sheffield city regions demonstrate that a HSR national network will provide economic growth for northern regions, as quoted elsewhere in this response. These figures are also likely to understate the true benefits as they do not include inward investment and higher underlying growth as a result of redistribution impacts.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 39. The national objective of economic growth and supporting a low carbon environment can be realised through local and regional regeneration. As mentioned earlier, we believe regeneration is not just dependant on the shape of the network (which has to meet demand)), but about the supporting infrastructure to provide connectivity between the rest of the city region and the high speed rail station.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 40. Our approach to HSR is that the benefits must be spread across the city region. This is via several aspects: — directly from the station and associated developments around it; — directly from having good access to the station for business or other travel; and — indirectly from connectivity benefits from freed up capacity on the classic network. 110 [See Ref 6] 111 [See Ref 1] 112 [See Ref 1] cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w199

From this type of approach our ambition would be for as many Social and Economic Groups to benefit as possible.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 41. To maximise the transport benefits of HSR, and allow the supporting infrastructure to be planned and delivered, the Government should ensure that national and Local Authority expenditure is planned in advance to give planning certainty to Local Authorities. This should be undertaken in partnership with all local authorities who will benefit from HSR.

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 42. In order to reduce the carbon emission to a considerable low level, some complementary measures to the introduction of HSR are essentially needed. For example, HSR should switch to carbon free or neutral energy production, attract a substaintial mode shift from road and aviation, accompany by introduction of measures to increase car occupancy, encourage rail frieght by switching it from road, and support “code sharing” with aviation on low demand domestic routes. 43. Operationally, HSR is only as low carbon as the energy used to power it.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 44. It is necessary to acknowledge that the business case considered the environmental impact and followed the DfT WebTAG and DMRB guidelines. However, as a result it is subject to the limitations of these techniques, particularly around non-monetised attributes.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 45. HSR potentially provides opportunities to promote a shift of freight traffic from road to classic rail, via released capacity.

6.4 How much disruption will there be to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 46. No response to this question. May 2011

Written evidence from Community and Regional Planning Services (HSR 78) Introduction 1. Community and Regional Planning Services is pleased to submit this evidence. Our evidence is not confidential. 2. Community and Regional Planning Services is an independent planning consultancy operating throughout England and offering a full range of planning advice and resources to both public and private clients at national, sub-national and local levels. We have particular experience in responding to development plans including strategic plans, and have represented clients at a number of Examinations-in-Public. We also undertake studies, research and policy advice for NGOs and statutory agencies. We provide training in the planning system through seminars and workshops. Through all our work runs the thread of a high level of environmental awareness and commitment together with community sensitivity. 3. We do not purport to represent any particular clients or other interests in responding to the Committee’s Call for Evidence, but do so from the perspective of our lengthy experience across a wide range of land-use planning issues including strategic planning. In particular, we do not have interests in or clients with interest in land or property along or near the line of the route. 4. We are not specifically requesting to give oral evidence.

Summary 1. We are aware of the Committee’s wish to concentrate on the strategic issues and not to examine the detailed line of route or the effect on individual landowners, residents or businesses along the line of route. We have therefore concentrated our evidence on four basic topics. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w200 Transport Committee: Evidence

2. Since these cut across more than one of the Committee’s specific Questions, we have submitted them on a topic-by-topic basis. 3. This Evidence: — draws attention to the lack of a strategic options consultation on the route for Stage 1 of HS2; — recommends that “passive provision” be made for an intermediate station between Old Oak Common and Birmingham; — raises matters relating to the Old Oak Common interchange, particularly with Crossrail; and — discusses the question of gauge and of accommodating on HS2 trains bound for destinations beyond the HS2 network.

Evidence Strategic options 4. We are aware that HS2 Ltd has looked at many options for the route and that this process has been described in the full Consultation Document. Fig B2 therein shows the full set of route options initially considered and Fig B3 the “shortlist”. However, there was no public consultation on strategic options for the route. The first true public consultation is the current one, which defines the route precisely and in full detail. We contrast this with that for HS1 for which, we seem to recall, there were three strategic route options on which the public were invited to comment before the present route was finally selected. 5. We are not necessarily disputing that the chosen route is the best option. Also it would not have been unreasonable for HS2 Ltd to have carried out an initial sifting process, in order to discard impracticable or very expensive options or those which offered extended journey times, as indeed it did. But a consultation process on a shortlist of strategic route options before making the final recommendation would have increased public “ownership” of the final result and raised public awareness of the engineering, commercial and other issues to be faced. 6. The Government may even be leaving itself open to legal challenge on this point given that, as we understand it, the requirements the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive require an options consultation stage.

Intermediate station 7. The HS2 proposals include no intermediate station between Old Oak Common and Birmingham Interchange. We are aware of the possible negative effect on running times of intermediate stations (although not all trains would need to call there) and of potential additional costs. Also, until the high speed line itself is extended beyond Birmingham the existing network is likely adequately to be able to serve passengers from intermediate areas between London and Birmingham with no time advantage by using HS2. However, once high speed services extend further north to Manchester, Leeds and eventually beyond to Scotland, a whole swath of the northern home counties and south Midlands (Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Milton Keynes, southern Northamptonshire and north Oxfordshire—a sub-region earmarked for considerable growth) will be unable to take advantage of the new service: for them, travelling into London first would negate all potential advantages of the new line. 8. An intermediate station at which not all trains called would have to be located on a “loop”, with a single platform for each direction, both to enable non-stop trains to overtake and for the safety of passengers waiting on the platform. However, it is understood that the maximum speed at which trains can safely turn into a loop from the main line at the junction is approximately 225kph, whereas the maximum design speed of HS2 is to be up to 400kph. This means that stopping trains would have to slow down to the junction speed, which costs line capacity inasmuch as following trains could be delayed or greater headways would be required. 9. However, not all trains would call at such an intermediate station between Old Oak Common and Birmingham Interchange. Trains from London terminating at Birmingham would not need to call since the existing “classic” network would suffice for passengers destined from Birmingham. It would be important for HS trains serving destinations north of Birmingham, once Phase 2 was completed, to call at the intermediate station northbound in the first part of the morning and southbound in the late afternoon and evening in order to provide an out-and-back-within-a-day service for its catchment area. At other times, the station could be served, say, hourly at the most. In this way the station would provide maximum benefit for the least running- time penalty. 10. It is not proposed that the station should serve London commuters. Through trains to the Continent via HS1 could also usefully call in order to provide a through service from the intermediate station, in order to eliminate cross-London interchange to St Pancras International. 11. The idea of an intermediate station between Old Oak Common and Birmingham Interchange is mentioned briefly in the box on p. 87 of the full Consultation Document. However, this appears only to have been considered before the final line of route had been selected, since it suggests that Bicester or Milton Keynes were possible candidate locations: these were on two of the “shortlisted” routes but on not the final one. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w201

12. It is desirable that an intermediate station should serve as large a population as possible, within a reasonable access time. Use of this station would generally be preferred by prospective customers of HS2 travelling to destinations north of Birmingham rather than first travelling to Euston or Old Oak Common if the overall journey time from the origin location was shorter by whatever combination of travel modes were used. 13. The principal towns and cities in the catchment area include Aylesbury, Banbury, Bedford, Bicester, Hemel Hempstead, High Wycombe, Luton/Dunstable, Milton Keynes, Northampton and Oxford. It should be remembered, however, that even the rural areas between these places support substantial populations in smaller towns and larger villages. 14. A marginal case can be seen at Hemel Hempstead, which is on the West Coast main line into Euston and so would have easy interchange with HS2 there. Trains from Oxford to Paddington would be likely to call at Old Oak Common but even after electrification this is likely to result in an uncompetitive journey time compared with use of an intermediate station on HS2. Banbury and Northampton may best be served by conventional train direct to Birmingham International (typical journey times 43 min and 47 min respectively) where interchange with HS2 will be available, although currently trains from these towns are not very frequent (typically every 30–60 min). 15. Less weight may therefore be accorded to accessibility to the intermediate HS2 station from Banbury, Hemel Hempstead and Northampton, although some users may still prefer it to travelling via Birmingham or London where a time allowance for interchange would also be necessary. 16. Given the final choice of route, there would appear to be four possible locations for an intermediate station: Aylesbury, Calvert, Finmere and . These are identified on the map at Fig 1. Given the strategic nature of the Committee’s Inquiry, exact sites are not specified, merely approximate locations. 17. Further analysis of these four options is given in the Appendix to this Evidence. We conclude that the Aylesbury area would provide the greatest benefit, having a higher level of advantages over disadvantages. 18. All that would be required for the intermediate station at Stage 1 would be what is called “passive provision”. Essentially this would be the purchase of (or an option on) land adjacent to the line, free of permanent structures such as bridge abutments and electrification masts, such that construction of the station and the necessary loops could be carried out at Stage 2 or later without disruption to HS services already running under Stage 1. Ideally, the inclusion of switches (points) for the turnouts in the Stage 1 running lines, together with additional signalling capacity, would make construction of the station at a later date even easier. If any loops were to be provided as part of Stage 1 for maintenance trains or emergency purposes, then the site of the future intermediate station would be an ideal location for these. 19. It is now being regretted that an intermediate station was not provided on HS1 on the outskirts of Chatham or Maidstone for use by South Eastern high-speed domestic services. The Medway towns have really lost out because of this: such HS services as they do have operate using the much slower route via Gravesend. It would be prohibitively expensive to add such a station now. Let the same mistake not be made with HS2. 20. Incidentally, the promise of a future intermediate station on HS2 might also de-fuse some of the local authority opposition in the area, and there is even the potential for the eventual station to be part-funded by developers of the site or of a wider local area, as is happening with Crossrail, depending on the chosen location.

Old Oak Common 21. This station on HS2 is to be provided as an interchange with Crossrail and with trains to/from Heathrow, local services to Reading and Great Western main line services to the west. Fig 5.3 of the full Consultation Document shows a map of the location and outline of the stations. 22. It would appear from Drawing 09080 that the HS2 station is to have four platforms: this would provide maximum flexibility. The station must be able to be served by trains bound to/from the link line to HS1. 23. Given that HS2 would run at a lower ground level, interchange at Old Oak Common should be as seamless as possible. It should be remembered that passengers will be interchanging in several directions: HS2 with Crossrail to/from Central London and HS2 to/from Heathrow and destinations further west. Interchange passenger volumes are expected to be high, particularly before the HS2 link to Heathrow is constructed. 24. Passive provision should be made in the Crossrail layout for Old Oak Common station when Crossrail is first constructed, even if the HS2 platforms are not built until HS2 itself is constructed. This would considerably reduce disruption to Crossrail at a later date at little if any additional cost. 25. Old Oak Common could be the terminus for those Crossrail trains from the east that were initially proposed to terminate at Paddington. (Only a proportion of Crossrail services are planned to operate west of Paddington on current plans.) This would ensure a sufficiently frequent Crossrail service into Central London for HS2 passengers wishing to change at Old Oak. Ideally, terminating “bay” platforms would be provided in the centre of the Crossrail tracks, similar to those at Dalston Junction on the London Overground line. This is an important matter for HS2 in order to ensure a sufficiently high Crossrail frequency for interchanging passengers. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w202 Transport Committee: Evidence

Train gauge 26. The proposal at Stage 1 for trains using HS2 from London which then continue beyond Birmingham towards Manchester and Scotland is for them initially to join the existing rail network north of Lichfield. 27. Although it is understood that European-gauge trains will operate the London-Birmingham route from the start, the operation on the “classic” network of trains bound for more northern destinations would necessitate new UK-gauge stock being procured for HS2 use which would become progressively redundant as the HS2 route is extended northwards (although in the case of services to Scotland, this could be some time away). 28. In order to maximise the use of capacity on the classic network and to provide overall competitive journey times, trains coming off HS2 to continue to Manchester and the West Coast route to Scotland would need to have tilting capability, similar to the existing “Pendolinos”. This appears to be a very expensive solution, unless these trains can be cascaded on to the classic lines once they are no longer required on an extended HS2 network. Only the West Coast Main Line is currently equipped for tilting trains, although scope may exist in the future for other electrified lines to benefit from tilt capability. 29. The alternative of diverting existing “Pendolinos” on to HS2 would put residual users of the West Coast Main Line at a disadvantage, as well as under-utilising their tilt capability. 30. Trains coming off HS2 bound for destinations other than on the West Coast Main Line (if any are planned) would not need tilt capability, but whilst only HS2 Stage 1 were operational there is likely to be no competitive advantage in using HS2 for destinations such as Leeds, NE England or the East Midlands. 31. The Consultation Document appears to have very little to say about this subject, and yet the question of gauge and tilt capability is fundamental to the overall planning (i) of HS2 itself, (ii) of the use of the line for trains serving destinations north of Birmingham and (iii) of rolling stock investment strategy. 16 May 2011

APPENDIX ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE FOUR SUGGESTED LOCATIONS FOR AN INTERMEDIATE STATION ON HS2 Aylesbury Pros: — Adjacent to large and growing urban area. — Easily served by public road transport to/from a variety of destinations. — Possible synergy with Aylesbury Vale Parkway Chiltern Line station, less than 1km distant (if HS2 station located to the west of the town). — Potential for developer contributions. Cons: — Distant from Banbury and Northampton.

Calvert Pros: — Interchange with proposed East-West Rail providing fast access to Oxford, Milton Keynes and Bedford. — Possible developer interest. Cons: — Rural location. — Poor road access. — Difficult to serve by road-based public transport. — Distant from High Wycombe and Luton/Dunstable. — Potential conflict with proposed HS2 Infrastructure Maintenance Depot. — Possible environmental impact.

Finmere Pros: — Served by (existing) express bus service to/from Oxford, Bicester, Buckingham, Milton Keynes and Bedford. — Close to A421 trunk road. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w203

Cons: — Rural location. — Distant from Hemel Hempstead, High Wycombe and Luton/Dunstable.

Brackley Pros: — Close to A43 trunk road with good access to Bicester, Northampton and Oxford. Cons: — Distant from Hemel Hempstead, High Wycombe and Luton/Dunstable.

Table 1 APPROXIMATE DISTANCES BY ROAD IN KM FROM PRINCIPAL CATCHMENT AREA TOWNS/ CITIES TO POTENTIAL LOCATIONS FOR INTERMEDIATE STATION ON HS2 Aylesbury Calvert Finmere Brackley Aylesbury — 21 35 39 Banbury 60 39 28 17 Bedford 57 57 55 57 Bicester 27 16 10 17 Hemel Hempstead 29 49 77 81 High Wycombe 27 69 67 69 Luton/Dunstable 36 60 61 65 Milton Keynes 30 27 28 32 Northampton 61 45 47 35 Oxford 46 35 33 35

Fig 1 POTENTIAL LOCATIONS FOR INTERMEDIATE STATION

Brackley

Finmere

Calvert

Aylesbury cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w204 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Terry Brennan (HSR 79)

Executive Summary

The key points of my evidence are: — The government’s expectation of huge growth in demand for inter-regional rail travel does not appear to be supported by age-specific demographic projections from the Office for National Statistics. — The ages most likely to use rail travel are ages 20–59. ONS projections indicate that by 2033, the government regions of the West Midlands, the North West, and Yorkshire and Humber will see only 3% growth by 2033 in these age bands. — The bulk of population growth in England by 2033 (78%) will occur in ages 0–19 or 60+, both age bands at which people rarely choose to travel by rail. — Longer term the number of people in the 20–59 age bands could diminish because of the UK’s “sub-replacement fertility rate” (of less than two children per female). This long-term decline will only reverse if significant net migration into the UK continues, and/or if fertility rates increase. — Modal shift from car appears to be a forced policy through capacity restriction of the UK motorway network, to the benefit of European competitors. — Modal shift from air appears not to be an objective of The Northern Way, who want to maintain existing Heathrow Airport slots and encourage regional airport expansion. — Value placed on time-saving appears to be overstated, with reference to recent commuter and business traveller behaviour. — The so-called “full appraisal of sustainability” is neither full nor sustainable because it omitted the likely impact on the London-Birmingham section from the proposed “Y” route (even though the likely number of “Y” route trains is known). — The assessment of environmental noise appears to have been downplayed, by modelling noise from train roof height as being a noise source at rail track height.

Recommendations — I would like the Transport Committee to ask the Office of National Statistics to audit the demand forecasts for HS2 passenger numbers, to see if they are consistent with the long term demographic profile for the main demand pool of rail passengers (ages 20–59). — I would also like the Transport Committee to call on HS2’s advisors or officials, particularly Mr. Rick James, to give evidence about why noise assessments and the potential train throughput has been modelled in the way that it has.

Question 3 (1): How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network?

Passenger forecasts

1. The government’s proposals for a new rail network are supposed to address a future capacity issue. At the most fundamental level, such a conclusion should depend on the number of people in future and their ages, compared with now.

2. However, the most recent population projections from the Office for National Statistics113 (summarised in Appendix 1) suggest that population growth in the regions to be served by HS2 may not support the forecast passenger numbers. Whilst it is clear and commonly accepted that the population of England is increasing, much less understood is the age profile of the demographics. This is important to understanding the pool of potential demand (people) for future rail travel.

3. The age demographics are highly significant because, as demonstrated by the recently published National Rail Travel Study114, the bulk of rail passengers are aged 20 to 59. For a clearer understanding of this, Figure 1 is a graph of rail travellers by age taken from the NRTS: 113 Office for National Statistics: Sub-National Population Projections June 2010 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=997 114 National Rail Travel Survey: December 2010 http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/statistics/datatablespublications/railways/nrtsupdate.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w205

Figure 1 AGE AND SEX PROFILE OF TYPICAL TRAVELLERS Thousands 500 450 400 350 300 250 Trips 200 150 100 50 0 Under 16 18 - 19 20 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 59 60 - 64 65 - 69 70 or over

Male Female

(source: NRTS 2010 page 21) 4. Under the government’s proposals, by 2033 (the year that ONS population projections run to) the London to Birmingham section of HS2 would be in its 8th year of operation and the onward sections to Manchester and Leeds would begin operating. 5. However, the ONS projections indicate that by 2033 approximately 64% of the population growth in England will be in the over 60+ age groups. A further 15% of the population growth will be children and young adults (below age 19). Both of those age bands take relatively few rail trips. 6. On a regional basis, in the West Midlands government region 93% of population growth will be under 19 or over 60; in the Yorkshire and Humber government region its 68%; whilst in the North West government region the figure is 100%—ie any population growth in the North West will be either 0–19 or 60+ whilst the ages 20–59 group will actually diminish. 7. To complement the earlier graph of age profiles, Figure 2 below illustrates the predicted change in population across England by 2033. Most of the population growth will occur in the age bands that are not typical rail travellers. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w206 Transport Committee: Evidence

Figure 2 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF POPULATION CHANGE IN ENGLAND ONS Population change 2010-2033 4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

People (000s) 1,500

1,000

500

0 0-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-59 60-64 65-69 70 or over Ages

(source data: ONS Sub National Population Projections). 8. So in the main demand pool of rail travellers, by 2033 the ONS predict that: — In the wider government regions of the West Midlands, North West, and Yorkshire & Humber, there will be only 3% growth in the 2059 age group. — In terms of population numbers, the West Midlands, North West and Yorkshire & Humber will see an additional 283,000 20–59 year olds by 2033. 9. At this point it should be noted that, at current rates, only about 3% of the population chooses to travel by rail on a daily basis. More importantly, it should also be noted that there is actually a downward trend in the number of trips (of all modes) per person as people’s lifestyles change.115 People want to travel less frequently. It follows then that only a small proportion of this additional population growth might choose rail travel. 10. Whilst there has been a recent increase in rail usage, overall rail usage as a proportion of daily journeys is still extremely small. Recent increases in rail travel include the new services on High Speed 1 (Eurostar) and the additional passengers on the West Coast Main Line—which were vigorously sought to meet the requirements of the operator’s business plan. These additional passengers could reasonably be thought of as the result of Say’s Law, whereby a new supply creates its own demand. 11. But even then, whether overall rail usage remains at around 3% of daily trips or increases (through choice or policy), a leap of faith would be required to assume that all of the extra passengers from the moderate population change would demand inter-regional trips. Referring again to the National Rail Travel Study,116 the proportion of daily rail passengers travelling inter-regionally is actually very small as shown in Figure 3 below: 12. So from a reasonable perspective of looking at future increases into the basic pool of demand (the number of people), and current travel behaviour, it would require some extraordinary assumptions of future behaviour to produce sufficient passengers to support the business case.

115 ONS Social Trends 40, 2010 edition pages 170–171 and: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_social/Social-Trends40/12_02.xls 116 National Rail Travel Survey: December 2010 page 17 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w207

Figure 3

TYPICAL DAILY TRAVEL WITHIN AND BETWEEN REGIONS Journey origin and destination: by country and region Great Britain Percentages Destination Scotland Wales North North Yorkshire and East West East of London South South Total East West Humberside Midlands Midlands England East West

Origin

Scotland 95 - 1 1 1 - - - 1 - - 100

Wales - 74 - 4 1 1 3 1 6 3 7 100

North East 7 1 56 5 12 2 2 2 10 3 1 100

North West 1 1 1 81 4 2 2 1 5 1 1 100

Yorkshire & Humberside 1 - 3 7 75 3 1 1 6 1 1 100

East Midlands 1 1 1 7 8 42 9 4 21 4 2 100

West Midlands - 1 - 4 1 4 75 1 8 3 2 100 East of England - - - 1 1 1 - 21 72 3 1 100

London - - - 1 1 1 1 12 68 16 1 100

South East - - - 1 - - 1 1 55 38 2 100

South West - 4 - 2 1 1 3 2 18 11 57 100

Percentages do not sum to 100 per cent due to rounding

(source: NRTS 2010 page 17)

13. So clearly HS2 will need to find more passengers to make a strong business case. Perhaps this is why it has been claimed that 70% of HS2 demand could be leisure travellers. However the NRTS findings lend no support to this assertion because only 24% of travellers on a typical day do so for leisure reasons. This reinforces similar findings from the National Travel Survey 2005, and the National Passenger Survey (Autumn 2006).117

14. In the longer run, the demographics of the UK will be affected by its fertility rate. A population generally needs a fertility rate of 2.1 children per female to maintain a steady state and anything less could imply a long- term decline in population. The UK now has an ageing population, with birth booms of the 1960s and approaching retirement ages. The UK fertility rate has been below 2.0 since the 1970s (most recently it was around 1.9). To offset this potential decline, the UK will need a continuous net migration inflow, and/or encourage higher fertility rates.

Modal shift: Road

15. In making the case for HS2, the government and lobbyists also cite what is happening with our European competitors, particularly France, Germany, and Spain. Therefore it is interesting to discover from the European Union statistics website118 the following observations: — France has reduced its railway network by 2,042km in the period 2000–09. In the same period France has added 1,390km to its motorway network (the 2nd highest increase in the EU). 117 National Rail Travel Survey: December 2010 page 26 118 European Union: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=tran_r_net&lang=en cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w208 Transport Committee: Evidence

— Germany has reduced its railway network by 6,796km in the period 2000–09. In the same period Germany has added 1,101km to its motorway network (the 3rd highest increase in the EU). — Spain, in contrast, has increased its railway network by 2,947km in the period 2000–09. But in the same period Spain also added 4,974km to its motorway network (the highest increase in the EU). 16. What about the United Kingdom? The UK has reduced its railway network by 914km in the period 2000–09. And in the same period, the UK has added just 97km to its motorway network (the 22nd highest increase in the European Union). It’s not clear from the statistic whether this includes the innovative scheme for using the hard shoulder of motorways. 17. Should anyone presume that the UK’s modest increase in motorway length may be because it already has a substantial network, the statistics show that is not the case. The UK appears to have only 60% of the motorway capacity that Italy has; 33% of the French capacity; 28% of the German capacity; and 26% of the Spanish capacity. 18. From this it appears that our European competitors place a much stronger emphasis on the economic benefits of road transport, placing the UK at a competitive disadvantage.

Modal shift: Air 19. It has been established elsewhere that there are no substantive air links from Birmingham or Leeds to Heathrow Airport, whilst rail already has over 75% of the London-Manchester market. Nevertheless it is worth noting that, according to The Northern Way’s recent analysis, business can cope quite well without links to Heathrow: “With the loss of the Leeds Bradford to Heathrow service businesses in Yorkshire have adapted their travel behaviours and are now also connecting over Manchester, Amsterdam and Dubai to other long- haul destinations. This is also to a lesser extent true in the North East. Businesses often cite a more relaxing and pleasant experience from travelling via Amsterdam rather than travelling through London Heathrow”.119 20. Even so, and despite this adaption, the Transport Committee should note the intention laid out quite openly that, as well as lobbying for high speed rail, The Northern Way will also lobby for maintaining remaining links with Heathrow and for the expansion of northern airports.120

Time value 21. I refer again to the NRTS to point out that a majority of rail commuters (58%) and most business travellers (41%) actually walk to their station of origin, rather than use faster modes of bicycle, taxi, car, car share, or public transport. Logically this suggests that time-saving is not nearly as critical as the government believes, and in fact for the rational traveller, convenience and cost appear to carry far more significance than currently estimated in the government’s assessments.121

Figure 4 TRAVEL CHOICES TO STATION OF ORIGIN Percentages Commuting Business Leisure Total Walk 58 41 50 54 Cycle 2 1 1 2 Bus/Coach 10 7 12 10 Car2 16 31 23 20 Underground/Light Rail/Metro 14 19 12 14 Other 0 0 1 0 Total 100 100 100 100 Percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding (source: NRTS 2010 page 19)

119 The Northern Way: The Importance of Improving International Air Connectivity for the North’s Economy—January 2011 section 3.13 120 The Northern Way: (as above) section 10 121 National Rail Travel Survey: December 2010 page 19 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w209

APPENDIX 1

COMPILATION OF ONS SUB NATIONAL POPULATION PROJECTION, 2010 Yorkshire & Humber Region Yorkshire 2010-33 Population Growth West Yorkshire county Yorkshire West county Greater Manchester England North West Region West Midlands Region West Midlands West Midlands county Midlands West London APPENDIX 1: Regional Population Growth By Age so urce data: from Growth "Office for NationalAPPENDIX (Compiled Population Regional 1:

ouaincag 00s ,6 4646454351044088,517 4,068 1,044 315 524 604 644 54 1,264 Population change (000's) ouaincag 00s 5 5 151 Population change (000's) 55 Population change (000's) ouaincag 00s 95 Population change (000's) ouaincag 00s 32 Population change (000's) ouaincag 00s 104 Population change (000's) ouaincag 00s 0 34 301 Population change (000's) 94 Population change (000's) oto foealgot 17.8% overall growth Portion of oto foealgot 48 .%76 .%62 .%1.%4.%100.0% 47.8% 12.3% 3.7% 6.2% 7.1% 7.6% 0.6% 14.8% overall growth Portion of oto foealgot 53 .%1.%1.%69 .%1.%4.%100.0% 40.4% 10.4% 2.7% 6.9% 13.1% 10.8% 0.5% 15.3% overall growth Portion of 5.7% overall growth Portion of oto foealgot 94 .%1.%1.%1.%28 .%2.%100.1% 29.1% 8.2% 2.8% 11.4% 15.9% 11.6% 1.6% 19.4% overall growth Portion of oto foealgot 15.9% overall growth Portion of oto foealgot 72 .%1.%1.%46 .%90 18 100.1% 31.8% 9.0% 3.9% 4.6% 10.0% 11.6% 1.9% 27.2% overall growth Portion of oto foealgot 17 .%64 03 23 .%99 00 100.0% 20.0% 9.9% 7.0% 22.3% 10.3% 6.4% 2.5% 21.7% overall growth Portion of 03Pplto 00s 3653687598061,9 ,3 ,6 02360,715 10,233 3,464 3,437 10,594 8,076 7,589 3,678 13,645 2033 Population (000's) 00Pplto 00s 5 9 2 0 1 2 2272,253 237 92 6,296 5,306 1,022 123 622 2,914 2,608 347 411 245 420 276 346 308 320 151 112 1,088 327 1,019 152 147 852 722 198 493 482 800 557 694 399 2010 Population (000's) 367 427 422 395 1,413 368 1,262 2033 Population (000's) 2010 Population (000's) 204 209 701 646 2033 Population (000's) 2010 Population (000's) 00Pplto 00s 2313646947421,6 ,2 ,2 ,6 52,198 6,165 2,420 3,123 10,069 7,472 6,944 3,624 12,381 2010 Population (000's) 03Pplto 00s 5 0 8 8 6 3 3 7 2,741 379 132 137 467 385 383 206 652 2033 Population (000's) 03Pplto 00s ,9 6 9 6 ,6 3 4 ,0 7,472 6,919 1,305 827 443 330 432 429 1,268 1,365 964 951 894 853 469 500 1,696 1,665 2033 Population (000's) 2010 Population (000's) 03Pplto 00s ,4 7 2 7 ,2 4 5 ,6 6,113 5,460 1,066 664 354 271 349 331 1,022 1,050 774 755 726 670 376 377 1,447 1,343 2033 Population (000's) 2010 Population (000's) 03Pplto 00s ,5 1 ,0 ,3 ,4 2 7 2 9,188 7,799 929 2,996 652 2,650 376 408 239 298 424 143 326 112 1,646 147 1,336 134 1,437 1,294 483 467 1,609 1,521 395 361 616 582 409 2,151 369 1,850 2033 Population (000's) 2010 Population (000's) 223 216 788 694 2033 Population (000's) 2010 Population (000's) ouaingot 02%14%92%80%52%1.7 31%6.9 16.32% 65.99% 43.13% 8.43% 10.07% % population growth 5.21% 8.08% 9.28% 1.48% 10.21% % population growth ouaingot 19%12%1.6 80%67%82%4.5 42%18.66% 64.25% 41.85% 8.22% 6.73% 18.03% 15.36% 1.21% 11.98% % population growth ouaingot 1.90% % population growth ouaingot 70%39%1.4 52%1.9 10%4.9 99%21.70% 59.98% 43.89% 11.02% 13.59% 25.21% 17.34% 3.94% 17.05% % population growth ouaingot 7.74% % population growth ouaingot 62%58%58%1.3 31%2.3 75%4.8 17.81% 42.58% 57.54% 13.05% 29.93% 36.95% 23.19% 27.98% 11.03% 10.10% 5.83% 3.38% 5.86% 9.56% 16.29% % population growth 10.91% 3.05% 13.54% % population growth -92-42-43-44-96-46-970 or 65-69 60-64 45-59 35-44 25-34 20-24 0-19 g g g g g g g Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age E S N M L I DEG -2.39% -6.08% -0.27% -1.6% -5.5% -0.2% -30 -5 -1 8 7 .3 .7 .4 .3 45%5.3 11.73% 51.83% 34.58% 3.33% 2.24% 8.57% 7.43% .7 1.38% 4.77% .3 2.52% 8.33% .%1.%35 .%1.%4.%100.0% 46.8% 12.7% 1.6% 3.5% 10.3% 8.9% .%2.4% 7.4% .%2.9% 8.5% 0 3 69 130 107 57 913309 3 7 1,389 277 137 98 310 143 89 40 27 41 56 78 34 32 13 19 -17.6% -7.12% -2.62% -4.2% -97 -28 56 16 11 Statistics 2008-based Subnationa .0 42%5.1 7.98% 57.91% 34.20% 0.70% .7 06%6.8 11.96% 60.48% 30.64% 5.47% .%2.%8.%100.0% 86.7% 20.5% 0.5% .%1.%6.%100.0% 61.5% 12.7% 2.8% 14 61340990 400 103 26 14 18 5 3 1 7 553 479 113 012489 142 40 110346 110 31 913306 143 39 342653 402 83 l Population Projections, 2010") Projections, Population l oe oasAe01 n 0 Age 20-59 Age 0-19 and 60+ Totals over 20.42% 113.3% 27.78% 77%10.86% 27.75% 19.26% 88%15.92% 28.83% 23.26% 20.10% 65%12.15% 26.54% 30,779 24,088 68.7% 78.9% 71.9% 78.6% 59.5% 92.9% 58.6% 6,691 3,129 2,449 1,009 1,423 1,182 3,877 3,251 1,300 3,880 3,066 3,216 2,609 1,486 1,237 291 680 814 249 241 626 607 -13.3% -2.01% 29,936 28,110 31.3% 4.53% 21.1% 28.1% 6.50% 21.4% 1.62% 40.5% 6.87% 41.4% 1,826 3,167 2,857 1,243 1,491 1,427 3,595 3,669 1,441 5,308 4,733 2,898 2,851 1,510 1,413 7.1% 198 310 575 -74 97 65 46

Question 6 (2): Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

1. With reference to the consultation material now published by the government and HS2, I urge the Transport Committee to call HS2 technical advisors to give evidence on the following points and clarify this issue: cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w210 Transport Committee: Evidence

Point 1: Noise source: Please ask the HS2 advisors to confirm that their own reference study122 indicates significant noise from modern high speed trains at speeds of just 200kmh; that the loudest noise at 200kmh comes from around the top of the train; and that this noise source increases with train speed. (In public meetings they have told people there will be no such noise). Point 2: Noise mitigation: Please ask the HS2 advisors to confirm that their own technical paper acknowledges noise barriers to be less effective against train roof noise; and that a decision was taken to model such noise as being at track level instead of at train roof height. This point is very significant.123 “Without first mitigating the source of aerodynamic noise, wayside noise barriers are not likely be as effective or feasible, due to the required increase in barrier height, to provide shielding to the entire train.”….. “It was decided that some modification to the base CRN calculation should be included to account for aerodynamic noise. The best option at this stage was to retain a single noise source but alter the source height………..For train speeds less than 300km/h the rolling noise source location of CRN was used (rail head height).” Point 3: European Commission advice: Please ask HS2 to confirm that Mr. Rick Jones of DeltaRail is the same advisor who participated in the IMAGINE project for the European Commission on how to appropriately model train noise. That project included a paper by Mr. Jones124 which provided the following advice and illustration: “It was agreed by the Work Package that the five source heights above rail head level (h) identified originally within HARMONOISE were suitable for carrying forward as the IMAGINE recommendations. These are shown in Figure 4.2.”

4m - traction, aero

3m - traction

2m - traction

0.5m - rolling:wheel, aero, traction 0.0m - rolling:track

Point 4: Accounting for noise: Following on, please ask HS2 to explain how their modelling of train roof noise, and its subsequent environmental costs, is justified and consistent with previous advice given by Mr. Jones to the European Commission. 2. The number of trains used in the “Appraisal of Sustainability” is 432 per day. However, whilst the specific “Y” route may not yet be known, the potential train throughput from the “Y” route is known and could be up to 576 trains,125 which is 33% more than used in the appraisal. Will the Transport Committee please ask HS2 officials to explain why they have claimed a “full Appraisal of Sustainability”, which in fact appears to be neither full nor sustainable because further substantial impacts arrive just seven years later; and ask them to explain when a proper “full” appraisal will be issued for similar level of widespread scrutiny. May 2011

Written evidence from Professor Mike Geddes (HSR 80) Summary This paper assesses evidence about the extent to which job creation associated with HS2/HSR may help to bridge the North-South employment divide. It shows that the forecasts of the regional employment implications of HS2/HSR produced by government or by supporters of the project are subject to serious qualifications. Consequently it is very difficult to sustain the prediction that, overall, the employment impact of HS2 would reduce the North-South divide. 122 “Noise Sources for High Speed Trains” table 3 (F Poisson, P E Gautier, and F Letourneaux) 123 HS2 Appraisal of Sustainability: Appendix 5 Technical Reports paragraph 6.3.3 and 5.6.10–11 124 IMAGINE paper by Mr. Rick Jones, page 13 http://www.imagine-project.org/bestanden/IMA6TR-061015-AEATUK10_D12–13.pdf 125 HS2 Appraisal of Sustainability: Appendix 5 Technical Reports—page 45 Table 1 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w211

Introduction 1. This paper assesses evidence about the extent to which job creation associated with HS2/HSR may help to bridge the North-South employment divide. 2. This is an important issue. Transport Secretary Philip Hammond claims the high speed rail network will “change the social and economic geography of Britain; connecting our great population centres and international gateways”. Hammond further suggests that linking England’s main cities via high speed rail, with further links to Scotland, could help break down the north-south divide. “Bringing those economies in closer reach of London, allowing them to benefit from London’s magnet effect in the world, is going to help solve some of the most intractable postwar social and economic problems Britain has faced.”126 3. Similar arguments are made by other supporters of HS2. The Yes to High Speed Rail campaign claims that “A new high speed rail network could help the Midlands and the North by increasing the connectivity between major urban economies, helping transform the cities of the Midlands and the North into a single economic area”.127 4. The debate about the job creation impact of HS2 falls into two parts: — Job creation from regeneration schemes linked to the construction of HS2, concentrated around stations. — Job creation arising from the wider impact of HS2 on the economy. 5. The next two sections of the paper will comment on each of these. A further section will then bring them together with other data about North-South employment disparities, allowing several conclusions to be reached.

Jobs from Regeneration 6. Current government estimates of job creation associated with HS2 are as follows: — 9,000 construction jobs; — 1,500 operational jobs of which 340 are in London and 420 in Birmingham; and — 30,300 from regeneration around the stations, of which 22,000 in London (Euston and Old Oak Common), and 8,300 in Birmingham (Curzon St and Birmingham Interchange).128

7. Of these the construction jobs are temporary, and the operational jobs are small in number. The regeneration-related employment is more significant, but 70% of these jobs will be in London. It might be hypothesised though that if and when the full “Y” route is built to Manchester and Leeds, further regeneration- related employment might arise at stations at Manchester, Leeds, South Yorkshire and a station in the East Midlands. It is not possible to do more than guess at the scale of this but if these were on the same scale as in Birmingham, this would be an additional 33,000 jobs. This would change the North-South balance of the jobs “created” to the advantage of the North and Midlands.

8. However, as the government admits, many of these will not actually be new jobs, but relocations from elsewhere. Moreover, they are not necessarily directly attributable to HS2: while their location is a direct consequence of the location of HS2 stations, they will depend heavily on other public and private investment.

9. This is reminiscent of the case of Lille in France, where there has been major regeneration investment around the HSR station. Lille is frequently cited by supporters of HS2 as showing the scale of job creation resulting from HSR, but in practice HSR has at best been only one element in a much bigger regeneration “package”.129 In a similar way, claims of 22,000 jobs made by CENTRO in the West Midlands are dependent not only on the direct impact of HS2 but on an associated package of regional transport investment.130

10. The experience of HS1 is also relevant. The Yes to HS2 campaign quotes a report by Colin Buchanan and Partners to suggest that HS1 might “help to deliver” 100,000 jobs.131 On the one hand, were these estimates to be realised, the impact of regeneration employment driven by the UK HSR network (HS1 plus HS2) would reinforce the North-South divide, with many more jobs in the South than the Midlands and North. On the other hand though, these projections are subject to all the above qualifications as to whether they are new jobs and to what extent they depend on HSR. Moreover, there is so far little if any evidence on the ground that these jobs are materialising in the manner envisaged.132 126 The Guardian, 3 and 4 October 2010. 127 http://www.campaignforhsr.com/the-north-south-divide 128 HS2 Ltd, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future—Consultation. DfT 2011. 129 http://hs2theregionalimpact.wordpress.com/2011/05/09/french-lessons-is-hs2-a-cost-effective-tool-for-regional-regeneration/ 130 http://hs2theregionalimpact.wordpress.com/2011/02/10/how-will-high-speed-rail-impact-on-the-west-midlands-economy/ 131 In fact, Buchanan suggests HS1 might “drive” the delivery of 70,000 regeneration jobs over 60 years. http://www.colinbuchanan.com/uploads/cms/files/147e7dfc-2a53–4267–83d7–72bdde92062e.pdf 132 In Ashford, where “huge economic benefits” were claimed, unemployment has fallen more slowly than in towns not served by the high speed line http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100082403/high-speed-rail-more-doubt-over-the-economic-case/ cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w212 Transport Committee: Evidence

11. To sum up this section: — Current claims about the causative role of HS2 in creating employment through regeneration are exaggerated. — When subjected to critical appraisal, evidence from comparators such as Lille and HS1 also suggests that employment claims for HSR are inflated.

Wider Employment Benefits 12. Government claims that the wider economic benefits of HS2 would be of the order of £4 billion npv.133 However, neither the employment implications of these claimed benefits, nor their regional distribution, are estimated. Thus any claims that these wider economic benefits of HS2 will contribute to narrowing the North- South divide do not rest on any evidence produced by government. 13. Instead, when supporters of HS2 make claims on this issue, they rest on other evidence. One widely cited source of this type is research undertaken for Greengauge 21 by KPMG. 14. Table 1 shows employment gains and losses by region attributed to HSR by KPMG for the period 2021–40.134 It will be seen that the data shows substantial gains by Northern and Midland regions (with the exception of the East Midlands) and substantial losses in the Southern regions. It must first be noted that these projections assume a far larger HSR network than that currently envisaged by government’s proposals, even taking together the HS2 “Y” + HS1, and therefore much larger impacts, with a bias towards the North. Table 1 JOB GAINS AND LOSSES ATTRIBUTED TO HSR BY REGION 2021—2040 North and Midlands 000s South 000s East Midlands −25 London −59 West Midlands 68 Southeast −71 Yorks and H 49 East −40 Northwest 62 Southwest −48 Northeast 46 Scotland 64 264 −218 Net South-North redistribution 482 North-South divide reduced by 24,000 jobs a year

15. Moreover, there are several important methodological reasons to question the robustness of this data: — The time period over which the projections are made is very long. It must be assumed that if government considered that this kind of projection was valid, it would either have produced its own data, or endorsed the Greengauge/KPMG data. It has done neither. — There may be an “upward bias” in KPMG’s calculations of the role of rail investment in driving employment location.135 — One of the factors on which the employment shift from South to North appears to be based is that London may be too big to make further agglomeration gains. This can however be questioned on the grounds that key economic sectors such as banking and finance are not subject to such constraints.136 16. To sum up this section: government has not produced figures on the regional employment implications of the claimed wider economic impact of HS2, while some figures which are widely cited are subject to major reservations.

Comparing Claims Against a Benchmark 17. Bringing together the findings from the previous two sections shows that: — Regeneration-associated employment driven by HS2 is small in scale: 30,300 jobs over a 12–15 year period, about 2,000 a year, of which 70% are in London. If these orders of magnitude are extended to the “Y” this rises to 66,000, ie maybe 4,500 per annum, of which two thirds are in the Midlands and North.137 133 The £4 billion figure is for Phase 1. These “wider economic benefits” are in addition to potential benefits for rail travellers such as business time saving and improved reliability. 134 High Speed Rail in Britain: Consequences for Employment and Economic Growth. Greengauge 21, 2010. The projections are from a base date of 2007. 2021 is the date when it was envisaged that the HSR network would become operational. 135 Laird J and Mackie P, 2010, Review of Methodologies to Assess Transport’s Impacts on the Size of the Economy, Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds for The Northern Way. 136 Ibid. If this is the case then the impact of HS2 will be to make the North a more accessible market for London businesses in these sectors. 137 If however regeneration-related jobs from HS1 are added in, the majority are in the South. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w213

— The wider employment impacts, as calculated by KPMG, are more substantial, suggesting a reduction in the North-South divide of about 24,000 jobs a year, but this is on the basis of a hypothesised HSR network about twice the size of the HS2 “Y”, so a truer comparative figure might be in the region of 12,000 jobs a year. — Together, this could, in the most optimistic scenario, amount to a reduction in the North-South employment gap by 16–17,000 jobs a year.

18. Such an impact is, as we have suggested, subject to major methodological concerns. However, let us put these to one side for a moment, and ask to what extent even this highly optimistic scenario would reduce the North-South employment gap. Asking this question highlights an important absence from the much of the debate about the impact of HS2 on North-South employment disparities: to wit, any benchmark of the scale of existing regional disparities against which to measure claimed impacts of HS2. There are good reasons for this. The claims made for HS2 and for HS1, by government and by consultants such as Buchanan and KPMG, are very long term. Many employment experts would rightly be reluctant to make such projections.

19. It is therefore not possible to suggest a benchmark which is directly comparable to the data which has been discussed above. It is suggested, though, that a comparison can be made which, despite these limitations, still offers a valuable contribution to this debate.

20. Table 2 shows estimates by Cambridge Econometrics of employment change by region over the recent past and short term future. This shows that the current period is one of job losses or small increases in the North and Midlands, and large job gains in the South. The North-South divide is currently widening annually by about 62,000 jobs. The 16–17,000 pa reduction in the divide which is the most optimistic scenario for the impact of HS2 would not come anywhere near stemming the current widening of the jobs divide, let alone start to close it. This seriously questions any statement that HS2 could bring “transformational change” to the economic geography of the UK.

Table 2

EMPLOYMENT CHANGE BY REGION 2010–15138 North and Midlands 000s South 000s East Midlands 1 London 145 West Midlands 21 Southeast 66 Yorks and H 23 East 54 Northwest 7 Southwest 72 Northeast −21 Scotland −6 25 312 Net North-South redistribution 312,000 North—South divide WIDENS by 62,000 jobs a year

Conclusions

21. This short paper has produced evidence which questions assertions that employment growth attributable to HS2 will reduce the North-South employment divide. It shows that: — The forecasts of the regional employment implications of HS2 produced by government or by supporters of the project are subject to serious qualifications. This is especially the case regarding the wider employment impacts. — When these qualifications are taken into account, it is very difficult to sustain the prediction that, overall, the employment impact of HS2 would reduce the North-South divide. This is consistent with the weight of wider evidence, relating to both the UK and other countries, that the geographical impact of new transport investments is likely to principally benefit the largest cities (in this case, the London region).139 — Even on the most optimistic—and highly unlikely—scenario for supporters of HS2, any reduction in the jobs gap would fail by a large margin to stop the North-South divide widening at its current rate, let alone produce “transformational change”. May 2011

138 http://www.camecon.com/UK/UKRegions_Local_Cities/PressReleaseUKRegionsLocalAndCitiesSectors.aspx 139 See for example Eddington, R, 2006, The Eddington Review of Transport. London: Department for Transport; De Rus, G, 2008, The Economic Effects of High Speed Rail Investment, Discussion Paper 2008/16. OECD-ITP Joint Transport Research centre. Paris: OECD. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w214 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from The Chiltern Society (HSR 81) Q1. What are the main arguments for or against HSR? 1.1 To answer this question meaningfully it is essential to distinguish between the concept of High Speed Rail (HSR), the proposed HS2 project and the issue of whether the latter is an effective response to the Government’s case for the former. 1.2 HSR covers a wide spectrum of different rail track and train design speeds.1 If there is a demonstrable case for HSR, one key question is “what design speed concept(s) will provide the best strategic fit and value for money for England, Wales and Scotland?” 1.3 The Chiltern Society is not opposed to the concept of HSR. It is though strongly opposed to the currently proposed HS2 project, which has been evolved through a highly flawed, and arguably unlawful, process. Moreover, the HS2 project has been proposed in the absence of a soundly developed national strategic context against which to test its soundness in terms of fitness for purpose. The Society is drawn into this debate because, as a direct result of these process failures, an HSR route through the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) is proposed. This has been done without conclusive demonstration, as required by planning guidance2 and best practice, that no alternative that avoids the AONB is possible to meet the (currently undefined) “national interest” need for an HSR network. 1.4 The Society is prepared to accept that there are prima facie arguments for reducing rail travel times between major cities and, importantly, improving connectivity to and between major centres in the English Midlands and the North. Achieving these objectives is likely to require the use of one or more forms of HSR. By definition, the overlaying of a separate network of new “dedicated” Very High Speed Rail (VHSR) track proposed by HS2 Ltd (HS2L) and DfT severely limits the number of major centres that can access and benefit most from HSR. In contrast, an “integrated” approach to accommodate slower speed HSR trains as part of the development of the existing national strategic rail network would eventually enable many more communities to benefit from HSR. This could still require sections of new HSR track, such as a strategic “spine” route integral with the existing network. 1.5 The HS2L/DfT HS2 proposals were founded on the presumption of future capacity restrictions on the West Coast Main Line tracks. Value of time and “wider economic impact” (WEI) assumptions have been used to justify these proposals. The value of time assumptions used have been discredited3 and there is no apparent robust evidence base to justify the WEI claims. At best, the HS2 economic case remains unproven. 1.6 Interestingly, the HS2 proposals are based on the “dedicated” VHSR network concepts mainly used in non-European countries such as China where the populations served are separated by very long distances. In European countries where the major centres are not as closely located as they are in Britain, the preference has been for the “integrated” network approach, with a consequent wider spread of benefits. By this comparison, the HS2L/DfT proposals do not seem fit for purpose. 1.7 It also seems perverse that the principal cause of the future capacity problems perceived for WCML arises mainly, not from the growth of long distance inter-city travel, but from rail industry responses to an increasing and extending demand for peak hour commuter services that are currently very heavily subsidised. This in turn distorts the sound economic provision of rolling stock assets and acts against the “work-closer-to- home” trends, central to regional planning over recent years, of encouraging a reduction in commuting distances on sustainable development grounds.4 Government policy on the sustainability of commuting and subsidised pricing of commuter train services should be part of the strategic context against which major rail development options are tested. 1.8 It is self evident that the ultra high investment required for a “dedicated” VHSR network will be far more sensitive and vulnerable to “predict and provide” traffic forecasts (as underpin the HS2 proposals) than applying the same risk factors to an “integrated” model for strategic development of the national rail network. The latter would have far more scope and flexibility to adjust to failure to achieve estimated traffic levels and operating costs.

Q2. How does HSR fit with the government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 The short answer is that the Government has yet to produce a coherent set of transport policy objectives that would provide the comprehensive strategic context against which HSR proposals (such as HS2) can be tested and judged. 2.2 The Government recently launched a scoping consultation on its future sustainable aviation strategy.5 Its draft proposals for a National Policy Statement on National Networks are still awaited. Other initiatives, including work on delivering a sustainable railway, are understood to be in the pipeline. These will eventually help create the framework of a (currently non-existent) sustainable National Integrated Transportation Strategy. It is foolhardy prematurely to propose what would in effect become the spine of a national VHSR network for the next century (ie Phase 1 of HS2 between London and Birmingham) and take a decision on it prior to taking account of the outcomes of this programmed range of new transport policies and consultations. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w215

2.3 Unlike the HS1 route, the “dedicated” southern spine route of HS2 will not be available to slower speed HSR trains. With an “integrated” approach based on slower speeds, there would be far more flexibility to use HSR trains to connect to intermediate stations and to cities linked to the HSR spine via the classic railway network. 2.4 A core political argument of Government for HS2 (in response to its policy decision not to build a third runway at Heathrow) is that it will facilitate the transfer of passengers to HS2 from domestic air services to Heathrow from the North of England and Scotland. Whether the Government currently believes it or not, its recently launched consultation on a sustainable framework for UK aviation will inevitably lead to a review of its decision to oppose additional runways at Stansted and Gatwick airports. In which case, given the many challenges and likely fundamental changes facing the global airline and airport industries, it would be highly unwise to assume that, for example, the case for a HSR link to a twin-runway Stansted post 2030 would be less than that perceived for Heathrow in 2011. If the country needs a new HSR spine track south of the Midlands, would it not be prudent to locate its southern approach to London where it could facilitate easier access from the North to a range of major transport nodes in Southern England, including a London station on the HS1 route? Such long term strategic scenarios should be an integral part of the nation’s HSR network strategy considerations. There was no such consideration in the conception of the HS2 proposals, because HS2L’s remit was so heavily constrained by current thinking influenced by the traditional dominance of a Heathrow hub airport. This repeated a fundamental mistake made in the 2003 Aviation White Paper.6

Q3. Business Case 3.1 There remains considerable doubt as to whether the highly constrained “dedicated” VHSR approach (eg current HS2 proposal) with its very high risk profile, is an affordable or safe strategy. Challenges to the HS2 business case by other parties seem to confirm that. 3.2 By any standards, the HS2 passenger forecasts are very bold, particularly the assumptions about new traffic generation and transfer from air. Given the huge timescales involved, over a period of inevitably uncertain change, traffic forecasting is more an act of faith than a science.7 Over a 30 to 50 year period we can expect to see further life-changing communications developments that will reduce the need to travel for business purposes; and also cultural changes, such as more working from home as an alternative to five-day commuting. This emphasises the need to adopt infrastructure strategies that maximise the flexibility to respond to change, rather than those which have built-in inflexibility such as the current HS2 proposals. 3.3 There appears to be no clear Government policy on the regulatory rail pricing regime that will apply once HS2 commences service. Statements by ministers seem to imply that competitive pricing will be permitted between HS2 and operators on the classic network. That seems both sensible and essential for the late 2020s and beyond. The rail industry should by then be using the more advanced inventory control pricing systems that are now commonplace in the airline industry. However, given the wide difference in the load factors between HS2 and WCML quoted for 2043,8 this highlights an important weakness in HS2 passenger forecasting. Learning from airline competition experience, a 58% HS2 load factor would not be sustainable against promotional pricing by slower competing WCML services, with 69% spare capacity over the same sector. The same would apply with respect to pricing competition on an improved Birmingham-London Chiltern Line. 3.4 Work by other parties on the possibility of upgrading scenarios for the West Coast Main Line (WCML) draws out several points. First, there is more optimism than assumed by HS2L that capacity improvements on WCML and development of the Chiltern Line could postpone any critical capacity point well beyond that assumed by HS2L and DfT. Second, government institutional thinking is heavily biased by the history of poor performance and high cost of previous WCML upgrades and the additional risks to sustaining service standards during construction. 3.5 Management of the Olympic and other recent major projects suggests that the second point reflects undue caution. Certainly the Government is dedicated to improving risk management in major projects.9 Arising from the first point, one must seriously question whether it is essential, as the Government implies, for a decision on the proposed HS2 southern spine to be taken before the end of 2011 and before the Government has considered the outcomes of its major national transportation investigations referred to above. The Government should resist pressure from the rail industry lobby for such an early decision, when there is so much uncertainty on critical strategic issues and the potential environmental harm to special protected areas, such as the Chilterns AONB, would be devastating, as the previous government’s transport minister admitted in Parliament.10

Q4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed HS2 southern spine route alignment stems from the very narrowly drawn and highly constrained remit given to HS2L. Hence, this, and the Coalition Government’s political commitment to an early decision, has meant that a proper comprehensive strategic review of feasible scenarios and options has not been conducted. 4.2 The original “Adonis” remit for HS2L, which the present Government essentially adopted, was focussed on a London to West Midlands route.11 Among the “Absolute requirements” of that remit were: a “Heathrow International station”; a “Connection to HS1”; “no intermediate stations between Heathrow International and cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w216 Transport Committee: Evidence

West Midlands”. Those requirements determined that any southern HSR spine route must approach London from the West. With those constraints, alternative scenarios that might have approached a London terminal from the north were effectively outside HS2L’s remit. That remit also denied HS2L the opportunity to investigate fundamental changes to the distribution of rail services into London that might have facilitated better passenger service in the post-Crossrail era and achieve a far more direct and speedier HS2 connection to HS1. It also effectively ruled out in-depth consideration of an “integrated” model of HSR network provision that could, in future, have provided for slower HSR services to intermediate stations in the South Midlands Sub-Regional Growth Area (and beyond) and, for example, HSR services between that area and the London Gateway Growth Area in Kent. 4.3 HS2L’s first report made it clear that HSR services between London and Birmingham alone would not be economically viable. That has been stated subsequently on several occasions by HS2L’s former Chairman and its Chief Engineer. Yet HS2L places great weight on achieving a straight line connection between London and the West Midlands (Birmingham). The real benefit of HSR is over greater distances, eg London to Manchester and Leeds/Sheffield. Had the original remit been prioritised to link those cities to HS1 and London, the “straight line” philosophy would have suggested a more easterly alignment for the southern HSR spine that would have passed through the South/East Midlands. 4.4 This fundamental failure initially to commission a much broader high level strategic rail network review has severely precluded a proper comprehensive evaluation of alternative HSR scenarios and spine route options. Since the current HS2 proposals also pre-empt the outcomes of other major strategic transportation studies and consultations, that project, including the proposed Y configuration, should at least be put on hold until a more comprehensive and coherent assessment is possible. The current HS2 proposals are widely perceived as unsound.12 4.5 In terms of priorities for a HSR spine route over the last three-quarters of this century, there can be little doubt that effective HSR through-service capability to the Continent from the Midlands and beyond will be essential. It is far less certain over that timescale that an HSR connection to Heathrow will still be perceived as important as it is now. Indeed, with all of its inherited shortcomings and constraints, it is inconceivable that Heathrow will still retain such a dominant role over other UK and near European airports, making speedier HS2-HS1 connections far more important. Another priority is clearly the need for interconnectivity improvements between cities in the Midlands and the North of England. The phasing of the development of the national HSR network strategy should take these priorities into account.

Q5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 We have already referred to the lack of a substantive evidence base for WEI. However, it seems self- evident that the more flexibility there is eventually to deliver HSR connections to more cities in the Midlands and North, with their classic rail connections to their sub-regional hinterlands, the greater the prospects for regeneration and greater modal shift to rail. This points strongly towards an “integrated” network strategic approach. In contrast, the “dedicated” VHSR network approach of the current HS2 project is concentrated only on the country’s major city conurbations, where arguably the need for regeneration support is much less. The wider rail network improvement is, the broader will be the benefit to a wider range of socio-economic groups. Concentration on the HS2L dedicated network could detract from sound investment in the development of sub- regional rail networks.

Q6. Impact 6.1 Even HS2L seem to accept that its project proposals will be no more than carbon neutral. This is particularly because of its fixation on a business model based on an exclusive 400kph VHSR, dedicated track network. Slower HSR speeds would reduce carbon emissions substantially. They would also reduce energy consumption. Slower speeds permit greater track curvatures and reduced tunnelling and associated costs, as well as significantly reduced embedded carbon impacts. They also make it, in stark contrast to the HS2 proposals, far more feasible to align any new HSR track within the environmental envelope of existing major transport corridors. The latter seems to be accepted good practice in the most densely developed European countries. 6.2 An HS2 connection to Heathrow is unlikely to have significant impact on reducing carbon emissions from aviation. Any runway slots released would be reutilised by larger long-haul aircraft, unless prohibited by regulation. Domestic flights into Heathrow are becoming less economic. When bmi recently pulled out of its Heathrow-Glasgow services, British Airways responded by increasing its services from to Glasgow and easyjet increased its Glasgow-Gatwick services.13 International transfer traffic to/from Manchester and Scottish airports would be far more likely to transfer to connecting flights to/from Continental hubs, enabling them still to check in their baggage at their originating airport, rather than carrying it onto an HSR train and then via additional modal interchanges to reach their departure terminal at Heathrow. 6.3 Note that the Government does not intend to publish its draft policy on a sustainable framework for aviation until March 2012. It will adopt the framework in March 2013.14 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w217

6.4 The true environmental impact cost of HS2 has yet to be fully assessed. There are huge gaps in the environmental evidence base so far produced by HS2L,15 and therefore in the account taken of environmental costs in the HS2 business case. 6.5 The major concern for the Chiltern Society is the Government’s proposal for a VHSR route right across the heart of the Chilterns AONB. The Chilterns is a unique example of ancient English countryside16 and, as a result, one of only two AONBs to have a statutory conservation board. The Chilterns is the most easily accessible large area of designated special countryside close to London and the only AONB between London and Birmingham. AONBs share the distinction with the National Parks of representing the finest quality of English landscape. Driving a VHSR route through the Chiltern Hills is the equivalent for people in the many growth areas surrounding this tranquil ancient countryside to driving such a route through the fantastic National Parks that people in the cities of Yorkshire and the North of England rightly value, enjoy and protect. If there are alternatives to such devastating harmful abuse of these national assets, they must be used. 6.6 The highly restricted nature of HS2L’s original and extended remit made it inevitable that the company would recommend a HSR route straight through the Chilterns. We are confident that a more well founded and comprehensive strategic assessment of the nation’s future rail transportation needs, including HSR, would identify other feasible solutions with much wider benefits, without causing irreparable harm to the Chilterns. May 2011

References 1 For example see EU definitions—http://www.uic.org/spip.php?article971 2 See Planning Policy Statement PPS7 para. 22 and related legislation. 3 Analyses by HS2 Action Alliance and others. 4 For example—see para.23.7 of South East Plan. 5 Developing a sustainable framework for UK aviation: Scoping document—DfT March 2011. 6 Future of Air Transport White Paper 2003. 7 The NAO report into Channel Tunnel 2005—Found that passenger volumes and revenue forecasts were too optimistic. The Public Accounts Committee report on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2005–06—concluded that “Where future income from passengers is expected to provide a major element of the revenue needed to repay the cost of constructing transport infrastructure, it is crucial that realistic forecasts are prepared from the start. Downside risks need to be given due weight, drawing on both UK and international experience, in considering future projects.” 8 Economic case for HS2—Figure4p21. 9 See—http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/government-launches-major-projects-authority 10 Mr Sadiq Kahn—Hansard 11 March 2010 Column 458. 11 HS2 Ltd remit. Sir David Rowlands letter to Lord Adonis 13 February 2009 and Lord Adonis’ reply of 9 March 2009. 12 See, for example—The Right Lines Charter for High Speed Rail http://www.cpre.org.uk/what-we-do/transport/rail/update/item/1683-a-charter-for-high-speed-rail 13 ABERT Newsletter 25 April 2011. 14 Developing a sustainable framework for UK aviation: Scoping document—DfT March 2011—para 1.17. 15 As admitted by HS2L staff/consultants at an HS2L Technical Seminar on 17 March 2011. 16 Chiltern Society paper by Alison Doggett—http://www.chilternsociety.org.uk/hs2/paper01.php

Further written evidence from the Chiltern Society (HSR 81A) I understand that the Transport Committee inquiry into High Speed Rail is seeking evidence relating to the impact on the environment. Please find attached a link to a report on our website, “Concerns arising from the Geology and Hydrology of the ground underlying the High Speed (HS2) routes through the Chilterns”. The report was produced in November 2010 and shared with HS2 Limited. It highlights the fractured nature of the chalk aquifer below the Misbourne Valley, and the risks from tunnelling therein, particularly the risk of polluting the aquifer, which feeds the Colne Valley, which supplies 20% of London's water. Also the risk of losing a globally rare chalk stream habitat. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w218 Transport Committee: Evidence

The Report in full can be found at: http://www.chilternsociety.org.uk/hs2/paper02.php 7 September 2011

Written evidence from TravelWatch NorthWest (HSR 82)

TravelWatch NorthWest is an independent organisation representing all public transport users in NW England. We are pleased to give the following views on the questions raised by the Committee on High Speed Rail. A document setting out our Position Statement (Revised) on High Speed Rail is also attached.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

The majority of the TWNW Board is in favour of the principle of HSR in Britain.

The main argument for HS2 is primarily an increase in capacity to meet growth beyond the capacity of the existing system. It will also bring economic benefits to the north. A high speed rail network provides fast and convenient city to city transport over distances of up to 500 miles. Deutsch Bahn have found HS rail a highly effective competitor to air on rail journeys of up to four hours and still competitive up to six hours due to the hassle factor of travel to and from the airport and potential problems at the airport.

The main arguments against are its very high cost and the environmental impacts along the route. A minority view from the TWNW Board is that ultra high speed lines of the type proposed have to be very straight and are therefore very unforgiving to the landscape and the communities they pass through in visual terms and in the noise they emit. They have to be serviced by trains which demand so much energy that their carbon footprint is at best neutral and at worst negative. And, in return for these downsides, the time saved would be marginal in a small county such as the UK, existing rail services would be seriously impaired and the benefits promised are questionable. It could well be the case that the only place which really benefit is London and having a slightly faster journey to it from Birmingham and Manchester merely encourages more people to live in those two cities but work in London

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

Inter-urban connectivity is important but the need to reduce the north-south divide and the need to combat climate change is also important. There is little point in spending large sums on the highway network. Additional road building takes up more space than rail, is more intrusive to nearby residences, raises air quality issues in the surrounding area, generates more unsustainable travel and currently is less environmentally friendly. It is also equally expensive and leaves cities with major problems in dealing with incoming cars.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

It is vitally important that concentration on the HS2 project does not deprive the existing route network of investment or continuing development. HS2 expenditure must be in addition to ongoing spending on rail. In addition the spin-off benefits of HS2 on other parts of the rail network must be fully exploited.

Investment in local rail based systems must continue and be expanded, including light rail in cities such as Leeds and Liverpool. HSR will not achieve its full potential if local connections are still slow, unreliable and infrequent.

Recent announcements by the government for further major rail investment in the classic network, including route electrification in the north west, seems to belie concerns about diversion of investment into a high speed project.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation?

Domestic aviation should be reduced or even eliminated because of its adverse environmental impacts and the need to reallocate airport capacity to longer haul flights, without the need to invest in new runways. HSR will assist that change. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w219

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? Forecasts that the development and increasing use of information technology would reduce the demand for travel have not been borne out by the evidence in passenger numbers throughout the British rail system. Increasing congestion of roads and motorways, coupled with rapidly increasing fuel costs and a growing environmental awareness, have done, and will continue, to drive more passengers—and freight—onto the railways. Recent figures show that even in the middle of a major economic downturn, passenger usage is up by 6.6% during the 12 months to March 2011. This figure is likely to rise further when the economy returns to normal and fuel costs increase for private cars. It is noticeable that practically all UK line and station re-openings have exceeded the passenger numbers expected by government estimates. Note should also be taken of the anticipated increase in population in the UK and the attendant increased travel demands that will bring.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? Experience in the on-line upgrading of the West Coast route, the main works of which were extended at vast sum over a period of 10 years up to 2007, is not one which users of the line would wish to see repeated with the extensive disruptions to services and unreliability they endured during that time. In any case most of the route is not suitable for further upgrading to HS engineering requirements. It has cost approximately £10 billion to increase the speed of the existing West Coast line to 125 mph. To increase its speed to 140 mph (the potential top speed of current stock) and increase the number of tracks to meet a necessary increase in capacity is likely to end up costing as much as HS2 without the High speed access to other UK and European cities which is the base case.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? Pricing rail travel off the system to reduce demand (which is already happening on a significant scale) is bad for the economy, bad for global warming, bad for modal split and is likely to lead to more travel demand by road. Alternative modes are already at or near capacity. There is little evidence that computer working has so far reduced the demand for travel in general. On the other hand, with increased free time, leisure travel is growing. It is noticeable that despite the depression passenger growth on many rural/tourist lines in the North West have shown continued growth. It is in Britain’s economic interest to foster tourism from overseas which is also growing as other countries become more prosperous. Tourists tend to visit environmentally sensitive cities and rural areas and are thus best transported by rail. Many tourists prefer to use rail in view of the confusion caused by driving on the left.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? Projects that have been built on time and within budget should be compared with those that have not to define the features that are essential for success. We should learn from those who have done it, particularly the French, instead of trying to re-invent wheels.

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? It is vitally important that major stations along the HS2 route, eg London, Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, are all built in close proximity to existing stations to avoid the inconvenience and time penalty of changing with the classic network. To build any station on the outskirts of a city and then expect passengers to change onto a transport link will prove to be a disincentive to travel and will negate the attraction of an otherwise high speed journey. For example, any terminus in Birmingham would need to be co-joined to New Street station. In London to terminate HS2 at a separate station from HS1 would make connections worse and discourage usage. Ideally a terminus with in-station pedestrian connection to HS1 and Euston would be preferable, with allowance for trains from the North to stop and continue their journeys to the continent without changes. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w220 Transport Committee: Evidence

If HS train length is an issue with station location and design consideration could be given to double-deck trains which would obviate the need for very long platforms and hence stations by almost providing a full train capacity in just over half the length. However if HS trains are to travel onwards on the existing classic network (as they should following completion of stage 1) this would mean two fleets, unless major gauge enhancement work was carried out on appropriate parts of that classic network. This is a complex area to which the Committee should give careful examination.

Selective Park and Ride stations should be an integral part of HS2, whilst keeping the number of station stops as low as possible to avoid destroying the benefits of high speed (some “skip stop” operation may be necessary). The criteria should be to minimise total journey time including access time and ensure maximum connectivity with other main line and local rail services.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?

The Y configuration is basically the right choice, serving Manchester and Liverpool on the west and Sheffield and Leeds on the east. It is important that HS trains should continue beyond Birmingham and beyond the limits of subsequent stages (as on the Continent) to serve the NW, Yorkshire, the NE and Glasgow/Edinburgh. HS stations should be located in the regional centres with good interchange with existing rail networks rather than at regional airports. This will mean tunnelling in most cases.

To serve the East Midlands and to allow HS travel between provincial cities consideration could be given to extending the Y into a diamond shape with the left hand proceeding Birmingham-Manchester-Leeds and the right Nottingham-Leeds.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

We have always advocated that any HSR proposals are seen as logical parts of a much longer term strategy for the provision of a network of new lines to connect the various nations and regions of the UK with London and each other.

However the current proposals do not indicate how a high speed network would be extended to serve the further parts of northern England, Scotland or other regions of the UK. The lack of a longer-term and wider strategy could well lead to costly white elephants as has resulted with the concentration of HS1 services at St Pancras International leaving the expensive development of Waterloo station and its connections now abandoned after a life of little more than a decade. Questions needing to be answered now include that of whether Manchester should be served by a terminus station or a through station which would allow trains to proceed onwards to Scotland.

Admittedly, building the network in stages starting from London is probably the only practicable option but it is crucial that the network is planned and approved as whole system and built as a rolling programme, not separately funded and approved sections

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

The link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 is an important one for through travel to and from the continent. We originally felt that the case for linking the NW and Heathrow was limited but we recognize the need for major improvement in the connectivity between Heathrow and the North of England. The route as planned now is some distance from the Airport. If the Governments argument for HS2+ involves reduction of internal flights thus lessening the need for a third runway it is important that high speed rail transport to the Midlands, North and Scotland is provided at Heathrow at some stage.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide?

The only real evidence in the UK is the economic benefits of HS1 which are considered to be much greater than estimates. Similar evidence can probably be found from France and Spain and of course Japan.

Subsequent extension beyond Birmingham (which should be a through station) and construction of the diamond (above) would enable the introduction of a high speed rail service between these cities eg Birmingham-Manchester-Leeds-Newcastle which would do a lot to promote provincial growth cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w221

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

Local and regional regeneration should be taken into account but not at the expense of the key criteria.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

While the higher socio-economic groups may be expected to be the main beneficiaries, spin off benefits onto other rail routes will benefit a wide range of users and locations, some which are not anywhere near the actual HS route.

The HSR provision should not be seen as the “rich man’s railway” by virtue of charging premium fares.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

It will be extremely difficult to attract financial contributions from Local Authorities or businesses. Added land value taxes may be one avenue worth exploring but difficult to administer. Any possible EU funds including TEN-T should be fully investigated.

6. Impact

6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

The overall direct impact of HSR on carbon emissions may be small but the overall impact including all spin-off benefits should be substantial as it will encourage rail travel in place of car or air. Actual figures can only be determined by relevant studies.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

Environmental costs including noise should be fully accounted for in the business case, either as quantified or unquantified costs. A separate audit of the business case may be needed to ensure this requirement is met. The alternatives of further air and road travel growth are currently more likely to cause environmental and noise damage in excess of HS2. The latter also has options for varying power generation sources.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network?

By removing substantial passenger movements from the classic network it should be possible for some paths to be released for additional freight movements, with consequential environmental benefits. However this must be balanced with the provision of more frequent local train services using capacity released from removal of longer distance trains.

HS2 could also provide a suitable route for international freight movements. Tests are currently under way on HS1 with high speed freight trains. New and stock are not required for this as the existing container trains already run through to the continent via the tunnel and the class 92 locomotives can also work through to France.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

It is inevitable that there will be substantial disruption during construction but the fact that most of the route will be on new alignment should reduce the impacts of existing rail services to those locations where the two systems are adjacent, eg Euston and Birmingham International.

The environmental problems which have been highlighted will mainly be short term during the building of the line, and will be offset by the obvious difference between an electrified high speed railway and six lane plus motorway which would be the only alternative. 13 May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w222 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Craig Todd (HSR 83) Thank you for your Select Committee inquiry into HS2. I have submitted my personal feedback via the [DfT] Online Public Consultation site and additionally wish to supply you my alternative view to HS2 as detailed below. While I agree with most of the reasons for people rejecting HS2, I have not heard too many radical alternative suggestions. I wish to offer one. The main driver for HS2 seems to be the case for bridging the economic divide between London and northern cities (Birmingham, Manchester etc). While a high-speed rail network connecting these northern cities to London appears like a good idea in principle—it is unfortunately fundamentally flawed in my opinion. Rather than investing billions of public funds (and in the process blighting the countryside and thousands of homes) surely it would make far better sense to use this money to encourage Government/Public Organisations and Private Companies to relocate their offices to northern cities? This has already been demonstrated to be a success in places like Leeds. The benefits to this simple but seemingly overlooked plan are numerous: 1. Less commuters impacting on an already overcrowded London. 2. No massive infrastructure costs. 3. No damage to the countryside and wildlife. 4. No detrimental noise/visual impact to thousands of households. 5. No exposure to the risk of rising commodity prices (which must have already significantly inflated the projected cost of HS2).

6. No huge energy costs or CO2 emissions. 7. Fully sustainable. “Local jobs for local people” is surely much more sensible than a multi-billion pound HS2 for City-to City commuters. Additionally, part of the savings of not going ahead with HS2 could be used instead to invest in the Digital Infrastructure of the UK (again encouraging local and home working). I hope that you will agree with my views, and if yes, that they can be a constructive part of an honest appraisal of the HS2 proposal. 18 March 2011

Written evidence from David Miles (HSR 84) THE PROPOSED BUILDING OF THE HS2 RAILWAY The Business Case for HS2 HS2 is not a sound investment. Commercially it loses money. It costs £25.5 billion, but only generates £15bn of extra fares. So Government turn to cost benefit analysis (CBA) to justify the expenditure. The CBA claims its value for money (NBR of 2.7). But it’s based on heroic assumptions that underpin excessive demand and illusory benefits, with a flawed assessment of the alternatives to HS2. On demand: — A huge increase in rail demand, some 267%—over 3½ times more than now. DfT both ignore the evidence of demand saturation for domestic travel generally and that the engine for rail growth is modal substitution. — DfT’s underlying model assumes a relationship with GDP that no longer exists (and not just in the UK). — DfT use out of date data that inflates forecast demand, ignoring recent analysis that give lower growth factors. — Projected demand takes no account of new technology or Government’s own initiative to reduce travel. — Domestic air travel is overestimated given the trends, inflating air modal shift numbers (and carbon impacts). — Car occupancy assumptions are too low which overestimates potential gains from cars. — Despite obvious uncertainty only a single case for demand is presented, instead of a range of scenarios. — The effects of competition (from classic rail) are assumed away despite the devastating consequences of inadequately anticipated competition for HS1, and Channel Tunnel. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w223

On benefits: — Biggest benefit wrongly assumes businessmen don’t work on trains—so 30 minutes saved adds 30 minutes productive time. — Using 10 year old data assumes top draw earnings for rail business travellers (£70k per annum in current money) unadjusted for a nearly fivefold increase in journeys by 2033. HS2 represents a regressive subsidy. — The £5 billion overcrowding benefits depend on implausible levels of crowding if HS2 does not happen. On alternatives: — HS2 is assessed against a “do minimum” scenario that is an unrealistic alternative as it can not accommodate forecast demand (because it takes no account of overcrowding and its effect on choking demand growth). — DfT’s own alternative (Rail Package 2) is ignored despite meeting demand with less crowding than HS2, being cheaper (£2 billion), better VfM (NBR 3.63), and delivering benefits incrementally, unreliant on long term forecasts. — DfT justify rejecting RP2 on the basis it does not provide the surplus capacity that HS2 provides. — 65% more capacity can be created on WCML with more rolling stock and hence without material disruption. On the recently claimed transformational benefits (to redress the north/south divide): — Wider economic impacts are already assessed in the business case, at just £3.6 billion—only 11% of HS2 benefits. — Any additional economic growth from faster connectivity assessed by Imperial College is small (£8/10m/a). — The redistributive effects will benefit London, UK’s dominant city, not the regions. DfT assume trips to London grow at twice the rate as those from London, and with 70% leisure travellers the result is obvious. — HS2 Ltd say biggest regeneration opportunity is Old Oak Common (not outside the M25, or even the N Circular). — Respected experts say there is no evidence base to support such claimed benefits (Overman, Tomaney). All this ill befits a government overseeing spending cuts of unprecedented severity. To solve rail capacity issues does not require a new £30 billion+ railway. Instead of spending £0.75 billion this parliament on planning for HS2 it could have a complete but unglamorous solution for £2 billion. Government first focused on HS2 as part of the low carbon economy (although even HS2 Ltd says it is “broadly carbon neutral”); then the spotlight moved to its business case (but increasingly found it holed below the water line); it appealed to catching up with our EU partners (but little has changed since Eddington, we still have faster connections between our key centres); most recently it is economic transformation and breathing economic life north of the M25. But moving the goalposts is a poor smokescreen to cover an ailing business case, failing to disguise that HS2 is a terminally anaemic white elephant. These cost figures do not include the cost of blight compensation, compulsory purchase, new rolling stock and the development of a new generation of engines and rolling stock!!!! There has been no cost calculation for the additional electricity generation required or where these capital assets will be located. As one living close to the proposed route I am also concerned that compensation for “loss” will be restricted to property value and not even go near to quality of life or disruption during construction. The Secretary of State for Transport has said that compensation payments will be better than ever before, but has not published what these will be. How can an economic argument be put forward in favour of HS2 when so many questions remain not only unanswered but also un-costed. Such a huge financial commitment needs to be based on a certainty that it will provide national benefits and that those funds cannot be used better in other ways. Parliament needs to satisfy itself that HS2 will lead to significant economic activity in excess of its costs and that it will provide environmental benefits including dramatically reduced emissions of greenhouse gases. How it can do this with no stations en route is to say the least baffling. A new high speed network would bleed the rest of the railway of money and care. What travellers want are boring unglamorous improvements to the services we actually use. This can be better accomplished with greater access to “all” the population by improving the existing corridors. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w224 Transport Committee: Evidence

— HS1 network has already been shown to only be worth 60% of its costs. The rolling stock and train length levels have been cut and new trains cancelled as a result of inadequate demand. This on a line that DOES have stations. — No weight is given to the importance of IT, which will result in a dramatic decline in the need to travel for both business and social purposes. — HS2 Ltd has assumed that time on a train is wasted and therefore there is a monetary value assigned to time saved for all travellers. In reality most travellers make good use of time of a train especially for business purposes—it is not wasted. — The value assigned to that time saved is exaggerated by HS2 Ltd and is equivalent to the average business traveller earning £70,000 per annum in today’s prices. This is clearly an overestimate of 150%! Research has shown that passengers want reliability and value for money much more than high speed. — Faster journey times will only lead to people staying in bed longer in the mornings, not getting to work earlier, so no economic benefit there. — Traffic and volume can be increased in existing corridors at seriously less cost, with the advantage of stations en route. These alternatives are of so much more benefit to the whole country but HS2Ltd ignores these economic issues as it has only one remit, therefore it can only be biased. — Using existing corridors will also significantly reduce the impact of the incredible noise levels projected for these trains. The HS2 Ltd noise survey has only been modelled using both the time trains are passing and when they are not so that it can demonstrate “acceptable” levels. This is nothing less than a “swindle” and you as a leader of this country cannot be seen as part of this. There is political expedient and there are down right lies! — HS2 Ltd believes that an additional 135,000 passengers per day will use the line (existing usage of the West Coast Main Line is 45,000 per day) just because it exists. This is not sustainable argument and is wholly unproven, especially in an era when energy saving should be an every day habit.

Is High Speed Rail Environmentally Friendly? — According to HS2 Ltd, HS2 will not reduce overall carbon emissions and will be carbon neutral at best. Even assuming there will be an increase in renewable energy production this will not create the low carbon economy claimed. It is much more likely to generate a net increase in carbon dioxide emissions. — The number of passengers switching from planes to HS2, according to HS2 Ltd will only be 3.5 million per annum—less than 7% of all passengers using HS2 and less than 5% of all passengers using Heathrow. There is evidence that domestic flights to London have been in decline for several years. Therefore the “green” argument for masses of travellers switching to train is nonsense. — The modal shift from cars and planes to trains will be small. Fewer than 2% of those driving on the motorways between Birmingham and London will switch to HS2. So what and who is this railway for? — HS2 Ltd. assumes a worst case scenario for aviation emissions, when the CAA expects aviation emissions to show a significant improvement by 2030. If domestic flights are displaced by long haul flights HS2 will have triggered an increase in aviation emissions. This is a blatant attempt to load the dice in favour of a dream and the earning of the major contractors who will be involved. — The carbon emissions generated by the construction of the line are significantly underestimated—the quantities of concrete, steel and stone required by HS2 will be colossal. So when will these emission be offset, 100 years? — The energy used by high speed trains will be at least double that of existing inter city electric trains. If HS2 reaches speeds of up to 400 kph they may use more than four times the energy. Where is this coming from? — HS2 Ltd believes the demand for through trains to the continent from north of Birmingham will be very low. This is consistent with the low numbers using the Eurostar services, which have stagnated. It will not significantly reduce the demand for short haul flights to the continent. According to the rail industry itself any journey taking more than three and a half hours is more likely to be taken by plane than train. So where is the economic argument in favour here. — The countryside will be permanently damaged all along the line including the nationally protected Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. It calls into question why these areas are given a special status if they can be so badly damaged by the government. How will the economic “benefit” be attached here. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w225

Just in case you need reminding. There will be 14–18 trains per hour in each direction (28–36 trains in total). Operating hours for line are 5.00 am to midnight. Maintenance overnight. Noise levels will be 95 decibels at 25 metres (Health & Safety requirement to wear ear defenders at 85 db.) Trains will run at up to 360km/h (225 mph) with ultimate speed planned of 400km/h. Trains will be 400m long. Therefore noise will just about be continuous. How to you place an economic value to this?

HS2 is a delusionary dream with no real economic benefits. Politicians are not supposed to be dreamers. 21 March 2011

Written evidence from Ian Waddell (HSR 85)

1. Introduction

1.1 Very ambitious claims are being made by proponents of HS2 in terms of its predicted impact on regional and local economies. These may perhaps best be summarised in the assertion that it will play a key role in “bridging the North–South divide”.

1.2 It is clearly extremely important that the TSC examines carefully the nature of the evidence behind these claims in order to assess their validity.

1.3 In order to assist the Committee in this process my paper: (i) Firstly summarises key evidence based on my analysis of INSEE statistics in relation to the French experience (France being the first European country to invest in high speed rail). (ii) Secondly critically reviews the evidence being offered in support of the regeneration impact of HS2 in the West Midlands (a region with which I am extremely familiar). (iii) Thirdly briefly relates these findings to the outcomes of a range of other independent national and international studies on the wider economic impacts of high speed rail.

2. Has the French TGV network had a significant impact on the economic fortunes of those cities and regions which it serves?

2.1 The primary TGV network was completed nearly 30 years ago. Consequently if high speed rail investment is indeed a significant factor in reducing local and regional growth economic disparities, then some evidence of this should be apparent by examining trends in relative economic well being of French regions, departments and cities served by the TGV.

2.2 In this context the proponents of HS2 frequently cite the examples of Lille and Lyon: When examining the case of Lille it is firstly crucial to remember that it is located at the cross roads of the European high speed rail network. It therefore enjoys levels of HSR accessibility and frequency of service, significantly in excess of what might be expected for, say, Birmingham, Manchester of Leeds.

2.3 Leading transport expert Roger Vickerman of Kent University observes: “…. the biggest gains in accessibility accrue to the major access points to the network. These are first, the major metropolitan areas such as London or Paris, and secondly major interchange points, such as Lille or Lyon.”

2.4 Lille has certainly seen a significant growth in jobs particularly as a result of the large EuroLille development. But to what extent are these genuinely new jobs and how far has investment which would have taken place anyway been diverted from other parts of the Lille Conurbation, local Nord Department or the wider Region?

2.5 If these are mostly genuinely new jobs then one would expect to see an impact in terms of a reduction in the persistently high levels of poverty and unemployment in the Lille conurbation, Nord Department and Nord Pas de region.

2.6 Evidence (from the French National Institute of Statistics—INSEE) shows that this has not occurred.

2.7 Between 1999 and 2009 the rate of unemployment in the Lille conurbation140 has actually increased, both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of France. 140 The INSEE website provides localised trend data for “Zones d’Emploi” for the period 1999–2010 (Q2), the metropolitan area of Lille is defined by INSEE as comprising the two Zones d’Emploi of Lille and Roubaix-Tourcoing . Both show an adverse trend in unemployment rates over this period—taking the average rates for the first and last four quarters of the period unemployment in Roubaix-T went up from 13.2 to 14.7 % and in Lille from 10.7 to 11.1%. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w226 Transport Committee: Evidence

2.8 The same applies to the Nord Department and the Nord Pas de Calais Region within which Lille is located. Unemployment in the Nord Department has increased since the arrival of the TGV in the early 1980s (from an average of 10.7% 1982–86 to 11.9% 2006–10), resulting in a further widening of disparities when compared to the rest of France.141 2.9 Turning to the case of Lyon, this is an area which has traditionally been amongst more prosperous parts of France. It has not suffered the depredations of the decline of traditional industries on anything like the same scale as the North East of France. 2.10 Nevertheless, if claims for the wider regenerative benefits of the TGV are to be believed, some further decline in absolute and relative levels of unemployment might be expected for the Rhone Department, over 75% of the population of which live within the Lyon area. 2.11 In fact the reverse is true: unemployment in the Rhone department has increased by nearly 1.5% since the arrival of the TGV (from an average of 6.3% 1982–86 to 7.8% 2006–10). It has also increased in relative terms compared to France as a whole by 1.24% over the same period. 2.12 The picture for the region of Rhone Alps within which Lyon is located is similar: its prosperity relative to the rest of France measured in terms of unemployment rates has actually declined since the arrival of the TGV in the early 1980s.142 2.13 In conclusion therefore there appears very little evidence that investment in high speed rail in France has had any significant impact in reducing regional and local economic disparities based on the most obvious yardstick—unemployment. Over a period of nearly 30 years since TGV services started running, there has clearly been no “transformational” effect, in fact the evidence shows that disparities appear to have worsened.

3. A critical review of evidence being offered in support of the regeneration impact of HS2 in the West Midlands 3.1 A number of ambitious claims have been made for the job creation and wider regeneration benefits of HS2 on the economy of the West Midlands. Most notably they are contained in a document: “High Speed Rail and supporting investments in the West Midlands—consequences for employment and economic growth.” KPMG/CENTRO June 2010 3.2 The document purports to be an independent analysis, however CENTRO (the West Midlands PTE) have been active proponents of HS2 since well before its publication and KPMG had previously been commissioned by pressure group Greenguage 21 to produce similar material nationally. 3.3 To do the report justice, headline figures such as 22,000 new jobs for the region from HS2 have been widely quoted in an unqualified manner and totally out of the context of the report, which contains many significant caveats. 3.4 A close examination of this report and its methodology reveals that, even if the report’s own conclusions are accepted uncritically, then it implies: (i) the figure of 22,000 jobs is based upon a huge investment in local transport in addition to HS2, without this investment the report admits the jobs created would reduce to 10,000. Any “fare premium” required for HS2 over other rail services would further significantly reduce the jobs created—the report examines the impact of a 30% fare premium, concluding that jobs created would be further reduce to around 5,000. (at an estimated cost of £17 billion for phase 1 of HS2 this would give a cost per job created of £340,00 compared to the DfT VFM guideline of £27,000 per job.) (2) In terms of the distributional impacts of HS2, the report admits that employment in Birmingham and Solihull will increase at the expense of employment elsewhere in the region: “The benefits are concentrated in central Birmingham and around the new Birmingham International HS station.” (Para 6.1 of the report page 38) 3.5 In terms of connections with Europe, the report admits the benefits to Birmingham are, in the final analysis, marginal, modelling links with just one European city they the report concludes: “With the introduction of a direct high speed rail service, Paris could become some six times more important as contributor to Birmingham’s effective business to business market. However, it begins from a very low base and remains far enough away to form only a very small part of Birmingham’s effective business to business market, even with a high speed rail link.” 141 Taking INSEE figures for Q4 of 2009 and the first three quarters of 2010 (the latest currently available) and the equivalent quarters for 1982–83 the unemployment rate in the Nord Departrnent has increased by 3.9%, and the Nord pas de Calais Region by 3.3%. Over the same period the unemployment rate in metropolitan France increased by 2.3%. 142 INSEE figures based on an average for the four quarters of 1982 and 2010 show an increase in the unemployment rate for the Rhone Alps region of 2.8% compared to an increase of 2.4% for metropolitan France. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w227

3.6 The methodology itself is based upon a highly academic analysis of projected connectivity improvements which is in turn based upon highly tenuous base data. In summary key weaknesses are: — no account taken of jobs attracted away from the region as (particularly business and financial sector enterprises) are enabled by HS2 to service their WM region clients from London; — no account taken of the fact that time spent on trains can be productive; — no account taken of the future impact of IT developments on the need to travel/business efficiency; and — the report bases its benefit calculations on assessments of productivity increases based upon a (highly dubious) assumption that relative wage levels can be used as a proxy for this. However it fails to identify appropriate local data sources, admitting: “It has not been possible to source data for productivity that is more disaggregate than district level. This has weakened the analysis of productivity impacts using local data. Model results are therefore not based on relationships derived from local data but on composite assumptions drawing on findings from other studies.” 3.7 In conclusion the report’s findings cannot in any way be relied upon to provide trustworthy evidence of positive regeneration impacts. Where it is in tune with other studies however is that it supports the view that high speed rail will have significant re distributional impacts—resulting in jobs and investment moving to areas in close proximity to projected stations from other (already less prosperous) parts of the region.

4. How the above findings relate to the outcomes of a range of other independent national and international studies on the wider economic impacts of high speed rail 4.1 The above analyses (of unemployment impacts in France and of the probable redistributional impact of HS2 on jobs and investment in the West Midlands region) fit well with the vast body of independent research on the wider impacts of high speed rail key aspects of which are highlighted below. 4.2 This research shows that there is no evidence of any dramatic transformational effect on regional and local economies as a result of high speed rail. To the extent that there is a provable impact, it is in influencing the distributional patterns of jobs and investment: — from less prosperous to more prosperous regions; and — from more peripheral (and often less prosperous ) parts of regions to those areas in close proximity to the few HSR stations (often already the more prosperous areas). 4.3 Professor Henry Overmann of the LSE in giving evidence to the TSC (19 October 2010) stated: “ … broadly speaking, the evidence that High Speed 2 will lead to a reduction in disparity is pretty limited”. 4.4 This view was echoed by Professor John Tomaney of Newcastle University: “ … the evidence that HS2 will have a positive impact on rebalancing the national economy, to use the current jargon, is not really there. I think the international evidence suggests that, where you make these big investments in this kind of infrastructure-particularly high speed train networks-as important to the investment in the infrastructure itself is investment in the conditions of the nodes around the lines that stimulate economic benefit and economic development. There is some evidence from European high speed train systems, and from Asian high speed train systems, that this is a critical ingredient, and in the debates around HS2 I haven’t really seen that discussed.” 4.5 In the case of the KMPG/Centro work discussed above, investment in a package of local transport improvements is shown to be equally, if not more effective in creating local jobs than the investment in HS2 and offers far higher VFM ratio in terms of jobs created. 4.6 At a broader level an OECD report143 evaluating the impact of transport infrastructure investment on regional development concluded: “ … there is a lack of information derived from ex-post studies which could provide a firm, quantitative basis for claims about the impact of infrastructure investment on regional economies and regeneration.” 4.7 Lastly, as exemplified by the following extracts, there is a strong body of independent European research shows that a connection to high speed rail may actually disadvantage poorer regions: “ … for regions and cities whose economic conditions compare unfavourably with those of their neighbours, a connection to the HST line may even result in economic activities being drained away and an overall negative impact.” (Givoni, 2006; Van den Berg and Pol 1998;Thompson 1995). “Medium size cities may well be the ones to suffer most from the economic attraction of the more dynamic, bigger cities.” 143 Impact of Transport Infrastructure Investment on Regional Development OECD 2002. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w228 Transport Committee: Evidence

High-Speed Rail: Lessons for Policy Makers from Experiences Abroad”—Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel GiM-IREA Universitat de Barcelona 2010 “Roads and rail tracks can be used to travel both ways. A better connection between two regions with different development levels not only gives firms in a less developed region better access to the inputs and markets of more developed regions. It also makes it easier for firms in richer regions to supply poorer regions at a distance, and can thus harm the industrialisation prospects of less developed areas.” The Economic effects of High Speed Rail Investment Ginés de Rus, University of Las Palmas 2008 16 May 2011

Written evidence from Leslie Fawcett (HSR 86) Summary 1. Thankyou for the opportunity to comment on HS2. 2. A new railway will almost certainly be needed but the current HS2 plan is fatally flawed. 3. Please press the government to commission an independent review of HS2 by professionals not tied to DfT or HS2 Ltd, as part of a national transport plan.

4. The plan does nothing towards the legally committed 80% reduction in CO2 emissions, while a sensible route at a sensible speed could make a major contribution befitting the largest rail scheme in the UK for over a century.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR It is most likely that we will need new rail tracks northwards from London to carry the number of people wanting to travel and the government is right to plan for it. The forecast passenger numbers are only forecasts and they may turn out to be wrong. A flexible policy is needed to respond to demand as the picture becomes clearer. This can be achieved by incremental development of the network, not by an all-or-nothing segregated railway that will take 10 years of construction before it is any use at all, and will then be found to be not what the nation actually needs.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? Rail is the correct means of achieving the extra capacity for long-distance passengers and freight that will be needed in the future for an increasing population, consistent with the commitment in the Climate Change Act to reduce our CO2 emissions by 80%. Road will remain the principal mode of UK transport. Rail developments can reverse the long-term increase in road usage, especially for long distance journeys, thus obviating large-scale expenditure on trunk road and motorway works. Since it is widely accepted that we cannot build our way out of road congestion, rail is the answer. A shortcoming of the HS2 plan is that it deals only with one corridor. A national rail plan is needed incorporating HS lines where appropriate. For local journeys, light rail and bus should be developed together with further discouragement of car use. This will reduce congestion and carbon emissions while allowing economic development in a growing population.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? The rate of spend on HS2 will be similar to the current spend on Crossrail and Thameslink, while other rail works continue. Consequently there is no reason why development of the classic network should not progress concurrent with HS2. Demand is likely to increase on all rail corridors so the HS2 plan should be part of a national rail plan considering all needs.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? Demand for long-distance air transport is likely to rise despite rising fuel price. Airport space can be released by replacing internal and near-continent air travel with HS rail travel. This will give slots for more long haul flights by larger aeroplanes, without new runways. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w229

International agreement is needed to subject air travel to the same realities as surface travel, eg VAT and fuel taxation. Passengers going to Heathrow will be a very small proportion of those using HS2, so access to Heathrow must not be allowed to dominate the HS2 plan.

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? The forecasts put forward by HS2 Ltd are symptomatic of someone striving to prove a weak case. Whilst it is true that Treasury approval will not be given unless there is a business case, the case should be made for HS2 to Manchester and Leeds rather than for the expensive first phase out of London. Forecasts can be wrong, therefore we should develop a range of plans in parallel. We have five years before construction is due to start and can reassess our plan during that time. This is more realistic than a gung-ho pursuit of a very expensive segregated HS2 that is not what the nation needs. Scheme costs are unreliable. For example, a blanket figure has been allowed for diversion of statutory services, whilst “stats” can form over half the cost of urban schemes. Records of underground services are available from all the “stats”. Costs should be calculated from the actual work needed rather than a blanket figure. The unreasonable charges made by stats as monopolies should be challenged, but this is a matter outside this study. It is a reason for UK construction costs being higher than those in similar economies. The transport planning profession have calculated the value of time on a train as lost time, and have only recently acknowledged that time is not all lost time because passengers work on trains. Philip Hammond recently announced that the NATA transport tool will be replaced by a new tool giving more emphasis on carbon emissions. Application of this to HS2 will lead to some of the basic flawed decisions being challenged, eg 400km/h and DfT infatuation with Old Oak Common, the source of the disastrous choice of route. The HS2 plan should be specific about its effect on classic services. The theory of HS2 releasing capacity on classic tracks is valid where trains are removed from towns where they currently pass without stopping, but is detrimental to towns where services stop now and would be taken away. The aspirations of bodies such as Centro and Greengauge 21 for a considerable increase in classic services consequent to the opening of HS2, are not backed up by any responsibility to provide those services, and in some cases there are not the available paths for them without additional works that are not proposed within HS2. That is why a national rail plan is needed rather than one for HS2 in isolation.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? Alternatives to HS2 have been developed and costed. Whether they would provide sufficient capacity depends on the passenger numbers. Forecast numbers may prove to be wrong. The government is right to progress the HS2 plan, indeed it would be irresponsible to neglect it in the face of the forecast demand. The answer to the uncertainty is to progress the alternatives in parallel. We have five years before construction is due to start. In that time we can reassess our needs and have more confidence in the likely demand before committing to construction. The government should take a neutral stance in the debate rather than spending public funds promoting HS2 to a sceptical public. Most important of all is for the government to commission an independent review of HS2 which would either reassure the public that the right decisions have been made, or more likely to reveal that the plan is fatally flawed and needs to be reconsidered.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? Price is a valid tool in a purely commercial venture but rail is a public service highly dependent on public funds. Fares are already labyrinthine with widespread anomalies and unfairness. Managing demand by price would increase the unfairness, and perhaps more importantly if there is insufficient capacity we will reap the economic consequence. Pricing is valid as a temporary measure, if only to raise the funds for a better railway, but is no substitute in the long term for providing the capacity needed.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? Experience shows that when risk is offloaded by employers onto contractors, prices rise, claims rise and delayed completion is more likely. This often happens where there is insufficient time to complete design work before inviting tenders, and when the employer has insufficient expertise to do the detail design. The remedy is to design the project in detail before asking contractors to price the work. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w230 Transport Committee: Evidence

Incremental development allows continuous smooth demand for expertise and construction industry output, and allows the first section completed to be used while construction of later phases continues. This is better than waiting 10 years to see if it all works.

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? The plan for HS2 is defective, perhaps because the brief was wrong. If the design team had been asked what transport provision the nation needed, they may have come up with a different plan from the one making a beeline from London to Birmingham. Euston is the right choice for a London terminus because it is the only place with sufficient space. Old Oak Common is ideal as an interchange for various services including those running off HS2 en route to Heathrow, but there is no justification for diverting HS2 miles off its natural course northward from Euston, very expensively in tunnel, wasting time by stopping at OOC, then having to exit London via the Chilterns AONB in yet more tunnel which is only likely to get longer to placate protestors. (Tunnels form 25% of the construction cost of HS2, stations another 25%). Commentators have agonised over whether HS2 should go through Heathrow. It should not, nor should it go near Heathrow on the vague notion that it would allow easy access to Heathrow. There is no need for a change of train to go to Heathrow if trains run from various cities via HS2 to north London then directly to the various Heathrow stations via N London line and OOC. The proposed station near Birmingham is the worst example of an out-of-town parkway sucking in thousands of cars on roads already congested, then needing another journey to reach NEC/B’ham airport. There is no need for it when there is International station in exactly the right place, with space for more platforms and car parks if needed, and already rail connected to most of the country. Fazeley St is the best compromise for a station in central Birmingham. It is unfortunate that it also called Curzon St because this leads people to believe it would be at the original station some distance from New St and Moor St stations. Terminus stations need travelators to reduce the walk distance. Travelators (or at least a shuttle bus) are also needed to integrate the new station with New St station. Moor St station should be integrated with Fazeley St to form one interchange station. The space above WCML should be bridged over to provide pedestrian, bus and taxi space between the old and new parts of the station.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? All communities along the route should benefit, not by having a HS line to each of them but by having UK gauge trains running off HS2 to existing city centre stations. This needs HS2 to be integrated with the existing network to link cities rather than being a stand-alone showpiece railway that links just a few of them to London. It will need 4 tracks to do it. HS2 have proposed this then forgotten about it in their detail plans, and they have admitted that a second route north would be needed eventually. We must get it right first time. A Y-plan would be acceptable if it could achieve those principles, but it will not. A spine and spur route east of the Pennines will connect more cities with less route miles on easier terrain at less cost and with less carbon emissions in construction and in use.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? Yes, it is inevitable that the project will develop within the limits of cash flow and construction industry capacity. A basic error in the HS2 plan is that the London-Bham section is proposed to take 10 years and £17 billion before it is of any use whatsoever. If passenger numbers increase as forecast, that will be too late. If instead HS2 is linked to WCML near Rugby, it will come into use earlier and cheaper while construction progresses onward. This alignment along M1 allows early connection to MML at Leicester and eventual connection to ECML, thus serving all communities north of London.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? I can’t evaluate the relative merits. Both links are needed, but they do not have to be HS rail links. It may be helpful to say that Heathrow needs better rail access from all directions, but HS2 is not the vehicle for it given that only about 2% of HS2 passengers will want to go to Hrow. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w231

The proposed single track connection between HS1 and HS2 is likely to be regretted in the future. Double tracks are needed.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? There is no doubt that an HS station will attract development around it (as at Lille in France) but the effect will be local and development may not be desirable there, eg at the Bickenhill WM interchange which would be in the green belt. Benefits around the station will be counterbalanced by disbenefits to communities remote from the station. Network Rail’s 2009 New Lines Study evaluated the benefits to each city served. Not surprisingly they were proportional to the size of the city. This means that the north-south divide would be exacerbated by HS2 rather than relieved, not only by favouring the largest cities but also blighting the communities bypassed by a poorly- designed HS2. The way to avoid that problem is to design the route of HS2 so it is not London-centric and to make sure all communities are included.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? HS2 should take into account planned developments rather just trying to serve communities as they are. It would be a mistake to skew the network as a means of social engineering, hoping economic generation will follow HS2 in areas with deep economic problems.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? Locations that will benefit are those near the stations. Claims that benefits will spread from cities with stations to cities without them are somewhat optimistic when the clear indication is that communities not served will be blighted. Wolverhampton, Sandwell, Dudley, Walsall, Stoke on Trent, Coventry and Leicester, would all be disadvantaged by the current plan, whilst an alternarive plan integrated into the existing network could be benefit all of them and be of so much more use to the nation as a whole. Users of HS2 are likely to be mainly the higher echelons of society. This is true of the existing railway and is likely to be more prevalent with a premium cost service. Classic services are likely to suffer as those prepared to pay the higher fares are creamed off by HS2. Classic services will have less passengers when HS2 runs parallel, the remaining passengers will be more price-conscious, so services will need more subsidy or will be withdrawn.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? The government should seek EU funding and it is surprising they have not already done so in view of the large sums already spent. Making local authorities and businesses contribute to the cost would no doubt dampen their enthusiasm. It has only been worthwhile for local authorities and businesses to lobby for HS2 on the assumption they would get an advantage over others without having to pay for it. There is no perfect formula, but the government could propose one on the French TGV model where the state gives the largest contribution, the region gives some (TfL and Centro or the successor to AWM), businesses pay an enhanced business rate and the local authority gives a smaller amount. It would be interesting to see local reaction to such a proposal. The clamour by various cities to be served by HS2 is perhaps more to do with them terrified of the indignity of being left out than any confidence in HS2 being of real benefit to them.

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? HS2 Ltd tell us that carbon emissions will barely change due to HS2 (+0.3% to −0.3%). That is not acceptable for the biggest transport scheme for over a century when we are committed by the Climate Change Act to reduce our emissions by 80%. If HS2 cannot contribute, what can? The major source of transport emissions is road. That is because road is the dominant form of transport. It is therefore essential for any rail scheme to enable a reduction in road use. Rail is nominally more green than other forms of transport, but the situation reverses when a full car or coach is compared with an empty or poorly-loaded train. The way to ensure trains are well loaded (especially cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w232 Transport Committee: Evidence

if they have 1,100 seats as proposed) is to run them along a series of cities. A spine and spur arrangement achieves this, whilst a fan of tracks radiating from London does not. The design speed of 400km/h involves more construction cost and environmental damage than is necessary. Energy use increases exponentially with speed. No rail service in the world runs at 400km/h. HS2 Ltd describe this as future-proofing. Their plan cannot be future-proof when they say that a second HS route will be needed northwards from London for the passengers not served by HS2. It is clear that there will not be a case for a second HS2 after the first has creamed off most of the flow. We must get it right first time. The way to do that is to route HS2 directly north from London along the M1 corridor and to link it with WCML, MML and ECML to relieve the congestion on all those routes that will be congested by the time HS2 is open.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? It is not possible to accurately evaluate noise, visual intrusion, division of communities and disruption during construction, in money terms. The relative values can only be a judgement. It is the lack of such judgement that has lead to the insensitive current HS2 plan.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? Any new rail tracks are bound to yield spare paths for freight. Whether the railfreight industry uses them is subject to commercial judgement. Part of the national rail plan I am asking for is enhanced freight facilities subsequent to the opening of HS2.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? Rebuilding of Euston is necessary and must involve some disruption. This can be minimised by working through the station gradually, taking two platforms out of use at a time, as in the rebuilding of New St. There is no need to expand the footprint of Euston or to demolish five blocks of flats. 400m platforms can be built within the current area, 2 new platforms can be added in place of a lorry ramp, some local services can be diverted to Old Oak Common. Pedestrian travelators are needed for 400m platforms as it is unreasonable to expect passengers to walk that far. Combined with escalators and a new pedestrian deck above the platforms, this gives more pedestrian area within the same footprint and the opportunity to separate conflicting pedestrian flows. Stations form 25% of the construction cost of HS2 and rebuilding of Euston is planned to take all of the HS2 construction period. There is scope for large cost savings at Euston and OOC, and earlier completion. May 2011

Written evidence from English Heritage (HSR 87) Introduction and Summary 1. English Heritage is the UK Government’s statutory adviser and a statutory consultee on all aspects of the historic environment and its heritage assets. This includes archaeology on land and under water, historic buildings sites and areas, designated landscapes and the historic elements of the wider landscape. This memorandum of evidence focuses on question 6.2 in the call for evidence: Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 2. English Heritage is considering closely the details set out in the Government’s consultation on high speed rail and associated Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS). We are investigating which historic places will be affected by the proposed route, and evaluating the nature of that impact. In doing this we will consider both demolitions and effects on the setting of important heritage, such as listed buildings and scheduled monuments. It is not English Heritage’s role to take a position on whether the line should go ahead or not. 3. In summary, English Heritage believes that without additional work to identify those historic assets outside the 350m buffer zone where the setting will be adversely affected and, ideally, on the currently unknown sites of archaeological interest within the corridor, the full extent to which the stated sustainability objective for cultural heritage is met by this route option cannot be properly judged.

Impacts 4. The Appraisal of Sustainability sets out the impacts upon designated assets and evaluates whether they are supportive of the objective to “preserve and protect archaeological assets/historic buildings/historic landscapes”. No grade I or II* listed buildings are directly impacted (ie within the anticipated land take for construction). Two scheduled monuments, three grade II* registered parks and gardens and 15 grade II listed buildings are directly impacted. Two grade II* listed buildings would be close to the construction, which would need to be carefully managed to minimise potential impact. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w233

5. The appraisal also considers a 350m buffer either side of the line. This includes 11 grade I and grade II* listed buildings and 274 grade II listed buildings. No assessment is given of the scale of the impact upon the setting of these assets. The desktop nature of the exercise means that no consideration been given to whether, given the changing landscape features, 350m is a sufficient buffer for all the route. Some important assets well beyond 350m will be impacted in some way (eg their setting) by the new line.

Assessment of Impacts 6. The AoS appropriately considers that the impacts on the GII* registered parks and gardens are highly unsupportive of the heritage objective. However, the direct impacts on two scheduled monuments (Grim’s Ditch in the Chilterns and a Roman villa site in the vicinity of Edgcote), likely to result in substantial harm, have been appraised as a lower level of impact. The loss of such nationally significant monuments ought to be appraised as a significant impact. The AoS also erroneously categorises Grade II buildings as regionally important: as a national designation, this is inaccurate and must be changed. 7. It should be noted that there may be as yet unrecognised nationally important archaeological assets that would suffer substantial harm. Although these cannot be appraised at this stage, their possibility means that the existing impact assessment is only partial. 8. We are also aware of the significant impact on landscape, including the historic landscape. We are engaged with the lead government agency on landscape issues, Natural England, and we anticipate that they will respond fully on this matter.

Mitigation and Offsetting of Impacts 9. English Heritage will continue to work with HS2 to minimise impacts where possible. However, the scope to do this will be limited owing to engineering constraints. While working with HS2 to minimise any impacts, we will also seek to mitigate them where unavoidable. This may include the use of good design to minimise landscape impacts, and archaeological and building investigation and recording. Where impacts are substantial and unavoidable, the opportunity to offset the harm through enhancements elsewhere will be identified, as was the case at Cobham Hall in Kent for High Speed One. In line with the Government’s objectives, English Heritage will advise that opportunities are taken to capture evidence from the historic environment and to make it publicly available, particularly where a heritage asset is to be lost. This process should be informed by an innovative and coordinated approach to maximise the benefit to the body of knowledge.

Representation of the Heritage Sector 10. This memorandum does not aim to reflect the views of other organisations within the heritage sector. We expect that HS2, if appropriate, will liaise with those organisations separately. May 2011

Written evidence from Pamela Taylor (HSR 89) High Speed Train I feel extremely angry that the Government are considering a high speed train to operate between London and Birmingham when all public services are being squeezed, stretched, reduced and shelved. It will be many years before our economy starts to grow and improve, yet Ministers are considering spending billions and billions of taxpayer's money on a project that is not necessary and is being built on a false premise. I am sure all those loyal soldiers, airman, sailors, nurses, policemen and local government employees who are about to be made redundant will be thrilled to learn that their lack of a salary is helping to fund a project that will not benefit them in the slightest. It is a kick in the teeth and the Government should be ashamed. 2.1 The need to travel by train for business or personal use is that of choice taken by the individual. But the need to export and import goods, which have an economic value to GDP, to and from Port is by and large limited to road and rail. Unless HS2 can effectively carry freight then the excessively high cost of this proposed train will be an extravagant vanity project that will benefit the few and not the many. I think one major road in particular needs consideration. The expansion of the A14 has effectively been shelved due to the current economic client, yet Felixstowe Port Authority is building a deep water container bay to accommodate some of the world's largest container ships, which inevitably means more containers to be transported. A minimal amount of those containers will travel by rail, a vast majority will use the A14, yet the government is reluctant to improve this road, relying on a private funding initiative which may never happen. It is vital that consideration is given to what is more important to the economic wellbeing of the UK: a high speed train that reduces travel time by a mere 11 minutes [Birmingham to London] or keeping our imports and exports moving that will benefit our GDP? Should it be decided that HS2 will carry freight it will have absolutely no benefit to the many haulage companies that rely on the A14 for business, and it is both naive and wrong to believe that HS2 will solve all our transport problems. £1.2 billion will improve the A14. £17 billion rising to £35 billion will reduce one journey by 11 minutes! HS2 is not a proven case. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w234 Transport Committee: Evidence

5.1 The north south divide is an interesting question. What exactly is meant by the north south divide? Is it a cultural identity, a social or economic barrier which sounds patronising and meaningless in this multicultural country in which we live? How will HS2 bridge this divide if it really does exist or is it a phrase that currently suits politicians as a justification for this proposed high speed train? To justify this expensive project the cost of tickets must be affordable to everyone and not just to the business traveller. Unless the economy greatly improves over the next few years, small to medium businesses will not be able to afford to pay for expensive train fares when it is more economic to travel by car, and the same will apply to the individual traveller. HS2 will not bridge gaps, real or imaginary. A recent public consultation in the north of England carried out on behalf of Action Alliance were not concerned with the north south divide concept but coined the phase fast train for fat cats. 5.4 It would be unacceptable to ask local authorities to contribute to the cost of HS2 when they are under extreme pressure to reduce their working budgets which has an impact on all local services. The condition of roads in and around my locality of South Northamptonshire is a disgrace which Government should be ashamed. Given the choice of decent roads that are safe to drive on, or a very expensive train that will benefit no one in South Northants, it goes without saying that the repair of roads would win hands down. I feel very strongly that Government should get its priorities in order and think about what is more important to both the voter and taxpayer. Is HS2 a priority? definitely not. 11 April 2011

Written evidence from Thomas Hart (HSR 91) This submission argues that HSR should be examined not only in relation to conflicts or synergy with other aspects of rail strategy over the next 20 to 30 years but also in the context of the economic importance, and climate change benefits, of more rapid moves to a low carbon and energy efficient economy. It considers whether a high priority for HSR investment might prejudice more beneficial investment (and other fiscal and regulatory actions) not only in other parts of the rail system but in other parts of the economy. The conclusion is that there is a justifiable place for phased HSR development in wider programmes for transport and other aspects of moves to a low carbon and energy efficient economy.

Changing Trends in Transport and the Economy As noted in the attached summary paper on changing trends presented at Glasgow University on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the formation of the Scottish Transport Studies Group, transport trends entered a period of major historical change in the later 1990s characterised by: — a near stabilisation of passenger movement per head within the UK (even in conditions of economic expansion and increasing car ownership); — a significant shift from car to rail passenger use (not evident in any previous decade since 1910); and — a substantial slowing of previous rates of aviation growth from around 2000 (including a near stabilisation of air miles per head within the UK but continuing, though moderated, growth in longer-distance travel by air. Freight was not dealt with in the paper but there is evidence of longer distance freight remaining overwhelmingly dependent on sea and rail with rising road fuel and labour costs and improving rail quality also leading to expansion of general rail freight in addition to bulk traffic parts of which—such has coal and oil—are shifting from growth to decline under low carbon policies). These changes have been poorly reflected in existing UK methods of movement forecasting. This requires urgent re-examination, especially in relation to longer distance trips and to patterns of movement within city regions. Even in the absence of low carbon issues, changing trends reflect a new situation where rising real incomes and aspirations for a different quality of life seem certain to see an increase in preferences for travel by rail over longer distances and also in, and around, larger cities and tourism centres i.e. a sharp contrast from the car and aviation preferences which were dominant from the 1960s to the 1990s. Low carbon issues, higher energy costs (notably for oil and gas), changing fiscal and regulatory policies and improved efficiency within the rail sector (both in procurement and in operations) are likely to reinforce an existing trend towards rail over the next 20 to 30 years with increasing probability of some absolute decline in car and lorry vehicle miles (with the possible exception of a few UK regions with above average rates of growth in population). Though it is arguable that an ability of the road motor sector to adapt to low carbon or a superior ability in other sectors to achieve cost-effective carbon reduction may permit a re-expansion of road use relative to rail, this is now highly improbable. It is worth noting that the recent EU draft of a revised transport strategy expects the rail and water share of medium distance movement to rise from around 20% to 50%. This evidence suggests that rail growth over the next 20 to 30 years will continue at a high level with road traffic stabilising or falling. Recent rail passenger growth on the West Coast Main Line has been as high as cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w235

10% a year with the Virgin Rail/Stagecoach partnership confident that growth will continue in the 6% to 8% range over the next five years and beyond if key capacity constraints are removed. There are particularly strong prospects for business and discretionary travel shifting from air to rail , not only on shorter trips into continental Europe but also on corridors such as the Scottish Central Belt to London, Birmingham and other English and Welsh cities. Within England and Wales, the greatest prospects are for changes in business and discretionary travel decisions from car to rail use.

Implications for Transport and Energy Strategy The above scenario, though it may vary in intensity and by corridor, indicates a clear and cumulative shift of mode share from road and air to rail within a stable level of total movement within the UK—demand for substantial increases in road capacity has virtually disappeared with attention shifting to a few localised schemes , better use of the existing inter-urban road network , absolute falls in road traffic levels within cities and some expansion of maintenance and localised schemes yielding clear gains. In all transport sectors, more attention (and investment—much being private) will require to be given to more efficient use of energy and shifts to low-carbon fuels. But rail offers particular opportunities for increasing the use of low carbon electric traction for both passenger and freight—justifying enlargement of the present electrification programme and the introduction of lower energy usage by both local and longer-distance trains (Present Virgin and Eurostar trains compare poorly with the latest continental HSR trains in terms of energy per seat mile while there are also opportunities to vary pricing to improve seat utilisation). In terms of track capacity, the present rail network offers much scope to increase usage through provision of more rolling stock, additional and longer platforms and signalling/timetabling changes. However, a key issue is to identify: (a) those corridors on which demand is rising beyond the ability to cope through relatively small improvements; and (b) gaps in the network and interchange/ticketing deficiencies which inhibit rail growth not only on corridors to, and within, London but also between, and within, other cities and tourism/leisure areas. This includes the topic of access to principal airports, using rail access to inter-link with flights increasingly to and from longer-distance overseas origins and destinations. Under (a), rising demand (and the ability to release capacity on existing routes for freight and additional regional and “intermediate express” services) justifies planning now for new sections of HSR route (as in the present Y strategy from London to the West Midlands dividing for Lancashire and Leeds) fully completed by 2030 but including complementary work to facilitate shorter trip times north from Leeds and Lancashire and also on other inter-city corridors. Lengthy sections of new route should be designed for HSR operation (defined as speeds of 200 mph or higher) but with most HSR trains also operating over sections of improved existing route—including extra opportunities for overtaking freight or intermediate passenger services or diversion of some of these to alternative routes. While some HSR trains may be designed to the more commodious continental loading gauge (including double-deck operation) but precluded from operating over existing lines with more limited clearances, the most cost-effective and realistic approach over the next 20 years is likely to lead to most HSR trains in Britain being capable of operating over the inter-city network—though with strictly limited stops and average speeds in the 135–150 mph range (higher on longer sections of new build route). HSR plans should proceed in parallel with: — city region rail/Metro/tram /bus improvements; — strengthened rail freight strategy (including a large rise in electric haulage); — an expanded national and regional rail electrification programme; — major improvements in interchange and ticketing; — specific programmes for improvements in the inter-urban passenger network; (involving shorter sections of new construction, line redoubling, line reopening and measures to raise speeds to 140 or 150 mph on some sections of route—together with timetabling adjustments, this could raise average speeds on inter-city links to the 90–110 mph range if demand so justified. On several routes, the preference may be for improved frequency and lower fares but somewhat lower average speeds—especially for links to, and within, tourist/leisure areas).

Rail Funding Expanded rail usage could be funded from a variety of sources such as: (1) increased usage and income. (2) savings arising from shifts in business and discretionary spend from car and air to rail use; reduced HGV levels, energy and fossil fuel savings; cuts in trunk road and airport investment; (3) since most savings and benefits under (2) would have no direct reflection in rail income, consideration should be given to allocating a proportion of net proceeds of road fuel taxation and cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w236 Transport Committee: Evidence

aviation taxation towards rail schemes shown to be offering benefits not fully reflected in income (or reduced if attempts were made to maximise income); (4) earmarking part of the proceeds of carbon trading or fossil energy taxation towards the costs of approved rail projects; (5) savings in procurement and more efficient operations (McNulty estimates suggests that, on the basis of continental comparison, rail project procurement costs could be cut in real terms by at least 30% while electrification offers considerable savings in operating costs (especially with a rising trend in usage) plus other opportunities for cuts in operational and signalling costs with gains for transport safety; 6) expansion of public/private partnerships subject to assessment of risk transfer eg private finance could be expanded in some areas of rolling stock provision, track/signalling maintenance and interchange improvement but with public finance (and lower borrowing costs) utilised for the formation of new rail alignments and for payments towards franchise specifications for sub- commercial networks. On some busy corridors, payments from operators to government could help fund borrowing costs but with care taken to ensure that such payments did not contradict the aims of encouraging mode shift from car and air to rail); and (7) potential levies on increases in property values or earmarking of other taxes towards contributions to borrowing costs. May 2011

Written evidence from Messrs Edwards, King, Osborn, Rees and Sullivan (HSR 93) Introduction Since HS2 Ltd. published its draft and consultation proposals for a new high speed railway linking London to the West Midlands and, ultimately, the North West and North East, views and attitudes have become increasingly polarised between those against and those for. The authors of this Submission are concerned that reasoned discussion between the two sides has become sidelined. We support the concept of high-speed rail in Britain, accept that some environmental damage will occur whichever route is finally chosen but feel that possible alternatives should be re-examined. We hope that the Alternative Approach to High Speed Rail, outlined below, will lead to a constructive debate of this exciting project. In our view the present Government’s stated objective, in its Coalition Agreement of May 2010, of creating “a truly national high speed rail network for the whole of Britain” has been thwarted by two factors. First, HS2 Ltd’s enthusiasm to operate at extreme and pioneering speeds and, second, the previous Government’s original 2009 requirement that any new high speed line should be orientated to serve in some way London’s Heathrow Airport. This Paper offers an Alternative Approach, an approach that has emerged from study of the technical background papers to the High Speed Rail Command Paper published in Spring 2010 and other sources. We are persuaded that the flexibility offered by operation at proven speeds of circa 300kph (187mph) outweighs the incremental journey time savings achieved by higher speeds. We are persuaded, too, that the alignment of Britain’s High Speed rail network should be dictated by the needs of the many—not dictated by an impractical vision of improved rail-air interchange for a small minority of travellers. We believe that the foundations of our work are sound and its logic is solid. Two models for high-speed rail infrastructure have emerged from experience around the world over the past 30 years—overlay and hybrid. In the absence of a clear national rail strategy, HS2 Ltd. has chosen to address a narrow interpretation of its brief using an “overlay” model. We have looked instead at a broader application using high-speed network enhancements of the existing rail network where they are beneficial in addressing broader needs of the travelling public. We call this hybrid the Alternative Approach. As its advantages compared with the HS2 Ltd. proposal are very significant, we believe it merits serious consideration. It would be faster and cheaper to build, would be more flexible to operate and would serve more of the UK population.

Overview of Alternative Approach 1.1 A truly national high-speed, or higher-speed, network can be achieved by: — utilising a mix of (mostly) existing main lines—upgraded to higher speed than 200 kph where technically possible; and — building a limited set of new higher-speed lines, integrated with the network and operating as a part of the whole—essentially a hybrid approach. New line speeds could be 320kph (200mph) while speeds on existing, upgraded, lines could be as high as 260kph (160mph) where curvature permits and 200kph–225kph (125–140mph) where alignment constraints prevent it. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w237

1.2 The hybrid approach takes advantage of recently announced commitments to rail investment, especially Crossrail. It circumvents HS2 Ltd’s dependence on a new interchange at Old Oak Common (OOC), resulting in greatly reduced tunnelling in London and through the Chilterns. It proposes interconnection for London Heathrow (LHR) similar to that proposed by HS2 Ltd, and expands it to serve a larger population base. It suggests that greater integration with the existing rail network is complementary to its modernisation. 1.3 Overlay networks, as proposed by HS2 Ltd, provide new high-speed, end-to-end, links between major conurbations. The Japanese were first to implement the idea; followed by China, Spain and others, including the UK’s Channel Tunnel Link—HS1. An overlay approach was necessary in both Japan and Spain, where the gauge of the national network is not standard. Hybrid models have proved more appropriate in closely settled European countries such as France, Germany and Netherlands. New sections of high-speed line have been built between cities while existing, sometimes upgraded lines in urban areas are shared with conventional inter-city and regional services, and use established major stations. 1.4 During the last 30 years, speeds achieved by high-speed trains have risen progressively from 200kph (125 mph), which were the operating speeds both the Japanese at its launch (1964), and the UK’s HS125 (1976). Today, the Shinkansen operates at 300kph, the design speed on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (HS1) through Kent. Although experimental trains have achieved higher speeds, operational speeds have converged across the world in the region of 280–320kph. Consideration of energy usage, track design and aerodynamics indicate that, with the relatively short distances between UK cities, still greater reductions in journey times from the higher maximum speeds proposed by would not be justified. Importantly, lower speeds enable more curved alignments, so that new lines can follow more closely natural landform and existing transport alignments. Lower speeds therefore allow routes rejected by HS2 Ltd. to be re-considered. 1.5 HS2 Ltd’s proposal for a “Y” network links just four cities—London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds. It would not be a truly national high speed rail network; its lines would not reach Scotland, Wales, the West Country, and East Anglia, much of the East Midlands or central Southern England. An alternative, hybrid approach addresses these omissions to serve an increased population. The likely environmental impact appears favourable, though HS2 Ltd has produced no Environmental Impact Assessment to support their preferred route and, therefore no numerical comparison can be drawn. 1.6 HS2 Ltd’s programme envisages services to Manchester and Leeds—the Phase 2 “Y” route—but at a later date than Phase 1—London to Birmingham, arguably the two best connected conurbations in the country today. By reducing cost and complexity, the alternative hybrid network creates the opportunity of including Manchester and the East Midlands cities within the timeframe proposed by HS2 Ltd for Phase 1. 1.7 HS2’s proposal includes an entirely new interchange in northwest London—at Old Oak Common— linked with Euston via a long and very costly twin bore tunnel. This is justified by the need to reduce pressure of increased passenger numbers at Euston. We propose instead to greatly reduce London and South East commuter use of Euston, by re-routing outer suburban services directly into Crossrail at Old Oak Common, and transferring the inner suburban (Watford dc) service to the . The former is foreseen by Transport for London as a potential additional arm to Crossrail; the latter is a TfL proposal already. HS2 Ltd makes much of the additional population centres served by locating its second London station on Crossrail at Old Oak Common (OOC)—implicitly emphasising the London centric view that underpins its vision. By contrast, the hybrid alignment creates opportunity to serve population centres outside London ignored by HS2—in particular, the growth triangle of Milton Keynes, Bedford and Northampton, and the manufacturing cities of the West and East Midlands, Coventry and Leicester. An additional served population (1.5 million people) is reached without penalising either cost or journey time. 1.8 To satisfy the (unproven) needs of international travellers from the Northwest (Manchester) and North East (Leeds), HS2 Ltd. has proposed a tunnelled spur from HS2 directly into Heathrow (LHR) at a cost of £3–4 billion, to be constructed during Phase 2 of the project. We propose that both travellers and airport staff should instead access LHR using existing and/or upgraded rail routes—linked to an electrified GWML— without the need for a new railway and its concomitant tunnels. We believe that overall end to end differences in journey time are marginal and do not justify the enormous costs proposed by HS2 Ltd. 1.9 HS2 Ltd. states, in its Consultation Document, that a dedicated high-speed line will relieve pressure on the existing West Coast Main Line (WCML), allowing more paths for both fast and commuter passenger trains and for freight traffic. However, HS2 appears not to have studied the implications of freight demand on the WCML (nor the other main lines), in order to substantiate its claim. We suggest that new capacity for Fast Passenger and Slow Freight services on the West Coast (WCML) and Midland (MML) Main Lines would be more beneficial if it facilitated dedicated freight transport on two tracks of the WCML and released the (currently under-utilised) MML for passenger use. 1.10 Inevitably new high speed rail infrastructure has both positive and negative impacts on the environment. Its positive impacts result from modal shift—from road and air to rail. However, HS2 Ltd has failed to recognise that operation at unnecessarily high speeds unnecessarily damages the environment through excessive energy usage, inflexible (straight) track alignment and increased noise. The alternative approach impacts all of these by reducing speed and has also considered opportunities for modal shift through improved rail access for local travellers and airport staff. We believe that HS2 has also ignored the opportunity for modal shift of freight from road to rail, available if capacity released on WCML is optimised for freight transport. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w238 Transport Committee: Evidence

1.11 Consideration of both freight and passenger utilisation studies of Network Rail indicates that the extension of High Speed Rail services north of London does not require long, expensive and inherently risky tunnelling. Instead, the Alternative Approach follows the MML Corridor, already shared with the southernmost section of the M1, via a short tunnelled link from Euston Station and thereafter largely follows the M1 corridor to its junction with M6 at Crick (near Rugby). Our mapping confirms that 300kph+ operation is readily achieved virtually everywhere on this alignment. 1.12 If the Centro (West Midlands Passenger Transport Executive) proposal for 4-tracking the congested line between Coventry and Birmingham is accepted, the alternative approach would use the existing track from Crick through Rugby to Birmingham; otherwise new track would be required. 1.13 The alternative approach provides a full capacity connection with HS1, without further tunnelling, replacing the long, costly and inflexible single bore tunnel projected by HS2 Ltd. It also facilitates direct connection between mainland Europe and the Thames Valley, West Country and South Wales using an electrified GWML (now committed).

Responses to Topics raised by Transport Select Committee Q1 Main arguments for and against HSR Principal case for: need for additional capacity to reinforce constraints of the Victorian Network, encourage modal shift from road and air, promote business and regeneration, and extend European HSR north of London. This submission supports the principle of High Speed Rail. However, it strenuously opposes HS2’s proposed overlay solution as technically over-ambitious, outrageously expensive, and unnecessarily risky. Substantially better financial performance (BCR) can be achieved along with improved sustainability and reduced environmental damage. We believe that a hybrid approach would be cheaper and faster to build, meet the key objectives of the remits given HS2, serve more of the population and cause less environmental damage.

Q2 How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? Increased rail capacity for both long distance and commuting passengers and for freight, targeted at pinch points of the current network, is fundamental to a successful transport policy. 2.1.1 HS2 proposes initially to serve only intercity travel between Birmingham and London, already the UK’s best connected cities by rail and road. Other major communities, and the devolved capitals of Edinburgh and Cardiff, do not benefit from HS2, as currently proposed. Potential travellers from these communities, who wish to benefit from HSR face additional journeys, typically be car, to reach the few rail heads served. 2.1.2 Construction of a new parkway interchange for Birmingham will necessarily increase traffic on already heavily loaded stretches of the motorway network and its feeder roads eg M40, M42, M4, and M6. 2.1.3 Provision of new rail connection to Heathrow only at OOC, does nothing to reduce road congestion of M4, M40, M25 and their feeder roads, (see also 2.2.1). 2.1.4 HS2 repeatedly states that it will relieve capacity (unquantified) for freight on the WCML. However, increased inter-modal freight volumes, the area of greatest growth and greatest environmental benefit, merit not just increased freight movements, but a dedicated freight line on the WCML alignment. 2.1.5 HS2 programme includes heavy costs for environmental mitigation, funds which are therefore not available to Highways Agency to meet commitments under the Noise Regulations (2006). Environmental funding for HS2 could be reduced if its alignment used existing transport corridors (which the A413 is not). 2.1.6 With commitment to electrification of GWML, trains from Thames Valley, West Country and S Wales could run directly to HS1. 2.1.7 HS2 has ignored the potential for an interchange at Milton Keynes with the East West Line between Reading, Oxford and Bedford / Cambridge, which would provide access to a large swathe of South Central England, currently ill-served for rail connection beyond London and Birmingham.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.2.1 Four-tracking of the line between Coventry and Birmingham is stated by Centro (West Midlands PTE) to be necessary by 2021 whether or not HS2 is built. The high cost to the public sector of the published HS2 Ltd plan would make very unlikely the funding of 4-tracking Coventry-Birmingham. 2.2.2 HS2 would involve a massive eight-year rebuilding of Euston. The provision of such a large station, providing for London & South East suburban services too, would use up funds that could be better spent on connecting the WCML at to Crossrail and avoiding the need for such a major rebuild of Euston. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w239

2.2.3 Airtrack (regrettably cancelled) would have permitted commuters from southern Home Counties eg Surrey to travel by train via Heathrow to destinations served by Crossrail, Euston (by extended Heathrow Express) and HS1. Funding is less likely to be made available for this scheme if HS2 is built.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.3.1 HS2 prejudges the outcome of a UK strategy for airports, by focussing on two airports whose growth is constrained by proximity to major population centres—London Heathrow and Birmingham. Potential at other airports is ignored by HS2 Ltd’s proposal. 2.3.2 In the absence of flights between Birmingham and London, HS2 has no impact on these routes. 2.3.3 Rail already dominates the market for travel between Manchester, Leeds and London. A fast train service to Heathrow from either of these would presumably be attractive to relatively small numbers of interchange passengers, but the £4.3 billion cost could never be recovered from an acceptable fare surcharge. 2.3.4 HS2 ignores the potential for an electrified loop on GWML to provide interchange at Heathrow not only for Thames Valley, the West Country and South Wales, but for Southampton and Birmingham (via Oxford). The latter would go some way to achievement of direct termination at Heathrow, using largely existing tracks.

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—eg on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 3.1.1 HS2’s assumptions and methodology have been challenged by many critics, elsewhere and will not be dealt with here. As no project can make firm predictions for a 60 year life, proponents of any such project must reduce cost and de-risk their proposal to the greatest possible extent. This HS2 has signally failed to do. 3.1.2 Service only for few conurbations, excessive speeds, over dependence on tunnelling increases capital and running costs while restricting revenues. The result is a BCR of 1.6 (2.0 with Wider Economic Impacts (WEIs), and a risk premium of 64%.

3.2 Pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.2.1 The WCML needs additional capacity—a new line—only south of Rugby. North of Rugby its divides into two, and the main has spare capacity following 4-tracking of the 2-track section in southern Staffordshire in 2004–08. There is no case for a wholly new line north of Rugby. Where new capacity is built, it can be designed for 300 kph (186 mph) running; a new conventional line would not be a suitable solution.

3.3 Pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.3.1 Even in China’s controlled society, government plans to operate its high speed train network at 300kph to achieve competitive prices. 3.3.2 Restriction of travel by rail would increase pressure of travel by road, which is noisier, more dangerous, less environmentally friendly, and slower. 3.3.2 Rationing freedom of travel by price would be politically unacceptable.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.4.1 UK can achieve success with major programmes (LHR T5 and Olympic). 3.4.2 Design goals must include minimise of risk. This has not been done by HS2—eliminate excessive tunnelling, large work packages, gating of the entire project by one critical element, operation at unproven speeds, excessive project duration, big-bang rather than progressive introduction. 3.4.3 Form one team that comprises best experience available, can contribute all necessary skills 3.4.4 Avoid “mission creep”.

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1.1 Euston is the only London station capable of operating as the London terminus. It currently carries two commuting streams, whose diversion (to LU and Crossrail) would facilitate adaption potentially within the cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w240 Transport Committee: Evidence

existing footprint and with reduced disruption to services. On completion of Crossrail which will serve Heathrow, the Heathrow Express service can be re-routed to Euston instead of Paddington. Removal of commuting traffic from Euston reduces pressure on its limited onward connections. 4.1.2 Hence, OOC appears unnecessary and should be replaced by a station at Milton Keynes (MK), to serve the travelling population of MK, Bedford and Northampton. Journey times would continue to be based on a one stop strategy. 4.1.3 We remain unconvinced of the overall benefit of introduction of constructing additional parkway stations. Upgrade of the city centre stations at Coventry and Leicester should be considered instead, at a frequency justified by travel volumes. 4.1.4 Curzon Street is the best location in Birmingham for a major national interchange. New Street cannot take more trains, or full-length high-speed trains. The HS2 Ltd proposal for a separate Curzon Street station for high-speed trains only would not enable interchange or connections with other services. It should be designed as Birmingham’s main station, with New Street acting primarily for suburban and regional commuter services.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.2.1 The Y network appears to be driven by a vision that the overlay high speed network ultimately evolves to be more and more independent of the existing network—imposing ever higher costs for ever reducing returns as it progresses north. HS2 appears to base the Y network on an untested assumption that there should be a hub at Birmingham International Interchange rather than in Birmingham City Centre, where existing lines meet. We question both these fundamental assumptions. 4.2.3 The distance between Birmingham and Manchester is approx. 110 kms—less than London to Birmingham. Even operating at 400kph cannot hope to save more than a few minutes compared with upgrading WCML via Crewe and Wilmslow. Any speed advantage would be negated if the Manchester HS2 station is not one of the existing main stations (Piccadilly and Victoria) so that interchange from other services was not possible. As far as is known, HS2 Ltd does not propose to use either of these stations.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.3.1 The immediate focus should be relief of capacity constraints on existing lines, which are most severe on (but not exclusive to) lines emanating from London. 4.3.2 Similar priority should be given to capacity relief elsewhere permitting progressive service introduction.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.4.1 Government proposes the link to HS1 in phase I only because the necessary very expensive tunnel cannot be constructed later. But a simple linkage can be made with HS1 at low cost by using the North London Line from the Primrose Hill tunnels through the former Chalk Farm station, building one new two-track bridge over Camden High Road to double trackage here from two to four tracks, and lay double track on the viaduct which connects the NLL with HS1. This viaduct was built for stock movements north of St Pancras as part of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Phase 2. This means a connection is possible for through trains at relatively low cost. 4.4.2 We do not believe there will ever be a case for construction of a tunnelled link to Heathrow from the proposed HS2 alignment. The economic and effective link would be to operate Heathrow Express from Euston instead of Paddington, once Crossrail is carrying air passengers between Central London and the airport terminals.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity No comments offered.

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1.1 HS2 Ltd has chosen to design the route to support speeds of 400kph (250 mph), substantially faster than any other operator, despite its claim that it will not be a pioneering solution. (Even China, acknowledged by HS2 Ltd to be the driving force in HSR has reduced its target speed to 300 kph in view of high ticket costs and safety hazards involved in travelling faster, and despite the much greater distances between cities compared with UK). A reduction of max speed from 400 to 320 kph (250 to 200 mph) will save approx 1/3 of energy used and an equivalent reduction in greenhouse gases, if power is predominantly generated by non-renewable sources. A railway designed for a maximum speed of 320kph. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w241

6.1.2 A route designed for a maximum speed of 320kph will reduce the energy and cost associated with the direct cost of tunnelling by 75%, since fewer and shorter tunnels are required. Contributions to energy usage and cost for removal of spoil, the volume of which HS2 Ltd appears to have grossly underestimated, are similarly reduced. 6.1.3 HS2 Ltd has ignored the benefit to the environment available from modal shift of freight from road to rail enabled by transfer of passenger capacity from existing to new high speed lines. As it has failed to analyse the capacity released to freight on WCML, it is not possible to comment on this benefit. 6.1.4 HS2 Ltd has examined extension of the line in phase to provide direct access at London Heathrow, at a cost of some £4bn to serve some 2,800 travellers daily. It has ignored the much more pressing opportunity to improve local rail service at Heathrow for its 48K workers and 200,000 passengers daily whose journeys start or end within 50 miles of the airport. (When LHR was closed by volcanic ash and strikes early this year, the beneficial impact on traffic volumes and therefore flows was remarkable for a radius of at least 20 miles from the airport.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2.1 In the absence of an EIA, this question cannot be answered. It is extraordinary and completely unacceptable that HS2 will not release an EIA until the final route has been agreed.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.3.1 HS2 Ltd claims that capacity for freight will be increased by the existence of the high speed line. It provides no evidence to substantiate the claim. We believe the scheme should be allowed to proceed only if, as result, 2 tracks of the WCML between London/Southampton and the West Midlands can be dedicated to freight. 6.3.2 HS2 proposes to route high speed trains on the WCML initially from Lichfield north and in the longer term from the interchange for Manchester/Liverpool. For freight travelling on WCML further north (including Scotland), where the WCML is a two track line, the consequences are disastrous. Each additional high speed train will displace three to five freight trains and therefore force 100 to 150 HGVs back onto the at high energy cost. Many of these will necessarily travel at night to avoid congestion, an increase of perhaps 50% on roads which are already unacceptably noisy at night.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4.1 HS2 Ltd indicates that reconstruction of Euston will take 8½ years, the longest single element of the entire programme. It therefore determines the critical path to completion. Choice of an alternative route could lead to service introduction on the high speed line up to five years earlier, bringing benefit rather than disruption to the UK’s over stretched network. 6.4.2 HS2 Ltd’s solution to overcrowding at Euston station is construction of an entirely new interchange at Old Oak Common, for which connections must be provided by tube, cross rail, bus and taxi. Introduction of these additional services in a busy area of North West London will create further disruption during construction and congestion in operation. 6.4.3 Overcrowding at Euston can be resolved by routing commuter traffic unto either London Underground or Crossrail using existing and new links. Disruption during reconstruction at Euston would then be greatly reduced, and it is possible that the reconfiguration could take place within the existing footprint—avoiding destruction of homes and disruption of the lives of hundreds of people. 6.4.4 A similar approach to distribution of traffic between New St and the proposed Curzon St stations in Birmingham would offer similar benefits. May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w242 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from the Bow Group (HSR 94)

Introduction

1. The Bow Group exists to develop policy, publish research and stimulate debate within the Conservative Party. It has no corporate view, but represents all strands of Conservative opinion.

2. We have a particular interest in transport, energy and the economy, all of which are relevant to the HS2 proposals. The Bow Group’s research paper, “The Right Track”,144 in January 2010 contributed to the high speed rail debate. A summary of our recommendations from that study is appended. Link here: http://www.bowgroup.org/files/bowgroup/The_Right_Track_PDF.pdf

3. We are grateful for the opportunity to provide this response to a number of the Committee’s questions.

Q1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?

4. The argument for a UK HSR network requires an integrated intermodal transport and spatial planning policy context, tested through the democratic process. Policy objectives might include assisting modal shift from both road and air to rail, enabling the decarbonisation of the UK’s transport network, providing network- wide benefits, promoting regional economic competitiveness, clarity in financial appraisal and minimising environmental impacts. We believe that it is also critical that Heathrow and HS2 are considered holistically.

5. The current HS2 consultation proposals lack such strategic policy objectives and democratic legitimacy. This has resulted in a flawed proposal, which has led to well informed criticism on specific aspects of HS2 and, worryingly, encouraged more general opposition to the principle of HSR.

6. We agree with the Committee’s conclusion that clear policy objectives must be agreed before the case for or against HSR can be properly considered.145

Q2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

7. European transport policy objectives make it clear that aviation and high speed rail should be planned using an intermodal approach.146 In contrast, the UK continues to adopt a silo approach to policy.

8. For example, DfT’s New Line Capacity Study in 2007147 included a map purporting to identify “the key transport centres of primary importance (or nodes)”. This showed the UK’s major cities, as well as ports such as and Immingham—but omitted Heathrow.

9. The current DfT consultation on aviation,148 whilst at least recognising that HS2 exists, notes only that “in the longer term, much of the demand for domestic aviation and for near-European short-haul aviation could be met by high speed rail”.

10. Government’s original remit to HS2 Ltd.149 continued this silo approach, focusing on reducing journey times between London and Birmingham to the exclusion of wider policy objectives.150

11. Such silo thinking is not new. Lord Heseltine has noted that “as Environment Secretary studying the various proposed routes for HS1, then called the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, in the early 1990’s, I was surprised by the lack of imagination shown by British Rail and the rail industry in their plans to connect London with the Channel Tunnel. The route chosen for HS2 must not be left to the rail industry, though their expertise and opinion is important”.151 144 “The Right Track, Bow Group, 2010 www.bowgroup.org/files/bowgroup/The_Right_Track_PDF.pdf 145 “The Government must explain the nature of the economic solutions that it is seeking to deliver through transport spending and how the schemes that it is supporting will achieve these aims. A detailed set of objectives and a robust analytical framework are required against which proposals can be assessed. Large sums of money are involved and difficult choices have to be made. We recommend that a White Paper be published, clarifying the Government’s objectives for all transport spending and the criteria it will use for deciding between different claims on the available resources”—Transport and the Economy, House of Commons Transport Committee, March 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/473/473.pdf 146 “Better modal choices will result from greater integration of the modal networks: airports, ports, railway, metro and bus stations, should increasingly be linked and transformed into multimodal connection platforms for passengers”—European Commission White Paper, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area—Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, March 2011 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/doc/2011_white_paper/white_paper_com(2011)_144_en.pdf 147 Figure 2.1—Key Transport Nodes in the UK, DfT New Line Capacity Study, Supplementary Report, May 2007 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/researchtech/research/newline/suppreport.pdf 148 Developing a sustainable framework for UK aviation: Scoping document, DfT March 2011 http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/ open/2011–09/consultationdocument.pdf 149 ?????? 150 “The company’s objects are the “development of proposals for a new railway line from London to the West Midlands and potentially beyond”—Letter from Sir David Rowlands to Lord Adonis, 13th February 2009 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/55864 151 Foreword by The Rt. Hon. Lord Heseltine, The Right Track, Bow Group 2010 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w243

12. However, it appears that the planning of HS2 has been left to the rail industry, since HS2 Ltd’s advisory/ challenge groups lack any representation from the UK aviation industry.152 We believe that this is responsible for many of the flaws in the current HS2 consultation proposal.

Q3. Business case Q4. The strategic route 13. We respond to Questions 3 and 4 together, as HS2 Ltd’s early decisions on the business case—in particular, Heathrow’s demand modelling and the value of journey time savings—were fundamental to the choice of the strategic route.

Heathrow’s context 14. We—and others153,154—argue that a coherent transport strategy should have Heathrow at its heart. It is the world’s busiest international airport,155 and UK’s only hub, directly contributing around 1% of GDP.156 A number of issues create an urgent need to secure a sustainable future for Heathrow.

Heathrow’s growth 15. Following the withdrawal of support for a third runway, the Coalition Government’s aim is a Heathrow that is “better, not bigger”.157 However, even with two runways, operating within current planning limits, Heathrow is forecast to grow significantly, from 65.7mpaa158 in 2010 to 90mppa159 or 95mppa160 by 2030. Such growth is outside Government’s control, and is a consequence of airline market forces replacing short haul domestic and near-Europe flights with larger aircraft serving long haul destinations. Heathrow is already the UK’s single largest traffic generator161 and its poor surface access requires significant improvement if this growth is not to have unacceptable local impacts.162

Heathrow’s market 16. Heathrow’s existing market is concentrated on London and the South East. However this simply results from its inaccessibility by rail from much of the UK—indeed, anywhere other than central London.163 Access is, in theory, possible from Wales, the west and south west by changing trains at Paddington. In reality, the interchange penalty164 acts as disincentive to the use of rail. Hence, Bristol generates ca. 300,000 surface access trips to Heathrow pa, of which only 6% are made by rail, and Reading, just 20 minutes from Paddington, with ca. 750,000 trips pa, only 1.3% by rail.165 152 High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A report to Government by HS2 Ltd.—HS2 Ltd, 2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/hs2report/ 153 “The surface accessibility of Heathrow is treated as an ancillary issue in UK air transport policy, with this important issue only being considered after decisions on airside infrastructure and terminals have been made. This undermines the policy objective of the Government with respect to developing Heathrow, especially with regard to securing its economic contribution to the whole of the UK”—Adding Capacity at Heathrow—Transport Studies Unit, University of Oxford 2008 http://www.tsu.ox.ac.uk/ pubs/1035-givoni-banister.pdf 154 “In particular, the TCPA highlights the need for an intelligent approach to integrated spatial planning in order to link HS2 with existing rail services and co-ordinate with planning for a sustainable future for the UK’s airports, especially London Heathrow”— The Case for a Sustainable Transport System, TCPA Briefing Paper 26, May 2011 http://www.tcpa.org.uk/data/files/resources/ 1040/TB26-HSR.pdf 155 http://www.flightmapping.com/news/Coventry-Airport/Biggest-busiest-airports.asp 156 “Heathrow contributes 0.9% of the UK’s GDP—significantly more than any other single site in the UK”- Heathrow Expansion, London Assembly 2005 http://legacy.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/plansd/heathrow_expansion.pdf 157 “As David Cameron has made very clear, we believe Heathrow should be better not bigger”—Theresa Villiers, July 2009 http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/12/Theresa_Villiers_The_Conservative_position_on_aviation.aspx 158 BAA press release 12 January 2011— http://www.baa.com/portal/page/BAA%20Airports%5EMedia%20centre%5ENews%20releases%5EResults/ 8b84191ed806d210VgnVCM10000036821c0a____/a22889d8759a0010VgnVCM200000357e120a____/ 159 UK Air Passenger Demand and CO2 Forecasts, DfT January 2009—http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/ http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/aviation/atf/co2forecasts09/co2forecasts09.pdf 160 Heathrow Interim Masterplan June 2005, BAA— http://www.baa.com/assets/B2CPortal/Static%20Files/LHRInterimMasterPlan.pdf 161 “London Borough of Hillingdon UDP Adopted September 1998 http://www.hillingdon.gov.uk/media/pdf/7/5/udp.pdf 162 “Even without a third runway, absolute numbers requiring surface access to Heathrow will increase dramatically over the next 20 years. In 2001/2, around 27mppa used cars and taxis to access Heathrow. By 2015/20, and assuming a 40% sustainable surface access target has been achieved, this figure will be around 40mppa”—Heathrow Expansion, The London Assembly’s response to BAA’s consultation on the Interim Masterplan for Heathrow, London Assembly 2005 http://ww.legacy.london.gov.uk/ assembly/reports/plansd/heathrow_expansion.rtf 163 “Heathrow’s catchment area is very limited to Greater London, though it is the main UK airport, due to its poor surface transport accessibility from areas outside Greater London—specifically the fact the airport is not a node on the UK long distance rail network”—Adding Capacity at Heathrow Airport—Givoni and Banister, Transport Studies Unit, University of Oxford 2008 164 “Previous studies have demonstrated that an interchange in a rail access journey to the airport suppressed demand by approximately 50%”—High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for Greengauge 21 http://www.scribd.com/doc/39964950/High-Speed-Rail-Development-Programme 165 Heathrow Hub: The UK’s Global Gateway, Arup submission to HS2 Ltd, December 2009 www.arup.com/.../091210_Arup_ submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w244 Transport Committee: Evidence

17. Heathrow therefore depends largely on road access, over the most congested parts of the UK network.166 Road congestion and the lack of rail access means that Bristol, just 90 miles from Heathrow and in what should be its natural market catchment, sees 10,000 passengers bypass Heathrow each week to interline instead at other European hubs.167 11.5% of Heathrow’s UK origin and destination passengers come from Berkshire and Buckinghamshire, whereas only 2.8% come from Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, Newcastle, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Cardiff and Bristol combined.168 18. In contrast, Schiphol , (33m people accessible by rail within 200km),169 Frankfurt, (35m within 200km),170 Charles de Gaulle and Brussels see a commercial imperative in expanding their markets by direct connection to high speed and classic rail services serving a cross-border hinterland.171 The Schiphol/Charles de Gaulle industrial alliance is predicated on direct high speed rail links between the two airports.172 Extending Heathrow’s catchment, with new , would benefit Heathrow’s hub operations.173

UK regional competitiveness 19. The current HS2 consultation confirms that Heathrow “is vital to the UK’s competitiveness: easy access to Heathrow is often a major factor for business in deciding where to locate.”174 Domestic flights accounted for only 6.6% of Heathrow’s capacity in 2010,175 a result of market forces leading airlines to focus on long haul routes and the structure of landing charges. 176 The continuing attrition of domestic flights and frequencies, and the lack of a rail alternative, reduces Heathrow’s accessibility from the UK regions, increasing their dependence on transfers through European hubs to access global markets.177 This exacerbates their already peripheral location within Europe and undermines their ability to compete.178 Direct HSR access to Heathrow, and improvements to the classic rail network, are needed.

Modal shift from road to rail 20. Improving Heathrow’s accessibility by rail would assist in increasing rail’s modal share of passengers (and staff), essential if Heathrow’s growth is not to put unacceptable pressure on the Heathrow area’s already congested roads. Road vehicles are a major contributor to poor local air quality,179 which even without further growth of Heathrow exceeds legally binding limits,180 is amongst the worst in London181 and presents a threat 166 “The western section of the M25 is the UK’s busiest section of motorway. Over 18% of total UK vehicle delay in the year ending March 2010 was experienced on the M25”—Road statistics 2009: Traffic, Speeds and Congestion, DfT June 2010 http://www.dft.gov.uk/adobepdf/162469/221412/221546/226956/261695/roadstats09tsc.pdf 167 “More than ten thousand passengers a week are turning their backs on direct flights from London airports and instead travelling between Bristol International and hubs such as Amsterdam-Schiphol, Frankfurt, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Brussels and Oslo, from where they can access connections to hundreds of destinations worldwide”—Bristol Airport press release 13th June 2008, http://www.bristolairport.co.uk/news-and-press/press-releases/2008/6/ten-thousand-join-hub-club-at-bristol-international.aspx 168 CAA 2007 UK O&D passenger survey data 169 “For Schiphol, landside accessibility is of essential importance. The construction of the HSL South line will place Schiphol on the European HSL high-speed rail network. The HSL will extend Schiphol’s catchment area towards Antwerp and Brussels” -Long term vision for Schiphol Group 2009 170 “Long distance trains doubled (surface access) market share between 1998 and 2000, and since 2004 high speed long distance services have carried more passengers than local services. 19% of originating passengers used high speed services in 2009, and this is projected to increase to 30% by 2015”—Frankfurt Intraplan 2010 171 “In addition to deregulation of the air transportation markets, one reason for the growing competition among the hubs is that their catchment areas increasingly overlap. The impetus here comes from the high-speed rail systems (ICE, TGV) permitting a fast journey to the airport”—Fraport 2009 172 Aéroports de Paris and Schiphol Group, December 2008 http://www.schiphol.nl/SchipholGroup1/NieuwsPers/Persbericht/ AeroportsDeParisAndSchipholGroupCreateALeadingGlobalAllianceInTheAirportIndustry.htm 173 “An HSR network serving Heathrow would also encourage those who currently interline at Paris CDG, Amsterdam or Frankfurt to use Heathrow, thus strengthening Heathrow’s competitiveness compared to other European airports for long haul flights”— High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for Greengauge 21 174 Connecting to Heathrow, Factsheet, DfT 2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/connecting-to- heathrow_0.pdf 175 Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, April 2010 http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/2011/04/11/londons-heathrow-competitive- disadvantages-are-beginning-to-hurt/page1 176 “The domestic passenger charge will increase from £13 to £20 per passenger, and, from 1 April 2011 an annual regulator- approved increase will also be implemented, bringing the total charge to £22 per departing domestic passenger”—BBC News, 31 January 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-12324693 177 “Organisations outside London were concerned about the impacts on international investment in the regions as a result of the limited and reducing number of services to Heathrow from airports within the UK”—Transport and the Economy, , Transport Select Committee 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/473/473.pdf 178 “The UK regions are at a major disadvantage in terms of access from major world markets. This hampers the ability to attract inward investment and regional economic growth”—Economic Impacts of Hub Airports, British Chambers of Commerce 2009 www.britishchambers.org.uk/.../BCC_Economic_Impacts_of_Hub_Airports.pdf 179 para. 275, London Borough of Hillingdon Response to Consultation on Adding Capacity to Heathrow Airport 2007 http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/hillingdon.pdf 180 “In 2001/2, air quality close to access roads at Heathrow failed the annual average daily NO2 objective. Monitoring has also shown several breaches of the PM10 daily average objective”—Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology report 195, Aviation and the Environment 2003 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/pn195.pdf 181 “The area around Heathrow currently has some of the poorest air quality in London. Air quality measurements show that annual average nitrogen dioxide (NO2) levels exceed the health based EU air quality limit values.”—Adding Capacity at Heathrow, Mayor of London’s response to the consultation 2008 http://www.legacy.london.gov.uk/mayor/.../docs/mayors_response_ heathrow_report.rtf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w245

to Heathrow’s ability to operate within its current legal limits.182 The environmental challenge is significant— taking airport operations alone, (and ignoring airport related surface access), Heathrow is claimed to be responsible for almost one third of London’s carbon footprint.183 21. Air passenger statistics also understate the challenge, since each passenger using private vehicles to access the airport can generate up to four road journeys, (eg minicabs, kiss and ride), estimated to be responsible 184 for 70% of airport related CO2 emissions.

Modal shift from air to rail 22. If Heathrow was seamlessly integrated into HSR services serving the UK’s regions and Europe (via HS1), this would release valuable slots at the airport, currently used for short haul domestic and near-Europe flights, for new long haul services that could benefit the UK’s global connectivity. 23. This is likely to have a negative impact on air quality and carbon, as a result of small aircraft being replaced by larger planes.185 However, the process has been under way for some time, and may be at least partially offset in a national context by HSR replacing existing short haul flights from UK regional airports to European hubs, (recognising the disproportionate environmental impact of such flights).186

Heathrow’s operational efficiency 24. Heathrow’s forecast growth also impacts on the airport’s already constrained operations. Heathrow occupies the smallest site of any major airport, 1227ha compared to Charles de Gaulle’s 3309ha and Schiphol’s 2147ha.187 A strategy that allowed HSR to provide a co-located airport terminal and rail interchange outside the current constrained airport site could provide a number of benefits—for example, improving the passenger experience, providing the additional passenger processing (terminal) facilities necessary to handle Heathrow’s forecast passenger growth and creating more space within the airfield for aircraft—the one activity that can’t be moved. This could improve resilience, reduce delays and assist air quality through more efficient airport operations, (eg reducing taxiing distances).188

Heathrow and HS2 25. Early policy statements by both major political parties supported the objective of integrating HSR and Heathrow. Conservative rail policy specifically endorsed an HSR route serving Heathrow directly, along the lines promoted by Arup (Heathrow Hub),189 while Lord Adonis190 and Geoff Hoon, the then Secretary of State,191 expressed similar support. 182 “Air quality limits could require BAA to reduce the number of aircraft using Heathrow”—Heathrow Expansion, London Assembly 2005 183 “London’s role as an international aviation hub means that (taking account only of Heathrow & London City airports) aviation emissions account for 34% of its total carbon footprint” (The Mayors Climate Change Action Plan 2007 http://www.static.london.gov.uk/mayor/.../climate-change/.../ccap_summaryreport.rtf—London City Airport responsible for less than 1% with Heathrow accounting for the remaining 33%, based on fuel loaded into aircraft on the ground at each airport, and without taking into account the carbon implications of airport related surface access) 184 “As part of a strategy to reduce the carbon impact of surface access, it is clear that the reduction of “Kiss and Fly” journeys would have a significant impact on reducing overall carbon emissions since it is the most inefficient form of surface access, requiring four trips per return flight. Estimated landside CO2 emissions (2005) from “Kiss and Fly” (passenger drop-off, including passengers using minicabs) equals 70% of estimated CO2 emissions”—BAA 2008–2012 Transport Vision http://www.heathrowairport.com/assets//B2CPortal/Static%20Files/LHR_SAS.pdf.pdf 185 “No sensible, well-informed person still seriously pretends HS2 is a green alternative to a third runway. “The question now is given no third runway, how we can maximise the effectiveness of our limited capacity at Heathrow. That means more long-haul flights. Every time BMI or British Airways have cancelled a domestic route in the past, they’ve replaced it with a more profitable medium or long haul route. That’s exactly what will happen when HS2 comes and more domestic routes get cut”—Nigel Milton, Director of Policy and Political Relations BAA, ENDS Report 434 March 2011 http://www.endsreport.com/28048/high-speed- rail-set-to-boost-uk-emissions-from-aviation 186 “Short haul passenger flights make a disproportionately large contribution to the global environmental impacts of air transport, much larger than those from equivalent rail journeys: C02 emissions per passenger by an average aircraft in 2001 being over four times that of an equivalent train”—The Environmental Effects of Civil Aircraft in Flight, Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 2002 http://eeac.hscglab.nl/files/UK-RCEP_CivilAviation_Nov02.pdf 187 Heathrow Interim Masterplan, BAA June 2005 188 “Delays caused by airport operations, (lack of gates etc), accounted in 2006/07 for eight percentage points of the 33% of flights which were delayed. Even controlling for congestion with respect to ATM’s per runway, the proportion of delays at Heathrow is relatively high”—Imagine a World Class Heathrow, London First, June 2008 http://www.london-first.co.uk/documents/ Imagine_a_world_class_Heathrow_FULL_REPORT.pdf 189 “A Conservative Government will support proposals along the lines of the plan put forward by engineering firm, Arup, for a new Heathrow rail hub. This would link Heathrow terminals directly into the main rail network and the lines to Reading, Oxford, Bristol, Plymouth, Cardiff, Swansea, Cheltenham and Southampton, greatly improving public transport links to the airport.”— Conservative Party Rail Review 2009 http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2009/02/Getting_the_best_for_rail_ passengers.aspx 190 “I think that it (the Heathrow Hub) is an attractive idea. It’s vital that we have an integrated approach to planning new rail capacity and any new airport capacity that’s also required.”- Lord Adonis, Sunday Times 4th January 2009 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article5439472.ece 191 “A Heathrow International Hub station on the Great Western line to provide a direct four way interchange between the airport, the new north-south line, existing Great Western rail services and Crossrail, into the heart of London”—Secretary of State for Transport 15th January 2009 Column 356, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090115/debtext/ 90115–0006.htm cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w246 Transport Committee: Evidence

26. However, what appeared to a very clear statement by the Secretary of State was immediately qualified in the debate that followed his announcement to the Commons, instead confirming Government’s decision that a station at Old Oak Common should provide the Heathrow interchange.192 Clearly, this ruled out a direct HS2 alignment via Heathrow.

27. HS2 Ltd’s conclusions could therefore be seen as pre-determined, with HS2 Ltd. confirming its understanding from the outset that Heathrow was to be relegated to a “convenient,” (not “direct”), interchange with HS2.193

28. We believe this is a fundamental flaw and do not agree that a remote interchange some 12km from Heathrow, with its inherent interchange penalty, can ever provide the passenger experience or modal shift that Heathrow and the UK requires.

29. The Coalition Government’s Secretary of State for Transport, in his evidence to the Transport Select Committee soon after taking office194 took the same view and consequently provided HS2 Ltd. with a revised remit.195

30. In our view, this significant change to the entire basis on which HS2 Ltd. had developed their original proposals should have led to a fundamental reappraisal. However, HS2 Ltd. simply proposed a spur, retrofitted to the route originally proposed, with the intention of constructing this as part of the second phase of HS2, by 2033 at the earliest, and with the ability for extension to form a loop at an even later date.

31. It is important to recognise the inherent inefficiencies in a spur, in terms of service frequency, operational cost and flexibility and line capacity.

32. For example, four tracking of the main HS2 route each side of its junction with the spur may be required if the projected 18 trains per hour capacity is not to be reduced. The technical notes confirm that the maximum speed over turnouts would be 230kph maximum196 whilst the route maps197 show a line speed between 300 and 360kph over the section from which the spur would diverge. Heathrow services joining and diverging from the spur would therefore need to accelerate to/decelerate from line speed to allow the lower speed turnouts and spur, on a ca. 3200m radius curve,198 to be negotiated. To the west of the proposed junction, four tracking would necessitate additional bores over at least some of the length of the proposed M25-Amersham twin bore tunnel.

33. Without four tracking, HS2’s business case, which is reliant on the 18tph service pattern and which is already marginal at best, is likely to be unsupportable. Even with four tracking, it is unlikely that headways would allow as many as 18tph.

34. The consultation suggests that Heathrow might be served by half length trains, which would split and join en route to Heathrow.199 This would reduce capacity by 50%, making it easier to fill trains. This presumably recognises the challenge of filling dedicated trains at sufficiently high frequencies whilst relying solely on airport traffic.

35. However, joining and splitting trains adds to cost, as it requires additional train crews, including the need to staff separate portions of the train, including catering facilities. There may also be an impact on the size of the train fleet. There is also a journey time penalty resulting from the need to split and join trains, and provide timetabled resilience. It is not clear how this relates to HS2 Ltd’s assumption of £300–600 million benefits for each minute saved. 192 “Our proposals on the hub are for a site much closer to west London, on land already owned by Network Rail, at the junction of the existing Great Western line and the proposed Crossrail line. A Heathrow hub would not necessarily have to be placed close to Heathrow”—Secretary of State for Transport, 15th January 2009, Column 368 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090115/debtext/90115–0007.htm 193 “Heathrow International station: This must provide an interchange between HS2, the Great Western Main Line and Crossrail with convenient access to Heathrow”- Letter from Sir David Rowlands to Lord Adonis, 13 February 2009 194 “What is clear is this: there has to be a form of connection to Heathrow that makes sense to air travellers, that feels like a proper rail to air connection of the type that many major European airports have. Frankfurt, Paris, to a lesser extent Schipol, have excellent rail to air connections. It is about the passenger experience.. There has to be a connection which feels right to airline travellers, which will encourage as it were interlining between air and train. That cannot be lug your heavy bags down a couple of escalators, along 600 metres of corridor and then change trains at a wet, suburban station somewhere in north west London. That is not an option. It is also clear that there could be options that involved a transfer point that was remote from the airport itself, provided the seamlessness of the service was of a type that airline passengers would find acceptable.”—Q48, Philip Hammond, Secretary of State, Evidence to House of Commons Transport Select Committee on the Secretary of State’s Priorities for Transport, 26th July 2010 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/359/10072602.htm 195 Letter from Phllip Hammond to Sir Brian Briscoe, 11th June 2010 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/57834 196 High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond—HS2Technical Appendix, HS2 Ltd. December 2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/ technicalappendix/pdf/report.pdf 197 HS2 Route map 5—http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/HS2-ARP-00-DR-RW-04205.pdf 198 “Minimum desirable radius of curvature—200kph 1800m, 300kph 4050m, 360kph 5900m and 400kph 7200m”—HS2 Ltd Technical Specification http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77048 199 “A spur … would allow HS2 services to start at Heathrow and split on route to serve a number of destinations in the Midlands, the North and Scotland”—Connecting to Heathrow, Factsheet DfT 2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/ highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/connecting-to-heathrow_0.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w247

36. A spur may also incur its own interchange penalty if the Heathrow interchange cannot, as seems inevitable due to lack of space and other constraints, be immediately co-located with an airport processor, (terminal).200 HS2 Ltd’s analysis suggests that a site in the Central Terminal Area is unlikely to be feasible,201 while a T5 site would need to be some distance from the terminal itself. In contrast, Arup envisage a processor fully integrated with their proposed road and rail interchange, (Heathrow Hub),with airside transit and baggage connections to satellites on the airfield, avoiding any interchange (and service frequency) penalties, and allowing a fast and seamless passenger experience from kerb/train to aircraft.

37. Government proposes that a spur could be extended at a later date to allow through services. However, the significant additional cost and limited additional benefits suggest that this unlikely to be feasible. European experience indicates that the inevitable journey time penalty would restrict the frequency of through trains.202

38. We are not alone in seeing the inherent flaws in the concept of serving Heathrow by a spur or loop—so do the International Air Rail Organisation203 MVA Systra,204 and Greengauge 21205—and DfT themselves.206

39. SNCF207 and Star Alliance,208 for example, confirm their experience that successful air/rail interchanges in Europe are a consequence of their location on through lines.

40. A spur is also likely to have considerable environmental impacts. A route between, for example, Heathrow’s T5 and the main HS2 line would be entirely within the Green Belt and Colne Valley Regional Park, where there is already concern over the environmental impact of the main HS2 route crossing the Park and its SSSI.209 HS2 Ltd. may in due course propose extensive tunnelling to partly mitigate these impacts, although the grade separated junction with the main HS2 line would necessarily be at grade, (or elevated since HS2 crosses the Colne Valley on a 3.6km viaduct in the area where junctions are shown). The costs of this length of tunnel would also be substantial.210

41. The spur, from the most recently published maps211 and statements,212 also appears to only provide a northern chord. Whilst this would allow high speed rail services between Heathrow, Birmingham and the north, this would preclude services from the east—ie from HS1 and Europe. This would presumably have to await any future extension of the spur to “loop back to the main HS2 line so that trains from West Midlands and beyond could call at Heathrow on the way to London.”213 200 “The attractiveness of air-rail links is certainly inhibited when passengers have to transfer to a second mode of transport in order to reach their terminal because the railway station is not integrated into the terminal building”—Potential and Limitations of Air- rail Links—A General Overview, Andreas Eichinger und Andreas Knorr, IWIM—Institut für Weltwirtschaft und Internationales Management, Universität Bremen 2004 http://www.iwim.uni-bremen.de/publikationen/pdf/w034.pdf 201 “Building a cavern at least 1km long and over 60m wide underneath a live airport would be extremely difficult”—High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A report to Government by HS2 Ltd.—HS2 Ltd, 2009 202 “A loop of high speed railway had been built to serve Cologne/Bonn airport but this had added 15 minutes to the rail journey time and as a result the loop was little used”—High Speed Rail Access to Heathrow, A Report to the Secretary of State by Lord Mawhinney July 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/ lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/highspeedrailaccessheathrow.pdf 203 “Dedicated trains between Heathrow and the rest of the country would be necessary. This is a major disadvantage. With trains serving London, Heathrow, the Midlands and beyond, the combined load would justify a reasonable frequency. Trains just connecting Heathrow, the Midlands and beyond would attract fewer passengers and would not justify such a frequent service— which would be a deterrent to use”—High Speed Rail at Heathrow: an international perspective, International Air Rail Organisation, December 2009 204 “To be attractive for airline passengers, the (rail) service frequency needs to be at least one per hour. Even on our assumption that more than one city can be served with a single train (which depends on the structure of the HSR network), many of the flows are not viable. The solution will require serving Heathrow by trains that also serve other markets, such as London to Birmingham/Manchester, placing Heathrow as an intermediate station”—High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/9, Strategic Choices, MVA Systra for Greengauge 21 205 “The key really, as far as we could see from what has happened in France, is to make the airport station a station call en route”—Q147, evidence by Jim Steer, Director, Greengauge 21 to Commons Transport Select Committee, 11 November 2009 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmtran/38/38ii.pdf 206 “The interchange with Heathrow should be considered as through services will not be able to run from all points, both because demand would not be sufficient and because every Heathrow train would take a path on the new line which could be used for London bound trains”—New Line Capacity Study—Cost Estimate, DfT, July 2007 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/ http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/researchtech/research/newline/costestimate.pdf 207 “The commercial success of TGV is due to the fact that Roissy Is a through station”—Guillaume Pepy, Chairman SNCF, Transport Times conference May 2009 208 “Heathrow requires an “on-airport” station on HS2, and located on the direct high speed route, not on a spur or loop”—Star Alliance submission to Lord Mawhinney, June 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/ http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_29.pdf 209 Colne Valley News Release, March 2011—http://www.colnevalleypark.org.uk/High%20speed%202%20-%20CVP%20- %20March%202011.pdf 210 “Tunnels cost about 5–6 times more per km than building through open countryside”—High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by High Speed Two Ltd. December 2009 211 Figure 1.1, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future—DfT February 2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/ highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsr-consultation.pdf 212 “A spur … would allow HS2 services to start at Heathrow …. to serve a number of destinations in the Midlands, the North and Scotland”—Connecting to Heathrow, Factsheet DfT 2011 213 Connecting to Heathrow, Factsheet DfT 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w248 Transport Committee: Evidence

42. It is not clear how this very long term aspiration relates to the Government’s objective, in the current aviation consultation, “that, in the longer term, demand for …. much of near-European short-haul aviation could be met by high-speed rail”.214 43. Heathrow might eventually be served by a spur by the 2030’s. However, in the interim, BAA’s Transport and Works Act Order application for Airtrack has been withdrawn and Heathrow, under current proposals, will be solely reliant on Crossrail for better rail access. However, Crossrail is forecast to generate very little modal shift,215 and simply reinforces existing access from central London. It is therefore difficult to see how Heathrow’s growth can be managed without unacceptable environmental impacts on air quality and road congestion, and how its hub status and UK regional competiveness can be improved. 44. In our view, only a direct HS2 alignment via Heathrow provides the right solution for both Heathrow and HS2. The Bow Group have previously noted what appear to be the benefits of Arup’s Heathrow Hub proposal. Predating the political support for HSR and HS2 Ltd’s work, this would provide a direct HS2 route via Heathrow, achieving seamless air/rail interchange and a very high service frequency in the first phase of the UK’s high speed rail network. It also includes a direct connection between the GWML and HS2, and allows a range of regional high speed services using new and existing rail infrastructure, transforming connectivity across the UK. 45. We remain convinced that the original political consensus for a direct interchange between Heathrow and HS2 is the right solution for the UK. However, we have reviewed HS2 Ltd’s key assumptions to consider whether their prioritisation of journey time savings between London and Birmingham over Heathrow can be justified in whole or part.

HS2 demand modelling 46. Heathrow generates much greater traffic than rail’s busiest routes. Existing rail journeys between London and Birmingham totalled 2m in 2006–07, Manchester 2.1m and Leeds 1.5m. These three cities are, by a decent margin, the biggest markets for rail.216 47. Heathrow by contrast generates almost 60 million UK origin and destination passenger journeys annually, (excluding staff). 217 Assuming the proportion of transfer traffic remains constant, this could increase to ca. 84m by 2030. 48. Heathrow’s market is, as previously discussed, currently dominated by London and the South East, reflecting the difficulty of accessing the airport from other regions. 49. However, HS2 Ltd’s demand modelling assumed that, regardless of any improvements in surface access, Heathrow’s existing market catchment would remain unchanged.218 Hence, their decision to simply extrapolate from current demand, albeit adjusted to reflect to reflect projected growth in passenger numbers, and the conclusion that HS2 demand is “not so strong for Heathrow access—wrong market (main market is South East), only 1Ð2,000 passengers per day forecast to go to Heathrow on HS2”.219 50. HS2 Ltd. therefore forecast just 1,400 passengers per day would use HS2 to reach Heathrow, (assuming a third runway and ca. 95m non-transfer, terminal passengers)—just 0.5% of the total. HS2 Ltd’s most recent review of demand, adjusted to allow for the cancellation of a third runway and a reduced 2030 terminal passenger forecast of ca. 66m terminal passengers, would presumably reduce even this low forecast.220 51. We believe, and European experience confirms, that improving surface access to Heathrow would in fact expand its market catchment. For example, it is likely that a large percentage of the 0.75 million surface access trips from Reading and 0.65 million from Oxford—of which 98.7% and 98.9% respectively are currently made by road—would switch to rail if Heathrow was served by frequent, fast and direct GWML services as, for example, Arup’s Heathrow Hub proposal provides.221 214 Developing a sustainable framework for UK aviation: Scoping document, DfT March 2011 http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/ open/2011–09/consultationdocument.pdf 215 “Analysis of passenger and staff data suggests that Crossrail will not contribute as much to the airport’s public transport mode share growth as Airtrack, as the areas served do not have such significant new passenger and staff resident populations”— Sustaining the Transport Vision 2008–2012, BAA 216 Option Development Report, New Lines Programme, Network Rail, undated http://www.networkrail.co.uk/documents/About%20us/New%20Lines%20Programme/5881_ Option%20Development%20Report.pdf 217 “In addition to the 43m passenger surface access journeys in 2008 people accompanying or collecting air passengers (passengers “escorts”) are estimated by BAA to have made 13m journeys, of which 95% were by car”—Heathrow Hub, The UK’s Global Gateway—Submission to HS2 Ltd, December 2009 www.arup.com/.../091210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ ARUP.ashx 218 “The expected catchment areas for HS2 rail trips… contain less than 10% of the air passengers accessing Heathrow” - HS2 Airport Demand Model, SKM 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/ pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/appraisalmaterial/pdf/airportdemandmodel.pdf 219 HS2 Ltd Technical Seminar, Modelling, Forecasting and Economic Appraisal http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77489 220 SKM Update for Atkins, Modelling and Appraisal Updates and their impact on the HS2 Business Case, A Report for HS2 Ltd, Atkins April 2011 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77824 221 Heathrow Hub: The UK’s Global Gateway, Arup submission to HS2 Ltd, December 2009 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w249

52. The same logic applies to long distance services. The West Midlands currently generates less than 3% of Heathrow’s surface access journeys. If HS2 provided a fast and frequent service to Heathrow, European experience—and logic—suggests that this would significantly increase demand. For example, the proportion of Frankfurt’s passengers arriving by HSR increased from 14% to almost 17% between 2006 and 2007, with the proportion travelling more than 100km to fly from Frankfurt also increasing from 37% to 40% in the same period.222 53. Lord Adonis specifically noted this experience,223 which results from Frankfurt airport’s location on a through high speed line, not a spur or loop, allowing a wide range of destinations to be served at high frequencies. 54. High speed rail requires very large traffic volumes for viability, with HS2 Ltd’s business case dependent on 18tph in each direction, each with as many as 1100 seats. Direct services to Heathrow would therefore assist HS2 Ltd’s business case. 55. HS2 Ltd’s assumptions on Heathrow demand, if unchanged, are likely to have a significant impact on any business case for the proposed Heathrow spur. 56. HS2 Ltd’s assumption of 18tph in each direction between London and Birmingham excludes any Heathrow services.224 If HS2 Ltd. continues to suggest limited HS2 demand for Heathrow, it is likely that replacing a highly valued London train with a lower value Heathrow service would have a significant effect on HS2’s BCR, (particularly if, as discussed earlier, each train path over the spur results in the loss of more than one path on the through line). The Catch 22 is that anything other than a very high frequency service would incur service frequency penalties,225 inevitably suppressing demand for Heathrow services and making it difficult to create a credible business case for a very expensive spur. 57. Alternatively, if HS2 Ltd. now conclude that there is a case for frequent services to Heathrow, (necessary to justify use of what would otherwise be valuable paths for London services), then it may be asked why this does not justify an HS2 route serving Heathrow directly since, as we discuss below, a direct alignment incurs only marginal journey time penalties and costs approximately the same.

HS2 journey time savings 58. HS2 Ltd clearly focused on a perceived need for speed, as a result of the appraisal methodology established at an early stage.226 This led to a change in emphasis, from reference to “sufficient speed”227 to the apparent decision, by the summer of 2009, that only routes which could provide a very high speed of 400kph were under consideration.228 59. Hence, even relatively modest time penalties have substantial adverse impacts on the business case, as recently re-confirmed by the current Secretary of State,229 (and despite doubt being cast on such methodology by a review of another DfT project).230 222 Fraport Investor Day, Frankfurt, September 19, 2007 223 “Some 16% of all Frankfurt airport passengers now come to and from the airport by ICE (high speed rail) from destinations across Germany. This experience needs to be studied carefully as HS2 assess options for serving Heathrow”—Lord Adonis, May 2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/press/speechesstatements/speeches/spchintertransrev 224 “The economic case for HS2 includes the link to HS1 for the first phase and the spur to Heathrow for the second phase. However, the service plans presented for HS2 do not include services to either, but uses all the train paths available on HS2 (18/hr) without them. DfT say this is because the decision to include Heathrow and HS1 was announced too late”—Review of the February 2011 consultation business case for HS2, HS2 Action Alliance 2011 http://www.hs2actionalliance.org/index.php/ business-case/consultation-business-case-feb-11 225 “Frequency is usually treated as being very important in transport modelling—subject to a weighting, intervals between trains or aircraft are treated as equivalent to additional in-vehicle minutes. Typically, an improvement in frequency from a train or plane every 2 hours to every 1 hour is considered as having the same impact on market share as a reduction in journey time of 20–30 minutes. In order to be able to compare the importance of frequency with the importance of journey time, we calculate a frequency penalty measured in minutes for each mode and route. The point of the frequency penalty is take into account that a low service frequency makes a mode relatively unattractive even if the journey time is faster, and vice versa”—Air and Rail Competition and Complementarity, Steer Davies Gleave for European Commission DG TREN 2006 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/ rail/studies/doc/2006_08_study_air_rail_competition_en.pdf 226 “Early tests suggested that reducing journey times by one minute would provide benefits of around £300Ð600m (present value discounted over 60 years in 2009 prices) on a fully utilised high speed line”—HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/ demandandappraisal/pdf/report.pdf 227 “The new line should be sufficiently high speed to optimise journey time benefits balanced with operational energy costs and achievement of maximum capacity. It is likely to be designed to at least the maximum speed of HS1”- Letter from Sir David Rowlands to Lord Adonis, 13 February 2009 228 “With such a high top speed, there could be no tunnels and few curves. Aerodynamic forces would increase tunnel costs tendfold”—Andrew McNaughton, Chief Engineer HS2 Ltd, Rail News 1 June 2009. http://www.railnews.co.uk/news/business/ 2009/06/01-hs-two.html 229 “A railway designed for a lower speed would have a very significant impact on the business case”—Response by Philip Hammond, Secretary of State, Transport Times conference 4 November 2010, quoted in Getting Back on Track, CPRE February 2011 http://www.cpre.org.uk/campaigns/transport/rail/highspeed2 230 “Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR’s) are sensitive to variations in the data, assumptions and valuations on which they are based. It is also likely that a project’s BCR will change over time as its context, including its policy context, changes”—Foster Review of Programme, Sir Andrew Foster, DfT 2010 http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/iep/fosterreview/ cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w250 Transport Committee: Evidence

60. Others have pointed out the various flaws in this methodology. Indeed, HS2 Ltd’s latest review of the business case highlights the potential difficulty attached to prioritising journey time savings over other criteria, by concluding that omitting the Old Oak Common interchange, (seen as essential by HS2 Ltd. for dispersal of London passengers onto Crossrail, as well as providing access to Heathrow), would further reduce journey times and hence improve the projects BCR.231 61. We suggest that the projected journey time saving of 3 minutes between London and Birmingham232 do not justify the decision to adopt a route that bypasses Heathrow. 62. The decision to adopt a 400kph design speed has also created fertile ground for opposition, with the currently proposed route through the Chilterns crossing the widest part of the AONB. It is difficult to reconcile the tranquillity of the Misbourne Valley with the Government’s suggestion that this is a “major transport corridor”. 63. HS2 Ltd. has clearly prioritised speed over any environmental impacts on the Chilterns AONB, despite the importance of its statutory designation,233 and HS2 Ltd’s own acknowledgement of its equivalent status to National Parks.234 It is also of concern that the Secretary of State appears not to appreciate the protection that Parliament intended, dismissing the Misbourne Valley as “not some Constable country”.235 64. An alternative, more southerly HS2 route via Heathrow, could more closely follow the M40 corridor, albeit requiring some compromise on speed. However, the M40 crosses the narrowest part (ca.12km) of the Chilterns AONB. Reducing speed over this distance, from HS2’s proposed 360kph, (albeit on a route designed for 400kph, with 7200m radius curves), to say 300kph, (4050m radius curves),236 and allowing the line to more closely follow the motorway and fit topography, would incur a journey time penalty of less than one minute. 65. Clearly any major new transport infrastructure will result in some environmental impacts. However, this more balanced approach, advocated in our 2010 paper, 237 is similar that proposed by CPRE238 and The Right Lines Charter.239 66. It also follows European practice, (eg the Cologne-Frankfurt240 and Turin-Milan241 high speed lines), aligning HSR with motorway corridors to minimise their environmental impacts. This was the approach taken by HS1, which, by also minimising the length of line crossing the Kent AONB, is widely acknowledged to achieve a satisfactory balance between benefits and impacts.242 231 “Accounting for the increased costs associated with the extra station, the BCR of the scheme reduces from 1.75 without Old Oak Common to 1.63 with it”—Modelling and Appraisal Updates and their impact on the HS2 Business Case, A Report for HS2 Ltd, Atkins April 2011 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77824 232 For a route via Heathrow “the additional route length would entail a longer journey time between London and the West Midlands of 3 minutes for non-stopping services, and 8 minutes for services stopping at the airport”—High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future—DfT February 2011 233 “Should it be implemented, the current high speed rail proposal could negatively affect the local environment of two areas: the Chilterns (which is an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty—AONB) and the Vale of Aylesbury and Warwickshire. Paragraph 22 of the Planning Policy Statement 7 (Sustainable Development in Rural Areas) states that major development within an AONB can only be considered if it satisfies the following criteria:1) It is clearly in the national interest and: 2) It cannot be built anywhere else. The Chilterns Conservation Board, an independent body established by Parliamentary Order in July 2004 to “foster the economic and social well-being of local communities within the area of outstanding natural beauty”, does not believe that the High Speed Rail proposal meets either of these criteria” (Environmental Law Foundation—High Speed Rail Briefing May 2010 http://www.elflaw.org/wp-content/themes/elftemplate/media/ELF-Briefing-High-Speed-Rail-Network-May-2010.pdf) 234 “AONB’s have equivalent status to National Parks as far as conservation is concerned. The single purpose of AONB designation is to conserve and enhance the natural beauty of the area”—HS2 Technical Appraisal http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/technicalappendix/pdf/report.pdf 235 “Have you looked at the route? It runs along the A413. Great Missenden is beautiful, but it doesn't go through Great Missenden. Between Great Missenden and the HS2 route are the A413, the Chiltern Railway and a line of pylons. So this is not some Constable country”. Philip Hammond, Daily Telegraph 11 December 2010 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and- rail-transport/8194406/Philip-Hammond-high-speed-rail-will-be-a-pleasant-surprise-for-many.html 236 HS2 Ltd technical specification—minimum desirable radius of curvature 200kph = 1800m, 300kph = 4050m, 400kph = 7200m http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77048 237 “The Chilterns will be one area where that seems likely to be affected by the first stage of a HSL. A corridor (is required) which minimises impact through routing the high speed line as close as possible to existing transport routes and .. keeps to a minimum the distance the line runs .. through the designated AONB. This … may mean that there is a small adverse impact on the maximum possible train speed when compared with a straight route”—The Right Track, Bow Group January 2010 238 “Damage to landscape, heritage and tranquillity must be minimal, for example by running new lines along existing road and rail lines wherever possible, as well as extensive tunnelling, landscaping and noise barriers”—CPRE http://www.cpre.org.uk/ campaigns/transport/rail/highspeedrail 239 CPRE, Greenpeace, RSPB, Environmental Law Foundation, Campaign for Better Transport and others www.cpre.org.uk/ resources/transport/item/download/531 240 “On environmental grounds, the new line (between Cologne and the Rhine/Main conurbation) was generally constructed in parallel with an existing motorway, as close to it as possible. For this reason, the maximum gradient was set at 40%, minimum track radius at 3350m and maximum cant at 170mm, which allows a design speed of 300 km/hr around curves. It proved possible to reduce the number of tunnels compared with the alignment that would have been necessary for mixed traffic. This made constructing the line 15% cheaper than it would have been otherwise.”—Dr.Ing. Eberhard Jaensch, Network Strategy Unit, DB Netz AG, Railway Technical Review 2/05 http://vrt.fd.cvut.cz/data/konference/24ten.pdf 241 “The route exploits the natural lie of the land and runs alongside the motorway to minimise environmental impact … within a corridor with an already dense infrastructure”—The New High Speed Turin—Milan—Line, RFI 2005 http://www.rfi.it/cms-file/ allegati/rfi/The%20new%20high%20speed%20TURIN%20-%20MILAN%20line.pdf 242 “HS1 has fitted into the surrounding countryside well, with few complaints”— Getting Back on Track, CPRE February 2011 http://www.cpre.org.uk/campaigns/transport/rail/highspeed2 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w251

67. This approach appears to have merit, even if HS2 Ltd’s figure of £300–600 million net benefits per minute saved is accepted, (although the overall BCR calculation appears to allocate no value to those impacts that cannot be easily monetised, such as landscape, heritage and habitats). Reducing speed also reduces noise,243 energy use,244 maintenance costs,245 and, potentially, cost,246 (for example, a route that was less constrained by the need to be straight may be able to avoid at least some tunnelling).247

68. It is therefore surprising that an M40 alignment was not included in any of HS2 Ltd’s numerous option studies.248

69. We therefore conclude that HS2 Ltd’s methodology is fundamentally flawed and that a more balanced assessment of journey time savings, environmental impact, cost and benefits, taking an integrated approach to Heathrow, is required.

HS2 costs

70. The consultation claims that a direct HS2 route via Heathrow is considerably more expensive than the Government’s preferred route.249

71. A through route is said to cost an additional £2.9 billion–£4.2 billion, compared to the additional spur cost of £2.5 billion–£3.9 billion.250 However, a through route would allow omission of the (very expensive) Old Oak Common interchange. It also appears that the claimed costs for a through route may be overstated. For example, in assessing Arup’s Heathrow Hub proposal, HS2 Ltd. have assumed an underground station, whereas Arup propose a Heathrow interchange at grade.251 The consultation’s cost estimates also include risk and optimism bias. A spur serving an interchange within the airport seems likely to incur additional risk, and therefore cost, compared to the unconstrained, “green field” site outside the airport proposed by Arup.

72. It therefore appears that the costs of a spur and through route may be broadly similar. However, as discussed earlier, a spur or loop may require four tracking and additional tunnelling in order to minimise environmental impacts and avoid unacceptable reductions in HS2 capacity, the cost of which may not currently be included.

73. Delaying a spur to a later phase of HS2 introduces uncertainty as to whether this can be delivered within the timeframe stated, since it relies on phase 2 of HS2 proceeding immediately following phase 1. This requires consistent Government funding and political support, perhaps over four administrations. As Crossrail has shown, such consistency is challenging, however important the project. The Labour party have in any case already indicated a possible review of their support for HS2.252 In contrast, a through route would allow Heathrow to be served from day one, and would assist HS2’s phase one business case, with its limited benefits, from a route serving only Birmingham, creating a viability challenge.

74. The consultation explains that those expected to benefit, (eg airline users, and therefore passengers), will be expected to contribute to the cost of a spur and/or loop.253 243 “The biggest issue in increasing Shinkansen [high speed train] speed is noise control”- East Japan Railway Company Technical Review Summer 2008 http://www.jreast.co.jp/e/development/tech/contents12.html 244 “Journey time saving of 3.5 minutes consumes 23% more energy (comparison of 360 km/h operation to 300 km/h operation)”- HS2 Traction Energy Modelling December 2009 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/56774 245 “Telling the People’s Daily that speed restrictions would be placed on the trains to make them most cost-efficient, Sheng Guangzu, head of China’s railways ministry, said that trains running at 350 kph consume twice as much energy as those traveling at 200 kph. Slowing them up will save both on power costs and maintenance. Speeds are to be cut back from upwards of 350 kph to 200 kph-250 kph with a maximum of 300 kph”—http://chinabystander.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/slow-train-coming/ 246 “Routes not constrained by requirements for such a very high speed could fit into the landscape better, such as being able to follow the lie of the land rather than carving valleys into a series of cuttings and embankments”—Getting Back on Track, CPRE February 2011 www.cpre.co.uk/resources/transport/item/download/379. 247 The base construction cost of the Amersham tunnel alone on the consultation route is estimated by HS2 Ltd. at £0.7billion— HS2 Cost and Risk Model, December 2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/ pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/riskmodel/pdf/report.pdf 248 Route templates, drawing no.HS2_ARP_00_G1_RW_00148 Issue 1, HS2 Ltd. 249 “This route would be around £3Ð4 billion more expensive than to construct than the proposed route”—Alternative Routes Considered—Route 1.5 via Heathrow, DfT Factsheet 2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/ alternative-routes-one-and-a-half_0.pdf 250 Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011 251 “Below is a description of the engineering and sustainability issues associated with the locations: Iver—Cut and cover box”— High Speed Rail—London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A Report to Government, HS2 Ltd, December 2009 252 "As Ed Miliband has said, we rightly start with a blank sheet of paper—that sheet doesn't have a high-speed train line already running through it,"—Maria Eagle interview 10th December 2010 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/dec/10/labour-high- speed-rail-link 253 “Significant numbers of individuals and organisations would stand to benefit from the construction of new high speed rail lines. This could include airport operators, businesses close to high speed rail stations and local authorities. The Government expects that such parties would therefore make a contribution to the cost of those links”.- High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsr-consultation.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w252 Transport Committee: Evidence

75. This is not unreasonable. However, Heathrow’s total closing RAB will be only £12 billion by 2013 under CAA’s March 2008 final determination. Any effective financial contribution to the very high, (and as yet unknown), cost of an HS2 spur and/or loop would therefore represent a significant, perhaps disproportionate, share of Heathrow’s total asset base.

76. The UK’s expectation that airport users bear a significant share of the cost of providing surface access to airports contrasts with other countries approach.254

77. Heathrow has recently moved from being the world’s 20th most expensive airport in the world to the 4th, following user charges increasing 46% in 2007–08. Whilst this may represent legitimate pricing of scarce demand, and might be argued as necessary to fund much needed airport improvements, it is important that this, and any future private and public decisions on charging and taxation, are considered in the wider context of the UK economy and inward investment decisions.

78. Heathrow was one of only two airports in the top 30 busiest airports worldwide to report a decline in traffic in 2010, (the other being Las Vegas/McCarren International in 22nd place).255 With the additional issues of constrained capacity and taxation, Heathrow’s continued pre-eminence amongst its European competitors cannot be taken for granted.256

79. The particular characteristic of a spur, serving only airport passengers, make it difficult to claim any wider capacity or congestion benefits that might justify Government funding. For Heathrow’s users, a spur requires Heathrow to generate sufficient demand to support a high frequency service to a wide range of destinations in order to justify the investment required.257 Although the UK’s single largest generator, filling very high capacity trains, even if half length sets, at a frequency that is commercially viable258 would present Heathrow with a challenge.

80. Even if a spur could be funded and built to the timescale envisaged, Heathrow would be dependent on a remote interchange for 20 years or more, the same interchange which the Secretary of State for Transport described as “not an option”.259

81. In that time, and bearing in mind competitive pressures and Heathrow’s constraints, airlines, with their most mobile of assets, may have simply relocated their hub operations elsewhere. Not only would that have severe consequences for the UK, it would reduce the ability of Heathrow to make any significant financial contribution to an HS2 spur.

82. In the worst case scenario, if investment in a spur or loop cannot be supported and HS2’s current route is taken forward, there is a significant risk that Heathrow would be solely reliant on a branch line connection with Old Oak Common.

HS2 Heathrow Interchange

83. HS2 Ltd’s revised proposal for a spur to Heathrow now requires stations at both Old Oak Common and Heathrow. This has significant cost implications, particularly at Old Oak Common where deep excavation is required to form the subsurface HS2 station box, with construction taking place in close proximity to the 254 “Already the UK Government places more costs on the airport owner than is the case internationally—eg surface access projects”—DfT Review of Regulatory Framework for UK Airports, submission from the Chartered Institute of Logistics & Transport, 2008 http://www.ciltuk.org.uk/download/Review_of_Regulatory_Framework_-_CILT_final.pdf 255 ACI World Traffic Report 2010 http://www.airportsint.com/view_news.asp?ID=3090 256 “Unlike most other major cities, where the government and regulators understand the value of air transport, aviation providers in the UK seem to be in constant conflict with plans by the government to further restrict—or tax—the aviation infrastructure.As a result, Heathrow is showing declines in areas where most major airports are registering positive growth. In addition, its primary tenant, BA, has been subject to labour actions that have made many seek other routings in order to avoid unwelcome surprises. Heathrow will always be a major international hub. But its competitive disadvantages, coupled with a government determined to fill its coffers at aviation’s expense, are beginning to hurt. If the present decisions and policies stand, we can expect LHR to continue to decline in position amongst its peers, having dropped below Beijing and Chicago O'Hare in the latest world rankings for 2010”—Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, April 2010 http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/2011/04/11/londons-heathrow- competitive-disadvantages-are-beginning-to-hurt/page1 257 “To be attractive for airline passengers who might reasonably need to catch a specific departing flight, the service frequency needs to be at least one per hour. Even on our assumption that we can serve more than one city with a single train, (which depends on the structure of the HSR network), many of the flows, (Scotland, Manchester/Liverpool, Sheffield/Leeds/Newcastle, Birmingham and Bristol/Cardiff), do not have a viable flow”—High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra for Greengauge 21 258 “Frequency is usually treated as being very important in transport modelling—subject to a weighting, intervals between trains or aircraft are treated as equivalent to additional in-vehicle minutes. Typically, an improvement in frequency from a train or plane every 2 hours to every 1 hour is considered as having the same impact on market share as a reduction in journey time of 20–30 minutes. In order to be able to compare the importance of frequency with the importance of journey time, we calculate a frequency penalty measured in minutes for each mode and route. The point of the frequency penalty is take into account that a low service frequency makes a mode relatively unattractive even if the journey time is faster, and vice versa”—Air and Rail Competition and Complementarity, Steer Davies Gleave for European Commission DG TREN 2006 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/ rail/studies/doc/2006_08_study_air_rail_competition_en.pdf 259 Philip Hammond, Secretary of State, Evidence to House of Commons Transport Select Committee on the Secretary of State’s Priorities for Transport, 26th July 2010 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w253

GWML, the proposed Crossrail and IEP (North Pole) depots and adjacent . The proposals also require relocation of the Heathrow Express depot, although this is not mentioned nor does there appear to be any cost allowance.

84. HS2 Ltd. also propose that Old Oak Common acts as a Crossrail interchange to relieve what would otherwise be unacceptable congestion on the Underground network at Euston appears weak. However, HS2 Ltd’s modelling shows, at best, a marginal impact on crowding.260

85. We are surprised that there appears to have been little or no consideration of the potential impact of the proposed Old Oak Common interchange on the surrounding community, in London’s single most congested borough, and remote from the trunk road and motorway network.261

86. Without local road charging or other demand management measures, the current proposals would be likely to act as a magnet for HS2 passengers making kiss and ride, taxi and minicab journeys from much of west London, yet HS2 Ltd. make only a brief reference to the need for better road access.262 There would appear to a real risk of worsening local air quality,263 in a Borough that already suffers from some of the poorest air quality in London, (the whole of Hammersmith & Fulham being designated as an Air Quality Management Area in 2000 for nitrogen dioxide, NO2, and small particles, PM10).264

87. The effect of HS2 Ltd’s proposed Birmingham interchange on the highways network is relevant to considering the potential impacts of an Old Oak Common interchange. Proposals for the former include a 7,000 space multi-storey car park,265 which the Governments consultation document admits would require “significant improvements to the road network (to) accommodate additional demand created by the interchange (which) would be the subject of a future local consultation.266

88. We suggest that a detailed and costed assessment of the local impacts of an Old Oak Common interchange is required, and that an appropriate allowance is included in HS2 Ltd’s business case.

89. Significant connectivity benefits are claimed for Old Oak Common. However, apart from Crossrail, these depend on providing interchange with the North London and West London lines, some distance apart. The current proposals appear to make no allowance for the costs of such connectivity. These lines would also require very significant investment in route-wide capacity enhancements, in order to provide claimed benefits, as well as the necessary work to provide a satisfactory interchange with HS2 and Crossrail.

90. In contrast, an alternative HS2 route directly via Heathrow would only require a single, probably less expensive interchange, at Heathrow.

91. This could provide similarly provide interchange with Crossrail and allow fast journeys for HS2 passengers into central London by, for example, making use of GWML fast line capacity released on expiry of Heathrow Express’s track access agreement. This would allow limited stop Crossrail services between Reading, Heathrow, and, (with a grade separated junction between main and relief lines), Paddington, and thence all central London Crossrail stations. Such a service would also provide much needed additional capacity for Thames Valley passengers.

The classic rail network

92. HS2 Ltd. were specifically tasked with examining how a Heathrow interchange might improve surface access from Heathrow’s existing catchment to the west, and assist in modal shift from road to rail.267 However, 260 Average loadings on all LUL services to and from Euston Underground Station in the 7–10am morning peak (expressed as LUL load factor)— 2008 without HS2—138% 2033 without HS2—185% 2033 with HS2 without OOC—194% 2033 with HS2 with OOC—191% HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010 261 “The strategic location of the borough and its position in relation to London’s transport network means that H&F suffers from the worst road congestion in London. Some of the busiest road junctions in London are located within the Borough and it suffers disproportionately from the effects of through traffic.”—Chapter 4, London Borough Hammersmith & Fulham LDF Core Strategy Options 2009 http://lbhf.limehouse.co.uk/portal/csojune09?pointId=1236781495778#target-d1756389e1527 262 “Further consideration should also be given to … options for the effective provision of road access”—High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A report to Government by HS2 Ltd.—HS2 Ltd, 2009 263 “There is a clear link between poor air quality and traffic in Hammersmith & Fulham”—Para 5.19 London Borough Hammersmith & Fulham UDP—Transportation and Accessibility Issues http://www.lbhf.gov.uk/Images/CH_05_Transport_ tcm21–136423.pdf 264 http://environment-agency.co.uk/static/documents/Research/HAMFUL_factsheet.pdf 265 High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A report to Government by HS2 Ltd.—HS2 Ltd, 2009 266 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future—DfT February 2011 267 “The key car modal shift gain is likely to be in respect of access to Heathrow from London, the west and Thames Valley, facilitated by the Heathrow interchange (and local rail enhancements)”- Letter from Sir David Rowlands to Lord Adonis, 13 February 2009 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w254 Transport Committee: Evidence

this was not considered at all, as variously acknowledged, without explanation, by HS2 Ltd.268,269,270 and noted by British Airways in their second submisison to Lord Mawhinney’s review.271 93. In contrast, Arup’s Heathrow Hub proposal integrates HS2 and Heathrow with Crossrail and existing GWML services, as also proposed by Network Rail.272 We suggest that this approach has merit, particularly as there is an opportunity for the proposed electrification and resignalling to be incorporated as part of the integrated, intermodal strategy for which we argue. 94. As part of this, we also support Network Rail’s emerging proposal273 to divert WCML suburban services onto Crossrail, via a new, (short), connection at Old Oak Common. This would have a number of benefits, including improving Crossrail’s current poor business case and utilisation west of Paddington.274 95. This proposal could also release significant capacity at Euston, assisting the phasing of HS2 works and perhaps obviating the need to extend the stations footprint, and the consequent need to demolish a large number of adjacent properties. It may also allow reuse, with suitable gauge enhancement, of existing Primrose Hill WCML tunnels for HS2, reducing cost and disruption. 96. Removing current services from Euston would also release capacity on the Underground for HS2 passengers. 97. We suggest that a clear strategy is required for use of spare capacity on the classic network, which HS2 is likely to make available. If the franchise system is to make use of the spare capacity, moderation of competition can be expected to ensure that there is no abstraction from HS2’s anticipated market. However, it is not clear whether such services could be operated without subsidy. Alternatively, open access operators may well be interested, with the risk that fares could be set at levels that are more competitive than HS2, albeit with journey time penalties. Competitive services over the classic network would certainly allow HS2 Ltd’s assumptions on the value of journey time savings to be tested in the real world.

Public consultation 98. Our 2010 paper highlighted the need for HSR proposals to have democratic legitimacy. It is therefore of concern that Government had made up its mind, even before the start of work by HS2 Ltd, that Old Oak Common would provide the Heathrow interchange. As this proposal has been carried forward, unchanged, to the scheme which forms the current consultation, there must be doubt as to the rigour of the subsequent option analysis carried out by HS2 Ltd, and indeed the entire basis on which HS2 Ltd. prepared the business case for HS2. 99. Regarding Heathrow, the consultation lacks any detail of HS2 Ltd’s revised proposals, apart from a single factsheet275 and passing reference in various documents, Hence questions such as the proposed service pattern over a spur or loop, business case, environmental impact and relationship with a Heathrow masterplan are left unanswered. Government has confirmed that it sees a direct connection between HS2 and Heathrow as being essential. We suggest that the current consultation is therefore flawed unless all issues relevant to a route between London, Birmingham and Heathrow can be assessed. 100. There must also be doubt as to the way in which alternative HS2 proposals have been assessed, for example, Arup’s Heathrow Hub proposal, the principles of which were supported by the Conservative Party’s Rail Review. HS2 Ltd. appear to misunderstand significant features of the proposal, omitting the benefits of an 268 “We have not taken account of the wider connectivity benefit that would accrue if Iver were to be developed as a wider hub interchange. We have not sought to model and analyse the benefits of improved connectivity to Heathrow generally through, for instance, improved western access. We focused on the case for high speed and considered a Heathrow station on the basis of a wider high speed network”—High Speed Rail—London to the West Midlands and Beyond—Report to Government, HS2 Ltd, December 2009 269 “Our models … do not address questions relating to potential demand for short distance travel to Heathrow from London and the South East (and therefore not using HS2)” - Supplementary Report, Options for Serving Heathrow, HS2 Ltd. September 2010 http://assets.dft.gov.uk/hs2-heathrow.pdf 270 “It is important to note that the model does not analyse the potential market to Heathrow from areas to the west. This means for instance that the model does not forecast the demand to Heathrow from (for example) Reading using a London Interchange Station connected to the GWML”—HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010 271 “Heathrow was not fully assessed for the wider benefits it could bring as an interchange type station to the south of England”— Second Response to the Heathrow Airport High Speed Rail Access Review, British Airways, June 2010 http://www.dft.gov.uk/ pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_6.pdf) 272 “The RUS considers that the existing Heathrow Express service would need to be incorporated into Crossrail. For this to be operationally viable, all the airport services would need to run on the relief lines, at least at peak times”—London and South East Route Utilisation Study, Draft for Consultation, Network Rail December 2010 http://www.networkrail.co.uk/ browse%20documents/rus%20documents/route%20utilisation%20strategies/rus%20generation%202/ london%20and%20south%20east/london%20and%20south%20east%20route%20utilisation%20strategy.pdf 273 “Crossrail extension onto WCML slow lines—recommended for further investigation, subject to business case, for several reasons”—London and South East Route Utilisation Study, Draft for Consultation, Network Rail December 2010 274 “We have 24 trains an hour in the peak going through the tunnels in each direction and ten of those continue on to destinations such as Heathrow, Slough and Maidenhead. We have to turn 14 of them back close to Paddington” —Anthony Walters, Select Committee on Crossrail Bill, Column 12738, November 2007 http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/ cmselect/cmcross/235/6062727.htm 275 Connecting to Heathrow, Factsheet, DfT 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w255

airport terminal co-located with the rail interchange,276 referring to a light rail link rather than an airside transit between the interchange and the airport,277 assuming costs for an underground rail station278 and suggesting that an Iver site has insuperable environmental constraints.279

101. We are also concerned at the considerable amount of new material that has variously appeared on DfT and HS2 Ltd’s websites since the start of the HS2 consultation in February 2011.

102. The material is obviously seen as important to the consultation, otherwise it presumably would not have been released. However, all relevant information should have been made available, in a co-ordinated manner, at the start of the consultation. Furthermore, no advice is being issued to alert consultees of new material, the material lacks any explanation of its purpose and relationship to other, previously published material, there is no advice as to whether new material supersedes earlier documents and much of the material is highly technical in nature, and lacks any explanatory text for a non-expert audience.

103. We believe we have reasonable technical knowledge, but we find many of the documents inexplicable and difficult to relate to earlier published information. Much of it is, we believe, frankly impossible for the general public to understand.

104. In addition, some of this material appears contradictory. For example, the map showing the proposed connections to Heathrow on the “Connecting to Heathrow” factsheet shows a delta (three way) junction with the main HS2 route, which would allow services over the spur from both the UK and Europe. In contrast, the diagram in the main consultation document280 shows only a north facing connection which would only allow services from Birmingham and the north to reach Heathrow. The factsheet also shows, without explanation, a purple dotted line striking north from Old Oak Common which could be seen as representing an alternative or additional high speed alignment.

105. Such confusion is not helped by press publication of other material, apparently obtained from official sources.281 Whilst there is no way of knowing if this is current or accurate, it certainly suggests that detailed studies have in fact been completed on various options for a spur and loop. There would therefore appear to be no reason why the scope of the current consultation cannot be widened to ensure a comprehensive approach can be taken to Heathrow and HS2.

106. These reports also appear to confirm that any of the proposed spur alignments would require extensive tunnelling, with the lowest cost option quoted as ca. £7.3 billion. (compared to costs for a spur of “between £2.5 billion and £3.9 billion” in the current consultation). It may be that these costs are not on the same basis, or may reflect further work, for example, to avoid the spur having unacceptable impacts on HS2 line capacity. Either explanation would appear to provide further justification for waiting until a comprehensive consultation can be carried out.

107. Other information recently released is simply unclear—the images that have recently appeared on DfT’s website, for example,282 lack any comparison with existing views, show only daytime scenes, (whereas the most significant visual impact will be at night, when trains with high intensity headlights and electrical arcing are likely to be more visually intrusive), and some locations are poorly described.

108. We suggest that continuing to release additional material at this late stage in the consultation process is not helpful and would appear to be contrary to best practice. The growing and complex suite of documents, some released by DfT and some by HS2 Ltd, makes it impossible to see any clear hierarchy, structure or explanation, placing a considerable and unacceptable burden on those seeking to respond. There is a legitimate question as to whether the consultation process is compliant with the Aarhus convention and the Government’s own consultation code.283

109. The process as it stands is fatally flawed. As well as making the consultation process unsafe, there is also a risk that far reaching and costly decisions are taken in isolation, perpetuating the worst aspects of the UK’s silo approach to transport planning and conflicting with European Transport policy. 276 “A station at Iver would have connections to GWML and potentially to a parkway. However—whilst a link to the airport could be established—it is unlikely to have any connectivity equivalent to a station on the airport. Similarly this is unlikely to have connections to the of Heathrow Express, and only limited Crossrail services”—P.48 HS2 DMA 277 “an interchange with a light rail link to Heathrow ….without offering the benefits of an on-airport station” - “High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future”—DfT February 2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsr- consultation.pdf 278 “Below is a description of the engineering and sustainability issues associated with the locations: Iver—Cut and cover box”— High Speed Rail—London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A Report to Government, HS2 Ltd, December 2009 279 “Any station at Iver would have a major adverse environmental impact with over 50% being within the Colne floodplain with potential to disturb riparian habitat. There would be serious floodplain impacts which would be difficult to mitigate”—High Speed Rail—London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A Report to Government, HS2 Ltd, December 2009 280 Figure 1.1, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation DfT February 2011 281 http://www.uxbridgegazette.co.uk/west-london-news/high-speed-rail/2011/05/11/gazette-reveals-hs2-heathrow-options- 113046–28677661/ 282 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/library/images 283 Code of Practice on Consultation, HM Government, July 2008 http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file47158.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w256 Transport Committee: Evidence

Conclusion 110. In a rare example of cross party consensus on long term strategic investment, the two major political parties provided political support for a UK HSR network as part of an integrated, intermodal approach to the UK’s future transport infrastructure needs. 111. It is unfortunate that HS2 Ltd’s decision making was then so heavily influenced by a rail industry perspective and a dubious appraisal methodology that prioritised journey time savings. 112. That led to the questionable and far reaching decision to adopt a design speed of 400kph, dooming the high speed line to slicing through anything that lay in its path—in this case, the Chilterns AONB, numerous protected wildlife sites, listed buildings, ancient monuments, National Trust properties and landed estates. This issue is of fundamental importance, yet the consultation adopts this as a fait accompli. 113. HS2 Ltd. also determined, through fundamentally flawed demand assumptions on demand, to ignore Heathrow, the world’s busiest international airport and UK’s single greatest traffic generator. Without any airline or airport representation within HS2 Ltd, no further thought was given to the illogicality of this decision, ignoring European experience, 114. The single specific area of HS2 Ltd’s remit that might have brought a co-ordinated approach to air and rail was also ignored, with the result that HS2, as currently proposed, fails to consider the vital issues of Heathrow’s sustainable growth and contribution to the UK economy. 115. The current consultation lacks any detail on options for connecting HS2 and Heathrow, without which it is not possible to reach well informed conclusions on the proposed route between London and Birmingham. The information that has been made available suggests that, even on HS2 Ltd’s own assumptions, and disregarding any wider case for a direct HS2/Heathrow interchange, there appears to be a strong case for an alternative HS2 alignment that serves Heathrow on a through alignment. 116. The consultation is also, we believe, unsound in the way in which important material is being made available without notice, commentary or co-ordination. 117. Retrofitting Heathrow and a European connection cannot make a bad scheme better, but calls into question HS2 Ltd’s judgement and ability to advise on a broader range of issues than a high speed railway in isolation. 118. As the Bow Group’s 2010 paper noted, “these are not transport issues, they refer to (Government) priorities. They are too important to be left to rail industry experts, whose role should be to advise on the options to deliver the wider national priorities”.284 119. In contrast, HS2 Ltd’s narrow approach to planning what may be the UK’s single largest public investment in a generation would be recognisable to the 19th century railway barons—conceived in isolation from any external factors, ignorant of other modes of transport, ignoring anything in its way and dismissive of its environmental impacts. 120. Our fear is that HS2, as currently conceived, may also have parallels with a 20th century grand projet, similarly conceived without a demonstrable business case, lacking democratic legitimacy, ignorant of the changing environmental landscape, designed without regard to energy use and promoted by Government as an article of technological faith—Concorde.285 121. The Secretary of State has dismissed opponents of the current HS2 proposals as having “not much more to their argument than Nimbyism”.286 However, we believe the current consultation raises fundamental issues that cannot, (and, considering HS2’s cost and strategic importance, should not), be so easily dismissed. Without the rigorous analysis that the Secretary of State so lightly disregards, the country—and its commitment to the expenditure of very large sums of public money—is wholly dependent on the conclusions reached by DfT and HS2 Ltd. 122. We reiterate the Bow Group’s continued support for the principle of a UK HSR network. However, we suggest that Government must return to the principles underlying the original political consensus, to ensure that the required investment delivers the necessary improvements to the country’s infrastructure in a way that is integrated, affordable, environmentally acceptable and beneficial to the whole of the UK. 123. This is the approach taken by the European high speed rail network—planned on an intermodal basis, integrated with the classic railway and major airports, considered within a wider spatial and economic strategy and mindful of environmental constraints. 284 The Right Track, The Bow Group January 2010 285 “A serious technical oversight was failure to recognise sufficiently the environmental problems. Probably more important was the commercial misconception that speed was the key criterion for success, overoptimism in predicting sales and insufficient regard to customer requirements. Indeed, one could argue that there was a reckless failure even to care whether or not there was a market”—They Meant Well—Government Project Disasters, D R Myddleton, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2007 http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/upldbook419pdf.pdf 286 Metro, 20 March 2011— http://www.metro.co.uk/news/858625-transport-secretary-philip-hammond-only-nimbys-oppose-250mph- trains#ixzz1MK3yQC2k cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w257

124. HS2 as currently proposed is fundamentally flawed and faces massive opposition. We have of course been here before,287 but it is not too late to return HS2 to the right track.

APPENDIX A EXTRACT FROM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS “The Right Track” The Bow Group, January 2010 — The Government risks choosing the wrong route for Britain’s second high speed railway (HS2). — HS2 should be directly linked to Heathrow Airport through the construction of a Heathrow hub interchange station combining HS2, the Great Western Main Line, Chiltern Line and Crossrail services. — Heathrow is one of the most difficult national airports in Europe to reach by rail, thus forcing many potential travellers to use other European hub airports. — Without direct HSR connection to Heathrow traffic congestion and pollution around the airport and the M25 will continue to be amongst the worst in Europe. — The Government must not just listen to the rail industry when making its choice for the route of HS2. British Rail was wrong in its choice for the first section of high speed rail, between London and the Channel Tunnel in the 1980s and a better route, promoted by Lord Heseltine, was chosen. — A non direct HSR link with Heathrow, represented by a loop or spur, would represent folly in Britains ambition to develop a truly integrated transport policy. — A successful national high speed rail network should directly connect all of Britain’s major airports and cities as is successfully reflected in France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. — Britain’s traditional North/South divide can be bridged by a successful HSR network as it will better bind and co-ordinate economic progress. May 2011

Written evidence from Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce (HSR 95) Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce (UK Chamber of Commerce of the Year 2009) with 2000 member companies is the leading business representative organisation in Scotland’s capital. We have a wide range of policy groups and have been actively involved in promoting High Speed Rail to Scotland since 2006. Our comments on the Committee’s enquiry follow:

Executive Summary Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce believes that the extension of HSR beyond London is an overdue and welcome investment. It believes that we should be planning now for a fully connected line from London to both Glasgow and Edinburgh and that it is the northern end of this line which will offer the greatest cost benefit. HSR is an imperative investment environmentally, socially, and commercially, and vital to the global competitiveness of the UK.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR 1.1 HSR offers speedier transit with environmental and economic benefits. HSR to Scotland has BCR much higher than any transport project seen in recent years. Objections to HSR are less likely in Scotland and Northern England where the main benefit is potentially to be derived and population density is lower. Failure to deliver HSR will leave the UK as a whole seriously under-provided with transport infrastructure that is globally competitive, attractive to inward investment and tourism and will accelerate the rate at which our economy is left behind by our major competitors. Given the remote nature of the UK from continental Europe and the remote nature of North Britain (which most needs development) from the South Eastern economic pressure cooker, we must accelerate the rate of HSR take-up and make a UK wide commitment to a truly national network.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives 1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 2.1.1 As the world’s economy progresses towards a common state of City Regions as economic hubs of all successful trading nations HSR offers a crucial option for connecting those major cities to their markets. This does not mean there are nor other important transport objectives, especially in terms of local public transport 287 “When the high speed (Channel Tunnel Rail) Link to London was announced the revolt that followed shook the Tory party to the core. A revolutionary mob in waxed green jackets is enough to bring any Home Counties MP out in a rash”—The Sunday Times London magazine, 6 May 1990 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w258 Transport Committee: Evidence

and an adequate roads network, especially for freight. However it is of paramount importance in terms of giving Britain’s regional cities the access to European markets which SE England already enjoys. 2.1.2 In the world of carbon reduction HSR offers the option of electricity as fuel, which can be derived from renewables. Other forms of vehicular transport are a long way from this option. 2.1.3 For the inland routes of Central Belt Scotland to London airports (the busiest in the UK) a proper end to end HSR system offers transport which is faster, more environmentally friendly, more comfortable, more central and better economically than air.

2. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.2.1 Investment in the existing network should continue. Apart from other considerations the lack of maintenance in the past has been shown to have dire consequences. It will be some years before there is any available expansion of HSR and demands on existing track are growing. Transfer of inter-city journeys to HSR promises to free up capacity on the existing network for both local journeys and freight (which are at capacity in many parts of the existing network).

3. What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.3.1 For Scotland a proper HSR network from London to Edinburgh & Glasgow would allow major changes to take place. With some seven million journeys Central Belt to London per annum, only one million are currently by road or rail. At this level ECML and WCML have little spare capacity. As many as six million journeys a year could be taken from air to rail with all the benefits mentioned above. 2.3.2 Scotland struggles for landing slots at the London airports (especially Heathrow) and when there are difficulties in the air is the first destination to have its flights out of London grounded (obviously for safety reasons a transatlantic flight being facilitated to land safely has greater priority than sending off a new internal flight which can be replaced by bus or train). 2.3.3. The freeing up of London landing slots would enable access from more northerly airports such as Inverness, Aberdeen and the Northern Isles which struggle to get access now. 2.3.4. The reduction in inland flights frees up more slots for international flights which are more profitable and access markets which cannot be reached by Eurostar.

3. Business case 1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 3.1.1 Completely unrealistic in the sense that the best payback and the best environmental benefit, which is from a line connecting Scotland to London is not even on the drawing board in this plan. BCR of (at lowest estimate) 3.5 fold and highest 15 fold is only achieved by including Scotland from the outset. 3.1.2 The models for HSR to Leeds/Manchester and then continuing on conventional track simply doo not stack up. HSR does not tilt and therefore would be slower on the northern end of the track than existing sets (eg Virgin’s Pendolinos). Modal shift cannot be achieved as the track simply does not have the capacity to achieve a six fold increase in traffic. 3.1.3 Fare levels need serious consideration. With rail fares above the levels of most of our competitors already, a continuation of the same pattern would result in reduced take-up and continuing lack of global competitivity. We should aim to replace lost revenue on the existing routes with increased local passenger traffic and greater freight traffic, reducing road congestion. 3.1.4 If best possible modal shift is to be achieved then it is vital the Euston-Birmingham (and successive) links are built with adequate capacity to carry the completed network. That should include six million journeys, p.a. from a major modal shift from air on the Scotland/London routes.

2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.2.1 A joke. Having spent £11 billion upgrading WCML over many years with gross disruption to existing service a speed benefit of 10mph is a poor outcome. Signalling upgrades might make a small difference but in reality there will be no increase of capacity unless more lines are built in which case the only sensible course of action is to make them HSR. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w259

3. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.3.1. Whilst there are strong arguments for lower ticket prices at times when demand is low (late at night, overnight, early morning,) any government committed to growing the economy as its first priority should be planning transport systems which aid commerce not hinder it.

4. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.4.1 Simplify contracts to eliminate grounds for dispute. Build in costs for variability. Reward on time delivery. Examine international models which have worked (eg South Korea).

4. The strategic route 1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1.1 The point of HSR is negated if further stops are introduced.

2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.2.1 Initial Priorities would be: London-Birmingham-Manchester-Glasgow/Edinburgh. (It is reasonable that a Glasgow Edinburgh link should be part of a “Y” at Carstairs) London-Nottingham-York-Newcastle-Edinburgh. Newcastle-York-Leeds-Manchester-Liverpool. London-Bristol- Cardiff. London- Bristol-Exeter. (Birmingham-Bristol would be an obvious later addition) This network would include other options for routes between Cities. Parkway stations might be appropriate in some instances. Airports present one opportunity for location.

3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.3.1 It is inevitable that the network will be built in stages. One at a time south-north is not the only answer nor is it the right one. We should start in Scotland and build South at the same time. You don’t build a bridge from one bank to the other- you start at both ends. And often in the middle as well. HSR offers a major opportunity to rejuvenate the economy. That need is now. 4.3.2 Throughout this process we have heard time and again that HSR will be built from London “to the North.” This is a major psychological error- especially for a government committed to defending the Union. Every railway runs in two directions- none run from-to, they all run between. If the government (and HS2’s) statements about the need to strengthen the UK’s regional economy have any validity then surely this point should be self-evident?

4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.4.1 Yes.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.1.1 We are not repeating information given in previous studies of which the committee will be well aware. Aditionally: — The models of France and Spain well demonstrate that on a similar distance of air traffic as Edinburgh/Glasgow to London HSR achieves a modal shift of 80% or better. — This modal shift is achieved when the transit time drops below two and a half hours. — On such a frequency London is easily accessible from Scotland without an overnight stay (a major cost saving and a major incentive to SME’s). — On such a frequency tourism is much easier and pleasanter by rail. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w260 Transport Committee: Evidence

— Onward transit to European markets by Eurostar becomes a realistic option from Scotland (which it isn’t currently).

2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.2.1 100%.

3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.3.1 The City Regions which it accesses, and at the end of the day potentially all socio-economic groups (witness the Lille experience) as businesses will want to be where they can access the network.

4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 5.4.1 Absolutely yes to TEN-T. The government should definitely seek private sector involvement in financing the network.

6. Impact 1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1.1 Carbon benefits from modal shift will be greater the greater the extent of the network. Our remarks above apply. 80% from inland air would be a reasonable objective. Road shift is left the further the journey time, and will be minimal for Scotand-London.

2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2.1 If anything we believe they are understated. This is borne out by the continuing growth of rail as transport of choice, beyond historical predictions.

3. What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.3.1 A proper Scotland—London network would free up major capacity for additional freight on the existing network.

4. How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4.1 Disruption can be minimised and will happen most when completed sections are joined in to the existing network. This will be necessary for joing sections of complete HSR into areas where there is yet no service, for some City centre access, and to provide “escape route” alternative lines during essential maintenance/incident management. May 2011

Written evidence from Cheryl Gillan MP (HSR 97) LETTER TO THE CLERK OF THE TRANSPORT COMMITTEE My constituency is on the proposed route for HS2 and should the consultation result in a decision to proceed with the route it would be very seriously affected. Many of my constituents have directly submitted views to the consultation, but they would like you to consider in your examination of the HS2 proposals the alternative routes which do not appear to have had full scrutiny. In particular, the route proposed by Arup, which follows to a greater degree the M1 transport corridor, and the route that offers better alignment with and connectivity to the West Country. I understand the “Ml Route” gives far better connectivity to a greater number of northern towns and cities. They would also like you to examine the connectivity between the proposed HS2 route and Crossrail, Heathrow and HS1. I understand that the development and discussion of alternative routes are subject to non-disclosure agreements, but it would be helpful to my constituents if you examined whether this is the case. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w261

In addition, I am attaching two documents concerning Arup and BAA that were brought to my attention by a constituent.288 I understand that these documents are now in the government’s archives and certain passages and diagrams on some of the pages have been blanked out. The Arup report blanking is easy to find, however the BAA (Heathrow) report is page 24 (or PDF page 36). I understand that the areas blanked out may possibly relate to the cost saving of £400 million and damage limitation to the Chilterns AONB. I should be grateful if the Transport Select Committee would examine this further. 16 May 2011

Written evidence from the Glasgow Edinburgh Collaboration Initiative (HSR 98) Glasgow City Council, City of Edinburgh Council and Scottish Enterprise share the following position on high speed rail. The case for building a UK high speed rail network is well established. We believe it is vital for future economic prosperity. However, the full economic and environmental benefits associated with High Speed Rail will only be realised with the construction of a dedicated HSR line over the entire route between London and Scotland. We believe that the UK Government should further explore the opportunities to build the network from both ends and give a clear commitment to building a continuous HSL to Scotland. Current proposals to run High Speed services on existing track north of the border do not deliver the sub 3 hour journey time required to ensure maximum shift from air to rail and return on investment.

1. What are the main arguments for or against HSR? 1.1 The main arguments for HSR are as follows: 1.1.1 Economic growth; capacity constraints on much of the existing rail network are costly to business and restricting economic growth. HSR is the fastest-growing transport mode in Europe; there is a danger of regional British cities losing out to regional European cities, in the absence of HSR connectivity. 1.1.2 As the DfT’s HS2 consultation documents state, business “consistently underlines the importance of reliable transport…95% of companies agree that the UK’s road and rail network is important to their business… Inter-city lines have an unrivalled capacity to enable rapid and direct journeys between central business districts…” Between 1994—2010, “passenger miles travelled rose from 18 billion to almost 32 billion. The fastest growth of all has been in demand for long distance travel”. 1.1.3 “Many services on…Main Lines are already extremely full. Despite…the WCRM programme, long distance services on this route are regularly overcrowded. Almost half of all long distance Midland Main Line trains arriving into (London) in the peak have passengers standing…demand on the London-Manchester route will grow by around 60% by 2024…(whilst) on the East Coast and Midland Main Lines…overall long-distance growth of more than 70%...from 2007 to 2036. Even higher…on specific routes…”. 1.1.4 Capacity on the existing network can be effectively increased by removing express services. This requires alternative long-distance routes. Having established the need, it is generally more cost effective to build such a route for high speed rather than 125mph/200kph standards. 1.1.5 A new HSR line will release capacity on existing lines, facilitating improved local passenger and freight rail services and encouraging more modal shift from road. 1.1.6 Reduced journey time particularly over longer journeys will help deliver the shift required from plane to train. Current journey times between Glasgow/Edinburgh and London are too long for rail travel to morning business meetings. Same-day return trips by rail leave little time in the destination city. 1.1.7 Reduced emissions; increased capacity and reduced journey times encourage modal shift from air and road to rail. The emission benefits from HSR are highest where trains run with high load factors and use renewable electricity. The greatest reductions will be on longer journeys (eg London—Scotland) where city centre—city centre journey times by rail will be faster than air and significantly faster than those by road. 1.1.8 Four major studies confirm the strategic case for HSR as an intercity rail investment: Atkins289 study for the SRA and 2008 Update (Transport Matters); Network Rail’s290 “New Lines” study, 2009. Greengauge 21’s291 Fast Forward, 2009; HS2 Ltd Reports and Consultation Documents 2010, 2011. 288 BAA and Arup submissions to Lord Mawhinney’s review. Not printed with this submission 289 Atkins was commissioned to study the feasibility of a north—south HSL. The full network option included Glasgow and Edinburgh 290 Network Rail’s study was designed to identify how to relieve congestion on the WCML and proposed a high speed line to Glasgow and Edinburgh with spurs to Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester 291 Proposes the most comprehensive HSR network of the four studies, and a benefit:cost return (BCR) of 3.5:1 . GG21’s H shaped network assumes 200mph operation and a London-Scotland journey time of 2hr 40mins cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w262 Transport Committee: Evidence

1.2 The main arguments against HSR are: 1.2.1 Affordability; the UK is likely to be emerging from the current economic downturn by the time of major expenditure on HSR. Private sector jobs and growth, which will be unlocked by HSR, will make the UK economy less vulnerable to future economic downturn. Affordability is sometimes linked to doubts about demand forecasts. Recent ATOC figures for number of train journeys confirm the rapid growth in rail travel, which is at it highest level for 90 years. 1.2.2 Disruption; building new lines is likely to cause less disruption than widening an existing transport corridor, which would not only disrupt existing transport services but also necessitate relocation of business and homes. 1.2.3 The costs of adding capacity to the existing network are much more difficult to estimate than those for a new alignment and upgrading existing infrastructure is neither sustainable in the longer term, nor good value for money. 1.2.4 Environmental damage; environmental impact can be mitigated by sensitive design and ancillary works. In “quiet” areas, the introduction of noise where there is presently silence will have an impact, but intermittent noise from passing trains is, arguably, less intrusive than constant road traffic, night and day, from a motorway. 1.2.5 It is sometimes claimed that Britain is too densely populated to warrant or allow HSR, however, the UK’s population density is therefore fairly typical of countries with, or planning, HSR.292 1.2.6 The argument that new communication and information technology will reduce travel is sometimes associated with a view that transport appraisal overstates the value of time savings, especially given the increasing possibilities of using travelling time productively. However, historically improvements in communications technology have not reduced travel demand; if there is any correlation, they have increased it. 1.2.7 If productive travel time was more important than a fast journey, there would already be much greater modal shift from plane to train on UK routes. But it appears that increased air journey times and inconvenience, associated with increased security procedures, have produced such modal shift as has taken place.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and programmes, including the strategic road network? 2.1.1 Britain faces a long term economic challenge to move into recovery and growth, competing on an international stage. It is our cities that will drive this growth and underpin the national economy. The Core Cities and their primary urban areas alone produce 27% of England’s economic output, more than London, with Glasgow and Edinburgh home to just over 20% of Scotland’s population but generating around 31% of Scotland’s economic output.293 They could do more with the right infrastructure in place. 2.1.2 Enhancing the strategic road network can improve local capacity but ultimately generates more traffic, leading to greater congestion elsewhere. By contrast, investment in HSR creates capacity for an alternative travel mode. Congestion costs business £23.3 billion a year. HS2 is an important first step to avoiding this costly problem. 2.1.3 Road schemes dominated investment between 1945 and circa 2000. From a strategic and long-term perspective, current rail investment (including HSR) merely goes some way to restoring the balance between modes of transport. 2.1.4 Over longer distances, (eg Scotland-London), HSR will also abstract air traffic significantly reducing carbon emissions. It will also produce economic benefits as HSR journey-time can be used more productively than air travel.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.2.1 Spending on new HSR need not reduce spending on the existing network. The argument that HSR funding should be reallocated across the existing network, or that HSR would distort investment funding, misunderstands the nature of priorities and finance in government. 2.2.2 “High-cost” rail projects are already under construction: London Crossrail (£18 billion over around seven years) and Thameslink (£5.5 billion over around eight years). These do not appear to have affected funding for the “classic” network; note for example Great Western Main Line and ECML enhancements, IEP, and further WCML enhancements. The peak annual spend on HSR is likely to be similar to that on Crossrail, 292 The UK is less densely populated than Taiwan, South Korea, the Netherlands, India, Belgium, Japan and Vietnam but more densely populated than Germany, Italy, China, Indonesia, Russia, Portugal, France, Turkey, Morocco, Iran, US, Sweden and Saudi Arabia. 293 Measured as Gross Value Added using NUTS 2 data cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w263

which will be largely complete as HS2 construction starts. Crossrail has a BCR of 1.87, which is less than that of HSR. 2.2.3 It is very doubtful that equivalent funding could be invested in the existing railway. There is a limit to the amount of work that it can sustain at one time. The cost of HS2 phase one spread across the existing network is equivalent to implementing the WCML upgrade on the WCML and the ECML simultaneously. 2.2.4 HSR may constitute the most cost effective means of increasing capacity in and around major cities.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.3.1 HSR services between London and Birmingham would have little impact on domestic aviation. Extending HSL to Manchester and Leeds would reduce journey times between London and Scotland sufficiently to encourage some transfer of domestic air travel to rail. It would probably eliminate any remaining air services between London, Manchester and Leeds, except, perhaps, for some interlining. 2.3.2 To achieve a significant modal shift from air to HSR, however, a new HSL over the full distance between London and Scotland is needed, eliminating the current time penalty by rail. In 2009, some 20% of journeys between Edinburgh/Glasgow and London were by rail. If the rail journey time were reduced to less than 3 hours by a new HSL throughout, it is anticipated that around 80% of journeys would be made by rail, saving 4 to 5 million domestic air trips on these routes. 2.3.3 Reducing domestic air travel between HSR-served cities could release capacity for additional domestic flights to cities beyond the reach of HSR (eg Aberdeen and Inverness) and/or international flights. These could bring economic benefits in excess of those already calculated from the construction of a HSR network.

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology eg passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fares, costs, economic assumptions (eg the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 3.1.1 As noted above, Atkins, Network Rail, and Greengauge 21 separately researched the case for HSR. Each considered a slightly different network, but all produced a case for a north-south spine route linking the major cities between London and Edinburgh/Glasgow. 3.1.2 HS2 Ltd’s methodology is based on standard DfT and Treasury models and cannot, therefore, be challenged in isolation. 3.1.3 It has been argued that HS2 Ltd assumed that time on trains is “un-productive” and therefore overestimated the benefits of HSR. In fact HS2 Ltd made no such assumption. Furthermore Greengauge21 reported that counting time on HSR trains as “working-time” marginally increases the overall benefit:cost ratio for HSR (because the productive time gained by passengers transferring from car and air outweighs the working time lost by passengers transferring from classic train services of longer duration). HSR may also create a better working environment than current rail services, affording greater productivity for passengers than other modes.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.2.1 The recent West Coast Main Line upgrade added significant capacity but this is rapidly being filled as passenger numbers rise; it is likely to be exhausted by 2020. Even if additional capacity was created, this would soon be exhausted too. Consequently, Network Rail concluded that the only realistic long-term solution for travel between London and West Midlands is to provide an additional line. 3.2.2 The WCML upgrade was initially estimated at £2.1 billion; the cost after a decade of disruptive work was £9 billion, with less capability than originally planned. Moreover, the new timetable was developed only by a series of compromises that restricted development of commuter services, cross country and freight. 3.2.3 The recent ECML capacity review indicated that stakeholders’ realistic aspirations might be achieved only to the medium term. The new timetable (May 2011) was achieved only after several years work; it is still not optimal. 3.2.4 Proposed improvements on existing routes are not detailed, so cannot be tested, or their feasibility verified. However, an alternative “Rail Package 2a” was set out as the best of a range of alternatives to HS2 examined by the DfT. On completion, RP2a could be followed only by route upgrades with BCRs of 1.11 to 0.85. At which point HS2 would still have to be built. 3.2.5 The “High Speed Rail Strategic Alternatives Study” indicates that the best performing of three scenarios has a BCR of 1.4; considerably less than the HSR network, but still expensive (£13 billion). Another option would cost £24 billion. These proposals produce a second-rate outcome, whilst requiring significant expenditure, and probably need further subsequent expenditure. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w264 Transport Committee: Evidence

3.2.6 It is more effective to remove long distance express services from these routes so they can be optimised for other rail services. 3.2.7 The railway network was developed in the 1800s primarily to serve local markets, not as a national network. Trying to achieve HS objectives by upgrading existing routes would be like building the motorway network by upgrading A roads. 3.2.8 Increasing capacity on existing routes does not deliver additional terminal capacity. As upgrades or new conventional lines would not deliver the passenger numbers of HSR, the business case for expensive new terminal capacity may not be justified. 3.2.9 A new 125mph line could deliver increased capacity but would not reduce journey-times and would therefore be less attractive for longer journeys. Therefore there would be less modal shift from road and air and consequently reduced environmental benefits. Furthermore, it may not remove sufficient long-distance journeys from the existing network to free capacity on it for local journeys and freight. 3.2.10 Proposals for a new conventional (125mph) line are likely to generate the same opposition on the line of route as proposals for a HSR line. A new conventional line therefore appears to be a non-starter.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.3.1 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would encourage passengers to travel by less sustainable modes. Passenger surveys score existing rail services poorly on value for money. The government’s policy is to allow fares to increase by RPI +3% (except in Scotland). Furthermore, the relative and absolute cost of public transport has risen over recent decades, whilst the relative cost of car travel has declined. Any national policy aim of encouraging sustainable travel has to contend with this, before confronting any concept of managing demand through price. Furthermore, it is not clear why public transport demand should be managed by price when car travel is not, other than in London and Durham. 3.3.2 There is a role for price in maximising efficient use of the rail network. Differential pricing according to time of travel and speed of journey could assist in maximising train load factors on both the classic and high speed networks.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.4.1 The construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) has a reasonably good track record in terms of time and budget (eg HS1 and the Airdrie-Bathgate project).

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? 4.1.1 Atkins identified that city centre stations are critical to a high-speed network. Non-urban stations on the French TGV network are often very lightly used. Without direct access to city centres, HSR risks replicating the access problems of airports. Nevertheless, “parkway” stations can have a role to play; as well as connecting the HSR network to airports (as at Birmingham International), it is unrealistic to expect all passengers to access HSR by sustainable modes to/from city centre stations. 4.1.2 Curzon Street is adjacent to Moor Street station, thus well-connected to the existing network. 4.1.3 There is an overwhelming connectivity case for a London terminal in the Euston/Kings Cross/St Pancras node. 4.1.4 Given the scale of London, the multiple potential origin/destination points within it, and the benefits of dispersing HS passengers across the Underground, there is a case for two stations in London.

4.2 What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations and 4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.2.1 A High Speed network by definition serves a limited number of strategic locations. TGV network managers admit that their system attempts to serve too many small urban centres. Frequency is important, and dispersing services so that everyone gets a train every four hours is not good use of HSR. 4.2.2 Population size, demand and connectivity should be the primary criteria; they generally coincide. The Government’s proposed network is not just about new lines, but services. Within the timescales foreseen in the HS2 proposal, services should include London, Birmingham, Manchester, Nottingham, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh. Nevertheless, the Y network should be seen as a work in progress, not a final product. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w265

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.3.1 It is not feasible to build a national network in a single effort, and therefore phased construction is necessary. However, it should not preclude early completion of route sections further north. We believe that the government should strongly consider building the network from both ends in light of the high BCR on sections of the line North of Manchester.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.4.1 The timing of the HS2-HS1 link arises largely from construction/technical constraints. Later construction would be practically very difficult, particularly expensive and disruptive. 4.4.2 The Heathrow link should be subsequent to the Manchester and Leeds extensions, as a simple Heathrow link may not be the best option. Connecting at Heathrow to a much wider network south and west of London should be examined, so the objectives of the Heathrow link need to be reframed.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.1.1 A recent study by Oxford Economics294 showed that the newly designated “Local Enterprise Partnership” areas around the eight Core Cities alone could produce an additional 1 million jobs and £44 billion economic output over the next two years, dependant on a number of growth factors, including infrastructure investment. A full HSR network linking the major cities of the UK would cost up to £69bn and would generate over £125bn of economic benefits. These benefits are derived from improvements in journey times, and crowding, reductions in road congestion, environmental improvements and the economic benefits arising in the release of capacity on the conventional rail network. It also includes the beneficial effect on the productivity of businesses through changes to employment patterns and agglomeration effects. 5.1.2 There are examples of European cities that have not benefited economically from HSR but what these cities have in common is that they took little or no other action after gaining an HS service. Cities which co- ordinated their social, economic and planning policies and activities to capitalise on HSR have benefited. 5.1.3 In Scotland, necessary actions were identified by a study by Halcrow for the Glasgow-Edinburgh Collaboration Initiative. Furthermore, we believe that the social, economic and cultural infrastructure of Central Scotland is such that it has the potential, given the right infrastructure, to unlock greater economic growth. 5.1.4 Greengauge 21 identified a reported upsurge in businesses relocating to Ashford after completion of HS1. The South East England Development Agency expects it to be the fastest growing economy in Kent in 2010–11. 5.1.5 HS2 serves city centres and should, given the right conditions, promotes urban regeneration. 5.1.6 Nations across Europe are investing in HSR, and this is both a threat and an opportunity: it makes other countries a better location for investment, but it offers the prospect of getting multiplier benefits from our own investment by linking to European networks.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.2.1 HSR is about making areas outside south east England accessible and economic development balanced so it is inherently linked to strategic regeneration.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.3.1 In absolute terms, all. However, relatively the Midlands, north of England and Scotland will particularly benefit. A study by KPMG work showed changes in average wages following construction of HSR, comparing a scenario with Greengauge 21’s H network with no HSR at all.295

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1.1 See above. The Edinburgh and Glasgow—London flows alone account for a quarter of total UK domestic air traffic. 294 ‘Our Cities, Our Future’, Core Cities Group 2011 www.corecities.com 295 High Speed Rail: Consequences for employment and economic growth. KPMG for GG21 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w266 Transport Committee: Evidence

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2.1 Overall, HS2 has taken a very cautious (pessimistic) approach.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4.1 See above.

References Atkins; Because Transport Matters (2008). Atkins; High Speed Line Study Summary Report (2004). City of Edinburgh Council: Local Transport Strategy 2007–2012 (March 2007). Glaeconomics; Reviewing the evidence on carbon emissions from rail and air travel (2010). GECI/Halcrow; High Speed Rail Wider Economic Benefits Study (2009). Greengauge 21; Fast Forward: A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain (2009). HS2 Ltd/DfT; reports, 2009–2011. Network Rail; New Lines Report (2009). Network Rail; West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy Draft for Consultation (2010). Network Rail; London and South East Route Utilisation Strategy Draft for Consultation (2010). Network Rail; East Coast Main Line 2016 Capacity Review (2010). May 2011

Written evidence from Gordon Pettitt (HSR 99) Summary of Evidence 1. It is based on the HS2 Y project, not just section 1 to Birmingham. 2. I have only responded to those questions “the committee are likely to pursue” where I have appropriate experience or expertise. It is limited to six pages as requested (excluding this summary). 3. There is one key argument for the HS2 Y network and that is that the existing main lines north from London are already at or near capacity. Between now and 2026 when the first stage is open, a small amount of extra capacity can be added by the lengthening trains, improvement to signalling headways, and construction of more grade separated junctions. Beyond that date new capacity is needed and the best way of providing that is to build a new line that provides a more efficient means of moving longer distance passengers and at the same time releases capacity on the existing routes which can then be used to provide capacity for improved urban, inter-urban, cross country services and freight. This enables the capacity on HS2 and existing lines to be to be increased in total and optimised in a way that reduces operating costs across both networks. 4. It is essential to take into account that the Y network when complete will enable long distance passengers from Euston, St Pancras and Kings Cross to the North to use the new line and benefit from a 40% improvement in journey times (there will be increased benefit at weekends as all maintenance on the new line is undertaken at night). As a result the new railway will be more attractive to a wider range of passengers who would otherwise choose to drive or travel by air. The very large investment already made and planned in London, the South East and Scotland together with that already planned for Birmingham, Manchester (Hub) and Leeds will increase accessibility to HS2 and provide for the fist time a realistic rail alternative to the M25. 5. The main alternative to HS2 is to endeavour to provide additional capacity on the three existing routes north. I provide detailed evidence of the serious disadvantages of this approach. In particular I point to recent experience with the upgrading of the West Coast main line that took ten years to complete and cost £9 billion. To increase the capacity of this route further, taking into account of the need to increase capacity, for local as well as long distance traffic, will mean additional tracks on the approaches to Birmingham and Manchester and provision of more terminal capacity in those cities. The situation on the East Coast route is worse, as only 50% of that route has more than two tracks between London and Leeds.. Disruption and delay to passengers will be worse than that experienced over the West coast main line for 10 years. 6. I know of no country in the world with the density and mix of traffic on our three main lines north that has decided that its passengers should suffer the cost and disruption of converting existing infrastructure, cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w267

(already operating at or near capacity) in preference to building a new line. To pretend that the long term rail capacity problems north from London will be solved by tweaking the existing network would be akin to adjusting the deckchairs on the Titanic.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 1.1 My evidence is submitted on the basis that the HSR programme is for implementation of the “HS2 Y Project” as a whole, due for completion in 2032–33 rather than on the first stage to Birmingham due for completion in 2026. It takes into account that there has been a 70% increase in passenger journeys and 46% increase in freight tonne kilometres over the past 15 years and a 14% increase in population is forecast between 2001 and 2021. 1.2 to cater for this growth there has already been substantial investment in infrastructure, particularly in London, the South-East and Scotland. Further major projects in these areas have been authorised and are due for completion before 2020. Plans are now advanced for major rail enhancement schemes around Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds. These schemes will transform railways in those areas over the next 20 years and will further increase demand for travel between these cities as well as to and from London. 1.3 The main argument for HS2 is that additional infrastructure capacity is needed to meet increased demand for long distance rail travel on a north to south axis between all the major cities in Scotland, North of England / Midlands and London. Existing routes between Euston, St. Pancras, Kings Cross and the north are already at or near capacity. These mixed traffic railways (ie used by fast, semi fast and stopping passenger trains as well as freight) have experienced unprecedented increases in business in all these markets, each of which require trains with differing characteristics and stopping patterns. This has already led to increasing conflicts between operators, local authorities and NetworkRail over the use of capacity, not least on the approach to the northern cities which unlike the approaches to London, still have limited access over two tracks for main line and local services and a shortage of terminal capacity following closures in the 1960’s (for background to this see my April Modern railways Article). 1.4 Main line services also suffer. On the East Coast Main line increased business has resulted in the need for more stops at intermediate stations which uses more capacity. This and additional trains on both the main line and suburban networks has resulted in the average journey time of the limited stop long distance trains between London and Newcastle being extended by 10 to 15 minutes compared with the schedules of 1992. This problem which has also affected East Anglia and Great Western lines will get worse on all the routes north, unless there is a substantial increase in capacity. 1.5 The best economic and operational solution to this problem is to divert all the long distance traffic from each of the main lines north from London on to a new railway as proposed for HS2. This will release significant capacity on the existing lines to cater for the growth of the suburban, inter-urban, cross country and freight markets. In this way the capacity of the High Speed and Classic lines can both be optimised whilst allowing growth in all sectors and at the same time minimising the costs of operation on both systems. 1.6 HS2 will be available 16/18 hours a day, seven days a week with maintenance done at night. The use of modern trains and infrastructure will bring about a step change in reliability compared with today’s standards of main line punctuality. On HS1 delay due to infrastructure problems is 3–4 seconds per train. 1.7 Journey times on the HS2 network will be 40–45% shorter than now and business will of course increase. But what is less known is that investment in rolling stock will, due to the shorter journey times be approx. 50% less than for a similar frequency of service on classic lines. Similarly staff and maintenance costs will also be lower. 1.8 On completion of the Y network, 400 meter trains with a seating capacity 50% greater than an 11 car Pendolino will be used. In the longer term it will be possible to increase capacity further by the use of double deck trains.

3. Business case 3.2 “What would be the pros and cons of resolving the capacity issues in other ways—for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line” 3.2.1 The HS2 Y Project will provide the capacity needed to meet future passenger demand on the East Coast and Midland Main Lines as well as the West Coast Main Line. Experience shows that this is not simply achieved by upgrading existing routes. The key issues are these: Upgrading works on all three routes to the north to meet the capacity demands beyond 2020, will be more extensive, effect more trains and take longer than those recently undertaken on the WCML The work will be taking place on infrastructure already 150 years old where a significant number of bridges, and possibly viaducts and tunnels will be in need of reconstruction during this time. To undertake such work at the same time as undertaking major works to increase extra capacity would be a logistical nightmare with considerable risks and costs attached. 3.2.2 At the end of upgrading work, the capacity added to the classic network will of course be considerably less than if the HS2 network had been built. If it had the capacity of both networks could have been optimised cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w268 Transport Committee: Evidence

to meet the specific requirements of the individual markets and at the same time reduce the operational costs of those markets. 3.2.3 The areas of land required for grade separated junctions and widening of existing routes will be considerable. All these sites will require individual Transport and Works Act orders (at least 8 on the East Coast route between London and Leeds alone) which means that total route capacity will always be uncertain until the last order is in place. Even if land was available alongside existing tracks on all three routes the work would take longer, and involve very serious disruption to line-side residents and businesses, which are likely to be on a larger scale than now proposed for the HS2 Y which is being routed to minimise the effect on people, businesses and the environment. 3.2.4 At the conclusion of the works the journey times for long distance passengers will be similar to today with little or no change to the already slow and tedious journeys over the last 20/30 miles between the main lines and the terminals of the northern cities. 3.2.5 Chris Green who was Chief Executive of Virgin Trains at the time of the West Coast upgrade told me recently “This upgrading attempted to keep the WCML open on weekdays, but proved arguably more disruptive as it dragged on for 10 years with endless weekend closures and unreliable weekday services. Mainline travel fell as passengers diverted to motorways and airlines. The domestic airlines achieved a 40% share of the London—Manchester (non car) market in this period—and this has only now fallen back to a 20%. It became very clear that it was both more expensive and more complex to upgrade capacity on an existing railway than it was to build HS1 on a brand new site. Working next to an operational WCML brought serious safety constraints. In the meantime the railway was very unreliable: tight engineering schedules often overran to delay morning services; newly installed equipment proved unreliable and the entire route was actually closed at Rugby for two days following a badly planned Christmas close down. But it has barely addressed the core weakness—that parts of the existing nineteenth century route alignment are fundamentally unfit for modern high speed passenger trains. A £9 billion upgrade has effectively raised running speeds by 15mph (from 110mph to 125mph) over the majority of the route but even this required the procurement of a bespoke fleet of tilting trains. The same £9 billion spend on a new railway could have funded and delivered the first 100 miles of a new 215 mph route with negligible impact on existing passengers”. 3.2.6 The problem we now face in the UK with increased traffic levels on mixed traffic lines is similar to those faced by most railways with advanced economies. The HS2 solution was first used in Japan in 1964 with the building of a new line to provide capacity for long distance trains between Tokyo to Osaka. Since then similar solutions, to divert long distance traffic from mixed traffic railways, have been adopted by 14 countries world wide. I know of no country in the world with the density and mix of traffic on our three main lines north that has decided to suffer the cost and disruption of converting existing infrastructure, which is already operating at or near capacity, in preference to building a new line.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand? For rail travel for example by price? 3.3.1 This question is complex when related to mixed traffic routes, that are at or near capacity. In particular which section of the market should have demand reduced by pricing and who will take such decisions and on what basis? Will the decisions change market share to the point where additional road or airport capacity is needed and how are these issues to be linked to the governments objectives linked to road congestion and climate change ? 3.3.2 HS2 will provide a step change in capacity which will avoid the need to manage through pricing or overcrowding, but yield management (which is also used by the airlines to manage capacity) will still be needed to encourage use of off peak services and to take the pressure off peak trains. Pricing elasticity can encourage small changes in travel demand but increasing fares, on its own, cannot deal with the 56% increase in passenger kilometres on Britain’s railways between 1996 and 2010, and the 61% growth in rail demand forecast by HS2 over the next 32 years, with a doubling of trips in the West Midlands to London corridor. Only additional capacity can do that unless, like the road system, we are prepared to see rail travel restricted by chronic overcrowding.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.4.1 The first and most important step is to ensure complete separation of client and contractor roles. The second is to employ project management with international experience and a proven track record of managing major projects—then add incentives to reduce costs and complete on time The project manager must be selected at an early stage and work with the client in ensuring that the project including costs is defined in detail prior to tendering. Finally the client has to ensure that no changes to the plan are permitted. The UK track record with major infrastructure projects has improved in recent years. HS1 and the Olympic project are examples of international best practice which should give confidence that HS2 can be completed on time and to budget. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w269

4. The Strategic Route 4.1 The proposed route to the west Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham New Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1.1 The stations proposed are the most appropriate for a new railway that is planned to cater exclusively for long distance traffic diverted from the mixed traffic routes between Euston, St Pancras, Kings Cross and the Midlands/ North. 4.1.2 The proposed stations at Euston and Old Oak Common in London give the best possible access to the new railway through the provision of high quality connections to and from the major destinations within London such as the West End, the City, Docklands and Heathrow. The completion of Crossrail in 2017 and of Thameslink in 2018 will have a profound impact on the market for rail travel between the north and south of the country when combined with completion of the HS2 Y project. The network effect of all these new lines with their superb connectivity will provide journey opportunities that are almost impossible to assess today. Rail will provide for the first time a realistic alternative to the M25. 4.1.3 The plans for Euston include an improved underground concourse and a direct link to Euston Square station. Access to HS2 could be further improved with a covered walkway or travelator link between Euston and Kings Cross. The distance between the two stations is no greater than between terminals at Heathrow or Gatwick and a further 82 stations on Thameslink and HS1 Kent routes would be linked to HS2 with a single change of train 4.1.4 The interchange at Old Oak will add 37 stations from Maidenhead, Slough and Heathrow in the west, through the West End and the City, to Stratford, Romford and Shenfield in the east. 4.1.5 The proposed stations at Birmingham International and Curzon Street must like Euston and Old Oak be seen together as maximising access to the new railway. It is impossible to increase the track capacity on the approaches to or increase the number of platforms in New Street. It will therefore be essential to provide pedestrian/travelator links between Curzon Street, Moor Street and New Street. Particularly for longer distance passengers from the South and South West who will (on present plans) have no through trains onto the Y network for long distance journeys north of Birmingham. 4.1.6 There would appear to be no scope for any additional intermediate stations between Old Oak Common and Birmingham International—a distance of circa 100 miles. My recommendation for the criteria would be: That any additional stop generates sufficient income from long distance traffic to justify the loss of capacity on the route as a whole and particularly in peak periods (one stop can destroy two following paths with a loss of 1,000+ seats). 4.1.7 The top priority for stations on the HS2 Y network north of Birmingham are Sheffield, Manchester and Leeds. The viability of the proposed station for East Midlands should depend on the availability of a suitable site that can deliver effective rail and road connections to Derby and Nottingham. Unless the connections are very good it is possible that existing services may be more competitive, in which case the capacity on the Y network could be better utilised.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.2.1 I have no doubt that the proposed Y is indeed the right choice. In the longer term extensions to York Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow are likely to become part of the HSR network. Passive provision must be made in plans for the line to be extended to those cities. Journey times from London to Edinburgh and Glasgow will come down to round 2 hours 45 minutes. If the latter are linked to the improved journey times planned in Scotland, through journeys from London, Birmingham and Manchester to Inverness and Aberdeen become viable by rail.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.3.1 The government is right to plan the building of HS2 from the London end but consideration should be given to opening the section from Old Oak Common to Birmingham International first in order that this section can be used for testing as soon as possible and bring forward the opening date for revenue earning traffic. Consideration should also be given to constructing those sections of HS2 around Birmingham and northwards which interface with other major rail or road projects under construction at the same time. In this way it is possible to minimise the construction costs of both. This worked very well on HS1 where the works interfaced with the widening of the A2 in the Southfleet area.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase. Are those the right decisions? 4.4.1 The proposed links to HS1 and Heathrow are both strategic links of national importance but the availability of finance is key to the timescale for the building of both. Building the HS1 link will probably release EEC funds or competitive loans for HS2 but Heathrow does have serious competition from Paris cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w270 Transport Committee: Evidence

Charles De Gaulle, Frankfurt and Amsterdam Schipol airports, all of which have stations on high speed lines. Rather than delay construction of the Heathrow link to Phase 2 it would surely be better to leave open the possibility of earlier opening if significant funds can be made available from potential partners such as BAA.

5. Economic Rebalancing and Equity 5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.2.1 The cities served by the HS2 Y Project, and particularly Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds and Sheffield all have significant local rail networks. These support the local and regional economy, and growth in levels of rail commuting have generally been higher than the national average over the last 15 years, as the city centres have been regenerated. HS2 provides the additional capacity that enables planners to optimise use of capacity on both the classic and high speed lines and, in effect, to ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. HS2 for example would both add to, and benefit from, the Manchester Hub proposals. Without it, it is hard to see how local services could be improved in the Crewe—Manchester corridor, for example. HS2 could also release the extra capacity to allow a better balance between the needs of long distance and local passengers in the congested Coventry to Birmingham corridor.

6. Impact 6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the classic network? 6.3.1 The diversion of many long distance trains will release additional paths for freight, particularly on the main line routes.

6.4 How much disruption wills there be to services on the classic network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4.1 A key advantage of building new capacity is that the impact is limited to those locations which interface with the classic network. Disruption is normally limited to weekend closures in order to join the old and new routes together. In the case of HS2 the number of such locations is similar to HS1 which included the rebuilding of the throat area on the approach to St/ Pancras and diversion of the Thameslink route below the station. 6.4.2 The work to be undertaken at Euston is substantial but the plan to have 14 platforms available for use at all times will minimise the effect. The disruption to passengers will be minor compared with the years of disruption and cancellation of trains that passengers throughout the route suffered during the 10 years of WCML modernisation. 15 May 2011

Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in the UK (HSR 100) Introduction The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in the UK (“the Institute”) is a professional institution embracing all transport modes whose members are engaged in the provision of transport services for both passengers and freight, the management of logistics and the supply chain, transport planning, government and administration. We have no political affiliations and do not support any particular vested interests. Our principal concerns are that transport policies and procedures should be effective and efficient and based, as far as possible, on objective analysis of the issues and practical experience and that good practice should be widely disseminated and adopted. The Institute has a specialist Strategic Rail Forum, a nationwide structure of locally based groups and a Public Policies Committee which considers the broad canvass of transport policy. This submission draws on contributions from all these sources.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 1.1 The capacity of the rail network needs to expand to meet growing demand for travel. High Speed Rail (HSR) is the most economically efficient means of expanding rail capacity. Major investment in developing the capacity of existing lines is both expensive and disruptive, as experience with the West Coast Route Modernisation showed. 1.2 HSR will enhance accessibility, contributing to the cohesion of Britain and thus reducing the “north/ south divide”. Many current rail journey times are slow and compare poorly with road. With the proposed “Y” shaped HS2 network, Leeds and Manchester to Birmingham journey times would be virtually halved, greatly improving the connectivity of these cities, both to London and between themselves. 1.3 This would also improve the classic network’s ability to cope with other traffic, which is especially important for the large intermediate towns or cities (near HS2 between London and Birmingham) such as cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w271

Milton Keynes and Coventry. These may otherwise be faced with increasingly limited access to long distance trains, due to such services being full before these cities are reached. 1.4 HSR helps address the under-appreciated challenges associated with population growth, ageing and distribution, and an increasing propensity to travel. 1.5 The arguments against HSR centre on affordability, the possible reduction of funds to support the classic network, alternative means of expanding capacity by more modest multiple investments, and what might more loosely be called “environmental concerns”. 1.6 The last of these can be mitigated by careful routeing of HSR away from sensitive areas and sound protection measures such as noise barriers. Environmental impacts should be seen on a “net” basis, taking account of reductions in effects associated with road and air traffic movements.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 HSR represents a major infrastructure enhancement which will contribute to achieving Government’s sustainability and carbon reduction objectives. It will relieve congestion on the strategic road network, reduce pressure on London’s congested airports and by reducing pressure on the classic rail network enable it to meets the challenges of commuter and regional demand more effectively. 2.2 As a means of connecting different regions and urban areas, HSR may be seen as an enabler for economic development, by reducing journey times and providing the necessary capacity. Faster journeys by HSR also mean greater productivity for the transport providers. In broad terms, halving the journey time allows the same number of trains and staff to provide twice as much service. 2.3 A degree of ring fencing between an HSR network and the classic network could be introduced, as it was on London Underground with the construction of the extension in the 1990s. 2.4 The problems of urban/suburban networks on the classic railway will be affected only marginally by HSR and the continued relevance and need for investment there will remain. Similarly, freight will continue to depend on the classic network, where all the freight terminals are located. 2.5 Contrary perhaps to popular belief, the British internal market for aviation is not strong, due to railway developments in both speed and frequencies in recent years. It does however have niche domestic markets, and these include services where water crossings are involved, such as the Scottish islands, Ireland/, the Channel Islands and the . What remains of the main trunk routes serves markets close to airports, such as the Thames Valley from Heathrow or Canary Wharf from London City, or passengers interlining at Heathrow for longer distance flights. 2.6 There is thus little scope for further reductions in domestic aviation. It is relevant to note that airport operators and some airlines are fully supportive of HS2, because they feel that it would enhance connectivity to air services.

3. Business case 3.1 The approach adopted in the preparation of demand forecasts and in the appraisal of benefits is robust. An appropriate methodology has been adopted and the assumptions and appraisal methodology have been subject to peer review. 3.2 The classic railway system has done very well to accommodate around 40% growth on a more or less fixed network over recent years, but there are practical limits as to what more can be achieved. Gradients and especially track curvature limit future expansion, whilst the four tracking of double track lines (for instance) imposes both land take and the adoption of the standards used by the original railway builders. 3.3 HSR has a strong international precedent demonstrating business benefits. For instance French Railways built their first high speed line as the most economic way of enhancing capacity between Paris and Lyon. 3.4 The building of a new classic railway may be suitable for urban areas, but would be a missed opportunity for an intercity type operation. It might possibly be cheaper, but the benefits would also be much less. There is no reason to conclude that it would avoid environmental problems. It could not provide the same capacity gains as HSR without a fundamentally different approach. 3.5 Any new railway infrastructure designed to link the core cities of Britain and raise the standards of connectivity needs to be built to high speed standards. Such standards also need to be those adopted internationally, if the future holds large scale increases in the demand for such travel. 3.6 Pricing on the existing network is clearly an important issue, and there are precedents for controlling demand by above inflation price increases. But such an approach ignores Government objectives of facilitating travel and social and economic regeneration. Managing strategic demand growth through pricing action will tend to reduce mobility and stifle economic growth to the detriment of the economic and social wellbeing of the nation. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w272 Transport Committee: Evidence

3.7 A related and perennial issue for transport is capturing wider economic benefits, such as increases in time saved by users or in land values, none of which shows in the operators’ accounts. 3.8 Transport projects can and have been delivered to time and budget. Evidence from HS1 and other major transport projects suggest that the key requirements are a clear project plan, a funding plan, strong project management and good stakeholder communications.

4. The strategic route 4.1 CILT agrees with HS2 Ltd’s choice of stations, both the number and locations. Euston requires improvements in access to the Underground and the capacity of the Underground lines serving it, but its superiority to any other reasonably available site is also apparent. 4.2 The Old Oak Common site for a Crossrail interchange, with its own access to Central London, is well conceived and potentially very useful. That extends to connections with services operated on the Great Western main line, which could offer substantial benefits to travellers to South West England and South Wales. 4.3 The proposed route of HS2 is commendably direct. It does not pass near any major towns, and any case for additional stations is correspondingly weak. HS2 Ltd seem to have taken much care in minimising the undesirable effects on the communities through which HS2 is likely to pass and it is not possible to undertake such major transport infrastructure projects without some effects on third parties. Existing trunk rail routes, even when they include major structures such as Welwyn Viaduct, , and the , Berwick, do not seem to have had a seriously adverse effect on nearby local areas. 4.4 The Y network concept should be supported, albeit as perhaps an intermediate development stage. Success is likely to result in popular pressure to extend the network to Newcastle and Edinburgh, and then to Glasgow, so later extensions to these cities are a distinct possibility. Comprehensive plans for a national High Speed network are desirable and passive provision for later construction should be made, where and when sensible. 4.5 There are two reasons why construction should begin at the London end of the route. Firstly, there are the practical matters of rolling stock and infrastructure maintenance depots, for both of which suitable sites have been identified. Secondly, working north from London would maximise early fares revenues. 4.6 The connection to HS1 is desirable and the option identified is probably the best that can be achieved physically. As matters stand, it will however have to rely solely on revenues from international passengers from Birmingham and those who join at Old Oak Common. (It is assumed that passengers from Stratford, Ebbsfleet and Ashford will have alternative provision). The additional ability to carry wholly domestic passengers on these trains would have a substantial beneficial effect on service viability. This is a matter which needs to be resolved by the Borders Agency as a matter of urgency. 4.7 The proposals to interchange with Heathrow services at Old Oak Common are appropriate for Stage 1. Filling 1,100 seat trains, which have a modest service frequency from the West Midlands, direct to Heathrow, is a substantial challenge. It is not going to happen quickly, and probably needs the stimulus of the services from Manchester and Leeds under Stage 2 to make it a viable proposition.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 On its own, HSR cannot provide economic regeneration, but it can make a major contribution. provides a useful precedent. The area could not have been revitalised without large rail transport investments, but it did need the input of entrepreneurial bodies. Development had to be underpinned by local authorities providing planning permission, and the judicial investment of public money. 5.2 HSR is however more about regional benefits, particularly those to business. Effective distances are shrunk and the disadvantages of the time taken in having to travel 100–250 miles are much reduced. The cities in the North/North West and the Midlands become that much more accessible, between each other as well as with London and the near continent. 5.3 Care though has to be taken that the High Speed railway does indeed remain as such, so stops are necessarily limited. Benefits for those places which are not served directly may be secured by good quality connectional arrangements, but the freeing up of the classic network will in itself allow substantial improvements to be made. 5.4 Planning for HSR should be in terms of the network which might exist in perhaps 50 years time. It is important that all interested parties; the cities and regions, industrialists, economic and social planners, the transport industry, rail passengers and freight users and the general public, should know what is intended and be able to plan ahead accordingly. 5.5 Funding should be sought from a wide variety of sources including local authorities and potentially businesses. The EU’s TEN-T programme should also be regarded as an appropriate source of funding. In this context, the connection to HS1 and hence the rest of the European High Speed Network will be an important factor. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w273

6. Impact 6.1 Rail is the most environmentally friendly transport system and remains the only proven and demonstrably effective way of using electricity as a source of propulsion in long-distance transport. 6.2 The environmental costs and benefits are properly accounted for in the business case. However, the local environmental impacts, notably noise and visual intrusion, will need to be assessed in detail to ensure that the final design minimises the environmental impact of HSR. 6.3 Freight would remain a classic network customer, and would be able to benefit from the additional train paths being made available. The need for operational flexibility is a characteristic of the freight business, where some traffic flows can change quickly, so the freeing up of capacity would provide opportunities to serve this market better. This additional capacity would be shared by other passenger services, whether long distance, regional or local, its apportionment between these interests subject to regulation. 6.4 The service disruption challenge from Euston reconstruction is significant but preplanning can mitigate the impact considerably, as has been shown with the successful regeneration of St. Pancras station.

7. Conclusion 7.1 CILT(UK) understands the planning, construction and funding challenges of HSR but is fully supportive of this vital project being progressed. May 2011

Written evidence from Professor Peter Mackie (HSR 101) Declaration—I am a member of the HS2 Analytical Challenge Panel. The evidence submitted is my personal opinion only and not necessarily that of the ACP or HS2 Ltd. Several points are in any case outside the remit of HS2 Ltd. 1. The HS2 project is going through various steps in the feasibility study phase. There is further refinement required of the modelling and appraisal. However, the work to date gives a fair and reasonable indication of the benefit/cost ratio of the scheme as assessed using DfT WebTAG principles. An appropriate interpretation is that the BCR of the London-West Midlands section assessed on a standalone basis is around 2—probably no worse than 1.5 and probably no better than 2.5. Perhaps for a scheme of this scale, such a result is not too surprising—if the BCR were 10, there would be serious questions about why the scheme had not been assessed years ago. However, and also given the sheer scale of the public finance commitment, the scheme taken in isolation is best characterised as moderate value for money in transport appraisal terms. This is before consideration of the local environmental impacts such as noise, visual intrusion, severance etc which lie outside of the BCR. 2. In the cost-benefit analysis, the scheme depends for its benefits on travel time savings for current and transferred/induced users and on capacity relief benefits—reliability gains and relief of overcrowding particularly on the West Coast Main Line. Carbon impacts are small and benefits due to diversion from air are small in the context of the scheme. 3. The value of business travel time savings has been the subject of comment by critics of the appraisal. HS2 has followed the WebTAG guidance in this respect. I would argue that there are two issues which need to be explored by DfT: — Whether up to date behavioural evidence on the value of travel time savings for briefcase travellers in the course of work supports the current values, and if not, how to handle benefits to transferred traffic from road and air as well as existing rail travellers; — Whether for all journey purposes the average values of travel time in the WebTAG are appropriate for relatively long distance trips. Other countries such as Netherlands and Sweden recommend higher values for time savings on long distance trips. Taking these two points together, I conjecture that the appraisal is not seriously over-egged in this respect. 4. The appraisal results are critically dependent on the future trajectory of population, employment, GDP/ capita, energy prices and rail fares relative to other transport cost trends. Also, the income and fare elasticities assumed and projected far into the future are critical to the traffic forecasts. There is a need for a full quantified risk assessment of the project. 5. There are various respects in which further modelling work is required. Some of these may be to the advantage of the appraisal case, others not: — Modelling of station choice especially between Euston and Old Oak in London. — Modelling of choice between reservation only (HS2) and walk up services on WCML particularly between London and Birmingham. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w274 Transport Committee: Evidence

— Further work on interchange penalties and route choice to Birmingham for traffic needing to interchange to regional services at New Street. — Further consideration of the potential for Old Oak to be a true London Junction station with much better connections between London and SE region south of the Thames and the Midlands and North. — Consideration of splitting the London-Paris/Brussels Eurostar service frequency, running some services direct from Old Oak via Herne Hill to the junction with HS1 as an alternative to constructing the link to St Pancras. — Further assessment of the impact on Great Western Main Line passengers of introducing a stop at Old Oak.

6. More broadly, the appraisal needs to be conducted so as to: — Distinguish clearly the incremental value of the components of the strategy—for example the incremental value of the link to St Pancras and of direct service to Heathrow. These should not be bundled together as a package, they are very substantial projects in their own right. — Be explicit regarding the franchise territory assumptions, competitive behaviour from existing franchisees or their successors, and use of released capacity on WCML eg by open access operators. The regulatory environment assumptions are important. All four long distance franchises will be affected by HS2. — Demonstrate careful consideration of the best Do-Minimum alternative scenario on the WCML. There are usually ways of coping with capacity and options such as 16 coach trains with enhanced energy supply should at least be considered against the status quo. — Establish what can be done to improve rail accessibility to Heathrow in the interim. Construction of the west curve from the Heathrow spur line towards Reading would permit, say, a train an hour from Heathrow to Birmingham which would be better than waiting till 2026.

7. Overall it is quite likely that a decision on phase one of the project (London—West Midlands) will turn out to be contingent on the assessed value for money of the entire Y network. This increases the importance of understanding the technical, economic and environmental case for the upper arms of the Y early. It could be that the true policy choice might be an all or nothing one.

8. The HS2 will be one of the first major projects to go through the five business case approach announced by the Secretary of State on 27 April. The consistency of the economic, commercial, financial and deliverability cases is going to be crucial to the overall assessment. Specifically, — The appraisal currently assumes no fare premium for the higher speeds and guaranteed seat offered by HS2. There is a need for further consideration of the trade off between user benefits, fare revenue and taxpayer support within the appraisal. At what rate can travel time and quality benefits be converted into revenue through yield management? — The appraisal results imply that if the HS2 infrastructure is publicly funded and endowed to the rail system then the forward operating costs of the infrastructure and services can be funded from within the rail financial support envelope. This requires careful study—it would be a mistake to accept the investment appraisal case on the basis of an operating plan which then cannot be fully funded. — The tacit assumption is that the public finance for the HS2 infrastructure is not going to displace the generality of transport sector schemes, rather that it is going to be a strategic priority of Government like HS1 and Crossrail and therefore additional to the normal transport budget. If this assumption is wrong, it is necessary to question the opportunity cost of the scheme in terms of investment forgone elsewhere in the transport sector.

9. Turning to the wider impacts of the scheme on the economy, it is important to recognise that the appraisal has been conducted on a fixed land use pattern assumption. It is quite plausible that the scheme will have land use impacts in Central Birmingham, in the vicinity of the Birmingham Parkway station and at Old Oak and Willesden and that there will be additional benefits resulting. It is also credible that there are competitiveness benefits to the UK from connecting several of the top conurbations to each other more effectively. However, I do not think these impacts can possibly be large additions to the direct transport benefits in the CBA ; they are largely the same benefits converted from the transport sector into the wider economy via the land use and development pattern.

10. It is important, if the Government thinks there is a strategic case for building HS2 which is above and beyond the economic and environmental case, that there is clarity on what that case is so it can be scrutinised. For various reasons, HS2 is rather unlikely to make much difference to the North-South divide. A spatial analysis would probably show London to be the main benefitting region. That is NOT a reason for not doing the scheme but claims of “strategic value” need to be capable of interrogation. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w275

11. Finally, given the population projections for London and the South East, I find it bizarre that advantage is not being taken of this piece of infrastructure to plan a new city either on the HS2 centred around say Brackley or to take advantage of the released capacity on the WCML. A true strategy would place HS2 within a broader regional land use plan which could address several deep problems simultaneously. May 2011

Written evidence from Buckinghamshire County Council (HSR 102)

This paper sets out Buckinghamshire Councils’ response to the Transport Select Committee inquiry into High Speed rail. It is submitted on behalf of Buckinghamshire County, Aylesbury Vale District, Chiltern District, South Bucks District and Councils, in response to question 6.2 of the inquiry’s questions: Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

Executive Summary — The Government’s proposals for HS2 have not costed or accounted for the total environmental impacts and associated mitigation costs and therefore the business case will potentially be weaker, meaning neither the nation nor the Government can make an informed decision about the HS2 proposals. — HS2 is apparently in “the national interest” and yet there is inadequate objective evaluation of all factors, work that other major scheme promoters would be expected to provide to inform the decision making process. — The timetable for environmental surveys and assessments is unrealistic and seems to have been driven by “political expediency” to meet Parliamentary timescales, rather than an adequate evaluation timetable; this may be why national designations such as the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty and the European Habitats Directive have not been sufficiently considered.

Introduction HS2 proposals will cause major environmental damage both in the short term, during construction, and in the longer term, once operational. The Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) prepared to support HS2 includes a series of objectives against which the proposals are measured, with scores ranging from highly unsupportive through to highly supportive.

HS2 is unable to score positively against any of the environmental objectives in the AoS, and whilst this is not unusual for any major development project at an early stage, since it indicates where mitigation is most required, HS2 Ltd has offered very few mitigation measures, but rather allocated an amount of funding for future investigations.

Further review of the AoS has highlighted that calculating total environmental costs and impact of the HS2 proposals is not possible, since not all the relevant information, surveys or supporting data has either been published or in many cases undertaken. This is at least consistent with HS2 Ltd’s approach to mitigation.

It is perhaps unfortunate for the Government that expensive solutions will not mitigate all impacts, since in some cases these are not environmentally or economically sensible. It is also likely that many impacts may become highly contentious later in the project, particularly when bound by European legislation.

Since so little has been done to consider mitigation, everyone is being asked to respond to a consultation with insufficient information to make an informed and balanced judgement. Indeed the proposals have been defined by HS2 Ltd as contrary to the Government’s environmental objectives since they fail to protect landscapes, water and the noise environment.

The Department for Transport stated in January 2011 that “further site surveys would not at this stage have offered any significant additional information”. We do not agree with this statement and further site surveys at this stage would have enabled the environmental impacts to be more appropriately measured. It is essential information for the business case analysis and without it one must question the validity of the business case.

There is no evidence that the additional surveys, mitigation measures and consequent delays, to comply with legal requirements and the Government’s own commitments have been adequately factored into the business case, and this further exacerbates the extent to which the environmental costs and benefits have failed to be correctly accounted for.

To support this submission, the Councils have tried to identify the environmental impacts of HS2 to let the Transport Select Committee review the strength of the business case. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w276 Transport Committee: Evidence

HS2 Preferred Route 3 Key facts about the Preferred Route: — 40% of the route is in deep cutting, 9% on viaduct, about 13% in tunnels. — More than 9% of the route passes through the Chilterns AONB. — Less than 40% of the route through the Chilterns AONB is in tunnel.

Species and Habitats affected by the Preferred Route HS2 runs through Camden, Hillingdon, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire, Warwickshire and Staffordshire between London and Birmingham. Buckinghamshire is nearly a third of the route and thus an initial environmental assessment was completed to identify species, habitats and significant features impacted. Headline information is provided below and more detail can be found in the table in Appendix 1. — HS2 travels through more than 25 km of Green Belt in Buckinghamshire. — Within 1 km of the HS2 route in Buckinghamshire there are: — Almost 270 ha of Sites of Special Scientific Interest. — 245 ha of Biodiversity Action Plan habitats & 474 ha of Ancient Woodland. — 60 different Protected Species & 425 Protected Species records. — 8 Scheduled Ancient Monuments & 590 Grade I, II*, or II Listed Buildings. — 6 Registered Historic Parks & Gardens & 15 Conservation Areas. — 141 Archaeological notification sites & 2568 Historic Environment Records. — 56 Footpaths or Bridleways will be intersected / crossed by HS2 in Buckinghamshire. Heritage assets, features and landscape also contribute to the character of the Chiltern AONB, protected by Planning Policy Statement 7 (PPS7—Sustainable Development in Rural Areas). We estimate that up to 7000 historic / heritage assets will be affected by Phase 1 of HS2 between London and Birmingham. However the AoS only identifies impacts on designated heritage assets. As such 90% of all assets may be overlooked. The AoS also underestimates impacts on Rights of Way. It states that “there would be at least 27 paths potentially affected” but Buckinghamshire’s baseline assessment shows that 56 will be affected, requiring 26 diversions and 30 bridges or tunnels. Whilst HS2 Ltd’s Chief Executive, Alison Munroe, clarifies that “with respect to footpaths we do not envisage these being closed…” and “we would endeavour to avoid lengthy footpath diversions, and footbridges and underpasses would be provided to enable existing routes to be maintained, wherever practicable” (in reply to the Ramblers, February 2011), such a large underestimate suggests HS2 Ltd has failed to do its homework. For biodiversity, no comprehensive ecological surveys have been undertaken to assess impacts on habitats and species. The data given above and in Appendix 1 is taken from the existing record, which particularly in the case of species, is incomplete.

Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) Buckinghamshire Councils believe that the AoS is an unsatisfactory compromise that tries to meet the needs of SEA, NATA, WebTag and other guidance, but singularly fails. HS2 Ltd and Dft state its proposals linking London and Birmingham are a “project”, and subject to EIA. However proposals for Phase 2, linking to Heathrow, Manchester, and Leeds, suggest HS2 is a series of projects, or programme and therefore subject to SEA. The AoS focuses on Preferred Route 3, without considering other options. It is suggested these were dismissed earlier, but such decisions were made without consultation or explanation. The scope of the AoS may have been determined without reference to Natural England, other stakeholders or consultees. The AoS, asserts that costs for all options are broadly similar. It is therefore assumed that mitigation costs are also similar but this can only be an assumption without evidence. As such, expensive mitigation measures may be necessary for any option.

Environmental Costs Noise and vibration The assessment of noise in the AoS is limited to train operational noise at dwellings for an 18 hour daytime period (06:00–24:00) with no quantitative assessment of “night-time” noise impacts (23.00–07.00). The AoS does not identify impacts at non-residential receptors, such as schools or community buildings. Other potential adverse noise impacts, such as alterations to existing transport networks, have also not been considered. The noise criteria and assumptions in the AoS represent a significant risk. For example, the adoption of the noise threshold value for High Noise Levels is taken out of context and therefore flawed. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w277

Further mitigation options need to be investigated once the true number and magnitude of noise impact at residential and non-residential receptors have been identified. Current noise mitigation is defined as standard noise barriers no higher than 3m and some reduction in train noise at source. In the absence of any measure to determine the residual impacts, there is major uncertainty about mitigation costs, especially where for example additional cut and cover tunnels or other extensive noise mitigation is needed. Unless more detailed work is completed, and more considered noise mitigation costs developed, future options for additional mitigation could be limited (by cost) to taller and more unsightly noise barriers or controls on train speed.

Land The business case sets out land purchase costs, at £930 million. This does not seem enough to buy all the land needed for offsetting principles. Some impacts from ancillary construction facilities, landscape and ecological mitigation and waste disposal will extend the impact “footprint” way beyond the line, adding to costs. The Government’s 2010 Lawton report proposes biodiversity offsetting which recognises all habitat value and assigns costs to identify the scale of compensation. It also states that if compensation and /or mitigation is undeliverable within the existing footprint, compensatory offsetting should be provided, on a 1:1 ratio at minimum. Land purchase, habitat establishment and land management (in perpetuity) are not factored into costs.

Rights of Way The AoS states it will maintain rights of way “in the long term where feasible”. It must be noted that even if access is maintained, the ability to enjoy a tranquil walk through open countryside will be lost. A major underestimate of the number of affected footpaths (based on assessments) means the business case does not reflect the true costs.

Route engineering Assessments show major disruption to a number of existing routes (road, rail, cyclist and pedestrian; man- made and natural) intercepted by HS2. Not all will be suitable for mitigation. Where routes can be diverted around, over, under or moved without permanent closure, the right solution will need to be sensitive to the environment and site appropriate. Such solutions may be costly and are not shown in the business case. These impacts will be felt along the entire length of the route. Still to be measured are the costs of disruptions or diversions to other transport networks, during a lengthy build programme.

Water The AoS admits that HS2 will affect groundwater, so failing to meet DfT sustainability objectives. Damage to groundwater could affect water supply that cannot be solved with expensive solutions (yet to be determined). Of particular concern is possible damage to the Chilterns AONB aquifer, which could limit water supply for many. The AoS recognises this risk but fails to prove that it can be managed. Rather the AoS assumes that money set aside for mitigation will cover all eventualities even though the Catchment Abstraction Management Strategies (CAMS, 2007) suggested that the Colne catchment, including the Misbourne, Chess, Gade, and Bulbourne chalk streams was already “over-abstracted”. If HS2 impacted public supplies, then any loss would need to be met from long distance imports of water.

Other Environmental Issues Potential delays The consultation documents do not consider possible delays (and associated costs) that may be encountered. DfT say that HS2 is subject to Environmental Impact Assessment, so all ecological surveys must be completed ahead of the Hybrid Bill, set for submission to Parliament in 2013. Given the scale and complexity HS2 Ltd must provide assurance that sufficient time is built into the project plan, should the Secretary of State choose to proceed with HS2. This timetable must not be short circuited for political expediency. Also, some surveys may need repeating if more than two years elapses between the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and the start of construction. This is good practice that the Government should adopt to ensure data is contemporary, but could further increase costs and impact the cost benefit ratio.

Planning requirements Designated Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) are protected by national legislation, with a presumption to refuse inappropriate development unless proposals identify “exceptional circumstances”. It has yet to be proved that HS2 is in the national interest and therefore it does not demonstrate exceptional circumstances. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w278 Transport Committee: Evidence

Planning Policy Statement 9 (PPS9) sets out how ecological impacts should be assessed and establishes the principle that all information presented, and impacts mitigated or compensated. Where this is not possible there is a presumption to refuse development. HS2 Ltd have proposed a single route, not assessed data, and assumed that all ecological issues can be overcome, inconsistent with PPS9.

Visual and landscape impacts HS2 will cut through some of the most iconic, valuable and valued countryside between London and Birmingham. The first section outside London bisects the Mid Colne Valley; a nationally important conservation site, SSSI, and Country Park. The section crossed by high viaduct is an open expanse of water attracting 70 breeding and 80 wintering species of bird, making it of national importance and possibly the most significant wetland breeding bird community in the area. The site is home to the Hillingdon Outdoor Activity Centre where residents, schools, and voluntary groups enjoy a variety of recreational facilities. These will be lost since the piers of the viaduct will interfere with the activities and the centre’s operation. When the route emerges from tunnel (close to Old Amersham, a conservation area with listed buildings and not far from a primary school) it cuts through the Chilterns AONB, on a range of tunnels, cuttings, viaducts and embankments. Claims that the A413 is a major transport route overstate the true nature of this single carriageway road through unspoilt countryside. Once beyond the AONB, it travels across open countryside, impacting on landscape and tranquillity, effects difficult to monetise but valued nonetheless by visitors, residents and businesses. Protection given to Hartwell House does recognise the value of designated assets, but there seems to be scant regard for undesignated but valued landscapes. Integrating a railway into any landscape can mean looking well beyond the rail corridor depending on visibility, landscape sensitivity and key receptors, to create the right landscape. HS2 Ltd show road and rail crossings but fail to give sufficient details about vertical realignments in critical areas, such as the crossing, that will have major impacts on the landscape and setting and cost and disruption implications. It is not just the current proposals that have major landscape and visual impacts, but also Phase 2 linking to Manchester, Leeds and Heathrow. Effects north of Birmingham are unclear, but a number of Heathrow options show routes that cut directly through two Country Parks within the Colne Valley. Black and Langley Parks attract more than half a million visitors each year, and offer filming locations for the adjacent Pinewood Studios.

Historic environment and heritage impacts Historic environment and heritage assets will be impacted by the route with effects being: — Physical destruction or harm during construction. — Adverse noise or visual intrusion on the setting of assets. — Loss of historic character by severing landscape patterns or linear features. — Harm from vibration, or alteration of water table. The AoS does not consider historic landscape patterns, a key feature of the AONB. It makes little mention of impact on undesignated assets or any mitigation. To suggest that: “Where practicable, the vertical alignment could be adjusted to avoid any identified deposits of archaeological significance” fails to account for engineering constraints. We believe most archaeological sites will be destroyed. Information about heritage impacts in Buckinghamshire can be found in Appendix 2.

Biodiversity and habitat impacts The Government’s Lawton Report (2010) stressed the need for wildlife corridors, showing that to rebuild ecological networks, better connections between, or joining sites, through physical corridors, or stepping stones was needed. As a result the Government announced plans to protect wildlife, halving the loss of habitats. It appears, however, that the HS2 proposals contradict such good intentions. Severing hundreds of wildlife corridors will have serious consequences for many species, not assessed in the AoS. HS2 will affect important species along the route; many internationally, nationally and locally protected species are already identified. Bechstein’s bats (protected by the EU Habitats Directive) are present in an area bisected by the route, (although further surveys are needed to confirm the population). Such effects must be fully investigated and reported in the EIA. Other species known to be impacted are detailed in Appendix Three. The AoS provides too little information about biodiversity and habitat impacts, and does not properly consider protected species. It fails to determine how cumulative impacts may be mitigated and key species protected. We believe this is a major omission. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w279

Conclusion

It is hard to believe that any infrastructure project, of similar significance, size or effects as HS2, here or abroad, would be subject to such little environmental impact assessment or scrutiny before choosing whether to progress the project and create such major blight.

Technically, the consultation documents show HS2 does not meet DfT’s sustainability objectives and there is grave concern that the Government is applying double standards; requiring less scrutiny for its own scheme compared to those promoted elsewhere. Other infrastructure projects would be expected to look at all impacts at the earliest stage.

HS2 will create major environmental damage that cannot be mitigated. Arguing the project is in the “national interest” cannot justify ignorance or non-quantification of that damage. As presented HS2 is an unsustainable and indefensible infrastructure project that admits huge environmental risks, but fails to show these can be mitigated, even at a strategic level, with no costs included in the business case. May 2011

APPENDIX ONE

KEY ENVIRONMENTAL FEATURES IN BUCKINGHAMSHIRE—INITIAL APPRAISAL Buckinghamshire Buckinghamshire Within 50m buffer Within 1km buffer Feature Length (No.) Area (No.) Green Belt 25.03 km 4569.7 ha Site of Special Scientific Interest 0.80 km (2) 269.6 ha (8) Biodiversity Action Plan habitat 0.51 km (10) 245.1 ha (27) Local Wildlife Site 2.26 km (10) 328.5 ha (36) Local Nature Reserve 0 (0) 30 ha (3) Local Geological Site 0 (0) 11 ha (4) Open Access Land 0 (N/A) 33.5 ha Village greens 0 (0) 1.2 ha (2) Protected Species Records (in 1km) N/A (425) No of different Protected Species (in 1 km) N/A (60)

Buckinghamshire Buckinghamshire Within 50m buffer Within 1km buffer Designated Heritage Assets296 Length (No.) Area (No.) Scheduled Ancient Monument 0.03 km (1) 3.5 ha (8) Listed buildings (Grade I or II*) N/A (0) (37) Listed buildings (Grade II) (7) (553) Registered Parks and Gardens 2.31 km (2) 416.1 ha (6) Conservation area 0.09 km (1) 295 ha (15)

Buckinghamshire Buckinghamshire Within 50m buffer Within 1km buffer Undesignated Heritage Assets297 Length (No.) Area (No.) Archaeological notification sites (25) (141) Ancient woodland 1.54 km (7) 474.0 ha Other significant historic landscape types: Not quantified Orchard (3) Historic meadow (12) Historic settlement (8) Historic parkland (2) Pre-18th C fields (53) 18th / 19th C fields (43) ALL HISTORIC ENVIRONMENT RECORDS 118 2,568

296 Planning Policy Statement 5 (PPS5) defines designated heritage assets as “A building, monument, site, place, area or landscape identified as having a degree of significance meriting consideration in planning decisions” and may be of archaeological, architectural, artistic or historic interest. 297 The majority of heritage assets are not designated but will still be of archaeological, architectural, artistic or historic interest. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w280 Transport Committee: Evidence

Buckinghamshire Rights of Way Number intersected by HS2 route Footpaths and Bridleways intersected 56

APPENDIX TWO HERITAGE IMPACTS IN BUCKINGHAMSHIRE—INITIAL APPRAISAL Turweston: HS2 in cutting 200m+ from village conservation area and listed buildings Chetwode: HS2 in cutting 75m from Grade II listed house and 300m from Grade I medieval church. Conservation area, medieval moats and priory affected. Twyford: HS2 on embankment 125m N of Grade I listed St.Mary’s medieval church and 80m from Grade II listed medieval vicarage. Steeple Claydon: 18th century Grade II listed Shepherd’s Furze Farm < 100m S of depot Upper Bernwood: Remote and distinctive landscape south of Claydon House, formerly part of medieval Bernwood Forest. Doddershall House: HS2 on embankment 400m from 16/17th century Grade II* listed house & park Waddesdon: HS2 on embankment 350m from registered park, affecting views from village conservation area, park and Grade I listed country house (National Trust). South → Fleet Marston: North HS2 cuts through Akeman Street beside largest Roman settlement in county Hartwell: HS2 cuts through Grade II* Hartwell Park, 370m from Hartwell House (Grade I) with major loss and severance of historic parkland. Grade II listed Glebe House lies within 20m of HS2 in cutting Old Stoke Mandeville: HS2 passes on viaduct 40m from ruined St Marys medieval church with major impact on setting and affecting archaeological remains of deserted village Grims Ditch, The Lea: HS2 destroys 90m of Grims Ditch, a scheduled prehistoric boundary bank East of Great Missenden: HS2 passes in cutting through Chilterns AONB severing field patterns, ancient woodland, lanes and harming setting of monuments and listed buildings Hyde End: HS2 cuts through Grade II listed Hyde Farm and barns—barns destroyed by cutting and farmhouse left within 25m of cutting edge Shardloes Park: HS2 in cutting 1.3 km long and up to 110m wide through part of Grade II* historic landscape park, set around Grade I listed country house Old Amersham: Cutting and tunnel entrance 300m N of town affects setting of conservation area Denham, Savay Farm: HS2 on viaduct 260m from Grade I listed medieval manor house

APPENDIX THREE PROTECTED SPECIES ALONG HS2 PREFERRED ROUTE 3 European protection — All other bats. — Great crested newts. — White-clawed crayfish. — Otters. — Dormice.

National protection — Amphibians & reptiles. — Water voles. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w281

— Barn owls. — Badgers. — Stag beetles. — Slow worms.

Local protection — Brown hares. — Hedgehogs. — All LBAP butterflies. — Black poplars. — Veteran trees. — Rare plants (some nationally scarce).

Written evidence from the Institution of Civil Engineers (HSR 103) 1. What are the main arguments either for or against High Speed Rail? 1.1 The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) believes that the current proposals of the UK Government for a High Speed Rail (HSR) network offers the potential for significant economic benefits to the North of England, the West Midlands and Scotland as a consequence of the freeing up of capacity on the existing congested classic national railway network and improved connectivity with London and markets with the rest of the European Union. 1.2 The HS2 proposals also offer a sustainable alternative to domestic and short haul flights providing that HS2 can compete with air travel on price, flexibility and connectivity. 1.3 Most importantly, the ICE believes the nation’s interests will be well served by addressing the real need to increase long-term transport capacity within this structured approach to the nation’s transportation planning. 1.4 The performance of a nation’s transport network is a key component of its productivity and competitiveness. Enhanced connectivity is critical to the economic growth of the nation’s major cities. Fast, integrated and reliable transport systems help sustain the productivity of urban areas, supporting deep and productive labour markets, and allowing businesses to reap the benefits of economic agglomeration. 1.5 Transport corridors are vital to both domestic and international trade, boosting the competitiveness of the UK economy. Put simply, better connectivity enhances business value, increases labour market catchments and workforce opportunities. This translates into more jobs, greater productivity, higher incomes and, ultimately, higher tax revenues. 1.6 Inter-urban rail services are expected to face increasingly severe capacity pressures. Demand for transport is concentrated on particular places, modes and times of day. Continued economic success has created increasing demands on the network, which are putting parts of the system under serious strain. 1.7 Network Rail have estimated that before 2020, the existing rail lines from London to the North and West of England will be operating beyond full capacity and the classic next generation tools for increasing capacity will be exhausted. This would constrain the economy, and continued growth in demand. 1.8 Put simply, capacity growth on congested corridors will soon be essential if the UK is to continue to grow and prosper both physically and economically. 1.9 However, there is a counter-argument to suggest that the funding which would be put forward for High Speed Rail would be better spent on upgrading the existing classic network. 1.10 There is an additional argument which questions whether we will actually need to travel as often in the future, in light of improved telecommunications and increased home-working. The responding argument is that cities and business clusters will continue to be as important in the future as they are today, but the question should be addressed. 1.11 We see High Speed Rail as a sustainable, economic and environmentally acceptable solution to achieving the necessary step change in capacity.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 2.1.1 The Eddington Transport Study, produced in 2006, stated that there was clear evidence that a comprehensive and high performing transport system is an important enabler of sustained economic prosperity: cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w282 Transport Committee: Evidence

a 5% reduction in travel time for all business and freight travel on the roads could generate around £2.5 billion of cost savings, which was quoted as being some 0.2% of GDP.298

2.1.2 Travel demand in the UK over recent decades has grown rapidly due to its continued economic success. This has created increased pressure on certain parts of the road network at certain times of the day. The rising cost of congestion could potentially waste an extra £22 billion worth of time in England by 2025.298

2.1.3 The nation already has some of the most crowded roads in the world. In 2007, the Green Light Group, which was facilitated by the ICE, published its report on Road Pricing, which identified the need for measures to be taken to reduce congestion on the UK’s roads. Traffic congestion in the UK is worse than in any other of the 15 members of the EU before enlargement. In Germany, 7% of road users experience congestion, while that figure is only 4% in France. In the UK, 20% of road users experience congestion, making UK roads much less reliable.299

2.1.4 The Green Light Group suggested some clear options of what could be done to mitigate this. These options were: — Build more roads; — Make better use of our roads—such as driving on the hard shoulders of motorways and ensuring the use of all lanes of motorways and dual carriageways; — Invest in new or improved public transport routes and services; — Encourage working from home, teleconferencing and driving at non-peak hours; — Encourage people to walk or cycle instead of travelling by car; — Concentrate new development in areas well served by public transport and limit the amount of town development; — Manage demand through parking schemes and road pricing.

Since the production of this report, further steps have been taken to encourage sustainable transport options within towns and cities. However, measures to provide an attractive alternative to car travel between urban agglomerations have not yet been taken.

2.1.5 The Green Light Group considered that a restructuring of the way in which transport services are priced and the way we paid for them was essential. A road-pricing scheme, which took into account the costs and environmental externalities, could lead to greater efficiency, as well as greater investment into both roads and public transport. The introduction of road pricing beyond local schemes designed to deal with local problems should be complemented but a restructuring of vehicle and fuel taxation.

2.1.6 However, in May 2010, the Transport Secretary, Philip Hammond, rejected calls to introduce road charging on England’s motorway network and described the existing fuel duty regime as an effective “pay as you go” system. In addition, although the Government objective to promote the electric car is a welcome step in terms of reducing carbon emissions, this will not impact upon reducing road congestion.

2.1.7 Therefore, alternative methods of reducing congestion on the road network must be sought, and High Speed Rail would provide a suitable and attractive alternative for inter-city business and leisure travel. The ICE and its membership will be considering these issues in greater detail before responding to the DfT consultation.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

2.2.1 It is fundamental that the UK continues to improve the “classic” rail network. High Speed Rail will only be able to work to its optimum if part of a complete network. This requires that the existing “classic” network acts as a complementary feeder to the high speed network. High speed trains will be able to access parts of the classic network to reach principal destinations.

2.2.2 The provision of High Speed Rail would release much needed capacity on the “classic” network to be used for more local and interconnecting services. This should provide a far better service in the vicinity of the HSR corridor. Also, if the proposals for High Speed Rail are approved, there would be the need to operate some high speed trains on the existing classic network. Therefore, the infrastructure would need to be improved sooner rather than later to reap the benefits of increased speed on the classic network before any high speed line is implemented.

2.2.3 Connections must be seamless if High Speed Rail is to be effective. Therefore, if High Speed Rail is to be introduced, the “classic” network should not be considered as a separate entity, but part of an holistic rail network, with additional integrated transport solutions applied for inner-suburban and urban travel. 298 Sir Rod Eddington, (2006), The Eddington Transport Study, The Case for action: Sir Rod Eddington’s advice to Government 299 The Green Light Group, (2007), Road Pricing: What are the facts? cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w283

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.3.1 In 2010, the ICE published its report Rethinking Aviation, which aimed to stimulate debate and highlight actions required to improve UK Aviation and Airport Infrastructure. Whilst it recognised the importance of aviation to investment in the UK economy, it documented that runway capacities at the busiest airports in London and the South East of England were severely constrained. This not only caused delays, but impeded the UK’s global connectivity, and ability to attract new long-haul services to and from emerging economies.300 2.3.2 As the UK emerges from recession it is essential to find new commercial opportunities in emerging markets. The ICE has encouraged strategically placed airport capacity to guarantee international connectivity for passengers and freight. More importantly, in relation to this Inquiry, the ICE supports the gradual surface- based substitution of short-haul flights within the UK. To enable this transition, more surface transport infrastructure, such as low carbon rail and road would need to be developed to not only ensure the UK meets its ambitious carbon reduction targets, but also to maintain regional connectivity as domestic air travel is reduced. 2.3.3 In 2009, the ICE produced its Aviation 2040 scenarios report, aimed at challenging industry and government to challenge their beliefs about what the future of air transport and infrastructure holds. The most significant message drawn from this report was that international long-haul aviation, in particular, is highly valuable to the UK economy and vital for maintaining the UK’s global competitiveness. However, unrestrained growth in aviation would lead to damaging long-term effects such as increased carbon emissions, higher noise levels and air pollution. This leads to the need to develop strategies that facilitate the provision of valuable long-haul business without extensive airport expansion. 2.3.4 Air travel and demand for air travel has risen in the UK, with respect to both domestic and international journeys. This is clearly putting pressure on airports and airspace. If a successful modal shift were to be achieved for short-haul domestic aviation, this could have significant implications for domestic aviation and reducing the environmental impact of increased air travel. It would be some time before High Speed Rail would be able to compete competitively with international short-haul flights, but, in the long-term, additional international short haul flights could be migrated onto rail. The success of the Eurostar High Speed Rail link from London to Paris/Brussels clearly illustrates the viability of this. 2.3.5 Therefore, the ICE would encourage the establishment of a network of fully integrated, low-carbon surface transport infrastructure solutions to provide alternatives to domestic short-haul air services in the long-term.

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 3.1.1 The assumptions and methodology appear fairly robust. Our members have commented that the level of detail they have received is comprehensive and far beyond the level provided in previous consultations. However, with regard to operational costs, these were based on 2009 prices. The costs of oil have risen somewhat since this time, due partly to the 2011 “Arab-Spring” and the instability of Governments within the Middle Eastern region. This should be borne in mind. Of course, the energy mix of the trains being used would dictate the operational costs and it is not possible to predict how far energy costs will have risen by 2026. The key issue is that high speed trains would be powered by electricity and, that it is up to current energy strategists in government and industry must ensure that, in the future, UK grid electricity will be generated with the lowest carbon impact. As far as possible, this should be insulated from political manipulation.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.2.1 Upgrading the West Coast Main Line or adding a new conventional line would provide additional capacity, but it would not match High Speed Rail for speed, and would not be as effective in encouraging a modal shift from air/car travel to rail. Congestion on the WCML is only a significant problem southeast of Rugby, so the high-speed route must take account of that section. 3.2.2 However, a further upgrade of the WCML would be extremely disruptive to the existing train services during construction, as occurred during the previous upgrade. Upgrades can also be far more costly, relative to the benefits accrued than new railways. It will always be more expensive to work on an existing railway where trains are still required to operate. This is even without accounting for any compensation which would be liable to rail operators and/or customers, where the cost penalty can be huge. 3.2.3 A new high speed railway would provide a step change in travel times and route possibilities for many potential users, particularly once the line is extended further north. Research indicates that significant modal 300 Institution of Civil Engineers (2010): Rethinking Aviation cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w284 Transport Committee: Evidence

shift to rail from other modes can be achieved once journey times are reduced to below three hours. New convenient direct services would be possible between our major cities.301

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.3.1 This would be a short-term option which would do little to increase the UK’s competitiveness, and would do little or nothing to increase economic growth or resolve the real need for additional transport capacity. Rail travel should be encouraged as a reliable, effective and affordable source of travel, not limited to the wealthy.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.4.1 The Government should ensure that a new high speed line is built to standard specifications used previously, such as for High Speed 1 or a French LGV. This reduces risks of use of new technologies, which can delay projects or lead to cost escalations. High Speed 1 (the Channel Tunnel Rail Link) was built to time and to budget on that basis. The ability for the track to cater for double-deck rail carriages should also be considered strongly. 3.4.2 High Speed 1 was successful in terms of its construction planning and execution. There is substantial information available publically on lessons learned and of course this is directly comparable to HS2, being a high speed railway to be constructed in the UK. Infrastructure UK (IUK) has investigated the reasons why construction costs are relatively high in the UK and the ICE is working with IUK on implementation.

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1.1 The ICE West Midlands regional office is currently considering whether these are the best locations for a High Speed Rail route. High Speed Rail will be most effective if it travels quickly from city-centre to city-centre, and allows seamless interchange to allow passengers to arrive at their destination. Curzon Street should allow this assuming that increased public transport connectivity is provided. 4.1.2 A stop at Birmingham International would seem a sensible option. Birmingham Airport is a Strategic National Asset and is running at less than 40% capacity. There is spare capacity at Birmingham—enough capacity to take another nine million passengers immediately and an anticipated 21 million plus passengers in future years, as capability is enhanced in line with existing Planning Consents. Currently, London Euston is only 70 minutes from Birmingham Airport. With a High Speed Rail link between London and Birmingham in place this could be reduced to just 38 minutes. This would provide a realistic solution to alleviating capacity shortages at airports in the South-East. 4.1.3 The Old Oak Common station would seem a sensible option to provide a link to Heathrow Airport, if a direct link to Heathrow is essential. Appropriate junction engineering works would be included to make it possible for a High Speed spur to Heathrow to be built at a later date. 4.1.4 With regard to the case for more intermediate stations, this should be assessed by considering whether or not these impact greatly upon the journey time between city-centres. The key attractions of High Speed Rail are speed and capacity. Increasing journey times would slow the service and reduce line capacity, therefore making the service less attractive to long distance travellers. It would be far better to add stations to the classic lines where this would increase overall accessibility to the rail network once High Speed 2 is operational, for example on the Chiltern Line or the West Coast Main Line.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.2.1 This is an issue we are currently discussing with our members. It is vitally important that we consider, at this stage, whether this strategic route is the right option for providing a truly national High Speed Network. HS2 has to be designed to the correct holistic railway engineering principles. The key points on which the new railway has to perform are on the attached document. 4.2.2 Regardless of the cities served, good connectivity from those not served will be essential. There must be frequent, fast and reliable connections between cities and any HSR hubs. The resulting overall journey times for real passengers must be competitive with the alternative transport modes such as road or air. The requirement to provide airport links, particularly to Heathrow, has a huge effect on the ultimate “high speed” solution. We have to prioritise the key aim, which is to end up with an efficient, high-capacity, inter- conurbation railway. 301 Network Rail (2008): High Speed Rail Investment; an overview of the literature cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:11] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w285

4.2.3 Connectivity outside London, inter-regionally, is a major shortcoming of current UK rail transport. Improving this situation needs to be a key objective of any new rail development whether high speed or not, if the UK is to achieve worthwhile modal shift to rail.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.3.1 In our view, yes, because this would lead to staged resource requirements at each stage, eg for design, procurement and construction, and reduces the timescale for Stage 1, which leads to earlier benefits for all.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.4.1 Yes. A link to HS1 would be difficult and intrusive to construct at a later stage; would bring immediate benefits of reduced journey times for passengers travelling from the north to the continent, and reduce the number of passengers travelling through the London terminal stations. However, we consider that the link, as provided for in the current proposal, is inadequate and should be enhanced to improve capacity from that envisaged in the current proposal. 4.4.2 Given that the London Heathrow to Manchester and Leeds routes have much greater potential to attract modal shift than London Heathrow to Birmingham, it would appear sensible for the construction of the LHR link to be constructed as part of Phase 2. Also, the interchange at Old Oak Common onto Crossrail will allow immediate benefits for passengers travelling to Heathrow from the north. Additional reductions in journey time through a later direct link to Heathrow can be added in stage 2 when demand has increased.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.1.1 Lille is an example, as it was in economic decline until the arrival of the LGV to Paris and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. It is now France’s third most prosperous city. The arrival of the High Speed Line would benefit the regions that it serves ie Birmingham, the North West (Liverpool/Manchester), the East Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East, all of which would help bridge the North/South divide.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.2.1 Its route should be influenced by where the demand is greatest, but the exact locations should be agreed with the local authorities to fit in with their local regeneration plans and where there is, or will be, good connectivity with other local areas.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.3.1 Potentially all, from businessmen on the high speed trains; those using the route for leisure; through to those able to make more local rail journeys because of the freed up capacity on the classic routes. Another argument is that without HS2, capacity on the rail network may end up being regulated via escalating fares, which could lead to rail travel only for the rich. This is something that Government will need to address.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 5.4.1 HS2 should be funded centrally as a national strategic project, free from local funding uncertainties. If European Union (EU) funding is available then it would further improve the business case.

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1.1 The proposals states that the impact on greenhouse gas emissions as a result of the implementation of high speed rail will be broadly neutral and we have no evidence or reason to disagree with this conclusion. We would like to state strongly, that every effort should be made now to ensure that carbon emissions are kept to a minimum during construction and operation. 6.1.2 High Speed Rail lines would be electrified, which provides the possibility of using a carbon free source of energy, whereas inter urban road and air transport are currently dependent on oil. Electrically powered trains are also free from local air pollution, except for a small amount of particulate matter from braking at the point of use, although the visual intrusion and noise from a new high speed line is often the subject of controversy. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w286 Transport Committee: Evidence

6.1.3 In terms of energy consumption, High Speed Rail has a substantial advantage over air, car and conventional rail travel. HS2 trains would have fewer stops, and most of the energy consumption occurs when trains accelerate. 6.1.4 Diverting traffic from roads does not simply affect greenhouse gases, but also reduces road noise, accidents, local air pollution and congestion. The biggest external benefits of HSR are likely to come where road or air is highly congested and expansion of these modes is difficult and expensive in terms of environmental costs. 6.1.5 Ultimately for High Speed Rail to reduce greenhouse gases, it must depend on a non-fossil fuel source of electricity generation.302 Electrified high speed rail will be low carbon or carbon free automatically to the extent that the nation’s power generation system becomes so. 6.1.6 The embedded carbon, representing the carbon emissions associated with construction operations has been accounted for in the appraisal of sustainability. Although the source is subject to uncertainty, there is scope to reduce emissions by the selection of plant equipment, and every effort should be made to reduce carbon where possible.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2.1 The environmental costs and benefits are sufficiently accounted for, although we would have appreciated further details of the energy mix which would be used for High Speed Rail. We believe also that the impact of noise during operation has been sufficiently accounted and justified.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.3.1 HS2 would release additional freight paths on the classic network. This again has further environmental advantages. Overall rail produces less than 1% of the total U.K. emissions of carbon dioxide, the principle green house gas, compared with 21% from road transport.303 Tonne for tonne rail freight produces 90% less carbon dioxide than road transport.304 With pressure on the classic network reduced owing to the reduction of long distance trains on West Coast Main Line there would be great potential to increase the number of train paths available for freight services, leading to increased capacity and reliability of freight services and further possibilities of modal shift from road to rail for freight.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4.1 It should be possible to follow a phased construction sequence as at St Pancras International, whereby the new terminal platforms on the west side of Euston are constructed, then the existing services are switched to the new platforms whilst work on the existing platforms is carried out, then the existing trains switched back to the refurbished side. This could be done with a few blockade weekends at bank holidays without too much interference to existing services May 2011

Written evidence from Derwent London plc (HSR 104) 1. As Chief Executive of Derwent London plc, I am writing in response to the consultation on high speed rail that will form part of the Transport Select Committee’s inquiry. 2. Derwent London is the largest Central London focussed REIT with a portfolio valued at over £2.4 billion. In particular, we have a substantial land holding adjacent to Euston Station at 132–142 Hampstead Road that will be directly affected by the proposed HS2 central London terminus. 3. We support investment in the economy through infrastructure projects and indeed supported Crossrail having owned the Tottenham Court Road Station over site development for 20 years. 4. We are of the opinion that substantial savings could be achieved by altering the route, whilst maintaining the key benefits to the economy of HS2. We therefore urge the committee to consider alternative options to terminating HS2 at Euston. 5. We support HS2 in principle, however, we are concerned about the significant implications surrounding the route terminating at Euston. 6. Current plans for the proposed HS2 rail link suggest that the route will follow the North London line through Camden. This would require our Euston site to be the subject of a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO), which has the potential to be the largest ever CPO granted in the United Kingdom. Given the high property 302 Nash, C (2010), When to invest in high-speed networks and rail links 303 DfT Ports Policy consultation (2010)—Rail freight’s role 304 DfT Ports Policy consultation (2010)—Rail freight’s role cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w287

values in Central London and in light of the Government’s budget reduction programme, substantial savings could be made by not bringing HS2 into Central London and terminating at an alternative site such as Old Oak Common.

7. Euston Station is already under strain in terms of capacity. The London Underground is unlikely to be able to cope with the additional passenger numbers that will be brought into Euston by HS2 without substantial additional investment. Terminating HS2 at Old Oak Common would avoid this issue by allowing HS2 passengers to connect onto Crossrail.

8. We support the assertion that should the current plans for HS2 go ahead further consideration will be required in order to deal with the additional large numbers of people arriving at London Euston. We also agree that further consideration needs to be given to the impact HS2 will have on passenger flows across London and particularly the additional demand it will bring to the London Underground.

9. The Network Rail Route Utilisation Strategy Consultation 2010 contained options which proposed increasing connectivity to Old Oak Common from the West Coast Mainline services. The major benefit of this option is the reduction in demand on the Underground system at Euston. Likewise, this option could be used in respect of HS2 in order to reduce the costs of HS2 and capacity overload coming into London Euston.

10. The proposed extended terminus for Euston will have significant implications to the surrounding area in terms of long term blight and the damaging effect this will have on the area. The lack of certainty as to timing that a proposal such as this can bring, having experienced the stop/start nature of Crossrail, gives us grave concern.

11. Should the Euston terminus go ahead the size of the project will also severely impact on the area with hundreds of residential units being demolished as part of the redevelopment. Hammersmith & Fulham Council strongly supports the redevelopment of Old Oak Common and the new homes it will create.

12. In conclusion, we are of the view that there are more attractive alternatives to terminating HS2 at Euston both in terms of transport connectivity and cost.

13. We are currently engaging with adjoining owners and the in respect of the impact of HS2 and would be happy to provide further assistance or any clarification which would assist the committee. May 2011

Written evidence from Jane Farley (HSR 105)

I do not believe that there is any credible argument in favour of HS2 and many reasons against it.

Rail Package 2 would provide more than the required capacity on the West coast Mainline at one sixth of the cost and in a much shorter time.

The forecast requirements for travel are based on inaccurate, unsubstantiated information and do not take into consideration the effect of faster broadband and internet connectivity.

HS2 can only replace domestic air journeys served by its route plus the forecast reduction in travel time of approximately 20 mins by 2032 is not sufficient to make an impression on potential air travel.

The scheme will not benefit the north as research has shown that HS2 will serve only the top 20% salary earners with the majority of jobs being created in the south, particularly London. In fact it could be said to exacerbate the problem rather than relieve it.

The project is incredibly expensive with a business case that is not proven. The £30 billion could be saved and a far smaller sum used to invest in existing rail networks and schemes to improve transport as well as discourage unnecessary journeys. At a time of financial restraint and government cutbacks to propose spending so much money on an unproven scheme must be wrong.

The lessons of HS1 have not been heeded and rail travel in Britain already compares favourably with high speed rail in Europe.

This scheme is hugely expensive, has an unproven business case, is not going to deliver either sufficiently better travel links or improve the north/south divide as has been argued. In addition it will be hugely destructive of the environment, cutting through Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, imposing years of upheaval, social and economic disruption to those living along the line. If approved this project could affect thousands upon thousands of peoples lives in this country as their environment is down graded, property is destroyed or significantly devalued and their daily lives are blighted by constant, repetitive noise. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w288 Transport Committee: Evidence

No one who does not work for HS2 or is not a politician looking for a glamorous project to pin their name to could possibly think this scheme was a proper or wise use of public money. It is most likely that those who promote this scheme will not be in office to deal with the social, environmental and economic problems that will result if this scheme goes ahead. My whole family including many who are not living anywhere close to the proposed line are against this scheme and will continue to do everything we can to stop it. May 2011

Written evidence from the Civil Engineering Contractors Association (HSR 106) About the Civil Engineering Contractors Association The Civil Engineering Contractors Association (CECA) was formed in 1996 to provide a single industry voice for civil engineering contractors in the UK. With more than 300 member companies, ranging from the largest international construction companies in the industry to specialist SME suppliers operating at a regional or local level, CECA represents those companies that are involved in the construction and maintenance of the UK’s transport and utility networks. Our members are estimated to deliver between 70 and 80 per cent of the total £20 billion of civil engineering work carried out the UK annually. CECA members will be intimately involved in the delivery of future nationally-significant infrastructure such as the High Speed Rail network, and as such we are keen to work closely with Government to ensure the delivery of future project both on time and to budget.

CECA’s Stated Policy on High Speed Rail CECA’s stated policy on High Speed Rail, drafted in November 2010 and agreed by the CECA Rail Forum and Transport Committees, is as follows: “CECA recognises the significant benefits that can be delivered through the introduction of High Speed Rail to some of the UK’s largest conurbations.” “Such a network would contribute to growth. In the short term it will provide a stimulus to the construction sector, which represents a significant proportion of the UK’s economic output. In the longer term, an operational High Speed Rail system will deliver improved journey times between UK cities, reduce congestion from existing transport networks and encourage the transfer of traffic from road to rail.” “However we are concerned about the business case for High Speed Rail when compared with other forms of transport investment. Current estimates for the London to Birmingham section of HS2 suggest a funding requirement in the order of £11Ð13 billion. Were the full cost of such a proposal to be drawn from public funding, it is likely that this would lead to shortfalls in other areas of transport funding. As such it is essential that any publically-funded High Speed Rail system first demonstrates that it presents better value-for-money than if they same amount of funding were to be directed towards traditional projects.”

CECA Reponses to the Select Committee Questions on High Speed Rail CECA is unable to comment on every question the Select Committee on Transport plans to address with regards to High Speed Rail. However, points in response to the questions set CECA wishes to raise are as follows: For and Against High Speed Rail—CECA believes that the implementation of a High Speed Rail Network would, like other nationally-significant infrastructure projects, act as a key driver to economic growth. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report places the overall quality of the UK’s railway infrastructure 19th out of 139 competitor countries, and the overall quality of the UK’s infrastructure a disappointing 33rd out of 139, despite its status as the world’s 6th largest economy. In the short term, the implementation of High Speed Rail would provide a much-needed boost to the UK’s construction sector, which has suffered disproportionately during the economic downturn of the last three years. Furthermore, High Speed Rail will deliver improved journey times between UK cities and reduce congestion on the existing transport network. However, CECA is concerned that should the funding for High Speed Rail be drawn from the existing transport budget, or from other sources of public funding, this will negatively impact on other sectors of the UK’s transport infrastructure that require both continued maintenance and further investment. To detract from existing investment infrastructure for the purpose of building High Speed Rail would be detrimental to the UK’s infrastructure as a whole at a time when improving that infrastructure is both stated Government policy and widely acknowledged to be crucial to achieving the economic growth necessary to a secure recovery. While achieving inter-urban connectivity will have obvious economic benefits, to do so at the expense of other sectors of the transport network, such as the strategic road network, would undermine the Government’s strategy of improving UK infrastructure in a holistic manner. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w289

Lessons to Learn from Other Major Transport Projects—It is of vital importance that nationally significant infrastructure projects be implemented in a consistent manner within a suitable time-frame. By their very nature, infrastructure projects involve large-scale works over large geographical areas, and must be implemented over a longer time-frame than other construction projects. It is of vital importance for the successful delivery of major infrastructure projects that there is no unnecessary delay in the commissioning and procurement process, and that civil engineering contractors are enabled to deliver projects free from unnecessary regulations or bureaucracy. Our organisations long experience in this area provides us with a good understanding of the factors that make the difference between success and failure when it comes to the delivery of major infrastructure projects. Key points to consider include: — Visibility—the supply chain must have good visibility and confidence in the forward work programme associated with delivery of the project. By providing this, suppliers can invest in the skills, innovation and equipment that will be required to deliver world class performance on the project. Such visibility will include regular engagement with the supply chain as early plans are developed, to allow industry to challenge assumptions and identify potential risks and conflicts before they have the chance to impact upon the project. — Early involvement—Having worked on similar projects, UK suppliers can provide considerable expertise in the development of projects as they move towards delivery on the ground. Early appointment of supply chain teams will help secure the best value solution to each element of the project. — Client capability—it is essential that for a project of the scale of High Speed 2, the expectations of the quality of the finished product are matched by the capability of those who will be required to manage delivery of the project. Poor or unclear management represents one of the greatest risk factors for major infrastructure projects. May 2011

Written evidence from Stop HS2 Ltd. (HSR 107) This submission is on behalf of Stop HS2 Ltd. Although we focus on the proposal by HS2 Ltd, some of the material may be relevant to other possible high speed rail proposals.

0. Introduction—What is HS2? HS2 is a proposed new high speed rail line, designed for running at speeds of up to 400kph. It is proposed to join Euston and Birmingham in Phase 1 at a capital cost of £17 billion (2009 prices): rolling stock will cost another £3 billion, including some specially designed “classic compatible” trains. It is also proposed to include a link to HS1, although the designs for this have not been made public. The government anticipate a second phase of the route, beyond Birmingham. This will have two branches, one on to Manchester and another to Leeds, with stations at East Midlands and South Yorkshire. This phase will include a link to Heathrow. HS2 Ltd anticipate the total cost for both phases to be about £33 billion in 2009 prices.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR 1.1 Arguments Against HS2 1.1.1 Unclear policy objectives Following the consultation on the Coalition’s programme for government, the Department for Transport said:305 “Our vision is of a truly national high speed rail network for the whole of Britain. We believe it can play a significant role in promoting a low carbon economy thereby helping to make our country greener and more sustainable. We believe it will be a transformational project that will revolutionise travel between our major cities and will almost eliminate the need for internal domestic flights.” Since the publication of that statement, the government has suggested a number of other reasons to go ahead with HS2. These range from promoting a low carbon economy (HS2 Ltd’s own documentation shows HS2 won’t reduce carbon emissions), to healing the north-south divide, to reshaping the economic geography of Britain and to providing extra capacity for commuters. 1.1.2 Opportunity Costs Alternative lower risk strategies could deliver benefits earlier. A FOI request by Speen HS2 action group306 showed that the government is expected to spend about £1.1 billion on HS2 in the period to 2015. The capital cost of Phase 1 is £17 billion. 305 http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/government/pfg/ 306 http://www.speenbucks.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/FOI10–047.doc cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w290 Transport Committee: Evidence

Clearly, this level of spending would finance a large number of alternative projects. Spending it all on one project which will not provide any benefits until 2026 is a high risk strategy, and means that the money cannot be used on smaller incremental projects which will meet policy objectives. Treasury “green book” guidelines recommend incremental improvements and addressing pinch points rather then big transformational projects. 1.1.3 Environmental costs Almost all large scale projects will have environmental consequences. It is therefore important that the projects are designed sensitively, and that the design constraints are chosen so as to balance the needs of the users of the project versus the damage to the environment and the areas through which it will pass. By choosing a design speed of 400 kph, HS2 Ltd have increased energy consumption and made it harder to avoid environmentally sensitive areas. 1.1.4 Cost in the UK The cost of building HS2 will be higher per kilometre then the cost of building high speed lines anywhere else in the world. A UIC document307 gives the typical price of constructing a high speed line as €12–30 million per kilometer, far less then the cost of building HS2.

1.2 Arguments in favour of building HSR used elsewhere 1.2.1 Possibility of modal shift from air, due to time savings Many high speed projects across the world lead to large time savings compared to using classic rail. It is typical for high speed rail journey times to take less than half of the time of the conventional rail journey: often as little as a third of the conventional rail journey they replace. In contrast, the HS2 Economic case, published in February 2011, lists a number of UK journeys and their time savings after completion of HS2 phase 1 and 2. Not a single journey they list is reduced to half the time. In minutes, the reductions in UK journey times are very small compared to other countries. For example the HS2 Consultation document (p38) says the Tokyo-Osaka journey reduced from 7 hours to 2 hours 25 minutes, a time saving of 4.5 hours. In contrast the largest time saving in the HS2 Economic case (p10) is one hour, with one example journey (Newcastle to London) being only 15 minutes faster. All of this at a far higher cost per kilometer to the UK then other countries spend. It is agreed that these large time savings elsewhere prompt the large scale modal switch from air to high speed rail. However, in the UK, domestic air passenger numbers are already falling. For example, air’s share of passengers between Manchester and London has been decreasing by approximately 5% a year from 2003, compared with rail. Because HS2 only links London and a limited number of cities, there is a limit to how much effect it would have on cross country flights. 1.2.2 Filling in missing links in the network Countries like the Netherlands have built high speed rail lines to fill in gaps in the European network. Although a direct link to HS1 will extend the network, HS2 trains will not be able to run at full speed in Kent, because the design speed of HS1 is lower. It should be noted that HS1 was originally expected to link to the West Coast Main Line. 1.2.3 Other countries’ experience In recent months, other countries are having second thoughts about their high speed ambitions. These include China, Portugal, the US, Brazil and the Netherlands. Rather then being left behind in a high speed rail race, it looks like Britain will be seen to have had a lucky escape from a financial fiasco.

2.0 How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives The HS2 proposal appears at odds with other transport strategies. 2.0.1 Carbon reductions High Speed rail was included in the Coalition’s Programme for Government as a means of reducing carbon emissions. However the HS2 Ltd main report published in March 2010 says: “Perhaps the most important point to note is that this is equivalent to a range of −0.3% to +0.3% of UK transport emissions. So HS2 would not be a major factor in managing carbon in the transport sector.” p180 On 9 February 2011, Philip Hammond sent a letter308 to MP’s in which he said “our proposed London-West Midlands line is expected to be broadly carbon neutral”. 307 High Speed rail: fast track to sustainable mobility, Nov 2010. 308 http://stophs2.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/DfT_Hammond_letter_to_MPs_re_StopHS2.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w291

2.0.2 Reducing Demand for Travel—the Government’s non-travel remit In a speech on sustainable travel which Philip Hammond gave last year he said:309 “Promoting alternatives to travel is a key part of the sustainability agenda. And although it has not traditionally been thought of as a transport responsibility, I have decided that we should integrate it into our transport agenda.” Far from discouraging travel, the HS2 proposal assumes that travel will continue to grow unabated. Further, they say the new rail route will encourage travel to the extent that 22% of travellers on the route are only traveling because the rail link has been built. Alternative ways of spending money, such as ultra-fast broadband would fit better with this part of the Dft’s strategy, and potentially benefit everyone in the country.

2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? HS2 does nothing to improve inter-urban connectivity. HS2 as proposed links cities which have already got good rail links. Travellers between Birmingham and London can already chose between the WCML and the Chilterns Line. Similarly there are existing rail routes between all the cities which will be connected in phase 2 of the plans. There is no evidence that HS2 Ltd considered links with other proposed rail projects, such as the East-West line which will join Oxford, Milton Keynes, Bedford and Cambridge.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? Many supporters of HS2 refer to an improved rail system which would be possible if HS2 and other improvements are made. This is a commitment over and above the possible spending on HS2. A typical example is:310 “HS2 will require a package of supporting measures on the existing rail network to maximise benefits.” p3 These other improvements will cost money, which is not included in the HS2 business case. In many cases, these improvements can go ahead, even if HS2 is not built. The opportunity costs of HS2 matter, because the more money allocated to HS2 and the associated improvements the less money available for other projects. These include the electrification of the rail line between Cardiff and Swansea.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? According to a BATA briefing paper,311 85% of domestic routes are over water or involve locations that cannot be served by high speed rail.

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 3.1.1 Passenger Forecasts It is Stop HS2’s view that the passenger forecasts for HS2 are unsound. HS2 Ltd were widely criticised for the passenger growth figures in their original proposal. Their February 2011 proposal has decreased their forecast growth rate. However, they have also extended the cutoff date for the forecasts. In March 2010, they used a cutoff date of 2033 for passenger forecasts, justified as it took the forecast period beyond the opening date of HS2. However, the Febraury 2011 proposal now uses the cutoff date of 2043—10 years later then in the March 2010 document. 309 http://www.dft.gov.uk/press/speechesstatements/speeches/hammond20100910 310 How HS2 Will Transform the West Midlands http://www.highspeed2westmidlands.co.uk/Images/ Centro%20Study%20on%20Economic%20benefits%20of%20released%20capcity_tcm37–33083.pdf 311 Air and High Speed Rail Briefing Paper—The Realities of Rail, March 2010, BATA, http://www.bata.uk.com/Web/Documents/data/policybriefingnotes/ BATA%20Air%20and%20High%20Speed%20Rail%20Briefing%20Paper%20March%202010.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w292 Transport Committee: Evidence

HS2 Ltd’s reason for this is:312 “…For our earlier work we capped growth of rail demand in 2033, at a level of demand in the WCML corridor that is slightly more than double current levels. With the lower current GDP forecasts, this cap would now be hit later, in 2043. This level of demand is consistent with households becoming wealthier as GDP per head grows and adopting lifestyles with more frequent long distance travel as demonstrated by those in higher income bands today. We have also capped our forecasts for growth of demand for other transport modes at 2043.” This is the wrong way round. One should choose a suitable cutoff date first, and then see what the demand level is at that date. Instead HS2 have picked the level of demand that suits their business case and then chosen the date that fits. In addition, demand estimates for high speed rail are frequently wrong: Fitch ratings313 say that nine out of 10 rail projects are overestimated. This can be seen with HS1: in 2009 the total passengers was 9.2 million whereas the original forecast said there would be 25 million in 2006. HS1 ignored possible competition from ferries, and the case for HS2 ignores competition from other rail franchises. Another competitor for HS2 is the increasing use of videoconferencing. If saving half an hour on a train journey is sufficiently important to make a difference, how much better would it be to not have to make a journey at all? Just like HS1 faced unexpected competition from low-cost airlines offering cheap flights to alternative destinations, so HS2 faces competition from videoconferencing. And there are as yet unknown competitors. Speculatively, as the first generation of teenagers to grow up with easy access to the internet reaches working age, what will that do to working practises…? 3.1.2 Modal Shift High speed rail is often cited as causing in modal shift from air. However, with HS2 65% of passengers are expected to have transferred from classic rail: only 6% from air and 7% from car. At the moment there are no scheduled flights between London and Birmingham. Rail’s share of the London Manchester market is increasing by about 5% a year. There is limited scope for further modal shift: in 2009, 74% of passengers on domestic flights between Heathrow and Manchester were transferring onto a connecting flight.314 3.1.3 Fares HS2’s demand figures are based on HS2 fares being similar to existing fares. Other high speed lines use premium fares. Rail fares in the UK are currently heavily subsidised. If the demand figures are wrong, then it will be necessary for the government to subsidise HS2 heavily meaning less money available to subsidise passengers on the classic lines. One report about fares on HS2 often cited by people who support HS2 is by Greengauge 21:315 However, the analysis in this report is less then robust, consisting of the following circular argument: — Because many travelers currently use discounts at the moment, train fares are affordable by all segments of the population. — The HS2 business case is based on HS fares being similar to “classic” train fares. — Therefore high speed train fares will be affordable by all segments of the population. The report has no explanation of why fares will be the same other than that is what the HS2 business case says. 3.1.4 Value of time Most of the so called “economic benefits” of HS2 come from the notional value of time savings. These are separated into business user savings and commuter and leisure user savings. Over half the monatarised benefits come from business user savings, so it is vital that these are robust. Recent academic work shows that the amount of time spent working by business travelers on the train has been increasing over the last decade. A 2008 paper says that:316 “In the UK a trend over time is discernible by comparison with the activities reported in the Autumn 2004 National Passenger Survey. A like-for-like comparison gave the proportion of business travellers who 312 Economic Case p 15 3.2.9 313 http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/presentations/2010/gig/fitch_high_speed_rail_projects_apr2010.pdf 314 Air and High Speed Rail Briefing Paper—The Realities of Rail. March 2010 http://www.bata.uk.com/Web/Documents/data/policybriefingnotes/ BATA%20Air%20and%20High%20Speed%20Rail%20Briefing%20Paper%20March%202010.pdf 315 http://www.greengauge21.net/wp-content/uploads/HSR-AffordableToAll.pdf high-speed-rail-fair-and-affordable/ “High-Speed Rail: fair and affordable”. 316 The Productive Use of Rail Travel Time and Value of Travel Time Saving for Travellers in the course of Work, 2008 The Mott MacDonald IWT Consortium cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w293

spend some time working/studying as 52% in Autumn 2004, 79% in Spring 2008. Whilst a like-for-like comparison of the percentage of time they spend working/studying has not yet been undertaken, the two surveys yield estimates of 43% in 2004 (for 1h-3h journeys), and 57% in 2008, again suggestive of a strong upward trend.” p8 The paper says the time spent working on trains is nearly as productive as work in the office—respondents reported on train productivity levels of between 96–98% compared to being in the office (p9). The study also looked at the effects of crowding on trains and concluded:317 “Table 5 sets this out split by crowding bands, and indicates that increasing crowding does have an impact on productivity—but that productivity remains high, even in the worst crowding conditions.” These results show that currently used assumptions about the value of time for business travelers on trains are out of date and should be revised. This is especially important for a project which will not start operating for 15 years. 3.1.5 Costs to business affected by construction and running HS2 The economic case makes no mention of the costs to businesses caused by the construction and operation of HS2. Anecdotal evidence show that building the new rail link will directly affect many businesses of a range of sizes.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? HS2 will have limited effects on the rail network outside the London to the North corridor. It will do nothing to relieve capacity issues on trains to Wales, the West Country, the South coast or East Anglia. The cost of HS2 is being treated as if it was a stand alone project. However organisations which support HS2, including Centro, Virgin trains, Greengauge 21 and Birmingham Airport. say that it is also necessary to undertake other improvements to the transport system so as to benefit from HS2. These include improvements to the West Coast Main Line. The alternative to HS2 in the economic case is a “do-nothing” scenario. This is clearly untenable, as according to Theresa Viliers, at the Parliamentary Lobby Day organised by Stop HS2 in October 2010, the West Coast Main Line will run out of capacity before HS2 will open. Rail Package 2 has also been put forward as an alternative to HS2, but has attracted criticism recently. It is important for any business case that it is compared to a well developed and credible alternative. Unless this done, how can HS2 be seen as the best option? It should be noted that the Department for Transport is arguing against West Coast Main Line improvements: for instance in their FAQ about HS2, written for a general audience, they say:318 “Wouldn’t it be better just to upgrade the existing lines? I’ve heard people say that ‘Rail Package 2’ offers an alternative to high speed rail. The 1998–2009 upgrade of the West Coast Main Line demonstrated the difficulties of upgrading a busy ‘live’ rail line. The upgrade took over a decade, cost £9 billion and caused huge disruptions for the passengers that use the line. Another upgrade, such as Rail Package 2, would provide nowhere near the new capacity of a high speed line or its speed and connectivity benefits while again causing massive disruption for passengers.” In addition, because HS2 ltd say it will offer a more attractive service between London and the North, consideration should be given to the effects on other long distance journeys (eg Leeds to Oxford), which involve cross country routes and changes at places like Birmingham New Street. If using the high speed service makes it more convenient to travel via London, this will have an effect on the demand for other routes from London.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? A report in November 2010 by the Public Accounts Committee criticised the rail industry for its attitudes to solving problems. It said (our italics):319 “The unique and complex structure of the rail industry makes it inherently cumbersome and expensive, and provides little external challenge to its vested interest in its own growth. The Department should conduct a fundamental review of the rail industry’s structure, to ensure better accountability and value for money, with the aim of reducing conflicts of interest, aligning efforts on maximising efficiency, and restraining the tendency to seek solutions through growth.” 317 ibid 318 http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/faq 319 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubacc/471/471.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w294 Transport Committee: Evidence

The report suggested a number of alternatives, such as smart cards and changes to the way season tickets work. Schemes like this can be rolled out across the entire country, benefiting commuters on overcrowded trains everywhere.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? The biggest problem facing HS2 is that not enough detail has been made available before the public consultation. Many questions raised during the consultation period have no clear answer. There are numerous questions about the strategic business case as well as the environmental case. Technical challenge is taking place behind closed doors. Information is being released in an ad hoc way, without publicity. These would be best dealt with in a public inquiry, as has occurred with transport projects like Heathrow Terminal 5 and the East-West line. In addition there is no clear plan for the scope of the work. The original proposal had no link to Heathrow and no link to HS1. These have been added in later, although the total cost of the proposal has not changed.

4. The strategic route The first issue when considering high speed rail is what it would add to the nation’s infrastructure. According to international experts conventional railway lines are faster then ultra high speed lines for distances of up to about 150km–200 km. London to Birmingham and Birmingham to Manchester are only just in this range. The stations on the branch to Leeds are far closer than this. According to European definitions, the WCML, the ECML and the Great Western Line are all “high speed lines”, and their top speeds are similar to other new high speed projects across Europe.

1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? The government seems to have no clear high speed strategy. This piecemeal approach puts up costs and risks choosing less then optimal solutions For instance, early documents regarding the building of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link refer to the building of a connection to the West Coast Main Line: one document suggested a possible travel time between Milton Keynes and Paris of 2 hours 50 minutes.320 This link was not constructed, and according to Frank Dobson, in a Westminster Hall debate on 31 March 2011, the route that was seen as unsuitable for HS1 is now being considered to link HS2 and HS1. A newspaper report of a meeting held with Theresa Villiers in Newcastle says that delegates at the meeting were told321 “trying to get a bill through Parliament for just the London to Birmingham extension was difficult enough, without adding to that the greater problems of a nationwide line.”

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? HS2 was not proposed as a way of providing economic regeneration or bridging the north-south divide. Therefore it has not been compared to other schemes set up for that purpose. Evidence from France (Lille) is often quoted, but in reality HSR was only part of a larger package of regeneration measures. We have no way of knowing what the opportunity cost of going ahead with HS2 is, compared to other schemes targeted on the north, such as the Northern Hub project. About 70% of the permanent jobs created will be in London. Further, MPs in Birmingham have criticised322 the choice of Washwood Heath for the HS2 maintenance depot, saying that alternative schemes could provide more, higher-skilled jobs, (3500 v 300) and sooner than HS2 would. 320 Channel Tunnel Rail Link Project Brief, Union Railways, October 2010 321 http://www.journallive.co.uk/north-east-news/todays-news/2011/03/25/mp-challenged-over-east-coast-main-line-high-speed-rail- service-61634–28400838/2/ 322 http://www.birminghampost.net/news/2011/03/04/birmingham-mps-oppose-plans-for-high-speed-rail-depot-at--site- 65233–28276475/ cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w295

There is another potential problem with the regeneration effects of HS2. Rather then creating new jobs, there is a serious risk that jobs are instead moved from other areas, such as Coventry.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? We believe that a high speed rail network alone is an inefficient mechanism to create regeneration.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? Or lose out According to the HS2 documentation, some areas will suffer worse train services after HS2 is built. This has been analysed by the Taxpayers Alliance.323 The majority of the national benefits come from monatarised time savings to business travellers. However it is the top 20% by income who undertake the most long distance journeys. Therefore most of the benefits of reduced travel times will be going to high earners or their employers. HS2 Ltd state the other monetarised benefits go to commuters and leisure users. If HS2 encourages an increase in commuting to London from a specific area, this comes at a cost to the “home” area. The commuter will spend some of their salary on their season ticket, and some of it on goods and services in London. House prices in areas convenient for access to the high speed station will rise, making then less affordable to people working in their home area. The leisure opportunities created seemed to be based around regional users being able to get to London more easily. Money will be taken from the regions and spent in the shops and venues of London. For example, Philip Hammond told the Yorkshire Press:324 “What we expect train operators to do is seek to fill their trains by attracting marginal passengers who currently wouldn’t be travelling by rail with very attractive fares in the off-peak,” said Mr Hammond. “For the person who’s able to travel in the mid- to late morning or the afternoon or later in the evening when there isn’t so much demand I would expect they will be able to get some fantastically good deals on High Speed Two.”

4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? It is clear that some cities, such as Birmingham, see themselves as huge beneficiaries. Other areas, such as Buckinghamshire have been warned that they will get no advantages from HS2, in spite of the environmental damage they will suffer. Therefore the government should expect Birmingham City Council and Birmingham businesses to put significant financial resources into the building of HS2, and it is equitable that the government should compensate areas like Buckinghamshire for the environmental damage they endure.

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? The Coalition Program for Government said: “Our vision is of a truly national high speed rail network for the whole of Britain. We believe it can play a significant role in promoting a low carbon economy thereby helping to make our country greener and more sustainable. We believe it will be a transformational project that will revolutionise travel between our major cities and will almost eliminate the need for internal domestic flights.” However the HS2 proposal does not promote low carbon transport, but relies on decarbonising the electricity sector. Because HSR uses more energy then classic rail, this means that more electricity will need to be generated. By increasing the country’s total electricity demand, we will need to use more of the ungreen forms of electricity. The March 2010 Main report published by HS2 Ltd said: “Perhaps the most important point to note is that this is equivalent to a range of −0.3% to +0.3% of UK transport emissions. So HS2 would not be a major factor in managing carbon in the transport sector.” p180 Moving 65% of passengers from a lower-energy form of train to a higher energy form does not make up for the 6% who have transferred from air. 323 Research Note 86, 30 March 2011 HS2 Capacity Analysis, Chris Stokes http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/hs2capacity.pdf 324 High speed rail network “could slash prices for train tickets”, Monday 21 March 2011 http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/at-a-glance/main-section/high_speed_rail_network_could_slash_prices_for_train_tickets_ 1_320215 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w296 Transport Committee: Evidence

There is the issue of carbon emissions during construction, which HS2 Ltd has ignored. Further, the HS2 proposal does not take into account efforts by both the aviation sector and the automotive sector to make vehicles which use less carbon intensive forms of power.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? The environmental costs of HS2 have not been considered adequately as there is no Environmental Impact Assessment yet. Any new high speed railway will have environmental costs, whichever route it chooses. However by setting a design speed of 400kph, the design of HS2 is constrained and cannot avoid sensitive sites in the way a slower design speed would be able to. This speed seems unnecessarily fast, because the advantage of this speed compared to a lower speed are negligible for the distances concerned. Further, with three stations on the Leeds branch, the trains are unlikely even to run at full speed: the UIC says that it takes 10–20km for high speed trains to reach their maximum. The design speed seems to have been chosen to make a marginal business case possible. HS1 was built with 85% of it in tunnels or next to railways, major roads and motorways. Of the remaining 15%, about half of it was through industrial areas. In contrast HS2 will be going across significant amount of open countryside. Although it will travel alongside existing roads in places, they tend to be minor roads like the A413 “transport corridor” which is a single carriageway country road between market towns. There are also concerns about damage to the Chilterns aquifer, and aquifers in Warwickshire, which supply water to London and other parts of the south east and Midlands. Stop HS2 is aware of the Voxopp submission and endorses their report about noise impacts. It is of note that noise is more intrusive where the background level is low.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? This question is outwith Stop HS2’s remit.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? Building work at Euston station will take seven to eight years, according to HS2 Ltd’s documents. There will also need to be changes to the underground to allow for increased numbers of on-ward passengers. There will also need to be work on the WCML where the HS2 route joins it. In summary West Coast Main Line passengers can expect significant disruption. May 2011

Written evidence from Pan-Camden HS2 Alliance (HSR 108) 1. Camden—who we are 1.1 The London Borough of Camden is an inner London borough with some 236,000 inhabitants in an area of 22km2. It contains significant areas of employment, notably in the academic and medical fields, media and creative industries and professional (legal and accountancy) fields. Camden Lock and Markets are important retail and tourist magnets and there is a large number of hotels in the Borough. 1.2 Two Main Line railway termini (Euston and St Pancras International) are in the Borough and two important main lines and three important freight routes run through the Borough. 1.3 Arguably, the proposals for HS2 Limited weigh more heavily on Camden than any other local authority area.

1.4 The pan-Camden HS2 Alliance 1.4.1 The pan-Camden HS2 Alliance has evolved in response to the acute local concern and seeks to protect the interests of local residents and businesses. A series of well-attended public meetings has been held, a website established and there has been considerable local publicity. Councillors of all political parties of London Borough of Camden have been very supportive of the Alliance. 1.4.2 Because our area is home to many people with interests in public policy and strategy development, and because there are also many residents with relevant professional experience, most of the scrutiny has been concerned with the policy and strategic implications of the proposals and how they assist, or work against, the achievement of other public policy objectives. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w297

1.4.3 This process has caused many people to form the opinion that the HS2 scheme as presently tabled is unlikely to make an adequate contribution to achieving current National objectives. (We believe that some local disbenefits could be mitigated although they will require major rethinking: local groups would hope to work with HS2 Ltd and its consultants to this end).

2. Scope of the Inquiry and the areas covered by this pan-Camden HS2 Alliance submission 2.1 The Transport Select Committee plans to examine: 2.1.1 The main arguments for and against high-speed rail. 2.1.2 How the proposals for HS2 relates to the Government’s transport policy objectives particularly in relation to transport connections between urban areas. 2.1.3 The strength of the business case and the robustness of the underlying assumptions and methodology, scheme costs. 2.1.4 Alternatives as regards capacity, other ways of managing capacity (for example by pricing). 2.1.5 The strategic route, proposed Stage 1 stations, the case for intermediate stations on the strategic route, links to HS1, freight, links to Heathrow. 2.1.6 The extent to which considerations of local or regional regeneration should shape the route. 2.1.7 Equity issues and whether the project will assist economic rebalancing. 2.1.8 The importance or otherwise of regeneration in the business case. 2.1.9 Environmental and other impacts including noise, and how these are treated in the business case. 2.1.10 Disruption especially in connection with the rebuilding of Euston Station. 2.2 The Pan-Camden HS2 Alliance submission only contains evidence concerning matters of direct relevance to Camden and inner north and west London, or to matters of which we have the relevant experience to provide useful observations. Our evidence generally relates to aspects of the following issues: 2.2.1 The main arguments for and against high speed rail. 2.2.2 The strength of the business case—whether the natural growth rate is not in fact the result of investment, the importance of the assumptions about advances in signalling technology, the feasibility of the service assumed in the business case by reference to the services actually achieved on the French LGV with the greatest similarities, whether HS2’s proposals might be inherently unstable, taking into account other government, regional and local policy objectives, the forecasting risks and choice of discount rate to reflect these risks, redundant trains, capacity on residual classic network. 2.2.3 Alternatives, capacity and economic mechanisms—Euston commuters, a new line does not remove the need to spend on remaining classic routes. 2.2.4 The strategic route—the cross London corridor, Old Oak location, Euston location, regeneration, effect of an additional station on the HS2 Phase One 1 route, freight strategy 2.2.5 Equity issues—some interesting value judgments inherent in HS2 Ltd.’s case. 2.2.6 Disruption at and near Euston—community, station users, road network, and the construction of the HS1-HS2 link.

3. The main arguments for and against high-speed rail 3.1 There is no single standard definition of high-speed rail. Because the realities of high-speed rail are so complex, the International Union of Railways (UIC) deliberately uses “definitions” in the plural. The concept is evolving all the time, and the technologies are also changing as operators and planners attempt to overcome perceived drawbacks in the concept as pioneered in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The UIC’s definitions imply a state of continual advance, since all components of the travel experience, including marketing, should be “state of the art”. 3.2 The definitions of “high-speed rail” offered by the UIC and by European Union Directive, and the permitted variations (usually for environmental or planning reasons) are so broad that they would cover almost any new or upgraded railway line which could accommodate trains which are capable of speeds in excess of 200 kilometres/hour (upgraded) or 250 kph (new build), even though in densely populated urban areas the operating speed could be as low as 110 kph. It is thus perfectly possible to build a high-speed line that would fit in to the topography of the London/West Midlands/North West corridor in a less intrusive manner. 3.3 HS2 attempts to achieve the highest speeds possible regardless of what the transport and regional objectives actually are. To produce a case for its construction, it claims high speed to be necessary in order to solve a range of problems for which in many cases it is not the only solution, or its contribution is not key. 3.4 “Capacity” is a complex idea. There is little doubt that obtaining a reliable, fast, transit system in the corridor requires a considerable upgrade in capacity. This is because railways do not operate reliably when pushed towards their design limits for long periods of the day. Typically, reliable railways operate at about one cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w298 Transport Committee: Evidence

half of their theoretical capacity except for short bursts when they step up to perhaps two thirds or three quarters of capacity. The HS2 solution would in fact do little more than transfer an existing “capacity” problem to a new railway whose higher operating speeds will increase the likelihood of inherent instability. There is every likelihood that there would still be a need (for reasons of capacity) for quality longer distance services on other routes in the corridor. 3.5 HS2 Ltd.’s brief was ill focussed and reflected a somewhat dated view of high-speed rail. The end result is an engineering project not a transport solution. Imagination and vision has not been central to the process. Aping the rather different high speed rail networks of France, Spain and Germany, without apparently understanding the mechanics of the operations and the reasons why they work as they do, is not a solution that is necessarily going to work in the UK. 3.6 If a solution is needed to the movement of very large numbers of people at speed in fairly densely populated corridors, then this has been achieved in Japan. However the Japanese design philosophy is different from the European approach. The Japanese system is “closed”, that is to say with no operating interaction with classic lines. The Tokkaido Shinkansen has an average station spacing of just 30.3 km. There are faster and slower trains. It moves around 400,000 passengers a day. 3.7 There are worse courses of action than studying how particular concepts work in practice and whether there are lessons that could be applied in the UK. We have considered how HS2 in its present form would deliver against the Government’s core ambitions set out in White Paper CM7176 “Delivering a Sustainable Railway”, July 2007. Overall HS2 does not score well. That is not to say that we think high-speed rail has no part to play in the corridor. We accept there is a need for increased capacity and this is going to require new construction. And as the definitions at the beginning of this section suggest, this will almost certainly fall within the definition of a “high-speed railway”. 3.8 The problem of HS2 stems from its narrow view of what is high-speed rail, the lack of operational understanding of a railway, and the seeming inability to think at a fairly low level about transport as a means to achieve policy ends rather than as an objective in its own right.

4. The strength of the Business Case 4.1 Base line forecasts—natural growth or a largely predictable consequence of investment in a product? 4.1.2 We believe that the growth experienced since 1995 has been misinterpreted. Far from being a “natural” rate of growth, much of it can be explained as a return on investment and marketing. 4.1.3 We have formed this view having looked at figures for the past decade for inter-city railway investment in infrastructure and rolling stock. We have also reviewed the train miles operated. (Earlier figures are not apparently publicly available in a comparable form.) 4.1.4 In a more general way we have also considered what happened to the economy, to railway services, to fares, to investment and car ownership in earlier years. The base line taken by HS2 Ltd for its forecasts is in fact the second lowest point recorded since 1955. Over six decades passenger mileage increased by about 25%. 4.1.5 When modelling for, and forecasting for, a project with a 60-year horizon, we think it appropriate to back-test the forecasting model against longer-run historical data. 4.1.6We have also reviewed SNCF’s passenger-kilometre figures for main line services, which include TGV services. The French picture seems to be a steady but slow upward progression. If the UK figures are, in fact, a natural growth rate, then we would expect similar figures to show up elsewhere in Europe—but this does not appear to be the case. 4.1.7 We would have expected the DfT to have that information available for example from submissions in support of projects or from “post-audits” carried out the check on value for money. We would also expect DfT to comprehend the impact of these changes on passenger usage. If a model cannot satisfactorily explain the past, then it cannot be used with confidence to predict the future.

4.2. Treatment of demand when capacity is not available 4.2.1 If the forecasts are indeed correct, and trains are grossly overloaded at some point in the next few years, we would expect trip suppression or diversion to take place, and growth would slow down or come to a halt. 4.2.2 The least flexible journeys may be choked off by congestion: passenger will look for alternatives and some of these (eg different ways of working, videoconferencing) will become permanent. 4.2.3 Individuals will take different decisions about where to live and work. Some of these changes may reverse wholly or in part if conditions become more favourable, but this process will take time, and the benefits will be to new users rather than existing. 4.2.4 The “rule of half” is conventionally applied to such new trips. Benefits to existing users are overstated because numbers will have dropped owing to suppression. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w299

4.2.5 The trips that may eventually take their place when conditions improve will be from new users, some of whom will have been attracted by a very small change in conditions, some of whom will only have been attracted by a very large change. The average improvement experienced by new users is therefore taken as one half of the change experienced.

4.3 The importance to the business case of the assumptions about signalling 4.3.1 Behind all railway signalling is the idea of maintaining a safe braking distance between trains, even if the first train crashes. The distance required for an emergency stop is significantly shorter than the distance required for bringing a train to a stand without discomfort to passengers. The greater the distance between trains, the lower the number of trains that can be run on a line in any one period. The safe braking distance is expressed as a number of “blocks”. 4.3.2 Railways are still constrained by the lack of a workable technology that would allow a reduction in the difference between the “comfort” and “emergency” braking distances. Put in the simplest terms, if the “comfort” distance could be reduced towards the “emergency” distance by a train “knowing” the distance between it and the train ahead, as well as the speed of the train ahead, then line capacity could be increased. This concept is sometimes referred to as “Moving Block”, and would be at the heart of an innovative signalling system. 4.3.3 Such a Moving Block system would have to be a pan-European standard, and to that extent, the timescale is not at the discretion of HS2 Limited. Innovative signalling systems using Moving Block principles have often resulted in being abandoned or downgraded for cost or technical reasons, the Jubilee Line and the recent WCML upgrade being cases in point. 4.3.4 Moving Block is also key to minimising service disruption in two ways: (1) Any unplanned deceleration or stop has an effect on capacity and reliability as well as on journey time. (2) The greatly reduced amount of lineside equipment means that physical damage is much less likely, and the temptation for copper thieves removed. 4.3.5 Moving Block underpins the business case for HS2 as without it the ultimate anticipated capacity of 18 trains an hour cannot be attempted.

4.4 The practicability of the service assumed in the business case 4.4.1 The business case depends on assumption about reliability, service intensity and journey times. As we are interested in the robustness of these assumptions and in claims about capacity, we have looked in some detail at the broad timetabling and rolling stock requirements. 4.4.2 We have also looked at what actually happens day-to-day on the group of high speed services that use the LGV Sud-Est and the various branches and the line to the Midi. We consider that this line probably has the most in common with the concept of HS2. We then considered the service frequency operated on the Tokkaido Shinkansen. We concluded that HS2 would have more in common with LGV Sud-Est than the Japanese Shinkansen, which being physically a different gauge to the rest of the Japanese railway system, operate in isolation and therefore perturbations cannot be transmitted between their classic and high-speed lines. 4.4.3 These are the key similarities between LGV Sud-Est and HS2: Double deck train operation using high-speed double decker trains (TGV Duplex). The same trains have been taken as the “reference” train for “captive” train operation on HS2. A significant proportion of trains starting or finishing on classic lines. Average passenger loadings on trains over 70%. Some services call at airport stations (but these are located on connecting lines) eg Paris Charles de Gaulle and Lyon St Extupéry TGV. 4.4.4 But there are some important differences: Distances between centres south of Lyon served by TGV services are shorter. The cities served by TGV services are smaller. TGV service intensity is lower. “La période blanche” a time of light traffic (when the system catches its breath) exists only on the TGV service. The proposed number of passengers for HS2 is almost twice that for LGV Sud-Est. The loading gauge of the classic network allows TGVs (there are no captive trains on LGV Sud-Est). 4.4.5 The number of trains that actually run over all or part of the LGV between Paris and Lyon is usually six to eight an hour in each direction. This compares with an HS2 minimum of 10/hour at stage 1, rising to 14/ hour and then to 18/hour. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w300 Transport Committee: Evidence

4.4.6 The present day theoretical operating capacity of the LGV Sud-Est is given as 12 trains an hour, (but if the signalling were upgraded this might rise to 16 trains an hour). The comparative figures for HS2 are 14 and 18. 4.4.7 HS2 proposes an intensive service that runs continuously for seventeen or eighteen hours a day, every day, throughout the year. Most of these trains would be “classic compatible” and would run off HS2 onto ordinary lines which are subject to all the problems of unreliability found on a traditional railway. 4.4.8 Scrutiny of the SNCF timetable confirms that there is an hour or so during the day when this intensity drops sharply, the so-called “période blanche”, which is a time when the system catches its breath, as it were, and recovers. HS2’s service proposals make no provision of this nature. 4.4.9 The “dwell time” allowed at continental stations for high speed trains is usually at least 3 minutes, although times in excess of 6 minutes are shown for some trains at busy locations. On other European high- speed services, dwell times at busy stations are often in the 4–8 minute range. 4.4.10 By comparison HS2 Ltd is assuming a two-minute dwell time. Thus at peak times up to 450Ð500 passengers would be expected to join or leave trains at Old Oak Common through 16 doors in just two minutes. 4.4.11 Our experience of high speed operation in Europe is as passengers, but it seems to us that the comparison above should serve to alert the Transport Committee to the strong possibility that the operations of HS2 would be inherently unstable as proposed. 4.4.12 It seems to us that there is a high probability that HS2 will be unable to deliver its claimed levels of service and journey times and that therefore the business case should include assessments of the effects of only being able to achieve a part of the improvements claimed. We would expect to see some modelling of the potential for instability on HS2, as we believe that the proposed levels of service are inherently unstable.

4.5 Taking into account other governmental, regional and local policy objectives 4.5.1 Because transport is not an objective in its own right, our experience is that the assessment of transport schemes in isolation can easily lead to “wrong” decisions in the overall picture of policy ambitions. For example, regeneration benefits are treated as all of equal worth, but in practice, the policy objective is to seek a more balanced economy and we propose that a part of the appraisal process should include an assessment of scheme benefits weighted for policy objectives at the different levels of government. 4.5.2 A similar approach was being developed at the Greater London Council in the 1970’s to test the contribution or otherwise of road schemes to GLC policy objectives in the GLC Development Plan. For example, such an approach helps highlight the more questionable value judgments often implicit (although generally unintended) in schemes and assist in the political decision making process. 4.5.3 As another example, is the loss of several hundred homes and communities in West Euston a reasonable trade-off for the modest safety benefit of straight platforms at Euston and the possibility of reducing disruption during station rebuilding, or are there other ways of achieving the desired result?

4.6 Forecasting risk and the choice of discount rate 4.6.1 Away from HS2 Ltd.’s consultation documents, there is recognition that the forecasts might be substantially in error. We note the length of the forecasting period, the inflexibility inherent in the present concept, and the over dependence on a few key benefits, some of which are in fact dependent on external factors if they are to work positively. 4.6.2 It is a basic commercial concept that an interest (or a discount) rate is a proxy for the riskiness of a venture. In discounting future benefits, a higher discount rate is assumed in order to take some account of risk. We note that rail and road projects both involve risks that vary according to the characteristics of the mode, and we believe that for these reasons different discount rates are logical and appropriate. A high-speed rail project is likely to be much more a “double or quits” bet than a road project.

4.7 Redundant trains—a cost not taken into account 4.7.1 We note that nothing is said about the use of the current Pendolino fleet once HS2 stage 1 was to be operational. These vehicles were built in 2001–04 and more are under construction. They should not reach the end of their useful lives until around 2035–40 but it is unclear if many of them could be reused economically elsewhere on the UK rail network. 4.7.2 The residual classic services are unlikely to require a large fleet of high capacity trains. Resale elsewhere depends on the availability of compatible signalling and electrical supply systems: a fleet of aging non-standard trainsets is not an attractive commercial prospect. We submit that the difference between Pendolino net book value and net realisable value at that date is a cost to the HS2 project and should therefore be included in the financial appraisal. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w301

4.8 Effects on the classic railway post-HS2 4.8.1 We have looked in some detail at the effects on the classic railway and its capacity following the completion of HS2 Stage 1. We have looked at the possible effects on the distribution systems forward from Euston. We have also looked at the effects of the project on arguably the most strategic station in the country— Birmingham New Street. 4.8.2 None of these issues have been dealt with to our satisfaction in the studies carried out by HS2 Ltd. That is not to say that we consider these matters to be sticking points for the scheme as a whole, (we think, for example, that HS2 could enable desirable infrastructure improvements eg between Camden Road/Euston and Wembley which would just not be feasible now.) But they do need to be incorporated in a proper assessment and this needs to be reflected in the HS2 case.

4.9 The Euston commuter issue 4.9.1 We have considerable past experience of the planning and operation of these services and have the following observations to make. (We have not gone into detail but a more technical assessment is available should it be required.) 4.9.2 The Euston outer-suburban commuter services divide broadly into three sections: 4.9.2.1 The mature metropolitan commuter zone between Euston and Watford Junction. This is well served in terms of service frequency and journey times, stable in terms of demand and little change can be expected short of a more radical proposal like diversion away from Euston onto Crossrail. This section of line produces around 3,000 commuters. 4.9.2.2 The belt of restricted development north of Watford Junction and south of Leighton Buzzard. Green belt and similar restrictions have been in place for many years and our assessment is that little change to the service provision at these stations would be possible although additional capacity could be provided by restructuring the calling pattern to attract passengers from the development zone (see below) away from these services. As with the mature metropolitan belt, only a radical proposal like the Crossrail diversion would be expected to materially affect commuter numbers. 4.9.2.3 The development zone consisting of Leighton Buzzard and stations north including Milton Keynes and Northampton. The material passenger growth over the past forty years has come from these stations, as was indeed forecast in the early 1970s. We have reviewed traffic and other data, and we concur that post HS2, this is where any growth will come from. We would not be surprised if, expressed as a percentage increase, this was substantial. However in terms of a requirement for train paths, we would not expect more than two or three extra trains to be required in the peak hour. This is not perhaps as significant in the wider scheme of things as has been made out in some quarters. These extra trains may require subsidy but we do not have access to the figures which would enable us to confirm that this would be so. 4.9.3 Commuter forecasting over a 10–20 year period is a fairly straightforward and robust process compared with other railway forecasting. The key variables (housing stock, office stock, the effects of any changes to the distribution network within Central London) are known with a high level of accuracy. All the commuters twenty years hence have already been born. Simple gravity models have been in use for years and are well understood. The 60 minute upper limit that people apply to their commuter journey has remained fairly constant for well over a century although with greater flexibility in employment practices this seems to have risen slightly in recent years. 4.9.4 Another important reason why explosive commuter growth will not happen is that Euston is not located within walking distance of any key business district. The hinterland has a national importance as an academic and medical district, but the employment densities are lower than in major business districts. Commuters wishing to travel to the higher density business districts have to change onto other modes and for many this places the journey outside their time tolerance limits.

4.10 Additional distribution capacity at Euston 4.10.1 It is possible but by no means inevitable that the operation of a high capacity railway from Euston would require an increase in the capacity of public transport at Euston. This is a strategic matter for London and we urge that in the consideration of this problem, a key aim is to provide wide-ranging benefits for London. Some of the solutions being touted involve very substantial expenditure, and have major implications over a wide area and for large numbers of Londoners and others. If such expenditure is required to make HS2 “work” (that is to say provide a quality and properly integrated transport experience) then the costs and benefits should be properly accounted for in the HS2 case. 4.10.2 We have had significant experience in the design and construction of major stations, and urge that the users’ needs should be accorded a very high level of importance (good design for commuters is not necessarily a question of great engineering or architectural statements—Euston is primarily an interchange station so what is required is quality functional design that places convenience, connectivity and adequate space above cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w302 Transport Committee: Evidence

commercial needs). Our examination of the proposals for the new Euston suggests that they do not yet address these needs.

4.11 The Birmingham New Street question 4.11.1 We have looked at the potential for additional cross-country services. We suspect most of these would need to access Birmingham New Street. 4.11.2 Birmingham New Street is in many ways the most important station in England because it is the crossing point between the South-West to North-East lines and the Birmingham loop of the WCML. 4.11.3 To optimise network capacity, one has to work outwards from New Street across most of the rest of the country. New Street is reported as operating at capacity, and it is not clear from HS2 Ltd.’s reports how much capacity might be released by the introduction of HS2. 4.11.4 The line capacity may well be increased, but if the capacity of the key station on the route does not expand then these paths are of little use to passenger traffic. 4.11.5 Until and unless there are practical and costed proposals as to how the additional line capacity can be used, we suggest its “benefits” be excluded from the case for HS2.

4.12 Differences of opinion 4.12.1 We are concerned that the outcomes of HS2’s work are significantly at odds with the thinking of Transport for London, Network Rail and the local authorities along the route, all of which can be expected to have devoted far greater intellectual effort to the issues.

5. Alternatives as regards capacity, pricing, diversion and suppression 5.1 Diversion of some outer suburban trains to Crossrail 5.1.1 Network Rail is considering the possible use of the ten spare train paths and the diversion of Euston outer suburban services via a short length of new track at Old Oak Common onto Crossrail. 5.1.2 Demand might change if the proposal to route ten Euston commuter trains an hour onto Crossrail were to come about. For some important destinations in key business areas, weighted journey time reductions might be achievable equivalent to those expected for Milton Keynes. However integration with Crossrail is unlikely provide a “win-win”: — The service that could be operated might preclude running the semi-fast trains enjoyed today and. — Significant business districts such as Victoria will not be as easily accessed via Crossrail as via Euston. — There will still be a need for some service into Euston because Crossrail cannot accommodate all the Euston commuter services. — The number of seats on trains is likely to reduce. 5.1.3 If we are right on these points, our preliminary assessment is that passengers from north of Tring might receive little benefit from a Crossrail service, but that some substantial benefits could accrue to the rather higher numbers who travel from Tring and stations south. Because of the constraints noted earlier, the effects on commuter volumes are unlikely to be transformational. 5.1.4 There are difficulties in introducing a Crossrail service for “LMR” commuters prior to HS2, but it would help ease the problems in building the new Euston and the lines to Camden whilst running today’s level of service. 5.1.5 This could relieve pressure on Euston quite substantially, both in terms of train movements and passenger numbers, and mean that the new Euston would only need a fairly small number of shorter classic platforms. 5.2 Our researches lead us to the conclusion that there is no one “right” solution for the London/Heathrow— West Midlands corridor. A robust and reliable solution to the demands of passenger and freight movement requires a margin of spare capacity to provide operational reliability and also give scope for future growth. 5.3 We accept that that some form of high-speed railway may be necessary, together with some upgrading of the WCML, of the “Evergreen” route, and a GC gauge route for freight. However as we have pointed out in our comments in Section 3 on the case for High Speed rail, there seem to be fundamental misconceptions in government quarters about the way in which high-speed solutions are now being developed in Europe.

6. The strategic route 6.1 The HS1 to HS2 link—the cross London corridor 6.1.1 The proposed link between HS1 and HS2 runs in a new single-bore tunnel between Old Oak and Primrose Hill tunnels, where it then picks up on the alignment of the North London Line link between the cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w303

WMCL at Primrose Hill and Camden Road. This section of line will be singled to allow low-cost conversion to GC gauge. 6.1.2 We consider that the HS1 to HS2 link proposals are the wrong response to the wrong question. 6.1.3 Further, the levels of reliability achieved on LGV in France with significantly lower utilisation levels suggest trains will regularly present late, especially at Old Oak Common, so the long single track section will be a major source of instability for the network as a whole. 6.1.4 Key strategic issues are whether: — HS1 can be linked to the main rail corridors serving the rest of the country, by adapting existing infrastructure and/or new build, to provide GC standard routes across London. — Existing infrastructure could be adapted to minimise new construction required. — These links can be designed to reduce, below existing levels, the environmental impact of railway operation on Londoners. — These links can also embrace other local and strategic transport objectives. 6.1.5 The singling of a strategically important section of cross-London railway between Primrose Hill Tunnels and Camden Road (the Primrose Hill link) would worsen conditions for freight because: — It would restrict the number of trains that can access the WCML from the south route that is one of only two “high cube” routes across London from the Haven Ports. — The route is used as a regulating area for trains joining or leaving the WCML: if this function cannot be performed here there is a real risk of delays being transmitted between the WCML and the GE lines out of Liverpool Street to the Haven ports. — Haven Port trains are already half a kilometre in length. The lower cost options for increasing traffic capacity for these services are centred on train lengthening but the singling of the Primrose Hill link may rule out this option. Train lengthening reduces unit costs which is why users favour it. 6.1.6 Network Rail has an aspiration to provide a GC route between London and the country’s industrial heartlands at some unspecified future date. 6.1.7 We hope that the HS2 Ltd.’s focus on the West Midlands and the North of England would be modified to consider also access to the West of England and Wales via Old Oak Common, for both freight and international passenger services. 6.1.8 A reduction in the number of daytime paths available through Primrose Hill will increase pressure for additional night-time trains leading to a worsening of living conditions for residents close to this and other cross London routes. 6.1.9 A number of proposals have been made in recent years to provide a GC gauge link to the Midlands using sections of the former . We offer no view on the desirability or practicality of this, but we do urge that the Government takes a holistic view of transport needs in the London-West Midlands corridor and considers how any future high speed link contributes—or at least does not impede—realisation of a GC gauge link. Even if currently a GC gauge freight route is considered not justifiable, the story of transport in this country should serve as a warning against closing off options for future generations. (We are aware of the current upgrades of the Southampton—Nuneaton and the Felixstowe—Nuneaton routes to accommodate “W10” working for “high cube” containers, and that in consequence the capacity problems on the WCML south or Birmingham will be relieved for the foreseeable future.) 6.1.10 TfL which is responsible for services running on the cross North London routes, has expressed concern about the effects of HS2 Ltd.’s proposals on TfL services. Although most of the adverse effects could be removed by the widening of approximately 350 metres of viaduct, HS2 Ltd.’s proposals would prevent the operation of TfL’s proposed Queens Park-Stratford service which is essential for relieving overcrowding on Orbirail—and which might possibly be developed as part of a strategic cross-London link to improve access to Old Oak Common.

6.2 International rail services 6.2.1 HS2 Ltd. proposes that international rail services would use the HS1 to HS2 link. We have already commented, in our assessment of the business case, on the capacity issues that we expect to become evident at an early stage on HS2, and, considering the relatively low passenger usage that can be expected for international services, point out that these services must be prime candidates for exclusion from HS2. Our reasons for this claim are that the achievable timings using HS2 are not so far removed from what could be achieved on the WCML as it stands, or less if the signalling and line speeds were to be upgraded. 6.2.2 However existing rail investment means that a Birmingham to Paris / Brussels service using Eurostar classic-compatible trains is already quite practical. 6.2.3 If it is the Government’s opinion that such services will help bridge the North-South divide by linking to our major international gateways, then such a service should be introduced in advance of the construction cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w304 Transport Committee: Evidence

of HS2, even if, initially it is a very limited service (perhaps even just a seasonal service). If the Government is confident of its case, it will pick up the challenge and prove its case. 6.2.4 Over a decade ago DfT concluded that there was insufficient demand to justify such a service. However between 1997 and 2010 Eurostar passenger volumes rose by 58% after much investment in track and station facilities. The earlier conclusions may no longer hold. 6.2.5 Recent trends in high-speed travel have included a greater willingness amongst passengers to use rail for journeys that hitherto have been regarded as beyond range in terms of journey time. For example, Deutsche Bahn is considering through services from Frankfurt and Cologne to London. 6.2.6 We estimate that if the international services using the WCML have all intermediate station stops taken out, the journey time differences between a WCML and HS2 solution between Birmingham and, say, Paris, would be 20 minutes, and 30 between Manchester and Paris at best, or 50 minutes at worst. Birmingham to Paris via the WCML would be 3 hours 30 minutes, and Manchester-Paris 4hrs 35 minutes. SNCF’s “wish list” for future LGV construction includes the LGV Picardie, which would reduce these timings by about 20 minutes. This line could be in operation before HS2. 6.2.7 If it is thought there is a case for running international services from the Midlands and North, our challenge is simple. The service should be capable of being introduced within a very few years. The equipment is there, even if not immediately available. The infrastructure is there. Run it, even if only on a seasonal, or once-daily service, prove the case, put the idea into the consciousness of West Midlanders and Mancunians, demonstrate that there is a business case, and start building up traffic.

6.3 The choice of London terminus 6.3.1 If it is thought necessary to have a Central London terminus, we think that the Kings Cross—St Pancras area would make much more sense in transport terms but we have been unable to establish the status of development land. Unfortunately this is a case of lost opportunities: had the idea of HS2 been under serious consideration twenty years ago, it would have been possible to use the Kings Cross lands. 6.3.2 We note that all high-speed lines in Europe make use of upgraded classic alignments in order to traverse urban areas.

6.4 Old Oak Common: a great opportunity for connectivity and regeneration 6.4.1 We believe that the issues concerning Old Oak Common (OOC) are so interconnected that they should be dealt with in the same section and not split as between discussion on regeneration and the strategic route. 6.4.2 The regeneration of OOC should take place regardless of whether HS2 is built, if only because it is one of the few remaining large areas available for development. What HS2 is likely to do is stimulate more thinking and discussion, and as a result it may be possible to exploit more of the potential of the site as new synergies become possible. 6.4.3 Worldwide, there can be few urban areas with such potential for accessibility and interchange as Old Oak Common (OOC). It is where two of the country’s main trunk railways converge and it potentially enables numerous connections with the rest of the system. The urban surrounds of OOC (including ) include large tracts of derelict industrial space and there is both need and scope for industrial regeneration and new housing. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w305

OLD OAK COMMON—THE AREA BOUNDED BY THE TRACKS IS APPROXIMATELY 1KM−2

6.4.4 The average distance travelled to work in London is under four miles, and the average journey time under 45 minutes. Much of Camden is therefore in the range of OOC. 6.4.5 Within a few years London Overground will circle the capital—the “Orbirail” scheme. “Orbirail” routes traverse both Camden and OOC. One of the benefits of Orbirail is that it will provide better accessibility in areas of relatively high deprivation. 6.4.6 Development of OOC, together with accessibility improvements to both it and the major industrial area of Park Royal, could assist with more general issues of social deprivation in Camden and other areas of north and west London. Equally, the rail-locked nature of the OOC site means that good local transport will be an important key to success. 6.4.7 TfL is concerned about the number of journeys which involve travel through the congested central area of London but which could advantageously be re-routed orbitally. The ongoing positive development of “Orbirail” services, which started over 30 years ago, demonstrates the worth of this approach. Inner London’s geography makes orbital movement very significant and concentrates it in fairly narrow corridors that are well suited to rail solutions. 6.4.8 Important local passenger lines run adjacent to OOC: the Central and Bakerloo lines of London Underground, the Stratford-Richmond, Willesden Junction-Clapham, and Watford-Euston services of London Overground/Orbirail, and national rail services from Reading to Paddington, and Milton Keynes to Euston and Gatwick. The rail lines through the area are also of considerable strategic importance for freight. 6.4.9 London Underground services could be extended from Kensington Olympia along existing track to run through the site, and it should be possible to adapt the proposed Orbirail Queens Park—Stratford service to provided a link between, say, the Park Royal industrial area, Old Oak and north London. 6.4.10 There is thus enormous opportunity although detailed study might show not all potential schemes would in fact be justifiable. The more radical proposals may only be desirable in the context of a major Crossrail/HS2 interchange. 6.4.11 Network Rail is examining the possibility of diverting some Euston commuter services onto Crossrail via a short length of new track at OOC. 6.4.12 Today OOC is largely rail-locked by presence of so many rail links, with their associated sidings and other facilities. A canal also bisects it. Regeneration pre-supposes resolution of site accessibility restrictions. Such resolution could improve the rail infrastructure and connectivity generally, provide better road, pedestrian cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w306 Transport Committee: Evidence

and cycle access to the site, and also release land for development so it can be aggregated into more suitably sized and shaped areas. 6.4.13 HS2 Ltd. claims that the OOC regeneration area is capable of supporting 20,000 jobs. By contrast London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham (LBHF) envisages 5,000 jobs. This discrepancy may be due to a more conservative estimate by LBHF of the area that could be made available for development, particularly given the need for land for housing. 6.4.14 It may that HS2 Ltd. envisages higher densities of development in order to improve their case rather than promote the most appropriate and beneficial uses for the site in relation to the economy of London and the nation. We note that HS2 Ltd. does not provide details of the types of jobs would be created at OOC or how they might fit into the wider scheme of things. 6.4.15 We think it illogical to rank equally all jobs created by regeneration and suggest there should be some weighting to favour jobs that align with government and local objectives in line with the thinking set out in the October 2010 White Paper “Local Growth”. 6.4.16 LBHF proposes to capitalise on the area’s potential as a media and high technology centre, citing Imperial College and Wood Lane as cluster foci. (Wood Lane is one of the three areas of London with the highest density of creative jobs: creative jobs, broadly defined, account for around 15% of London’s jobs.) The numbers have grown sharply in number over the past twenty years and there is no reason to think that they will not continue to do so. Continued growth in the type of jobs that LBHF think suitable will help diversify London’s economic base and employment opportunities. The area has a number of advantages that support LBHF’s aims, but none of them are critically dependent on HS2. ) 6.4.17 As we have pointed out OOC provides a great opportunity to integrate HS2 and the local rail network. Sadly, we do not see signs that this has percolated into the thinking behind the proposed interchange station. For example, the station engineering does not provide currently for good interchange because of inconsistencies with the infrastructure demands of the services actually proposed. 6.4.18 In essence HS2 Limited underestimates the potential of OOC.Asthe London terminal for HS2 a developed OOC could enable London-bound passengers to switch to several tube lines, Orbirail / Overground in addition to Crossrail and current commuter lines. The availability of many alternatives would avoid the swamping of Crossrail and be consistent with TfL’s thinking. 6.4.19 However for OOC to become the London terminal a change in the railway “mindset” is essential: it should be regarded as a place to be developed for the benefit of the country rather than simply serving the narrow interests of rail people. 6.4.20 It has been suggested that Arup and Partners had proposed OOC as the London HS2 terminal but that this was opposed by Crossrail which intends to use the valuable real estate for a large train shed. 6.4.21 It is an indictment of generations of railway companies that industrial archaeology is possibly the only attraction of today’s OOC, a big parcel of land close to the centre of London. Even the vast former Eurostar depot lies empty, not yet 20 years old. 6.4.22 With OOC as the HS2 terminal then redevelopment of Euston within today’s footprint could proceed on its own merit and without the destruction of the local community. 6.4.23 We suggested earlier (6.2.7) that a trial link and service from Birmingham to Paris could be established over today’s infrastructure. If that trial proved to be encouraging and the traffic volumes were sufficient then consideration could be given to a link from OOC to HS1 at GC gauge at an acceptable speed. In the event that traffic volumes did not justify a dedicated link then continental services could continue over existing lines.

6.5 Additional stations on the route 6.5.1 To help us understand the HS2 proposals, we carried out some work on rolling stock requirements and service capacity. The results may be of interest to the Committee, since they illustrate the effects on the costs of operating the service if one station is added to the Stage 1 route. The results are not, scalable, so the effect of adding more than one station cannot be estimated by multiplying our estimated costs by the number of extra stations. 6.5.2 The Transport Select Committee’s remit includes consideration of additional stations. Our detailed work on timetabling and rolling stock usage provides information on the effects of adding stations tot the Stage 1 route. 6.5.3 The intensity of service proposed on HS2 means that if additional stations were to be included in the scheme then all trains must stop at them. (A pattern in which only some trains stop reduces line capacity very significantly.) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w307

6.5.4 If a high speed train is travelling at its maximum operational speed, a significant time—around 5 to 6 minutes depending on assumptions—is needed to bring it to a halt in a station without causing discomfort to passengers, for dwell time at the station and then to bring it back up to speed on departure. 6.5.5 Time is also extended by the station dwell time necessary for passengers to alight and join: a double- deck train may require a longer dwell time. 6.5.6 The trainset utilisation proposed for HS2 is intensive: for routine operation a train turnround time of 20 minutes is required at termini, and the trainsets would be required to operate over a fairly complex route using fleets of vehicles with limited interchangeability. 6.5.7 Our calculations suggest that the additional capital costs of rolling stock required to maintain seating capacity with one extra stop on the Phase 1 route would be of the order of £200 million: the exact number of additional sets required could only be established after a detailed exercise. 6.5.8 In turn, this affects the number of platforms required at termini, depot and stabling facilities, and train crewing requirements. (Power consumption will also be increased significantly.)

6.6 Freight and operating flexibility 6.6.1 HS2 will be built to GC gauge that could permit full size continental freight trains to run over it provided the engineering took account of freight’s needs for heavier axle loads, easier gradients and other freight-specific constraints. 6.6.2 However we understand HS2 Limited proposes that the route would not be designed to convey freight traffic at any point along its route. For instance it would be physically impossible to access HS2 from the southern end as the proposed gradient of the section of line onto the HS2-HS1 link tunnel at Primrose Hill is too steep to permit freight working. After construction it would only be possible to modify the line to accommodate freight at enormous cost. 6.6.3 Not all high-speed lines are built to the exclusion of freight. Some sections of the French Lignes à Grande Vitesse (LGV) can accept mixed freight and high-speed passenger working. HS1 was also built to permit freight operations. 6.6.4 We have discussed the importance of GC routes across London and how they should be designed to take account of freight’s strategic needs. 6.6.5 Proposals for HS2, and indeed, any other high-speed lines, should as a matter of course be subject to scrutiny so that it can be established whether there are any sections that should be designed so as to enable mixed operation. 6.6.6 We note that the proposed HS2 passenger network does not provide for operating flexibility (for instance diversions for renewals or in the event of disruption). The strategic importance of these lines is so great and so concentrated that these risks should be properly evaluated and appropriate provision made to permit greater operating flexibility.

6.7 Disruption especially at Euston and on classic services 6.7.1 If we are correct in our comments about the practical capacity of HS2, then HS2 will be inadequate for all the services that are mooted. Issues of future-proofing then arise and there should be some clear strategy as to how demand will be catered for once HS2 becomes full. Potentially, the question of future-proofing could blight Camden for three or four decades unless proper provision is made when the Euston and Euston approaches are remodelled. 6.7.2 We note that in order to build the “up” tunnel portal the important tracks on the west side of the approaches will have to be taken out of use. These tracks perform two crucial functions: 6.7.2.1 they provide a facility that allows main line trains to depart from the eastern side of the station without crossing over the all the suburban lines on the flat; and 6.7.2.2 they access the Camden sidings used in the main for daytime stabling of commuter trains. 6.7.3 Should these facilities not be available, there may be considerable additional train mileage to an alternative stabling point and pressure on line and platform capacity generally. This will represent significant cost and delay that should be incorporated in the project evaluation. 6.7.4 The construction of a GC gauge link from Primrose Hill through Camden Town to HS1 will need to be carefully managed. For most of its length, the line is on viaduct as it crossed the valley of the Fleet River. A number of important traffic arteries, both radial and orbital pass under this viaduct, in the main on elderly iron bridges which will require rebuilding. We estimate that up to 20 single-track spans will need to be replaced. 6.7.5 Fortunately there is at present a certain amount of space on the viaduct which is not at present used for running lines, and it may be possible to adapt the techniques used on the construction of the new Borough Market viaduct, with final fabrication of most of the replacement spans on site and then rolling them along the trackbed into position. This may need to be phased over several years if road closures are to be kept, as at cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w308 Transport Committee: Evidence

Borough Market, to holiday weekends. If an innovative approach to the logistics is not possible, then there will be very considerable disruption to road traffic in North London and the costs associated with this should be reflected in the HS2 Limited economic case. 6.7.6 We offer no comment on the disruption that might occur during the reconstruction of Euston and its approaches for HS2, save that we pray that the apocalyptic scenes described by estwhile local resident Charles Dickens in Dombey and Son, are not repeated.

7. How does HS2 fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 7.1 The flavour of every government and DfT statement on their transport objectives is that sustainability and CO2 reduction are key policy drivers. Fairness and quality of life in our communities are added to the mix. 7.2 Andrew Adonis announced HS2 on 11 March 2010 as, “the most sustainable way to provide more capacity between conurbations”. 7.3 Philip Hammond commended HS2 on 26 July 2010 as part of the new Government’s commitment to a programme of measures to, “create a low carbon economy”. 7.4 Under the Coalition’s programme for Government, “Freedom Fairness and Responsibility” the new Government committed to “reform the way decisions are made, and which transport projects to prioritise, so that the benefits of low carbon proposals are fully recognised.” 7.5 In September 2010 at the IBM Start Conference Mr. Hammond stated: “And make no mistake—the Coalition Government is committed to the sustainability agenda in everything it does, including transport. And of course, addressing the urgent and unavoidable challenges of climate change are a key part of ensuring sustainability. Sustainable solutions have, of course, first and foremost to be environmentally sustainable. But they must also be fiscally and economically sustainable—affordable to the taxpayer in the long-term and compatible with an economic growth agenda. And the Department for Transport can and must be at the heart of this programme. Tackling climate change through policies which deliver technology and behaviour that will decarbonise mobility as we progress through the 21st century. Those challenges call for a genuinely sustainable policy response: A response that recognises the need for carbon reduction, fiscal discipline, economic growth, social justice and genuine localism. Not one, or some of them, But all of them. Together. In every policy initiative.” 7.6 The DfT business plan has as its vision, “a transport system that is an engine for economic growth but one that is also greener and safer and improves quality of life in our communities. By improving the links that help to move goods and people around, and by targeting investment in new projects that promote green growth, we can help to build the balanced, dynamic and low-carbon economy that is essential for our future prosperity.”

7.7 The importance of a low CO2 agenda is repeatedly emphasised throughout DfT publications as is the importance of fairness and quality of life for communities. Creating Growth Cutting Carbon, January 2011 the government’s vision for a sustainable local transport system, encourages local authorities to prioritise quality of life, safety and the environment alongside economic development in their transport planning. 7.8 Surely this integrated thinking should be implicit in national transport strategies? Transport is not purely an issue for travellers. It is also an issue for those travelled over. From a fairness perspective, investments in transport must put the quality of life of people they affect at the heart of the design process and actively seek to redress the wrongs of the past. The Euston community has re-assembled itself after the initial re-development of the station and displacement in the 1960s. The HS2 Appraisal of Sustainability recognises the people due to be displaced at Euston are amongst the poorest in the borough and the fact that almost all new jobs created will be filled by those who will be travelling in from elsewhere, which is neither fair nor sustainable. 7.9 Developing a sustainable framework for aviation (March 2011) plainly states “the fact that climate change has become one of the gravest threats we face”. It is our view that there is a flaw and a contradiction at the most basic level in the Government’s policy aspiration and its practical implementation. Ultra high-speed travel is not sustainable, ultra high-speed travel, within the context of the world as we know it today, can never contribute to CO2 reduction. The development of HS2, as it is proposed, will contribute nothing to the quality of life for communities and in many cases will damage them. 7.10 Energy used increases with the square of velocity: a train travelling at 400kph will consume four times the energy of one travelling at 200kph. Currently 93% of the UK’s electrical energy comes from burning fossil fuel. The difficulties of implementing alternative sustainable sources of power in the face of increasing national demand and international events are daunting and cannot be safely predicted. 7.11 We will leave it to others to analyse the cost benefits of travel time saved but the fact remains that HS2 would require a massive increase in power per unit distance. Even assuming that sustainable power generation was widely available HS2 would require more generating capacity. This is inconsistent with a sustainable model. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w309

7.12 Any unforeseen technological developments that might make HS2 more viable could by the same token make alternative transport solutions such as electric coaches and cars more sustainable. 7.13 As for fairness and sustainable communities, ultra high-speed is inflexible in its infrastructure requirements compared to existing high-speed railway: the land take is greater and the platforms are more intrusive as is the case in Euston. 7.14 Equally flawed in terms of sustainability and practical effect is the assumption that domestic air passengers tempted off domestic flights (although there are none between London and Birmingham) would contribute to overall CO2 reduction. BAA Limited has stated that any released short-haul slots would be replaced by long-haul flights typically increasing emissions tenfold. 7.15 In their 12 July 2007 report for the DfT, Estimated Carbon Impact of a New NorthSouth Line Booze Allen Hamilton Limited concluded that building and running a new high-speed line from London to Manchester would have such a large carbon footprint that the assumed shift from road or air would take 60 years to offset the damage. May 2011

Definitions Camden—the geographical area comprising the London Borough of Camden. GLA—Greater London Authority—regional authority. LBB—London Borough of Brent—local authority. LBC—London Borough of Camden—local authority. LBHF—London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham—local authority. TfL—Transport for London. UIC—the International Union of Railways, the worldwide international organisation of the railway sector. Orbirail—the various services marketed as London Overground together with TfL’s “wish list” of enhancements. LNWR—the London & North Western Railway, merged with the and others to form the London Midland and Scottish Railway. OOC—Old Oak Common—The large area of railway-owned land 4km west of Paddington and immediately north of Wormwood Scrubs. HS1—High Speed One—the GC gauge 109 kilometre long high-speed railway from St Pancras to (formerly known as the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL)) GC gauge—a loading gauge used on mainland Europe that will apply to HS2 (and applies to HS1). It is wider and higher than other loading gauges used in UK. Classic-compatible train. A train built to fit on Classic lines that can also operate on HS2 or HS1 with identical performance characteristics to a Captive train. It may also have a tilting capability to maximize its speed potential on a Classic line. Captive train—a train that can only operate on GC gauge lines such as HS1 or HS2. It is thus “captive”. WCML—West Coast Mainline—the fast line running out of Euston to Glasgow. This is a Classic line. ECML—East Cost Mainline—the fast line running out of Kings Cross to Edinburgh. This is a Classic line. LGV—Ligne à Grande Vitesse—a French high-speed train line specially built for the famous TGV.

Written evidence from Mike Vernon (HSR 110) The strategy for HSR appears to be co-dependent upon UK energy policy and this raises a specific concern re development of HS2 as set out in the consultation paper/economic case. Having reviewed the technical papers there are concerns that: The published costings for the construction and running of HS2 do not fully take into account the impact of the government’s policies designed to meet the UK’s carbon emissions reduction targets. In particular, they do not include any allowance for the impact of the introduction of the recently announced Carbon Price Floor measures from 1 April 2013. Furthermore, it is felt that the complexity of the range of UK and EU measures designed to encourage the introduction of low-carbon generation technologies may mask a more serious underlying problem. This problem is the uncertainty about the supply of electricity in the medium term brought about by the necessity to achieve cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w310 Transport Committee: Evidence

emission reduction targets. Achievement of these targets is likely to result in widespread closures of fossil fuelled power plants before the end of 2015. The potential reduction in supply and consequent increase in the price of electricity would affect all aspects of the construction and running of HS2. It is felt that this uncertainty about electricity supply and price should be taken into account in the costing of the project.

The government is committed to full compliance with EU Directive 2001/80/EC Limitation of Pollutants Directive. This in effect states that unless the UK’s major fossil fuelled power plants conform to EU emission standards they will have to cease operating, which could mean that by 31 December 2015 25% of our largest fossil fuelled power plants will have to shut down. The government has also stated that all but one of the UK’s nuclear power plants (Sizewell B) will be shut down by 2025. The likely consequence of these closures would be an upward pressure on electricity prices, and until the introduction of significant levels of low-carbon generation capacity, fossil fuels will continue be provide the bulk of UK electricity generation. The carbon price support mechanism will therefore continue to inflate electricity prices throughout the construction period for HS2, and this should be factored in to the estimated costs of the project.

Assurances

— Can it be confirmed that there are specific plans in place for government to increase the supply of energy and therefore support the increased demand for power arising from investment in HSR?

— Will revised cost estimates be published in the near future to take into account the effects of energy price increases resulting from (a) carbon tax increases and (b) possible supply constraints?

— When the rising costs of energy are fully reflected in the business model for HS2, what impact does this have on ticket prices—or the requirement for additional government subsidy—and therefore the achievement in the growth of passenger numbers forecast in the business case [which in turn underpins the case for HS2]. Key points Evidence By 2015, 25% of the largest fossil fuel plants are planned to close, as part EU Directive 2001/80/EC of the UK Government’s commitment towards reducing carbon emissions. Limitation of Pollutants Directive [replaces DIR 88/609/ EEC] Also government has also stated that all but one of our nuclear power See attachment 1 plants [Sizewell B will be shut down by 2025] [see attached list of plant closures]: and as yet there are no plans in place to replace these plants. The UK government has committed to reducing carbon footprint and has HM Treasury HMRC announced the introduction of a carbon floor pricing policy wef. April Document/Carbon Floor Price 2013, which will have the impact of increasing the price of power Consultation—The Government production from fossil fuels. Response: March 2011 pdf] Transportation within the UK in general contributed 24% of all CO2 BlueSpace Thinking Ltd April emissions in 2007. 2010—Review of High speed Rail—HS2 Proposals The business case for HS2 is based on the premise of incentivising a Consultation Document on HS2 substantial increase in growth of long distance travel within England— specifically, from several major cities into London—through subsidised travel on the new HSR network. The new system will uses more power than a conventional inter-city train HS2 Traction Energy Modelling and so must increase our CO2 emissions significantly. The technical report Report 31/12/2009 identifies that a 3.5 minute time saving between Birmingham and London achieved through higher speed adds an additional 23% to the energy cost for the journey. So as with other forms of transport, the very high speeds proposed in HS2 require disproportionately more energy use. The operating costs presented in the business case are “high level” and the Page 4 s 1.1.5 Cost and Risk technical report states that more work is required on in-depth costing Model Tech Annex 0.4 analysis. No cost escalations have been factored in on original 12.3 billion pound costs for London to Birmingham route. All costs are based on 2009 figures.

May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w311

Written evidence from Henry Law (HSR 111) 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR 2. Journey times between cities will be reduced. 3. Additional capacity will be created, including capacity released by transfer of services from existing routes. 4. The case made by the proponents of the route rests primarily on the second argument. However, additional capacity could equally well be created by construction of a new route or routes, including one on a similar alignment to that selected for HS2. This could be substantially achieved by the reinstatement (as 125 mph railway) of routes and tracks removed in the 1960s rationalisations, including the , the Midland direct route to Manchester, and the Midland and other routes where quadruple track was reduced to double track. 5. The costs of constructing, equipping and operating a high speed railway must be very substantially higher than those for a 125 mph railway. Energy consumption doubles for every 40% increase in speed. Higher speeds give rise to higher costs for other reasons. This will include the provision of a fleet of bespoke high speed trains for running on Britain’s classic routes. 6. To reinforce the above point: 250 mph is not optimal for rail transport in the UK. Costs are proportional to speed to the power of x, where x is greater than 2. Thus, the costs of travel at 140 mph are more than double those at 100 mph. These extra costs comprise amongst other elements, energy costs, initial costs of equipment specified for the higher speed of operation, wear and tear, and maintenance. 7. Time savings, on the other hand, are less for each increment of speed increase. Thus a journey of 120 miles takes 2 hours at 60 mph, 90 minutes at 80 mph, 72 minutes at 100 mph and 60 minutes at 120 mph, giving successive time savings of 30 minutes, 18 minutes and 12 minutes respectively. For typical UK distances, speeds much higher than 100 mph achieve diminishing returns. 8. The high costs of the service will mean that demand has to be finely tuned, using yield management techniques, resulting in complex fares structure which force people to make their travel plans far in advance and tie their journeys to particular times. This in turn adds to journey time since passengers must allow the best part of an hour for delays on the way to their point of departure. That completely negates most of the time savings achieved by high speed running. From this point of view, a conventional speed walk-on service will give shorter journey times than a high speed railway with an airline-style booking system!

9. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives 10. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 11. All journey start and finish with local journeys. The number of local journeys made is at least an order of magnitude greater than the number of inter-urban journeys. Investment must be balanced between the different needs. HS2 could be harmful to this balance by consuming too much of the available resources. 12. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 13. Unless additional funding is set aside, the classic network could be starved of funds. Moreover, there is a risk that building of the line and rolling stock could consume an excessive share of the physical engineering resources and personnel available for rail construction in the UK.

14. What are the implications for domestic aviation? 15. In that most inter-urban journeys are not city-centre to city-centre, for trips starting and finishing within the catchment areas of airports, especially local ones, HS2 may not be as attractive as expected.

16. Business case 17. How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 18. The best measure of the external economic value of infrastructure is aggregate change in land value attributable to the project. There is a need to refine the methodology so that this can be more accurately forecast.

19. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 20. This was comprehensively explored in the report by W S Atkins. However, that report over-estimated the difficulties of running longer trains on the WCML, referring to the need for platform lengthening. This cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w312 Transport Committee: Evidence

problem could be significantly alleviated by the development of an improved system of selective door opening. (SDO) to facilitate the stopping of long trains at stations with short platforms. 21. As regards a new conventional line, the option that needs to be explored is the reinstatement of the Old Oak Common to Northolt route, the Great Central main line and cross-connections including Ashendon- Grendon Underwood, the Calvert spurs and the east-west route between at least Oxford and Bedford, reinstatement of four tracking of the Midland route from London to Trent Junction, and reinstatement of the Midland direct route to Manchester via Matlock and , all as 100 mph–125 mph railway.

22. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 23. Complex yield management schemes are unpopular. High fares drive people onto alternative modes of transport.

24. Economic rebalancing and equity 25. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 26. HS2 is as likely to promote long distance commuting and further centralisation to London as it is to promote regional economic regeneration. A strategy more certain to bridge the north-south economic divide would be to adjust the tax system so that it was related to ability to pay, where this is determined by geographical advantage and disadvantage—in effect creating “tax havens” where they are most needed and raising a greater share of public revenue from those areas most able to bear the burden. This would apply the same principle as the Domesday survey.

27. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 28. This question lies at the crux of the matter. There is a need for connectivity both at local and national scales.

29. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 30. The benefits of fixed infrastructure are ultimately capitalised into land values. The benefits go to whoever owns the land. This was demonstrated with the construction of the Jubilee Line Extension in London, which resulted in a land value uplift of three times the cost of building the line.

31. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? 32. By a substantial replacement of existing taxes by a charge on the site rental value of land. This is the policy known as land value taxation (LVT). In the absence of this tax, the benefits will be creamed-off through higher rents and higher land prices, including prices of domestic property. Any other means of recovering the benefits will be arbitrary and unfair.

33. Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 34. No. Conditions are likely to be imposed resulting in additional costs.

35. Impact 36. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? 37. It is worth noting again that energy consumption doubles for every 40% increase in speed. In addition, the embodied energy of the structure and rolling stock must be taken into account.

38. Conclusion 39. The fundamental question that must be asked is whether, given a pot of money sufficient to pay for HS2, and a decision to spend it on public transport infrastructure, whether HS2 is the best way to spend that pot, as against other options such as a 125 mph railway, urban light rail, or improvements to urban bus travel, and beyond this, on improvements in facilities for cyclists and pedestrians in cities. 16 May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w313

Written evidence from ASLEF (HSR 112) 1. The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) is the UK’s largest train drivers’ union representing approximately 18,000 members in train operating companies and freight companies as well as London Underground and light rail systems. The union has 130 years knowledge and experience of the railways. 2. ASLEF welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this Transport Select Committee Inquiry into High Speed Rail. As the union representing the UK’s only high speed train drivers’ on Eurostar and HS1 we believe we are well placed to comment on this proposed infrastructure development. 3. Investment in the UK’s infrastructure, particularly rail, is crucial to reducing the deficit and boosting economic growth. A key objective of that investment in the railways must be to cultivate a modal shift from air to rail and from car to train along in tandem with the development of a high speed rail network in line with Coalition’s Programme for Government commitment to make the transport sector greener, more sustainable and reduce carbon dioxide emissions. An increase in rail capacity is strongly linked to a decrease in car journeys undertaken with the result that there is less carbon emissions. Decisions must therefore be determined by what will best deliver these outcomes.

What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 4. ASLEF believes that the development of a high speed rail network is vital to the long term prosperity of the UK and notes that British rail network is already running at capacity. Over the past few years rail use has been at record highs with more distance being travelled by rail than any other era in peacetime. We are travelling 10 billion miles a year more than we did just a decade a go. Projections quoted by the McNulty review team suggest that the rail industry has the potential to double its traffic by 2030. In addition the UK is highly unlikely to build any more motorways in the near future so the construction of a high speed rail network is therefore the only viable solution to the capacity challenge. 5. The growth on the main two north to south rail routes in the UK has also witnessed an extraordinarily upward trajectory. Between 2008–09 and 2009–10 the West Coast Mainline increased the number of passenger journey’s carried by 15.8% and passenger kilometres by 18%. 6. The East Coast Main line is one of the busiest routes on the rail network yet there is currently insufficient capacity on parts of the line to deal with the existing requirements of passenger and freight services notwithstanding future growth requirements. 7. The Committee will know Network Rail’s West Coast Route Utilisation Strategy published in December 2010 explained that “the Line is nearly full to capacity. The market for travel between London and Manchester is expected to grow at the fastest rate, with passenger demand expected to increase by as much as 61%.” It also states that “this RUS therefore supports the development and implementation of a high speed network initially between London and the West Midlands, but also to Manchester and beyond. We believe that this is the best way to free up capacity on the West Coast Main Line and are delighted the Government is committed to the project.”

How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 8. This Government has sought to become the greenest Britain has seen. Therefore not only must this been seen in the context of improving inter-urban connectivity, but within the scope of carbon reduction through reduced car journeys and flights. The Government has a legal commitment to reduce CO2 emissions by 34% by 2020 and 80% by 2050.Transport is the fastest growing polluter in the UK. However rail emits just 2% of these emissions whilst road is responsible for 19% of all emissions and 55% of transport emissions.

Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 9. It is essential that any funds spent on a high speed network are ring fenced and should not detract from the ongoing funding of the remaining network. It is thus essential that the High Speed rail builds capacity along with other areas of the network rather than simply moving it.

What are the implications for domestic aviation? 10. By linking to Heathrow airport, domestic connecting flights which use Heathrow as a main hub for international journeys will be substantially reduced. It is important to remember that travel by HSR produces one-quarter the emissions of an equivalent trip by air, taking into account the average loadings typically achieved on each mode. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w314 Transport Committee: Evidence

Business case

What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

11. High speed lines tend to promote more growth than conventional lines. Currently rail only enjoys a 15% market share in journeys between London and Scotland. The Eurostar demonstrates the popularity of high speed rail as an alternative to air travel with around an 80% share of London to Paris travellers.

What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

12. ASLEF believes that for environmental reasons and likely road congestion projections we must look at increasing demand and capacity on rail. Reducing demand in lieu of investment in capacity is simply not an option. HSR can deliver modal shift from carbon-intensive car and air travel by dramatically speeding up journey times for medium and long-distance journeys. In the future, the carbon savings of HSR will be as great if not better, given that it operates on electric traction and will therefore benefit from future de-carbonisation of the electricity supply. This is likely to be the case even if a switch is made to electric cars and if aviation becomes considerably more efficient.

The strategic route

The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?

Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

13. ASLEF believes that it makes no sense to have a high speed network in the United Kingdom that does not go to Edinburgh or Glasgow. These are two major cities in the UK and the benefit of high speed travel and the shortening of journey times would be enormous. This is especially true when you consider that rail only enjoys a 15% market share in journeys between London and Scotland whereas the Eurostar now has four fifths of London to Paris travelers. Paris-Lille, Osaka-Tokyo and Cologne-Frankfurt routes are all about 120 km long, which is quite similar to the first part of high-speed rail that is planned (ie the line to Birmingham).

14. Research already carried out by ARUP and Volterra had shown that a “Y-shaped” network travelling from London to Birmingham, where it would split with one arm of the “Y” heading to Yorkshire, could provide between £1.5 billion and £3 billion of productivity benefits to the economy, in addition to transport benefits of around £29 billion.

ARUP’s new research estimates that linking the Sheffield City Region the Leeds City Region, and the “Three Cities” of Derby, Nottingham and Leicester as part of a national high speed rail network would connect an area of 6.7 million people and 3 million jobs. Existing connections to the Tees Valley and Tyne and Wear City Regions would provide access to a further 2.2 million people and 0.9 million jobs.

This route to the East of the Pennines would provide an estimated £60 billion in standard transport benefits and a further £2.3 billion of productivity benefits. Its Benefit to Cost Ratio would be 5.61, compared with 2.58 for the route to Manchester.

A direct route to the Leeds City Region, via the East Midlands and Sheffield, would have greater economic benefits than the less direct route to Leeds via Manchester. It would have a higher Benefit to Cost Ratio of 2.46 compared to only 1.88 for the less direct route, deliver far greater productivity benefits—£2.3 billion compared to £0.4 billion—and result in far faster journey times to Leeds, York and the North East.

The scheme will create in the region of 40,000 jobs and generate economic benefits of around £43 billion. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w315

Impact What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 15. Examples of the benefits of High Speed rail are clear when considering the Eurostar and the high speed line between Madrid and Barcelona. Eurostar now has about an 80% share of London to Paris travellers. In Spain, since the opening of the new high speed service in 2008, 50% of passengers now use the train between Madrid and Barcelona. The EU is currently exploring proposals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from transport by 60% over the next 40 years by replacing short haul flights with high speed rail. According to the EU, Heathrow’s congestion problems could be eased by cutting domestic and European flights, while demand for new runways could be suppressed by building new rail networks. The EU transport commissioner, Siim Kallas, has announced a series of green transport goals. He explains “If we are successful in creating new railways they can take over short-haul airline connections. It makes it easier for the runway issue.” A new high speed line could have a significantly positive effect for Rail Freight by relieving capacity on the East Coast and West Coast Mainlines for the use of freight services.

Conclusion 16. ASLEF would again point out that the development of a high speed rail network is crucial to the economic and social future of Britain. It is vital we invest in our rail infrastructure to encourage more of a modal shift from unsustainable domestic aviation and our congested roads. 17. High speed rail is the only viable solution to the capacity challenges we face on a rail network whose traffic is projected to double by 2030. 16 May 2011

Written evidence from the Leeds and North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce (HSR 113) Introduction This is the Leeds and North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce response to the Transport Select Committee’s call for evidence on high speed rail. Leeds, York & North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce welcomes the opportunity to submit comments about High Speed Rail to the Parliamentary committee. The Chamber is one of the largest in the country and represents around 2,500 businesses of all sizes and from all sectors. The Chamber firmly believes that an efficient and effective transport system is essential for a successful and sustainable economy. The Chamber sees high speed rail as a vital component in an integrated transport strategy that will help this region and the north compete even more successfully with areas both within and outside the United Kingdom. The Leeds and North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce have contributed to the work of the High Speed Rail Eastern Network Partnership. The Partnership has commissioned Arup (the leading global transport and development consultancy) and Volterra (a leading economic consultancy) to analyse the economic benefits of the eastern route of the national Y-shaped high speed rail network. This evidence draws on the Arup- Volterra reasearch.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? The Leeds and North Yorkshire Chamber Commerce believe the main arguments for high speed rail are the economic benefits that will result from faster rail journey times and the additional rail capacity that will be created. However to secure these economic benefits the network needs to be planned and constructed in the right way. In particular the eastern route should be built at the earliest opportunity. This route will provide access to the East Midlands, the Sheffield City Region, Leeds and to the East Coast Main Line near York to allow high speed trains to access York and the North East. We believe that high-speed rail is essential if the Government is to rebalance the economy by accelerating the growth of towns and cities in the north of England. High speed rail will connect Yorkshire’s businesses cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w316 Transport Committee: Evidence

with the Midlands, London, and Europe and further afield, via the link to Heathrow, improving the competitiveness and productivity of the region. Investment in infrastructure is vital for us to remain a competitive economy. According to the Arup-Volterra research, the total wider economic impacts of the eastern route of the proposed national high speed rail network are estimated to be £4.2 billion over a 60-year appraisal period. These comprise productivity benefits (of bringing businesses closer together) of £2.6 billion, imperfect competition benefits of £0.8 billion and economic benefits of releasing capacity on existing rail routes of £0.8 billion. These benefits are additional to the benefits from reduced journey times of rail passengers (conventional transport benefits), which have been estimated by HS2 to be £23.1 billion for the entire Y-shaped network north of the West Midlands. We need to build the eastern route as soon as possible, in advance of, or at least at the same time as the western route. The economic benefits compared to the costs of the eastern route are significantly higher than the western route. In terms of benefits to rail users, the Benefit to Cost ratio of the eastern section of the high speed network north of the West Midlands is 5.6, compared with 2.6 of the western section. The Arup-Volterra research shows that the productivity benefits of bringing businesses closer together of the eastern part of the network (£2.6 billion) are around 20% higher than those for the western part (£2.1 billion). Once the national high speed rail network is completed it will be important to ensure that there will be at least six high speed trains to/from London on the eastern part of the network. According to the Arup-Volterra research, most (70%) of the productivity benefits of the eastern route are created by the faster journeys to London. It is vital that there are at least six trains per an hour to/from London on the eastern route of the Y shaped network. We need to ensure the eastern part of the high speed network is planned in the right way to maximise the potential for bringing city regions outside London close together. A significant proportion (30%) of productivity benefits from the eastern route will also result from high speed rail bringing city regions outside London closer together. The national high speed rail network has the potential, if it is planned in the right way, to transform the connectivity between main cities outside London. Some of the existing rail links between these cities are poor. For example it now takes almost two hours to travel by rail between Leeds and Nottingham, two of the largest cities in England, which are only 70 miles apart. In addition to the high speed rail services to/from London, there will also be high speed services between Birmingham, the East Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East. The economic benefits of high speed rail will be maximised if it is planned and delivered in the right way and integrated with a strategy for improving rail services on existing lines. High speed rail is essential, but it is not a panacea. It is vital that upgrades be made to existing rail links. Electrification and new rolling stock with expanded capacity must be introduced on regional connections. Upgrades to the East Coast Main Line are a priority. Improvements are needed to existing rail routes in the short to medium term to deliver benefits in advance of completion of the full national high speed rail network (which could take over 20 years). Capacity released on existing rail routes by high speed rail should be used to retain existing long distance inter-urban rail services to the Eastern Network Partnership area, not for additional London commuter services. There should be more regular services to London from places in the Eastern Network Partnership area that do not have them currently. There must also be improvements to local and regional transport networks including rail and light rail services that connect with the high speed rail stations. This will spread the benefits of high speed rail as well as delivering substantial economic benefits in its own right. To maximise its economic benefits and integration with the wider rail network, high speed rail should serve city centre stations where feasible. The economic benefits will be increased if high speed rail is planned in conjunction with regeneration and development projects in the areas next to the high speed rail stations.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? We believe that high speed rail is not an alternative to investment in local and regional transport networks, and the strategic road networks. In the context of current public spending constraints it is important to remember that major capital spending on High Speed Rail is not planned to start for several years, and will be phased over time. It is possible to deliver investment in transformational national transport projects, as well as a series of other economically important transport schemes. For example, as well as investing in a range of local transport projects and road schemes, the Government is also currently (at a time of spending constraints) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w317

investing in Crossrail. Once Crossrail is complete, the next major national transport project should be high speed rail. Evidence from city region studies shows that typically 70–80% of all journeys are within city regions. Therefore, more effective integrated city region transport networks and systems will support agglomeration and economic growth, and contribute towards the Government’s low carbon agenda. Better city region transport networks can help maximise and spread the benefits of high speed rail, by improving access to the high speed rail stations. Improvements to existing lines (including electrification, capacity improvements, and new rolling stock) would deliver benefits in the short-to-medium term. This will be important for places such as Yorkshire which may have to wait for 20–30 years for the full high speed rail network to be completed. These improvements would also help increase the benefits of capacity release on existing rail lines once the high speed network is completed.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? We believe that the Leeds City Region is at an economic disadvantage in terms of its international connectivity. Leeds Bradford Airport is an under exploited asset, with scope to develop its route network. However, improvements are needed to its connections to the city region transport network in order to strengthen is catchment. Our businesses also require good access to London airports, particularly to Heathrow which is a global hub. Leeds Bradford Airport no longer has flights to Heathrow, and is losing its flights to Gatwick. The proposed high speed rail network will transform our access to Heathrow via the proposed Crossrail interchange in West London.

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? We believe that the Government’s proposals for high speed rail are underpinned by robust economic analysis. Indeed in some respects the analysis of the economic benefits is conservative. For instance, the existing “Wider Economic Impacts” methodology is best suited to assessing the benefits of schemes to successful business centres (it was designed to help make the case for Crossrail) and does not capture all the transformational benefits of high speed rail.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? It is important there are capacity and speed improvements to existing long distance rail routes, particularly the East Coast Main Line, and also to the Midland Main Line. These schemes have a strong business case, would deliver substantial benefits over the short-to-medium term. However improvements to existing lines would not provide the step change in north-south rail capacity that will be needed over the medium to longer term. The experience of the West Coast Main Line upgrade demonstrates the potential pitfalls—disruption and cost over-runs—of seeking to deliver overly ambitious upgrades of existing routes.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? We believe that managing demand by price will suppress overall demand, which will constrain our economy. The cost of a Leeds to London Standard Class Anytime ticket is already £239.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? High Speed One (the Channel Tunnel Rail Link) was built on time and on budget, despite it being a very challenging scheme in engineering terms.

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? No response to this question. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w318 Transport Committee: Evidence

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?

The proposed Y shaped network is the right option. Previous work undertaken by Arup and Volterra on behalf of the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions demonstrated that the Y shaped network would deliver greater economic benefits than the alternatives.

As well as providing fast access to London the high speed network should also be configured to support links between cities outside London. In particular there is an opportunity to transform rail journey times between the Leeds City Region, the Sheffield City Region and the main cities of the East Midlands. This corridor has a population of over 6 million and over 3 million jobs. Its main cities are close together geographically, but currently function as separate economies as a result of poor transport links. For example it takes almost TWO hours to travel by rail the 70 miles between Leeds, Sheffield and Nottingham, generating an average journey time of 36 mph on a service which links three of the largest cities in England.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

The Government is right to build the network in stages, but the eastern route between the West Midlands and Yorkshire should be built as soon as possible and in advance, or at the very least, at the same time as the western route to Manchester. It should also be noted that the North West will benefit from the first stage of the HS2 networks because it will include a link to enable high speed trains to run north of the West Midlands on the West Coast Main Line.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

Yes. The proposed Crossrail interchange in West London will provide easy and fast connections from HS2 to Heathrow. A direct link to Heathrow could lead to capacity constraints on the core London to West Midlands section of HS2. We would not support a direct HS2 link to Heathrow if it resulted in a service pattern of less than six central London high speed services and hour to / from the eastern route of the Y shaped network.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide?

The work of HS2, and the work undertaken by Arup and Volterra, shows that high speed rail will deliver substantial economic benefits to the places it serves. A national high speed rail network, if planned and delivered in the right way, can help narrow the north-south divide in economic performance.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

There is a need to plan the high speed network in the right way, and in conjunction with wider land-use and regeneration plans and investments, in order to maximise the economic benefits. High Speed 1 is a case in point. It has unlocked development areas around the new stations at Kings Cross-St Pancras, (location for the London Olympics), Ebbsfleet, and Ashford. In these four locations alone around 50,000 new homes and over 100,000 jobs will be created. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w319

Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? No response to these questions.

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? No response to these questions. That concludes the submission from the Leeds, York & North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce. As mentioned the Chamber is supportive of high speed rail and will look to continue its support over the coming years. May 2011

Written evidence from Greater Manchester Combined Authority (HSR 114) Introduction Greater Manchester welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Committee inquiry into the strategic case for a proposed high speed rail network. Transport is recognised as a priority by the GMCA and LEP which have identified the need to “significantly improve connectivity into and within the city region” as a strategic objective. It was in recognition of this that the Greater Manchester Transport Fund (GMTF) was developed, an innovative £1.5 billion package of schemes developed and prioritised on the basis of their contribution to regional productivity through a measure of increase in GVA per £ of whole life cost whilst also demonstrating positive benefits in terms of environmental and social outcomes. Funded by a combination of local, regional and national funding streams, the prioritised list of schemes alone is forecast to increase employment in the city region by 20,000 and lead to a GVA increase of £1.3 billion per annum by 2021. We express our strong support in favour of the principles of developing a high speed network, which will increase both capacity and inter-urban connectivity between Manchester and the other cities on the line as well as releasing capacity on the existing Greater Manchester rail network.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? From our perspective, the primary arguments in favour of the HSR programme centre on the increases in inter-urban connectivity and the knock-on capacity improvements to the “classic” network.

Capacity Despite £9 billion of upgrades, the West Coast Mainline is set to again exceed capacity by mid-2020. The West Coast is the only direct link between Manchester and London, and is set to see passenger demand grow by as much as 61% by 2025 according to the West Coast RUS. Further incremental upgrades to the line would be short sighted when set against the opportunity to develop a new dedicated high-speed inter-urban network. Increasing capacity will not just benefit long distance passengers, it will free up capacity on the existing network. At present 13% of trains arriving in Manchester during the three hour morning peak are overcrowded. This figure is set to rise to over 25% by 2025.The extra capacity HSR will create would allow increased frequencies to local destinations and new services to more locations benefiting local commuters, leisure travellers and freight services.

Inter-urban connectivity Cities like Manchester are the drivers of our nation’s economy, with an economic base centred on new knowledge-intensive and high-tech industries which serve local, regional and international markets. The continued successful expansion of these industries is dependent on high quality intercity links, allowing firms to gain agglomeration benefits by accessing new and more diversified markets throughout the UK and Europe. With journey times at over two hours to London and over one and a half hours to Birmingham (which are unimpressive when compared to our European competitors) current inter-urban connectivity is constraining cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w320 Transport Committee: Evidence

Manchester’s economic growth. The Manchester Independent Economic Review suggests that Greater Manchester, given its scale and range of assets, is the best placed city in the UK to increase its productivity and long term growth and to act as a complementary growth pole to London and the South East, supporting the objective of the Coalition Agreement to rebalance the economy geographically.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? The HSR programme matches the Government’s vision for sustainable, balanced growth across the whole of the United Kingdom, by addressing the economic North-South imbalance which costs the UK economy £38 billion per annum in GDP. HSR will improve inter-city connectivity, which, when combined with proposals for the Northern Hub, will generate economic benefits across the 10 million Northern conurbation. HSR also meets the Government’s transport policy objectives for an integrated transport network by encouraging a modal shift to more carbon efficient, environmentally sustainable modes. Existing road capacity cannot meet the forecast increases in demand, and building new road space is expensive, environmentally unsustainable and politically contentious. Previous Government plans to increase capacity on the M6 by developing a new parallel running motorway between junctions 11–19 were abandoned less than two years after their proposal. HSR, coupled with investment in the existing rail network in Greater Manchester via the Northern Hub, progressive electrification and potential Tram-Train schemes will complement the development of a low carbon sustainable transport system in Manchester. The HSR programme matches Government spending policy in achieving value for money in transport investment. The alternatives to HS2 generate much lower cost benefits and crucially don’t provide the long term capacity increases needed. Rail Package 2a (RP2a), which is by far the best performing of the alternative schemes to HS2 has a comparable BCR but only increases capacity by 54% as compared to the 200% rise in capacity HS2 would create. (High Speed Rail Command Paper, DfT, March 2010)

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? The HSR programme should not be viewed as an alternate approach to investment on the existing network, but as an addition. The effectiveness of the HSR programme is reliant upon the efficient running of the conventional network to aid onward connectivity. It is critical that HSR stations and infrastructure are well integrated into existing local rail and tram networks, as the immediate area surrounding the HSR station is unlikely to be the ultimate origin or destination of any journey. Investment must be made where necessary to existing facilities or new connections created to allow passengers to quickly transfer to and from their ultimate origin and destination. The success of HSR in Manchester and the wider Northern region will be reliant upon investment in the Northern Hub scheme, which will enhance inter-urban connectivity in the North, complimenting the HSR proposal. Money must be made available for Network Rail to commit to this programme (which generates a BCR of 4:1) in control period 5 in order for the full social and economic benefits of HS2 to be realised in the North West. Current investment commitments allocate in excess of £1 billion per annum to Crossrail, a scheme which will be complete by 2017; the same time that investment in high speed rail will need to commence. This funding should be allocated to the HSR project to reduce additional funding requirements and protect funding for the conventional rail network, and other general transport spending.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? A combination of reduced journey times, improved quality and increased service frequency has been proven to induce modal shift from competitor modes to rail. The 2008 introduction of the Virgin Pendolino service between Manchester and London, which reduced journey times from 2 hours 30 minutes to 2 hours 8 minutes, resulted in rail’s market share on the Manchester-London corridor increasing from 38% in 2003 to 80% in 2010. Figures published by The Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) show that rail’s market share on the 10 most popular domestic air routes in 2010 grew to 44%—up from 29% in 2006. Whilst this growth is impressive, it shows that the majority of trips on these routes is still undertaken by air and demonstrates the potential for future modal shift to rail if further reductions in journey time are brought about by HSR. In Europe, the introduction of a HSR line between Madrid and Barcelona saw the market share for air travel fall from 84%–52%, and is expected to drop to just 30% in the future. We would expect similar model shift from domestic aviation to occur in the UK with the introduction of a full HSR network. We welcome the Government’s interest in linking Airports to the HSR network and HS2 Ltd’s examination of Manchester Airport as a potential parkway station serving Greater Manchester and the North West. We are cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w321

keen that this option is developed further in order that the maximum number of people possible is able to access the network without the need to enter the centre of Manchester.

3. Business Case

3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network?

The Government has been comprehensive in its methodology of the costs and benefits of a HSR network, which has been developed on an understandably cautious basis. The Government has gone to great lengths to revise their BCR assumptions in line with updated passenger demand figures, based on lower growth levels as a result of the projected lower rate of growth of GDP.

Cost estimates are based on the project being solely Government funded, yet the Secretary of State has expressed his expectation that major beneficiaries of HSR in the private sector will make financial contribution. Private sector investment, which isn’t taken into account in the business case would both make the scheme more attractive and reduce costs to Government. Precedent for public private partnership funding is evident from the Crossrail Bill which included the use of a supplementary business rate to levy funds from the private sector totalling £150 million.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

Britain cannot continue to rely on incremental improvements to our existing rail infrastructure. The West Coast Mainline is a Victorian railway that has served us well in the 19th and 20th centuries, but is not able to cope with the demands of the current century. The main alternative to HSR; Rail Package 2a; is an upgrade of existing lines and the experience of the earlier version of this approach (the West Coast Route Modernisation project) is relevant. Its costs were estimated at £2.1 billion. The final cost was £9 billion and it entailed a decade of on-line works, which was hugely disruptive to rail users. There is much greater risk and uncertainty around cost estimates to upgrades of existing lines than those made for new-build. Upgrades typically take longer than originally programmed too (note HS1 was constructed on time, and to budget, unlike the West Coast Route Modernisation).

Proponents of the alternatives must also take into account as best they can what will have been achieved upon completion. In the case of RP2a, a situation will have been created in which any further similar developments designed essentially to create additional capacity will have increasingly poor benefit cost performance and the Government of the day will find themselves belatedly needed to construct a high speed line after all.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

Managing demand by way of pricing rail out of passengers’ economic means contradicts Government policy on creating a sustainable and integrated transport network. Long distance domestic travellers will be forced into using air travel, which is unsustainable on carbon grounds and given that HSR is the Government’s alternative to building a new runway at Heathrow. Similarly forcing medium distance travellers onto the already saturated motorway network will stifle economic growth, whilst also generating significant negative environmental impacts.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

From Manchester’s perspective, we urge the Government to ensure that there is no repeat of the lack of long term strategic planning that resulted in the “White Elephant” £135 million Waterloo International Station only being operational for 13 years. It is for this reason that we believe it is necessary to develop proposals for the whole of the “Y” network now, rather than to break it down into two phases. It is noted that whilst HS2 Ltd’s work on the Birmingham–Manchester line began only seven months after their work on the London–Birmingham line concluded, it is predicted to open seven years after the first phase. It is Greater Manchester’s strong belief that the maximum economic benefits will only be captured if the full network is promoted as a single whole and that Parliament should scrutinise the proposal for the full “Y” network rather than as two parts. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w322 Transport Committee: Evidence

4. The Strategic Route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? We have no view on the proposed line of route from London to the West Midlands but support the proposed stations at Euston, and Old Oak Common which will provide access to a greater proportion of London and the South East than is accessible from Euston alone, as well as providing access to Heathrow. Intermediate towns and cities between London and Manchester will benefit significantly from the extra capacity released by HSR on the “classic network”. If intermediate stations were to be built, they should be built in such a way that the principle journey times and capacity available for services to Greater Manchester is not diminished.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? GMCA supports the Government’s proposal for an initial “Y” shaped high speed network serving Birmingham, Manchester (and Manchester Airport) and Leeds as these cities will provide the greatest economic benefits in terms of agglomeration; though we believe that more analysis needs to be carried out on the how high speed trains will be integrated onto the current network to run North of Lichfield and accommodated at stations including Piccadilly and in Liverpool. GMCA firmly believe that the proposed “Y” network should be seen as the first step of a longer term strategy in developing a comprehensive national HSR network, increasing inter-urban connections between currently poorly connected cities in order to address the nation’s economic divide, Manchester needs better more frequent and quicker services to the Northern cities of Liverpool, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Sheffield. It would also be beneficial to improve links to the cities of Nottingham, Bristol and Cardiff.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? We agree with the Government’s view that the HSR programme should be constructed in stages from London upwards. However, as we make clear in our answer to question 3.4 we believe the scheme should be planned as a single project and considered through Parliament on the basis of a single hybrid bill. Although it would add time and complexity, it would still take significantly less parliamentary time than two hybrid bills in different parliamentary sessions. In the intervening period before the high-speed line opens in Manchester it is clear that some work may be required between Lichfield and Manchester to accommodate the new High Speed Rail services from day one.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? We strongly support the proposals for a link to HS1 as part of phase 1 of the construction of the HS2 network. Direct access to the Channel Tunnel and Europe will allow firms in Manchester and the North West to access new and more diversified markets, increasing economic productivity. We agree that a future HSR link to Heathrow may be required, but this must not disadvantage passengers wishing to access central London.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the North-South economic divide? European evidence from case studies highlighting the agglomeration benefits created by bringing major urban areas closer together is clear. It was feared the introduction of a HSR line between Lyon and Paris would damage Lyon’s regional economy, and widen the economic divide between Paris and the French regions. Instead since the introduction of HSR, Lyon has seen unprecedented economic growth and regeneration, with a second central business district forming around the new HSR station, creating 20,000 new jobs. There are strong parallels therefore between Manchester and Lyon. Early local studies conducted by us predict almost 10,000 jobs would be generated across the region covered by the Northern Way partnership, boosting productivity and growing the economic output across the area by £967 million per year.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? It is paramount that the shape of the HSR network is led by the desire to support regional economic development and where possible local regeneration. Urban regional centres will benefit the most from HSR through job creation and increased economic output, and we feel the proposed “Y” shape network linking cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w323

London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds; and potentially onwards to Liverpool, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow will be critical in achieving the objective. However, high speed rail is not a panacea for regional regeneration but is one of a number of interventions, including capacity improvements on the existing rail network, which will better link a wide range of towns and cities in order to maximise the ability of people to reach employment, training and education opportunities.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? HSR will primarily benefit major urban areas through agglomeration opening up new markets. HSR will increase the number of workplace jobs accessible from Manchester within 90 minutes by rail by 90%. A city centre station site is essential as all previous studies have concluded. Only rail can provide unrivalled city centre to city centre transport capacity. A second HSR station located at Manchester Airport would also generate large benefits. Growth impacts concentrated on Manchester Airport and surrounding area will see an estimated productivity rise of £290 per job per annum. Benefits of HSR however are not limited to the immediate urban areas surrounding HSR stations. In the North West HS2 will create economic benefits that spread far beyond the immediate Greater Manchester area, with productivity per job estimated to rise by £201 per job p.a as far away as Preston. Although HSR’s primary markets will be business and leisure travel, the capacity released on the conventional network will support access to jobs and other opportunities at all levels and to all socio- economic groups.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? Government needs to explore all appropriate areas of funding, especially those that reduce the cost to the tax payer. Greater Manchester through its Transport Fund is making substantial investments into local transport infrastructure. In the main we see HSR as infrastructure of strategic national importance—and would expect therefore that much of the necessary funds would therefore come from central government.

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? The introduction of a HSR network has the potential to significantly reduce carbon emission levels in the UK as it will induce a modal shift from the carbon-intensive modes of car and air travel. According to the Department for Transport, in 2008 domestic transport accounted for 21% of the UK’s domestic emissions of carbon dioxide. ATOC research demonstrates that HSR travel produces only one-third of the carbon emissions of car travel and one-quarter the emissions of an equivalent trip by air, taking into account the average loadings typically achieved on each mode. A national HSR network incorporating Scotland is forecast to reduce CO2 emissions by one million tonnes each year by 2055. HSR’s carbon output will fall further in the future due to the progressive de-carbonisation of the UK’s electricity generation facilities.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? GMCA feel that the Government has gone to great lengths to account for environmental costs and benefits within the business case. Assessments of environmental costs and benefits attributed to both the lines construction and eventual usage have been derived from detailed assessments and future levels of demand and carbon emissions are based on conservative estimates. Comparisons have also made with the environmental impacts of HS1 and other rail schemes.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? Introduction of a HSR network would have positive impacts on freight services, as they will benefit from the reduced demand for inter-urban services on the existing rail network freeing capacity on the “classic” network. The freed capacity HS2 would create for freight services on the “classic” network is extremely important, as according to Network Rail’s “The Network Route Utilisation Freight Strategy”, volumes are set to increase by as much as 140% between 2006–07 and 2030–31.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? Whilst we accept their will be disruption to services during the rebuilding of Euston station, the disturbances caused will be far less than those which would be created by incremental improvements to the West Coast Mainline. Lessons need to be learnt from the 1998–2008 West Coast Mainline modernisation. Disruption caused cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w324 Transport Committee: Evidence

by live incremental improvements increased journey times between Manchester and London to almost three hours and had a significant negative impact on punctuality and reliability. The resultant impact saw passengers move away from rail travel to more environmentally unsustainable modes, and it took a long time for the rail industry to recover patronage. No work has been published to date around plans that may need to be developed at Manchester Piccadilly to accommodate HSR trains from the outset. It is essential (i) that such plans are developed expeditiously and (ii) that when implemented these plans do not lead to significant disruptions during construction. 16 May 2011

Written evidence from the National Farmers Union (HSR 116) 1. The NFU represents 55,000 farm businesses in England and Wales involving an estimated 155,000 farmers, managers and partners in the business. In addition we have 55,000 countryside members with an interest in farming and the country.

2. Introduction 2.1 The NFU welcomes the opportunity to respond the Transport Committee. 2.2 The NFU is a representative of many of the farming landowners and agricultural tenants on the proposed route who feel strongly about both the economic case put forward by High Speed 2 and also the steps that can be taken to mitigate impact and complexity of the compulsory purchase process. In preparing for this submission, and also our response to DfT’s High Speed 2 consultation, the NFU has held six meetings in the affected regions, as well as gathering information on farm holdings affected.

3. Question 2.1—HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network 3.1 A well-functioning strategic transport network is central to any productive economy, but specifically for those involved in the agriculture and food industries. As UK farmers’ productivity increases, improved transport networks are required to aid competition with other countries products, and also to reduce transport emissions. These dual purposes are highlighted in the Government’s recent Foresight Report,325 as food security and emissions awareness both move up the political agenda. 3.2 With this in mind, it would make sense for any transport strategy to lead to better cross country transport links which would make the journey times from processer to distributor and to the port facilities faster and less carbon intensive. With little produce being moved between London and Birmingham, it is difficult to see how High Speed 2 would aid this. 3.3 According to the Economic Case, High Speed 2 should support all transport users through both an increase in rail capacity, but also a modal shift which will reduce congestion on the roads, particularly on the M1. Whilst this will help road users who are forced to use the M1, there are little benefits for road users elsewhere. 3.4 Other road and rail users are concerned that such a large project will leave less funding available for improvements elsewhere, often in places where there could be increasing amount of transport required in the future. For example plans to upgrade the A14, an important cross country road which provides a useful link between the UK’s agricultural heartlands to the ports in the east, have been shelved as part of the spending review. A proper assessment concerning the impact of funding availability for transport projects elsewhere should be considered alongside the proposal for High Speed 2.

4. Question 3.1—How robust are the assumptions in the methodology—for example on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions and the impact of lost revenue on the classic line? 4.1 Whilst the economic case goes into some depth analysing the potential benefits of a high-speed rail line between London and Birmingham, very little attention is paid to the cost, beyond the consideration of risk and optimism bias. 4.2 In particular interest to our organisation is the costs which have been considered in relation to taking land out of production. The appraisal shows that £960 million has been allocated to cover the land purchase and compensation costs, but no thought has been given to other costs that farm businesses will face as a result of their land being purchased. Over time the average size of farms in England has increased as the importance of economies of scale has risen, with many farmers renting extra land in order to maximise profitability. The acquisition of small parcels of land from farmers will not only mean that that the farmer loses the area of land taken, but will also affect his bottom line as fixed costs will have to be spread over a smaller farmable area. 325 Foresight Report, Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Synthesis C5. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w325

Whilst there will be a possibility for some farmers to rent other land near by this will not be possible in many cases and farmers will be left out of pocket, and in some cases the farm business will become an unviable asset.

4.3 Access to land via bridges and tunnels is another area where the costs have not been fully considered. There is no indication on where access might be placed on the current set of maps, and there is no estimate of how many of these bridges and tunnels High Speed 2 expects to incorporate. Without access to land separated by the track, farmers will, in some cases, be unable to farm these parcels of land. In other cases farmers may face a lengthy round journey on rural roads, which will increase costs for them as well as increasing congestion, and risk of accidents for other road users as more, large, farm vehicles, such as combine harvesters, take to the roads. We are also aware of cases where the High Speed 2 route effectively isolates farm businesses from access to the main road network, such as removing links that HGV delivery vehicles can use.

5. Question 3.4—What lessons should to Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

5.1 Costs and build time can be minimised if a good relationship is built up with land holders along the proposed route. Having the individual farmer’s support will allow for easy access to the land for the numerous surveys that have to be carried out.

5.2 In the early stages of construction of High Speed 1, goodwill was gained by agreeing a payment upfront, to be given to the landholder on first, second and subsequent visits to the land. A code of conduct should be followed whilst on the land.

5.3 Goodwill was also gained during the construction of HS1, as contractors used by HS1 to do the work had to abide to a construction Code of Practice and a quick dispute resolution procedure. Not only did this improve relationships between occupiers and constructors it also improved the speed of construction as disputes were avoided where possible, or resolved quickly. Construction of HS2 could be improved further by applying a Duty of Care as this will help with the smooth running of the operation of HS2 and for the project to reach its targets and the budget allowed.

5.4 Accommodation works in particular bridges and tunnels need to be considered at the earliest stage in detail and factored into the costs. We know from our experience with HS1 that this element was considered far too late in the process and HS1 did not take on board the access that is required by farmers on a daily basis to reach blocks of land and buildings which are severed by the rail line. Without proper assessment of these costs early on, both budget targets and deadlines will be difficult to meet.

5.5 A further lesson learnt from HS1 was that the initial Bill allowed far too much land to be acquired that was not necessary for the rail link. The total acquisition was 858 hectares whereas 350 hectares was actually required for the rail line and the landscaping. This highlights that it is very important to consider the area of land to be acquired as this will affect the budget.

6. Question 4.3—Is the Government correct to build the network in stages moving from London northwards?

6.1 It does make business sense to have a part of the line open at the earliest available opportunity, so that those who will benefit from the construction of the line can enjoy it as early as possible, and construction costs can begin to be paid off. However, the decision to consult separately on the two phases, particularly when the Government appears committed to both phases does not allow for those affected in the second phase to respond to the initial consultation with full knowledge of how it affects themselves and their business interests.

6.2 The Economic Case shows that the London to Birmingham line on its own, with a benefit cost ratio (BCR) of 1.6, does not meet the Department for Transport’s threshold for high value for money projects of 2. However when considering the whole Y network the BCR is much higher at 2.2. This suggests that, should the funds be available, the project is more likely to go ahead as a whole Y network than simply a line from London to Birmingham.

6.3 Many members of the public have no strong views on this project and north of Birmingham there is a low level of understanding of the Y network. This is especially true for those who live a long way from the urban centres where the stations will be based. Amongst some of the general public, and NFU members, there is an assumption that no new lines would have to be built north of Litchfield, with the trains simply transferring onto the newly upgraded West Coast Main Line (even in phase 2). This lack of understanding reflects the absence of communication with potential stakeholders north of Birmingham, during a consultation which effectively is many people’s last opportunity to comment on the worthiness of high speed across the whole country. May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w326 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Sue Taylor and Christopher Boyce (HSR 119) 1. Main arguments either for or against HSR We oppose the plan for a second high speed rail network. In our view (set out in greater detail below): (a) there is no convincing case for HS2 on economic, business, environmental or national interest grounds; (b) other transport policy objectives claim higher priority, especially at a time of severe financial constraint; and (c) although Government promotes HSR as an innovative policy, enabling the UK to match the transport infrastructure of our European partners, it is insufficiently forward looking, taking too little account of advances in communication technology, and missing the opportunity to design a new model of transport suitable for a small and densely populated nation.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? We do not believe that HSR is consistent with other key transport policy objectives, in particular: (a) Much improvement is needed in our existing infrastructure to give us a properly “joined up” transport network (air, rail and bus), representing value for money for the bulk of the population, as well as cost effective and “green” ways to move goods around. HS2 is set to be an immense drain on resources without achieving the necessary result for our communities and our economy. (b) The environmental damage will be great—both in construction and operation. This is not consistent with the Government’s stated objective of encouraging low-carbon travel. (c) As part of a more considered response to our transport infrastructure deficiencies, we would urge the Department to look seriously at Rail Package 2 to upgrade the West Coast Mainline, as the alternative to HS2 Phase 1. RP2 is capable of delivering much greater capacity than HS2, with less disruption and at much lower cost. See also 4 below.

3. Business case We do not find the assumptions and methodology adopted in the business case for HS2 to be robust and compelling. For example: (a) Critics (including businessmen, senior politicians and economists) calculate the cost of HS2 to every family at over £1,000. At the same time, we learn that the date for benefit to be realised has been extended by a further 10 years to 2043, alongside a small and questionable benefit ratio and an inflated demand target based on outdated assumptions.

4. Economic rebalancing and equity In our view, HS2 will not promote economic regeneration by tackling the north-south divide, nor is its impact likely to be socially equitable. We would argue that: (a) To have an impact on the economy, transport systems must keep the country working at a time of severe financial constraint—enabling ordinary people to get to and from their places of work and other regular travel destinations such as education, healthcare and leisure services—easily and at affordable prices. (b) HS2, by contrast, is costly and focused on a long-distance travel market, ie a relatively small and wealthy socio-economic group which is less locally/regionally focused than most workers and their families. We note the Government statement (in the document mentioned below) that in contrast to this market, two thirds of all journeys are under five miles. (c) In Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon (Cm 7996, January 2011) the Government appears to recognise the huge importance of local transport systems as an engine of our economy. This document sets out the goal of a transport system which is “greener and safer and improves quality of life in our communities ... improving the links that help move people and goods around”. Importantly, it states that: “Local transport faces a sustainability challenge—excess delay is costing our urban economies £11 billion per annum, and carbon emissions impose a cost to society equivalent to up to £4 billion per annum. The costs to the health of our communities are even greater—up to £25 billion per year on the costs of physical inactivity, air quality and noise...” (d) Against this background, it is reasonable to question how Government can justify net expenditure of almost £12 billion (comparable to the cost of delays in local transport, see above) on HS2, especially when on the Government’s own estimation, benefits will not begin to be seen for decades to come. (e) The more privileged business travel market that would be the principal beneficiary of HSR should shrink over the proposed development period as a result of continuing advances in communication technology, reducing the need for long-distance, high-speed business travel and replacing it with a ‘low carbon’ solution. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w327

(f) According to DfT, the large majority of regeneration jobs will be in London. This seriously undermines the argument that HS2 can rebalance the UK’s north/south divide. It is also important to bear in mind that the current plan, budget and timetable concentrate on the London to West Midlands route. Impacts beyond that point must remain extremely speculative and long-term until detailed proposals have been put forward and properly scrutinised.

5. Impact—environmental costs and benefits The absence of a published environmental impact assessment to underpin the HS2 business case is a matter of serious concern to us, as we live in the heart of an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (the Chilterns). Our concerns are both for the Chilterns and for the broader environmental impact of the scheme. We would wish to highlight that: (a) There is no convincing evidence that HS2 will move traffic from air or road to rail, since most passengers will be making new journeys or transferring from conventional rail. Lorries on roads are ignored. (b) HS2 is not a “low carbon” solution—high speed trains have much higher energy consumption than conventional rail. (c) The destruction of the AONB in the Chilterns, with no compelling business or environmental case, sets a very dangerous precedent and a pattern for what may be undertaken further north, if and when the line is extended. Many wildlife sites, ancient woodlands and SSIs are threatened, as well as agricultural land and water supplies. May 2011

Written evidence from Nottingham City Council (HSR 120) This response focuses on the questions that are most relevant to Nottingham as a Local Authority, which is well placed to benefit from the huge potential of a High Speed Rail network, provided the right choices are made in determining route and station locations. This response has been provided by Nottingham City Council Officers.

1. What are the main arguments for or against High Speed Rail (HSR) 1.1 Nottingham considers that there is a compelling case in favour of HSR and that this case will be seriously undermined if the full Y network is not constructed. The construction of a network will allow the full benefits to be dispersed and shared nationally. A partial network could hold back economic growth and regeneration of those cities not included on the network. This is particularly true of cities like Nottingham where national rail connectivity is already comparatively poor due to short sighted decisions made in the 1960s with regard to the closure of the Great Central Railway. 1.2 Nottingham as a Core City will support national economic growth but needs appropriate infrastructure and connectivity to do so. There must be investment in new rail technology, in terms of both the Midland Mainline (MML) and HSR, to ensure that sustainable conditions for growth will be secured. This is coupled with the fact that there is an urgent need to invest in the economy, with infrastructure being a top priority. Our cities need better strategic transport connections and simply widening roads will not secure the economic and environmental future of the country. Together with an enhanced classic rail network, HSR should therefore be seen as the answer to meeting our increasing demand for inter-regional, national and international travel demands for the coming decades. 1.3 HSR makes financial sense. According to The British Chamber of Commerce, congestion costs business £23.3 billion a year and just within Nottingham it is estimated to cost local businesses £160 million a year. A full HSR network linking the major cities of the UK would cost up to £69 billion and would generate over £125 billion of economic benefits. These benefits are derived from improvements in journey times, less crowding, reductions in road congestion, environmental improvements and the economic benefits arising in the release of capacity on the conventional rail network. It also includes the beneficial effect on the productivity of businesses through changes to employment patterns and agglomeration effects. 1.4 Forecasts suggest that by 2055 a full HSR network could be carrying 30 million journeys which would otherwise be made by air, and 13 million from car journeys.326 This would indicate that high speed rail could deliver carbon savings of around one million tonnes per year, but a full national network is needed to create this modal shift. 1.5 HSR would also: — strengthen existing and generate new economic and business flows and interactions, worth £125 billion to the economy; — increase rail and decrease air and car journeys by 30 million journeys a year; 326 Fast Forward—A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain. Greengauge 21. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w328 Transport Committee: Evidence

— provide a catalyst to improve local public transport networks; — enable new business and economic flows between cities; — reduce carbon emissions by 1 million tonnes a year, improve air quality and achieve targets; and — bring UK infrastructure up to competitive international standards.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 Nottingham supports the move to follow the world leaders in HSR, China, Spain, Japan and France to implement a comprehensive high speed network serving the whole of the country. 2.2 The changing context of the country’s commitments to combat climate change, rising oil prices and peak oil supply threats, means that pursuing UK national transport policies which seek to accommodate travel demand through extending the capacity of the trunk and motorway network will be the wrong path in economic and environmental terms. The costs and environmental impacts associated with sub national domestic air travel are also considered to present strong incentives to pursue a more sustainable national transport policy. 2.3 A new high-speed line would not only significantly boost the national infrastructure itself, but also release capacity on the existing network when long distance services transfer to the new line. This radically opens up the opportunity to provide new services where previously there were none and to improve the quality of existing services, expanding business and employment potential through improved commuter networks and spreading the agglomeration benefits on a much wider basis than just looking at the line itself. 2.4 All this is needed because the country’s existing rail infrastructure is currently reaching capacity. To date we have responded by upgrading what is already there. In order to provide for the level of growth and capacity needed, this is no longer sustainable, nor is it good value for money. 2.5 Modernisation of the West Coast Mainline (WCML) was due to cost £2 billion, take six years, and deliver maximum speeds of 140 mph. The final scheme cost £8.8 billion, took nine years, and provided for maximum speeds of 125 mph. Despite this work, the line is expected to reach full capacity by the early 2020s, and some sections much earlier than this. In addition to the WCML there are capacity problems on the East Coast, Midland and Great Western Mainlines. It is clear that given the strategic importance of these lines to the economy, we cannot suffer years of disruption and delay for upgrades which will not deliver the long term benefits that are needed and will cost nearly as much as building the new HSR lines themselves. Instead we must plan for a new HSR line which runs in addition to the existing classic network. 2.6 However, our existing rail lines do and will continue to play a pivotal role in support of HSR and the national infrastructure. Whilst the classic network alone cannot provide the capacity and speeds that are required, which will be provided by a new HSR network—they are vital for connections and capacity and must where necessary, such as on the Midland Main Line receive the required investment to support them. £69 million has recently been allocated for journey time improvements; but partners are having difficulties in securing just £27 million which is required to raise the standard and reduce the journey time of the MML. This modest investment is in stark comparison to the £8.8 billion that was spent on the WCML. 2.7 It is also important to remember that HSR is not projected to come to the East Midlands for at least 20 years. Investment in the classic rail network such as electrification and allocation of new Intercity Express Rolling stock on the MML which is needed now, cannot and must not be blighted by the plans and must be pursued and funded in addition to HSR. 2.8 The provision of HSR and the classic network is essential for improved inter urban connectivity. Nottingham currently has relatively poor connections to other core cities, the north and London. By improving these connections it will allow Nottingham to fulfil its growth potential, expanding on the growing key economic, science and business sectors which the City needs support to develop and expand. 2.9 For example, the service between Nottingham, Sheffield and Leeds operates at an average speed of 36 mph and the Nottingham–Birmingham service at just 44 mph. These are short distances but entail relatively significant journey times limiting the agglomeration between the cities. There is therefore a strong case for strengthening the links between these cities on the eastern leg of the Y network and beyond. 2.10 For a city like Nottingham in the centre of the country, as well as improved connectivity to London and Heathrow, HSR offers a very substantial opportunity to connect with the other Core Cities and build economic capacity and agglomeration which will help close the widening economic productivity gap between the midlands and the north and the south-east, with significant associated social inclusion benefits.

3. The Business Case 3.1 The HSR consultation document makes a compelling case, it clearly highlights that the business case for HSR stacks up. This is through the provision of direct economic benefits, much needed additional capacity, but it is also enhanced once the environmental and social benefits are also factored in. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w329

3.2 We are also aware that the business case for the eastern leg of the Y is a very significant element which improves the overall business case for HSR. Previous work undertaken by HS2 Ltd has estimated that the BCR for the eastern leg at 5.6 compared to 2.6 to Manchester. Therefore it is critical important that the process moves forward as fast as possible and ensures that the second Hybrid Bill is not delayed. 3.3 Whilst we see the logic in building the route in phases we would want the construction of the eastern leg to be viewed as the next priority following the Birmingham leg. We believe that it is makes sound financial and business sense to build the eastern route as early as the process allows, ahead of the expansion of the western leg and the Heathrow extension. This is particularly important as the midlands and eastern inter city rail networks have not benefitted from the scale of investments enjoyed by the WCML in recent years. Classic compatible trains could run over the WCML to Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow from the outset, but not to Leeds and the ECML, so it is logical that this is progressed at the earliest opportunity. An absolute imperative will be to ensure that allocation of HSR train paths between the eastern and western legs of the “Y” fully reflects the demand potential and contribution to the business case demonstrated by the eastern leg, which has the potential to join up Nottingham, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle and Edinburgh.

4. The Strategic Route 4.1 HSR must be seen as more than just a route, the network approach is essential to its success. 4.2 It is essential that this opportunity to redress the poor national rail connectivity suffered by Nottingham is fully grasped by HSR. 4.3 We are supportive of the Y network but are concerned about the pathing and capacity constraints associated with the “trunk” section of the network. It will be essential (and equitable) to prioritise pathing to the eastern leg, but we believe that in the longer term a wider network which includes a new eastern north south route which would directly serve London could be required to meet growing national demands. We would therefore support further work to expand the network above the remit currently being worked on by HS2 Ltd. 4.4 HSR has huge potential to act as a catalyst for regeneration; therefore the planned network must serve city centres. Where a dedicated City Centre Station on the line is not feasible a spur must be provided with appropriate pathing to ensure that the growth potential and economic benefits of the investment into HSR is maximised by all our core cities. Economic growth needs to be centred on City Centres to support sustainable development patterns, local economies and provide regeneration growth and jobs in a way which meets projected future environmental commitments and social inclusion objectives. There are substantial regeneration opportunities in and around Nottingham City centre which provide capacity for growth in an area where labour supply, housing market conditions and skills availability are very favourable and competitive. 4.5 Firms which would benefit from HSR cluster in City Centres and are willing to pay a premium to be there. This provides the high density labour market which they need and are ideally suited to benefit from the rail market, which can transport large volumes of commuter, business and leisure travellers. 4.6 It is right that a link to HS1 is provided in the first phase. It is logical that a link to existing infrastructure is provided from the outset. It also enhances the national connectivity to the Continent helping to support more sustainable travel options over air travel. Nottingham City would however not support any proposal which would compromise or result in the loss of the existing direct MML connection to HS1 at St Pancras International. 4.7 There are benefits of linking to Heathrow, especially in light of the very poor existing connections from Nottingham, but it is not essential that this is delivered in the first phase, especially in the light of forthcoming improved connectivity to Heathrow via classic rail. We would argue that the eastern leg of the Y should be prioritised ahead of this link when planning the second phase.

5. Economic Rebalancing and Equity 5.1 By significantly reducing journey times between the countries largest cities it should be possible to rebalance the national economy, as a result of the improved connectivity between areas of opportunity with the capacity for growth such as Nottingham. 5.2 Britain needs the South East’s economic contribution, but we can also unlock greater growth elsewhere by investing in HSR, in a way which avoids decreasing environmental conditions associated with exacerbating an unbalanced, overheated, congested and inefficient economy based on London and the south east. However, the Core Cities and their primary urban areas alone produce 27% of England’s economic output. Therefore the rest of the country in particular the Core Cities must be better linked to the South East to allow them to support and grow off each other. This is in addition to improved regional connections to support this. 5.3 For example the Eastern Partnership area (covering the area potentially served by the Eastern leg of the Y) contains more than 8.7 million people and 3.6 million jobs. The delivery of HSR could make this area function as a more balanced single economic zone, reducing dependence on public sector funding and increasing private sector jobs and investment. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w330 Transport Committee: Evidence

5.4 As with the Motorway network HSR is a nationally important investment. Not only will the Cities directly served benefit but the regional economies and areas supported by these cities will grow as a result of the investment.

Conclusion HSR is strongly supported by Nottingham’s local business community as well as the Council. However the opportunities offered by HSR will only be captured with effective connectivity into the heart of the UK’s Core Cities including Nottingham. However it is crucial that the long planning and procurement processes for High Speed Rail do not frustrate or blight the necessary investments in our classic rail network which will be required over the intervening Control Periods, in particular electrification and the upgrading of the Midland Main line and its rolling stock. Notwithstanding this, HSR offers an outstanding opportunity to make a step change in the improvement of the country’s national infrastructure which will ensure we are better placed to meet both our growth aspirations and our environmental commitments; for Nottingham in particular it is a once in a generation opportunity to retrieve the damage done by the closure of the Great Central Railway which took the city off the country’s core inter city rail network. Not to take this opportunity would be a massive economic blow to the City’s medium and long term aspirations to capture our true potential. 16 May 2011

Written evidence from the Association of North East Councils (HSR 121) Introduction 1. This evidence is submitted by the Association of North East Councils (ANEC), the representative body for local government in the North East. It encompasses all 12 local authorities throughout Northumberland, Tyne and Wear, Durham and the Tees Valley, on issues of concern to them and the communities they serve.

Summary of Main Points of Our Evidence 2. There is strong support from local authority leaders and elected mayors in the North East for HSR which offers a once in a generation opportunity to transform the economic geography of the UK, support sustainable growth and international competitiveness and to rebalance the economy in line with Government policy. However, it is essential that a new HSR network is developed in such a way as to maximise opportunities across the UK from the beginning, to ensure that the whole nation benefits. There are compelling economic arguments for the North East to be part of a HSR network and failure to be connected from the start will undoubtedly have a detrimental impact on the North East economy. 3. It is also essential that high speed lines should form part of a coherent strategy for the wider national rail network. The development of a high speed network needs to be considered, not in isolation, but should form one important part of the long term strategy for rail in the UK. Investment in high speed should not come at the expense of conventional rail. Since the planned high speed network is predicated on having a limited number of stopping points, it will be essential for the North East to ensure that improvements in local connectivity are planned and implemented in parallel to, or in advance of, HSR development such that the whole of the North East can share the benefits. It is vital that such complementary rail and public transport improvements are considered now and committed within other rail investment programmes within the next two years, to align with the next Spending Review periods and new rail franchises. The potential to generate localised economic development by the introduction of new stations that meet the needs of HSR services and customers better than existing stations should not be underestimated. 4. High speed fits well within national, regional and local transport policy objectives to improve connections between our key centres, supporting economic growth and reducing carbon emissions. The North East’s location, relative to UK and European markets, means the North East regards air services and high speed rail as being complementary rather than competitive. The North East has consistently argued for the importance of good air, rail, road and sea connections in the context of overall improvements to transport infrastructure that support economic growth and competitiveness, and HSR is an important element of such infrastructure. 5. The business case for the HSR network is based around improving journey times between significant centres. Research and experience from other European countries demonstrates that to maximise the capacity of high speed, there needs to be relatively large centres of population and activity along the entire route. The Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) areas around Leeds, Sheffield, Tees Valley and Tyne and Wear, and Derby/ Nottingham/Leicester have a combined population of 9.1 million to connect with Scotland, London and the West Midlands. An east coast route therefore makes economic and financial sense from the outset, with the wider economic benefits of this route totalling £4.2 billion. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w331

6. ANEC’s response to the main headings within the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry is outlined as follows.

Main arguments for and against HSR 7. The North East is committed to building a competitive and dynamic economy and HSR can play a key strategic role in delivering this vision. In addition to delivering unprecedented improvements in rail capacity and connectivity, significant economic benefits will accrue as a HSR connection transforms the area’s economic geography. Consequently, ANEC believes that there is a strong case for HSR, with the main arguments in favour being ones of capacity, connectivity, speed and economic benefit. 8. Growth in rail demand has been significant over the past decade across the UK, and in the North East. Passenger numbers on the East Coast Main Line increased by 36% up to 2007–08,1 whilst on the local networks, there has been an average increase of 58% in passenger numbers at stations across the Tees Valley since 2000.2 Despite the recent economic climate, passenger numbers have continued to rise, and this trend will continue. 9. Through its Route Utilisation Strategy process and as part of its New Line Programme work, Network Rail has identified that, even with incremental enhancements, forecast growth in passenger demand is such that each of the north-south main lines—the West Coast Main Line (WCML), the Midland Main Line (MML) and the East Coast Main Line (ECML)—will reach their effective capacity for long distance services in the 2020s.3 Additional capacity on these corridors is vital for the UK economy. 10. Increasing the capacity of the rail network to meet forecast demand using the existing routes, over and above the recently announced incremental improvements that we welcome, is predicted to give a poor rate of return.4 More importantly, a large scale online upgrade would be extremely disruptive to existing services during construction and have an adverse impact on passenger numbers. This would have a damaging effect on the North East economy at a time when we are seeking to nurture sustainable long term growth and moving from recession to recovery. 11. The preferred way to address future capacity issues is by constructing new routes. Such an approach has a secondary benefit that is even more important to those areas without a direct connection to the ECML at present, capacity would be released on the existing network through the transfer of services to a new line. This released capacity can be used to support growth in commuter services, as well as strengthen existing linkages and create new connections between LEP areas in the North, and between the North and the rest of the UK, bringing economic benefits of around £0.8 billion to the eastern side of the UK.5 Changes to the ECML timetable could facilitate improved frequencies from London to Bradford, Halifax, Harrogate, Hull, Sunderland, or the introduction of wholly new trains to the Tees Valley, Huddersfield, Grimsby or Scarborough. Released capacity can also be used to accommodate growing freight traffic, an important element of the North East’s economy. 12. In supporting the construction of a new route, it is important to ensure that this provides the speed of connection between the major centres that people and business require. Reduced journey times benefit all travellers—for business travellers, less time spent travelling means that more time can be spent in productive work; for non-business travellers, there is a less direct economic benefit, but new markets can be encouraged, such as tourism. In 2008, the North East was the only region outside London to increase its visitor numbers.6 13. Both capacity and speed improvements support the most important argument for HSR with resultant benefits to the economy. Improvements to the availability and speed of rail connections with the rest of the UK will benefit the economy of the North East in two ways. Firstly, it will make the existing economy more productive and provide economic benefits to non-business users and secondly, it creates the opportunity to support the further economic growth and regeneration of the North East and the re-balancing of the economy. It is estimated that HSR could result in a £3.1 billion productivity increase for the North East.7 14. Potentially much more significant than the productivity and traditional economic benefits is the transformational impact that HSR can have on the size of the economy of the North. By effectively bringing the LEP areas of the North closer to Scotland, London and the West Midlands, HSR will affect where economic activity takes place. As the North’s economy grows and as it restructures, north-south links, particularly to London, will become more, not less, important over time. Improved connections to London are not at risk of draining economic activity from the North in the same way that the evidence from France is that HSR has not resulted in a concentration of economic activity in Paris at the expense of other towns and cities served by HSR. Indeed, there is evidence that cities such as Lyon and Lille have experienced significant economic benefits from HSR due to the enhanced connections to Paris.8 15. The main arguments against HSR would appear to relate to the cost and environmental impacts of the proposals. 16. The supporting evidence for HS2 shows that the cost of building a new rail line between London and the West Midlands that would operate at maximum speeds currently found on the national network would be only 9% less than building a line that can operate at high speeds.9 Hence, the marginal cost of building a high speed line is small, whilst the benefits are much greater. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w332 Transport Committee: Evidence

17. In terms of environmental impact, any project of this type will have environmental impacts, but the evidence presented10 demonstrates how these impacts will be minimised during construction and operation. It is important to achieve a sense of balance between localised impacts and a project that is of such importance to the UK economy.

Fit with Government’s transport policy objectives 18. The Department for Transport’s (DfT) stated vision is “for a transport system that is an engine for economic growth but one that is also greener and safer and improves quality of life in our communities”.11 HSR presents a real opportunity to revolutionise the economy by bringing places and people closer together, with national and international markets, in line with the first part of this vision. It also presents the opportunity to achieve the wider Government ambition to “create a fairer and more balanced economy”.12 19. To support the re-balancing of the economy, there is a need to enhance the connectivity within and between the North’s LEP areas. Current transport links between many of the large centres are often relatively weak, with slow journey times being a common characteristic. Whilst the importance of connections to London was stressed above, almost 60% of the productivity benefits forecast for the North East from HSR result from improved connections to other UK centres outside London including South Yorkshire, the East Midlands and Birmingham.13 20. Given the North East’s geographical location, inter-urban connectivity is paramount to the well-being of the economy, and the North East has consistently argued for the importance of good air, rail, road and sea connections in the context of overall improvements to transport infrastructure that support economic growth and competitiveness. Recent announcements regarding the roads investment programme14 has seen the postponement of the A1 upgrade to motorway standard between Leeming and Barton, and the focus of investment on the strategic road network has moved towards congestion management. Therefore, rail offers the preferred means of improving inter-urban connectivity, although there is still a need for investment in improving capacity in the North East’s strategic road network. 21. The North East’s location, relative to UK and European markets, means we regard air services and HSR as being complementary rather than competitive. Newcastle International and Durham Tees Valley Airports play a major role in supporting the competitiveness of existing business in the region, including knowledge based and global industries in chemicals, steel and engineering/architectural design, which rely on scheduled services providing direct links to key markets. To achieve its potential, the North East needs both modes, as well as continued investment in our ports. It is also essential that high speed lines should form part of a coherent strategy for the wider national rail network. The development of a high speed network needs to be considered, not in isolation, but needs to form one important part of the long term strategy for rail in the UK. 22. Investment in high speed should not come at the expense of the conventional rail network. The announcement of the Intercity Express Programme new rolling stock, means that it is necessary to continue to invest in conventional rail in order to address capacity constraints on the ECML. Since the planned high speed network is predicated on having a limited number of stopping points, it will be essential to ensure that improvements in local connectivity are planned and implemented in parallel to, or in advance of, HSR development such that the whole of the North East can share the benefits. 23. It is vital that such complementary improvements are considered now and committed within other rail investment programmes within the next two years. For example, in the North East, proposals have been developed to a relatively advanced stage for Darlington and Newcastle stations, and the re-opening of the Leamside Line, all of which will have capacity benefits for the ECML/HSR network, and could be included within the scope of the project with minimal additional cost. ANEC strongly suggests that HS2 Ltd engage with regional partners during the latter part of 2011 to examine such opportunities now, such that they can be included where appropriate in the December 2011 report to Government of route options for the wider network, as well as specifications for the next relevant rail franchises. 24. In terms of environmental considerations, HSR is thought to be broadly carbon neutral in absolute emissions terms.15 However, given the increased demand generated by HSR, carbon emissions per trip will be lower with HSR, and so fit with national, regional and local policy objectives.

Business Case 25. The business case and economic appraisal presented by Government follows standard DfT methodology and HM Treasury’s Green Book. Whilst there continues to be some misgivings about how this process is applied to public transport schemes in particular, it appears valid for giving a relative comparison between options. 26. It is appropriate that demand forecasts have been revised since the publication of the previous Government’s proposals16 to reflect recent economic conditions and changes to Government policy in relation to the third runway at Heathrow Airport. 27. One important point to note is that the business case has been developed from assumed service patterns, the one for the wider “Y” network being included as Figure A2.17 This service pattern includes a peak hour cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w333

frequency of 18 trains per hour (tph) using the HSR network between London and Birmingham, with six of these services serving the eastern side of the UK. No high speed line elsewhere in the world currently operates at a frequency of more than 12tph—the planned 18tph frequency is to be delivered by a new signalling system to be developed by the time of opening. 28. Given that well over 60% of the benefits of the wider HSR network accrue to the eastern side of the UK,18 it is vital that, should the 18tph frequency not be achievable in practice, the frequency of East Coast services is maintained. If not, there is a risk of implementing a project that creates an economic imbalance across the North. 29. The relatively poor business case of the alternative of investing exclusively in the existing network has been outlined previously, and we would have significant concerns about managing demand for rail travel through other means such as increased pricing. Having articulated how important fast and reliable rail links are to the economy of the North East, pursuing a policy that increases rail fares in real terms to manage demand such that it does not exceed the available capacity, would have a significantly detrimental impact on the North East economy. Using fare increases to reduce rail travel numbers could also disadvantage the North East in respect of increased levels of carbon taxation. 30. In terms of learning lessons from other major projects, experience of such large infrastructure projects in the North East has suggested that having private sector involvement in the detailed design and implementation process, aligned to minimum direct Government interference, has driven value through the construction process.

Strategic Route 31. As one of the benefits of HSR is journey time reductions, it is important to achieve a balance between serving as many key centres as possible, without compromising the benefits of speed. Recent DfT policy has concentrated on defining a strategic national network based around the 10 cities with the largest centres of population and major international gateways.19 For consistency, it would seem sensible to use similar criteria when examining possible station locations, bearing in mind that not all locations will be served directly or with city centre stations. 32. We strongly support the principle of the Y network proposed for HSR in that it creates opportunities on both sides of the Pennines. It is critical that the North East is linked to high speed rail infrastructure and investment in the UK, in the context of the compelling economic arguments already outlined. Achievement of the North East’s ambitions to be a world leader in the low carbon economy and to maximise its strengths and assets in areas including digital and creative media, process and chemical industries, healthcare and life sciences, is significantly dependent upon North East being linked into a high speed network. The potential to generate localised economic development by the introduction of new stations that meet the needs of HSR services and customers better than existing stations should not be underestimated. 33. Whilst the North East recognises a need to develop the network in phases, an approach where one route is developed in advance of the other will create imbalanced economic growth and exacerbate regional disparities. It is clear that development of a high speed network will give an early economic advantage to those areas connected first and so it is critical that the North East is connected from the start, in order to make the most of the opportunities HSR presents. Otherwise, this would potentially send a signal to investors which will be difficult to turn back from and could result in creating lop-sided growth in the UK. 34. Research and experience from other European countries demonstrates that to maximise the capacity of high speed, there needs to be relatively large centres of population and activity along the entire route, such as that offered by an eastern route. The LEP areas around Leeds, Sheffield, Tees Valley and Tyne and Wear, and Derby/Nottingham/Leicester have a combined population of 9.1 million to connect with the Scotland, London and the West Midlands. An east coast route therefore makes economic and financial sense from the outset, with the wider economic benefits of this route totalling £4.2 billion.20 35. The evidence is strong that additional capacity between London and the West Midlands to relieve the southern sections of the WCML should be the first stage in developing a national network. However, beyond this, there is little published evidence to support the notion that the remainder of the national network should start from Birmingham and work northwards. As the first phase of HS2 will include a connection to the WCML, and a connection to the MML could benefit the East Midlands and South Yorkshire, there is an argument on equity as well as economic grounds that the next investment should concentrate on linking Scotland, the North East and the rest of Yorkshire into the HSR network.

Economic rebalancing and equity 36. HSR offers a once in a generation opportunity to transform the economic geography of the UK, support sustainable growth and international competitiveness, and gives a strong opportunity to rebalance the economy in line with Government policy. However, it is essential that a new HSR network is developed in such a way as to maximise opportunities across the UK from the beginning, to ensure that whole nation benefits. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w334 Transport Committee: Evidence

37. In addition to conventional transport benefits, the eastern leg of the Y network is forecast to contribute some £2.6 billion in productivity benefits.21 Although the majority of the benefits are through productivity benefits in producer services, all major sectors of the economy show predicted productivity benefits. The North East has significantly higher benefits through productivity benefits in manufacturing, one of the sectors leading the UK in its current recovery. 38. On a per capita basis, GVA in the North is 80% of the South East.22 Whilst manufacturing in the North remains an important part of the economy and the service sector has been growing, the North has a greater than average proportion of workers in public sector employment—for example, 25% in the North East compared with 17% in the South East.23 As a proportion of people available for work, unemployment at 8.6% is notably greater in the North than in the South East where it is 6.1%.24 Therefore, if the economy is to be rebalanced, it is vital that HSR serves the whole of the North of the UK. 39. Recent research on the line between Cologne and Frankfurt has shown that that towns connected to a new high speed line saw their GDP rise by at least 2.7% compared to adjacent towns not on the route.25 This was based on the results from two towns (Limburg and Montabaur) that were included on the high speed route due to lobbying by regional government and not because their economies were particularly powerful or expanding. The study also found that increased market access through HSR rail has a direct correlation with a rise in GDP—for each 1% increase in market access, there is a 0.25% rise in GDP. The economic growth associated with HSR came before the line entered into service, as businesses and individuals changed their economic behaviour in anticipation of the arrival of HSR, ensuring an early realisation of benefits. 40. As noted above, to maximise the benefits of HSR, there needs to be detailed consideration given to how the released capacity on the existing networks could be utilised. The DfT has indicated, for example, that the implementation of HSR between London and the West Midlands could allow up to 12tph from London to serve Milton Keynes. Whilst there will be some sense in providing additional commuter services into and out of London, the real opportunity to spread the benefits of HSR by using spare capacity to provide other towns and cities with a direct service to London and to enhance links between LEP areas outside London. 41. There also needs to be an immediate review of how local and regional networks connect into the HSR network, as improvements in advance of HSR to these networks and services can not only support the realisation of the predicted benefits, but bring additional passengers to the service over and above that predicted. The international evidence is that integrating HSR with the local transport networks further increases the area over which the benefits of HSR are felt.26

Impact 42. Previous comments have addressed the issue of carbon emissions and the possible environmental impacts of HSR, as well as the need to minimise any disruption to the existing network during construction. 43. In terms of freight, just as there is an opportunity to use released capacity on the ECML and other main lines for passenger services, so the same is also true for freight services, and a part of the North East’s plan for economic recovery includes the development of the two major ports in the North East; Tees and Hartlepool and Port of Tyne. Both of these have proposals to expand, and so it is vital that onward connections by rail are possible to minimise additional lorry miles. To illustrate the point about complementary investment, some £2.4 million will be invested in the Tees Valley’s rail network over the next two years to allow the passage of larger containers and support the expansion of Teesport.

Conclusion 44. There is strong support from local authority and business leaders for HSR in the North East. The North East occupies a special place in the rail industry’s history as the birthplace of the modern railway. For the region to compete effectively in the 21st century, it is vital that the North East continues to play its full part in the rail industry’s future, particularly the development of HSR and the connecting rail infrastructure required to maximise the transformational benefits that HSR can bring. May 2011

References 1 East Coast Route Utilisation Strategy, Network Rail, February 2008. 2 Transport Monitoring Report, Tees Valley Unlimited, July 2010. 3 Network RUS—Scenarios and Long Distance Forecasts, Network Rail, June 2009. 4 High Speed Rail Strategic Alternatives Study—Strategic Alternatives to the Proposed “Y” Network, Atkins, February 2011. 5 High Speed Rail Eastern Network Partnership—Technical Business Case Work, Arup, May 2011. 6 High Speed North East, ANEC, October 2009. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w335

7 Because Transport Matters, Atkins, 2008. 8 High Speed Rail: International Comparisons, Steer Davies Gleave, 2004. 9 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Department for Transport, February 2011. 10 HS2 London to the West Midlands: Appraisal of Sustainability, Booz & Co and Temple, February 2011. 11 http://www.dft.gov.uk/about/vision 12 Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s Potential, HM Government, October 2010. 13 ibid, Arup, May 2011. 14 http://nds.coi.gov.uk/clientmicrosite/Content/Detail.aspx?ClientId=202&NewsAreaId=2&ReleaseID= 416118&SubjectId=36 15 ibid, Department for Transport, February 2011. 16 High Speed Rail Summary, Department for Transport, March 2010. 17 Economic Case for HS2: The Y Network and London—West Midlands, Department for Transport, February 2011. 18 ibid, Arup, May 2011. 19 Delivering a Sustainable Transport System Main Report, Department for Transport, November 2008. 20 ibid, Arup, May 2011. 21 ibid, Arup, May 2011. 22 Office for National Statistics, Regional Gross Value Added, NUTS1 GVA (1989–2009) Data (Table 1). 23 Public Sector Employment and Expenditure by Region, House of Common Library, July 2010. 24 Office for National Statistics, Regional Labour Market Statistics February 2011, (Table S1). 25 From Periphery to Core: Economic Adjustments to High Speed Rail, Gabriel M Ahlfeldt (LSE) and Arne Feddersen (University of Hamburg), September 2010. 26 High Speed Trains and the Development and Regeneration of Cities, Greengauge21, 2006.

Written evidence from Warwick District Council (HSR 122) 1. Overview 1.1. This statement does not prejudice the formal response of Warwick District Council to the Government consultation, which will be submitted before the close of the consultation (31 July 2011). 1.2. Warwick District Council is aligned with and in complete agreement with the full submission made by the 51m Group of Authorities to the Transport Select Committee. Warwick District Council does not believe that the business case stacks up and therefore cannot support the route suggested by Government. It is considered that the current proposal is not in the best interests of the UK as a whole in terms of the benefits claimed in the business case. We also consider that the current proposal is therefore inappropriate given that the economic and environmental benefits are not at all credible. 1.3. We do not believe that all the other alternatives to achieve the transport capacity, regeneration and environmental benefits have been fully explored by the Government and with in excess of £30 billion proposed to be invested, we owe it to the nation to ensure that these are fully explored. 1.4. For all these reasons Warwick District Council is of the view that the case for the HS2 scheme does not begin to be made out. The Committee is asked to request that the DfT undertake a fundamental reappraisal.

2. Impact In relation to part 2 of Question 6 regarding Impact, Warwick District Council would like to offer the following: 2.1. Warwick District Council believes that the High Speed 2 (HS2) proposal will cause considerable environmental damage both in the short term, during construction, and in the longer term, once operational, and throughout its life. 2.2. Warwick District has a very high quality built and natural environment and is concerned at the prospect of this being damaged irretrievably by an eagerness to proceed with a project that appears to be flawed with regard to its economic justification and by a measurable lack of detailed environmental information needed to underpin the overall cost/ benefit analysis within the business case. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w336 Transport Committee: Evidence

2.3. The appraisal of sustainability (AoS) includes a series of objectives against which the proposals are measured, with scores ranging from highly unsupportive through to highly supportive. No aspect of HS2 scores positively in the AoS for its environmental impacts, and whilst this is not uncommon at an early stage for any major development project (since it indicates where mitigation is most required), HS2 has not suggested any mitigation measures but rather allocated an amount of funding for future investigations within the business case. Given that individuals and groups are currently being asked to submit mitigation proposals for consideration by the Government it follows that it is not possible to make an informed conclusion with regard to the both the environmental and economic costs and related wider impacts of the HS2 proposal. 2.4. This is further compounded as HS2 Ltd has recognised the EU and UK legislation to protect listed sites and species. However HS2 Ltd has only used part of the data that is readily available without any detailed survey work. Only data on Birmingham and London’s Local Wildlife Sites (LWS) has been used despite Warwickshire’s being publicly available since the summer of 2010. This is considered to be a substantial flaw in the project that will have further negative effects on the business rationale. The proposed route is well populated with European, national and county important species and sites (none of which are appraised in this report). 2.5. It should also be noted that Warwick District is also blessed with many Heritage assets, some of which are under threat from the HS2 proposal (for example Stoneleigh Abbey and the associated historic parkland). It is a fact that the HS2 proposal will not be able to mitigate the impact on such features as their setting and intrinsic value will be changed considerably. It should be recognised that it is beyond question that such impacts will not be measurable in terms of a monetary sum within the business case; however they represent a real environmental cost. 2.6. To conclude we would therefore offer our opinion that the impact of the environmental costs and benefits has not been accounted for correctly and as a consequence of this the overall business case must therefore be inaccurate/flawed. May 2011

Written evidence from PTEG (HSR 123) 1. Introduction 1.1 pteg represents the six Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) in England which between them serve more than eleven million people in Tyne and Wear (“Nexus”), West Yorkshire (“Metro”), South Yorkshire, Greater Manchester, Merseyside (“Merseytravel”) and the West Midlands (“Centro”). Leicester City Council, Nottingham City Council, Transport for London (TfL) and Strathclyde Partnership for Transport (SPT) are associate members of pteg, though this response does not represent their views. The PTEs plan, procure, provide and promote public transport in some of Britain’s largest city regions, with the aim of providing integrated public transport networks accessible to all. 1.2 pteg welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Committee’s inquiry into this important topic and would be willing to appear before the Select Committee, should the Committee wish us to expand on any of the points made in this response. Our response focuses on the key issues for the city regions and addresses the relevant questions from the Committee only.

2. The City Regions need High Speed Rail 2.1 pteg support the development of a High Speed Rail (HSR) network for the UK. We support the government’s view that this is “a once in a generation opportunity to transform the way we travel in Britain”.1 2.2 We believe that there is a pressing need to better connect the major urban centres of the UK, in particular those in the North and the Midlands, with London and, critically, with each other. Alongside improvements to the “classic” network, HSR offers the potential to dramatically improve connectivity of key city centres, thereby opening up new opportunities for business growth, extended labour markets and wider economic benefits associated with tourism and leisure markets. 2.3 Our support for HSR is therefore based on two core, inter-related arguments—economic and regeneration impacts; and capacity benefits.

Economic and Regeneration Impacts 2.4 HSR will reshape and rebalance the economic geography of Britain, closing the gap between the South East and the rest of the country over the longer term. On a per capita basis, GVA in the city regions is lower than that of the South East—eg the North is 80% of the South East.2 While manufacturing in the North and West Midlands remains an important part of the economy, and the service sector has been growing strongly, there are greater than average proportions of public sector employment—for example, 25% in the North East compared with 17% in the South East.3 As a proportion of people available for work, unemployment is persistently higher in the North and Midlands than in the South East.4 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w337

2.5 To support the re-balancing of the economy, there is a need to enhance the connectivity within and between the city regions; between the North and the rest of the country (London and the South East in particular); and to and from international gateways, including Heathrow Airport and the Channel Tunnel.5 Growing city region economies will also generate greater demand for travel6 between them as their economies become more interconnected. 2.6 As the economies of our city regions grow and restructure north-south links, particularly to London, will become more important over time in economic terms. London is a World City and global financial hub and as such offers financial, legal and other services essential to businesses in the North and West Midlands. Economic growth in these areas will increase demand for the internationally renowned services that London offers, not diminish it. On top of this, by virtue of its size and wealth London and the South East is the largest domestic market for our businesses and, of course, as the nation’s capital it is the home of government.7 2.7 HSR has the potential to radically transform the economies not just of the major cities, but also of the surrounding connected areas, extending its advantages beyond the places that it directly serves. Therefore ensuring that HSR is properly integrated into the classic rail and other public transport networks will mean that the maximum number of people benefit from the advantages of the network, reducing journey times for business and leisure. 2.8 For example, the economic benefits of HSR, combined with enhancements to the existing rail network, demonstrated that the West Midlands would benefit from an additional 22,000 jobs; generating £1.5 billion GVA benefits and, with the attraction of higher value business sectors, an increase in average wages of £300 per annum.8

Capacity 2.9 Evidence from the rail industry shows that additional rail capacity is needed to prevent overcrowding on rail services in the future (ie that demand for long distance travel will increase by 70%; and regional rail services double by 2034).9 Without this additional capacity, travel conditions will decline, overcrowding will increase and services are likely to become more expensive, damaging the economic prospects of our cities and the country’s economic competitiveness. 2.10 HSR will provide the best value for money solution to the capacity challenge as new railway lines deliver a step-change in capacity and reliability that cannot be matched by upgrading the existing rail network. HSR will release substantial capacity on the existing rail network for additional local and commuter services and for an increase in rail freight. 2.11 Research has identified the potential capacity benefits of HS2 route and demonstrated the potential for substantial improvements to capacity, stating that: “Services to most of the stations along the route can be transformed: frequencies typically doubled, connections dramatically improved and in some cases, quicker journeys too. Irritating limitations on the commuter peak timetable will become history”.10 2.12 We might expect to see similar gains from the properly planned implementation north of Birmingham of the two legs of the Y network to Leeds and Manchester.

3. High Speed Rail: Key Issues What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 3.1 Our core arguments for supporting High Speed Rail are set out above.

How does HSR fit with the Government's transport policy objectives? 3.2 The government’s high level objectives relate to long-term and sustainable economic growth, rebalancing the economy and carbon reduction—HSR clearly fits with these high level objectives, albeit over the long term. 3.3 Making the link between major projects such as HSR and local transport will be important. This is recognised at a high level in the government’s Local Transport White Paper.11 We believe that HSR and the White Paper’s objective of “making public transport more attractive”12 go hand-in-hand; that it is important for HSR to be seen in the context of “end-to-end” journeys; and that it therefore remains vital to continue to invest in local transport schemes that allow the free flow of people out of HSR stations in a sustainable way. 3.4 We also believe that there is a need to strengthen the supporting policy framework to deliver HSR. The government is due to produce a National Policy Statement (NPS) on transport networks, which will set out the strategic context for major transport infrastructure. We believe that this NPS should provide the strategic framework that sets out transport’s role in promoting sustainable economic growth and regional balance. The NPS needs to sit alongside the National Infrastructure Plan13 so that clear links are made to the delivery of national policy objectives, as set out in NPS, and which would include HSR. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w338 Transport Committee: Evidence

HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 3.5 We believe that improved inter-urban connectivity has significant economic benefits and is a worthwhile policy objective in this regard. This does not reduce the importance of other transport policy objectives, in particular the spending programmes within city regions. 3.6 We note the government’s conclusion that “the road network cannot offer an effective solution” and that “the unreliability and delay caused by congestion in cities… make road travel an unattractive option for the journeys into city centres which are seeing the highest levels of demand growth on the rail network”,14 and therefore we would question whether investment of a similar order in the strategic road network could achieve the same outcomes as HSR.

Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 3.7 HSR should be treated as a national project whose significance stretches far beyond its transport role and therefore funding for it should fall outside of the normal spending limits for classic rail, in which case the impact on the classic network would be limited. By way of example, the funding for CrossRail has been allocated as a distinct line of funding from government and we believe that funding for HSR should follow this approach. 3.8 To extract the maximum benefits from HSR, there is a need to continue to invest in and upgrade “classic” rail services. For example, in the short to medium term there is a continued need to address the capacity constraints on the existing network, including rolling out electrification and major infrastructure schemes, such as the Northern Hub. 3.9 It is essential that HSR is placed within the context of a long term strategy for the enhancement of the longer distance rail links between city regions. This needs to establish an affordable and value for money programme of enhancements to the West Coast Main Line, Midland Main Line and East Coast Main Line in advance of HSR, and ultimately to complement a HSR network. Also needed is a strategy to enhance the transpennine routes which may not be part of the national HSR, but which evidence demonstrates are so important to the economy of the entire North. 3.10 Additionally we believe that HSR increases the need for complementary measures to maximise the benefits—a key concern for us is that local transport, including local rail services, can be properly integrated so that when HSR services arrive at our city centres, we have adequate and sustainable means of distributing passengers to their final destinations. A key objective in this regard is therefore the devolution of local rail services to PTEs which will help integrate rail more effectively and, potentially, unlock mainline station capacity through the wider implementation of light rail conversions and tram-train.15 3.11 If funding for HSR comes from within existing rail funding sources then it will have a major negative impact on other rail investment, particularly for the North and Midlands, which already suffer from under- investment in terms of rail expenditure.

Business case How robust are the assumptions and methodology? 3.12 At present the DfT business case does not fully reflect the business case benefits that accumulate the further north the HSR network is extended. The development of a HSR network through the reduced journey times allows for transformational economic change and benefit to the north of England and Scotland. The benefits of this transformational change have not been quantified in the DfT’s appraisal which means the total benefits already calculated are likely to be conservative. Furthermore, the experience of European and other countries in the development of HSR networks suggests that there are significant transformational benefits to regional economies (see Lille in France as a good example). 3.13 Additionally, the current business case understates the demand for services. The future patronage forecasts used by HS2 for growth on the rail network appear to be conservative when compared to historical and actual passenger growth. The demand forecasting work undertaken by HS2 Ltd uses an estimate of underlying growth in rail demand of 3.4% per annum across the entire UK rail network, and a net 1.5% per annum growth for HS2 passengers by 2043. 3.14 The key drivers of rail patronage growth include increased economic and population growth. Future growth levels of both are projected to be in broad alignment with historical trends meaning that unless the rail industry introduces policy tools such as pricing to reduce demand, future rail demand is likely to be consistent with historical growth levels. 3.15 Therefore, the future growth outlined by HS2 needs to be assessed against actual and historical growth in rail travel demand (rather than the estimate above). Table 1 outlines growth in long distance rail journeys from London 1999–2000 to 2009–10: cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w339

Table 3 HISTORICAL GROWTH LONG DISTANCE RAIL TRAVEL16 London to Total Growth Ave. Annual Growth Rate Manchester 70% 5.4% Birmingham 58% 4.7% Liverpool 41% 3.5% Glasgow 23% 2.1%

3.16 Furthermore, if a more dynamic approach to modelling the interaction between changes in accessibility and land use were employed (reflecting changes in the location and mix of businesses in an area as a result of improved transport connections) this would represent a more realistic estimate of the economic impact of HS2. The Department for Transport have assumed no changes to land use will occur as a result of HS2, which is not consistent with international case studies of HSR which prove otherwise.

What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.17 There are worthwhile and value for money proposals for increasing north-south rail capacity on the existing main lines and these should be pursued. However, the capacity increment that such enhancements will bring is finite and not sufficient to meet the needs of the/our economies if they are to grow to their full potential. Any further capacity increases would be highly disruptive to implement (eg the experience of the West Coast Route Modernisation programme), as well as being very costly. 3.18 The most cost effective way to provide the north-south capacity that is required is to build new railway lines. The extra benefits that come from operating this new capacity at high speed transforms the economic and productivity benefits that the new capacity will deliver. Building a new conventional speed line would save around 9% of the cost of HS2 but would deliver only two thirds of the benefits and is therefore not considered to be a credible alternative to HS2.

What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.19 Managing demand through pricing for longer distance rail travel will have a negative impact on the economy through discouraging economic activity and business; the environment through increased demand for motorway travel and domestic aviation; and quality of life through increased congestion, noise, and additional land take for extra road space. Whilst pricing clearly has a role in spreading demand for rail to encourage better utilisation of capacity, any choking off of inter-city rail demand by pricing would, in our view, be a retrograde step for the our economies.

The strategic route Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 3.20 There is a need for a national HSR network that connects the major cities of the UK together. The Y network therefore represents a good starting point, but further connections are required to Newcastle and Scotland, as well as connecting other major centres such as Liverpool. A possible network is set out in Greengauge 21’s “Fast Forward” strategy.17 3.21 There is also a need to ensure that the proposed Y shape has sufficient capacity to ensure that future demand from all parts of the country can be accommodated to facilitate not only inter-city links, but also connectivity to Heathrow and also HS1 to mainland Europe.

Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 3.22 Whilst it is inevitable that a national HSR network will need to be delivered in phases given the complexity of the task, it is important that the full network is delivered at the earliest possible timescale. We believe that there should be a firm commitment to the whole of the network—either through provision in the Hybrid Bill or through the National Policy Statement on transport networks. It is particularly important that both legs of the “Y” to Manchester and Leeds are delivered in parallel to avoid any economic imbalances. 3.23 The option to build more than one section of route in parallel has not been fully explored within the strategy. Given that the benefits of HSR are about rebalancing the economy and that there are huge wider economic benefits to be had by bringing northern cities closer to other city regions and London, there is a strong argument for beginning construction of HSR simultaneously in London and the north, although there is clearly a cost to this (financially and procedurally). It may be that there is scope to develop sections in parallel over the life of the project, particularly if there is an improvement to the macro-economic context. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w340 Transport Committee: Evidence

Economic rebalancing and equity What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 3.24 See the section above on economic impact.

To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 3.25 There are clear benefits in making sure that the full HSR network extends to all the major urban centres to ensure that they are effectively connected. As stated above, we believe that the Y network represents a good starting point.

Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 3.26 City centre locations near to HSR stations will be the primary beneficiaries. Research by KPMG18 illustrates how public transport accessibility to the city centres can make a critical contribution to higher productivity and wages, job creation and direct foreign investment. They argue that rail plays a crucial role in supporting the shift of economic activity towards the densest and most productive locations and sectors of the economy. 3.27 These findings are echoed by the analysis of the Northern Hub in Manchester19 and the Centre for Cities20 report on agglomeration and growth in the Leeds City Region. These reports agree that public transport schemes improving city centre accessibility can generate wider economic benefits corresponding to 20–25% of total benefits, which are not currently taken into account by the Department for Transport.

How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? 3.28 We believe that it is fair that those who benefit from HSR should contribute towards its cost if the appropriate financial regulations and tools are in place. For example, if local authorities are allowed to keep the additional business rates generated through HSR (using mechanisms such as Tax Increment Financing) then these areas should contribute towards appropriate HSR infrastructure, such as stations. However, if government captures the additional uplift in tax raised through HSR, then it is appropriate that the government and major private sector developers pay for HSR.

References 1 Department for Transport, “High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future Consultation Summary” February 2011, p3. 2 Calculations based on—Office for National Statistics, Regional Gross Value Added, NUTS1 GVA (1989–2009) Data (Table 1) GVA is defined as Headline Workplace Based GVA for 2009 (provisional estimates). North is defined as the Government Office Regions of Yorkshire and The Humber, The North West and the North East. The South East is defined as the Government Office Region of the South East. 3 Table 1, Public Sector Employment and Expenditure by Region, House of Common Library, July 2010. 4 Calculations based on—Office for National Statistics, Regional Labour Market Statistics February 2011, (Table S1). 5 The need to improve links within and between city regions, between the North and the South and to and from international gateways was identified in the Northern Way’s March 2007 Strategic Direction for Transport and then reaffirmed in the Northern Way’s September 2007 Short, Medium and Long Term Transport Priorities. 6 See Transport Demand in the North, The Northern Way, March 2010. 7 For a fuller discussion of the North’s position in the national economy see the Northern Way commissioned report Northern Connection: Assessing the Comparative Economic Performance and Prospects of Northern England Institute for Political and Economic Governance, University of Manchester and Centre for Urban Policy Studies, University of Manchester January 2008. 8 Centro Commissioned Report by KPMG “High Speed Rail and supporting investments in the West Midlands Consequences for employment and economic growth”. 9 Network Rail, ATOC and RFOA “Planning Ahead 2010”, 2010. 10 Greengauge 21, “Capturing the benefits of HS2 on existing lines”, 2011, p5. 11 Department for Transport, “Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon: Making Sustainable Local Transport Happen” January 2011. 12 Ibid. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w341

13 HMT, National Infrastructure Plan, 2010. 14 Department for Transport, “High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future Consultation Summary” February 2011, p8. 15 See “Rail Cities in the 21st Century: the case for devolution”, pteg, 2010 http://www.pteg.net/NR/rdonlyres/ F5FB1E6E-EF2F-4EAD-B9D2-E4A235544B51/0/Railvisionfinalforwebsml.pdf 16 Network Rail (draft) West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy. 17 Greengauge21, “Fast Forward: A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain”, September 2009. 18 KPMG. “Value for money in tackling overcrowding on northern city rail services”. Report to the Northern PTEs, 2010. 19 The Northern Way, “Manchester Hub Phase 2—Transport Modelling and Benefit Assessment”, 2009 http://www.thenorthernway.co.uk/document.asp?id=718 20 Centre for Cities, “The case for better transport investment: Agglomeration and growth in the Leeds City Region”, 2007 http://www.centreforcities.org/assets/files/pdfs/071127LeedsPaperFINAL.pdf May 2011

Written evidence from Crossrail Limited (HSR 124) Crossrail Limited (“CRL”) welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Transport Committee’s call for evidence regarding the strategic case for High Speed Rail. CRL is charged with delivering the Crossrail Programme—a new east-west high-frequency, metro railway through London from Maidenhead to Shenfield and Abbey Wood. Crossrail is due to begin passenger operations in late 2018. CRL’s interest in High Speed Rail is limited to the interface between the new Crossrail Depot at Old Oak Common and the proposed High Speed 2 station at Old Oak Common and we wish to draw the Committee’s attention to the following points: 1. The Crossrail Programme does not include provision of any station facilities at Old Oak Common. However, the Government’s HS2 plans propose a station at Old Oak Common to enable interchange with Crossrail and other rail services. Any change to the Crossrail scope would need to be instructed to CRL by the Crossrail Sponsors (Transport for London and the Department for Transport). The funding of any change would also be a matter for the Crossrail Sponsors. 2. HS2 Limited has confirmed to CRL that a proposed station at Old Oak Common will not encroach on the Crossrail depot and will not adversely impact upon depot operations. HS2 Ltd is working on the basis that access to the Crossrail depot is required at all times, should HS2 be constructed. Any change to this position will have an adverse impact as the Crossrail depot at Old Oak Common is critical to the future operation of Crossrail services. 3. CRL has recently appointed a shortlist of potential suppliers to bid for the design, build and finance of the 60 trains and the related depot and maintenance facilities to be based at Old Oak Common—it is anticipated that tenders will be invited to submit bids in late 2011 with a view to awarding a contract in late 2013. 4. Commercial development proposals at Old Oak Common are a matter for the local authority, the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham. CRL would be happy to provide further clarifications should you wish. May 2011

Written evidence from The Highlands & Islands Transport Partnership (HSR 125) The Highlands & Islands Transport Partnership (HITRANS) is a statutory body covering all forms of public transport in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland encompassing not only road, rail, sea and air travel, but also cycling and walking. HITRANS, working with its five constituent Councils, is charged with supporting the Scottish Government in delivering the National Transport Strategy and developing and delivering a strategy and promoting improvements to the transport services and infrastructure network that serve the region. The organisation takes an integrated and inclusive approach by consulting with the local communities and companies to achieve its objective of “enhancing the region’s viability by improving the interconnectivity of the whole region to strategic services and destinations”. HITRANS is responsible for an area that holds many of the assets critical to Scotland’s future prosperity. It covers just under half of Scotland’s land mass but with only 410,000 residents—less than 10% of Scotland’s cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w342 Transport Committee: Evidence

population. It includes over 80 island communities, of which 20 or so are served by air transport. The major challenge to maximising the effectiveness of the region is to improve its accessibility both internally and externally, to the rest of the UK and increasingly to international markets. HITRANS welcomes the opportunity to respond to this call for written evidence from The Transport Committee as part of its inquiry into the strategic case for High Speed Rail. The Partnership offers the following input into the Review.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR 1.1 The main arguments for HSR are; economic growth and a balanced economy, rail capacity and Journey times and the environment. 1.2 Economic growth and re-distribution of wealth; The positive link between economic growth and transport connectivity has been long established. Experience in other countries has shown that HSR stimulates economic growth outwith the Capital City such as for Lille in France and will therefore re-balance the national economy and reduce the current north-south divide. Improved accessibility to the north of England and Scotland will in addition provide opportunities for growth as a whole in the UK economy. 1.3 Rail capacity; The West Coast RUS concluded that the southern end of this line would soon run out of capacity to cater for expected growth and the only effective way to deal with this scenario would be to build an additional line. The East Coast and the Midland Main Line would also in due course experience a similar situation. The construction of HS2 would then release capacity on existing main lines, in particular the West Coast, which will cater for additional local rail services and freight. 1.4 Reduced end-to-end journey time; This is a more important benefit and opportunity for North of England and in particular Scotland where rail still has a relatively low share of the inter-city travel market and where only HSR can facilitate a step change in modal share from air to rail for longer distance travel whilst at the same time enhancing UK regional connectivity as part of a more sustainable UK economic growth strategy. 1.5 Environment; Increased capacity and significantly reduced journey times will stimulate transfer from car and air to rail. Rail is the only mode with the realistic potential to transport large volumes of passengers over long distances between UK cities and regions in a sustainable manner, in particular with an increasing proportion of the primary energy being renewable.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 2.1 The objectives and potential benefits of HSR go well beyond improving inter-urban connectivity by improving overall network capacity and enhancing regional connectivity by reducing journey times. Other objectives that will be met through HSR would be to redistribute wealth and enhance regional prosperity by reducing real and perceived peripherality within the UK and to make transport more sustainable, in line with Government Climate Change objectives. 2.2 Whilst some of these objectives could be met in part by investing in other transport modes, when compared with roads, rail is in particular more environmentally sustainable (air quality, energy use, land use) and is best suited for travel between and to access regional-centres.

Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.3 There are already significant “high-cost” rail projects under construction, in particular London Crossrail (approx. £15 billion over around seven years) and Thameslink (approx. £5.5 billion over around eight years) and it does not appear than these schemes have affected funding for the general “classic” network. 2.4 These two schemes will be very close to completion by the time construction would start on the proposed HSR between London and Birmingham in around 2016. At an approx. cost of £17 billion over 10 years, the peak expenditure on the London-Birmingham HSR and subsequent phasings should be no higher than for Crossrail alone, never mind the combined peak expenditure of the two London projects 2.5 There is already commitment to invest in a significant number of classic rail projects, such as Great Western Main Line electrification, Intercity Express Train Replacement Programme (IEP) and significant further enhancements to the East and West Coast Main Lines (eg Hitchin and Stafford flyovers). 2.6 The development of a comprehensive and regionally inclusive HSR network, which extends to the north of England and Scotland, must be viewed as a UK Treasury priority, with commitment to development of a HSR network which delivers comparable “step change” journey time, capacity and connectivity benefits for all of the regions, including Scotland. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w343

What are the implications for domestic aviation?

2.7 In 2009, approximately 8.8 million out of the 13.2 million domestic UK Mainland air passenger journeys were between the main cities that it is anticipated will eventually be directly served by a UK HSR Network (London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow). With significantly faster rail journeys, there should be a major shift from air to a much more sustainable rail travel mode. 2.8 Out of the 8.8 million air journeys, as many as 6.7 million either start or finish in Edinburgh or Glasgow demonstrating the much more significant modal change potential that exists in extending the full HSR network to Scotland. It is, therefore, imperative that the construction of a high speed rail network also includes new lines across the Border, delivering journey time improvements comparable with those proposed between Leeds/ Manchester/Birmingham and London. Under the current “Y network” proposals journey time improvements between Edinburgh/Glasgow and London are roughly half those for Birmingham/Manchester/Leeds to London, potentially worsening relative peripherality for the northern parts of the UK and failing to fully capture the economic and environmental benefits that HSR offers. 2.9 The 2009 rail market share of the Edinburgh/Glasgow to /air market was around 20% with rail journey times of typically 4hrs 30 mins. For the Newcastle to London rail/air market, rail held around 60%, with a rail journey time of around 3 hrs and for Manchester-London journeys, rail held around 76% of the rail/air market with a typical rail journey time of around 2 hrs 10 mins. For the Leeds to London air/rail market, rail held more than 95% of the market, with a typical rail journey time of 2 hrs 15 mins. 2.10 A 30 mins reduction in journey time (which should be achieved with high speed rail between London and West Midlands), could therefore see a shift from air to rail of nearly 1.5 million of today’s long-distance passenger journeys. This should increase to more than 3 million with the extension of the network to Leeds and Manchester when it must be assumed that domestic flights between Manchester/Leeds/ Newcastle and London will end. It is acknowledged however that modal split is also affected by other factors such as frequency and fares and ease of airport access.

2.11 3.8 million out of the 8.8 million air journeys quoted above are to or from London Heathrow so there should be significant scope to redirect valuable take-off and landing slots to other routes. Some of these Heathrow slots should go to domestic air routes that do not directly benefit from High Speed Rail, such as Aberdeen and Inverness which will not directly gain from the HSR network due to their geographical peripherality, so that these cities and their surrounding regions do not “fall behind” in respect of London and international connectivity.

3. Business case How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network?

3.1 A number of fairly in-depth studies have been undertaken into a UK High Speed rail Network in addition to the HS2 study, in particular the following three major studies: 1. Atkins study (on behalf of SRA), later updated for the Government in 2008. 2. Network Rail “New Lines” study (2009). 3. Greengauge21”Fast Forward” study (2009).

3.2 The studies looked at different HSR solutions and had different objectives behind their proposals. However, there were common strands such as the need for and benefits of a comprehensive UK north-south network linking in the major cities from London to Edinburgh and Glasgow. They all showed positive cases for a HSR network with benefit/cost ratios in the region of 2–3.5 and costs and passenger forecasts comparable with those found in the HS2 study.

3.3 A recent argument is that assumptions on time spent on trains is “un-productive” has overestimated the benefits of HSR. A recent study by Greengauge21 (where time spent on train would be regarded as “working- time”) did however show that the opposite was the case (although only marginally so). Passengers transferred from car and air would gain more productive time than in the original estimate and this would outweigh the “over-estimate” (in the original study) of working time gained by passengers transferred from classic train services.. It could also be argued that HSR will create a better working environment than current rail services and also that there will be a limit as to how long it is reasonably practical to work on a train.

3.4 The study by HS2 surprisingly did not include Edinburgh—London services in its modelling and business case for the London—Birmingham/Lichfield High Speed Line although the Edinburgh—London market is around 30% greater than the Glasgow—London market . Edinburgh—London Services via the West Coast and HS2 would be around 30 mins faster than existing services (as for Glasgow services) so by including Edinburgh—London services should make the business case even stronger. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w344 Transport Committee: Evidence

What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.5 Upgrading the West Coast Main Line could only be limited in scope in respect of capacity and the Network Rail RUS concluded that the only longer-term capacity solution would be to construct a new line between London and West Midlands. 3.6 The most recent upgrading of the West Coast Main Line also saw significant added costs in terms of disruption to services and reduced capacity during construction. Adding these costs to the actual upgrading cost of around £9 billion (the most recent cost estimate) for a scheme that will give less incremental capacity than a new line, it is almost certain that such an upgrade will not be better value than a new line. 3.7 A new conventional line (restricted to 125 mph) would largely resolve the capacity issue but would not enhance journey-times and would therefore be much more limited in benefits to North of England and Scotland where journey times become increasingly more important. Without the journey-time savings, there will not be such a significant shift to rail from the less environmentally sustainable modes of car and air. Greengauge21 has also shown that the cost of a conventional line is only marginally cheaper than a High Speed line. In summary, the potential regional and UK economic and environmental benefits would be significantly diminished compared to HSR.

What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.8 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would push passengers back onto less sustainable modes such as car or air, or journeys would not be undertaken in the first place which would be damaging in overall socio-economic terms. 3.9 There must also be doubts if price alone could realistically manage to reduce demand sufficiently to avoid investing in additional capacity. Regulated fares are already the highest in Europe and increasing these fares much further in real terms could make rail travel only affordable by the more well-off in society, contrary to wider equality and social inclusion objectives.

What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.10 Construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a reasonably good track record in terms of time and budget, eg HS1 and the recent Airdrie-Bathgate project. There will also be a large number of European High Speed projects that have a good record in this respect.

4. The strategic route case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? 4.1 The most important issue for high speed rail is that stations are well located to serve the key UK cities and major centres of population and, through excellent connections with regional rail networks, their surrounding regions. Rail is the most efficient mode in respect of land use to access city centres where this can be achieved, and without city-centre termini the advantage of high speed rail will be eroded. 4.2 Station locations outwith city centres will depend on local circumstances but should on average be located at not less than 100 mile intervals along the line. As a general principle HSR services should only stop at key city or regional hubs, with limited stopping patterns aimed at maximising achievement of the over- arching economic, environmental and regional connectivity objectives and benefits of the project. 4.3 Stations should only be provided where demand is predominantly for long distance rail travel. The temptation to add stations to cater for high volumes of shorter journeys such as commuting, must be resisted on the basis that such a strategy would erode the benefits of HSR.

Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.4 Most studies have demonstrated that a UK network including London, Birmingham, Manchester, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow derives greatest benefit and offers best value. These should be considered as the core cities for a north-south high speed network, which could be expanded by a western network. The UK Government’s proposed “y-network” supports this scenario but needs to be extended to Scotland.

Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.5 No. It is accepted that phase 1 of the HSR network should be the London-Birmingham section. It is the most capacity constrained section on the West Coast Main Line and is probably also the most complicated section to plan and construct. Furthermore, the link between Birmingham and London is accepted as being cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w345

crucial to the future development of a more extensive UK HSR network. Should the London—Birmingham section be rejected, it is highly unlikely that a national network will ever materialise. 4.6 However, the proposition that future phases should be constructed moving northwards from London is challenged. The most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the English-Scottish border. In addition, as indicated above, various studies have confirmed that extension of an HSR network to Scotland will deliver significantly greater economic and environmental benefits. Consequently detailed consideration should be given to starting construction of northern sections at a much earlier stage rather than as “last legs”, with cross-Border sections being potentially progressed alongside, or possibly earlier than, sections between Leeds/Manchester and Birmingham. 4.7 In particular, the UK Government should show greater commitment to plan the future network beyond Manchester and Leeds in recognition of the benefits the completed HSR national network, including Scotland, will achieve.

The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

4.8 The link to HS1 must be part of phase 1 due to technical issues but will also cater for the current West Midlands-Europe market.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide?

5.1 European experience has shown that most regions directly connected to the high speed network experience higher economic growth and there is no reason why this should not be the case for the UK. A Greengauge21 report also found that areas of Kent experienced rapid growth following the construction of HS1.

5.2 The 2009 Greengauge21 study also found that regional economic benefits from a “full” HSR network between London and Glasgow/Edinburgh would amount to around £80 billion and would be widely distributed but with Central Scotland, the North West and the South East benefitting most.

To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

5.3 The most important element of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity between the main centres of population in the UK and in particular connectivity with London. By serving City Centres, high speed rail will indirectly support regional regeneration.

Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

5.4 A Greengauge21 study advised that the business case for high speed rail was robust when based on current fare levels for long-distance rail travel and would cater for both business and leisure travel. Furthermore, the release of capacity on the existing network will also benefit other travellers and commuters in particular, as well as users of rail-freight. As such, all socio-economic groups currently using rail would benefit if fares do not rise. If fares rise then this will result in negative impacts on lower social groupings..

5.5 The majority of the population of the UK enjoys reasonable good links with the Cities that will be directly served by a future HSR network extending to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Many cities along the HSR corridors will also experience improved connectivity by increased service levels on the classic network.

5.6 However, it must be recognised there will be areas that will benefit significantly less such as the Northern half of Scotland, Wales, the South West of England and Northern Ireland and transport investment in these areas should be identified to reverse their relative decline (such as rail electrification programmes or, for the north of Scotland, improved air connectivity) and ensure a fair distribution of benefits.

How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

5.7 There may be examples from other countries with HSR that could be used as models and there may also be lessons learned from London Crossrail project.

5.8 A UK HSR Network will “replace” current classic rail links that form part of TEN so support should be sought from TEN-T and other relevant EU budgets. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w346 Transport Committee: Evidence

6. Impact What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1 HSR has considerably lower carbon footprint than car and air and also matches that of classic rail when the higher capacity of HSR trains are taken into account. If it can be assumed that the primary energy source is non-fossil the carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction completion) should be relatively very small.

Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2 It could perhaps be argued that studies have erred on the “safe” side so that overall environmental benefits have not been fully expressed.

What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.3 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line which is the busiest rail freight corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by rail freight services so the impact on freight by HSR should be very positive.

How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4 Experience from the St Pancras redevelopment indicates that this should be manageable. Disruption could also be reduced through service changes/ improvements to some of the existing local services terminating at Euston. For example, some local services on the West Coast Main Line as far out as Northampton could be incorporated into the Crossrail network through a connection in the Willesden/Old Oak Common area, extending planned Crossrail services from the East that would otherwise terminate at Old Oak Common. This could take away up to seven train arrivals/departures per hour from Euston Station. May 2011

Written evidence from Conserve the Chilterns and Countryside (HSR 126) 1. Summary 1.1 Conserve the Chilterns and Countryside (CCC) is a group of residents based close to HS2 Ltd’s preferred route for the high speed rail link. We seek to protect the interests of those living around and between Amersham, Chesham and Wendover. 1.2 We believe that the UK should continue to develop a modern, efficient transport system and that high speed rail may have a part to play in this, but only if a robust business case can be made for it. We are concerned that the government has overstated its case for High Speed 2 (HS2); underestimated its impact on the environment, especially in the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB); and ignored the case for alternative routes with a better business case or a lower environmental impact. 1.3 In this submission we focus on one such alternative route which runs via a new hub just north of Heathrow airport. In examining this alternative we stress that we are not advocates for the route or for HS2, but believe that a fuller examination of the alternative routes should be undertaken and the results made available as part of the consultation process. If necessary, the government’s consultation should be delayed to allow this to happen.

2. Conserve the Chilterns and Countryside 2.1 Conserve the Chilterns and Countryside is committed to protecting the Chilterns AONB. We are a non- profit based organisation funded by its founding members and public donations. We are committed to rational discussion and debate on the location of HS2, and its value to the national infrastructure and economy. 2.2 CCC believes that if HS2 is to proceed, it must be on the basis of a robust economic case, delivered in a way that spreads the benefits of HS2 to communities along the route, and offer the best protection possible to the Chilterns countryside. In detail, the criteria we are calling on the government to ensure are met are as follows:

2.3 Economic — A full economic cost/benefit analysis should be carried out by the government to demonstrate there are concrete advantages to be had from HS2. — HS2 must have a central London terminal, with a direct link to Heathrow, Crossrail and, via HS1, to the Continent. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w347

— The government must make a commitment that over time the high speed network will link the continent, via HS1 and HS2, to the north of England and Scotland.

2.4 Environmental — Full environmental mitigation must be put in place along the entire route, but particularly in the Chilterns AONB. — The route should also follow existing major transport corridors or travel through tunnels, wherever possible. — The line must traverse the shortest viable route across the Chilterns.

2.5 Community — The government needs to provide viable and tangible benefits to communities along the route, including javelin services for nearby towns. — There must be robust planning that makes provisions and commitments to reducing visual, traffic and noise impact during construction. — Unlike the previous administration, the government must ensure communities play a leading role in the consultation. 2.6 In our submission to the Transport Select Committee we will be concentrating on the strategic route, namely why we believe HS2 must directly connect to Heathrow in the first stages of its construction, and also touch upon the environmental issues surrounding HS2 which are threatening our nation’s precious AONB.

3. The Objectives of High Speed Rail 3.1 All too often the UK’s major infrastructure projects have been short-sighted and pushed through to navigate the planning system more easily and to appease opposition. The huge detrimental effect is that many places have been left with sub-standard national infrastructure which the tax payer has had to pay to upgrade subsequently and users have been left to suffer the impacts of poor planning and unreliable services. 3.2 We are currently seeing this very problem with the long term upgrade works taking place on the M25. Experts warned all along that this project would require more lanes and could have been incorporated at the time of initial construction with no extra impact on road users and at a fraction of the multi-billion pound cost the country is now incurring during a period of austerity. 3.3 CCC believes that the government’s current proposals for HS2 are, at best, a compromise that cannot possibly achieve its full potential nor deliver its full benefit. CCC urges the government to look at alternative options and not build a line that threatens to be a white elephant that will not meet the full objectives set out for a successful HS2. 3.4 The previous government, the current government and HS2 Ltd have consistently set out key objectives for HS2.327 These objectives included the following criteria:328 — A Heathrow International station—this must provide an interchange between HS2, HS1, the Great Western Main Line (GWML) and Crossrail with convenient access to Heathrow. — Increase passenger capacity. — A freight capability—taking freight off the roads. — Modal shift from car to rail. — Modal shift from air to rail. 3.5 CCC believes that the preferred route chosen for the current public consultation fails to meet these objectives and that alternative options must be looked at if the government’s objectives are to be met, as demonstrated below:

A Heathrow International station 3.6 Independent engineering firm Arup has designed both the Heathrow hub option and the current route the government are consulting on. It is noteworthy that Arup has shown a preference for the route via Heathrow, but we understand that they are now contractually prevented by HS2 Ltd from promoting the Heathrow alternative. 3.7 The current plans do not allow for the seamless integration of transport modes required to maximise the benefits and revenue of HS2. While current plans do incorporate HS1, HS2, the GWML, Crossrail and Heathrow airport, they are not to be found at a central hub. A properly integrated hub would achieve this, as well as the added benefits of freight distribution, a coach and bus station and close links to the M25 and M4. 327 P Hammond letter to B Briscoe, “remit for work” http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131112903/ http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2remit/remiths2june2010.pdf 328 Objectives and remit for HS2 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/55864 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w348 Transport Committee: Evidence

3.8 Any suggestions that an Old Oak Common interchange or a spur/loop is the answer is perhaps best dismissed by quoting Guillaume Pepy, Chairman of SNCF. In May 2009 he said: “We have more than 12 years of experience and are fully confident in the value of an easy connection between TGV and plane. The commercial success of TGV is due to the fact that Roissy is a through station. There must be a seamless connection between rail and air”.329 As the Bow Group has declared any “non direct HSR link with Heathrow, represented by a loop or spur, would represent folly in Britain’s ambition to develop a truly integrated transport policy”.330 The Bow Group’s report was endorsed by Lord Heseltine, who promoted the change to the original Channel Tunnel Rail link in the 1980s. 3.9 There have been some concerns that a Heathrow hub route alignment would result in a significant increase to journey times. However, for a non-stop train from Euston to Birmingham City Centre, the route via Heathrow hub will take just three minutes longer than the alternative using HS2 Ltd’s preferred route, according to train performance modelling of journey times carried out by Arup.331 This is a small increase that is mitigated when offset against the benefits of a fully integrated transport network, less environmental damage and reduction in cost of the spur option. Furthermore, the increase in journey times is almost negligible when put in the context of overall time savings expected on the entire high speed network from phase two to Manchester and Leeds and beyond. 3.10 If a hub at Heathrow is not built, the UK will be the only country with a high speed rail network not incorporated with its major airport. The success of a high speed rail network is, in part, dependent on its integration with air travel. Air passengers will not use a rail service in any great numbers if the interchange is not simple and direct. 3.11 The government has tried to tackle this by incorporating a future spur or loop to the line connecting to Heathrow. Yet the designers of the preferred option concede that doing so would “compromise the ability of rail services to compete with domestic and short haul air services”332 largely making any spur/loop redundant and a vast waste of money. 3.12 Heathrow is one of Europe’s most difficult airports to reach. If an integrated, effective and long term solution is not sought, Britain risks losing many potential passengers and business opportunities to other European hubs. 3.13 In summary, a hub would tackle many of the problems the High Speed network should look to tackle and that the current preferred route ignores. It provides exceptional connectivity between classic and high speed rail services and between domestic road and rail services at a single interchange; significantly improves rail access to Heathrow for many UK cities; improves productivity by reducing journey times for business trips to Heathrow; improves reliability of journeys by rail to Heathrow; improves access to international markets for businesses, including the growing markets of China and India; attracts international firms to locate and invest in the regions; releases short haul air slots at Heathrow; improves access to the rest of the country for international tourists visiting; improves access to Heathrow for the West and North of the UK; improves local air quality and reduces both carbon emissions and noise pollution; and increases farebox revenues—which provides a far more sound financing model for HS2 than current proposals. CCC fails to understand why this is not being considered more seriously by the government and HS2 Ltd.

Increase passenger capacity 3.14 The government has a poor record when it comes to predicting passenger numbers on new rail lines. Government figures on capacity for the consultation route on HS2 have inevitably come under great scrutiny from a number of sources. A line that only links central London and Birmingham is not maximising the potential benefits and use of the service. In order to achieve its potential, a line must be linked with Heathrow to allow passengers to access the airport from the West and North, to promote a modal shift from car to rail and also from air to rail, and to link up in a highly integrated hub. 3.15 The main advantages of a Heathrow hub would be to link a rail station, airport terminal, coach and bus station, freight distribution terminal, a connection for HS1, HS2, the Great Western Mainline, Crossrail and the M25 all in one place. The current proposal simply cannot match this potential to maximise capacity.

A freight capability 3.16 While current proposals may be able to incorporate a freight capability, alternative options such as a hub based at Heathrow would create the potential for high value freight to be conveyed more quickly between continental Europe and areas around London, the south of England and the Midlands. In the same way, it also brings the UK’s major centres—areas of economic activity—closer together, increasing opportunities for productivity gains and trade in a way the government’s current plans fail to do. Furthermore, by allowing a high proportion of lorry journeys to be moved to rail, there are significant environmental benefits. 329 Transport Times conference, London May 2009 330 http://www.bowgroup.org/files/bowgroup/The_Right_Track_PDF.pdf 331 Arup’s submission to Lord Mawhinney’s review http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/ http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_4.pdf 332 Arup submission to HS2 Ltd. Full report http://www.arup.com/News/2010_04_April/~/media/Files/PDF/News_and_Press/2010_ 04_April/091210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w349

Modal shift from car to rail 3.17 According to Arup’s figures, a Heathrow Hub will increase public access to Heathrow by 21% and take 10–20 million cars off the road. In turn, combined with the modal shift of air to rail (see below), this will reduce carbon emissions by between 500,000 and 800,000 tonnes a year.333

Modal shift from air to rail 3.18 According to Arup’s figures, a Heathrow Hub will shift between 92,000 and 150,000 passengers from air to rail.334 3.19 The Rail Minister, Theresa Villiers, has said that high speed rail was a "viable and attractive" alternative to short haul flights335 and would reduce road congestion, generate economic benefits and improve transport links without the "considerable" environmental penalties of a third runway. 3.20 The government has cancelled the proposed third runway at Heathrow and therefore it is a key objective for high speed rail to take both cars off the road and passengers off planes; their current proposals will simply fail to achieve this with anywhere near the degree of success that a Heathrow hub option or other alternatives could offer.

3.21 Does the current plan deliver the government’s desired outcomes? 3.21.1 While the construction of a Heathrow hub and other alternative options would not incur any significant extra financial costs to construction—particularly if a spur or loop option is to be built—the huge benefits of integration on capacity, road to rail and air to rail modal shifts, increased freight and other opportunities vastly outweigh the current proposals to maximise benefits. Furthermore, these more efficient solutions would increase passenger numbers and therefore revenue, making the economic case for the project far more sound. For example, for passengers travelling from the west of England to Heathrow, initial estimates indicate journey time savings with a present value at government discount rate of £640 million.336 3.21.2 The Prime Minister, David Cameron, cited his own particular objective for HS2 back in November 2010. He told journalists that “If we think about governments of all colours, they have all failed—over 50 years—to deal with the North-South divide. With high-speed rail we have a real chance of cracking it”.337 CCC believes that high speed rail cannot tackle a North-South divide effectively unless its use and potential is maximised. Providing the people of Manchester, Leeds and Edinburgh with a direct link to the UK’s only international hub airport through a truly integrated transport interchange is a far more effective solution than the current preferred route. Alternative routes must be fully considered otherwise the government risks choosing the wrong route for Britain’s second high speed railway.

4. Protecting the Chilterns 4.1 One of CCC’s greatest concerns about HS2 is that it severely threatens the unspoilt beauty of the Chiltern’s AONB. We are insisting that the government gives more consideration to the environmental impacts of high speed rail and, if HS2 proceeds, offers full environmental mitigation where possible. 4.2 We recognise that the government has already taken steps to reduce the environmental impact of HS2 in the Chilterns, for example by lowering the vertical alignment to reduce noise and visual intrusion. However, in our view this does not go far enough. Ideally the route would be diverted around the AONB or, failing that, would not follow the widest route through it. Yet, even if the current preferred route were endorsed, we believe the route should be carried in a tunnel under the entire width of the AONB. Such a move would greatly reduce the environmental impact and reduce the construction impact in the Chilterns, not least from the reduced level of spoil to be removed. 4.3 Whilst we accept that every route option will cause some damage to the environment, we are disappointed that other routes which offer more environmental mitigation have been given less consideration by the government. According to the evidence338 given by Arup to Lord Mawhinney for his review, the Heathrow hub proposal would be far less environmentally damaging and impact less upon the Chiltern’s AONB. Additionally, the noise pollution in residential areas would be reduced, which would be a great relief for homeowners in the Chilterns area. 333 Arup submission to HS2 Ltd. Full report http://www.arup.com/News/2010_04_April/~/media/Files/PDF/News_and_Press/2010_ 04_April/091210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx 334 Arup submission to HS2 Ltd. Full report http://www.arup.com/News/2010_04_April/~/media/Files/PDF/News_and_Press/2010_ 04_April/091210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx 335 Conservative party conference 2008 http://www.bbc.co.uk/manchester/content/articles/2008/09/29/290908_hi_speed_rail_ feature.shtml 336 Arup submission to HS2 Ltd. Full report http://www.arup.com/News/2010_04_April/~/media/Files/PDF/News_and_Press/2010_ 04_April/091210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx 337 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road-and-rail-transport/8158342/David-Cameron-high-speed-rail-link-will-go- ahead.html 338 Arup’s submission to Lord Mawhinney’s review http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http:/ www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_4.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w350 Transport Committee: Evidence

4.4 Furthermore, if HS2 linked directly to Heathrow it would achieve the greatest shift from road and air travel to rail, and would also traverse the narrowest part of the Chilterns—one of the criteria we are insisting upon if HS2 goes ahead. It must also be noted that if HS2 were to follow the Heathrow hub route option and provide greater environmental mitigation than the current preferred route offers, the economic case would be improved. According to Arup’s figures,339 a direct alignment to Heathrow would cost £400 million less than the least expensive loop or spur alignment, and would avoid the blight and costly duplication associated with such options. 4.5 CCC is calling on the government to further consider the environmental impact that the current proposed HS2 route would have, to acknowledge the greater environmental mitigation that the main alternative route offers, and to shift the current preferred route accordingly.

5. Conclusions 5.1 The Chilterns AONB is a beautiful, unspoilt landscape, which the government has a duty to protect. The current plans for HS2 do not pay sufficient attention to this duty, the business case is poorly argued, and too little attention has been paid to alternative routes. The government should withdraw its existing proposals and consider a full range of alternatives. May 2011

Written evidence from Local Government Yorkshire and Humber (HSR 129) Local Government Yorkshire and Humber (LGYH) is pleased to submit this response to help inform the Transport Select Committee’s inquiry into the Government’s proposals for a national high speed rail network. The network put forward in the DfT consultation would significantly reduce journey times to London from Yorkshire and Humber, helping to make the region a more attractive place to do business. This in turn could help to transform and rebalance the economy, making the north more prosperous and reducing the gap that exists between it and the South East. The Leeds and Sheffield City Regions are currently leading work as part of the Eastern Network Partnership (in conjunction with the North East, Derby, and Nottingham councils) to provide further technical evidence to inform their response to the Government’s consultation. We would urge the Committee to ensure that this Eastern Network Partnership be fully consulted in the course of this inquiry. This response sets out the main messages from local government in Yorkshire and Humber on the importance of high speed rail in supporting future economic success.

1. The Business Case for High Speed Rail Fast, high quality, efficient inter-city transport links are essential to supporting economic growth and business activities. Without continuing investment into the rail network people’s ability to do business will be reduced; as many north-south lines, including the East Coast, West Coast and Midland Main Lines are already operating at close to capacity and are projected to be at capacity in the future. This will require additional investment to provide further capacity to meet projected future demand. The current journey times between some of largest cities in the country are slow and of poor quality by rail. For example, it takes 115 minutes to travel between Leeds and Nottingham, a distance of only 70 miles, meaning that the average speed is just 36 mph. By enhancing the performance of such networks, rail would become a more attractive mode of transport in comparison with the use of the car. Furthermore, this could help to facilitate trade and business linkages between these cities and their wider economic geographies, helping to rebalance the country’s economy. Without investment in rail infrastructure there is a significant risk that the UK could be left behind other countries that have chosen to prioritise improving the capacity and performance of their own infrastructure. The significant economic benefits that have been created in places such as Lille illustrate how investing in the rail network can act as a catalyst for regeneration, when combined with appropriate land use and economic development policies. This significant potential to help regenerate the economic geographies across Yorkshire and Humber—such as the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions, as well as the wider North Yorkshire and Humber sub-regions—makes a very strong case for investments to improve the capacity and performance of Britain’s inter-city rail network.

2. The strategic route required for High Speed Rail The “Y” high speed rail network, as proposed by Government, has the potential to transform the shape of the national economy, helping to rebalance it through the growth of the north of England. This would connect some of the country’s largest cities and the nature of high speed rail means that the more people connected the greater the economic benefits that would be generated. 339 Arup’s submission to Lord Mawhinney’s review http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http:/ www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_4.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w351

From a Yorkshire and Humber perspective, stations in the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions would connect more than 4 million people and two million jobs located within these functional economic areas. This could help the two city regions to become increasingly integrated, as journey times would be significantly reduced between them. For Yorkshire and Humber, therefore, high speed rail is both important in terms of providing reduced journey times to London and by reducing journey times between the some of the other largest cities in the country. This proposed eastern leg of the “Y” would help to create, in effect, a single economic zone encompassing the East Midlands and the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions, which would have a combined population of 6.7 million people and 3 million jobs. Research undertaken by the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions has demonstrated that the proposed “Y” network would generate significantly more economic benefits than the previous alternative route of the “Reverse S”. This showed that the “Y” would generate wider economic impacts of £2.3 billion, whilst the “S” would generate only £0.4 billion.340 In the long-term, high speed rail would provide the best solution for enhancing rail capacity and performance between Yorkshire and Humber and London. However, as the current plans show, HSR will not connect to this region until 2032–33 and it is of fundamental importance to continue to invest in improving the performance of existing rail lines in the short to medium term. This investment will be vital to places such as Doncaster and York, which do not feature as direct HSR stations under current proposals and, therefore, will continue to rely on existing lines after the commencement of high speed rail services to Yorkshire and Humber. We therefore believe that there is a very strong economic case for the “Y” network. The Benefit to Cost Ratios (BCR) published by HS2 in March 2010 showed that the benefits of high speed were significantly increased when it was extended to from London-to-Birmingham to Yorkshire and Humber, via the East Midlands. Consequently, we strongly support the “Y” network proposed and also call for a clear commitment of simultaneous investment in the existing rail network, which will be of vital importance to wider Yorkshire Humber and rebalancing the UK economy.

3. How the route should be delivered Whilst we recognise the need to phase delivery, high speed rail services and routes should be progressed to the Sheffield and Leeds City Regions and beyond as soon as possible, to create growth and jobs. There could be a significant east-west imbalance created in the economy of the north of England if the route to Manchester was progressed in advance of a route to Leeds for example. Data published by HS2 in March 2010 showed that the Benefits to Cost Ratio of the extension to Leeds were, in fact, double that of the extension to Manchester. We therefore believe that the link to Leeds via Sheffield should be delivered at the same time, if not in advance of, the link to Manchester, due to the strength of the economic case for the link. The current consultation proposes, as part of phase 1 of HS2, to link directly to the West Coast Main Line to provide onward services to Manchester. Similarly, we believe that the Government must ensure a rapid and effective connection to the Midland Main Line (potentially in the Tamworth area) at the earliest time to allow high speed trains to run to Sheffield and Leeds, thereby increasing the overall benefits of HS2. The onward connection proposed in the consultation to the North East and Scotland is particularly important to Yorkshire and Humber due to the economic linkages that currently exist between the two regions. Similarly, the opportunity to have significantly improved connectivity to the international gateways of Heathrow Airport and HS1 would help to improve the region’s international linkages and trade relationships. This onward connection to the North East, via the East Coast Main Line is also of further importance as it will provide York and thus North Yorkshire with a link to high speed services. Ensuring that this connection is fully incorporated into the network is therefore a top priority for Yorkshire and Humber.

4. The need for simultaneous investment in the wider rail network We recognise that the delivery of high speed rail to the north is a long-term project, with the connection to Leeds City Region estimated to open in 2032–33. Improvements to existing routes are therefore vital to deliver the benefits from improved performance in the short to medium term. Existing proposals to upgrade and electrify the Midland Main Line, East Coast Main Line, Transpennine, Leeds-Sheffield and Leeds-York links can deliver substantial benefits, in some cases at modest costs. These improvements will also be of vital importance to ensuring that those places in Yorkshire and Humber not directly served by high speed rail can benefit through more direct services on the existing classic lines when high speed services commence. As high speed will only serve a limited number of places directly in the City Regions, in terms of specific station locations, there is an urgent need for improvements to existing local and regional rail routes and services, to improve access to high speed stations and maximising the benefits provided. Ensuring that people can connect by public transport to the stations in Leeds and South Yorkshire will be of vital importance in ensuring that the opportunities created by high speed are spread throughout the city regions and beyond. 340 Arup and Volterra (2010). The Economic Case for High Speed Rail to Leeds City Region and Sheffield City Region, on behalf of SYPTE and Metro. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w352 Transport Committee: Evidence

We therefore believe that high speed rail needs to form a part of an integrated strategy for the rail network. In order to maximise the benefits of high speed in Yorkshire and Humber it will be particularly important to consider how to make best use of the capacity released on existing lines to benefit the places in the region that will not be directly served by high speed rail. May 2011

Written evidence from the six statutory Scottish Regional Transport Partnerships (HSR 130) Hi Trans Highland and Islands Strategic Transport Partnership Nestrans North East of Scotland Transport Partnership SPT Strathclyde Partnership for Transport SEStran South East of Scotland Transport Partnership Tactran Tay and Central Transport Partnership ZetTrans Shetland Transport Partnership

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR 1.1 The main arguments for HSR are: Economic growth and a balanced economy, Rail capacity and Journey times and the Environment. 1.2 Economic growth and re-distribution of wealth: The positive link between economic growth and transport connectivity has been long established. Experience in other countries has shown that HSR stimulates economic growth outwith the Capital City such as for Lille in France and will therefore re-balance the national economy and reduce the current north-south divide. Improved accessibility to the north of England and Scotland will in addition provide opportunities for growth as a whole in the UK economy. 1.3 Rail capacity: The West Coast RUS concluded that the southern end of this line would soon run out of capacity to cater for expected growth and the only effective way to deal with this scenario would be to build an additional line. The East Coast and the Midland Main Line would also in due course experience a similar situation. The construction of HS2 would then release capacity on existing main lines, in particular the West Coast, which will cater for additional local rail services and freight. 1.4 Reduced End-to-End Journey time: This is a more important benefit for North of England and in particular Scotland where rail still has a relatively low share of the inter-city travel market and where only HSR can facilitate a step change in modal share from air to rail whilst at the same time enhancing UK regional connectivity as part of a sustainable economic growth strategy. 1.5 Environment: Increased capacity and significantly reduced journey times will stimulate transfer from car and air to rail. Rail is the only mode with the realistic potential to transport large volumes of passengers over long distances between UK cities and regions in a sustainable manner, in particular with an increasing proportion of the primary energy being renewable.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 2.1 The objectives of HSR go well beyond improving inter-urban connectivity through improving overall network capacity and enhancing regional connectivity by reducing journey times. Other objectives that will be met through HSR would be to redistribute wealth and enhance regional prosperity by reducing real and perceived peripherality within the UK and to make transport more sustainable, in line with Government Climate Change objectives. 2.2 Some of these objectives could be met in part by investing in other transport modes but when compared with roads, rail is in particular more environmentally sustainable (air quality, energy use, land use) and is best suited for travel between and to access city-centres.

Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.3 There are already significant “high-cost” rail projects under construction, in particular London Cross Rail (approx. £15 billion over around seven years) and Thameslink (approx. £5.5 billion over around eight years) and it does not appear than these schemes have affected funding for the general “classic” network. 2.4 These two schemes will be very close to completion by the time construction would start on the proposed HSR between London and Birmingham in around 2016. At an approximate cost of £17 billion over 10 years, the peak expenditure on the London-Birmingham HSR should be no higher than for Crossrail alone, never mind the combined peak expenditure of the two London projects. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w353

2.5 There is already commitment to invest in a significant number of classic rail projects, such as Great Western Main Line electrification, Intercity Express Train Replacement Programme (IEP) and significant further enhancements to the East and West Coast Main Lines (eg Hitchins and Stafford flyovers).

What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.6 In 2009, approximately 8.8 million domestic UK Mainland air passenger journeys were undertaken between the main cities that it is anticipated will eventually be directly served by a UK HSR Network (London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow). With significantly faster rail journeys, there should be a major shift from air to a much more sustainable rail travel mode. 2.7 Out of the 8.8 million air journeys, as many as 6.7 million either start or finishes in Edinburgh or Glasgow demonstrating the much more significant modal change potential that exists in extending the full HSR network to Scotland. It is therefore imperative that the construction of a high speed rail network also includes new lines across the Border. 2.8 The 2009 rail market share of the Edinburgh/Glasgow to London rail/air market was around 20% with rail journey times of typically 4 hours 30 minutes. For the Newcastle to London rail/air market, rail held around 60%, with a rail journey time of around 3 hours and for Manchester-London journeys, rail held around 76% of the rail/air market with a typical rail journey time of around 2 hours 10 minutes. For the Leeds to London air/rail market, rail held more than 95% of the market, with a typical rail journey time of 2 hours 15 minutes. 2.9 A 30 minute reduction in journey time (which should be achieved with high speed rail between London and West Midlands), could therefore see a shift from air to rail of nearly 1.5 million of today’s long-distance passenger journeys. This should increase to more than 3 million with the extension of the network to Leeds and Manchester when it must be assumed that domestic flights between Manchester/Leeds/Newcastle and London will end. It is acknowledged however that modal split is also affected by other factors such as frequency and fares and ease of airport access. 2.10 In addition, there would also be significant growth in the total long-distance travel market beyond what took place in 2009 so the overall transfer from rail to air with the introduction of a future high speed rail network will be considerably higher. 2.11 3.8 million out of the 8.8 million air journeys quoted above are to or from London Heathrow so there should be significant scope to redirect valuable take-off and landing slots to other routes. Some of these Heathrow slots should go to domestic air routes that do not directly benefit from High Speed Rail, such as Aberdeen and Inverness which will not directly gain from the HSR network due to their geographical peripherality, so that these cities and surrounding regions do not “fall behind” in respect of London connectivity.

3. Business case How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 3.1 A number of fairly in-depth studies have been undertaken into a UK High Speed rail Network in addition to the HS2 study, in particular the following three major studies: 1. Atkins study (on behalf of SRA), later updated for the Government in 2008. 2. Network Rail “New Lines” study (2009). 3. Greengauge21 “Fast Forward” study (2009). 3.2 The studies looked at different HSR solutions and had different objectives behind their proposals. However, there were common strands such as a north-south network linking in the major cities from London to Edinburgh and Glasgow. They all showed positive cases for a HSR network with benefit/cost ratios in the region of 2–3.5 and costs and passenger forecasts comparable with those found in the HS2 study. 3.3 A recent argument is that assumptions on time spent on trains is “un-productive” has overestimated the benefits of HSR. A recent study by Greengauge21 (where time spent on train would be regarded as “working- time”) did however show that the opposite was the case (although only marginally so). Passengers transferred from car and air would gain more productive time than in the original estimate and this would outweigh the “over-estimate” (in the original study) of working time gained by passengers transferred from classic train services. It could also be argued that HSR will create a better working environment than current rail services and also that there will be a limit as to how long it is reasonably practical to work on a train. 3.4 The study by HS2 surprisingly did not include Edinburgh-London services in its modelling and business case for the London-Birmingham/Litchfield High Speed Line although the Edinburgh-London market is around 30% greater than the Glasgow-London market. Edinburgh-London Services via the West Coast and HS2 would be around 30 minutes faster than existing services (as for Glasgow services) so by including Edinburgh-London services should make the business case even stronger. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w354 Transport Committee: Evidence

What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.5 Upgrading the West Coast Main Line could only be limited in scope in respect of capacity and the Network Rail RUS concluded that the only longer-term capacity solution would be to construct a new line between London and West Midlands. 3.6 The most recent upgrading of the West Coast Main Line also saw significant added costs in terms of disruption to services and reduced capacity during construction. Adding these costs to the actual upgrading cost of around £9 billion (the most recent cost estimate) for a scheme that will give less incremental capacity than a new line, it is almost certain that such an upgrade will not be better value than a new line. 3.7 A new conventional line (restricted to 125 mph) would largely resolve the capacity issue but would not enhance journey-times and would therefore be much more limited in benefits to North of England and Central Scotland where journey times become increasingly more important. Without the journey-time savings, there will not be such a significant shift to rail from the less environmentally sustainable modes of car and air. Greengauge21 has also shown that the cost of a conventional line is only marginally cheaper than a High Speed line. In summary, the potential regional and UK economic and environmental benefits would be significantly diminished compared to investment in HSR.

What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.8 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would push passengers back onto less sustainable modes such as car or air, or journeys would not be undertaken in the first place which would be damaging in overall socio-economic terms. 3.9 There must also be doubts if price alone could realistically manage to reduce demand sufficiently to avoid investing in additional capacity. Regulated fares are already the highest in Europe and increasing these fares much further in real terms could make rail travel only affordable by the more well-off in society, contrary to wider equality and social inclusion objectives.

What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.10 Construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a reasonably good track record in terms of time and budget, eg HS1 and the recent Airdrie-Bathgate project. There will also be a large number of European High Speed projects that have a good record in this respect.

4. The strategic route The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1 The most important issue for high speed rail is that stations are well located to serve the key UK cities and major centres of population and, through excellent connections with regional rail networks, their surrounding regions. Rail is the most efficient mode in respect of land use to access city centres where this can be achieved and without city-centre termini the advantage of high speed rail will be seriously eroded. 4.2 Station locations outwith city centres will depend on local circumstances but the general rule of thumb should be that not all services will necessary stop at non-city-centre stations and that in general, distances between stops should not be less than 100 miles or so. 4.3 Stations should only be provided where there is sufficient demand for long distance rail travel. The temptation to add stations to cater for high volumes of shorter journeys such as commuting, must be resisted on the basis that such a strategy would erode the benefits of HSR.

Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.4 Most studies have demonstrated that a UK network that includes London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow derives greatest benefits and offers best value. These should be considered as the core cities for a north-south high speed network (which could be expanded by a western network). The UK Government’s proposed y-network supports this scenario but needs to be extended to Scotland.

Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.5 The UK Government has decided that phase 1 of the HSR network should be the London-Birmingham section. It is the most capacity constrained section on the West Coast Main Line and it is probably also the most complicated section to plan and construct. Furthermore, the link between Birmingham and London is cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w355

accepted as being crucial to the future development of a more extensive UK HSR network. So should the London—Birmingham section be rejected, it is highly unlikely that a national network will ever materialise. 4.6 However, the proposition that future phases should be constructed moving northwards from London is fundamentally challenged. The most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the English- Scottish border. In addition, as indicated above, various studies have confirmed that extension of an HSR network to Scotland will deliver significantly greater economic and environmental benefits. Consequently, detailed consideration should be given to starting construction of northern sections at a much earlier stage rather than as “last legs”, with cross-border sections being potentially progressed alongside, or possibly earlier than, sections between Birmingham and Leeds/Manchester. 4.7 In particular, the Government should show greater commitment to plan the future network beyond Manchester and Leeds in recognition of the benefits the completed HSR national network, including Scotland, will achieve.

The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.8 The link to HS1 must be part of phase 1 due to technical issues but will also cater for the current West Midlands-Europe market. 4.9 The Heathrow market will to a large extent be catered for through the Old Oak Commons interchange as part of phase 1 so it is reasonable that further expenditure on this link should come later. However, the Heathrow link should be built in a way so that High Speed Trains for Heathrow from the north can continue on the classic network south of London to also serve important destinations such as Gatwick Airport and south coast cities.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.1 European experience has shown that most cities directly connected to the high speed network experience higher economic growth and there is no reason why this should not be the case for the UK. A Greengauge21 report also found that areas of Kent experienced rapid growth following the construction of HS1. 5.2 The 2009 Greengauge21 study also found that Regional economic benefits from a “full” HSR network between London and Glasgow/Edinburgh would amount to around £80 billion and would be widely distributed but with Central Scotland, the North West and the South East benefitting most.

To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.3 The most important element of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity between the main centres of population in the UK and in particular connectivity with London. By serving City Centres, high speed rail will indirectly support regional regeneration.

Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.4 A Greengauge21 study advised that the business case for high speed rail was robust when based on current fare levels for long-distance rail travel and would cater for both business and leisure travel. Furthermore, the release of capacity on the existing network will also benefit other travellers and commuters in particular, as well as users of rail-freight. As such, all socio-economic groups would benefit. 5.5 The majority of the population of the UK enjoys reasonable good links with the Cities that will be directly served by a future HSR network extending to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Many cities will also experience improved connectivity by increased service levels on the classic network so most of the UK will benefit from HSR. 5.6 However, it must be recognised there will be areas that will benefit significantly less such as the Northern half of Scotland, Wales and the South West of England and Northern Ireland. Transport investment in these areas should be identified to reverse their relative decline (such as rail electrification programmes or, for the north of Scotland, improved air connectivity) to ensure a fair distribution of benefits.

How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 5.7 There may be examples from other countries with HSR that could be used as models and there may also be lessons learned from London Crossrail project. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w356 Transport Committee: Evidence

5.8 A UK HSR Network will “replace” current classic rail links that form part of TEN so support should be sought from TEN-T and other relevant EU budgets.

6. Impact What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1 HSR has considerably lower carbon footprint than car and air and also matches that of classic rail when the higher capacity of HSR trains are taken into account. If it can be assumed that the primary energy source is renewable, the carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction completion) should be relatively very small.

Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2 It could perhaps be argued that studies have erred on the “safe” side so that overall environmental benefits have not been fully expressed.

What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.3 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line which is the busiest rail freight corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by rail freight services so the impact on freight services by HSR should be very positive.

How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4 Experience from the St Pancras redevelopment indicates that this should be manageable. Disruption could also be reduced through service changes/ improvements to some of the existing local services terminating at Euston. For example, some local services on the West Coast Main Line as far out as Northampton could be incorporated into the Crossrail network through a connection in the Willesden/Old Oak Commons area, extending planned Crossrail services from the East that would otherwise terminate at Old Oaks Commons. This could take away up to seven train arrivals/departures per hour from Euston Station. May 2011

Written evidence from William Summers (HSR 132) The government appears to be hell bent on pushing through the building of a high speed rail link in an effort to keep up with other members of the EEC. 1. We do not have the area of land to support such a major infrastructure project as is available in other EEC countries. 2. We have no need for the project nor, certainly not at the moment, the money to finance it. 3. The business case for it is not viable, wild assumptions have been made to try to justify it. 4. If there were a need for increased capacity, which is by no means certain then alternatives exist which would be far less expensive.

5. HSR is not environmentally friendly using far more CO2 than existing modes of travel. 6. The government, on behalf of the Nation, declared the Chilterns an Area of OUTSTANDING national beauty. Intrusive building is only allowed if there is an overwhelming need, no alternative exists and all other avenues of solving the problem explored. These criteria have not been met. May 2011

Written evidence from the Northern Way (HSR 133) Summary This submission sets out the Northern Way Transport Compact’s evidence on high speed rail. The Northern Way was the public and private sector partnership funded by the three Northern RDAs that promoted the North’s productivity and output growth and closed at the end of March 2011. The Northern Way Transport Compact has concluded that: — Set in the context of a national rail investment strategy, high speed rail will bring substantial and worthwhile transformational economic benefits to the North and to the nation. — The Government’s benefit assessment is conservative and that, in reality, benefits will be significantly greater than the £44 billion calculated for the Y shaped network. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w357

— Agglomeration benefits at over £6 billion are an important part of the Government’s benefits assessment. The Northern Way’s evidence is that proportionally, the North’s economy will receive a greater agglomeration uplift than that in London and the South East. — High speed rail will create the circumstances to accelerate the North’s economic growth and will help rebalance the economy North South. — While the Government has not quantified the impacts of high speed rail on the size of the economy measured by Gross Value Added, the Northern Way’s assessment is that these could be a multiple of the £44 billion in economic benefits quantified to date. — The greatest economic benefits come from a network approach that brings major cities closer together and spreads prosperity across regions. — A north-south high speed rail network that serves both sides of the Pennines is needed. The proposal for a Y-shaped network substantially meets this need. — The North’s economy will benefit from direct high speed rail services to Central London and Heathrow and a network with a direct link to HS1 and the Channel Tunnel, both provided by the Government’s Y-shaped network. — The greatest economic gains will come from serving city centres, linked with complementary economic development and land use master planning and strengthening of local transport networks. — HS2, the high speed line from London to the West Midlands should be the first phase of the national network. — Progressing the eastern and western limbs of the Y-shaped network in parallel, with completion in 2032–33 as the Government suggests in its consultation, will help minimise any competitive disadvantage between regions. — To provide benefits to the east side of the Pennines in 2026 the Government should consider a link between HS2 and the Midland Main Line enabling access from Yorkshire and the Humber and the North East to London Euston and to destinations served by the proposed station at Old Oak Common, including Heathrow. — The Government should consider the case and timing of extensions of the Y shaped network north of Leeds and Manchester to serve the North East and Scotland directly by new lines, as further developments of the national high speed rail network. — A faster, modern electrified route is needed across the Pennines—the key route in the North that will not benefit directly from the Government’s high speed rail proposals. This would build on the benefits to the North of the Northern Hub Strategy which must be delivered as a priority, in full by 2019. — There also remains a pressing need for medium term investment in the existing classic north south main lines—the East Coast Main Line, Midland Main Line and West Coast Main Line— pending the completion of the Y shaped high speed rail network in 2032–33.

The Northern Way Transport Compact 1. This submission sets out the Northern Way Transport Compact’s evidence and position on high speed rail which it has developed over the last five years. 2. The Northern Way was the public and private sector partnership funded by the three Northern RDAs that closed at the end of March 2011. The Northern Way Transport Compact’s remit has been the identification of the transport priorities that will maximise the North’s economic growth whilst minimising the impact on the environment. As part of its work, the Transport Compact has helped the North establish a broad consensus around the case for high speed rail. 3. As described by Evaluation of the Northern Way (April 2011), the Northern Way Transport Compact has “coordinated across a range of partners in the North, providing a forum for discussion of evidence versus parochial interests and allowing transport experts to talk to politicians.” The Independent Evaluation also concluded that the Transport Compact has “produced a clear and consistent approach to influencing transport policy and was arguably the star performer of the Northern Way with demonstrable benefits … The influencing and advocacy on transport was built on the evidence base, focusing on the links between transport and economic development in the North.” The Independent Evaluation further concludes that “the lesson for the North going forward would be to ensure that there is a body which exists to enable the agreement of a joint position on priorities for investment in transport schemes—this consensus is valued by government. This needs to be achieved in a relatively short timeframe otherwise opportunities for future transport investment in the North will pass by.”

The Strategic Direction for Transport 4. The Northern Way Transport Compact’s Strategic Direction for Transport is an evidence-based assessment of the most appropriate transport interventions that will promote productivity gain, while at the same time cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w358 Transport Committee: Evidence

seeking to protect and enhance the North’s natural and built environment, and contributing to the nation’s commitments regarding climate change. Looking over 20 to 30 years, it sits above the level of individual priority schemes and projects. The Strategic Direction sets out the types of interventions which will have the greatest productivity impact, as well as where in the North those interventions will have the greatest impact. 5. A key conclusion of the Strategic Direction for Transport is that a balanced investment strategy is needed that considers transport links within and between the North’s city regions, and between the North and the rest of the country, especially central London and Heathrow.

The Northern Way’s Short, Medium and Long Term Transport Priorities 6. Having established the Strategic Direction for Transport, the Northern Way Transport Compact then identified Short, Medium and Long Term Transport Priorities. The prioritisation work shows that while the transport proposals being pursued by stakeholders across the North will make worthwhile contributions to productivity growth, taken together they do not allow the Strategic Direction for Transport to be met. Consequently, if the North’s productivity growth is to be maximised a number of the “Strategic Delivery Gaps” need to be addressed. The Transport Compact identified strategic delivery gaps for the rail network, the road network and associated with network integration. The rail gaps are the Northern Hub (the strategy to transform rail in the North), rail gauge enhancements for multi-modal container traffic, a rail rolling stock strategy and strategies for trans-Pennine and north-south rail (including high speed rail). The road gaps relate to the need for a long term strategy to keep the strategic road network moving and a north-wide approach to behavioural change. For network integration the strategic gaps relate to pan-Northern smart ticketing and strategic park and ride.

The Strategic Case for High Speed Rail 1. What are the arguments for High Speed Rail? 7. High speed rail is a once in a generation opportunity to transform the economic prospects of the North. Work published by the Northern Way in March 2011(Transforming Our Economy and Our Connectivity: High Speed Rail for the North—Issues and Evidence in Response to the Government’s High Speed Rail Consultation available at www.thenorthernwaytansportcompact.com) identifies that the case for high speed rail to serve the North is straightforward. This is because: (a) Links between the North and the World City functions in London (as well as links between the North’s city regions) are of fundamental importance to the Northern economy and its productivity. (b) North south links, particularly to London, will become more, not less, important over time. There is no question that new north-south capacity will be needed, only when it is required and what form it should take. (c) The existing road and rail networks linking the north and south have finite capacity and they will become increasingly congested and journeys will become extended and more unreliable. There is no prospect of any significant increase in north-south road capacity. The future strategy for the motorway network is focussed on managing congestion. (d) Air links between the North and London are increasingly under threat. Now only Manchester and Newcastle airports have links with Heathrow. Constrained capacity at Heathrow will amplify the commercial pressures on these links in coming years. (e) There are worthwhile and value for money proposals for increasing north-south rail capacity on the existing main lines and these should be pursued. However, the capacity increment that such enhancements will bring is finite and not sufficient to meet the needs of the North’s economy if it is to grow to its full potential. Any further capacity increases would be highly disruptive to implement, as well as being very costly. (f) The most cost effective way to provide the north-south capacity that the North requires is to build new railway lines. The extra benefits that come from operating this new capacity at high speed transform the economic and productivity benefits that the new capacity will deliver. (g) If high speed rail is judged not worth proceeding with, the consequence will be demand well in excess of capacity. This will inevitably lead to ever increasing real-term fare increases as a demand management tool, to the economic detriment of the North.

2. How does High Speed Rail fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 8. Speaking in Shipley at the end of May in his first major speech as Prime Minister, David Cameron identified the Coalition Government’s goal of rebalancing the economy away from the heavy reliance on the South East, and through the growth of private sector businesses. 9. As set out in written evidence and debated at an oral session of the Transport Select Committee’s Transport and the Economy Inquiry, the Northern Way Transport Compact’s evidence shows that what is needed to foster the North’s economic growth is a balanced approach that looks at the connectivity needs of travel within city regions and the links between the North’s city regions. Also important are links between the North and London with its World City functions, and international connectivity via gateways within the North and elsewhere in cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w359

the country including Heathrow. Enhancing connectivity within city regions is focused on expanding labour supply across functional labour markets. Improving the connectivity between city regions facilitates the movement of goods, business to business links and allows the expansion of labour markets, most notably for entrepreneurial high level skills. International connectivity facilitates trade. 10. The Northern Way Transport Compact has been mindful of the time taken to develop significant transport interventions, the importance of bringing forward investment proposals in a timely manner and the importance of the development of long term plans as well as the phased delivery of transport priorities in the short and medium term. The Northern Way Transport Compact’s priorities align with the five year control periods (2009–14, 2014–19 and 2019 and beyond) and have to date received substantial backing by Government. The Transport Compact’s Priorities for the North’s Strategic Networks involve: 2009Ð14: Additional Rail Rolling Stock; North West rail electrification (committed); start of work on Northern Hub delivery (committed); rail gauge enhancement of the routes from Doncaster to the West Midlands and Doncaster to Edinburgh and Glasgow) and linking in the Tees, Tyne and Humber Ports (committed except for linking in the Humber Ports); Managed Motorway projects on key congested sections in the North (committed). 2014Ð19: Further rail rolling stock; completion of the Northern Hub Strategy; electrification and gauge enhancement between Manchester, Leeds and York; interim improvements to the East Coast, Midland and West Coast Main Lines pending high speed rail; gauge enhancement between Doncaster and the Humber Ports; further Managed Motorway investment and targeted improvements to road access to the Ports of Immingham, Hull and Liverpool. 2019 and beyond: Further rail rolling stock; delivery of the Y shaped high speed rail network; and longer term solutions to the management of motorway congestion (including consideration of the role of charging). 11. A widely held criticism of the previous Government’s 2007 Rail White Paper has been that it lacked clear medium and long term components. This needs to be fully addressed when the Coalition Government publishes its high speed rail strategy at the end of 2011 and its Transport White Paper and High Level Output Statement in summer 2012.

3. Business case 12. Nationally, the number of trips made by rail is now higher than at any time in peacetime since the 1920s. The last 10 years have seen strong, sustained growth in long distance rail travel. Notably, and in contrast to traffic on the national motorway network and domestic and international air travel, long distance rail travel continued to grow through the recession. 13. Past investment has not kept pace with the growth in demand. If new capacity is not provided and demand is constrained, it is evident that the North’s economy will suffer. Expanding the capacity of the road network to provide for the growth in north-south demand would be prohibitively expensive and environmentally unacceptable. Air travel is not a viable alternative. Greater north-south rail capacity is needed to support and facilitate the growth and re-structuring of the North’s economy. Upgrading existing lines would be expensive and very disruptive over a long period, as well as offering only a limited capacity increase. The optimal way to increase the capacity of the north south rail network is by building new lines. 14. Faster journeys by high speed rail will support the growth of the North’s economy in two ways: (a) It will make the existing economy more productive and provide economic benefits to non- business users. (b) It creates the opportunity to support the further economic growth and regeneration of the North and the re-balancing of the economy from the South and away from the public sector. 15. If high speed rail is judged not worth proceeding with, the consequence will be demand well in excess of capacity. This will inevitably lead to ever increasing real-term fare increases as a demand management tool, to the economic detriment of the North.

4. The Strategic Route 16. The Government’s proposal for a Y-shaped national network substantially meets the Northern Way Transport Compact’s evidence-based position that there is a need for a north south high speed rail network that serves both sides of the Pennines. In addition, the Northern Way Transport Compact has also considered it clear that any national network will be implemented in phases. The case for the London to West Midlands line being the first phase of the national network, followed rapidly by the full build out of the Y shaped network, is overwhelming. 17. The Northern Way Transport Compact has however also concluded that: (a) There remain opportunities both to increase the economic and productivity benefits that high speed rail will bring to the North, as well as to bring forward the date when these benefits will be enjoyed. These need to be explored as the Government develops its end of year strategy and cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w360 Transport Committee: Evidence

include a link between the HS2 and the Midland Main Line in order to provide benefits in 2026 to the east side of the Pennines at that date. (b) Further work is warranted to examine the case for northward extension of the dedicated high speed network beyond Manchester towards Glasgow and beyond Leeds towards Newcastle and Edinburgh. 18. In regard to Heathrow, the Northern Way Transport Compact agreed with the conclusions of the Mawhinney Review and the Government about the timing of serving Heathrow Airport directly and that passive provision for a high speed link to Heathrow should therefore be constructed as part of the first phase. 19. Intermediate destinations between London and Birmingham would be best served by development of services using capacity freed up on the West Coast Main Line.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 20. The Northern economy is underperforming when compared with the more prosperous regions in the South. On a per capita basis, Gross Value Added in the North is 80% of the South East. 21. As the North’s economy grows and as it restructures, north-south links, particularly to London will become more, not less important over time in economic terms. London is a World City and global financial hub and as such offers financial, legal and other services essential to businesses in the North. Economic growth in the North will increase demand to access the internationally renowned services that London offers, not diminish it. On top of this, by virtue of its size and wealth London and the South East is the largest domestic market for the North’s businesses and, of course, as the nation’s capital it is the home of government. 22. The Northern Way Transport Compact has identified that a north-south high speed rail network serving both sides of the Pennines has the potential to generate agglomeration benefits through linking the northern city region economies. In analysis pre-dating the Government’s identification of the Y-shaped network as its preferred way forward and for a more extensive network, these agglomeration impacts are valued at £13 billion PV, (using the Department for Transport’s current methodology). Of this £13 billion, £5 billion is in the North of England. Proportionally, the North’s economy receives a greater uplift than that in London and the South East. 23. Work looking at agglomeration impacts has also been undertaken by 4NW, the former local authority leaders’ board for the North West as well as by a consortium of the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions. This work also identifies substantial agglomeration benefits for the North. For the preferred Y-shaped network, analysis for 4NW identifies that it would result in productivity benefits of £1 billion a year by 2030, of which 20% would accrue to the North West. The work for the Leeds and Sheffield city regions identifies that a high speed link between the two city regions and London could deliver productivity gains of at least £1.2bn PV to the two city regions. 24. The Department for Transport’s own assessment is also that high speed rail will generate substantial agglomeration benefits. Around 15% of the economic benefits that HS2, the line from London to the West Midlands, will generate are associated from agglomeration and a further 5% from addressing imperfect competition. Together wider impacts result in £4 billion PV worth of benefits. Looking at the Y-shaped network, this figure increases to £6.3 billion in total. 25. When considering Department for Transport’s figure, it is important to note that for their assessment of the wider impacts of the lines beyond the West Midlands to Leeds and Manchester, they have used a “rule of thumb” approach and consequently have adopted a very prudent assumption on the size of the benefits. Evidence from the Northern Way, 4NW and the Yorkshire authorities all suggests that full application of the wider impacts methodology would result in the Y returning substantially greater wider impacts than currently conservatively assessed by the Department for Transport. 26. However, the principal benefit of high speed rail identified by stakeholders across the North and by the Government is that it will also stimulate a change in the structure of the economy and that it will increase Gross Value Added (GVA). Such transformational changes will happen because high speed rail will support and facilitate growth of employment in the most productive locations (which are in and around city centres). It will also support employment growth in the most productive sectors of the economy. These GVA benefits do not form part of HS2 Ltd’s value for money assessment. 27. Techniques to quantify the impacts of transport investments such as high speed rail on the size of the economy are in their infancy. Given the Northern Way Transport Compact identified the criticality of transport connectivity to the North’s economic growth and the important potential impacts of GVA analysis on funding availability and scheme prioritisation, we commissioned the Institute for Transport Studies (ITS) at the University of Leeds to review the methods that have been developed to assess the GVA impacts of transport investment. A Northern Way sponsored study by the Spatial Economic Research Centre at the London School of Economics has also modelled the GVA uplift of rail journey time improvements. 28. Collectively, the Northern Way Transport Compact’s review of work that has been done to look at the impacts of major transport investments suggests that GVA benefits could be up to three times the size of welfare benefits assessed in a conventional cost benefit appraisal. For this potential to be realised, the Northern cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w361

Way Transport Compact has acknowledged that further investments may be needed which could be in complementary transport enhancements, for example to local public transport networks serving a high speed rail station or it could be in sites and premises or skills and training. This evidence is further demonstration of the transformational potential of high speed rail.

6. Other Impacts 29. By relieving the capacity constrained classic north south main lines (the West Coast Main Line, Midland Main Line, and East Coast Main Line) the Y shaped high speed rail network will deliver benefits for the north’s economy by creating the opportunity to enhance local commuter and inter-regional services and to release additional capacity for growth of rail freight. 30. High speed rail will also contribute to meeting the nation’s obligations to reduce carbon emissions. Analysis by ATOC for Greengauge 21 shows that with load factors similar to those currently experienced on the Eurostar services between London and Paris and London and Brussels, high speed rail already has lower carbon emissions per passenger mile than existing inter-city trains, domestic aviation or cars. High speed rail’s per passenger mile emissions will fall further as technological advancement (eg use of lighter materials in train construction, more efficient motive power) will lower per passenger mile emissions. The progressive de- carbonisation of electricity generation will also reduce further high speed rail’s carbon emissions per passenger mile. When considering carbon emissions, high speed rail currently has and will maintain a clear advantage over alternative modes. May 2011

Written evidence from Leeds City Council (HSR 135) 1. Summary 1.1 Leeds City Council welcomes the Committee’s inquiry into the Government’s proposals for High Speed Rail. 1.2 The proposals for a high speed rail network are considered to offer major economic benefits for Leeds and the Leeds city region which represents 5% of the overall UK economy as well as opportunities to address the growing pressure on the classic rail network especially the East Coast Main Line. As such the Council supports the “Y” shaped network as proposed. 1.3 It is considered that the development of a high speed network will offer the one-off opportunity for a transformational change to the rail network, including connectivity to international networks, in a way which does not seem feasible for the classic network. However, parallel investment in the classic network to meet demand and develop services during the likely 20 year plus period in which the network to Leeds is developed should be strongly encouraged. 1.4 The timing and delivery of the network are critical matters and the City Council believes that it is essential that the proposed routes to the North should be developed in parallel so as to maximise the overall benefit to the Northern economy.

2. The City Council’s Position on High Speed Rail 2.1 Leeds City Council is presently considering the implications of the Government’s proposed strategy for high speed rail prior to providing a full response in line with the deadline set by the Secretary of State for Transport. At this stage in the development of the high speed rail proposals the Council is continuing to work with a range of partners and potential stakeholders in the high speed rail project to develop a greater understanding of the detailed impacts of the proposals. This includes the West Yorkshire Integrated Transport Authority; the Leeds city region authorities; the Core Cities Group of England’s eight largest cities; and the High Speed Rail Eastern Network Partnership. 2.2 Leeds Metropolitan District sits at the heart of the 11 local authority areas which together form the Leeds City Region and forms basis for the Leeds City Region Local Enterprise Partnership. Leeds’ population of 800,000 makes up over a quarter of the city region population of nearly 3 million and the city contributes around 35% to the overall city region economy of £51 billion GVA, which represents 5% of the overall UK economy. Transport is therefore a vital part of maintaining a competitive economy. 2.3 The LCR is host to a number of major businesses and outside London, Leeds is the primary financial and business services centre employing 95,000 people in Knowledge Intensive Businesses. As well as this the City Region has significant strengths in existing and emerging sectors, particularly environmental sciences, electrical and optical equipment, bioscience, health and medical research, and digital and creative industries and the highest concentration of universities outside of London, and one of the largest clusters in Europe, providing over 36,000 graduates per year. Some 36% of the research produced by these higher education institutions is deemed world class and 10% is deemed world leading. National and international transport links are therefore critical to the success of Leeds and the City Region. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w362 Transport Committee: Evidence

2.4 The City Council therefore supports the proposals for high speed rail and the proposals for a “Y” shaped network and welcomes the inclusion of Leeds in the proposed network.

3. Choice of Route 3.1 It is the City Council’s view that the “Y” shaped network offers the optimal and future proof solution for providing the basis for a network that can properly serve the North of England. By passing to the East and West it enables the route to become accessible to the majority of the population of England and as well as Leeds brings the East Midlands and South Yorkshire directly within the catchment of the network. This option also allows, in a way which the alternative reverse “S” shaped network did not, for the North East of England and Scotland to share in the benefits of the network initially through a direct connection into the classic East Coast route and with the potential to extend the high speed route. This also preserves options for longer term incremental development of the high speed network as well as ensuring that the network is less London focussed by catering better for intermediate “cross-country” journeys. 3.2 The decision to include provision for links to Heathrow Airport and directly to join the High Speed One route to the Channel Tunnel are also to be welcomed. It is considered that these additions to the route will improve its usefulness by the potential it offers for rail-air interchange and for the connectivity into the European high speed rail network. Having recognised this opportunity it is important as the project develops to formulate realistic plans for capture the benefits of this link to connect the North to Europe with direct services.

4. The Case for High Speed Rail 4.1 The case for major investment in the UK rail network is considered to remain very strong with a continuing growing demand for rail travel both for local journeys and for longer distance travel that is generated by a modern economy and lifestyles which place a high value on good mobility. The completion of the first high speed line (HS1) from London to the Channel Tunnel has underlined the need to extend UK connectivity into the wider international high speed networks that have been spreading across Europe for several decades. 4.2 Improving journey speeds and hence connectivity alongside the release of capacity on the classic network is the main driver for the creation of a high speed network. The initial forecast journey times Leeds to London which knock off around one hour (or 60%) from the present journey time will be transformational in comparison to previous route modernisations. What is also significant is the much improved connectivity from Leeds to Birmingham and the West Midlands where present journey times would be halved. These changes will have a major impact on connectivity to Leeds and are considered to justify the choice of 360 kph network with the ultimate potential for 400 kph. 4.3 In terms of economic benefits the Government’s own analysis shows that the proposed “Y” shaped network delivers an estimated £44 billion of economic benefits over 60 years. Work for the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions indicates potential wider economic benefits over £2 billion and the Northern Way has estimated the economic agglomeration benefits to North at over £6 billion. Sustaining strong and growing economies in the face of international competition and climate change requires a new approach to long distance travel. 4.4 The creation of a new network rather than further route modernisation will deliver the transformational change needed for the UK’s railways. Whilst it may be possible to increase the capacity of the existing main line routes serving the North, Yorkshire and the Humber and the East Midlands, the completion of the West Coast Main Line modernisation programme at a cost of nearly £9 billion and a timescale of nine years to completion shows the very significant costs incurred by the “on-line” route improvements. Although this route has created new capacity forecasts suggesting that by the 2020s this will have been used up. Similarly whilst maximum speeds of 125 mph have enabled journey time improvements, this has only delivered top speeds which have been the norm on significant lengths of the East Coast and Great Western main lines for several decades. 4.5 The West Coast Main Line modernisation illustrates that modernising live railways, often on historic alignments passing through heavily built up areas is a major and disruptive undertaking carrying significant management and operational costs. It is also difficult to significantly future proof classic routes for further development, for example in terms of increasing train speeds. This suggests that without a major step change of approach a transformational approach to the country’s inter-city networks is going to become increasingly more difficult. Therefore the City Council believes that the proposals for a purpose built high speed rail network are a one-off opportunity for the UK rail network to brought to a standard that matches those routes already established in Europe. 4.6 The City Council sees an urgent need to plan for tackling deficiencies in the existing “classic” rail network. For example on the East Coast Main Line the rolling stock is between 20 and 30 years old and an infrastructure that has seen a fraction of the investment made in the West Coast Main Line and similar could also be said of the Midland Main Line. Therefore the Council is firmly of the view that the development and progression of High Speed Rail proposals ultimately should provide for a durable and flexible “once and for all” solution. But in the meantime this should not be at the expense of this much needed investment in the classic routes, such as the Intercity Express Project to modernise the train fleet and investments in line speed and capacity enhancements. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w363

4.7 High speed rail, by “freeing-up” capacity on the classic rail network, will provide opportunities to utilise their capacity to provide better services for centres not served by the new routes. This additional capacity should also enable greater provision to be made for growing the role of rail freight. 4.8 What is less well quantified in the present work and will need to be understood better from experience elsewhere is the undoubted potential for transformational change to those centres through which the route will pass. Again the City Council recognises this potential opportunity and is working to understand what it will mean for th city and city region.

5. Timing of High Speed Rail 5.1 Whilst costs, logistics and industry capacity may well make it inevitable that a national high speed rail network will need to be delivered in phases, it is important that the full network is delivered at the earliest possible timescale and that every step is taken to minimise the time between the opening of the Birmingham route and completion of the wider network. In this regard it is particularly important that both legs of the “Y” to Manchester and Leeds are delivered in parallel to ensure the economic and transformational advantages expected to be brought about by the arrival of high speed route can be shared. In this regard it is noted that previous work by HS2 indicated a potentially higher benefit cost ratio for the Eastern leg which suggests a strong case for the early progression of this section of route. 5.2 Leeds City Council at its Full Council Meeting on 6 April 2011, recognised the critical importance of the timing of project’s delivery when the following resolution was passed: That this Council expresses concern that the Government’s proposed hybrid bill relating to High Speed Rail will only adopt legal and planning powers for a route from London to the West Midlands. This Council therefore calls on the Government to reaffirm its commitment to bringing the social, economic and environmental benefits of High Speed Rail to Leeds by expanding the detail of the upcoming hybrid bill to include a framework for the north of England. 5.3 Since the full high-speed network is not expected to be completed until 2032–33 it is important that investment in the classic network continues in the short to medium term. Such investment will not only sustain vital inter-city services on the East Coast main line but will also allow the continued development of regional and city region rail networks in order that the benefits of high speed rail for the classic network can be realised across the widest possible area. It is considered especially important that good connectivity from centres not on the high speed network is provided and that therefore modernisation of local rail networks alongside or ahead of the project is very important. There as well as the East Coast route investment in the key Trans- Pennine routes (both via Huddersfield and also the Calder Vale-Bradford/Halifax-Line) and local networks in West Yorkshire will be important to ensuring the widest possible inclusion of communities in the benefits of high speed rail. May 2011

Written evidence from ABTA—The Travel Association (HSR 137) 1. ABTA—The Travel Association was founded in 1950—and is the leading travel trade association in the UK, with over 1,400 members. Our members range from small, specialist tour operators and independent travel agencies through to publicly listed companies and household names, from call centres to internet booking services to high street shops. ABTA members sell millions of independent arrangements for travel both overseas and in the UK. 2. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to your inquiry. We have commented on points of principle and not on the detailed route.

Summary 3. ABTA supports the proposed high speed rail network. However, we believe this should complement additional airport capacity in the South East and not be a substitute. We also feel there needs to be an integrated transport system with seamless interchanges to international gateways and networks and that the Government should commit to both phases from the outset with onward extension to Scotland.

General 4. ABTA has long supported additional runway capacity in the South East, particularly at Heathrow and Gatwick, to allow for long-term growth. We were very concerned at the Government’s announcement ruling out further runways at Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted and its intention to make these airports better and not bigger. 5. ABTA believes that high speed rail will not solve Heathrow’s chronic capacity constraints. The short-haul air market represents a relatively small proportion of Heathrow’s total flights and passenger numbers. The airport serves a small number of destinations in Scotland, Northern England and continental Europe where there is some form of viable rail alternative available from central London. HS1 between London and Paris cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w364 Transport Committee: Evidence

and Brussels has reduced the number of passengers flying between those destinations and London, but it has not replaced the routes entirely. Many of Heathrow’s domestic passengers are transferring to flights to other destinations from Heathrow. Further, unless there is a direct link to the airport allowing passengers a seamless interchange, there is no incentive to switch to rail from air. Rail is never going to be able to serve long-haul destinations, and even for short-haul routes, rail will always be more limited than in continental Europe because we are an island nation. Building a high speed rail link is not an alternative to increasing runway capacity. 6. To be noted that additional runway capacity will be paid by private funding whereas HS2 will largely be paid for from the public purse.

Strategic Route 7. ABTA strongly believes that the Government should commit to building the full network to Leeds and Manchester from the outset, so that HS2 is not simply a trunk route from London to Birmingham. Without this further extension, the case for HSR becomes weaker given that it is the relieving of congestion on existing rail lines to Manchester and Leeds that form a key element of the business case. Without links to Manchester and Leeds, the degree to which HSR could help reduce emissions from domestic air travel will be further limited. 8. We also believe the Government should give early consideration to onward extension to Scotland given the potential economic benefits created by increasing connectivity within the UK. 9. We feel that HS2 needs to be an integrated transport system with seamless interchanges to international gateways and networks. This includes HS1, Heathrow and Birmingham airports. 10. It is not sufficient that Heathrow is connected by a spur link from Old Oak Common. Unless there is a seamless interchange, passengers will not be inclined to use HSR and will continue to fly in order to transfer to onward flights.

Environmental Impact 11. HS2 Ltd themselves say that this project is at best carbon neutral. They predict that 65% of passengers will either transfer from existing rail services, with faster trains inevitably increasing carbon emissions, or are additional incremental journeys as a result of faster trains which will also increase emissions. 12. It is crucial that the environmental impact of a HSR network is fully understood and plays a positive role in helping the UK meet its 2050 greenhouse gas emissions reductions target. 13. Thank you for taking our comments into consideration. We would welcome the opportunity to contribute further or expand upon any of the above points. 16 May 2011

Written evidence from Jonathan Tyler, Passenger Transport Networks (HSR 138) Preamble and Summary 1. Jonathan Tyler joined British Rail as a Traffic Apprentice in 1962. His career path has been from operations through demand modelling to BR-sponsored university lecturer and then to independent-minded consultancy in a range of transport work. Since 2000 he has specialised in making the case for the importance of integrated strategic timetabling, drawing in particular on Swiss methodology and software for case-studies in Britain. Most recently he was invited by Greengauge 21 to design a joint timetable for HS2 and the West Coast Main Line in order to illustrate the opportunities for new services on the latter that would be afforded by building HS2. He has also contributed to the service-planning aspects of several other HS2 studies. It is this involvement in the technical debate that has prompted the concerns expressed in this submission. 2. The thrust of the submission is that the planning process for new high-speed railways is too fragmented, based too much on bold assertions and too little on wide-ranging analysis, and too high-level and thus lacking in crucial detail to have yet made a convincing case for building HS2 in the form presently proposed. Attention is drawn to a troubling disconnect between the frequency of services that is being promised and what can credibly be delivered. However this is emphatically not an argument against HS2 in principle, and certainly not an argument against the construction of any new lengths of railway. Rather it is a plea for a more rigorous, extensive and realistic approach, for taking longer to examine the options but in the end reaching sounder decisions, probably including a more even spread of benefits across the regions, cities and towns of Britain. The paper restricts itself to responding to selected questions in the Committee’s Inquiry; the author is aware of similar submissions that provide more depth on some of the issues raised here. Full references and additional detail appear in endnotes [p 8].

Introduction 3. According to the consultation document the Government’s vision is “a truly national high speed rail network for the whole of Britain”.1 That is a desirable objective, but no specification of its structure, other cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w365

than of the “Y” sub-network, has been published. Instead there seem to be unquantified assertions, generalised aspirations, ill-defined commitments and neglected collateral effects. No obvious mechanism exists for resolving the contradictions, and they provide fodder for those who wish to block the proposals for quite other reasons. In particular, no serious timetabling has been undertaken, despite the fact that the timetable is the essential basis on which a railway, of its nature, must be specified and operated.

Defining a National Network 4. I take “national network” to mean one that provides every urban centre with a reasonably equal quality of service commensurate with its geography and size, supplemented by suburban railways and bus connections. Only such a network—going beyond a few big-city links—is capable of meeting future demands for travel by a mode that is inherently sustainable in a world where reducing carbon emissions and dependence on increasingly expensive oil is imperative. Britain is some way from that ideal, since service standards vary greatly, rail’s modal share varies greatly in consequence and governments, unlike those of some other European countries, have never concerned themselves with defining a programme to improve the situation.2 For the reasons outlined in this paper the adopted scheme for High Speed Rail does not provide a remedy either.

Why We Are Where We Are 5. Before discussing the problems it is as well to try to explain how we have got into this situation. The overriding factors appear to be division of responsibility and differing aims. 6. The Department for Transport [DfT] manages the passenger franchises as largely separate units and with predominantly financial objectives. Improvements to the infrastructure, however welcome, are not explicitly influenced by seeking to meet national standards of service and inter-urban connectivity. The commitment to build new high-speed lines seems instead to be driven by broad assumptions rather than by a detailed analysis of where the country most needs capacity and accelerations. And local governments have only a fragmented and reactive involvement, often, as in the case of HS2, over-influenced by a determination to win a slice of the action. 7. Responsibility for developing the proposals has been devolved by DfT to High Speed Two Ltd [HS2 Ltd]. That is not in itself an issue, but HS2 Ltd’s approach is. It is clear that the company is driven by the prospect of building the world’s most advanced high-speed railway, at the cutting edge of technology and with dreams of exports. Whether that is sensible or appropriate in a crowded island with dense development, relatively short distances between urban centres and already-fast timings (at least on London routes) has not been convincingly established. 8. Network Rail has the herculean task of managing and improving the “classic” network and securing expansion of its capacity. Nonetheless, in public at least, it appears semi-detached from the planning of HS2, despite the substantial implications of future inter-running between HS2 and classic lines. In the same way Crossrail, another distinct entity, does not seem to have had much involvement in HS2’s plans for the interchange at Old Oak Common. 9. Train operating companies mostly have short franchises that render them uninterested in the long-term evolution of services in their territory, and their responses to demand are determined more by the imperative of profit than by any sense of building a public network. They have contributed little to the high-speed debate. 10. Finally, consultants engaged to develop schemes are obliged to follow the specifications of their clients and to maintain secrecy (out of concern for property values), with the result that no national debate can be held until detailed proposals are ready, by which time it is too late for the community to have a proper conversation about the purposes and characteristics of new railways.

The Fault Lines in the Current Proposals Confused strategies, poor forecasts and muddled economics 11. Government documents repeatedly emphasise the economic importance of faster inter-city railway services, but it is curious how little analysis is presented of what the real needs are if business travel is the primary motive. Instead, without discussing the mix of business, commuting and leisure generators of travel (the last has sub-categories of varying social benefit), the argument tends to shift to the allegedly serious impending shortfall in capacity.3 However this case is flawed. It pays too little attention to weaknesses in pricing tactics, to the economic implications of the disparity between peak and off-peak volumes and to the scope for relieving the problems (much sooner than HS2 could do) by lengthening and redesigning trains, by comparatively modest infrastructure works and by a thorough review of over-cautious operating practices.4 12. Three particular features are of concern. One is that classical economic arguments in favour of widening employment markets (to the point, for example, of encouraging mass commuting between Milton Keynes and London and the growth of Birmingham <> London commuting) will increasingly be tempered by resource and carbon constraints. Such travel may even be greatly curtailed. The second is that a significant element of the statistical evidence of overcrowding comes from operating companies who have an interest in talking up the problem and the accuracy of whose data is not publicly tested. And third, the Government’s normal economic cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w366 Transport Committee: Evidence

rigour should be applied to questioning whether the very high cost of alleviating the peak of the peak out of Euston on Friday evenings can be justified.

Maximum speed 13. HS2 Ltd has specified a railway with a maximum speed of 400 km/h. That is beyond the range of 300 to 360 km/h that is presently typical of new lines and trains. Given the disproportionate increase in energy consumption as speed increases and the effect of very high speed on route geometry one would have expected more open and deliberate analysis of the costs and benefits of options for, say, 300, 350 and 400 km/h. For example, between Birmingham and London running at 300 km/h would add only about five minutes to the 400 km/h schedule of 49 minutes: it is not intuitively obvious that that would make much difference to rail’s ability to capture traffic.5

Station location 14. The consultation paper emphasises the role of the railway in serving city centres.6 This has been a fundamental tenet of the design of railways throughout their history, and it has become normal European practice where high-speed services have been introduced. Moreover, likely trends make central stations critical: the new thinking on place-making clearly indicates this, while building ex-urban stations that principally depend on cars for access would be socially inequitable and (at best) unwise in terms of sustainability. 15. Yet the present proposals refer imprecisely to what appear to be “parkway” stations for South Yorkshire and the East Midlands. Equally, the service specifications suggest that the preoccupation with fast services between major centres has led to the omission of calls at places such as Carlisle (a railhead serving a huge area) and Stoke-on-Trent (desperately in need of regeneration).

Connections with the “classic” railway 16. Closely associated with the economic-geography, access, land-use and resource factors in favour of central stations is the question of connections with regional and local public transport networks. These focus on main stations since their own primary function is to serve the concentrated activity of city centres and since that optimises their links with longer-distance services. If the links are broken because high-speed trains serve separate stations then swathes of the population will be denied a share in the benefits from what is likely to be a Government-funded project. A two-tier system of access to fast transits would be economically detrimental. 17. HS2 Ltd has adopted a seemingly cavalier approach to the impacts of its proposals on some users (notably those from Coventry)7 and on operation of the classic network. For example, just north of the junction between HS2 and the West Coast Main Line [WCML] near Lichfield lies one of the latter’s critical constraints, namely the flat junction at Colwich and a two-track section in a four-track railway. It is proposed to add a significant number of extra services, at least during phase one: it is not that they cannot be accommodated, rather that to do so will have a material, yet barely acknowledged,8 effect on the entire WCML (and hence the national) timetable. 18. Similarly, HS2 Ltd holds out the prospect of connections between its trains and Heathrow Express and long-distance services on the Great Western Main Line [GWML] at a multi-function interchange at Old Oak Common in west London. The Heathrow case derives from the assumed need to include the airport in the high-speed scheme and is more persuasive than the idea of a direct spur [on which see paragraphs 24–25]. The longer-distance case is arguable, since the territory that could benefit is quite limited. GWML is already operating close to its limits, and even when the pending electrification and resignalling add capacity that will quickly be absorbed by indigenous growth. Apparently unaware of this, HS2 does not appreciate that stopping just the Heathrow trains would remove the performance buffer and outer-suburban paths, while the only practicable timetable including stops in GW services would require every train to call (because that, and twin platforms, is the only way to maintain a smooth flow). This would lead to costly works and cause an unacceptable loss of time for GW travellers, relative to marginal gains to interchangers.

Incoherent timetabling of HS2 services 19. Incoherence in timetabling is also evident in questions about how HS2 itself would work. No evidence has been published about the effect on headways of intermediate stops at Birmingham Interchange and Old Oak Common, apart from unspecific statements about track geometry. Operation of a very frequent service imposes particular requirements on the design of the new Euston, yet turnround and platform-reoccupation times seem optimistic, and it is doubtful whether space exists for the grade-separation that may be essential to avoid conflicts at the “throat”. And published summaries of the proposed services are disjointed. We discuss the links to HS1 and Heathrow and the matter of the total number of paths in separate sections below; here we draw attention to issues concerning the pattern of services and the treatment of particular places. 20. Carlisle and Stoke-on-Trent were mentioned above. The descriptions of the modelling hardly refer to how sub-regional centres will be linked to the core network. No strategy has been set for through running or systematically-planned connections to serve places such as Wakefield, Huddersfield, Rotherham, Chesterfield, Derby, Motherwell, Bolton and Wolverhampton, and no data has been proffered on the share of total demand cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w367

and potential economic benefits that such places represent or on whether HS2 trains could be adequately loaded without their traffic. 21. Diagrams outline possible services between provincial centres on the two arms of the “Y” route,9 but those on the eastern arm are meaningless so long as the location of the stations is unknown (greenfield sites would have negligible value for intra-regional journeys) and those on the western arm raise difficulties in serving Macclesfield, Stoke and Wolverhampton which in turn affect the working of WCML in ways that are being ignored. And it is very odd timetabling to suggest that all four Birmingham trains, none of the Manchester trains and one random Leeds train will call at Birmingham Interchange.

Links to HS1 and London Heathrow Airport 22. The Government believes that HS2 should be connected with HS1 (the line from London St Pancras to the Channel Tunnel and the continental railway network) in order that through trains can operate between British and key European cities. The cost of such a link (including border controls at regional stations) would be considerable, its operation would be extremely difficult (it has not been shown that it is even feasible to timetable HS trains along a section of high-frequency urban line), and it would import into the working of HS2 just the kind of perturbation that HS2 Ltd, when specifying frequencies, has said must be avoided. In any case, the pattern of services could not possibly offer particularly attractive frequencies in competition with direct air services. 23. The initial evaluation of demand for through services demonstrated that they could not be justified and proposed a local connection between Euston and St Pancras (which would not entail any greater inconvenience than travellers endure at airports). The Government has chosen instead merely to assert the need for the link,10 abetted by parts of the railway promotion lobby that fantasise about romantic international expresses but hardly analyse the market. 24. A similar situation exists in respect of the proposed link to Heathrow. Several evaluations have found against it on the grounds of demand relative to the cost and to the practical difficulties of securing an effective service without degrading the London offer—the prime purpose of HS2. However the idea of a link is powerful if one buys into belief in an ever-expanding global economy without noting the probability that the very environmental constraints that are used to justify transfers to rail are likely to curtail aviation, especially business trips for which video conferencing is a viable substitute and the marginal leisure trips which cannot conceivably provide an economic rationale for public expenditure on so expensive a new piece of railway. 25. The plan for an interchange with Crossrail (but not Heathrow Express [see paragraph 18]) is a plausible alternative with other strong arguments in its favour (though it does depend on acceptance of the westerly route though the Chilterns), but this is seen only as an interim measure (at great cost), partly on the basis of the government’s visceral objection to interchanging.11 That is not a convincing foundation for serious transport planning.

The Capacity of HS2: Aspirations, Paths and the Urgent Need for Realism 26. Given the Government’s presentation of HS2 as a national project and given the strong sense in the regions (especially in Scotland and northern England) that they should obtain early and tangible benefits from this huge investment it is entirely understandable that many aspirations are being expressed for inclusion in the pattern of high-speed services. At the same time HS2 Ltd has uncritically bought into the story about capacity promulgated by Network Rail and Virgin Trains and thus extrapolated current WCML services to 2026 and HS2 without sufficient analysis of priorities. The result is an extraordinary muddle that threatens the credibility of the entire scheme. The issues are summarised in the table overleaf (note that the numbers of paths are for the peak period, since that is what matters most when planning the timetable). 27. A railway has a finite capacity that depends on the layout and speed of the route, the design of signalling, its operational rules, the acceleration, braking capability and stopping patterns of the trains and the mix of these characteristics. As a general rule, the more homogeneous the services the more trains can be operated. High-speed lines tend to have this property, but conversely headways must be wide enough to secure safe separation between trains in the event of a serious incident. At present no high-speed line anywhere in the world runs at more than 14 trains/hour.12 Advances in signalling may raise this to 16 as a peak-period maximum, with some performance risks accepted and if fewer paths are used off-peak to provide a recovery margin. 28. HS2 Ltd believes that 18 trains/hour may eventually be feasible, but many railway people see this as supremely optimistic, dependent on far-from-proven technology and thus an unsound base for planning: it would be irresponsible to raise expectations and rest calculations of benefit on unachievable scenarios. Moreover, it is expressly admitted that, while 18/hour allows for everyday, unavoidable perturbations within the high-speed system, it would by that same token only be practicable in circumstances where the system has been largely quarantined from the more troubled conditions on the classic railway. The fact that that may not be realised for many years and may be undesirable, for reasons argued earlier, thus strengthens the case for caution. 29. However HS2 Ltd now envisages 18 for the Y network without explaining why it thinks that will be achievable by the opening of phase 2.13 The proposed distribution of paths is shown in the first column of the cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w368 Transport Committee: Evidence

table. Broadly the plan is to run four Birmingham services, six on the eastern arm of the Y and eight on the western arm. A strange note is then appended: “Further work is being done to determine which of the above services might serve Heathrow and which might run on to mainland Europe”. That is more than a technical matter of “further work”! It is absolutely fundamental to the concept and objectives of HS2. 30. Column 2 sets out a specification that combines the aspirations expressed around the country with an outline evaluation of the ideal frequencies required to make the services attractive in terms of convenience (assuming continued availability for the majority of travellers of the ever-flexible car). The total is an impossible 27 to 30, including provision for HS1 and Heathrow trains. Something must give, and an optimistic maximum scheme is presented in column 3. This cuts Edinburgh and Glasgow to alternate-hour trains each, removes a Newcastle service, sharply trims the Yorkshire, East Midlands and North West patterns and reduces both HS1 and Heathrow to a thin provision of only two trains/hour each. Column 4 removes two more paths to bring the total to an altogether more rational planning maximum of 16 trains/hour.

Frequency of HS2 services under a range of scenarios [trains / hour]

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

scenarios

to 18 trans/h to 18 trans/h aspirations and ideal frequencies aspirations trimmed

routes with portion working Figure A2 in Economic trimmed to 16 trains/h to 16 trains/h trimmed Heathrow or HS1 services or HS1 services Heathrow Appraisal of the Y Network Appraisal with portion working but no working portion with no Heathrow or HS1 services or HS1 services no Heathrow

rest of Britain <> LONDON Edinburgh - 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 Glasgow 2 1 0.5 0.5 1 Newcastle ... York 2 1 - 2 - - - - - Leeds 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 Sheffield 2 2 2 1 2 Nottingham 2 1 1 1 Manchester 4 3 - 4 3 3 3 Liverpool 2 2 1 1 2 3 4 other North West - 1 - 2 1 - 1 Birmingham 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 spare - - - - - 2 2 rest of Britain <> HEATHROW Manchester 1 1 1 - 1 - other North West 1 - - -

Leeds … East Midlands 1 - - - 1 - Birmingham 1 1 1 - rest of Britain <> HS1 Scotland 0.5 - - - - - Newcastle … Leeds 0.5 - - - - -

Manchester 1 1 1 - 1 - other North West 0.5 - - - -

East Midlands 0.5 - - - 1 - Birmingham 1 1 1 - - TOTAL 18 27 – 30 18 16 16 16 14 ‘0.5’ = service in alternate hours; figures in columns 6 and 7 are for combined trains (ie. x2 for portions) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w369

31. At that point it must be asked whether the listed HS1 and Heathrow services would offer sufficient flexibility to attract travellers who have the alternative options of either direct flights or a relatively simple interchange along the Euston Road. Operationally too the need to provide connections would impinge on timetable planning. And above all the frequency could not justify the cost of constructing the two links while the unavoidable loss of Euston services would undermine the economics of HS2, with consequences probably spreading back to the capacity that it was supposed to release on WCML. The inescapable conclusion is that links to HS1 and Heathrow cannot be justified and should be removed from the Government’s proposals. They are simply not credible. 32. The outcome of achieving clarity on this issue is shown in column 5, where the freed paths are redistributed to give a more appropriate domestic network: these are the services timed in detail in the Greengauge exercise in proposals wholly integrated with other services on WCML.14 33. There is one possible source of relief, but it is another sign of the confusion surrounding pathing that statements differ and practical proposals are absent. HS2 Ltd proposes that the Birmingham <> London trains should be composed of two 200-metre sets, and the stations are to be designed to accommodate 400-metre trains. Yet the trains working through from and to the classic railway would be formed of single 200-metre sets (presumably total separation might allow coupled units for Leeds and Manchester eventually, but not for other places). This would represent substantial under-utilisation of capacity. 34. The solution of course is to run separate sets between provincial centres and locations in the Midlands where they would couple to run over the core HS2 section—and divide on the return.15 The practice is commonplace with German and French high-speed trains, which seem to manage it effectively. The suspicion must be that HS2 Ltd is so committed to achieving the fastest possible times between major centres that it has lost sight of practical service-planning. Joining and splitting does require time for the technical operation, a performance margin and one or two stations on the existing railway rebuilt to handle 400-metre trains, but it would bring with it great gains in connectivity and frequency and more effective use of the new capacity. 35. The implications are shown in the last two columns of the table. It could be used to retain two trains/ hour for both HS1 and Heathrow, but it would be better (column 7) to maintain a worthwhile frequency on each Y arm and to run only 14 trains/hour. Natural locations for joining and splitting are Derby and Stafford. Crucially, pursuing this concept implies closer integration between the old and the new systems than HS2 Ltd might wish—but with large potential benefits—and it would predicate comprehensive timetabling of the whole network. 36. Finally a point must be made about regulation and competition. The analysis of possible distributions of paths assumes a planned railway (because a complex system demonstrably depends for its optimal functioning on planning). If multiple operators are granted access by a regulator to compete for the most lucrative markets it is certain that services for the less lucrative markets will be cut back, to the detriment of an even spreading of benefits. The ambiguity in government policy on this matter must soon be resolved. It should be noted that a service planned by a public-interest agency does not exclude its delivery by a range of contracted parties.

What Should Now be Done? 37. The strategic objectives of HS2 are in disarray. Timetable planning on the existing network is not in good shape, as the East Coast saga has shown.16 Awkward interfaces between plans across the country are becoming more evident, and none so much as those between HS2 and the classic railway. It has not been proven conclusively that the capacity shortfall on WCML merits a huge single project that cannot deliver benefits for fifteen years, in preference to enlarging the programme of smaller, more immediate incremental projects across the country, particularly ones that might appreciably lift rail’s very low modal share. And timetabling is emphatically not some secondary technical activity that can be undertaken long after large projects have been designed. 38. In my view, what is needed is a process that (a) starts with a matrix of flows by all modes and models future demand under a range of scenarios; (b) sets targets for modal shares driven by environmental (eg. carbon-reduction) as well as economic factors; (c) derives a national timetable plan to meet the forecast demand, within a framework of standards and free of historical and institutional preconceptions; and (d) draws up a national rail infrastructure plan to enable the planned services to run in an operationally efficient manner. Such a process might well generate a case for new lines, including even something akin to the current proposal, but they would be embedded in a coherent plan for the benefit of the country as a whole. The tools and the data exist for such an exercise—and to undertake it would bring Britain into line with Switzerland, whose much admired public transport network has been built through applying broadly this methodology over the last 30 years and which already enjoys a vision for the next 20. May 2011 1 Department for Transport [DfT] (2011—February). High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. Consultation. This quote [at p.28] comes from the May 2010 Programme for Government. 2 For one of countless examples see: Abbott, S (2011). A lament for Lincoln. Modern Railways, May, pp 69–73. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w370 Transport Committee: Evidence

3 For example, the consultation document [op cit, pp 9–10] slips from generalisations about economic growth and competitiveness into an uncritical discussion about capacity, for which high-speed lines may, or may not, be the solution. The too-easily-forgotten Eddington Transport Study [Department for Transport (2006)] concluded [Volume 2, para 2.18] that “average rail journey times between major UK urban areas are close to that [sic] of other European countries, with journeys between London and other UK major cities performing particularly well relative to journeys from other European capitals”. In its advice to Government [Executive Summary, paras 1.50–1.52] it placed the emphasis on the density of transport demand rather than on high speed. The genesis of the present proposals lies in the former but has been taken over by the latter. The report is archived at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/adobepdf/187604/206711/ executivesummary.pdf and ~ /206711/volume2.pdf.

4 Some safety rules are unnecessarily restrictive, some timing margins are longer than they need be in order to protect Network Rail’s performance record, and on some sections more trains could probably be run in peak periods by trading off the advantage of more seats against occasional risks to punctuality.

5 Author’s estimate from the published diagrams [www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/proposedroute/maps/]. Comparisons between current and high-speed journey-times must be transparent with regard to recovery margins: the latter are probably being quoted with modest allowances whereas the former are inflated by the malign effects of the prevailing performance regime.

6 “Inter-city rail links have an unrivalled capacity to enable rapid and direct journeys between central business districts” [op cit, para 1.32]; HS2 Ltd’s “demand-led” approach indicated “city centre station locations with high quality onward transport links” [para 4.6].

7 It described its future London service of one train/hour (rather than three) as “residual” [DfT (2009). High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. HS2 Technical Appendix, Appendix 2, p 17].

8 “It is assumed that some infrastructure/signalling works have taken place in the Stafford area to alleviate this known capacity constraint” [ibid, para 2.20]. Any project would be complex, environmentally fraught and very costly.

9 DfT (2011—February). Economic Case for HS2: The Y Network and London—West Midlands. Figure A2, p 61.

10 Compare the two appraisals: DfT (2010). High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A Report to Government by High Speed Two Limited*, section 3.8, and paras 3.24–3.33 of the Consultation document [op cit]. * http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/ hs2ltd/hs2report/pdf/chapter3d.pdf

11 The Secretary of State is reported to have said “Lug your heavy bags down a couple of escalators along 600m of corridor and then change trains at a wet suburban station somewhere in north west London. That is not an option” [http://www.estatesgazette.com/blogs/jackie-sadek/2010/08/transport-sec-chops-down-old-oak-high-speed- 2.html].

12 As far as this author is aware. The Tokaido Line runs at 14 trains/hour in the morning peak into Tokyo. There are plans for 15/hour in France after 2020.

13 See the figure referenced at endnote 9. The original specification was 14 trains/hour in the peak (10 off- peak) with “an ultimate capacity of 18” [see endnote 7, Appendix 1, para 2.3.2].

14 Greengauge21 (2011). High-speed rail: capturing the benefits of HS2 on existing lines. The present author designed the timetable summarised in this report; a detailed technical report will shortly be available. See: www.greengauge21.net/wp-content/uploads/Capturing-the-benefits-update.pdf.

15 The consultation document refers rather casually to portion working for Heathrow services [op cit, p 66], and two associated Factsheets mention coupled running, but no other reference is known. See: http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hs2-trains_0.pdf and ~ files/connecting-to-heathrow_0.pdf.

16 See: Tyler, J (2010). How not to write a timetable. Modern Railways, November, pp 64–66. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w371

Further written evidence from Jonathan Tyler, Passenger Transport Networks (HSR 138A) The Maximum Capacity of HS2 and the Priorities for its Use In written evidence to the Commons Select Committee Inquiry into High Speed Rail [HSR 138] I drew attention to the confusion surrounding the capacity and timetabling of HS2. Having listened to the session of oral evidence on 21 June and checked the (uncorrected) transcript I am alarmed at how unappreciated this fundamental issue is. It urgently needs rigorous examination. Several witnesses before the Committee quite rightly emphasised their concern that the plans for HS2 both lack a strategic context and are not based on any substantive timetable planning. This is nowhere more apparent than in the rather loose expressions of aspirations for services. And if those cannot be realised then the business case will be undermined. The maximum number of trains/hour on any high-speed railway is 14 (into Tokyo in the morning peak on the original Tokaido Line). I note the categoric statement of Pierre Messulam from SNCF [Q84] that the maximum feasible capacity of a high-speed railway is 16 trains per hour. No one has persuasively demonstrated that that can be exceeded, which makes HS2 Ltd’s assumption of 18 seem exceptionally optimistic. In order to relieve the capacity shortfall on the West Coast Main Line (accepting here that a shortfall will exist and that a new railway is the appropriate solution) the minimum requirement for London paths in a peak hour on the “Y” network is as follows: Scotland 1 Manchester 3 Liverpool 1 other North West 1 Yorkshire and East Midlands 3 Birmingham 3 These numbers are based on current patterns, likely growth and reasonable aspirations. They also represent frequencies that would be credible in market terms and broadly adequate relative to the construction costs of a high-speed line. The total number of paths is 12. However, HS2 Ltd envisages four Birmingham trains/hour in the peak, while the draft WCML Route Utilisation Strategy raised the foreseeable need for four Manchester trains. It is improbable that there would not be similar requirements on the other routes, and only three per hour on the eastern arm of the “Y” is a bare minimum that would diminish any hope of significant relief of the East Coast and Midland Main Lines. This leads to the inescapable conclusion that the maximum capacity of 16 trains per hour will be fully utilised by London services. It follows, given present assumptions, that no capacity will be available for independent through services to HS1, the Channel Tunnel and Europe, or for direct services to Heathrow Airport. For each of these routes the minimum pattern to provide attractive options for travellers and to justify the (high) cost of construction of the links would be two trains per hour. Four paths could be taken from the London totals outlined above, but only if the HS2 and classic timetables for the routes concerned were to be integrated more intimately than has so far been suggested in order to offer an excellent overall service, albeit with many connections rather than through trains. This solution would however become increasingly difficult if the HS1 and Heathrow frequencies were raised to the more desirable 3/hour each and infeasible for any greater number. An alternative approach would be to adopt “portion working”, ie to run trains coupled together over the common and busiest sections. Since the line will be engineered to take 2 x 200m trains and since it will optimise the technical arrangements for (un)coupling its practicability is not in question. However the many issues that would need resolution do not appear to have been addressed: — locations for (un)coupling must be identified and designed (and may not lie on HS2 itself); — the best combinations of services must be carefully considered; — even with optimal operational arrangements (un)coupling takes time; — portion working can transfer disruption from one section to the wider network; and — interaction between HS1 and HS2, in planning and in real time, will be problematic (it could for example cause a reduction in paths/hour in order to allow for operational delays). In sum, portion working might help to resolve the conundrum of how HS2 can serve the London market and the Europe market and the Heathrow market, but this can only be established if the present specifications are revisited and if a comprehensive strategic-timetabling and infrastructure-planning exercise is undertaken. Even then it is difficult to see how the more optimistic forecasts of demand for all three markets are compatible with a two-track railway limited to 16 trains per hour. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w372 Transport Committee: Evidence

There is potentially a similar incompatibility between the aspirations for inter-regional (non-London) services on the two arms of the “Y” and the capacity of the route between their junction near Lichfield and the delta junction at Water Orton. Finally it must be stressed that this assessment assumes strong central planning of the utilisation of capacity, albeit with delivery possibly in the hands of more than one operator. If on-track competition between operators were to be introduced (as is now envisaged on HS1 and assumed in certain quarters for HS2) then the matter of priorities would become even more intractable. Jonathan Tyler designed what is to date the only integrated timetable for HS2 and WCML. This was commissioned by Greengauge 21 ** and was the work referred to by Professor Nash in his evidence on 21 June [Q21]. ** see http://www.greengauge21.net/publications/capturing-the-benefits-of-hs2-on-existing-lines/ 25 June 2011

Written evidence from SEStran (HSR 139) 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR 1.1 The main arguments for HSR are; Economy, Rail Capacity and Journey times and the Environment. 1.2 Economy and re-distribution of wealth—The positive link between economic growth and transport connectivity has been long established. Experience in other countries has shown that HSR stimulates economic growth outwith the Capital City such as for Lille in France and will therefore re-balance the national economy and reduce the current north-south divide. 1.3 Rail capacity—The West Coast RUS concluded that the southern end of this line would soon run out of capacity to cater for expected growth and the only effective way to deal with this scenario would be to build an additional line. The East Coast and the Midland Main Line would also in due course experience a similar situation. The construction of HS2 would then release capacity on existing main lines, in particular the West Coast, which will cater for additional local rail services and freight. 1.4 Reduced End-to-End Journey time—This is a more important benefit for North of England and in particular Scotland where rail still has a relatively low share of the inter-city travel market and where only HSR can facilitate a step change in modal share from air to rail and safeguard long-term connectivity. 1.5 Environment—Increased capacity and reduced journey times will stimulate transfer from car and air to rail. Rail is the only mode with the realistic potential to transport large volumes of passengers over long distances between city centres in a sustainable manner, in particular with an increasing proportion of the primary energy being renewable.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 2.1 The objectives of HSR go well beyond improving inter-urban connectivity through improved capacity and reduced journey time. Other objectives that will be met through HSR would be to enhance and redistribute wealth and to make transport more sustainable. 2.2 Some of these objectives could be met by investing in other transport modes but when compared with roads, rail is in particular more environmentally sustainable (air quality, energy use, land use) and is best suited for travel between and to access city-centres.

Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.3 There are already significant “high-cost” rail projects under construction, in particular London Cross Rail (approx £15 billion over around seven years) and Thameslink (approx £5.5 billion over around eight years) and it does not appear than these schemes have affected funding for the general “classic” network. 2.4 These two schemes will be very close to completion by the time construction would start on the proposed HSR between London and Birmingham in around 2016. At an approx cost of £17 billion over 10 years, the peak expenditure on the London-Birmingham HSR should be no higher than for Crossrail alone, never mind the combined peak expenditure of the two London projects. 2.5 There is already commitment to invest in a significant number of classic rail projects, such as Great Western Main Line electrification, Intercity Express Train Replacement Programme (IEP) and significant further enhancements to the East and West Coast Main Lines (eg Hitchins and Stafford flyovers). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w373

What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.6 In 2009, approximately 8.8 million out of the 13.2 million domestic UK Mainland air passenger journeys were between the main cities that it is anticipated will eventually be directly served by a UK HSR Network (London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow). With significantly faster rail journeys, there should be a major shift from air to a much more sustainable rail travel mode. 2.7 However, out of the 8.8 million air journeys, as many as 6.7 million either start or finishes in Edinburgh or Glasgow so in order to make a significant modal change, it is imperative that in the longer term, the construction of a high speed rail network also includes new lines across the Border. 2.8 The 2009 rail market share of the Edinburgh/Glasgow to London rail/air market was around 20% with rail journey times of typically 4 hours 30 minutes. For the Newcastle to London rail/air market, rail held around 60%, with a rail journey time of around 3 hours and for Manchester-London journeys, rail held around 76% of the rail/air market with a typical rail journey time of around 2 hours 10 minutes. For the Leeds to London air/rail market, rail held more than 95% of the market, with a typical rail journey time of 2 hours 15 minutes. 2.9 A 30 minute reduction in journey time (which should be achieved with high speed rail between London and West Midlands), could therefore see a shift from air to rail of nearly 1.5 million of today’s long-distance passenger journeys. This should increase to more than 3 million with the extension of the network to Leeds and Manchester when it must be assumed that domestic flights between Manchester/Leeds/ Newcastle and London will end. It is acknowledged however that modal split is also affected by other factors such as frequency and fares and ease of airport access. 2.10 In addition, there would also be significant growth in the total long-distance travel market so the overall transfer from rail to air with the introduction of a high speed rail network will be considerably higher. 2.11 3.8 million out of the 8.8 million air journeys quoted above are to or from London Heathrow so there should be significant scope to release valuable take-off and landing slots to other routes. Some of these Heathrow slots should go to domestic air routes that do not directly benefit from High Speed Rail, such as Aberdeen and Inverness, so that these cities do not “fall behind” in respect of London connectivity.

3. Business case How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 3.1 A number of fairly in-depth studies have been undertaken into a UK High Speed rail Network in addition to the HS2 study, in particular the following three major studies: 1. Atkins study (on behalf of SRA), later updated for the Government in 2008. 2. Network Rail “New Lines” study (2009). 3. Greengauge21 “Fast Forward” study (2009). 3.2 The studies looked at different HSR solutions and had different objectives behind their proposals. However, there were common strands such as a north-south network linking in the major cities between London and as far as Edinburgh and Glasgow. They all showed positive cases for a HSR network with benefit/cost ratios in the region of 2–3.5 and costs and passenger forecasts comparable with those found in the HS2 study. 3.3 A recent argument is that assumptions on time spent on trains is “un-productive” has overestimated the benefits of HSR. A recent study by Greengauge21 (where time spent on train would be regarded as “working- time”) did however show that the opposite was the case (although only marginally so). Passengers transferred from car and air would gain more productive time than in the original estimate and this would outweigh the “over-estimate” (in the original study) of working time gained by passengers transferred from classic train services. It could also be argued that HSR will create a better working environment than current rail services and also that there will be a limit as to how long it is reasonably practical to work on a train. 3.4 The study by HS2 surprisingly did not include Edinburgh-London services in its modelling and business case for the London-Birmingham/Lichfield High Speed Line although the Edinburgh-London market is around 30% greater than the Glasgow-London market. Edinburgh-London Services via the West Coast and HS2 would be around 30 minutes faster than existing services (as for Glasgow services) so by including Edinburgh-London services should make the business case even stronger.

What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.5 Upgrading the West Coast Main Line could only be limited in scope in respect of capacity and the Network Rail RUS concluded that the only longer-term capacity solution would be to construct a new line between London and West Midlands. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w374 Transport Committee: Evidence

3.6 The most recent upgrading of the West Coast Main Line also saw significant added costs in terms of disruption to services and reduced capacity during construction. Adding these costs to the actual upgrading cost of around £9 billion (the most recent cost estimate) for a scheme that will give less incremental capacity than a new line, it is almost certain that such an upgrade will not be better value than a new line. 3.7 A new conventional line (restricted to 125 mph) would largely resolve the capacity issue but would not enhance journey-times and would therefore be much more limited in benefits to North of England and Scotland where journey times become increasingly more important. Without the journey-time savings, there will not be such a significant shift to rail from the less environmentally sustainable modes of car and air. Greengauge21 has also shown that the cost of a conventional line is only marginally cheaper than a High Speed line.

What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.8 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would push passengers back onto less sustainable modes such as car or air, or journeys would not be undertaken in the first place which would be damaging in overall socio-economic terms. 3.9 There must also be doubts if price alone could realistically manage to reduce demand sufficiently to avoid investing in additional capacity. Regulated fares are already the highest in Europe and increasing these fares much further in real terms could make rail travel only affordable by the more well-off in society.

What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.10 Construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a reasonably good track record in terms of time and budget, eg HS1 and the recent Airdrie-Bathgate budget. There will also be a large number of European High Speed projects that have a good record in this respect.

4. The strategic route The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1 The most important issue for high speed rail is that stations serve the city centre. Rail is the most efficient mode in respect of land use to access city centres and without city-centre termini the advantage of high speed rail will be seriously eroded. 4.2 Station locations outwith city centres will depend on local circumstances but the general rule of thumb should be that not all services will necessary stop at non-city-centre stations. 4.3 Additional stations should only be provided where there is sufficient demand for long distance rail travel. The temptation would be to add stations to cater for high volumes of shorter journeys such as commuting, but that would soon erode the benefits of HSR.

Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.4 Most studies have considered wider networks that include London, Birmingham, Manchester, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow. These should be considered as the core cities for a north-south high speed network (which could be expanded by a western network). The y-network would fit in well with this scenario.

Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.5 Pragmatically it makes perfect sense to start the HSR network with the London-Birmingham section. It is the most capacity constrained section on the West Coast Main Line and it is probably also the most complicated section to plan and construct. Furthermore, the link to London is the most essential element of a national HSR network so should the London-Birmingham section be rejected, it is unlikely that a national network will ever materialise. 4.6 However, future phases do not necessarily have to be in a consecutive northwards order. The most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the English-Scottish border so serious consideration should be given to start construction of northern sections at an earlier stage rather as the last legs. 4.7 In particular, the Government should show greater commitment to plan the future network beyond Manchester and Leeds so that the longer term benefits of a national network become clearer. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w375

The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.8 The link to HS1 must be part of phase 1 due to technical issues but will also cater for the current West Midlands-Europe market. 4.9 The Heathrow market will to a large extent be catered for through the Old Oak Commons interchange as part of phase 1 so it is reasonable that further expenditure on this link should come later. However, the Heathrow link should be built in a way so that High Speed Trains for Heathrow from the north can continue on the classic network south of London to also serve important destinations such as Gatwick Airport and south coast cities.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.1 European experience has shown that most cities directly connected to the high speed network experience higher economic growth and there is no reason why this should not be the case for the UK. A Greengauge21 report also found that areas of Kent experienced rapid growth following the construction of HS1. 5.2 The 2009 Greengauge21 study also found that Regional economic benefits from a “full” HSR network between London and Glasgow/Edinburgh would amount to around £80 billion and would be widely distributed but with Scotland, the North West and the South East benefitting most.

To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.3 The most important element of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity between the main centres of population in the UK and in particular connectivity with London. By serving City Centres, high speed rail will indirectly support regional regeneration.

Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.4 A Greengauge21 study advised that the business case for high speed rail was robust when based on current fare levels for long-distance rail travel and would cater for both business and leisure travel. Furthermore, the release of capacity on the existing network will also benefit other travellers and commuters in particular. As such, all socio-economic groups would benefit from HSR. 5.5 The majority of the population of the UK enjoys reasonable good links with the Cities that will be directly served by a future HSR network extending as far north to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Many cities will also experience improve connectivity by increased service levels on the classic network so most of the UK will benefit from HSR. 5.6 However, it must be recognised there will areas that will benefit less such as North of Scotland, Wales and the South West of England and transport investment in these areas should be identified (such as rail electrification programmes or, for the north of Scotland, improved air connectivity) to ensure a fair distribution of benefits.

How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 5.7 There may be examples from other countries with HSR that could be used as models and there may also be lessons learned from London Crossrail project. 5.8 A UK HSR Network will “replace”current classic rail links that form part of TEN so support should be sought from relevant EU budgets.

6. Impact What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1 HSR has considerably lower carbon footprint than car and air and also matches that of classic rail when the higher capacity of HSR trains are taken into account. If it can be assumed that the primary energy source is renewable, the carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction completion) should be negligible.

Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2 It could perhaps be argued that studies have erred on the “safe” side so that overall environmental benefits have not been exaggerated. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w376 Transport Committee: Evidence

What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.3 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line which is the busiest rail freight corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by rail freight services so the impact on freight services by HSR should be very positive.

How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? Experience from the St Pancras redevelopment should indicate that this should be manageable. Disruption could also be reduced through service changes/improvements to some of the existing local services terminating at Euston. For example, some local services on the West Coast Main Line as far out as Northampton could be incorporated into the Crossrail network through a connection in the Willesden/Old Oak Commons area, extending planned Crossrail services from the East that would otherwise terminate at Old Oaks Commons. This could take away up to seven train arrivals/departures per hour from Euston Station. May 2011

Written evidence from T.H.Effendowicz (HSR 141) The current economic difficulties in which the country finds itself make it imperative to review the Government’s proposals for the HS2 line. Britain needs a new, fast railway that would bring considerable economic benefits to the whole country but the HS2 project has started from the wrong premise. The terms of reference for the project laid down by the previous Government and extended by the present one place undue emphasis on benefits likely to flow to Heathrow from the project, and overemphasise the role of Birmingham as compared with other major cities. The company created to carry out the project, HS2 Ltd., followed their terms of reference rigidly and therefore did not explore alternatives which would favour the country as a whole. Heathrow, as HS2 Ltd. recognized, has two predominant roles, as London’s origin and destination airport accounting for 80% of its traffic, and as an international transfer hub. Quoting HS2 Ltd’s own conclusions, only 1000 passengers per day from the whole rest of the country would be likely to utilise Heathrow, equivalent in numbers to a single daily train load on the High Speed Railway. As for Birmingham, the cost of providing it with a 250 mph railway line would be £17 billion and the city would have to wait for it until 2026. This ignores the fact that the existing could develop a slightly more modest 125 mph line between London and Birmingham within four-five years at a cost of £5 billion or less, using established noise corridors. HS2 Ltd. examined superficially a route running parallel to the M1, but at some distance from it, and turned it down as non-viable. They did not, however, attempt to run it along the present Ml noise corridor which had all the problems of proximity to houses, terrain difficulties and disturbance to water supplies ironed out when the M1 was built. Motorway noise corridors are regularly used on the Continent for High Speed Railway routes, as indeed is the case with UK’s own HS1. It is fully practical to build HS2 in close proximity to the Ml and M6, adding just 8 km (4%) to the length of the route and to the time taken for the journey from Birmingham to London, ie 51 minutes instead of 49. This route might even turn out to be cheaper to construct than the one proposed by HS2 Ltd. Do we really wish to damage the beauty of the Chilterns and risk serious harm to Chilterns’ and London’s water supply for the sake of shortening the Birmingham to London journey by two minutes? The benefits of these proposals therefore are: — Birmingham could obtain a semi-fast route to London, connecting to Crossrail at Paddington on the way to Heathrow, some 10 years before HS2 is completed and for £5 billion or less instead of £17 billion. The Chiltern Railway line could even be extended the full distance from Birmingham to Heathrow if passenger volumes would justify doing so. — A very costly development of the Old Oak Common site could be avoided. — Directing the line by the shortest route from Euston to the M1 corridor would make for appreciably shorter tunnels through London. — HS2 would run through established noise corridors and would not damage aquifers. — Birmingham would still in time get its HS2 connection but, by then, the main value of this would consist in connecting the city direct to the Continent via the HS2/HS1 junction. — The HS2 route would probably pass close to Rugby, in a straight line for Manchester, a little farther east than in HS2 Ltd’s previously published plans but closer to the dividing point of the planned Y shape, making it easier to reach the large conurbations on the eastern side of the Pennines. — Finally, and of interest to counties on both the western and eastern routes, it is feasible to have intermediate stops at hubs such as Milton Keynes/Northampton, Rugby/Coventry, Stoke/Stafford and East Midlands (for Leicester/Derby/Nottingham), by adopting a system of alternate trains— express ones and marginally slower stopping ones. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w377

One might legitimately ask why has the Coalition Government not looked in depth at this and other options that could potentially provide high speed rail connectivity to more Midlands and Northern cities than is possible with the current proposal.

Written evidence from B Bedford (HSR 142) 1. I understand that your Transport Committee has decided to hold an inquiry into the strategic case for High Speed Rail (HS2). I am writing to you because my concern is that the building of this railway will not provide the economic growth so desperately needed by this country. 2. I think economic growth can occur only if there is a perceived demand which a service or industry can satisfy at a competitive price. An example is the demand for Jaguar Land Rover vehicles which are perceived as good quality and good value in many overseas markets. Hence, this Indian owned company is proposing to invest in both increased production and also in an increased number of designs. In general, British manufacturers are failing to compete against foreign rivals due, in part, to their products not being-well designed or competitively priced but also due to the loss of workforce skills which are very difficult to regenerate. They also find it difficult to obtain bank loans with which to improve their performance and expand. The construction of HS2 would not improve this situation. Indeed, HS2 Ltd admit as much in their Tables 47, 48 and 50 in Appendix 3 of their Socio-economic Report, where they admit that a total of 157,000 sq metres of industrial area would be lost at the proposed three stations between London and Birmingham leading to less employment in the manufacturing sector, so vital to this country’s recovery. 3. This country is in a dire financial state. The Chancellor hopes to eliminate our monthly borrowing requirement by 2015 but our debt will still be around £1.4 trillion which will be a monumental hurdle for future generations to tackle. Therefore, any project which will not add significantly to economic growth but will add to our debt should not be pursued. I view the construction of HS2 as a project which should not be progressed. 4. It is instructive to consider the experiences of Continental countries, who have built High Speed Lines. Both France and Spain, after writing off their construction costs, have highly successful lines, aided by the inhibiting influence on air travel which security processes provide. In both countries their rail systems had suffered years of decline so that they were unable to compete with either rail or air travel. 5. However, demand forecasting has failed in a staggering 84% of High Speed projects (New Engineer 3/3/ 11). The Dutch High Speed Line is facing bankruptcy after only a year in service because some of the trains have only 15% of their seats occupied. Closer to home the traffic forecasts for the Channel Tunnel Rail link were so inaccurate that the operator, London & Continental, became insolvent in May 2009. The London & Continental Railway forecast that passenger numbers would reach 21.4 million a year by 2004. However, by 2009 they had reached only 7.3 million. Even in the U.SA. and China there are doubts whether demand will support their construction costs. 6. It should be remembered that British Rail introduced into service trains capable of travelling at 125 mph long before other European countries considerered building high speed lines. The average speeds, calculated from published timetables, achieved by continental high speed lines are given in the following table: Average Speed mph St Pancreas to Brussels 114 St Pancreas to Paris 120 Paris to Lyon 120 Paris to Tours 118 Paris to Nice 108 Berlin to Hamburg 105 Madrid to Seville 118 Average Speed 113

These figures suggest that the maximum speed achieved by continental high speed trains are much the same as UK Long distance trains. They are not operating pioneering high speed lines which HS2 Ltd suggest. 7. The recent upgrade of the West Coast Line and the introduction of Pendolino tilting carriages has enabled trains to travel for longer distances at 125 mph and has brought Glasgow to be only four hour 10 minutes from London. It has also produced a line capable of 1000 extra services a week and a 70% increase in freight capacity. However, HS2 Ltd has reported continued overcrowding on this line which, they admit is essentially at peak times. Perhaps the inhibiting factor against using longer trains and where necessary longer platforms is the “access charge” which is levied on train companies and which is proportional to the number of carriages comprising a train. These charges will impinge on the profit that a company can make. 8. Train Operator East Coast has announced that on 22nd May, their new timetable will provide 3,000,000 additional seats per year, 19 new services per weekday and faster journey times for millions of passengers. They cite the return of the “Flying Scotsman” express which will travel from Edinburgh to Kings Cross in 4 hours including a stop at Newcastle. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w378 Transport Committee: Evidence

9. I think the cost of constructing HS2 to save approximately 30 minutes journey time to both Glasgow and Edinburgh is money not well spent. 10. There appears to be an assumption by HS2 Ltd that this proposed line would be entirely reliable. The utopian situation has yet to be achieved in mechanical mechanisms or electrical systems. Nevertherless, they are proposing to transfer long distance services from the East and West Coast from day one. Surely a failure for whatever reason that brought a train to an unscheduled stop would be catastrophic. 11. In reviewing the Business Case, I consider that the crucial monetary values given under Transport User Benefits are too high because: (a) Business will increasingly use video and other technology as an alternative to travelling to meetings. (b) Working from home will increase for office workers as the technology becomes more generally available. (c) Leisure travellers tend to use the cheapest mode of travel because time may not be a significant factor. (d) Quantifying in monetary terms the redevelopment of stations as a benefit to passengers is a step too far. For example, HS2 Ltd has concluded that the re-design of Euston Station would deliver benefits of between £900 million–£1.5 billion to passengers. All the above assumptions are vital to the production of the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) and if demand is lower than HS2 Ltd computer modelling suggests, then revenue will be lower and the B.C.R would be on a knife edge. I have pointed out earlier in this letter that demand forecasting has failed more that it has worked. 12. The heading of Chapter 2, Page 42 of the February 2011 Consultation is entitled “The Case for National High Speed Rail Network”. However, the author confines his comments to London and the major conurbations of the Midlands and the North. He makes no mention of the fact that the combined population of South Wales and South Western England is over six million people—more than Scotland and similar to the major conurbations of Northern England—yet these regions appear to be forgotten in the HS2 coverage proposed by HS2 Ltd. May 2011

Written evidence from Steve Rodrick (HSR 143) What are the main arguments either for or against HSR A national transport plan 1. It is essential that the UK prepares a national transport strategy to identify what the country’s transport needs are and how investment and timing priorities should be set. The commitment of so much money to high- speed rail in the absence of a national context for investment in all forms of transport is premature. The plan prepared not so long ago by Rod Edington is a good starting point. It would also help to settle those who believe that high speed rail is a political vanity project. In the absence of any thorough justification it’s a label that will stick.

High Speed Rail will significantly increase carbon emissions 2. Based on published information it clear that HS2 will lead to significantly increased carbon emissions. Despite best efforts to de-carbonise the national grid, fossil fuel generated energy will remain a significant component of generating capacity for many decades. The significantly higher energy demands of high speed rail will increase directly carbon emissions compared to classic rail. The proposal to offset this by attracting air passengers and for airlines to both subsequently withdraw those flights but not replace them with flights to other destinations, is not credible. The aviation industry is almost certain to use those valuable slots to replace those withdrawn short-haul flights with long haul, especially from the London airports. This will lead directly to significantly increased emissions. For example, a long haul flight to the far east will cause emissions ten times that of a UK domestic flight. 3. The combination, in addition to the embedded carbon in construction of high speed 2 and the stated aspiration of Birmingham Airport to increase its passenger throughput by 9 million passengers per year if a Birmingham Parkway station is built, mean HS2 should not be allowed to proceed. It should be a basic principle of major government investment that it will provide a significant contribution to meeting UK carbon reduction targets.

The opportunity costs of investing in high speed rail will be significant 4. There are more pressing transport needs which would provide better value for money and greater improvements to services used by more people over a wider geographic area. Improvements to the existing rail network, bus services (have we forgotten more people use buses than trains), the quality of the road network, cycle lanes, shared space initiatives footpath enhancements would provide more benefits to more people at lower cost. In so doing the economy would benefit to a greater extent in the short and long term and carbon emission reductions achieved. The extraordinary improvement in the emissions performance of cars cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w379

should be noticed and welcomed. It is conceivable that in time they prove to be the lowest polluting form of travel.

Does high speed rail really stimulates economic regeneration? 5. The evidence that high speed rail stimulates economic development is weak. It seems is largely confined to an area within close proximity to the stations themselves. The city centres of Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Edinburgh have been successfully regenerated in recent years. The economic problems of these cities do not lie in their centres. There is no evidence that the more peripheral areas benefit. The oft quoted example of Lille is misleading. Lille enjoys a unique location in Europe. It is notable that unemployment in Lille, always higher than the French average, has risen faster than the French average despite its central position in a European network.

We already have high speed rail 6. Claims that that UK “will be left behind” lack any rationale that is pure politicking trying to justify expenditure which would fail any reasonable value for money test. In comparison with countries with high speed rail, the journey times between our main cities is shorter—they are trying to catch up with the UK. The more important time is that from door to door rather than station to station. In this context the modest time savings achieved by HS2 are even less impressive. 7. The Government has failed to explain that there are several definitions of high speed rail. Perhaps to the surprise of most, many of our existing routes capable of operating services at 200 kph can already be considered as high speed. Surely it is a higher ambition to provide most of the country with a high speed network by upgrading all intercity routes than just a few cities with a very high speed line.

IT reduces the need to travel 8. The advance of communications IT in recent years has been very impressive enabling instant communication whilst on the move and increasingly displacing the need to travel. IT makes it possible to work nearly anywhere at any time. This has much reduced the imperative to get a journey over with as quickly as possible. Arguably some journeys provide a working environment better than in an office, rendering the reading of reports, for example, more achievable than in a busy office environment. Faster journey times are more likely to bring social (ie getting home to put the kids to bed) rather than work time benefits. 9. It is interesting to note that in no other form of travel is there a desire for much greater speed. It is not clear, therefore, why it should matter so much for rail travel. Certainty, punctuality and value for money are all more important to the traveller.

Reducing the Need to Travel—Reducing the demand for long distance travel 10. Except for a few instances nobody travels for its own sake—it entails a time and monetary cost. Better still, not to travel at all unless there is an overriding reason to do so. With advances in technology and awareness of the costs, most businesses will increasingly reduce the need for their staff to travel—a pattern already becoming well established. For most people improvements to short journeys in and around where they live and work will have greater value. Building a few hundred kilometres of high speed rail in 20 years time may contribute a small amount to national pride but will do little for most people. It is a fair bet the majority of the population will never use it. Making a difference to the journeys that most people do most days will have a far greater value to society and the economy. In this respect the UK often compares badly to our counterparts.

Congestion and Crowding 11. The media and HS2 Ltd would have us believe that all inter-city trains, especially on those on the West Coast Main line, are crowded to bursting point. However, the reality is very different with very few trains full and passengers left to stand. It is interesting to read that HS2 Ltd anticipate that HS2 services will have higher load factors than current services. 12. The challenge is to prevent the crowding from happening without having to build an entirely new line— surely the worst of all options. A good start will be to reduce the need to travel in the first place. The obvious options then are: — Make trains longer. — Have fewer first class and more standard class carriages. — Do what you can to increase the speed of existing services. — Introduce reservation only trains for peak hours—that will happen anyway with HS2. — Change pricing policy to even out demand. 13. As so many employers are switching to flexible work patterns the traditional rush hours will increasingly become a thing of the past. The scope to work at home will also reduce the need for so many people to travel into the city centres in the first place. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:12] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w380 Transport Committee: Evidence

3. Business case 14. The forecasts for the numbers of passengers who will use High Speed 2 do not seem to be realistic. It is impossible to understand why, unless the population increase dramatically, so many more people would want to travel between Birmingham and London on a daily basis, especially for leisure trips. No explanation is provided by HS2 Ltd on the motivation for such journeys. The forecasts can only have been prepared by desk based statisticians and not based on research which actually asked people what sort of transport improvements they wanted. 15. The estimated costs of HS2 are vast. But it is a reasonable expectation that the costs will exceed those given now. This looks like an extremely complicated project and many unexpected problems will arise. Other factors will, no doubt, intervene and eventuality the costs will rise. As the Government will have made such deep, long term and irreversible commitments there will be no turning back and High Speed rail will gobble up yet more scarce funds. Such a prospect fills most taxpayers with dread—it looks like yet another debt we will load onto the next generation. A more sensible strategy would be an incremental one, which provides more flexibility and lower risk.

4. The strategic route 16. This proposed route will create yet another London centric transport network—with the added bonus of even more preferential treatment for Heathrow. A more imaginative approach would be to build the last leg to London. I have no doubt those captains of industry who routinely sign letters calling for yet more public funding to be spent on projects which suit a small number of large corporations would be filled with dread. 17. As someone who lived in the north of England and Scotland for 30 years it is hard to see how saving 40 minutes on a long journey makes any difference at all. A day trip from Glasgow to London is still impossibility unless you fly. The door to door time will barely changed. Saving a few minutes will probably be welcomed but it won’t suddenly trigger great economic activity. High speed IT might, but not a train.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 18. HS2 will almost certainly generate more economic activity in London than anywhere else. It is difficult to see Londoners making their way to the provinces is equal numbers as those travelling to the capital. The result, economic activity gravitates to London again. Ironically the majority of tickets will be bought by those in the midlands and north, draining billions of pounds from the regional economies. 19. I have read of Chambers of Commerce in northern cities saying HS2 is essential for their well being, but I have yet to hear any of them explain or give a real example of how it would make any difference in practice. As is so often the case, the prospect of a shiny new toy largely paid for by someone else is seductive, and those easily seduced lose their grip on reality.

6. Impact 20. As the energy needed to move an object multiplies by the square of its speed, trains travelling at 400 kph will use 4 times that of a train travelling at 200 kph. As HS2 plans to transport 4 times as many passengers as currently use those routes this means that HS2 services will use up to 16 times that of comparable services now (assuming broadly similar seating capacity) . That is a lot of extra energy and carbon dioxide. I believe that HS2 hopes to balance those emissions by “ending domestic aviation”. Presumably that really means London to Glasgow and Edinburgh. It is hard to see why passengers would entirely abandon planes when the HS2 save so little time. However, even if they did, do we really expect airlines to keep those valuable landing and take off slots free? Those airlines flying out of Gatwick and Heathrow will be falling over themselves to replace domestic flights with one to the far east presumably, as the main growth market. That means each cancelled UK flight will be replaced by one which emits about ten times as much carbon. 21. The next effect of these two HS2 induced impacts is a truly massive increase in carbon emissions. The law of unintended consequences makes an entrance! Yet another argument for improving the existing railways so we can all benefit, and concentring on those local journeys which genuinely need to be improved. 22. A look into the crystal ball also suggests that IT will play a far larger part in our lives than those planning this expensive railway, using taxpayer’s cash, are willing to accept.

Do we really want to trash the countryside?

23. The British care about nothing more that the countryside. We have long lost the art of building beautifully. With the best of intentions the cutters of budgets and aesthetically blind will turn this into yet another eyesore. June 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w381

Written evidence from Transport Futures (HSR 144) Supporting the UK Economy, Regional Growth and Prosperity — High Speed Rail (HSR) offers a once in a generation opportunity to transform the economic geography of the UK, supporting sustainable growth and international competitiveness. — HSR is essential to the future prosperity and sustainability of the UK; high quality, speedy and effective transport links will bring the opportunity for a more equal distribution of economic activity and wealth between regions. It will strengthen the economy and create jobs. — It is a vital element in achieving the government’s objective for a “transport system that is an engine for economic growth, but one that is also greener and safer and improves quality of life in our communities.” — The government should commit to the delivery of a comprehensive UK high speed network which includes Scotland and the North East, thereby maximising the economic and environmental benefits to the whole UK. Both axes of the “Y” shaped network should progress in parallel to ensure equitable distribution of economic benefits. — HSR will improve transport connections between UK regions and Europe, reducing peripherality, increasing trading opportunities and boosting tourism. — Several studies, including the government’s own HS2 study, have demonstrated a good business case for high speed rail. — Just the first stage of the high speed network, between London and Birmingham, is forecast by HS2 Ltd to contribute £44 billion in benefits to the UK economy.

Providing Additional Capacity on Britain’s Rail Network, Allowing More Freight on Rail and Improved Local Services — Increasing demand for rail travel cannot be met by further enhancements to the existing north south lines and the only effective solution will be to build additional lines. High speed lines cost little more than conventional lines, yet bring significantly more benefit in terms of greatly reduced journey times. — By increasing capacity on the whole network, opportunities will be created to allow a significant expansion of freight on rail to support industry and improve rail links to ports. — Local rail services can be enhanced to attract more journeys from car.

A More Environmentally Friendly Means of Transport — Overall, HSR will provide a more sustainable form of transport for high volumes of people in terms of carbon emissions and air quality. — Early extension of new HSR lines to the north of England and Scotland will deliver significant additional economic and environmental benefits to the whole of the UK through transfer of passengers from air to rail, with corresponding carbon reduction benefits. — HSR can be an integral feature of a “virtual hub” between London and regional airports, reducing the need for costly new airport infrastructure, whilst rebalancing capacity to protect essential air connectivity with London and Europe for peripheral regions not directly connected to the high speed rail network.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 1.1 There are three principal arguments for High Speed Rail (HSR) and why it is essential to the future prosperity and sustainability of the UK. For this to be achieved fully, the Government should commit to the completion of a full network extending beyond the current proposals to include Scotland and the North East.

1.2 Supporting the UK economy, regional growth and prosperity 1.2.1 HSR will strengthen the economy and create jobs. It has a crucial part to play in spreading economic activity and growth across all regions of the UK. At present, the UK economy is dominated by London and the South East and it is important that steps are taken to close the present north south economic divide and enable all regions to benefit from the world status of London. It is generally recognised that the economy is over-reliant on financial and service industries and a reshaping of the national economy to encourage manufacturing industry will require a high standard transport system if the UK is to be able to compete effectively on the world stage. Moreover, tourism is a key industry in the economy of the country and high speed rail will provide stimulation for this sector also, helping to attract European visitors to areas further north, to Scotland and the North East of England. 1.2.2 The positive link between economic growth and transport connectivity has been long established. High quality, speedy and effective transport links will bring the opportunity for a more equal distribution of economic activity and wealth between regions. The proposed Y shaped high speed corridor will spread the economic prosperity of London and the south east to the regions further north with the full benefits being achieved when cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w382 Transport Committee: Evidence

the network reaches the North East and Scotland. This is an opportunity to close the economic gap and provide a strong basis for international competitiveness across the whole UK. 1.2.3 Just the first stage of the high speed network, between London and Birmingham, is forecast by HS2 Ltd to contribute £44 billion in benefits to the UK economy.

1.3 To meet the need for additional capacity on Britain’s rail network, allowing more freight on rail and improved local services 1.3.1 Demand for inter-city rail journeys is currently running at 5% pa. Forecasts indicate that the West Coast Main Line will reach its full capacity in 2024. The East Coast and the Midland Main Line will also reach capacity in the next ten years. As costs increase for road and air travel, rail is likely to become more attractive as a cost effective means of travel. This increasing demand can not be met by further enhancements to the existing north south lines and the only effective solution will be to build an additional line. In addition, capacity problems on parallel inter-regional motorways like M1 and M6 are already evident and the costs and environmental impacts of addressing these through provision of additional highway capacity far exceed those of providing for equivalent volumes on HSR. 1.3.2 Through the provision of new lines to increase the overall capacity of the rail network, opportunities will be created to use released capacity on existing lines. This will allow a significant expansion of freight on rail and for enhancements to local rail services. It will also create opportunities for more cross country journeys.

1.4 A more environmentally friendly means of transport 1.4.1 High speed rail will provide for high volumes of movement with reduced carbon impact per passenger than either road or air. Extending the HSR network to the north of England and Scotland generates much more substantial economic and environmental benefits through more significant transfer of passengers from air to rail, with corresponding carbon reduction benefits. 1.4.2 In addition, through the release of capacity on the classic network, opportunities will be created for higher frequency local services, thus offering a frequency of rail service which will encourage people out of cars for commuting and shorter distance journeys. Greater use of the network for freight will also lead to significantly reduced carbon emissions. Freight on rail produces 70% less carbon dioxide emissions than the equivalent road journey. 1.4.3 Overall, HSR will provide a more sustainable form of transport for high volumes of people in terms of carbon emissions and air quality, with a manageable physical environmental impact considerably less than for equivalent major highway construction.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 2.1.1 The government’s vision is for a “transport system that is an engine for economic growth, but one that is also greener and safer and improves quality of life in our communities.” 2.1.2 High speed rail will provide for efficient connections between the UK’s major cities and regions, with lower carbon impact per passenger than alternatives by road or air. This meets the policy objectives set out above, by enhancing wealth generally and rebalancing the economy through significant distribution of growth. Whilst some of these objectives could be met by investing in other transport modes, focusing on the switch to rail-based transport will mean that the underlying transport networks need for this growth will in overall terms (air quality, energy use, land use), be more sustainable when compared with roads. Furthermore, rail, in particular is best suited for travel between, and to access, city-centres. 2.1.3 In addition, by providing additional capacity on the key north south corridor, opportunities to encourage greater use of rail for freight transport will become more achievable and contribute to the objective set out in the EU Transport White paper published in March. This sets out a target for 30% of road freight over 300 km to shift to other modes such as rail or waterborne transport by 2030, and more than 50% by 2050, to combat climate change. The White Paper also sets out a target for the majority of medium-distance passenger transport to go by rail by 2050, which again can only be achieved in the UK if additional capacity is created on the network to allow both longer distance and local rail journeys to increase. 2.1.4 To meet these goals set out in the White Paper will require appropriate infrastructure to be developed, with high speed rail as a fundamental feature of the national and European level TENS-T networks. This will provide for the required passenger growth and encourage transfer from other modes; the capacity released on the traditional network will allow a significant expansion of freight on rail to meet these targets. 2.1.5 Whilst roads will continue to be important for many journeys and new construction may be justified in some particular locations, future investment in roads should largely concentrate on maintaining the existing network. Future capacity for both passengers and freight should be met by higher levels of investment in the rail network, linked to an integrated public transport system at a local level. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w383

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

2.2.1 At the moment, two expensive rail projects are under construction in the London area, Crossrail (£15 billion) and Thameslink (£5.5 billion). Funding for these would appear to be independent of general funding for the rail network. Other major rail schemes in the pipeline are electrification projects with new rolling stock on the Great Western Main Line and in Manchester-Liverpool-Preston area of the North West; Manchester Northern Hub, significant further enhancements to the East Coast Main Line and Intercity Express Train Replacement Programme are also being pursued. The Secretary of State has provided reassurances that these schemes will not affect funding for HS2.

2.2.2 Most of these schemes will be substantially complete by the time construction is expected to start on the first phase of HS2 in 2016. At an approximate cost of £17 billion over 10 years, this is little more than for Cross Rail alone, so it can be expected that a future programme of regional schemes could be funded if resources are maintained at the same level as at present. However, the planning for such schemes needs to happen in the short term, to align with spending decisions and new franchises. Assuming commitment for and completion of these current major schemes, the development of a comprehensive HSR network, connecting London and the north of England and Scotland should be the UK government’s top rail infrastructure planning and investment priority.

2.2.3 The development of a high speed network present an opportunity to explore how many of the suburban and underground lines in London and the South East could be altered to maximise their connectivity, for example connecting the West London Line to the station at Old Oak Common, and the development of Crossrail 2 to relieve overcrowding at Euston. Consideration should be taken over the coming two investment periods (“control periods”) of how funding for “classic” rail can be targeted to maximise the benefits of HSR and mitigate any burdens it may introduce.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation?

2.3.1 HSR is best suited for journeys of up to three hours (about 900 km), for which the train can beat air and car trip time. When traveling less than about 650 km by air, the process of checking in and going through security screening at airports, as well as the journey to the airport, makes the total air journey time longer than by HSR.

2.3.2 In 2009, around 66% of domestic UK mainland passenger journeys by air were between the main cities that will eventually be directly served by the high speed rail network (London, Birmingham, Manchester, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow). With a full HSR network in place, there is the potential for rail journey times to be reduced to be more competitive with air.

2.3.3 In Europe, air travel has been all but eliminated on a number of inter-city routes such as Paris to Lyon. Eurostar now has around 80% of the market between London and Paris and Brussels.

2.3.4 Similar effects are likely to be seen in some areas of the UK domestic air market, where a major shift from air to high speed rail is likely to happen. However, the impact of the first and second phase of the Y network is not likely to reduce domestic air travel by a significant amount. Only when the high speed network reaches Edinburgh and Glasgow is further significant modal shift from rail to air likely to take place.

2.3.5 Nevertheless, the trend away from domestic flights will lead to the release of some take-off and landing slots at major airports like London, Manchester and Edinburgh; this will ease airport congestion and reduce the pressure to provide additional runway capacity. It will also provide opportunities to enhance flights to London and Europe from domestic markets which will benefit less directly from HSR, for example northern parts of Scotland. It is essential that a proportion of released slots at London “hub” airports are protected for domestic flights to/from these more peripheral regions of the UK.

2.3.6 For the more peripheral of areas of the UK, air services and high speed rail services will be complementary rather than competitive to provide the most appropriate connections to UK and European markets; HSR is an important element of a comprehensive package of transport measures, including air and sea to support economic growth and competitiveness.

2.3.7 High speed rail can play a vital part in creating a “virtual hub” airport serving London and the regions, as suggested in the DfT “Developing a Sustainable Framework for UK Aviation: Scoping Document” published in March 2011. For example, with a high speed rail link between Birmingham and central London, Birmingham Airport can become a viable airport for London. Heathrow will be accessible via Old Oak Common and with a link to the West London line, connections to Gatwick would also be enhanced. In a similar way, with a link between HS1 and HS2, Manston Airport in Kent, which has one of the longest runways in Europe and the capacity to accommodate up to six million passengers per annum by 2033, could be developed as a part of a “virtual hub.” cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w384 Transport Committee: Evidence

3. Business case

3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network?

3.1.1 Prior to the report by HS2 Ltd, published in 2010, several independent studies have been undertaken into HSR. W S Atkins undertook a study on behalf of the then Strategic Rail Authority in 2001, which was updated for the government in 2008. In 2009, Network Rail undertook a study into capacity issues and Greengauge 21 also published a study into HSR possibilities. Although the brief for these studies varied, a number of common themes emerged and all studies recommended high speed rail connections between London, Birmingham and points north. All proposals have shown a positive cost: benefit ratio, similar to the conclusions of HS2 Ltd. Further work has been done on the value of time by Greengauge 21 to test the robustness of assumptions made. Taken together, all this work underlines a consistently strong business case for high speed rail.

3.1.2 Furthermore, work by Greengauge 21 for Transport Scotland demonstrated that the business case is considerably enhanced if the network is extended to Scotland. Also, inclusion of additional markets which could be served as a result of high speed trains running through to the existing network would also enhance the business case.

3.1.3 Any loss of revenue on the classic network should be compensated through currently suppressed trips as a result of less frequent or more crowded services and increase in demand as local trips are encouraged to transfer from other modes.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

3.2.1 There would seem to be little advantage in constructing new conventional lines, given that the cost would not be significantly less than for a high speed route and that the benefits of time reductions, and hence a more attractive service, would not be achieved.

3.2.2 In terms of choice of route, opportunities for further upgrading the key West Coast Main Line (WCML) line are deemed to be limited in engineering terms and in any case would lead to major works and realignments at existing stations. Many intermediate stations would require rebuilding or bypassing and further upgrade would be difficult, expensive and environmentally intrusive. It is also worth noting that none of this could be achieved without very major disruption to existing services, at a significant cost to the economy.

3.2.3 Even if all this could be managed, the end result would be a mixed use railway, without the same potential for increasing freight traffic. In the light of all this, the Network Rail RUS concluded that the only longer-term capacity solution would be to construct a new line between London and West Midlands.

3.2.4 Previous attempts to increase speeds to 140 mph (225 km/h) on existing tracks on both the east and west coast main lines have failed, partly because of track alignment and that trains which travel above 125 mph (201 km/h) are considered to require in-cab signaling for safety reasons.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

3.3.1 Managing demand could only be achieved by limiting capacity or by raising prices. The only argument in favour of this approach would be to reduce capital investment in the railways by central government. This would lead to hidden costs for the economy and restrict economic activity, further concentrating economic activity in the London area to the detriment of the wider UK economy.

3.3.2 Regulated fares in the UK are already the highest in Europe. Attempting to manage demand through the fare box would not encourage passengers to transfer from car or air; indeed it would be likely to have the counter effect and increase demand for these modes. In addition to raising costs for businesses, it would also be socially regressive, making rail travel the preserve of the better-off.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

3.4.1 HS1 was satisfactorily delivered on time and on-budget and there is no reason to assume that further high speed projects should not be efficiently delivered either. Experience from European High Speed rail line construction would also support a confident approach to this.

3.4.2 Conversely, recent work to enhance the WCML suggests that work on existing busy lines can be a recipe for severe disruption to services and time and cost overruns. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w385

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1.1 The value of high speed rail is in providing good city centre to city centre communication. Spacing of stations should not be so close as to reduce the benefits of higher speeds. From European experience, spacing of around at least 100 miles is desirable. This would tend to rule out intermediate stops on the London to Birmingham route. 4.1.2 It is essential however, that stops are only provided where there is a verifiable demand for longer distance journeys. Any station locations outside city centres should be determined by the need to provide access particular facilities such as airports or to provide a major interchange point serving a wider hinterland.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.2.1 All the HSR studies have considered an eventual network to link London and HS1 with, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow to the north. The Y choice provides a basis to include all these points, although Transport Futures believes strongly that a commitment should be given now to include the North East and Scotland directly in the overall network. It is also important to ensure that both axes of the “Y” are committed to and progress in parallel. To do otherwise would lead to a serious imbalance in economic development in the northern regions and it is not considered economically justifiable for one part to proceed before the other. 4.2.2 There is also the potential for significant service improvements to destinations beyond the high-speed network using high-speed trains that can also operate on conventional lines. As the network develops in the medium term, direct services could potentially be introduced using both high speed and conventional lines. This approach of using high speed lines and conventional lines has been an important part of the success of the French TGV network and has been key to the phased expansion of that network over time. With successful operation of this type of service in UK, it is also possible to envisage the eventual development of more high- speed lines (eg to the West and South Wales) later in the century.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.3.1 The most pressing capacity issues are in the corridors leading into London, especially on the WCML. The greatest initial capacity benefit therefore will be achieved by constructing the London to Birmingham section first. However, the country will only fully realise the wider economic and environmental benefits of HSR when it extends to Manchester and Leeds and beyond to include the North East and Scotland. This is when the journey time savings and full economic and environmental benefits to the regions and the whole of eth UK generally will be fully achieved. 4.3.2 Current proposals for the Y network will reduce journey times from Birmingham to London by 50%; a roughly 45% cut from Leeds and Manchester, but only 23% from Scotland. Hence Scotland will be disadvantaged and remain relatively more peripheral to London and Europe unless it is included in the high speed network. 4.3.3 Consideration should therefore be given to phasing of extensions further north depending on a combination of capacity issues and potential maximum speeds on existing lines. What is important is that the government should set out a clear commitment to implement a network beyond Manchester and Leeds, to include the North East and Scotland. During these phases, earlier benefits can be achieved by constructing the elements of the new lines according to where greatest speed benefits can be obtained, which might mean construction from the northern end as well as sections in the middle. 4.3.4 HSR offers a once in a generation opportunity to transform the economic geography of the UK to support sustainable growth and international competiveness. However, it is essential that a new HSR network is developed in such a way as to maximise opportunities across the UK from the beginning, to ensure that the whole nation benefits.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.4.1 If UK regions are to derive full benefit from HSR, it is essential that a link to HS1 Is provided in the first stage. This will avoid disruption in the London area and additional costs which would be incurred if this were to be left until later. Providing through services to Europe from the UK regions will be a key factor in shifting passengers from air to rail and greatly assist business interaction with European markets. 4.4.2 Previous proposals to run Eurostar services northwards via a link built to the WCML did not materialise, partly as a result of such services being limited to international passengers. A way round such restrictions should be found to create a much more viable network of services, offering through services to destinations such as Brussels and Paris and interchange to a wide range of European destinations. International cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w386 Transport Committee: Evidence

services on the mainland of Europe cater for both domestic and cross-border passengers and restricting services in the UK only to international passengers will lead to less effective services into mainland Europe. 4.4.3 In the first phase, travel to Heathrow can be facilitated relatively easily via a station at Old Oak Common and it seems reasonable that a direct connection to Heathrow should be developed later. At that stage, consideration should be given to providing onward links from Heathrow to points further south and to Gatwick and how a new link to Heathrow can be incorporated into lines to the west in order to link high speed rail opportunities in this direction also.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north south economic divide? 5.1.1 The economic benefits of high speed rail are already apparent in other countries where there is clear evidence that it stimulates economic growth away from the capital. In Spain and France, the still expanding TGV networks have brought large scale change to centres such as Zaragoza in Spain and Lyons and Lille in France. In the latter case, a declining post industrial city with high levels of unemployment has been transformed into the France’s third financial, commercial and industrial centre. It is these sorts of benefits that we need to see in UK regional cities, especially in areas of current economic disadvantage in the north of England and Scotland. 5.1.2 Within the UK, HS1 has stimulated development in the Ashford area and in the Gravesend/Dartford area centred on the HS1 station at Ebbsfleet. 5.1.3 This experience, both in the UK and abroad, helps to give confidence about the beneficial effects of high speed rail in spreading economic wealth to the areas served by the network.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.2.1 As indicated earlier, facilitating regional regeneration should be one of the key objectives of high speed rail. The network should seek to improve connections to as many key centres in the regions as possible. It has already been noted that levels of economic activity and wealth need to be spread more fairly between regions in the UK and the HSR network will have a major role to play in improving accessibility to the northern regions, North Wales and Scotland. 5.2.2 Over the last thirty years, the economy of London and the south east has prospered at the expense other UK regions; in many areas of the north, there is an over reliance on public sector employment. The world class status of London and its proximity to mainland Europe has meant that other regions have not shared the prosperity of the European economic corridor stretching broadly from London to Milan. In transport terms, regions on the “wrong” side of London are at a significant disadvantage, which can be remedied by linking HS1 to HS2 and other strategic main lines to permit through passenger and freight services to mainland Europe, hence reducing the disadvantage of peripherality. 5.2.3 The current proposals for a Y shaped network would provide good connections to most of the major city centres in the East and West Midlands, North West, Yorkshire and Humber. Nevertheless, the need to link in the North East and Scotland must be included, as well as the potential to provide new freight routes using the classic network. Areas which could benefit from such an approach include Northern Ireland, by improving freight links to key west coast ports such as Holyhead, Liverpool, Heysham and Stranraer. It will also be important to use the associated benefits of HSR for freight to enhance connections to these and other ports for global and European trade, including East Coast ports such as Tees and Hartlepool, Tyne, Hull and Felixstowe, with the overall aim of minimising lorry miles.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.3.1 Potentially, by increasing overall network capacity, most regions of the UK should derive either direct or indirect benefits from a high speed rail network. Clearly, the main direct benefits will accrue to those regions directly serviced, but the benefit can be extended by linking high speed lines with the classic network in a way which maximises possibilities for longer distance services; the release of capacity on the existing network will also benefit more local journeys; for example, a much more frequent commuter service into London will be achievable on both the West Coast mainline from Rugby southwards and on the Chiltern Line for services from Warwickshire and Buckinghamshire into Marylebone. With the completion of later phases, local services on other lines will also benefit, for example, services on the East Coast Main line from Peterborough into Kings Cross. 5.3.2 A Greengauge21 study has advised that the business case for high speed rail is sufficiently robust when based on current fare levels for long-distance rail travel. If these levels are retained in real terms, services will cater for both business and leisure travel and hence be as inclusive as the current rail network. With increased capacity on high speed trains themselves, business travellers’ needs for working on the train could be accommodated through premium fares commensurate with facilities offered. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w387

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

5.4.1 It is appropriate for the private sector, where it directly benefits from new infrastructure, to contribute to its development. Opportunities will exist for private sector contributions to key stations if they are also linked with new developments in the immediate vicinity and a mechanism should be devised to ensure contributions can be secured from those interests that will particularly benefit from high speed rail and the location of new stations. However lessons should be learnt from the introduction of the Mayoral CIL (Community Infrastructure Levy) in London, where from 2012 schemes across the city will be charged whether or not they directly benefit. This arrangement could impact on the viability of some developments, including that of much needed housing.

5.4.2 Scope should also exist for attracting European funding as the HSR network will form part of the Trans European Network. The latest European Transport White Paper sets out a target to shift the majority of medium haul passenger travel to high speed rail by 2050.

6. Impact

6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

6.1.1 HSR has considerably lower carbon impact per passenger than either car or air travel. As power sources are progressively moved towards renewable resources, the carbon footprint from HSR operations will be reduced further.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

6.2.1 Given the academic challenges in doing this, we believe this to be generally the case.

6.2.2 Environmental benefits associated with high speed rail are mainly linked to carbon reductions and air quality, not only by more efficient propulsion per passenger for HSR itself compared with air or car, but also in the potential to reduce demands for short haul air and car based trips. It could be argued that as the full potential of this has not yet been scoped out, the environmental benefits may have been hitherto underestimated.

6.2.3 The DfT has made great efforts to ensure that the environmental impact in the sensitive landscape area of the Chilterns is minimised, both from the visual perspective and from the noise emitted. . In reality, as demonstrated on HS1 through Kent and indeed in other countries, the impact of a high speed railway, both visually and in terms of noise, can be reduced through careful choice of alignment and mitigating features and is considerably less than that of a three-lane motorway such as the M1 or M40. Motorways are yesterday’s solution to dealing with demand for transport and in overall terms, high speed rail will provide for high volume travel demands in a more environmentally friendly way. The careful planning that went into HS1 in Kent in this respect confirms that it is possible to construct a high speed railway without unacceptable environmental consequences.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network?

6.3.1 As alluded to earlier, release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line, already the key artery for freight in the UK, will lead to growth in rail freight services. The full potential for this does not seem to have been thoroughly scoped and will require supporting infrastructure and feeder services to be fully effective. Attention will need to be given to the location of freight transfer facilities to maximise the potential benefits of this.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

6.4.1 Clearly, a project of this magnitude cannot be delivered without some disruption and careful planning will be required to ensure that this is the least possible. In the case of Euston, similar circumstances at St Pancras with the Thameslink services and Midlands Line indicate that this should be manageable. Where possible, disruption could be reduced by diverting some services onto other suburban lines in the London area, for example via Old Oak Common and Cross Rail. Elsewhere, the advantage is that the route will be new- build and the only rail disruption should be the construction of connections back into the existing network. May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w388 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Atkins Ltd (HSR 145) Atkins has been involved in the debates over High Speed Rail (HSR) since its original study for the former Strategic Rail Authority between 2001 and 2003. In 2008, we produced an independent research paper341 which set out the ongoing case for investment in HSR in the UK. We have subsequently provided advice to the Department for Transport (DfT) and High Speed 2 (HS2 Ltd) on demand modelling and economic appraisal for HSR options, as well as investigating alternative options to HSR. We stress that this submission is an independent assessment of the issues raised by the transport select committee. It is not based on—and does not represent—any work or advice given to either DfT or HS2 Ltd.

1. What are the main arguments for and against HSR? 1.1 We strongly believe that HSR is the most effective way to provide capacity to the UK transport system in a way that encourages sustainable economic development and maximises efficiency of the overall transport network. In particular: — HSR provides a step change in the capacity of the rail network by removing the fastest services from the network and making space for more regional and local passenger services and freight trains. This capacity is needed to address the ongoing growth in both long-distance and commuter travel by rail. — The reduction in journey times between London and the main economic centres of Scotland, the North and Midlands will provide huge economic benefits that no other major transport scheme could provide. The majority of economic benefits from the scheme will be accrued by residents and businesses outside London. — The development of HSR stations and hubs can act as a focus for sustainable economic development in those areas, and encourage local transport networks to feed the hubs and increase accessibility of local employment opportunities. 1.2 We also recognise that HSR is a huge infrastructure project, which needs to be planned carefully, both to minimise the impact on local communities affected by construction and operation of new lines, and maximise the benefits of the investment in a new HSR network.

2. How does HSR fit with government objectives? 2.1 Importance of inter-urban connectivity: Although inter-urban trips make up only a small proportion of total travel in the UK, their impact on the transport network is large. Statistics from the National Transport Survey in 2009 showed that around 40% of car kms on the road network were associated with trips over 25 miles, with that figure rising to 75% of passenger kms being trips over 25 miles on the rail network. In other words, t strain on the transport network comes from catering for longer-distance journeys. 2.2 However, inter-urban and local connectivity are closely inter-related, particularly for rail and HSR. For HSR to be successful, the stations on the network need to be easily accessible—local connectivity is vital. In turn, development of rail and HSR hubs encourages local transport networks to develop around those hubs, creating a potentially symbiotic relationship. 2.3 From an economic perspective, inter-urban and local connectivity also complement each other. While inter-urban connectivity increases accessibility to markets for businesses, local connectivity is often more effective at increasing accessibility to skilled workforce, It would be misleading to describe either local or inter-urban connectivity as more important than the other. 2.4 Impact of HSR on funding for “classic” network: Because of the national scale of developing a HSR network across the UK, it is vital that investment in the existing rail network and services is not affected. To a certain extent, the High Level Output Specification (HLOS) process set up by the previous government provides a framework which requires the rail industry to ensure investment is targeted appropriately and fairly through setting targets on capacity, safety and reliability across the network. 2.5 Implications for domestic aviation: The UK domestic aviation market is highly competitive, and has historically competed with rail on both journey time and price. Recent research conducted by ATOC342 suggests that rail has started to regain market share, at least partly due to improved rail services on the West Coast Main Line (WCML) route. 2.6 If fully completed, international research343 suggests that mode share for HSR on the main Scotland to London routes could be up to 75%. It is unlikely that HSR would completely eliminate domestic aviation unless there was significant additional regulation imposed on domestic aviation. For example, while Eurostar enjoys a high mode share (around 70%) on the London to Paris route, three airlines fly 28 flights a day each way between the two cities. For many areas around the two cities, airports are still more accessible than the HS1 terminal at St Pancras. 341 “Because Transport Matters: High Speed Rail”, Atkins 2008 342 ATOC Press release 05 April 2011: Shift from air to rail heralds “turning point” in how people travel between UK’s main cities 343 “Competition and interaction between rail and air, part 2: time series analysis in Sweden”, Anna-Ida Lundberg, Bo-Lennart Nelldal, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Department for Transport & Logistics, KTH Railway Group (2011) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w389

3. Business case 3.1 Business case methodology: Atkins has assisted HS2 Ltd with development of its passenger forecasts, estimates of modal shift and calculation of economic benefits, all of which are consistent with government guidance and international best practice. We provide the following comments in two areas raised by the Inquiry: — Forecasts of passenger growth through to 2030 and beyond are inherently uncertain, but are vital to understand what the likely value for money of HSR would be, and, critically, ensure any scheme is designed with enough capacity to cater for the expected passengers. While HS2 forecasts of 95% growth in passengers over 100 miles from 2008 to 2043, we understand that passenger growth since 2008 on the current Virgin franchise has been between 20% to 30%344—ie already a quarter of the total forecast growth to 2043 in just two years. — Estimates of economic benefits associated with time savings are consistent with central Government guidance and are designed to allow meaningful comparison between different public investments. For each individual project, the standard methodology will necessarily over-estimate in some areas and under-estimate in others. For example, although there may be some use of productive travel time on high speed trains—which may reduce the value of overall time savings for business users—equally the methodology underestimates the productive time savings of those switching from car or air to HSR, and the overall generally higher value of time for business travellers who make long-distance trips. 3.2 Alternatives to HSR: Atkins was also appointed by DfT to undertake a study of potential alternatives to HSR, to increase capacity on the London to Birmingham corridor, through road and rail enhancement schemes. An independent challenge team developed realistic alternative schemes for providing more capacity on the route. We found that some of the upgrade packages—particularly a medium scale upgrade of the WCML route (“Package 2”)345—could offer value for money, although it would not provide the scale of capacity benefits or economic benefits that HS2 offers. 3.3 However, it would be wrong to interpret the analysis as showing that conventional rail upgrades offer better value for money than a high speed rail network for several reasons: 3.4 First, while Package 2 does provide additional capacity on the WCML route, HS2 would provide capacity relief on the parallel Midland Main Line (MML) and East Coast Main Line (ECML) routes as well through the eastern branch of the “Y” network. Only very minor capacity enhancements could be provided on those routes in a cost-effective way because of the mix of commuter and long-distance services. Furthermore, if passenger growth continued, it is unlikely that further capacity enhancements on the WCML could be undertaken in a cost-effective manner, and little of the additional capacity would be available during peak hours when it is most needed. 3.5 Second, the business case for HS2 focuses solely on the changes to long-distance services from Euston as a result of HS2 services being introduced. The development of a separate HSR network provides a step- change in the availability of spare capacity on the existing network to provide new inter-regional services (for example, Manchester Airport to Milton Keynes) that the limited capacity upgrades of existing routes either fails to provide or even removes as the intensity of use of the existing network increases. 3.6 Finally, HSR provides much greater network resilience, as the intensity of use of the expanded UK rail network is correspondingly reduced. Beyond improvements in service reliability, the availability of a new rail corridor would ameliorate the impact of temporary closure of any of the main trunk north-south routes due to major incidents. 3.7 Managing rail demand: There are other ways of managing rail demand, principally by either increasing fares on crowded services and routes or restricting ticket availability. In either case, the impact will be to encourage further travel by road or air. Since around a half of long-distance rail trips are made for leisure purposes, increasing rail fares to manage demand would affect the less well-off disproportionately. 3.8 Beyond the problems of increased congestion and pollution, this would also reduce the benefits of businesses locating in areas easily accessible by public transport, making sustainable economic development more difficult. In the long-term, developing a high speed rail network provides a more efficient rail network and actually reduces the ongoing operating cost per passenger km across the system, allowing additional capacity for regional and local trips to provided more cheaply. 3.9 Lessons from other major projects: The successful completion of HS1 into St Pancras contrasts heavily with the huge problems associated with the WCML upgrades started by Railtrack and taken forward by Network Rail. We believe the key lessons to take on board are: — Reducing and managing interfaces with the existing network effectively, including planning carefully to mitigate impacts on passengers. We believe work on the by Network Rail has demonstrated how this can be achieved even on a heavily used rail line. 344 Office of Rail Regulation’s National Rail Trends Yearbook 2010 345 “High Speed 2 Strategic Alternatives Study: London to West Midlands Rail Alternatives—Update of Economic Appraisal”, Atkins, February 2011. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w390 Transport Committee: Evidence

— Staged construction and development of the HSR network, reducing risk exposure to all parties and allowing early provision of benefits where possible. This was achieved on HS1 through construction of an early section reducing journey times into Waterloo International, and providing revenue streams to support further construction work. — At an early stage, robust external challenge by potential contractors of proposals, including technical and design standards, to drive down costs, eliminate any unnecessarily high specifications and improve deliverability.

4. The strategic route 4.1 Station locations: The reports by HS2 have shown that there may be a case for an intermediate station between London and Birmingham—possibly up to £2 billion present value (PV) in user benefits and £1 billion PV in revenue, depending on station location.346 This level of benefits and revenues would outweigh the costs of any station or services. However, in turn, stopping HS2 services at an intermediate station would have detrimental effects on a similar scale on passengers travelling between London and the North, and would reduce overall line capacity. 4.2 We agree with HS2’s assessment that, in the long term, the disbenefits of an intermediate station to longer-distance passengers would outweigh the benefits for users of that station. This situation would only change if capacity on the line, either because long-distance patronage was much below forecast or if a second HSR route into London was developed which diverted HSR services to the East Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East away from HS2. 4.3 The strategic locations for new stations in the West Midlands provide access to central Birmingham as well as accessibility by car from a large area of the West Midlands. We stress the importance of providing effective interchange with existing stations at New Street and International. 4.4 At present, the spur line into Birmingham is planned to be operated as a self-contained HSR route. The government should examine whether this section of route, which would neither be intensively used by HSR services nor operated at full high speed for significant lengths, could be developed as a conventional line, to allow more long-distance high speed services to be released from the existing crowded corridors in the West Midlands area. We also stress the importance of physical connections from the HSR station in central Birmingham to the existing rail network, to allow HSR services to continue south from Birmingham to the South and South West. 4.5 In London, Euston is by far the most appropriate central London location for a high speed rail station, from an engineering, economic and planning perspective. The case for a station at Old Oak Common is largely driven by providing access to a much wider catchment area via Crossrail, particularly from the East and West of London, and alleviating pressure on the Underground network at Euston station. However, we regard provision of this station as adding incremental value to the scheme, rather than an essential component. 4.6 Shape of proposed network: The “Y” network proposed by HS2 has significant strategic advantages, by using the additional capacity between Birmingham and London to benefit both the East and West Midlands, and both Yorkshire and the North West. This configuration also gives an opportunity to extend beyond Leeds and Manchester to Edinburgh/Glasgow via a west coast route, and to Newcastle via an east coast route, linking London by HSR with the largest core urban areas. 4.7 Depending on the level of passenger growth and on technical views of the effective capacity a new HSR line, there remain doubts as to whether a single route into London would be sufficient to provide HSR service to all major urban centres. At present, a combined total of 19 long-distance services (serving markets more than 100 miles from London) operate every hour on the WCML, ECML and MML routes, rising to 22 services in peak hours. 4.8 If only a single HSR route into London were to be provided, then inevitably some major urban centres more than 100 miles from London would not have direct HSR services, although they would continue to be served by residual services on the existing network. We note that there are currently four HSR lines from Paris, each of which carry about eight-12 TGV services an hour to both “online” and “offline” urban centres, and believe that it is likely there is a case for developing two separate high speed rail lines into London from the north, providing direct HSR services to many more regional centres. If sufficient capacity is provided, we believe there is a strong case for connecting as many cities as possible to the HSR network, through using HS2 as a “trunk” route, and accessing smaller stations on the existing network, as is the case on the German and French high speed rail networks. 4.9 We stress that the “Y” network does allow a further leg into London to be built, probably from the East Midlands, at a later stage. It is important that any route through the East Midlands is planned to facilitate a suitable second HSR route direct to London to be provided subsequently. It may also be worth examining whether a more direct connection from the main East Midlands centres to the main HS2 route to London further south of Birmingham could provide faster journey times to London from more centres in the East Midlands. 346 “HS2 Demand Model Analysis”, February 2010, Table 6.2b cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w391

4.10 We also recommend further examination of the relative merits of extending the “Y” network to Glasgow and Edinburgh via Newcastle, rather than a western route via the Lake District. 4.11 Staging: The first stage of the high speed network in the UK should be from London to the Birmingham and the Midlands, as this section would provide the greatest relief to the most heavily used sections of the UK long distance rail network and offer reduced travel times for the highest number of passengers and freight services. 4.12 However, there may be a case for considering completion of other regional sections of high speed rail at an earlier stage, to provide a greater spread of benefits across the UK. For example, early completion of a HSR route between Sheffield and Leeds, in conjunction with electrification/upgrade of the Midland Main Line route and a simple connection to the HS2 route near Lichfield, could provide reduced journey times from London to Derby (55 min from 1 hour 33 minutes), Sheffield (1 hour 20 minutes from 2 hours 07 minutes) and Leeds (1 hour 40 minutes from 2 hours 15 minutes). Journey times from Birmingham to the same areas would be similarly reduced, for example to Leeds by up to 45 minutes. 4.13 In turn, capacity could be released on the Midland Main Line and East Coast Main Line routes for more services from Nottingham, York, Newcastle and Edinburgh to London in advance of completion of high speed rail to those areas. Further sections of HSR route in other locations, such as between Newcastle and York, could also reduce journey times between London Kings Cross and Newcastle/Edinburgh in advance of connection to the London to Birmingham leg of the network. 4.14 Links to HS1 and Heathrow Airport: Until completion of a more extensive HSR network across the UK, which could be capable of accepting standard European high speed train sets, the prospects of extending HS1 services north onto HS2 are relatively limited—only Birmingham would be available during Phase 1. The connection between the two lines should only be built at an early stage if there are significant construction savings by doing so. 4.15 The phasing of any link to Heathrow is more complicated, and needs to be planned in conjunction with a wider strategy of medium and long-distance rail access to Heathrow. If any major new rail infrastructure to access Heathrow is built, it should be developed and designed in a way that facilitates rail access from other areas, including South West England and South Wales. 4.16 We note that the vast majority of Heathrow travellers, even those from outside London, come from areas which would not be directly served by HS2 services. As such, we recommend that links to any new Heathrow rail infrastructure are provided to the existing Chiltern, WCML, MML and ECML routes, allowing areas not on the HSR route, particularly closer to London, to benefit from connections to Heathrow. 4.17 Finally, we note that extending HSR services from HS1 at St Pancras through to Heathrow Airport would have the potential to reduce demand for short-haul flights from Heathrow to Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam. When combined with potential government intervention on prioritisation of flight slots at Heathrow and through-ticketing on HSR services, this could allow complete removal of some short haul flights at the airport.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 Economic regeneration: The extent to which HSR can assist in economic regeneration is heavily influenced by station location and the willingness/ability of individual cities to adapt their economic, land-use and transport policies around a new HSR hub. There is inevitably controversy and differing views on whether HSR provides net increases in inward investment in particular areas, or only diverts investment towards the HS2 hub and away from areas less well-served. We recommend this is examined further to ensure that cities and towns not currently proposed to be served by the HS2 network are not adversely affected. 5.2 Figures produced by HS2347 demonstrate that the majority of the economic benefits from high speed rail would accrue to residents and businesses outside London and the South East. While transport investment on its own cannot eliminate the north-south economic divide, the faster journey times between regional centres and London provide a significant incentive for businesses to locate significant skilled capability in regional centres, while still being able to maintain contact with the huge international base of potential customers in London and the South East. 5.3 We are not aware of any estimates of figures of job creation in individual areas which would be served by HSR. We emphasise again the need for local economic development and transport planning to be shaped around the increased inter-urban accessibility provided by HS2, including review of potential job creation for individual business sectors for each location. The benefits of HS2 come from joining up economic development and transport policies, not just from faster journey times. 5.4 Decisions on network shape: The development of a new HSR network is a national planning decision. The overall shape of the network has to be guided by transport and economic development priorities at a national level, reflecting the significant investment by the government. 347 “HS2 Demand Model Analysis”, February 2010, Table 10.4 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w392 Transport Committee: Evidence

5.5 Decisions on how individual cities and towns would be served after completion of HS2 should take local economic development needs into account. We stress that there are a number of options of how centres can be served, whether by dedicated stations on the HSR line itself, by services running off the HSR line and onto the existing network to serve multiple stations, or by improved long-distance services making use of released capacity on the existing network. These decisions should take into account development plans and priorities in the surrounding areas.

5.6 Distribution of benefits: The majority of benefits from HSR accrue to areas outside London, as described in HS2 reports and other research on HSR. This is principally due to the fact that more long-distance trips are made by residents and employees of firms based outside London and the South East.

5.7 Different socio-economic groups will benefit from HS2 in different ways: while long-distance trips are generally made by higher income groups, the released capacity on the existing network will primarily benefit those making shorter commuting trips and inter-regional trips, improving accessibility to employment opportunities for many communities.

5.8 Contributions from major beneficiaries: It is important that areas and businesses which benefit from HS2 contribute appropriately to the costs of the scheme. At the same time, higher local contributions may act against the aim of encouraging economic regeneration—a key objective of the HS2 scheme in the first place. However, it would be appropriate to require cities and towns to ensure transport and economic development policies maximise the impact of central government investment in HSR in their areas, and for businesses to contribute towards provision of other enabling infrastructure.

6. Impact

6.1 Impact on carbon emissions: Estimating the net impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions is not straightforward, and depends on a complex balance between the higher energy consumption of HSR compared to conventional rail, the energy mix used in electricity generation in the UK, and the amount of modal shift achieved by HSR.

6.2 For HSR to contribute towards a significant reduction in carbon emissions, it needs to encourage modal shift to rail not just from air—which makes up a relatively small proportion of transport-related carbon emissions in the UK—but also from car, particularly for shorter, urban car journeys on congested roads. It is vital that the planning of HS2 is not just around introduction of new, faster, long-distance rail services, but also about improving local and regional rail services to provide an attractive alternative to commuting by car. This also reinforces the “step change” advantage of developing a HSR network that piecemeal upgrades of the existing network cannot achieve.

6.3 Constructing a new line to operate at lower speeds might result in lower ongoing energy consumption for the rail network, but the much lower levels of mode shift achieved would mean that associated reductions in carbon emissions for air and car would be greatly reduced compared to HSR.

6.4 Environmental costs and benefits: We do not have any specific comments on the methodology used to calculate environmental costs and benefits in the HS2 business case. From a technical perspective we note that it is difficult to provide a quantified comparison between the environmental benefits at national and regional levels, and the disbenefits at local levels caused by construction of the route and operation of HSR services. We recommend a focus on assessing what appropriate levels of mitigation against local environmental disbenefits should be.

6.5 Impact on freight services: Again, we emphasise that the key advantage of HSR is the step-change release in capacity across the network. The current rail network is particularly constrained in peak periods, with extremely limited opportunities for freight services to operate due to the density of passenger train operation and the need to maintain overall rail network service reliability. HSR will provide much greater flexibility to operate freight services throughout the day and reduce vulnerability of freight service operation to closures of the “classic” rail network for maintenance and upgrade work.

6.6 We emphasise again the need to develop an overall strategy for how the existing rail network— particularly the WCML route—can be used to provide maximum benefits for passenger and freight users from the released capacity.

6.7 Disruption during construction: The recent work to upgrade the WCML route demonstrated the massive disruption that reconstruction of the rail network can cause, and is one of the main advantages of HS2 over further capacity enhancements on the WCML and other routes. The published HS2 proposals provide an outline plan of the areas and timings of how the existing rail network will be affected by HS2 construction. We note that the existing network will be affected not just around Euston, but also on the Great Western Main Line through the construction of the proposed Old Oak Common interchange.

6.8 While the staged approach at Euston, making best use of the much larger site for the final station, will alleviate disruption to passengers, we believe there is merit in looking at whether some services could be cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w393

diverted into Paddington, using some of the capacity released by Crossrail, to alleviate disruption to passengers during works at Euston. May 2011

Written evidence from the Campaign to Protect Rural England, Warwickshire Branch (HSR 146) High Speed 2 is the wrong type of high speed railway. What is needed is a realistic, economic and practical approach which upgrades the best of our existing major routes and adds new sections of line where necessary and environmentally feasible. The High Speed 2 proposal is a very costly separate, segregated railway with different standards, unable to be used by any trains than those specially built. It would serve just four cities, bypass several others, and seems orientated to serve airports rather than places where people live and work. There has been no public consultation on the principle of this concept compared to other approaches to upgrading the country’s main railway network. CPRE supports the development and improvement of our railways, so that taking the train becomes a better way to travel than car or plane where possible. But the exacting engineering specification of HS2—trains capable of speeds of 250 mph—mean that an acceptable alignment through the Warwickshire countryside is virtually impossible. In addition to the high speeds, the tracks will need to be wider apart and tunnels larger than on conventional railways. So very high speed lines are more expensive to construct and have a greater impact on the local environment. “Nature abhors a straight line”, wrote William Kent, the C18th landscape gardener who inspired Capability Brown. An almost straight railway line across 35 miles of Warwickshire countryside with its gentle hills, ancient woodlands and patchwork of fields will conflict with the whole character and patina of our landscape, which has evolved over many centuries. The deep cuttings, high banks and bridges across wide river valleys, and the loss of some houses (even a complete small village in the first draft of the route) will do serious damage to the County. There has been no public consultation on the design requirements. If the same speed as on the new line through Kent to the Channel Tunnel, 185 mph, is adopted, a line can be more curved, a mix of new and existing lines could be used and the county’s most beautiful countryside would be avoided. CPRE has set out five tests against which we believe that high-speed rail proposals in England should be judged. These have the objective of ensuring that new high-speed lines support sustainable development, respect environmental limits and will assist and not conflict with the sound planning of the areas it serves or crosses. They are to: (1) Protect the environment, by for example using existing transport corridors. (2) Tackle climate change and minimise energy needs. (3) Shift existing trips rather than generate new ones. (4) Improve local transport. (5) Integrate with planning and regional regeneration. These tests are not met by High Speed 2. (1) Existing transport corridors are not to be used at all. (2) The energy consumption is high. 50% more energy will be required to run HS2’s proposed 250 mph trains than the existing Eurostar London-Paris trains use. (3) There are no commercial flights from Birmingham to London to be switched to rail; instead the scheme would generate wholly new travel and lead to longer journeys as it enables more distant destinations to be reached in the same time. (4) The new line as so far proposed would have no links with local transport and no effective interchange with other rail services. (5) The line would not serve areas needing economic development—in the West Midlands Nuneaton, North Coventry, or the Black Country.

Actual Needs on the Rail System The most burdened inter-city main line is the West Coast Main Line between Euston and Rugby, and between Coventry and Birmingham. The 10-mile length between Rugby and Coventry is suitable for high speed and has adequate capacity. North of Rugby to Manchester and Liverpool, the Trent Valley line, which runs through northern Warwickshire, has considerable spare capacity following four-tracking of the two-track section in 2004–08. The need for more capacity is south of Rugby. Widening the Coventry-Birmingham line from two to four tracks is stated by Centro (West Midlands Passenger Transport Executive) to be needed whether HS2 is built or not. The mix of fast and local trains on cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w394 Transport Committee: Evidence

this line cannot be handled without separate tracks for the intensive stopping service that Centro wishes to offer. With four tracks between Coventry and Birmingham, high-speed trains could use the line and serve Birmingham International as now. A new central Birmingham station at Curzon Street would be of great benefit. But the HS2 Ltd proposal, a terminal station solely used by its segregated service, is the wrong type. Other services would have to continue to use the congested New Street station, which the current concourse-level reconstruction will not enlarge. The Arup proposal for a through “Grand Central” station at Curzon Street remains wholly feasible and should be recommended for appraisal now. It would: — provide for the full length of high-speed trains that international standards specify (400 m); — create a national rail interchange for movements across the country, to the standard of the most modern European stations (such as Berlin Hauptbahnhof); — facilitate direct interchange between high-speed trains, regional express services, Birmingham suburban lines, and the city’s tram system at one station; and — enable London-Birmingham high-speed trains to continue to Sandwell & Dudley, Wolverhampton, and (with electrification) Telford and Shrewsbury; they would not have to turn back at Curzon Street as would the trains proposed by HS2 Ltd. CPRE Warwickshire believes that the Transport Committee should recommend: — reconsideration of the type of high-speed railway represented by the HS2 Ltd proposal; and — national public consultation over the next year on: — The type of high-speed rail that the UK should have—a separate railway (as in Spain and as proposed by HS2 Ltd) or additions to the existing network (as in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy). — The design standards of any new lines—speed, curvature, loading gauge. — The scope for the existing major railway routes, or parts of them, to act as high-speed lines for speeds above 125 mph (200 kph). — What part in the future rail network should be played by new lines. — The provision of separate tracks, and where necessary routes, for freight. May 2011

Written evidence from Great Missenden Stop HS2 (HSR 147) Introduction 1. Great Missenden Stop HS2 is the umbrella organisation for communities in the Misbourne valley in the very heart of the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). This includes the villages of Little Missenden, Great Missenden, Ballinger, South Heath, Heath End and the larger settlement of , a population totalling well over 10,000. 2. In this submission, we avoid any discussion of the local impacts of the HS2 preferred route as that lies outside the scope of this inquiry. We would however like to extend an invitation to members of the select committee to visit Great Missenden in due course so that members can have an opportunity to discuss the many outstanding issues relating to the Government’s preferred route and in the absence of a full Environmental Impact Assessment. 3. Great Missenden Stop HS2 would respectfully remind the Transport Select Committee of the Public Accounts Committee’s observations of November last year that: “The unique and complex structure of the rail industry makes it inherently cumbersome and expensive, and provides little external challenge to its vested interest in its own growth. The Department should conduct a fundamental review of the rail industry’s structure, to ensure better accountability and value for money, with the aim of reducing conflicts of interest, aligning efforts on maximising efficiency, and restraining the tendency to seek solutions through growth.” This should form part of the Transport Select Committee’s considerations.

Question 1. “What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?” 4. The committee’s starting point should be consideration of how the term “High Speed Rail” is defined. Great Missenden Stop HS2’s understanding is that for newly constructed lines, “high speed” is a minimum of 140 miles per hour. The Campaign to Protect Rural England points out that: “While High Speed 1, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, was designed for 300 km/h (186 mph), HS2 is proposed to cater for very high speeds of 400 km/h (250 mph). No services in Europe currently operate faster than 330 km/h.” (Campaign to Protect Rural England, August 2010, High Speed 2 Statement ) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w395

Speed is key here because it determines the design of the route and the amount of energy required, both of which are of huge environmental significance. 5. It is also noted that the Inquiry is into the strategic case for High Speed Rail, although this is not defined, rather than the specific case for High Speed 2. GM Stop HS2 believes strongly that it is possible to support the strategic case for “high speed rail” as defined as a minimum speed of 140 mph, without endorsing HS2. 6. Indeed, we take the view that it is crucial that the two ie HS2 and “high speed rail” remain distinct. This is because the HS2 proposals envisage an ultra-high-speed not high speed line with trains travelling at 225— 250 miles per hour—well above the defined minimums and in excess of the European average for high speed rail. There are specific issues relating to the proposal of a dedicated line capable of accommodating those speeds. To quote the CPRE again: “400 km/h was chosen as the maximum track speed [for HS2]—without any consultation—as it was believed to the maximum speed possible for track based trains…. ‘Lines designed for very high speeds have to be very straight, making it harder to fit them in with the landscape and avoid sensitive areas. In addition a bigger gap between tracks is needed, while tunnels must be wider to allow trains to pass safely. So very high speed lines are considerably more expensive to construct and have a greater impact on the local environment… very high speeds mean… much more energy is needed for propulsion. For example, a train travelling at 36 0km/h requires 50% more energy than one travelling at 300 km/h. Very high speed rail would only save a couple of minutes for most trips at huge cost financially and to the local environment.’ (Campaign to Protect Rural England, August 2010, High Speed 2 Statement)”.

Question 2. “How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?” 7. Question 2.1 asks: “HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?” We note that a significant plank of the Department for Transport’s policy has been omitted—the travel reduction strategy. 8. The travel reduction strategy was announced by Mr Hammond last autumn. In a speech on Sustainable Transport at the START Summit on 14 September he said: But you might be surprised to know that the most innovative change we have made in the Department for Transport in the last four months is to introduce a portfolio responsibility for “non-travel”. Promoting alternatives to travel is a key part of the sustainability agenda. And although it has not traditionally been thought of as a transport responsibility, I have decided that we should integrate it into our transport agenda. So my colleague, Norman Baker, is working with colleagues at DCMS, in BIS and in other Departments to look at reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business. Encouraging home working; promoting the use of high-speed broadband for both business and leisure purposes and encouraging the uptake of video conferencing as an alternative to long-distance travel. No, it is not the mission of the Department for Transport to stop people travelling, but unnecessary travel is expensive in environmental and financial terms and, if we can help businesses to understand the opportunities to operate efficiently with a need for less travel, we will be advancing both their agendas and our own. (Rt Hon Philip Hammond, IBM START Conference) 9. Hence alternatives to travel should be considered as one of the transport policy objectives. This is particularly the case with High Speed Rail since Mr Hammond specifies video-conferencing as an alternative to long-distance travel. 10. We recognise that firm evidence of the take-up of business broadband as an alternative to travel is limited because it is happening so rapidly. Nonetheless the National Statistics Office’s latest report, published in November 2010, states that “…the largest businesses continued to lead the way with adoption of new technology. However, smaller businesses were closing the gap with increasing numbers using broadband and mobile Internet, developing websites and using the Internet to interact with public authorities…Just over 91% of businesses had Internet access in 2009, with 87.4% connecting via a broadband connection.” (Office for National Statistics, 26 November 2010, E-commerce and ICT activity 2009, Statistical Bulletin). 11. In addition, the Government itself is investing in video-conferencing equipment—for example in the Welsh Office—to reduce travel and so cut costs and increase efficiency. It is now possible for businesses that do not have their own facilities to rent video-conferencing facilities for specific meetings through companies like Regus, which provides serviced office accommodation. Travel companies are now offering “video-travel” packages as an alternative to arranging business trips. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w396 Transport Committee: Evidence

12. These changes offer the likelihood of a reduction in demand for business travel which should be taken into account when projecting long distance rail passenger demand into the future.

Question 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north- south economic divide?

13. The Government claims that one of the major benefits of HS2 is that faster journey times will reduce the North-South divide, but it is more likely that regional disparity will increase as business investment and leisure travel is drawn to the capital. 14. Far from boosting regional employment during construction, the department for Transport’s new business case suggests that 70% of the jobs created by high speed rail will be in London. In addition, outside the immediate urban centres served by HS2, it is likely that the wider regions will suffer as investment and jobs are sucked away from towns and cities off the route, reflecting the experience in France for example.

Question 6. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? 15. We agree with Friends of the Earth and other environmental organizations, that at best the impact of HS2 on reducing UK carbon emissions will be negligible and that at a time of austerity the Government should be prioritizing upgrading our existing rail network and other genuinely sustainable transport alternatives. 16. Although Ministers have largely dropped the “green” justification for HS2 in recent months, carbon emission reductions are still a claimed benefit of the scheme, in part because of the promised reduction in domestic air travel that the Department suggests will follow once the Y section of the route is complete. The first stage of the scheme will have no such benefits as there are no domestic flights between London and Birmingham. We would submit however that HS2 is likely to lead to significantly increased emissions due to its energy demands as noted in paragraph 7 above. 17. The danger with HS2 specifically (as opposed to more incremental improvements to deliver “high speed rail”) is that it will actually lead to an increase in domestic air travel emissions, as Birmingham airport expands significantly to take advantage of the reduced train time to central London and Heathrow airport runway slots are used instead for more carbon intensive long haul flights. The only way in which this could be avoided, if HSR is really intended to form part of a strategic solution to long-term transport carbon emission reductions, would be to retire the domestic flight slots altogether. 18. The vast majority of emissions from UK domestic passenger transport, come not from domestic air travel, diesel train services or long distance commuting at all but from short car journeys. HS2 and HSR will not provide a low carbon alternative for these trips of typically less than five miles and where the Committee on Climate Change has pointed out that comparatively small investments in car journey alternatives deliver significantly greater carbon emission reductions. May 2011

Written evidence from Star Alliance Services (HSR 148)

Star Alliance is the largest global airline alliance, carrying more than 600 million passengers each year on a fleet of over 4,000 aircraft, with annual revenues in excess of $150 billion. Our member airlines control one third of slots at Heathrow, one of Star Alliance’s main global hubs. We therefore have a keen interest in the Committee’s important Inquiry. Star Alliance believes that there are a number of key principles to be considered in the relationship between Heathrow, HS2 and also classic rail. We are pleased to provide this response to some of the questions posed by the Inquiry.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR Taking Europe as an example, our experience is that the European Commission’s transport policy and member country transport strategies are well aligned in adopting an integrated, intermodal approach. These policies provide seamless connectivity between air and rail, providing an important argument for HSR by, for example, allowing the most appropriate modal choice for each journey, reducing the environmental impact of air travel by allowing rail access to airports, and releasing scarce capacity at slot constrained airports for long haul flights. Star Alliance is concerned that the current consultation proposals on HS2 adopt a different approach, treating aviation and HSR in isolation, and with Heathrow served only by a remote rail interchange for at least the first phase of HS2. In our view, this does not assist either the argument or business case for HSR and, when considered alongside other constraints on Heathrow, puts the UK’s competitive position at risk. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w397

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives 3. What are the implications for domestic aviation? Heathrow has seen a steady decline in domestic destinations served, and the frequencies of those services that remain. In the absence of a rail alternative, this makes access from the regions to the UK’s only international airport more difficult, directly affecting the UK’s competitiveness. HSR could improve access to Heathrow, which would benefit the UK economy as a whole and strengthen Heathrow’s hub operations by enlarging its currently very limited, (principally London and the South East), catchment. HSR could also potentially allow some domestic flights to be replaced by rail. However, with domestic flights accounting for only 6% of Heathrow’s capacity, this would be unlikely to provide significant additional capacity. The majority of domestic destinations currently served from Heathrow would not be connected by HSR until phase 2 of HS2 and journey times, even by HSR, may not be competitive with air. However, as discussed below, we do see potential for HSR to compete for interline traffic with short haul flights between some UK region’s and European hub airports.

3. Business case 1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? HS2’s business case appears to be flawed in its assumptions of Heathrow demand. This is significant as it has informed their decisions on the HS2 route, leading to the original proposal to bypass Heathrow altogether and the more recent decision to serve Heathrow via a spur, as a second phase of HS2, (with possible extension to form a loop as a third phase). HS2 Ltd’s have assumed that improving rail access to Heathrow has no effect on the airport’s geographic markets and the size of demand within those markets. This appears to misunderstand the reality of airport markets. For example, Birmingham, although only 100 miles from Heathrow, currently generates very few Heathrow passengers. Whilst it is possible to drive to the airport, the UK’s congested road network makes journey times unreliable. Rail access is also difficult, requiring a change of train in London, and a cross- London journey by Underground, and another change onto Heathrow Express or the Piccadilly Line. Research, and our experience, clearly shows that even one interchange in an airport access journey acts as a significant disincentive to choosing rail. Birmingham therefore largely relies on short haul flights to European hub airports to access global markets. This is attractive to those airlines and airports seeking to attract transfer traffic and strengthen their hub operations at European hubs such as Charles de Gaulle, Schiphol and Frankfurt. It also weakens Heathrow’s hub operations through reliance on smaller, less well connected markets. Birmingham, and other UK regions without domestic flights to Heathrow, are also placed at an economic disadvantage in only being able to access global markets by short haul flights and interlining at European hubs. This increases overall journey times, with infrequent connections to hubs without Heathrow’s high levels of connectivity and frequency. it also reinforces market perceptions of UK’s regions peripheral location within Europe. If HS2 served Heathrow directly this would provide very short journey times, avoiding interchange penalties, and providing access to Heathrow’s global route network and high frequencies. It would also remove the interchange penalty associated with current access journeys, and the proposal for a remote interchange at Old Oak Common. Taking the example of Birmingham, we would expect to see passengers choosing to travel by HSR to interline through Heathrow, instead of taking short haul flights to European hubs. With a high frequency of HSR services, and recognizing Heathrow’s unrivalled service frequency and connectivity, we would also expect overall journey times from the regions to be reduced compared to interlining through European hubs, benefiting UK plc. European experience clearly demonstrates that improving rail access increases an airports catchment area. For example, Frankfurt airport’s direct high speed rail connection has brought much of Germany closer to the nation’s hub airport, with almost 20% of air passengers now travelling over long distances to and from the airport by high speed train. This allows German regions to be internationally competitive, with direct access to the global route network and frequency that only a hub airport can provide. Improved accessibility also increases competition between airports, driving up standards and keeping costs competitive. We would therefore expect an integrated, high frequency HSR service to expand Heathrow’s catchment. HS2 Ltd’s demand modelling, and the decision that HS2 should bypass Heathrow, therefore requires reassessment. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w398 Transport Committee: Evidence

4. The strategic route 4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? As currently proposed, Heathrow will be reliant on a branch line connection with HS2 via a remote interchange at Old Oak Common until the 2030’s. We do not believe this is acceptable, particularly when Heathrow’s short term competitive position is threatened by the UK’s approach to aviation tax, uncompetitive user charges and lack of capacity. We would also urge Government to reconsider their proposals for a spur under phase 2 of HS2. Whilst this removes the interchange penalty that is unavoidable with the Old Oak Common interchange, a spur is likely to be served by a relatively infrequent service of trains compared to the main HS2 route between London and the north. The current consultation does not include any detail of, or request comment on, the proposed spur or loop to Heathrow. We welcome Government’s revised remit to HS2 Ltd, which has at least highlighted the flaws in the Old Oak Common interchange. However, it is not credible to proceed in isolation with significant decisions on a first phase of HS2 without considering how best to serve Heathrow, at least cost, with the least environmental impact and with the greatest overall benefits. Heathrow’s airlines and BAA have confirmed that a remote interchange is the least acceptable way of connecting HS2 and Heathrow. Our analysis also concludes that a spur or loop have inherent disadvantages—they are costly to build and to operate, require two interchange stations at Old Oak Common, (for Crossrail) and Heathrow, and provide a much lower frequency service than a station on a through line. Airlines recognize the resulting service frequency penalty as having a significant effect on demand, comparable to an interchange penalty. European experience, (Charles de Gaulle, Schiphol and Frankfurt), clearly demonstrates the benefits of HSR directly serving hub airports on through lines, not spurs or loops. Brussels, which has been restricted to access over a spur, is now reconfiguring its rail infrastructure at considerable cost to allow through HSR services. A direct connection between rail and air has also been proven to assist the business case for high speed rail. It also reduces cost and environmental factors, as it requires less route mileage, and only one interchange station. We believe that proper assessment of an alternative HS2 route is therefore essential. This should assume an HS2 route at or near Heathrow, serving an “on-airport” interchange and providing a one seat ride to the airport from a range of destinations via HSR and classic rail. We would make the important point that an “on-airport” station does not have to be located within the existing airport boundary, if this results in an unacceptable deviation of the HS2 alignment, significant journey time penalties for non-airport passengers or a significant cost penalty due to the inevitable challenges of major construction in, or under, the operational airfield. Recognising that Heathrow occupies the smallest site area of any major international airport, and the dispersed nature of Heathrow’s terminals, sites outside the existing airport boundary should be explored, particularly if this allows better connectivity and alignment with HS2, the existing rail network—particularly the Great Western Main Line—and the local motorway network. The over-riding objective is not necessarily to minimise the distance between train and plane, but to balance journey time, seamless connectivity and costs, in order to achieve the best possible passenger experience and least environmental impact. An integrated, intermodal solution, (along the lines of Arup’s Heathrow Hub proposal), could also release valuable space within the airfield, allowing more space for larger aircraft, improving operational efficiency and resilience, improving air quality and enhancing the passenger experience. We recognise that Government policy has the objective of a better, not bigger Heathrow. However, the reality is that Heathrow’s passenger numbers are likely to significantly increase as the economy recovers, even with a two runway airport and without breaching current planning limits. This is outside of Government influence as market forces—in part influenced by changes in BAA’s airport user charges—leads to airlines replacing small aircraft on short haul flights with larger aircraft serving long haul routes. We would argue that this, within a supportive and realistic policy framework, can provide significant, if not essential, benefits to the UK economy. Without an integrated approach to improve Heathrow’s surface access, such growth could have significant local impacts on road congestion and local air quality. It could also accelerate the UK’s regions competitive disadvantage as domestic connectivity declines. In the worst case, it could herald the start of Heathrow’s, and the UK’s, decline as an internationally competitive hub. We therefore believe that there is an urgent need for an integrated, intermodal, affordable and deliverable transport strategy to secure a sustainable future for Heathrow. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w399

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

Government has made clear that Heathrow’s users would be expected to make a financial contribution to the cost of a spur or loop. The comparatively small benefits that could be provided by a limited service over a spur are disproportionate to the very high cost of infrastructure that is, by the nature of a spur or loop, only of benefit to airport users.

It is also not clear whether HS2 services would be required to operate on an entirely commercial basis. If that is indeed the case, we doubt whether Heathrow, although a major traffic generator, could provide the very large numbers of passengers necessary to provide a commercial return on services to a wide range of destinations, operating at a frequency high enough to overcome any service frequency penalty and justifying use of train paths on the main HS2 route, (since each Heathrow service would take up a path that could otherwise be used for London or European services).

There is a significant risk that, if a first phase of HS2 is built as currently envisaged, a spur, or even more expensive loop, may not then follow, as a result of funding and/or the lack of a credible business case. In either case, Heathrow, the country’s only hub airport and the busiest international airport in the world, would be relegated to a remote HS2 interchange at Old Oak Common.

We therefore conclude as follows: — It is essential that HS2 and Heathrow are fully integrated as part of an affordable and deliverable intermodal strategy. Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam all provide precedents for this approach; — Heathrow’s need for much improved surface access should not be solely focused on HS2, but as part of an integrated approach that includes early surface access improvements through seamless connectivity with Crossrail and classic Great Western Main Line services from the Thames Valley, Wales, the West and South West; — Heathrow requires an “on-airport” station on the direct high speed route in the first phase of HS2, not a remote interchange at Oak Common, nor a spur or loop, in order to provide the required range and frequency of services necessary to achieve modal shift, improve market access, and maintain Heathrow’s international competitiveness; — An “on-airport” station does not have to be located within the existing airport boundary, if this results in an unacceptable deviation of the HS2 alignment or a significant cost penalty, and if an alternative site provides better overall connectivity and benefits.

We trust these comments are helpful and would welcome the opportunity to assist the Inquiry in any way that the Committee may feel appropriate. May 2011

Written evidence from Socialist Environment and Resources Association Scotland (HSR 149)

The Socialist Environment and Resources Association Scotland (SERA Scotland) campaigns for our sustainable environment, economy and society. A transport system both environmentally friendly and inclusive in economic terms is a priority. High Speed Rail has particular implications for Scotland. SERA Scotland aims to meet the Parliamentary Committee’s request for concise responses. Several millions of pounds have been expended by the Department for Transport (DfT) and related studies on the High Speed Rail (HSR) project. It is beyond the means of our voluntary group to analyse completely the DfT study findings. However, further details could be provided if specifically requested. This response follows, as requested, the format proposed in the consultation.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?

That Britain’s South—North railway system, in particular the West Coast Main Line (WCML), is already almost at capacity and unable to cope with demand. Additional tracks are the only solution. Tinkering with the already full WCML in the late 1990’s was a financial disaster. Additional tracks have to be built to modern standards without low speed restrictions but not necessarily to the very high speeds proposed.

Present railfreight demand is very much suppressed by the large subsidy lavished on the road haulage sector. Transfer of more freight from road to rail would make a more significant reduction in CO2 emissions. The other aims of economic regeneration and CO2 reduction by a switch from air travel are less clear. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w400 Transport Committee: Evidence

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? HSR is designed, but only amongst other objectives, to improve inter-urban connectivity. HSR is only fully justified taking into account these other objectives such as increased capacity for regional and local passenger services and railfreight services. Increased railway capacity in terms of additional tracks is an important investment for the future and more important than even further expansion of the strategic road network. Investment in the road network should be changed to the objective of safer, more environmentally friendly roads designed so as not to increase the overall level of road traffic any further.

2. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? HSR must justify its investment and not reduce the effectiveness of the rest of the rail system. This will be the duty of the Government and the Rail Businesses. It will take into account that an objective of HSR is to free capacity on the rest of the system. Some evidence from other countries is that their “classic” rail operations have become very much downgraded with the advent of their HSR. This must not happen in Britain. It should, however, be noted that a great proportion of the passenger overcrowding repeatedly emphasised in the DfT Study is due to lack of rolling stock and the fixed formation train design. Outside the S.E. England Commuter belt few trains are operating at maximum length and the recent DfT design for new inter-city trains are for short length fixed formations.

3. What are the implications for domestic aviation? Nothing to which aviation cannot adapt. The bulk of domestic aviation susceptible to HSR has already been lost to the 125 mph railway (but not in Scotland). Aviation’s challenges are future fuel prices, security and being brought into the tax regime. HSR may give aviation advantages in higher value longer flights.

3. Business case 1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? The assumptions and methodology cannot be robust. The variables and timescales take us all too far into the unknown. The DfT Study has, however, investigated as thoroughly as possible and used all the advised methodologies and procedures. These, in theory, allow comparison with other investment options but, even since the study was undertaken, some of these methodologies have been discredited or changed. The essential point is to use strategic “common sense”. Any HSR must be sufficiently flexible to be a future asset under the almost certainly changing World conditions of next 60 years and at an affordable cost. The secondary point of the financial effect on the “Classic” system is a very significant detail. The DfT Study includes large cost savings for the classic system but this response did not find quantification of reduction in income (it must have been quantified). The concern is that these main lines were working and earning at almost full capacity which may be diluted with some diversion to HSR. It is generally assumed that the “Inter- city” services provided the lion’s share of profitable income. This is not necessarily true as the 1990’s WCML Renewal was a financial disaster. The DfT Study appears to concentrate on the generally correct view that there is suppressed demand on the existing main lines which will be satisfied on introduction of HSR. There is the issue of the Classic Lines beyond the proposed phases of HSR and if these are not yet at capacity then HSR will increase their demand and earnings.

2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? This is THE most important question and depends on what is meant by “conventional”. It is clear that additional tracks are essential. The existing WCML cannot be tinkered with any more. The 1990’s attempt to renew the very busy railway while trains were running was a disaster. It must not be tried again. The other main lines can and should be improved but would still provide insufficient capacity. Additional semi- independent tracks are essential but at what speed? There can be little doubt that a reliable, comprehensive 100 mph railway system would meet better all the objectives except competition with motorways and airlines. Environmentalists are concerned about the negative effects (particularly energy consumption) of the 225 mph design and it is understood Network Rail expressed concerns about the increased costs of maintenance at these speeds. Energy demand is approximately proportional to the square of the speed and at some speed HSR will have no energy advantage over air travel. SERA Scotland believes a sustained 155 mph is possibly the best compromise with much lower CO2 emissions and costs although it is appreciated that track alignments should allow for higher speeds. These 155 mph speeds, if sustained, should be competitive with air between Central Scotland and London. Even 225 mph would not be competitive with air between Northern Scotland and cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w401

London. The train at 125 mph has effectively already captured the airline market between London and Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Yorkshire and even Newcastle. The DfT Study should review the design speed. Its findings are that the very high speed would divert more traffic at higher fares giving a better business case. This depends on assumptions such as “Load Factor” which is a difficult assumption and, in any case, is supposedly already at a maximum south of Newcastle and Lancashire. Should an assumed business case take precedence over an environmental case? The other view is that for the 225 mph design proven equipment is available “off the peg” from overseas. This is not exactly true because of loading gauge restrictions but there is a concern about designing a “British” solution. It is understood that in France and China, leaders in HSR, a lowering of maximum speeds is under way because of high running costs.

What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? The railway is already doing this, fares are too high and complex, and it is damaging our environment and social and economic inclusion.

What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? Careful consideration by Government, designers and practical, experienced contractors and operators such as Network Rail. Many large projects are built on time and budget, and, if this is the implication, it is not just some rail projects which go over budget. The DfT Study costings include large “optimisation” costs which are unhelpful and effectively a “fiddle factor”. One important point is that any statutory acts for HSR must include all the margins needed for construction works, not just the final product, and comprehensive site investigation is essential prior to costing .

4. The strategic route 1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? There is concern about the Phase 1 Route through the “greenfield” Chilterns. This is chosen primarily because it is cheaper to construct through undeveloped countryside rather than along an existing corridor. There is something environmentally wrong with this even if the same decision has been taken in the past for routing motorways. A route along the existing WCML/M1 Corridor would be preferred, even at higher cost, but not intertwined with the existing WCML tracks. The DfT Study has put a lot of consideration into this decision and we appreciate the dilemma. There are many other advantages and disadvantages in following the developed WCML/M1 corridor but space in this response does not allow a repetition of the arguments. There is no justification for a station between Old Oak and Birmingham International. It is felt Euston is the right terminal but although Old Oak Common is a very clever intervention to meet the new Government’s changed specification it does have other implications and it has to be asked if it should be either Old Oak OR Euston rather than Old Oak and Euston. The Birmingham City terminal should be at New Street but the difficulties are understood and a Curzon Street Terminal is unlikely to affect Scottish interests but where will HSR trains from the North terminate in Birmingham?

2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? All the northern cities should be served one way or another. Serious thought should be given to Glasgow, Edinburgh and Carlisle and this may be included in the December 2011 announcements? The “Y” proposal is correct, notwithstanding the preference for the “Y” to follow the existing transport corridor. The previous view of a sinusoidal route through the middle of practically every northern city was completely impractical and counter-productive. It should be appreciated that with a maximum capacity of 15 trains per hour on HSR compared to all the longer distance departures from the four north London terminals then a single HSR will be insufficient and that a “Kings Cross” route more direct to Yorkshire will be required at some future date. However, the “Y” branch to Yorkshire would be fully utilised on just NE to SW services.

3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? It cannot be done in any other way although the main justifications given, diversion from airlines and freeing capacity, cannot be achieved until Central Scotland is included. Effective air diversion has already been achieved from Lancashire and Yorkshire southwards. It is Scotland to the South, including Manchester, where the gains are to be made. SERA Scotland also suggests that, given financial uncertainties, the big terminal constructions at Euston and Curzon Street (and even Old Oak) should be phased later while capacity and speed gains are made on the main part of the route at an earlier stage. Initial use of existing terminals has been a cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w402 Transport Committee: Evidence

feature of British, and many other, HSR proposals. The Chiltern route may preclude this but the other British practice of chipping away at costs will surely re-visit this aspect of phasing. Note that Network Rail’s WCML Rail Utilisation Strategy suggests only minor journey time reductions to Scotland within the early phases of HS2 compared to “conventional” trains with a similar reduced number of station stops.

4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? Yes, and for the clear reasons given in the DfT Study.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? The DfT Study tries hard to find evidence but is not convincing. As is the case with motorways an individual change in transport tends to move development around with some locations more advantaged, others disadvantaged and just a slight overall improvement. The suggestion that a new terminal will “create” 400 new jobs cannot be justified any more than a new supermarket would create 400 truly additional jobs. Jobs are gained and jobs are lost. Safeguarding our transport system against oil price rise and availability is important for the North-South divide but if motorway and airline services ever become unaffordable then HSR, in contrast to conventional rail, would become less of a priority. The actual construction work would be a welcome improvement to employment with expenditure mainly retained within Britain, unlike the purchase of foreign built trains. Apparently, according to industry sources, Britain is so far behind with HSR technology that we cannot teach China anything.

2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? In contrast to the above response HSR can advantage and disadvantage local and regional economies and this has to be thought out. However, the main objectives of HSR, environment, capacity and possibly commercial return, should not be lost in attempts to serve all markets by primary HSR services. There is a well founded concern that existing centres will lose good train services and that on the “classic” lines HSR extended services will be pre-eminent and squeeze off local passenger and freight train services. A further study by DfT is due to report in December 2011. Throughout the DfT Study there is continuous mention of “releasing capacity” on classic lines by-passed by HSR but there is no guarantee that previous services will actually be replaced by local/regional services. In particular, the DfT Study mentions many times the City of Lille in Northern France where a declining industrial city campaigned and won a HSR line through the city centre with a station served by HSR trains. There is not, however, a single mention of a British “Lille” in the DfT Study. In fact the inference is that potential “Lilles” will be bypassed and that cities such as Carlisle will not be on the eventual HSR system at all.

3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? Considering the thorough detail in the DfT study this subject is not well treated. Some locations will gain a competitive advantage but there must be an absolute commitment to having a second and third tier of train services which will connect into HSR services and fill gaps left by HSR lines. The faster and more segregated a HSR service is then the more likely premium fares and supplements will be charged. This is not made clear in the Study. If not properly guaranteed then less wealthy people will lose out on HSR, especially for short notice travel and it is often the least wealthy who cannot take advantage of loss-leader advance fares. Additionally, without safeguards, people may have to have a car to access HSR services both adversely affecting poorer people and damaging the environment. These are dangers which must be addressed.

How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? While all funding streams should be assessed we do not recall, for example, motorway building being funded by local businesses and local authorities. This is essentially a duty for railway Businesses and Government (including Scottish Government). Local authorities can help by co-operation on planning and roads issues. Professional planning can save a lot of money and time. We imagine that at this very moment planning authorities somewhere are granting consent for adverse development on previous and potential railway land or insisting that rail projects in their area fund incidental road improvements. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w403

6. Impact 1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? The DfT Study gives a wide range of CO2 savings or increases, depending on assumptions, with which SERA Scotland concurs. It seems that most divertable domestic air travel from Lancashire/Yorkshire southwards has already been diverted. For CO2 a compromise on speed is essential. SERA Scotland suggests 155 mph but that is arguable. Secondly, the diversion of heavy freight from road haulage is an essential element. Road haulage should pay more of its true costs and there should be no further increase in the size of lorries operating on the public street. Additionally, HSR must not be an incentive for people to drive long distances to major park and ride terminals. A comprehensive second and third tier train service (as well as integrated buses) is essential to connect with HSR and fill gaps left by HSR. The advantage of railways is the ability to run on electricity. CO2 emissions depend on the method of electricity generation but the trend, fully supported by SERA, is towards renewable low CO2 modes of generation. One eccentric concept is that, as HSR is new then its electricity must be drawn from the marginal pool and therefore coal generated. This should be dismissed. Another is that of “embedded” CO2 which the DfT Study considers. As railways last for a century or more and as all rails are inevitably recycled it is difficult to see railways being worse than the alternatives. A particular issue for CO2 comparison is load factor and this is essential in making CO2 comparisons between different modes. Presently the conventional main lines are at very high load factors (according to DfT Study) and it is difficult to see how occupancy could be raised further. To do so would require practically all travel to be booked in advance which would be counter-productive. People would just go by car instead. Flexible length train formations would help load factors.

2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? Probably not despite good attempts by the DfT Study. Environment aspects always have to be considered both in and outside the business case. While noise is important it can be overstated. The author of this response lives next to the WCML which operates 24/24 (HSR is proposed to operate 18/24). This community does not appear affected by the train noise and, in reality, people try to build new houses right next to the railway. When planning consent has been withheld they have gone to appeal and won. It is the change of circumstances which gets people upset not the actual noise itself. Existing transport corridors should be prioritised for HSR.

3. What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? Beneficial where capacity is released but very problematical should HSR trains be prioritised beyond the new HSR line limits, in particular the lines to Scotland where HSR extended trains may conflict with freight and local passenger services. DfT is to report later in the year and Scottish Government should take active interest.

4. How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? A lot less than previous WCML disruption. Euston will probably be reviewed with the possibility of a deeper low deck, shorter HSR trains (but longer than at present) or even abandoning Euston in favour of an Old Oak Common Terminal. A practical review should be made by Network Rail.

Summary Points An additional double track between London and Scotland is essential for capacity. Design speed should be commensurate with objectives and not the highest attainable. The existing WCML cannot be modified again to increase speed/capacity. A long term investment, HSR should be capable of mixed use in future if required. The “Y” route strategy is supported, an additional east HSR may be needed in future The main route should follow the WCML/M1 route corridor if practicable. The HSR case for CO2 reduction is not clear cut. The HSR case for total economic regeneration is not clear cut. HSR would provide some protection against increased oil prices and shortages. HSR may advantage and disadvantage different areas. It is essential that local train services connect into or fill gaps left by HSR. Long distance car driving to HSR terminals should be discouraged. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w404 Transport Committee: Evidence

Fares must not exclude less wealthy sectors of society. Phasing of construction and design is unavoidable Terminals may be phased later after new line capacity is commissioned Issues with connection to Scotland should be addressed Issues with remaining and by-passed “Classic” lines are under consideration. Statutory actions should include all land needed for construction. Site investigation is an essential, not an add-on. Connections to HS1 and Heathrow are correctly phased. Heathrow to be reviewed? May 2011

Further written evidence from Heathrow Hub Ltd. (HSR 150A)

HS 2

Paddington

Heathrow Hub HS 1

1 1980/1990’s—We’ve been here Before The Channel Tunnel rail link debate had many similarities with HS2, with vocal and well informed opposition to what were seen as British Rail’s poorly conceived proposals, in particular their failure to properly consider environmental impacts. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w405

“The revolt that followed (British Rail’s announcement of the original proposed route for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link) shook the Tory party to the core. A revolutionary mob in waxed green jackets is enough to bring any Home Counties MP out in a rash”—Plight at the End of the Tunnel—Sunday Times magazine, 6 May 1990.

The lessons of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (now called HS1) suggest that high speed rail in the UK should: — Form part of a wider integrated transport & economic strategy. — Avoid the railwayman’s solution of a point to point line in isolation. — Connect with the existing rail network and provide local transport benefits to areas affected by new lines. — Minimise the length of route crossing Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). — Adopt a design speed allowing an alignment that can follow topography and is twinned (where possible) with existing motorway corridors to minimise environmental impacts.

HS1 crosses the narrowest part of Kent’s AONB, (shown in green on the above map), and closely follows the M20 and M2 motorway corridors for much of its length. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w406 Transport Committee: Evidence

2. 2009—Cross-Party Consensus on HS2 & Heathrow

The political consensus that recently developed on high speed rail recognized, (despite fundamental differences over a third runway), Heathrow’s importance to the whole of the UK: — UK’s only hub, and world’s busiest international airport. — Directly responsible for 1% of UK GDP. — Vital to UK’s international competitiveness, serving seven out of the top 10 business routes in the world. — UK’s single largest traffic generator and single site employer. — Forecast to grow, (despite Government’s policy objective of a “better, not bigger” Heathrow), from 66mppa currently to ca. 95mppa by 2030 (with two runways, within 480,000 ATM cap, and outside statutory control) as capacity constraints lead to airlines introducing larger aircraft.

A number of wider issues were also recognized as relevant to consideration of HS2 and Heathrow. — Heathrow’s environmental impacts are unacceptable, (and in terms of air quality, illegal), even at current traffic levels. Better rail access is essential to prevent these having even greater impacts as Heathrow grows. — Heathrow’s passenger experience and operational efficiency compares poorly against other major airports. — Better access from the regions to the UK’s only hub is vital to regional economic competitiveness by providing access to global markets and increasing customer choice. This assumes increasing significance as airlines take commercial decisions to abandon domestic UK routes from Heathrow. — High speed rail could replace some short haul flights, releasing valuable airport capacity and/or improving resilience.

GWML

A clear consensus therefore emerged on the need for a direct connection between Heathrow and HS2: “A Conservative Government will support proposals along the lines of the plan put forward by engineering firm, Arup, for a new Heathrow rail hub. This would link Heathrow terminals directly into the main rail network and the lines to Reading, Oxford, Bristol, Plymouth, Cardiff, Swansea, Cheltenham and Southampton, greatly improving public transport links to the airport”—Conservative Party Rail Review 2009. “I think that it (Heathrow Hub) is an attractive idea. It’s vital that we have an integrated approach to planning new rail capacity and any new airport capacity that’s also required”—Lord Adonis, Sunday Times 4 January 2009. “I see a strong case for (high speed rail) approaching London via a Heathrow international hub station on the Great Western line, to provide a direct four-way interchange between the airport, the new north- south line, existing Great Western rail services and Crossrail”—Geoff Hoon, 15 January 2009. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w407

3. 2009—HS2 Ltd Ignored Consensus

Despite this consensus, the route that HS2 Ltd. developed during 2009 bypassed Heathrow. The then Secretary of State’s statement, prior to HS2 Ltd. starting work, made clear that this route was to some extent pre-determined: “Our proposals on the (Heathrow) hub are for a site much closer to West London at the junction of the existing Great Western line and the proposed Crossrail line. A Heathrow hub would not necessarily have to be placed close to Heathrow”—Geoff Hoon, 15 January 2009

West Midlands

HS2

Old Oak Common St Pancras (Change here for International Heathrow) HS1

GWML Europe London Euston (Change here for Europe) Heathrow Crossrail

The proposal that HS2 should bypass Heathrow reflected various assumptions and decisions by HS2 Ltd: — An assumption that Heathrow’s existing (very limited) market catchment would be unchanged by better rail access. — Analysis that a route via Heathrow would incur a nine minute journey time penalty compared to a more direct route between London and Birmingham—(subsequently corrected to three minutes after route decisions had been made). — Journey time savings prioritised over intermodal and environmental considerations (including statutory designation of Chilterns AONB). — No aviation industry representation on any of HS2 Ltd’s Challenge Groups. — Little or no weight given to effect of interchange penalty on airport passengers travelling by rail. — Government’s remit to consider better rail access to Heathrow from the Thames Valley and the west not considered. — Pre-conception of remote Heathrow interchange at Old Oak Common.

The proposal to provide the Heathrow interchange at Old Oak Common, some 12km from the airport, was subsequently criticised by the Coalition Government’s Secretary of State in oral evidence to the Transport Select Committee: (The connection between HS2 and Heathrow) “cannot be lug your heavy bags down a couple of escalators, along 600 metres of corridor and then change trains at a wet, suburban station somewhere in north west London. That is not an option”—Philip Hammond, 26 July 2010.

4. 2010—HS2 Ltd Revised Proposal For Heathrow Spur

The Coalition Government’s revised remit required HS2 Ltd. to “undertake additional work to develop route options for a direct high speed link to Heathrow” —Letter from Philip Hammond to HS2 Ltd, 11 June 2010

This may have been expected to result in a fundamental reappraisal of the HS2 route. However, a Heathrow spur was instead proposed, to be retrofitted to an otherwise unchanged route alignment in a second phase of HS2, (perhaps by 2033), with the capability of extension to form a loop at an even later stage. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w408 Transport Committee: Evidence

West Midlands

St Pancras International Old Oak Common GWML Europe London Euston Heathrow (Change here for Europe)

This requires significant duplicate route mileage, as can be seen from the initial spur alignment options published to date by HS2 Ltd.

The scale, impact and land requirements (in London’s Green Belt) of a grade separated junction between a spur and the main HS2 route is indicated by HS2 Ltd’s published images of the similar junction at Water Orton, where the Birmingham spur is proposed to join the main HS2 route. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w409

The proposed approach to serving Heathrow has other fundamental problems: — Heathrow would, prior to any future phase 2 of HS2, be relegated to a branch line connection with HS2 at Old Oak Common, perhaps for as long as 20 years or more, despite Government stating this “is not an option” and Heathrow’s forecast growth during that period. — If, as proposed in Network Rail’s London & South East Route Utilisation Study, Heathrow Express’s access rights are not renewed on termination in 2023, Heathrow would be reliant on slow, stopping Crossrail services from central London. — A spur, in a second phase of HS2, is dependent on consistent political and financial support over an unprecedented period and a second Hybrid Bill. If, as Lord Adonis fears, events conspire to affect the programme and/or funding, Heathrow could be permanently relegated to a branch line connection served by stopping trains. — A spur, and its grade separated junctions with the main HS2 route, would be both costly and environmentally damaging. — Two separate, and expensive, stations are required to provide HS2’s interchanges with Crossrail and Heathrow. — Government’s view is that the beneficiaries of a spur, airlines and airport users, would be required to make a significant financial contribution to its cost. However, it is unlikely that a viable business case can be made, since a 2tph service (in each direction), providing the minimum service frequency necessary for time sensitive airport passengers, would provide ca. 4,400 seats per hour— the equivalent of ten fully loaded A380’s every hour between Heathrow and UK regional cities served by HS2. Although Heathrow is a major, and growing, traffic generator, it is unlikely that airport traffic alone can support a viable business case for capacity on this scale. (The inevitable inefficiencies of trains serving airport demand alone is shown by Heathrow Express, which achieves only 30% utilisation in the morning peak). — Alternatively, if Government did provide a financial contribution to the cost of a spur, this could lead to State Aid challenges from other airports. — Whilst the economic case for HS2, (which assumes a very high frequency service of 18tph in each direction), includes the benefits of a spur to Heathrow, the service plans that have been published do not include any capacity for Heathrow services or indicate which services would be diverted to serve the spur instead of Euston. — Services over a spur would need to decelerate from, and accelerate to, linespeed in negotiating the slow speed turnouts when diverging from and joining the main HS2 route. Each Heathrow service would therefore take more than one HS2 path, further reducing capacity on the through line for services to and from Euston. — A spur perpetuates the lack of connectivity between Heathrow and GWML classic/Crossrail services. — A spur also continues the legacy approach of fragmented planning of air and rail infrastructure at a critical tipping point for Heathrow’s future competitiveness. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w410 Transport Committee: Evidence

— Delaying a Heathrow spur to a later phase of HS2 places Heathrow at a competitive disadvantage, since through running of high speed rail services between the UK regions and continental Europe provides European hubs with direct rail access to the UK market without a reciprocal benefit to Heathrow.

High speed network Existing lines for Heathrow Express (Phases I & II) direct services

Crossrail Interchange Thames Stratford Valley Euston Bristol Cardiff Paddington Bond St Tottenham Farringdon Liverpool Whitechapel Heathrow Ct Rd St Airport Canary Wharf

Whilst the recent public consultation lacks detail, it does appear that, if or when eventually completed, the spur would not provide a chord to the East, preventing air-rail substitution of European short haul flights, or access to Heathrow from European markets. A spur therefore appears to conflict with European policy, as set out in the Commission’s 2011 Transport White Paper: “Intermodality with rail must produce significant capacity gains by transforming competition between rail and air into complementarity between the two modes, with high speed train connections between cities. We can no longer think of maintaining air links to destinations for where there is a competitive high- speed rail alternative. In this way, capacity could be transferred to routes where no high-speed rail service exists.” The inherent flaws in a spur have also been recognised by DfT and others: “The interchange with Heathrow should be considered as through services will not be able to run from all points, both because demand would not be sufficient and because every Heathrow train would take a path on the new line”—New Line Capacity Study, DfT 2007. “To be attractive for airline passengers who might reasonably need to catch a specific departing flight, the service frequency needs to be at least one per hour. Even on our assumption that we can serve more than one city with a single train, (which depends on the structure of the HSR network), many of the flows, (Scotland, Manchester/Liverpool, Sheffield/Leeds/Newcastle, Birmingham and Bristol/Cardiff), do not have a viable flow”—High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008–09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra. Government’s recent consultation on HS2 recognized the importance of an integrated approach to Heathrow and HS2 but any detail of the proposed spur/loop will be the subject of a separate future consultation. This risks flawed decisions being taken on phase 1 of HS2. European experience clearly demonstrates that hub airports should be located on through lines rather than spurs or loops.

5. 2010—HS2 Ltd ignored European precedents European examples of air/rail interchanges clearly demonstrate the benefits of airports located on directly on through high speed lines. The inherent inefficiencies of a spur are repeated in a loop, with Lord Mawhinney’s 2010 report noting that “a loop of high speed railway had been built to serve Cologne/Bonn airport but this had added 15 minutes to the rail journey time and as a result the loop was little used”. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w411

New high speed railway

Amsterdam Schiphol “For Schiphol, landside accessibility is of essential importance. The construction of the HSL South line will place Schiphol on the European HSL high-speed rail network. The HSL will extend Schiphol’s catchment area towards Antwerp and Brussels”—Long term vision for Schiphol Group 2009. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w412 Transport Committee: Evidence

Paris Charles de Gaulle (Roissy) “We have more than 12 years of experience in the value of an easy connection between TGV and plane. The commercial success of TGV is due to the fact that Roissy Is a through station. Roissy is progressively working like a hub with many rail/air connections but also numerous rail/rail connections”—Guillaume Pepy, Chairman SNCF. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w413

Direct high speed railway to Frankfurt Airport

Frankfurt “Long distance trains doubled (surface access) market share between 1998 and 2000, and since 2004 high speed long distance services have carried more passengers than local services. 19% of originating passengers used high speed services (174 services/day) in 2009, and this is projected to increase to 30% by 2015”—Frankfurt Intraplan 2010 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w414 Transport Committee: Evidence

The Netherlands Antwerp Mechelen

New line to be build alongside the E19 Northern connection 2012 Public private partnership 2012

Brussells Airport Nossegem curve Hasselt DECEMBER 2005 Leuven Liege SCHAERBEEK HAREN Germany Ghent ZAVENTEM 36 NOSSEGEM Line 36 / 4 tracks Leuven - Brussels Future Schuman - + Leuven curve Josaphat tunnel DECEMBER 2006 2013 Brussels infrastructure works France Namur in progress Luxembourg executed

Brussels Zaventem Zaventem has historically been served by a spur, as proposed by HS2 Ltd. for Heathrow. Significantly, work is now nearing completion on “conversion of the existing underground terminus station (from a spur) to a through station, crucial for the development of Brussels airport” - Mobility Projects 2009.

6. The Solution—HS2 Direct Route Via Heathrow There is therefore a compelling case for HS2 to follow European precedents of a through airport station served by the main HS2 route, not a spur or loop, and which also provides seamless interchange with classic rail services.

West Midlands

GWML

Heathrow London Europe

This approach has been widely endorsed: “Services (with a Heathrow interchange located on the through HS2 line) will have high load factors because they are connecting a number of different markets. Their usage is not dependent on the single market at Heathrow, and their load factors and overall economics will be attractive, in a way that far fewer services would do if they were just to serve Heathrow on a spur”—The Heathrow Opportunity, Greengauge 21 2010. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w415

“For rail to be a viable alternative to the aircraft, and to the car to get to/from the airport, airports, certainly the main one, must have a station on the line, not a spur from it. With currently over 40 million non-transfer passengers a year needing to travel to/from it, it is hard to understand how a ‘city’ like Heathrow might be bypassed”—Dr Moshe Givoni, Oxford University Transport Studies Unit, The House Magazine, 31 January 2011. “The solution will require consolidation of demand by serving Heathrow by trains that also serve other markets, by placing Heathrow as an intermediate station (on a through line)”—High Speed Rail Development Programme 2008–09 MVA/Systra Importantly, there are little or no adverse cost and journey time impacts for a HS2 route via Heathrow compared to the current proposal of a route bypassing Heathrow.

7. Comparison of Alternative HS2 Routes

HS2 HS2

Old Oak Common

Paddington Paddington

Heathrow Heathrow HS1 Hub HS1

There is no justification for HS2 to bypass Heathrow when a route via the airport is less costly than the current HS2 proposals, and has, at worst, a marginal impact on journey times for non-airport passengers.

Cost

Heathrow Hub £16.5bn + £2.9-4.2bn=£19.4 - 20.9bn Omits Old Oak Common interchange Birmingham Excludes private sector Heathrow Hub funding contribution

Heathrow spur £17bn + £2.5 - 3.9bn= £19.5-20.9bn Heathrow loop £17bn + £4.1 - 5.4bn= £21.1-22.4bn

High HS2 Phase 1 =£17bn Wycombe Ruislip

Old Oak Common Route Northolt Old Oak Common Route plus Loop Old Oak Common Hub Route

Costs taken from HS2 public consultation, 2011 Heathrow Hub

A route via Heathrow allows an Old Oak Common interchange to be omitted, (providing very substantial cost savings), since Heathrow Hub provides both a GWML/Crossrail and airport interchange on a single site. This aligns with HS2 Ltd’s most recent (2011) Modelling and Appraisal, which shows an Old Oak Common interchange adversely affecting HS2’s business case, and Greengauge 21’s current view that the case for an Old Oak Common interchange should now be reassessed. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w416 Transport Committee: Evidence

Using Governments cost estimates, a route via Heathrow is therefore less expensive than HS2 Ltd’s proposed route bypassing Heathrow and a later, retrofitted spur. The cost saving is increased when the potential private sector funding of the Heathrow/HS2 interchange is taken into account.

Journey time London Euston – Birmingham via Heathrow 48m (non-stop) Birmingham 52m (one stop at Heathrow Hub)

London Euston – Birmingham bypassing Heathrow 49m (one stop at Old Oak Common)

High Wycombe Ruislip

Northolt Old Oak Common Route Old Oak Common Old Oak Common Route plus Loop Hub Route

Journey times taken from HS2 public consultation, 2011 Heathrow Hub Euston

An HS2 route via Heathrow incurs marginal time penalties, which are outweighed by the wider environmental and economic benefits that the route provides. In any case, HS2’s Strategic Challenge Group, (in their meeting of 1 September 2009), noted that: “There was evidence to suggest demand did not change drastically between 60 and 45 minutes, and so an intermediate station which added a 10 minute penalty to a 45 minute journey may not erode too much demand”. For non-stop services between London and the north, a route via Heathrow is in fact faster since Heathrow Hub, unlike Old Oak Common, allows non-stop services to pass at line speed.

8. Comparison of Alternative Airport Interchanges on HS2 Route Via Heathrow An HS2 route via Heathrow can serve the airport by an interchange located either “at airport”, (within the existing airport boundary), or “near” the airport. Both options are supported by Heathrow’s airlines at this stage: “Airlines are of the strong view that the strategic route for HSR must be fully integrated with an en-route station at or near Heathrow”—London Heathrow Airport Consultative Committee to the Transport Select Committee HS2 Inquiry, May 2011. “The HS2 main line should run at or near the airport to maximise frequency and include a Heathrow HS2 station that offers a seamless transfer for passengers and baggage … and becomes a fully integrated multi-modal transport hub … in the first phase of HS2”—IATA/London Heathrow Airport Consultative Committee/Heathrow Airline Operators Committee submission to HS2 consultation, July 2011. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w417

Option 1—HS2 interchange “at” existing airport (T5 or Central Terminal Area)

HS2 Spur

Reading London

Central London

Staines

Possible future HS2 loop HS2 Great Western Main Line/Crossrail Airtrack/ Western Connection Heathrow Express Picadilly Line Transit

An “at airport” interchange requires the HS2 route to be aligned through the existing Heathrow airport campus. This presents significant challenges: — Requires lengthy, slow speed deviation in HS2 route. — Extensive tunnelling required. — Environmental impact of surface sections of route. — High cost and risk due to construction in live airport environment. — Disruption to airport operations during construction. — No connectivity between HS2 and GWML services. — Potential competition issue if interchange location (eg T5) exacerbates competitive inequality between airline facilities. In addition, an “at airport” interchange would not provide seamless connectivity between air and rail. A T5 location would be a considerable distance west of the terminal itself, whilst a location in the congested Central Terminal Area would be similarly remote from terminals themselves. A CTA location would also incur significant disruption, risk and cost penalties due to the need to avoid existing Hex, LUL, baggage, pedestrian and vehicle tunnels (as well as a safeguarded route for future APM’s between terminals). An indirect interchange between rail and air has a similar effect to rail/rail interchange penalties: “The attractiveness of air-rail links is certainly inhibited when passengers have to transfer to a second mode of transport in order to reach their terminal because the railway station is not integrated into the terminal building”—Potential and Limitations of Air-rail Links, Andreas Eichinger und Andreas Knorr, IWIM, Universität Bremen 2004. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w418 Transport Committee: Evidence

Heathrow option 2—HS2 interchange “near” existing airport (Heathrow Hub)

Routeing HS2 close to Heathrow, with an airport interchange (Heathrow Hub) located both on the GWML/ Crossrail, (and M25 motorway), provides a number of benefits: — Requires minimal deviation in HS2’s route between London and Birmingham. — Is less costly than the current preferred route. — Has little/no impact on London to Birmingham journey times. — Increases rail demand and assists HS2’s business case. — Provides a direct connection between Heathrow, HS2, Crossrail and the classic rail network in the first phase of HS2. — Provides wider benefits to the Thames Valley, West and South West, and South Wales. — Enables air/rail substitution, providing additional airport capacity and resilience. — Assists modal shift from road to rail, reducing Heathrow’s environmental impacts. — Releases space for aircraft within the existing airport, improving operational efficiency and resilience, and reducing environmental impacts. — Airport terminal co-located with station provides passenger check-in facilities at an “on-airport” facility, allowing seamless interchange between modes and improving Heathrow’s passenger experience. — Transit times reduced by seamless passenger and baggage links between Hub and terminals/ satellites within the existing airport. — Reduces cost, risk and disruption of developing passenger processing and aircraft facilities necessary for Heathrow’s forecast growth. — Supports vital hub operations by expanding Heathrow’s catchment. — Assists UK regional competitiveness through improved access to global markets. — Allows a less damaging—and potentially cheaper—route for HS2 through London and the Chilterns. — Enables private sector funding. — Futureproofs connectivity between Heathrow and any future Thames Gateway airport. — Prevents Heathrow from becoming a “stranded asset”. The benefits of such a “near airport” option are recognised by Star Alliance, the world’s largest airline alliance with extensive global experience of air/rail interchanges: “We would make the important point that an “on-airport” (high speed rail) station does not have to be located within the existing airport boundary, if this results in an unacceptable deviation of the HS2 alignment, significant journey time penalties for non-airport passengers or a significant cost penalty due to the inevitable challenges of major construction in, or under, the operational airfield. Recognising that cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w419

Heathrow occupies the smallest site area of any major international airport, and the dispersed nature of Heathrow’s terminals, sites outside the existing airport boundary should be explored, particularly if this allows better connectivity and alignment with HS2, the existing rail network—particularly the Great Western Main Line—and the local motorway network”—Star Alliance submission to Transport Select Committee HS2 Inquiry, May 2011.

9. The Solution—Other Benefits of Heathrow Hub HS2 and the Chilterns An HS2 route via Heathrow allows an alternative, more southerly alignment through the Chilterns AONB. This allows HS2 to cross the narrowest part of the AONB, (rather than the widest as currently proposed). Alternatively, following the example of HS1, HS2 could be twinned with the existing M40 corridor.

Whilst an alignment following or close to the M40 corridor would require a much lower design speed, the route crosses only 12km of AONB. Significantly, HS2 Ltd’s Strategic Challenge Group noted, (in their meeting of 23 April 2009): “Evidence suggested that the benefits of further improving journey times beneath a 60 minute threshold were marginal (and) if the line was to be engineered for 300kph or faster, it may nonetheless not be too damaging (to the business case) if in places the line operated at a slightly lower speed.” DB’s experience of constructing new high speed lines in environmentally sensitive areas also demonstrates that compromising design speed to reduce environmental impacts (and energy use) has significant capital cost benefits. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w420 Transport Committee: Evidence

HS2 and London

M25 Chiltern Line to Gerrards Cross Birmingham Denham WCML to Watford Junction West Ruislip Marylebone M40 South Ruislip M40

Northolt Junction WCML to Birmingham & Willesden Euston & HS1 the North Greenford Junction

Heathrow GWML & Hub Old Oak Crossrail to Ealing Bdwy Common Paddington

GWML to Southall Hayes Reading M4 M4

M25

Proposed route for HS2 Proposed route for HS2 in tunnel Heathrow Existing Railways Heathrow Express tunnel APM and baggage system (proposed R3 not shown)

An HS2 route via Heathrow would extend the tunnel currently proposed between Euston and Old Oak Common further west, beneath the GWML following the precedent of HS1 below the North London Line. This (shown dotted on the plan above) avoids the environmental impact of a surface route through the London suburbs.

Experience from HS1 suggests that tunnelling through urban areas can be cost effective when all costs, including environmental mitigation, of alternative surface routes are taken into account. As a tunnel is currently proposed from Euston to Old Oak Common, the establishment costs, including acquisition of Tunnel Boring Machines, are required in any case.

M25 Chiltern Line to Gerrards Cross Birmingham

Denham WCML to West Ruislip Watford Junction Marylebone M40 South Ruislip M40 Northolt Junction

Birmingham and WCML to Willesden the North Euston & HS1 Greenford Junction

Heathrow Hub GWML & Old Oak Crossrail to Ealing Bdwy Common Paddington

GWML to Southall Hayes Reading M4 M4

M25

Proposed route for HS2 Proposed route for HS2 in tunnel Heathrow Existing Railways Heathrow Express tunnel APM and baggage system (proposed R3 not shown)

Alternatively, HS2 could take over the current GWML corridor, with existing GW services diverted to a new classic line, partly in tunnel, and making use of the redundant rail corridor via Greenford. This could be constructed in advance of HS2, reducing disruption during GW electrification and Crossrail construction. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w421

HS2 and the UK’s transport network

Heathrow Hub would provide a step change in rail connectivity, with benefits extending far beyond airport passengers. Scotland Milton Keynes North of England Aylesbury Worcester Birmingham Chilterns

Oxford

HEATHROW Stratford Cheltenham HUB International

Thames Gateway Euston Europe Swansea Cardiff Swindon Paddington Reading Bristol Temple Meads

KEY Basingstoke HEATHROW HS2 domestic long distance rail services Cornwall Exeter AIRPORT Regional Express Southampton New Southampton/Heathrow service Great Western main line services International high speed services Crossrail Airtrack Heathrow Express Picadilly Line

For example, “Javelin” high speed regional services from Kent and the Thames Gateway could be extended to Basingstoke, Oxford and Reading, (making best use of GWML electrification).

Such connectivity would enable significant modal shift from road to rail, and increase rail revenues; “The potential demand for rail services at Heathrow is likely to make it the biggest railway station in the UK if appropriate infrastructure was provided”—Adding Capacity at Heathrow Airport, response to consultation by Transport Studies Unit, University of Oxford 2008.

At a wider regional and national level, Heathrow Hub facilitates an integrated, intermodal approach to transport network planning.

West Midlands Northwest and Scotland Midlands Northeast and Scotland West Midlands

Chiltern Interchange Aylesbury Milton Bedford ECML Interchange Cambridge Interchange Keynes

High Wycombe Cotswolds

St Pancras Willesden Junction East Anglia

Euston Kings Oxford Cross Marylebone Heathrow Hub Stratford Reading

Farringdon Canary Wharf Paddington Wales and West Ebbsfleet Victoria Heathrow Charing Cross

Southwest Clapham Egham Richmond Jnc Abbey Waterloo London Wood Bridge Ashford Basingstoke Woking and Europe

Southwest Guilford

GWML Great Eastern Crossrail ECML Thameslink London Orbital LOL Freight Orbital Chiltern HS1 East Croydon Southern HS2 WCML Javelin Southwestern Heathrow airside transit MML Picadilly Line Eastwest Gatwick Airport Jubilee Line Southeastern South coast Brighton cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w422 Transport Committee: Evidence

Heathrow Hub allows a phased development, with early benefits in advance of HS2 to support Heathrow’s forecast growth whilst reducing the airports environmental impacts and supporting the UK’s economic competitiveness.

Phase 1 provides a GWML/Crossrail Heathrow interchange, developed and funded entirely within the private sector.

Conclusion The principle of a direct HS2 route via Heathrow, and the specific features of Heathrow Hub, has been widely endorsed: “A Conservative Government will support proposals along the lines of the plan put forward by Arup, for a new Heathrow rail hub. This would link Heathrow terminals directly into the main rail, greatly improving public transport links to the airport”—Conservative Party Rail Review 2009. “A non-direct high speed link with Heathrow, represented by a loop or spur, would represent folly in Britain’s ambition to develop a truly integrated transport policy”—Lord Heseltine, Bow Group meeting 20 January 2010. “Only an HS2 alignment via a Heathrow interchange located on the GWML as close as possible to the airport, providing direct connections between high speed rail, classic rail, Crossrail, the motorway network and Heathrow can provide the connectivity that the UK requires”—Conservative Transport Group 2011. “The Deputy First Minister, Ieuan Wyn Jones, has already placed on record our support for a Heathrow Hub linked to the (electrified) Great Western Mainline”—Welsh Assembly. “A direct western link between Heathrow airport and the Great Western Main Line would enable passengers from Wales access into Heathrow, rather than first having to go out to London and then come back”—Mark Hopwood, Managing Director, First Great Western. “Unite believes there are advantages in constructing a new rail hub station on the Great Western Line as proposed by Arup”—Unite the Union. “HS2 should be directly linked to Heathrow through the construction of an on-airport interchange station connecting with the Great Western Main Line, Crossrail, Airtrack and potentially Chiltern services”— SEEDA. We are grateful for the opportunity to provide this additional evidence to the Committee’s important Inquiry and would be pleased to provide any further information that may be required. 30 August 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w423

Further written evidence from Heathrow Hub Ltd. (HSR 150B)

GOVERNMENT’S CURRENT PROPOSALS—HS2 PHASE 1 (LONDON—BIRMINGHAM), PHASE 2 (HEATHROW SPUR), PHASE 3 (HEATHROW LOOP) & WESTERN CONNECTION

Dotted lines indicate tunnel

THE HEATHROW HUB ALTERNATIVE

Dotted lines indicate tunnel cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w424 Transport Committee: Evidence

1. Executive Summary We are grateful for the opportunity to provide this further submission, which responds to HS2 Ltd’s further evidence to the Committee’s Inquiry dated 30 August 2011 (ref. HSR 169A). The additional material provided by HS2 Ltd, (which we address in detail in Part 3 of this submission), confirms that, compared with Government’s current proposals, the Heathrow Hub alternative: — Costs less, with costs to the taxpayer further reduced by private sector investment. — Provides faster journeys for non-stop trains between London and Birmingham. — Spreads the benefits of transport investment to far more of the UK, including the West, South West & South Wales, and at an earlier date. — Provides local transport benefits to areas (including the Chilterns) impacted by HS2. — Improves UK’s regions connectivity with the country’s only hub airport, providing better access to global markets and improving regional economic competitiveness. — Enables greater modal shift from road to rail, and air to rail. — Seamlessly connects Heathrow to the UK’s regions and the European HSR network in the first phase of HS2. — Reduces Heathrow’s environmental impacts, allowing forecast growth within environmental limits. — Supports Heathrow as a global aviation hub against increasing European competition by allowing more efficient airport operations, providing a better passenger experience, connecting to Europe’s HSR network and releasing additional capacity and/or improving resilience. — Improves HS2’s business case by reducing capital and operational costs, increasing passenger demand and improving yields by allowing trains over a single HS line of route to serve more than one market. — Increases rail revenues on the classic network and Crossrail. — Provides more options for a less environmentally damaging HS2 route, reducing the environmental impacts on London’s suburbs and the Chilterns AONB through better use of existing transport corridors.

2. Western Connection to Heathrow The benefits of Heathrow Hub increase when additionally compared to Government’s proposed “Western Connection” between the Great Western Main Line (GWML) and Heathrow, as recently described in the press.348 Whilst this may at first appear to be outside the scope of the Committee’s Inquiry, HS2 Ltd’s original remit from Government349 specifically referred to the need for HS2 to consider “the key car modal shift gain … likely to be in respect of access to Heathrow from London, the west and Thames Valley, facilitated by the Heathrow interchange (and local rail enhancements).” We therefore believe that the Western Connection should be considered as an integral part of the HS2 project since, without this, HS2 fails to meet one of Government’s key objectives. Modal shift from road to rail is also critical to mitigating the environmental effects of Heathrow’s forecast 40% growth in passenger numbers by 2030. This issue is of critical importance to securing Heathrow’s ability to compete, and to operate within environmental limits, (with air pollution already in breach of legally binding limits imposed by EU legislation). Heathrow Hub, as well as connecting HS2 and the airport, provides an integrated interchange with Great Western and Crossrail services on a single site, meeting all of Government’s objectives in the most cost efficient and operationally effective way. Access to Heathrow is therefore provided as part of a holistic approach to the planning of high speed rail, classic rail and airports as mandated by European transport policy. In contrast, the proposed Western Connection appears to have been developed in isolation from the HS2 project, and adds yet more complexity and inefficiency to the current proposals, (which have of course already been amended to include a retrofitted, costly and operationally inefficient spur to serve Heathrow). In addition, a Western Connection would provide fewer benefits, since it is likely to allow only a slow, stopping service, using the GWML relief lines, to Heathrow from Reading, and requiring a change of train at Reading for passengers from the West, South West and South Wales. The need to interchange has been shown, in research by DfT and others, to significantly reduce demand, particularly for time sensitive, luggage laden airport passengers. Service frequency would also be less attractive, and journey times would be longer, than the Heathrow Hub alternative of allowing all trains, both long distance and Crossrail, to serve the airport. 348 Sunday Times, 4 September 2011 http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/National/article768355.ece 349 Letter to Lord Adonis from Sir David Rowlands, 13 February 2009 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/55864 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w425

The likely result of relatively unattractive journey times and limited demand for dedicated airport services serving the Heathrow market alone, whilst nevertheless requiring a reasonable frequency, is that services would require either subsidy or premium fares. A Western Connection would need very significant additional classic rail infrastructure in order to connect to Heathrow, including land intensive grade separated junctions located within London’s Green Belt. This would be in addition to the even larger high speed junctions and the additional length of high speed line required for an HS2 spur and loop, resulting in significant adverse environmental impacts on large parts of the Green Belt and Colne Valley. Perhaps most importantly, a Western Connection increases the already significant cost difference between the Governments proposals and Heathrow Hub, which provides western access to Heathrow as an integral part, and within the overall cost, of the project. The cost of a Western Connection, (suggested as ca. £0.5 billion) should therefore be added to HS2’s current cost estimates as, without this, HS2 does not provide the access to Heathrow from the west that Government has stated to be a key objective associated with HS2. We attach, as Appendix A, a revised comparative cost summary which suggests that, even before taking into account the additional costs that the Mayor and others suggest have been omitted by HS2 Ltd, (eg improved road and classic rail connections with Old Oak Common and additional environmental mitigation on the HS2 surface route through outer London), the Heathrow Hub proposals are significantly cheaper than the Government’s alternative. This gap would of course increase further should our proposal for private funding of the Heathrow Hub interchange be taken forward.

3. Response to HS2 Ltd’s Additional Evidence Dated 30 August 2011 Q12. How do the costs of a single route via Heathrow compare with the costs of the HS2 route plus a spur to Heathrow? HS2 Ltd. provide no justification for their assertion that, assuming worst case costs, a spur “would be ca. £200 million less than for a route through Heathrow Hub.” Government’s published estimates in fact show that, even on best case assumptions for a spur, the combined cost of the phase 1 HS2 route currently proposed and a phase 2 spur would be significantly more expensive than our proposed alternative HS2 route via Heathrow Hub. HS2 Ltd’s submission also notes, in answer to Q14, that they expect tunneling costs to be further reduced from current estimates, perhaps by as much as 15%. As a significant element of the cost of a route via Heathrow comprises the necessary additional tunneling between Old Oak Common and West Drayton, compared to the current surface route from Old Oak Common through the London suburbs, this would be expected to lead to even greater cost savings for a Heathrow route. We also note that HS2 Ltd’s reference to a “Terminal 5 station” is misleading. Any such station, whether underground or at grade, would in fact not be “on airport” as is suggested, but would be located some distance from the terminal itself, requiring considerable associated infrastructure including road access and people mover facilities between the station and terminal. It is not clear whether these costs have been included, (nor whether the impacts of the interchange penalty that would be incurred by passengers transferring between rail and air have been taken into account in demand modelling).

Q13. We have received a detailed submission saying that the Heathrow Hub/ Iver Common site assessed by HS2 Ltd is not the same as the Heathrow Hub station proposed by Heathrow Hub Ltd, and that the conclusions drawn are therefore misleading. Can you please comment? HS2 Ltd. confirm that “the assumed nature of the station and services are very different” in their assessment of the Heathrow Hub proposal, which underlines our concerns that a like for like comparison has not been made by HS2 Ltd. Some of these issues are noted in HS2 Ltd’s evidence: — HS2 Ltd. state that their “remit was to provide an interchange for HS2 with Heathrow Airport and Crossrail” whilst “the Heathrow Hub proposal was developed as a wider interchange with conventional rail and coach services.” This effectively confirms that HS2 Ltd. did not consider Government’s specific remit to consider rail access to Heathrow from the west, (and which Heathrow Hub provides). Government’s latest proposal for a Western Connection, entirely separate from HS2, only now provides such a connection, (albeit, in our view, in an inefficient and sub-optimum way). Clearly, it is essential that Heathrow Hub is therefore properly assessed against both HS2 and a Western Connection in order to arrive at a proper comparison of costs and benefits. — HS2 state that “the Heathrow Hub proposals envisaged a new 30 million passenger airport terminal integrated with the hub.” We welcome this clarification since Government’s statements in the consultation and elsewhere have suggested that Heathrow Hub would not provide an “on airport” interchange. It is our view that these incorrect assumptions have clearly led to inaccurate appraisals of costs and benefits. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w426 Transport Committee: Evidence

Heathrow Hub would indeed provide passenger processing facilities (an airport terminal) co- located with the railway station. This would effectively make the interchange “on-airport,” providing the seamless transfer that passengers require when changing between modes. — HS2 Ltd. state their “station design and approach routes differed slightly—we did not consider that a surface level station was viable given the necessary tunneled approach either side.” In fact, our detailed engineering studies, (which we would be pleased to provide to the Committee if required), demonstrated that a surface station could easily be accommodated within the constraints of the site, and that a surface route to the west was entirely sensible and feasible, (as well as allowing a grade separated junction between HS2 and the Great Western Main Line). The result is that Heathrow Hub has been assumed, in HS2 Ltd’s analysis, to have far higher costs, both as an underground station and requiring additional tunneling to the west, than is actually the case. Whilst we have used Government’s cost estimates in comparing Heathrow Hub with the current HS2 proposal, clearly these costs appear to significantly overstate the actual costs of the Hub, whilst omitting many benefits, (including the connection between HS2 and the GWML). — HS2 Ltd. states “the Heathrow Hub proposal included the shared use of the high-speed rail corridor into London, such as by ‘Javelin’ services to Kent. These were not compatible with the capacity that we considered would be needed for long distance high speed services on HS2, consuming around half the potential capacity of the HS2 route.” Clearly a judgment will be needed to determine the optimum service pattern over any new line. Our proposal for extending “Javelin” services from Kent to, for example, Reading, Oxford and Basingstoke via Heathrow is intended to make effective use of existing and proposed rail capacity, in particular taking advantage of the connection we propose between HS2 and the GWML at Heathrow Hub and the opportunities presented by the proposed electrification of the GWML. As well as dramatically improving access to Heathrow, these proposed inter-regional services would provide a step change in connectivity and journey times across Greater London and the South East region, overcoming the Victorian legacy of railways separately terminating in central London, and linking the economic powerhouse of Heathrow and the Thames Valley with the more disadvantaged and developing areas to the east of London. There may also be scope for such services to provide congestion relief on the existing network, in particular the GWML and SWML. We acknowledge HS2 Ltd’s concern as to capacity over the high speed network, but suggest that long distance services are highly unlikely to make full use of HS2’s claimed 18tph capacity, at least until phase 2 is completed, perhaps in the 2030’s. In the meantime, “Javelin” type services could make efficient use of HS2’s expensive and valuable phase 1 infrastructure. Fundamentally, however, this issue goes to the heart of the philosophy behind HS2. Should it be a simple London—centric line between two points, conceived in relative isolation from the wider transport network, or should it—as we believe—form part of an integrated strategic approach to connectivity and economic development? Our proposals also draw on experience from HS1 where providing local transport improvements assisted in overcoming local opposition from areas which would otherwise see only adverse impacts. HS2 Ltd. refers to the Heathrow Hub site being located “on flood plain land occupied currently by the Iver Sewage Treatment Facility.” The proposed Heathrow Hub station and airport interchange is in fact located outside the functional flood plain. Our proposal (and cost estimates) include the relocation of the Iver Water Treatment Works within the overall site, (as agreed in principle with the utility’s owners), providing a new, more efficient and higher capacity facility. With reference to journey times, HS2 Ltd. notes the effect of Heathrow Hub on both non-airport and airport passengers. For the former, they state “passengers on HS2 travelling to and from London—who comprised the great majority of travellers—would incur a significant journey time penalty.” In fact, assuming that Heathrow Hub avoids the need for an Old Oak Common interchange, journey times for non-stop services between London and Birmingham would be one minute faster than times quoted for the current HS2 proposal. For airport passengers, HS2 Ltd. suggests that “for air passengers it (Heathrow Hub) was not as attractive as options closer to or on- airport.” This appears to contradict their earlier confirmation that in fact Heathrow Hub provides an “on-airport” passenger terminal and experience. It is likely that leaving a train at Heathrow Hub, and checking in at the highly convenient processor located immediately above the station, would provide a far more attractive passenger experience between train (as well as bus/coach) and aircraft than a passenger having to transfer from an HS2 station remotely located somewhere to the west of T5 to a separate airport terminal. Passengers not using the processing facilities at Heathrow Hub would transfer to and from terminals located on the existing airport campus using an Automated People Mover (APM), similar to the systems in use at other cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w427

international hub airports (eg; Hong Kong and Singapore). Transfer times between the Hub and the rest of the airport would vary between three and six minutes.

In considering journey times, we recognize that HS2 Ltd’s methodology apportions very high values to journey time savings—between £0.3 billion and £0.6 billion per minute saved. Although we do not necessarily agree with these values, a route via Heathrow, which provides a one minute journey time saving for non-stop services, would significantly improve HS2’s business case using HS2 Ltd’s methodology.

We also suggest that the negative BCR implications, as a result of HS2 Ltd’s estimate of a three minute journey time penalty for trains stopping at Heathrow Hub, is vastly outweighed by the benefits of a direct connection between HS2 and Heathrow. Heathrow Airport Ltd’s evidence to the Inquiry (Committee ref. HSR131) concludes that a direct interchange between HS2 and Heathrow could offer benefits of as much as £9 billion in Present Value terms.

HS2’s BCR is further improved by Heathrow Hub’s lower capital cost, lower operational costs, increased revenues and private financing of the Heathrow Hub interchange itself.

In considering HS2’s BCR, we also note that HS2 Ltd’s appraisal fails to monetize the scheme’s environmental impacts, despite DEFRA’s recent publication of the UK National Ecosystem Assessment (NEA). 350 This provides a clear way of valuing ecosystems, is intended to strengthen the arguments for protecting and enhancing the environment and is claimed to be the basis for Government policymaking.

An HS2 route via Heathrow would allow alternative routes through the narrowest part of the Chilterns AONB, rather than the widest as currently proposed. It might therefore be expected that a BCR that properly accounts for monetised impacts would conclude that a route that reduces the environmental impacts on the AONB would also improve HS2’s BCR.

HS2 Ltd’s further evidence alludes to this issue, in responding to Q26, which notes “an indicative assessment of the potential impact of the (current HS2) route valued the impacts at up to £4.5 billion.” However, this appears to refer simply to landscape impacts, rather than a valuation in accordance with NEA methodology. Clearly these are significant issues that need to be addressed if a proper comparative assessment of alternative routes is to be carried out to reduce or avoid the threat of challenge through the judicial process.

As regards a Crossrail interchange, HS2 Ltd. suggest that “for HS2 passengers going to and from London, (Heathrow Hub) was not as attractive as a Crossrail interchange at Old Oak Common and we could not envisage these passengers transferring to Crossrail at this location, thereby increasing demand at Euston.”

We recognize the importance of both issues—a seamless interchange between HS2 and Crossrail, and the need to consider dispersal of HS2 passengers at Euston.

In considering the former, HS2 Ltd’s analysis, however, fails to consider wider network issues. Network Rail’s most recent London & South East Route Utilisation Study recommends further study of diverting existing West Coast Main Line (WCML) inner and outer suburban services to, respectively, London Overground and Crossrail.

As well as taking passengers closer to their ultimate destinations, and dramatically improving the business case for the currently under-utilised western arm of Crossrail, this would release significant capacity at Euston, allowing easier phasing during construction and providing some congestion relief on the LUL network at Euston.

The same study also suggests that GWML capacity could be optimized by an integrated approach to planning long distance, Thames Valley and Heathrow services, (in part enabled by expiry of Heathrow Express’s access rights in the medium term).

Our view is that a variant on the current Crossrail proposal could provide a fast service between Reading, Heathrow Hub and Paddington, from where, (assuming a new grade separated junction between main and relief lines west of Paddington), trains would call at all central London stations. As well as providing an attractive Crossrail interchange, this would also reduce journey times to Heathrow from central London and the east, (important if Heathrow Express is downgraded or removed), and relieve congestion on long distance GWML services between the Thames Valley and Paddington.

We suggest that such an approach also balances HS2’s current London—centric focus, since a Heathrow Hub interchange would improve wider connectivity for non-London passengers.

Turning to the issue of HS2 passenger dispersal at Euston, HS2 Ltd’s own analysis demonstrates that the proposed Old Oak Common HS2/Crossrail interchange makes, at best, a marginal difference to crowding on the LUL network at Euston. 350 Hidden value of nature revealed in groundbreaking study, DEFRA June 2011 http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2011/06/02/hidden-value-of-nature-revealed/ cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w428 Transport Committee: Evidence

HS2 Ltd. forecast 351 that average loadings on all LUL services to and from Euston Underground Station in the 7–10am morning peak (expressed as LUL load factor) would be: 2033 with HS2 without OOC—194%. 2033 with HS2 with OOC—191%. Old Oak Common therefore appears to make very little difference to levels of crowding on the Underground at Euston, a difference of perhaps 3% on what would, in the absence of further capacity enhancements, be an already massively overcrowded LUL network by 2033. It is significant that HS2 Ltd’s most recent update to the Business Case notes that omitting the proposed Old Oak Common interchange improves HS2’s BCR.352 Greengauge 21’s submission to Network Rail’s consultation on the London and South East Route Utilisation Study353 similarly concludes that consideration should be given to omitting an Old Oak Common station on HS2.

Q14. If a route were to be provided via Heathrow, what is your latest estimate of the time penalty that would be incurred by stopping trains at Heathrow? Has this figure been used in your economic analysis? HS2 Ltd. states that “the economic analysis assumes that the journey time penalty of going via Heathrow would be an extra seven minutes including a station stop.” As noted above, this assumes services would stop at both Heathrow and Old Oak Common. In practice, this is unlikely and unnecessary. HS2 Ltd. confirm that their design of a route via Heathrow differed from that proposed for Heathrow Hub. In particular, HS2 Ltd. assumed that the alignment to the west of the interchange would severely restrict line speed.354 In fact, the alignment we propose does not restrict speed in this way, which therefore suggests that HS2 Ltd. overstate the journey tine penalty for a route via Heathrow. Nevertheless, using HS2 Ltd’s assumptions, journey times for non-stop services via Heathrow Hub are faster than a route via Old Oak Common as shown in Appendix B. 8 September 2011

351 para. 4.3.4, Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd, February 2010 http://www.scribd.com/doc/39672277/High-Speed-Rail-London- to-the-West-Midlands-and-Beyond-HS2-Demand-Model-Analysis 352 “Accounting for the increased costs associated with the extra station, the BCR of the scheme reduces from 1.75 without Old Oak Common to 1.63 with it. This suggests that, on the basis of the current representation of the station and its impacts, there is not a financially positive case for the station” - Modelling and Appraisal Updates and their impact on the HS2 Business Case—A Report for HS2 Ltd, Atkins April 2011 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77824 353 Letter from Greengauge 21 to Network Rail, 16 March 2011 http://www.networkrail.co.uk/browse%20documents/ rus%20documents/route%20utilisation%20strategies/rus%20generation%202/london%20and%20south%20east/ consultation%20responses/g/greengauge%2021.pdf 354 “West of the M25 and the station throat, the alignments would dip down to a tunnel portal. On the approach to the tunnel portal, … the horizontal alignment would restrict speeds to 130kph” —p. 216 Route Engineering Study Final Report—A Report for HS2, Arup December 2009 http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/HS2_RouteEngineeringStudyChapter8_2010.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w429

APPENDIX A COMPARISON OF COSTS

Heathrow Hub £16.5bn + £2.9-4.2bn=£19.4 - 20.9bn Omits Old Oak Common interchange Birmingham Excludes private sector Heathrow Hub funding contribution

Heathrow spur £17bn + £2.5 - 3.9bn= £19.5-20.9bn Heathrow loop £17bn + £4.1 - 5.4bn= £21.1-22.4bn

High HS2 Phase 1 =£17bn Wycombe Ruislip

Old Oak Common Route Northolt Old Oak Common Route plus Loop Old Oak Common Hub Route

Costs taken from HS2 public consultation, 2011 & Heathrow press coverage of Western Connection, Sept 2011. Hub

APPENDIX B COMPARISON OF JOURNEY TIMES London Euston – Birmingham via Heathrow 48m (non-stop) Birmingham 52m (one stop at Heathrow Hub)

London Euston – Birmingham bypassing Heathrow 49m (one stop at Old Oak Common)

High Wycombe Ruislip

Northolt Old Oak Common Route Old Oak Common Old Oak Common Route plus Loop Hub Route

Journey times taken from HS2 public consultation, 2011 Heathrow Hub Euston

Written evidence from Jeff Travers (HSR 151) This written submission provides evidence relating to the HS2 proposed strategic route at the London end. My name is Jeffrey Travers I am an architect and have extensive experience of design and contract administration of rail projects. I was detuty to the director of the newly privatised British Rail Architects Department (NDDA) the designers of Ashford Internation Station for HS1. I took over from Alastair Lansley OBE when he became project architect for St Pancras International Station. I was also architect on Waterloo Jubilee Line Station. I was also project architect for Croydon though the architectural work was limited to tram stops and a large depot. My evidence is as follows: cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w430 Transport Committee: Evidence

At the HS2 Euston roadshow I queried why Old Oak Station was not proposed as the main London terminus for HS2 in view of the space constraints of Euston (as well as the tunnelling difficulties and disruption to existing homes and services in getting the line through to Euston). I was told by HS2 senior staff that there was insufficient space at Old Oak Common for a terminal. I checked the consultation documentation and found that although there appeared to be plenty of space, most of this space was earmarked for a 17 track depot for Crossrail adjacent to the proposed HS2 station. I returned to the roadshow the next day and asked senior engineers from Arup why the proposed Crossrail Depot was located at Old Oak Station. They told me that they had argued with Crossrail that the depot should be relocated so the HS2 Old Oak Station could be the terminus but Crossrail insisted on going ahead with the design tender for the Old Oak Depot because otherwise they would not meet their contract obligations. Arup engineers said that the Old Oak site was potentially the best connected site in the country for such a terminus and they were very disappointed that they were forced to expand Euston with all its difficulties. They said the Crossrail depot would only last a few years once the commercial value of the depot site was realised We all agreed that this is no way to make strategic decisions. May 2011

Written evidence from the Taxpayers’ Alliance (HSR 152) Summary — The TaxPayers’ Alliance (TPA) strongly believes that the Government’s proposed new high speed rail line (HS2) represents poor value for money and the project should be cancelled. Our position is that incremental investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in roads and commuter rail, would be a better priority for scarce resources. At the same time, with long term pressures on the public finances it is difficult to justify spending so much on a project that will predominantly benefit high earners. — The business case is based on assumptions that are hard to justify and subject to three key flaws. Despite these flawed assumptions, the cost benefit produced still does not match the usual standard required for road projects, for example: — Forecasts for growth in demand are almost certainly overstated. — Zero passenger productivity during a journey is assumed. — An unrealistic comparator is used that ignores likely improvements on the West Coast Main Line if HS2 does not go ahead. — Many towns and cities will receive a worse service if HS2 goes ahead on the basis planned. Avoiding that would require additional subsidies and further weaken the business case. — Claims that the programme will create jobs are, in context, unimpressive for the scale of the spending planned. This document will set out the TPA position on this project and then look at the business case; towns and cities likely to see worse capacity as a result of the project; and claims on jobs. It will then conclude by discussing other countries and why “me too HS2” has a poor financial record.

Priorities The TaxPayers’ Alliance is not hostile to infrastructure investment in itself. In our report with the Institute of Directors—How to save £50 billion: Reducing spending for sustainable public finances—we largely avoided cuts in investment expenditure, and instead focused on government consumption. We did so because the Government had “already set out plans radically to reduce net investment” and “transport and energy infrastructure should be the last items to cut”.355 Our view is that the priority for scarce resources should be maximising additional capacity for every pound spent, to ease overcrowding with scarce resources. Opinion polling suggests that reducing cost, congestion and overcrowding is the public’s priority for investment in the transport network.356 In our Manifesto ahead of the last election—intended to be a benchmark whoever formed the next Government—we included this item:357 “Refocus transport spending on high use commuter rail and roads. Despite motorists facing excessive taxation, far more is spent on railways per passenger kilometre. Resources should be focused where they will do the most to ease congestion. Approve a third runway at Heathrow.” 355 http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/50bil.pdf 356 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/transport-and-the-election-survey-rac-foundation-2010-toplines-and-trends.pdf 357 http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/TPAmanifesto.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w431

While there is a need for greater capacity on the West Coast Main Line, that can be addressed more effectively through incremental improvements. The case for high speed rail inherently depends upon prioritising greater speed, and the case for HS2 depends upon prioritising greater speed on the already fast West Coast Main Line. We do not think that is appropriate. While RP2 is not a perfect alternative, something along those lines would offer better value in our view. The business case for high speed rail relies upon business passengers in particular having a high income, as that increases the value of time saved with quicker journeys. More broadly, research shows that nearly half (47%) of long distance rail journeys in Britain are made by people from households in the top income quintile: Long distance rail trips by household income (source NTS)

6.00

5.00

4.00

3.00

trips per year 2.00

1.00

0.00 £10,740 £17,590 £26,460 £38,700 £70,420 income quintile Source: 'Modelling Long-Distance Travel in the UK', Charlene Rohr, James Fox, Andrew Daly, Bhanu Patruni, Sunil Patil, Flavia Tsang. RAND Europe, NTS 2002/5, income data 2005/6 ONS

With long term pressures on the public finances, spending so much on a project benefitting a relatively small number of fortunate passengers is hard to justify.

Business Case The business case for high speed rail is problematic on a number of grounds, which have been explored in a TPA report by senior railway executive Chris Stokes, High Speed Rail.358 The issues have subsequently been updated on our website and in research by other groups like the HS2 Action Alliance,359 after the updated business case was published for the Department for Transport consultation, so only a basic summary will be provided here. There are three principle issues: — Forecasts for growth in demand are almost certainly overstated. While the assumed rate of growth is more moderate in the consultation business case it is projected even further into the future. That is clearly unreliable with a fixed elasticity model. — Zero passenger productivity during a journey is assumed. The consultation document claims that the business case is robust to this issue as the new line will reduce overcrowding. With a more realistic comparator that is not the case though, as alternatives like RP2 will do more to reduce overcrowding. — An unrealistic comparator is used that ignores likely improvements if HS2 does not go ahead. It assumes there are no improvements for 30 years, even ignoring developments already planned by operators. It is important to compare to practical alternatives that can double capacity over time and deliver alternatives before 2026, rather than assuming that without HS2 the network is left in stasis. Overestimating future demand, in particular, is endemic for major rail projects both in Britain and elsewhere in the world. Research by Danish academics in 2006360 states: “for nine out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated; average overestimation is 106%.” Eurostar has captured the lion’s share of London—Paris passenger journeys but the market is near saturation, and its passenger numbers in 2009 where 37% of the forecast for 2006. Manchester—London can be expected to show a similar pattern; there has been rapid growth since the dramatic service improvements in 2008, mostly 358 http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/highspeedrail.pdf 359 http://www.hs2aa.org/index.php/news/publications/category/11-business-case-post-consultation-launch-post- 2822011?download=41%3Areview-of-the-consultation-business-case-for-hs2-v19–5-may-2011 360 Inaccuracy in Traffic Forecasts. Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K Skamris Holm and Søren L Buhl, Department of Development of Planning, Aalborg University cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w432 Transport Committee: Evidence

at the expense of air. But this is a step change over three/four years, not a straight line ever upwards. Rail is also already dominant in the markets from Leeds and Birmingham to central London, so DfT’s forecasts are only credible if there is evidence that there will be a step change growth in the demand for travel on these corridors; this has not happened for London—Paris. DfT told the Public Accounts Committee that they would not repeat those mistakes, made with HS1: “next time it considered undertaking a major transport project, it would factor more severe downside assumptions into its business case analysis”. But it is clear that this has not been done for HS2. In April 2010, the rating agency Fitch looked at high speed rail projects. To quote from the report: “Historically, the agency has observed that the assessment of rail demand has displayed a significant optimism bias, particularly for Greenfield projects”; and “Rail projects are often high profile. This exposes them to “political entrepreneur syndrome” where the public authorities overestimate the benefits of the project to get it approved for the purpose of political gain”. Despite these assumptions HS2 still produces a cost-benefit ratio below that required for other transport projects, particularly roads.

Capacity Another research note for the TPA by Chris Stokes looked at the towns and cities that would see a worse service.361 Here is a summary of some that lose out in the first phase. Table 1 IMPACT OF HS2 PHASE 1 Station Impact Milton Keynes, Northampton Potential doubling of commuter capacity from around 2016 not taken forward in advance of HS2 Coventry Frequency reduced from three to one train per hour from 2026, with journey times extended by 10 minutes, as trains stop at Rugby, Milton Keynes and Watford Junction West Midlands suburban network via Birmingham Implications for connections with the West Midlands New Street suburban network—Frequency reduced from three to one train per hour from 2026, with journey times extended by 10 minutes, as trains stop at Rugby, Milton Keynes and Watford Junction. Sandwell, Dudley and Wolverhampton Journey times extended by 10 minutes Shrewsbury, Wrexham and mid Wales Journey time for connecting services from Wolverhampton and Birmingham New street increased by 10 minutes, and Frequency from Birmingham New Street reduced from three to one trains an hour. Stoke-on Trent No high speed service proposed. Frequency reduced from two to one train per hour. Average journey time lengthened slightly Manchester, Stockport A reduction in overall capacity on the route, from 1,767 seats to 1,650 seats per hour, despite Network Rail’s forecasts that this route would have the highest growth.362

And those that lose out in the second phase: the construction of the “Y”.

361 http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/hs2capacity.pdf 362 This assumes 550 seats for HS2 units, as set out in the consultation documentation, and 589 seats for 11 car Pendolino sets. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w433

Table 2 IMPACT OF HS2 PHASE 2 Station Impact Wellingborough, Kettering, Corby, Market Electrification, journey time reductions and increased Harborough capacity not taken forward in advance of HS2 (2032–33 at the earliest) Leicester Electrification, journey time reductions and increased capacity not taken forward in advance of HS2 (2032–33 at the earliest) Service frequency and journey times likely to deteriorate on completion of Phase 2—Leicester currently has four trains an hour, two non-stop Loughborough Electrification, journey time reductions and increased capacity not taken forward in advance of HS2 Service frequency and journey times likely to deteriorate on completion of Phase 2—Loughborough currently has two trains an hour, one non-stop from Leicester Nottingham, Derby, Sheffield Electrification, journey time reductions and increased capacity not taken forward in advance of HS2 Reduced frequency and increased journey times for existing city centre stations Loss of local transport interchange Chesterfield Electrification, journey time reductions and increased capacity not taken forward in advance of HS2 Service frequency and journey times likely to deteriorate on completion of Phase 2—Chesterfield currently has two trains an hour, non-stop between Leicester and London Peterborough Service frequency likely to deteriorate on completion of Phase 2—Peterborough typically has three/four fast trains an hour. Doncaster, Wakefield Service frequency and journey times likely to deteriorate on completion of Phase 2 York, Durham, Darlington and Newcastle HS2 documentation shows two High Speed trains an hour—no capacity increase on the present service Berwick on Tweed HS2 documentation shows no High Speed trains North of Newcastle Edinburgh HS2 documentation shows no High Speed trains to Edinburgh via Carlisle or Newcastle

It is also worth noting that the new line will put significant pressure on certain existing choke points in the network. For example, far more passengers will terminate in Euston and its connections to the London Underground are likely to be unable to cope with the additional demand. Even with upgrades to the station, it is unlikely that the London transport network will be able to cope with the amount of traffic being directed to Euston. Southbound trains are already particularly overcrowded. The Government have responded to our report, but their claims have been misleading. In a Westminster Hall debate on 31 March 2011, Theresa Villiers effectively promised that there would be no service cuts on the existing network once HS2 is built. In response to a speech by Dan Byles MP, in which he said Coventry would see its fast trains to London cut from three to one an hour, she responded: “This is simply not true. There are some indicative forecasts in the HS2 analysis about how services might be configured in the future. The reality is that Coventry is going to enjoy frequent fast services.” But the documentation is clear.363 The HS2 Business Case is based on an assumption that Coventry will only have one train an hour, which will be slower because of additional stops. If all the Birmingham passengers are on HS2, it would be extraordinary if the present 20 minute frequency continued, just for Coventry passengers. The HS2 business case includes a total saving of £5.4 billion for reductions to existing services. Philip Hammond told the Daily Telegraph on 1st April that: “Our proposed new high speed rail network would free up a huge amount of space on the current railways for more trains to operate. Building a whole new line would create scope for people who live on the current lines to have more frequent services that are less crowded—I would also hope that this additional competition could mean cheaper fares as well” 363 HS2 Technical Appendix, March 2010. Appendix 2, Page 23 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/ http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/technicalappendix/pdf/report.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w434 Transport Committee: Evidence

This is apparently very attractive. But the existing services are generally good, so faced with a choice of using HS2 to get to Birmingham in 49 minutes or paying half price to go on the existing trains in 82 minutes, many people will save money and take a bit longer, especially when they arrive at a station in the heart of the city, with good public transport connections. They already do this in Kent, where the “Javelin” high speed services to towns like Chatham are embarrassingly empty, and passengers continue to use the cheaper, slower alternatives.

These “promises” from Theresa Villiers and Phillip Hammond would have a major impact on the already poor financial case for HS2. Extra capacity and competition would certainly drive fares right down. But the published financial details assume no competition on routes served by HS2, and fares going up at RPI + 3% for the next three years and RPI + 1% for every subsequent year until 2033, a 36% increase above inflation. The overall additional revenue included in the HS2 business case364 is £27.2 billion (Net Present Value over 60 years). Unfettered competition will undoubtedly halve this, probably more, so we can assume it drops to £13.6 billion. And promises of “no service cuts” wipe out a £5.4 billion cost saving. Adjusting the total evaluation for these changes increases the net cost of the project to the taxpayer to £36.1 billion, much higher than the £30.4 billion capital cost.

If this really happened, it might be good news for the minority of the population who use rail and travel on this route, enjoying overcapacity and cheap fares. But it would represent an appalling cost to the taxpayer. A much more likely outcome is that existing services will be cut; fares on HS2 will be priced at a premium; and, as with Kent, fares across large parts of the network will be raised as well to plug the financial black hole created by HS2.

Jobs

An increasing number of major projects are promoted on the basis that they will create jobs. The number of jobs claimed can be impressive, such as the purported 40,000 jobs that will be created by a new high speed rail line—cited in the Department for Transport consultation document.365 But they can be very misleading. There are two issues: — The estimate of jobs created may be inaccurate in itself. For example, the estimate of jobs created by HS2 may be based on overly optimistic demand assumptions, like the wider estimate of costs and benefits. — There are opportunity costs to any major investment, in the form of foregone opportunities to make other investments. Any investment on the scale of the £17 billion the Government plans to spend on the London to Birmingham high speed link would create jobs. But if that investment is not made, other investments, elsewhere in the public or private sectors, could lead to greater gains in employment.

In our research note on jobs, we assumed that the 40,000 jobs estimate is accurate. There are a number of reservations about that figure though: — 9,000 of the jobs are in construction, and therefore likely to prove impermanent. — Regeneration benefits may well come primarily from shifting economic activity around the country. Jobs created may therefore not represent higher employment, but come at the expense of fewer jobs elsewhere.

The second concern is particularly critical, as the Financial Times put it in a leader, 28 February 2011: “To govern is to choose. Would the benefits of a shiny new high-speed line outweigh the less visible but valuable things that could be done with the limited funds available?”

To test whether high speed rail is an efficient way of promoting employment, we can use a method deployed by two recent studies, which assessed the opportunity costs of major investments in the energy sector.

The paper Study of the effects on employment of public aid to renewable energy sources,366 produced by a team led by Dr. Gabriel Calzada Álvarez at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Spain, pioneered an attempt to understand this issue by comparing the capital stock per worker across the broader economy with the cost per worker of investment in renewable energy sources.

There has been criticism of that paper, but that criticism has mostly argued either that the estimate of jobs created by renewable energy support was wrong (Dr. Calzada used an estimate produced by a European Commission initiative) or that a better measure would be to look at the amount of employment produced for every dollar of investment in different sources of energy (which is obviously inappropriate when projects entail significantly increasing investment in a sector not previously promoted primarily as a source of employment). In the case of HS2, the estimate of jobs created comes from the Department for Transport. 364 Economic Case for HS2 February 2011 Page 12 365 Available here: http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsr-consultation.pdf 366 Available in English here: http://www.juandemariana.org/pdf/090327-employment-public-aid-renewable.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w435

It was followed up by a study by Luciano Lavecchia and Carlo Stagnaro for the Istituto Bruno Leoni in Italy.367 The researchers in that study summed up what the results imply: “The only scope, and we dare to say the only result, of our study is to show that green investments are an ineffective policy for job creation.”

To produce a similar estimate for HS2, the first step is to calculate capital stock per worker in the broader economy. The Office for National Statistics put the total net capital stock of the UK—the total cost (at current prices) of replacing all capital assets in their current condition—at £3.182 trillion in 2009.368 They also recorded the total number of workforce jobs at nearly 31 million.369 That implies net capital stock per worker of £102,655.

By contrast, the proposed high speed rail line from London to Birmingham is expected to cost £17.8 billion and create 40,500 jobs—9,000 in construction; 1,500 in operations and maintenance; and 30,000 from wider economic regeneration. That is nearly £440,000 per worker. Calculation Wider Economy Amount A Net capital stock, 2009 £3,182,000,000,000 B Employment, 2009 30,997,000 C (A/B) Capital stock per job £102,655 HS2—London to Birmingham D Cost £17,800,000,000 E Jobs created claim 40,500 F (D/E) Cost per job £439,506 Comparison G (D/C) HS2 opportunity cost, jobs 173,396 H (G/E) Ratio, opportunity cost/jobs created 4.3

For every one job supposedly created by HS2, we could expect four jobs to be created in the wider economy for the same amount of money.

The fact that the wider economy generates more than four times as many jobs for every pound in capital stock suggests high speed rail is a deeply inefficient generator of new employment, and there is a significant opportunity cost to investing in it. High speed rail is capital intensive, not labour intensive, and for the Government to promote it as a means to increase employment is misleading.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the case for the new high speed rail line has not been made and, given constraints on spending and the likely distributional impact, HS2 should be cancelled.

It is often argued that Britain needs to adopt high speed rail to compete with other countries making similar investments. However there are increasing signs that countries investing in HS2 have seen poor value: — Schemes taken forward as PPP projects such as in Taiwan and the Netherlands risk bankruptcy and have required government bailouts. — High speed rail has been largely abandoned in the United States as state governors were concerned about the long term costs. — Charles Lane recently wrote in the Washington Post that the Ministry responsible for high speed rail in China has $271 billion in debt and the Minister has been arrested for embezzling on a substantial scale.370

It is increasingly clear that international adoption of high speed rail constitutes “me too HS2”. Taken up as a visible signal of political commitment to growth and development, it substitutes for more effective but less prestigious investments and proves extremely poor value. Britain should avoid making the same mistake and focus on incremental infrastructure improvements. May 2011

367 Available in English here: http://brunoleonimedia.servingfreedom.net/WP/WP-Green_Jobs-May2010.pdf 368 Office for National Statistics Capital Stocks, Capital Consumption and Non-Financial Balance Sheets, 2 August 2010 369 Office for National Statistics DYDC: UK Workforce Jobs SA : Total (thousands) 370 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-train-wreck/2011/04/21/AFqjRWRE_story.html cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w436 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Glasgow City Council (HSR 154) Summary of Main Points Glasgow City Council strongly supports the construction of a UK High Speed Rail network, which is considered essential both for the country’s future economic prosperity and also to reduce transport’s contribution to carbon emissions. However, GCC contends that the full economic and environmental benefits of HSR will not be realised until a dedicated HSR line is constructed over the entire route between London/ HS1 and Scotland. GCC considers the construction of a new HSR line between London and Birmingham to be the optimum means of providing the increased transport capacity urgently required in that corridor. However new HSR infrastructure has the potential not only to provide increased transport capacity but also to reduce end-to-end rail journey times between Glasgow/Edinburgh and London to well below three hours. So doing will encourage considerable modal shift from air and road to rail, thereby reducing transport’s overall carbon emissions and generating new rail patronage to maximise the return on investment in HSR. Glasgow City Council is concerned that the construction of dedicated HSR lines only as far north as Manchester and Leeds could increase Scotland’s peripherality and concentrate economic development and regeneration in the southern half of Britain, to the detriment of Scotland’s economy and that of north east England. Consequently, given the significantly greater journey-time reductions and consequent modal shift from air that would be achieved by providing a dedicated HSR line over the northern half of the London— Scotland route, GCC believes that the UK Government should commit to the early provision of a new HSR line over the entire route between Edinburgh/Glasgow and London and construct this line simultaneously from both ends.

Responses to Listed Questions 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 1.1 The main arguments for HSR are as follows: 1.1.1 Economic Growth—Capacity constraints on much of the existing rail network are proving costly to business and restricting economic growth. Most constrained at present is the southern end of the West Coast Main Line (WCML) between London and Birmingham with capacity on more northerly sections of this line and parts of the East Coast (ECML) and Midland Main Lines (MML) also constrained. With HSR the fastest- growing transport mode in Europe, there is a danger of regional British cities losing out to regional European cities in terms of economic growth, in the absence of HSR connectivity. 1.1.2 Reduced Journey time—This is a more important benefit for longer journeys such as those between Scotland and London. Current rail journey times between Glasgow/Edinburgh and London are too long for travel to morning business meetings and same-day return trips by rail allow little time for activity in the destination city. 1.1.3 Reduced Emissions—Increased capacity and reduced journey times will encourage modal shift from air and road to rail. The emission benefits from HSR will obviously be highest where trains run with high load factors and utilise electricity generated from renewable fuels. Again, the most significant reductions will be for longer journeys (such as London—Glasgow) where city centre—city centre journey times by rail will better those by air and be considerably shorter than those by road. 1.1.4 Capacity on existing rail lines will be released by the construction of a new HSR line, facilitating improved freight and local passenger services on these lines. These services will, in turn, encourage more modal shift from road thereby reducing road congestion, benefitting both the economy and the environment. 1.2 The main arguments against HSR are as follows: 1.2.1 Affordability—Some claim that public finance in the United Kingdom cannot afford HSR. However, by the time that major expenditure is required, the country is likely to be emerging from the current economic downturn. Without HSR the economy is likely to be more (not less) vulnerable to future economic downturns. 1.2.2 Disruption—The construction of any major engineering project will be disruptive to the landscape and communities through which it passes. However, the disruption caused by construction along a carefully chosen new alignment is likely to be much less than that caused by widening an existing transport corridor, where many residents and businesses located adjacent to the existing corridor boundaries would require relocation. The use of an existing corridor would also be much more disruptive to existing transport services using the corridor than will be the case for a new alignment. 1.2.3 An upgrade of existing rail lines would be preferable. Some argue that the provision of additional capacity on the existing rail network would achieve the same objectives (as HSR) but be cheaper and less disruptive. However, the actual costs of adding capacity to the existing network are more difficult to estimate than those for a new line on a new alignment. Widening existing rail corridors to provide additional tracks is likely to require the purchase of many parcels of land and will prove extremely disruptive to some owners. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w437

While it may be argued that lengthening trains or providing higher-capacity rolling stock would be relatively inexpensive and easily implemented, the consequent changes required to infrastructure may not be. 1.2.4 Any platform lengthening required to accommodate longer trains will be disruptive, both to rail users and to those with property required for the extended platforms. Platform lengthening is likely to be particularly problematic adjacent to existing bridges or tunnels and future services may require selective door opening or the omission of some station stops. Similarly, there are likely to be many locations on existing lines where increasing the gauge clearance to accommodate double-deck trains is problematic. However, the chief failing of any proposal to increase capacity on the existing rail network is that it would not provide high speed rail services. While this may be of little consequence to those travelling between London and Birmingham, the benefits for those travelling between London and Scotland are significantly less than for HSR. 1.2.5 Environmental Damage—Any civil engineering construction work has the potential to damage the environment but this can be mitigated by sensitive design and ancillary works. The most commonly cited environmental arguments against HSR are damage to landscape and noise pollution. The insertion of a new rail line into a landscape will certainly change it but not necessarily damage it. The route currently identified for HSR between London and Birmingham does not cross open moorland but a landscape already bisected by numerous roads, tracks, pathways and even rail lines. The new line will obviously be a feature in the future landscape but, carefully designed, should not inflict lasting damage. In fact many major structures on “classic” rail lines are now listed in recognition of their positive contributions to the landscape. 1.2.6 The noise generated by HSR trains is likely to be intrusive only in areas that are currently quiet. For much of its route the HSR line will pass through built-up areas, where there is already background noise from traffic, aircraft, industry and farming operations. In these areas, HSR will add to the noise but is unlikely to be particularly intrusive. In “wilderness” areas, the introduction of noise where there is presently silence will inevitably destroy the tranquillity. However, even in these circumstances, the intermittent noise from passing trains is, arguably, less intrusive than the constant drone of road traffic, which emanates, night and day, from a motorway.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 2.1.1 Improving inter-urban connectivity is the most important transport policy objective for economic development, although improving the sustainability of transport is arguably the most important objective overall. HSR scores highly on both counts. Inter-urban connectivity is improved through the provision of additional capacity and reduced journey times. Being electrically-powered, HSR is more sustainable than either road or air transport due to the potential to generate electricity from a variety of renewable sources and its non-reliance on depleting reserves of increasingly expensive oil. 2.1.2 Additions and improvements to the strategic road network can improve capacity locally but are also likely to reinforce the perception that road is the preferred mode of travel, leading to greater congestion elsewhere on the network. By way of contrast, investment in HSR will create capacity for an alternative travel mode. This will abstract some traffic from the road network, thereby reducing road congestion, without simultaneously encouraging additional road traffic. HSR will also release capacity on the existing (classic) rail network for additional freight and local passenger services, thereby further reducing road traffic and congestion. 2.1.3 Over longer distances, such as those between Scotland’s Central Belt and London, HSR will also abstract traffic from air services, since city-centre to city centre travel times will be shorter by HSR. Assuming similar load factors for air and HSR services, this transfer will significantly reduce carbon emissions. It will also bring economic benefits in terms of the ability to use HSR journey-time more productively than is the case with air travel.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.2.1 There is no reason to suppose that spending on the construction of new HSR infrastructure will reduce capital spending on the existing network. There are already significant “high-cost” rail projects under construction, in particular London Cross Rail (approx. £15 billion over around seven years) and Thameslink (approx. £5.5 billion over around eight years) and it does not appear than these schemes have affected funding for the general “classic” network. These two schemes will be close to completion by the time construction is proposed to start on HSR between London and Birmingham in around 2016. Spread over ten years, the £17 billion estimated cost of HSR should generate annual expenditure no greater than for Crossrail and certainly below the combined peak expenditure of the two London projects. 2.2.2 As regards increasing track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities, HSR may constitute the most cost effective means of doing just this. Transfer of long distance inter-urban services to the HSR network will provide seats on existing rolling stock for commuters and capacity on classic tracks for additional commuter services. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w438 Transport Committee: Evidence

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.3.1 There is likely to be little impact on domestic aviation as a result of HSR services between London and Birmingham, since most travel between these cities is currently by road or rail and reductions in overall rail journey times between London and cities north of Birmingham will be insufficient to encourage significant modal shift from air. 2.3.2 Extension of the new HSR line to Manchester and Leeds is likely to reduce journey times between London and Scotland sufficiently to encourage some transfer of cross-border domestic air travel to rail. It should also eliminate the use of air services for travel between London and those cities on the HSR network, except, perhaps for some interlining. 2.3.3 However, to achieve a significant modal shift from air to HSR, it will be necessary to provide a new HSR rail line over the entire route between London and Scotland, thereby eliminating the current time penalty in using rail services for these longer journeys. In 2009, some 20% of journeys between Edinburgh/Glasgow and London were made by rail. If the rail journey time were to be reduced to 2 hour 30 minutes (by providing a new HSR line over the entire route), it is anticipated that around 80% of journeys would be made by rail— resulting in four or five million fewer domestic air trips on these routes. 2.3.4 One implication of this reduction in domestic air travel between cities served by HSR services could be the release of capacity at British airports for additional domestic flights to cities beyond the reach of HSR infrastructure (eg Aberdeen and Inverness) and for additional international flights. These additional flights could bring economic benefits in excess of those already calculated to result from the construction of a UK HSR network.

3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 3.1.1 In addition to the work undertaken by HS2, Atkins (on behalf of SRA, later updated for the Government in 2008), Network Rail (New Lines, 2009) and Greengauge21 (Fast Forward, 2009) have separately researched the business case for HSR. While each of these studies considered a slightly different HSR network, all produced a case for a north-south spine route linking the major cities between London and Edinburgh/Glasgow, indicating that the overall case is robust. 3.1.2 The methodology adopted by HS2 is based on standard DfT and Treasury models and cannot, therefore, be challenged in isolation. Moreover, the use of this methodology allows the benefit:cost ratio for HSR to be compared directly with those calculated for other transport schemes. 3.1.3 It has been argued recently that, in assuming that time spent on trains is “un-productive”, HS2 has overestimated the benefits of HSR arising from reduced journey times. On the other hand, Greengauge21 reported that regarding time spent on HSR trains as productive “working-time” marginally increases the overall benefit:cost ratio for HSR. The basis for this finding is that the productive time gained by passengers transferring from car and air outweighs the working time lost by passengers transferring from classic train services of longer duration. It might also be argued that HSR will create a better working environment than current rail services, affording greater en route productivity for passengers than by all other modes, including classic rail.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.2.1 The most recent upgrade of the West Coast Main Line added significant capacity to the route but this capacity is rapidly being filled as passenger numbers continue to rise and is likely to be exhausted by 2020. To create significant additional capacity on the existing tracks, it would be necessary to lengthen the trains and/or provide higher-capacity rolling stock (eg double-deck carriages). As set out in response to Question 1 above, provision of the infrastructure necessary to accommodate either of these capacity enhancements is unlikely to be readily achievable over the entire length of the existing route. Even if additional capacity were to be created in this way, it would be only a matter of time before this too was exhausted. Consequently, Network Rail have concluded that the only realistic long-term capacity solution for travel between London and West Midlands is to provide an additional line. 3.2.2 Additional to the considerable engineering costs of increasing the capacity of an existing rail line are significant costs in terms of disruption to services and reduced capacity during construction. These latter costs were further increased in the case of the recently completed upgrade of the WCML by delays to the project programme, due to the difficulties of working alongside an operating railway. None of these additional costs will arise with the construction of a rail line on a new alignment and the capacity created will be considerably greater that that achieved by upgrading an existing line. 3.2.3 A new conventional line (restricted to 125 mph) could deliver increased capacity equally as well as an HSR line but would not reduce journey-times and would therefore be of more limited benefit for longer cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w439

journeys (eg between London and the North of England and Scotland) where overall travel times are a major consideration. Without the journey-time savings, there will be less modal shift to rail from road and air and consequently reduced environmental benefits in terms of pollutant and carbon emissions. However, proposals for a new conventional line are likely to generate the same opposition from those on the line of route as proposals for a HSR line. The construction of a new conventional line would therefore appear to be a non- starter.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

3.3.1 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would encourage passengers to travel by less sustainable modes (ie car or air) and, in the case of car travel, would increase road congestion. Alternatively, some journeys may not be undertaken at all which, while more sustainable, would be detrimental in overall socio-economic terms.

3.3.2 To some extent, demand is already managed by price and, except where travel is free of charge at the point of delivery, this will continue to be the case. If it is accepted that rail travel is more sustainable and environmentally acceptable than air or road travel, the aim should be to provide the capacity that will enable rail services to be available at the lowest possible cost. To do otherwise would adversely impact on both the environment and business and the economy in general.

3.3.3 It is likely that there will be a continuing role for price in maximising the efficient use of the rail network. Differential pricing according to time of travel and speed of journey could assist in maximising train load factors on both the classic and high speed networks.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

3.4.1 The construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a reasonably good track record in terms of time and budget (eg HS1 and the recent Airdrie-Bathgate project). Competitive procurement on a design-and-build basis is probably the best means of reducing cost overruns.

4. The strategic route

4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

4.1.1 For the benefits of HSR in terms of reduced journey times to be maximised, there should be few, if any, intermediate stops on routes between any two city centre stations. Consequently, the HSR network should be designed in a similar fashion to the UK’s motorway network with the route by-passing all towns and cities en route. In general, intermediate cities would be served not by through stations on the main line but by terminal stations reached via spurs off the main line. Such a terminal station is currently planned for Curzon Street in Birmingham.

4.1.2 In certain situations, it may be appropriate to provide through stations on the main line, such as that currently proposed at Birmingham International. However, only trains commencing or terminating their journeys a few miles distant (in this case at Curzon Street) should slow down and stop at these stations; other services should continue non-stop at high speed on a parallel bypass line, thereby avoiding any increase in their end-to-end journey times.

4.1.3 The proposed station at Old Oak Common (OOC) is supported, in the short term at least, as a useful interchange for London Crossrail and services to Heathrow airport. Given its proximity to the proposed Euston terminal, the increases in end-to-end journey times for HSR services resulting from stops here should be smaller than would be the case for intermediate stops elsewhere on the network. Stopping HSR services at OOC for interchange to London suburban services could also reduce congestion on connecting services at Euston. In addition, directly connecting the West Coast Main Line into London Crossrail at OOC, could reduce the number of platforms required at Euston to accommodate classic services (see also comment at 6.4.2 below).

4.1.4 Additional stations should be provided only in cities where passenger demand for travel to a single destination served by HSR is sufficient to entirely fill high speed trains. If it becomes necessary for trains to collect passengers from several stations to achieve the loading required for viable operation, the benefits of high speed travel will be seriously eroded by repeated station stops. Where a city cannot generate sufficient patronage to justify a HSR station, feeder services should be provided on classic lines to a convenient HSR station for interchange. To minimise the potential for feeder journeys to be undertaken by private car, interchange with HSR services should take place at city centre stations wherever possible. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w440 Transport Committee: Evidence

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.2.1 As stated above, only those cities generating sufficient patronage to fill trains destined for a single location should be directly served by the eventual high speed network. Likely candidates are London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Newcastle, Bristol, Edinburgh and Glasgow. These cities should be considered core cities for the network and could be joined by Sheffield and an East Midlands station if patronage there is sufficient. 4.2.2 The proposed Y configuration serves only four of the suggested core cities but the eastern branch of the Y could readily be extended northwards to also serve Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh, suggesting that it forms a good basis for the eventual HSR network. Two further extensions should be considered to complete the network of dedicated HSR lines—one from Birmingham International to Bristol and the other from the East Midlands to London. 4.2.3 Given that hybrid HSR/classic trains are proposed to provide initial HSR services to destinations north of Birmingham, it is suggested that, network capacity permitting, these trains could be used subsequently to provide through-running HSR/classic services westwards to Cardiff via Heathrow and Bristol, southwards to Southampton via Heathrow and northwards to Aberdeen and Inverness.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.3.1 Pragmatically it makes perfect sense to start the HSR network with the London-Birmingham section, which is the most capacity-restrained section on the West Coast Main Line. Furthermore, the link to London and HS1 is an essential element of any national HSR network so, should the London—Birmingham section be rejected, it is unlikely that a truly national network could ever materialise. 4.3.2 However, future phases do not necessarily have to be constructed in a consecutive northwards order. The most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the English-Scottish border so serious consideration should be given to starting construction of these sections at an earlier stage rather as the last legs. In particular, the Government should show greater commitment to plan the future network beyond Manchester and Leeds so that the longer term benefits of a national network become clearer.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.4.1 While it is understood that construction of the link to HS1 has been proposed as part of phase 1 for technical reasons, it is welcomed as essential to enable direct services between Europe and UK cities north of London. It is suggested that, as soon as this link is operational (possibly prior to the opening of HS2) consideration is given to extending the UK’s existing sleeper services to European destinations. services currently arrive in London at around 6.00am and, given the procurement of suitable rolling stock could reach Brussels and Paris in time for morning meetings. Similarly, evening departures from these cities would reach London prior to midnight to utilise the existing WCML train paths to Scotland. 4.4.2 The Heathrow market will to a large extent be catered for through the Old Oak Common interchange as part of phase 1 so it is reasonable that further expenditure on this link should come later. However, the Heathrow link should be built in a way that enables High Speed Trains for Heathrow from the north to continue on the classic network to Southampton and those from London to continue to Bristol and Cardiff (see 4.2.3 above).

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.1.1 While not all European cities directly connected to the high speed network have benefitted economically, those that have co-ordinated their social, economic and planning policies and projects to capitalise on HSR have experienced increases in their economic growth. The only experience of HSR in the UK to date is HS1 and Greengauge21 reported an upsurge in business activity in parts of Kent following its construction. 5.1.2 A study undertaken by Halcrow for the Glasgow-Edinburgh Collaboration Initiative has specifically identified the policy approach and action necessary to ensure that the construction of HSR lines to Edinburgh and Glasgow will promote economic regeneration throughout Scotland. The location of HSR stations in Edinburgh and Glasgow City Centres will, in particular, facilitate urban regeneration rather than the development of “Greenfield” sites.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.2.1 The most important role of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity both between the main centres of population in the UK and also with Europe, where HSR is fastest growing mode of travel. Currently cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w441

London and the South East are both better connected to Europe than other UK cities and also experiencing the greatest economic growth. By directly linking regional city centres to London and Europe, HSR will bring agglomeration benefits to UK plc and will also promote regional regeneration. 5.2.2 The network should certainly be shaped to serve those areas of the UK most in need of regeneration. In this respect, it is particularly important that the North East of England and Scotland are included in the network from the outset and that their regeneration does not stall as a result of HSR’s initial connection only to Birmingham and the WCML. Scotland is already at a disadvantage due to its geographic peripherality in both the UK and Europe. The UK’s HSR network should aim to reduce this peripherality and not increase it.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.3.1 It is anticipated that any city-region directly served by the HSR network will benefit from its development. While HSR services will be long-distance and used mainly for business and leisure (tourist) travel, the capacity released on the classic network will facilitate improvements to local passenger, commuter and freight services. Consequently, all socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR. The cascading of hybrid HSR/classic rolling stock to lines running on from the dedicated HSR network (see 4.2.3 above) will ensure that the benefits of HSR are also felt beyond the network itself.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 5.4.1 Government procurement of a HSR network will be funded by all UK taxpayers and businesses. Provided that the network is developed to benefit all regions of the UK, this appears an appropriate means of sharing costs and risks. Given that the UK HSR Network is likely to “replace” classic rail lines that currently form part of TEN, it would appear sensible to seek support from any relevant EU budgets.

6. Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1.1 Assessment of the overall impact HSR on carbon emissions is complex due to the number of variables involved. While emissions resulting from initial construction of the track and rolling stock can be calculated with a fair degree of accuracy, those resulting from HSR operation will be highly dependent on the mix of fuels used for electricity generation and train loadings. However, under almost all scenarios, the emissions due to HSR travel will be lower than those for the equivalent journey by air. It therefore follows that most favourable impact on emissions will result where HSR encourages a significant transfer of air passengers. This significant transfer is unlikely to materialise for domestic passengers until Scotland and London are connected by HSR (see 2.3.3 above). 6.1.2 The impact of HSR on carbon emissions as regards modal shift from roads is likely to result more from the capacity relief that HSR brings to the classic rail network than from the HSR services themselves. In particular, the provision of additional freight paths on the classic network will enable a transfer of container traffic from road to rail. This will not only directly reduce the carbon emissions generated by the transport of that freight; it will also reduce congestion on the road network, thereby reducing the emissions per tonne- kilometre for freight that remains on the road network. Similarly for passenger traffic, additional commuter and local rail services will reduce emissions both directly, in terms of those who shift from road to rail, and also indirectly, in terms of a reduction in road congestion. 6.1.3 Overall, GCC would expect carbon emissions to be lower with HSR in place than would be the case if an HSR network were not constructed. This will certainly be the case if the primary energy source is renewable, when the carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction) should be negligible.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2.1 HS2 appear to have taken a very cautious (pessimistic) approach in their assessment of overall environmental benefits. With the exception of noise, the effect of which is difficult to analyse on a cost:benefit basis (see 1.2.6 above), it is likely that HS2 have underestimated the environmental benefits of HSR.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.3.1 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line (the busiest rail freight corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by rail freight services. Consequently, HSR’s impact on freight services on the classic network is expected to be entirely positive. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w442 Transport Committee: Evidence

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4.1 Provided that the HSR network is constructed on a new alignment, there should be no disruption to services on the classic network other than at locations where the two networks cross each other. Even here, disruption should be minimal. However, there is obviously potential for significant disruption at Euston and some during construction of the HS1-HS2 link. 6.4.2 Experience of the St Pancras redevelopment indicates that it is possible to minimise disruption to existing services, while redeveloping a station to accommodate HSR, but the scale of reconstruction proposed at Euston is greater than at St Pancras, as is the scale of existing rail operations. It is suggested that potential disruption to classic services at Euston could be reduced by connecting the West Coast Main Line to Crossrail at Willesden/Old Oak Common and diverting services running between London and towns south of Birmingham on to the Crossrail network, prior to works commencing at Euston. May 2011

Written evidence from London Councils (HSR 155) London Councils represents all 32 London boroughs, the City of London, the Metropolitan Police Authority and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority. We are committed to fighting for fair resources for London and getting the best possible deal for London’s 33 Councils. We lobby on our members’ behalf, develop policy and do all we can to help boroughs improve the services they offer. We also run a range of services ourselves which are designed to make life better for Londoners. London Councils’ Transport and Environment Committee (TEC) welcomes the opportunity to respond to the questions posed by the Transport Select Committee’s inquiry into high speed rail. Due to the nature of our organisation not all of the questions posed are of equal relevance for London and therefore we have answered questions 2.2, 3.1, 4.1, 4.4 and 5.4.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.2.1 One of the strongest elements of the case made in the government’s recent consultation document “High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future” is the potential financial boost high speed rail could bring to the national economy. On the basis that a high speed network would generate significant economic benefits (estimated at £71 billion over a 60 year time frame; a cost:benefit ration of 1:2.6), we would not wish to see initial investment in it come at the price of much needed funding for the existing network. Overcrowding is already a problem on many suburban lines in the capital, limiting both the city’s economic potential and quality of life for many Londoners. 2.2.2 Network Rail’s draft Route Utilisation Strategy (RUS), published in December 2010, anticipates that over half of London’s suburban lines will face significant capacity issues by 2031, including the East Coast, Great Eastern, West Anglia and Midland main lines.371 The RUS highlights the opportunity high speed rail represents to free up capacity on the West Coast Main Line but cautions that additional interventions may be necessary to manage large numbers of passengers arriving at Old Oak Common and Euston stations and to alleviate disruption to the North London line caused by a link to High Speed 1 (HS1). The RUS outlines the benefits investment in Crossrail 2 (the Chelsea-Hackney line) would bring in alleviating many of the additional burdens high speed rail would impose on London’s existing transport infrastructure, and for this reason TEC advocates funding for Crossrail 2 being made available in line with the development of high speed rail. 2.2.3 Though this question specifically addresses future investment in rail services it is important to consider the wider role of sustainable transport options for passengers arriving in London. Bus services, walking and cycling are crucial forms of transport, particularly in inner London, and funding for improved provision of all three should be incorporated into plans for the development of both Old Oak Common and Euston stations.

3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 3.1.1 TEC committee welcomes the Department for Transport’s recent update of the economic appraisal of the London—West Midlands high speed route. TEC member’s had shared concerns expressed by some commentators that the original “value of time” assumptions did not adequately take into account the use many business passengers make of laptops and wi-fi to continue working on train journeys. 3.1.2 Though complex and challenging, it is critical that such appraisals are realistic. In the case of HS1, demand forecasts proved to be significantly optimistic and have been previously criticised by the Transport Select Committee. It would not be desirable to see future high speed rail fares having to be raised to balance 371 Network Rail (December 2010) “Route Utilisation Strategy. Draft for Consultation” cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w443

lower than forecast demand, a situation that would impact on the attractiveness of high speed rail to potential passengers and undermine the potential capacity and environmental benefits that stand to be gained from the project.

4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1.1 London Councils’ TEC committee does not have comments to make on the specific location of stations on the West Midlands route but is supportive of the decision to include an interchange station in West London. Indeed, the consultation document’s proposals for Old Oak Common are expected to create up to 20,000 new jobs and be accompanied by new housing, office and retail space, all of which will bring welcome economic benefits to the local community in what is currently a deprived area. 4.1.2 In contrast the use of Euston station as a terminus raises a number of concerns, particularly around the impact a high speed line will have on local suburban rail services. The consultation document anticipates that an extra 5,500 passengers could arrive at Euston during the three hour rush hour period looking to use the underground to reach their onward destination. The Victoria and Northern lines are often already overcrowded at these times, and though the figures may represent an only two per cent increase in the number of passengers it is obvious that the existing infrastructure would struggle to cope. 4.1.3 The current high speed proposals will require the demolition of around 200 mainly local authority owned homes on the Regent’s Park Estate. It would not be appropriate for any local authority to be disadvantaged in terms of the number of socially rented homes or social amenities available to local people. We urge project partners to ensure that upheaval and disruption to London’s communities throughout the construction phase is minimised.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.4.1 Ensuring that any future extension of Britain’s high speed rail infrastructure is integrated into the existing international rail network is crucial. Britain’s first purpose-built high speed line, HS1 (linking London to the Channel Tunnel), has transformed travel between London and mainland Europe. Already Eurostar services account for 80% of journeys made from London by both rail and air to Paris and Brussels. A direct link between HS1 and HS2 will ensure reduced journey times and greater convenience for passengers choosing to travel by rail and will therefore help to maximise the environmental benefits of building the whole HS2 line. The government’s consultation document states that, for technical reasons, tunnelling for this direct link must be completed before the interchange station at Old Oak Common is operational. Therefore not including it in phase one would represent a very significant missed opportunity. 4.4.2 London Council’s TEC committee is also supportive of the government’s proposals not to include a direct link to Heathrow in phase one of the scheme. The principle aim of building a high speed rail network should be to support the provision of low-carbon travel choices, rather than support any expansion in air travel. Including a direct link in phase one will increase journey times between Birmingham and London, making high speed rail a less appealing option for inter-city travel. 4.4.3 Around half of passengers flying from Heathrow begin their journey in London, and already have access to the airport by rail (access that will improve with the expected completion of Crossrail in 2018). However travellers accessing Heathrow from other areas, in the Midlands, South East, Wales and the South West are at present poorly served by rail services. In 2007, 63% of journeys to Heathrow were made by car.372 Enhanced environmental benefits may be better achieved in the long-term by a full examination of how existing rail services across the South of England could better connect with all the airports in the South of the country, rather than just a possible link between the proposed high speed line and Heathrow.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 5.4.1 London’s local authorities are concerned about potential future funding burdens that could be placed upon them if the construction of high speed rail goes ahead. The current Crossrail project is being partially funded by contributions from section 106 planning agreements and also through the imposition of a Mayoral CIL (Community Infrastructure Levy). In the case of the former, only commercial developments within the Central Activities Zone (CAZ), Isle of Dogs and within the reach of a Crossrail station (which therefore stand to benefit from its construction) will be charged. The Mayoral CIL, however, is to be levied on all development over 100sqm, both commercial and residential, within London’s boroughs, meaning that even those too far away to feel the benefit of the new line must pay. 372 CAA data cited on p.46: Bow Group (2010) “The right track”, http://www.bowgroup.org/files/bowgroup/The_Right_Track_PDF.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w444 Transport Committee: Evidence

5.4.2 The Mayoral levy is likely to be introduced in summer 2012, and will continue to be charged until a £300 million target has been reached. The Mayor predicts this will be in 2018–19, (already after 2017 when the government’s high speed rail consultation anticipates construction beginning). Reaching this target could, of course, take longer. 5.4.3 The ability of London’s boroughs to implement their own CIL will be affected by the introduction of a Mayoral levy (a situation not found elsewhere in the country). With the viability of many potential developments in London severely limited by the economic climate, many boroughs have been concerned that the implementation of their own local CIL on top of the Mayor’s Crossrail CIL would see fewer much-needed developments, particularly of affordable housing, come to site. The proposed arrangements, as they stand, will reduce London’s local authorities’ ability to invest in the valuable social infrastructure needed to enhance their local communities, a situation that could be significantly prolonged if a further charge for high speed rail is introduced. May 2011

Written evidence from (HSR 156) Angel Trains Angel Trains owns, leases and maintains trains for Train Operating Companies. We are the largest Rolling Stock Operating Company (ROSCO) in the UK: — Angel Trains owns nearly 4,500 vehicles. — 37% of the trains currently leased for operation on the UK rail network are run by Angel Trains. — 99.8% of our fleet are currently on lease to operating companies. We do more than just lease trains to Train Operating Companies. Through our team of expert engineers based at our offices in London and Derby, Angel Trains provides expertise in maintenance of leased trains and advice on the purchase of new rolling stock. Since 1994 we have invested over £3 billion in the UK economy through the purchase of rolling stock, and the refurbishment of existing trains. The single biggest investments made by Angel Trains include over £700 million in new passenger trains for the route into London, and £977 million on new tilting trains for the Virgin Railways West Coast Mainline route from London to Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow. Our company was established in 1994 as part of the privatisation of British Rail. Angel Trains does not have a position on the strategic case for High Speed Rail, as some crucial aspects of the analysis required fall outside its area of expertise. However, Angel Trains would like to respond specifically to Question 2.2, which deals with the potential impact of HS2 on the current, conventional rail network.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 63% of all current rail journeys are accounted for by passengers commuting to and from work or education.373 While the High Speed line will offer long-distance and business users an alternative, commuters will have no option but to continue to use the conventional rail network on a daily basis. It is important that these passengers continue to receive the improved service that they have come to expect from the UK rail industry, and also benefit from technological innovation in the future. This can only occur if the conventional network receives continuous, steady, predictable levels of investment. Unfortunately, the past few years have been characterised by a “boom and bust” approach to rail investment as political and departmental priorities are adjusted over time. Angel Trains consider that the political focus on the High Speed 2 project might lead to a significant recalibration, resulting in reduced investment in the “classic” network. We note that the “Economic Case for HS2” already indicates an additional £3.1 billion of cost savings on the classic line.374 We do appreciate that, particularly in times of highly constrained public spending, the development and subsequent adherence to a rail strategy and its associated investment programme is a complex undertaking. However, a continuous, predictable investment programme for the “classic” network would have a significant, three-fold impact: on efficiency, on physical assets, and on human capital. Efficiency and value for money is a dominating focus at present for all the organisations which constitute the rail industry. (As a member of the UK Rail family Angel Trains have engaged at every opportunity with 373 National Rail Travel Survey, updated 2010: http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/statistics/datatablespublications/railways/ 374 p 12, “Economic Case for HS2: The Y Network and London–West Midlands” http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/library/documents/economic-case cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w445

Sir Roy McNulty’s Value for Money Review team.) Angel Trains only has the expertise to comment on those issues which impact on rolling stock, but here the “boom and bust” approach has had a significant impact. The Rail Industry Association375 estimates that the lack of continuity of rolling stock production adds approximately 20% to the cost of rolling stock in Great Britain. This issue is not restricted to train manufacturers, but also impacts the entire supply chain supporting rolling stock manufacture, maintenance and operation over the rolling stock’s asset life. Passenger vehicles have improved since privatisation, leading to measurable, positive changes in passenger satisfaction376 as a result. Over the course of the next decade technological improvements will allow passengers greater access to Wi-Fi provision, more real-time, integrated information about their current and onward journey, and improved seat allocation systems. The Train Operating Companies who lease our trains will also see benefits from innovation, as our engineers will be able to monitor the health of vehicles in real-time, rather than waiting for the regular maintenance checks. This will lead to increases in safety, reliability and availability of rolling stock. Finally, human capital will also be affected. Angel Trains believe that stability in the investment environment would also be beneficial in encouraging sustained investment in people and their skills, leading to greater adoption of apprenticeships, graduate training programmes, and general staff development throughout the industry. May 2011

Written evidence from Andrew Green (HSR 157) Wider Impact on Non HS2 Journey Times and HS2 User’s Actual “Door to Door” Journey Times I would like to request that the Committee fully considers the wider impact of HS2 on the wider publics journey times and potential users actual door to door journey times. The main justification for HS2 and the selection of an extremely high speed option is often given as the savings in journey times simplistically quoted as ‘platform to platform’ times. This ignores the more complex real world times of peoples actual journeys which don’t start and end at a train platform. The actual impact on journey times using the complete transport system and real world speeds (rather than maximum design speeds) that will actually be achieved by HS2 needs to be independently assessed. Secondly, HS2 will lead to less frequent services for all the passengers at intermediate stops on the existing rail lines who will not have access to HS2. It will not be commercially viable to run so many services once large numbers of passengers are removed from the line resulting in less frequent and slower journey times for many rail users. This also needs to be independently assessed and set against HS2 speed benefits for passengers that can use it. These appear to be major flaws in HS2 relating to the UKs overall transport policy which have not been fully scrutinised and independently assessed. May 2011

Written evidence from The Scottish Council for Development and Industry (HSR 158) 1. The Scottish Council for Development and Industry is pleased to participate in the Transport Select Committee’s inquiry into the strategic case for high speed rail. SCDI is an independent membership network that strengthens Scotland’s competitiveness by influencing Government policies to encourage sustainable economic prosperity. SCDI’s membership includes businesses, trade unions, local authorities, educational institutions, the voluntary sector and faith groups. 2. SCDI strongly supports the introduction of a high speed rail network connecting Glasgow and Edinburgh to London and welcome the all-party vision to build a high speed rail network linking large areas of the UK to the high speed rail network in continental Europe. Whilst SCDI welcomes the speed with which detailed plans for HS2 are progressing and the assurance that Birmingham will not be the end of the line, we remain concerned by the lack of a firm commitment to continue the HSR network to Scotland and the lack of any timetable for this. 3. Inter-city rail travel has seen substantial increases in passenger numbers over recent years. As fuel prices increase and consumers are increasingly aware of their carbon footprint, this modal shift is likely to continue. Significant improvements in passenger satisfaction levels, investment in rolling stock and reduction in journey times on major routes have also been instrumental in increasing passenger numbers. Parts of the existing inter- city rail infrastructure, such as the West Coast Main Line are approaching maximum capacity. 375 Costs of Rolling Stock for the GB national network, published by the Railway Industry Association, 2 August 2010 376 National Passenger Surveys (2005–2010), published by Passenger Focus, http://www.passengerfocus.org.uk/research/nps/content.asp?dsid=496 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w446 Transport Committee: Evidence

4. As with any high-speed transportation system, the greatest benefits are seen over longer distances. Network Rail’s August 2009 Strategic Business case for high speed rail377 concluded that a strong business case exists for the construction of HSR to Scotland—stronger than a route terminating in the West Midlands, Greater Manchester or Yorkshire. Greengauge 21’s Fast Forward: A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain378 calculated the economic and wider benefits of HSR. Scotland’s benefit figure of £19.8bn is the highest of any region in the UK outside of London [Annex 1].

5. Including Glasgow and Edinburgh in HS2 from the outset significantly improves the business case and provides increased value for money to the taxpayer. Over 60 years, it pays for itself 1.8 times over. Network Rail’s report showed that new HSR lines to Glasgow and Edinburgh are major demand generators, adding some 10–11 million trips to the network. However, using the classic network north of Preston severely reduces the advantage of new lines and reduces the demand by 62% to just 4.1 million. The benefits of the investment can only be maximised over the longer London-Scotland distance.

6. High Speed Rail has the potential to create a more balanced society where opportunities are more evenly shared between regions. This is a policy priority which SCDI shares with Government. Including Glasgow and Edinburgh in the network will deliver significant economic benefits to Scotland; improving connectivity with London, the South East and North of England and with Europe. However, the failure to bring HS2 to Scotland will comparatively disadvantage the Scottish economy, particularly in relation to tourism.

7. Overseas evidence indicates that when a journey can be made in less than three hours, railways capture 50% of the market. HSR to Scotland would deliver the journey times required at two and three quarter hours between Glasgow and Edinburgh and London. Running High Speed trains on existing lines north of Manchester and Leeds would not. Indeed, journey times would, at best, be 3 hours 37 minutes and High Speed trains using classic tracks north of Manchester and Leeds could even be slower than at present.

8. Cross-border connectivity is a significant issue for the development of Scotland’s economy. SCDI was disappointed that the third runway at the UK’s hub airport, Heathrow, is not to go ahead, raising concerns that lower-value domestic slots, carrying traffic to and from Scottish cities will be lost in favour of higher-value long haul slots into Heathrow. This makes High Speed Rail connections between Scotland and London all the more important.

9. SCDI recognise that high speed rail is unlikely to be competitive on routes to the north of Scotland’s central belt. However, modal shift on journeys between the central belt and London will present opportunities for increased regional air services between Aberdeen, Inverness and Heathrow. We would also like to see coordinated interconnecting services between the high speed rail line and services on the classic rail network to and from the north of Scotland.

10. High Speed Rail will also have a positive impact on carbon emissions. As High Speed 1 and European routes have demonstrated, in addition to the economic benefits of shorter journey times, improved connectivity would promote modal shift towards rail and away from aviation.

11. If rail is to become the mode of choice for most inter-city journeys between the population and economic centres of Scotland and the largest cities of the rest of the UK, building new lines to Scotland is the only option. It would significantly reduce air demand, capacity pressures at South East airports, and carbon emissions.

12. SCDI is aware of and concerned by proposals which would slow down high-speed rail in England. Any lengthening to journey times will further erode the more marginal overall benefits of journey time reductions to Scotland of the existing high-speed rail proposals, the potential economic benefits and likely environmental benefits of modal shift between air and rail.

13. SCDI would like to see construction of the new high speed line started at both ends as part of a firm commitment to cross-border high speed rail. The Scottish Government, working closely with northern English cities, should immediately begin to prepare the way through the planning process. In addition, the existing East and West Coast Main Lines linking Edinburgh and Glasgow to London have the opportunity to undertake incremental and comparatively inexpensive improvements which would act as stepping stones on the way to a full high-speed rail link. Once High Speed 2 is built, these lines would provide fast inter-regional travel where there is large scale demand, and open up more track space for low-carbon freight transportation.

14. With the new lines comes additional capacity for freight transit. The UK and Scottish Governments should explore the opportunities for freight, either from high speed freight or greater access to existing main lines. May 2011 377 Strategic Business Case for High Speed Rail, Network Rail, http://www.networkrailmediacentre.co.uk/Publications/Strategic-business-case-a44.aspx 378 Fast Forward: A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain, Greengauge 21, http://www.greengauge21.net/wp-content/uploads/fast-forward1.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w447

Annex 1

REGIONAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HIGH SPEED RAIL

Image produced by Greengauge 21 and reproduced with permission.

Written evidence from LaSalle Investment Management (HSR 159)

Introduction

1. LaSalle Investment Management is one of the world’s leading real estate investment managers. With nearly 700 employees in 16 countries, LaSalle manages approximately £26 billion of private and public property equity investments.

2. In the UK, LaSalle is the largest owner and manger of high technology science parks around the country, including the Royal Agricultural Society of England’s 1,047 acre Stoneleigh Park estate. As an established innovation park, and a significant agricultural, equine and rural cluster, Stoneleigh accommodates agricultural, horticultural, equestrian, animal welfare and rural organisations. The Park currently has 140 tenants and employs over 2,000 people, including the National Farmers Union, the Agricultural and Horticultural Development Board, the British Equestrian Federation and the British Horse Society. It has between three to four million visitors and over 200 events each year and contributes some £43 million to the economy

3. The Royal Agricultural Society for England’s core purposes are the promotion and improvement of the science, technology and practice of agriculture, forestry, horticulture and husbandry of livestock and land, and the promotion and application of improved methods and processes connected to this.

4. At the time LaSalle acquired the site it committed to an investment of £20 million by 2012 and £50 million by 2020 to build on and cement the Stoneleigh estate’s reputation as a national hub for innovation and research. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w448 Transport Committee: Evidence

The Business Case For High Speed Rail 5. It is recognised that the Committee is not intending to examine the precise specification of the HS2 route nor how the route would affect individual landowners, businesses or residents since this can be addressed through the Hybrid Bill process. 6. However, the current proposed alignment of HS2 will have a significant adverse economic impact on LaSalle’s and the Royal Agricultural Society of England’s investment plans for the future and their on-going management of the overall estate. The original route for HS2 avoided the estate. The revised route goes directly through it and will therefore significantly undermine the viability of the business. 7. Many of the businesses can be expected to relocate (not necessarily in the UK) and the significant advantages of a science park and cluster of related businesses and activities will be lost. It is unlikely that a site similar to the Stoneleigh estate can be found elsewhere in the UK. This will seriously undermine important research programmes in areas such as agricultural innovation which facilitate knowledge transfer and the application of best practice to the environment, sustainable food production and land management. 8. LaSalle has serious reservations whether the economic analysis undertaken by HS2 in determining the revised route for the line has taken into account not just the significant economic implications for the Stoneleigh estate, but also the wider national implications of undermining a significant world renown hub for agricultural and rural innovation and research. 9. If these important wider national implications have not been assessed in HS2’s business case then it must be seriously questioned whether it is sufficiently robust for HS2 to be able to justify the current alignment through Stoneleigh Park. 10. The importance of the site is recognised by the government itself which has just agreed to renew the lease at the Park for the Agricultural and Horticultural Development Board, while Sport England plans to promote the site as an equine training arena.

Conclusion 11. LaSalle recognises that the Select Committee will wish to focus on the “higher level” justification for and economic merits of high speed rail, and that it wishes to avoid detailed issues around specific alignments and the impacts on individual businesses and properties. However, the significant adverse implications of the proposed route through Stoneleigh Park are of sufficient national importance that LaSalle believes there is a compelling case for the Select Committee to investigate whether the economic justification for HS2 has sufficiently taken into account the impact of the proposed route on those businesses which have a significant wider national role and importance. May 2011

Written evidence from the London Borough of Newham (HSR 162) 1. What Are The Main Arguments Either For Or Against HSR? 1.1 We believe the compelling argument in favour of a new high speed rail network is not just that it will bring UK cities together with resulting economic benefits but that it can also link the West Midlands, the North and Scotland with European destinations for trade, commerce, leisure and tourism. 1.2 Business growth overwhelmingly relies on transport infrastructure, and if the Government is serious about rebalancing the UK’s economy and generating further growth outside the capital, high speed rail is a pre-requisite. Huge extensions of the European high speed rail network are being planned and delivered. The UK should be looking at becoming an integral part of this network. 1.3 That is why Newham has welcomed the link between the new high speed two line and the existing high speed one (Channel Tunnel) line currently operated by Eurostar. The country is constructing a railway for the next 100 years; given this, it is critical to take the long term approach. The alternative is to build a discrete set of lines which fail to join up and, by extension, fail to capitalise on the growth which would be generated by a link between European cities and the UK regions. 1.4 Those who question the existence of a market to travel between the UK North and Europe are often not including economic projections around growth and business relocation. We remain concerned that regeneration benefits are not fully taken into account in the appraisal of major transport schemes. In many transport schemes (the Thames Gateway Bridge is a local example) regeneration benefits are not fully included in the Benefit to Cost and investment appraisals. 1.5 The regeneration benefits seen at existing Eurostar stations have driven at least £6 billion of gross development value.379 A report for London and Continental Railways on the total regeneration benefits of High Speed 1 estimated these as £17 billion. LSE and the University of Hamburg also demonstrated that high-speed rail lines bring significant economic benefits to the communities they serve, the first thorough statistical research 379 Development press releases, Kings Cross Central Limited Partnership, Stratford City development limited. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w449

on the subject. Towns connected to a new high-speed line saw their GDP rise by at least 2.7% compared to neighbours not on the route.380 1.6 The benefits of investment in transport are well documented; High Speed 2 Ltd’s work demonstrated that the first step of the London to Birmingham high speed line would generate a return of £2 for every £1 spent.381

2. The Strategic Route 2.1 Having said this, we believe the proposed current HS2 route does not make the most of existing high speed rail assets. Stratford International station, in Newham, is international only in name and we believe it is in danger of becoming a white elephant; despite its strategic location at the heart of the 2012 Olympic district springing up in London’s new metropolitan centre. We believe Stratford is an option that has not been fully explored in the consultation.

Sweating existing transport assets 2.2 Stratford International station has had public investment of over £210 million to make it fit for its purpose as an international stopping point, and £238 million has been invested in an extension of the Docklands Light Railway due to open this summer and enabling international travellers better access to Docklands in particular. Yet still no international services are stopping at the station. 2.3 We have clear evidence that demonstrates a commercial case for operators to stop at Stratford now on the existing High Speed One line. However, we are also anxious that the station is utilised to its full potential in the new network. 2.4 Stratford could be used as a complementary station to Euston and Old Oak Common—with international trains from Birmingham and the North using Stratford as their London stop and also with Stratford acting as an intermediary stop for some intercity High Speed Two trains.

Preventing duplication of investment 2.5 There are several advantages to Stratford. The London Borough of Newham supports a station at Old Oak Common in West London in order to enable a connection between the new HS2 and the existing HS1 lines. However, the original role for the Old Oak Common interchange station did not envisage it as an international station. Since the Old Oak interchange station was first proposed it has now been suggested its scale should be enhanced so that it becomes a superhub and an international station—with the infrastructure alone costing over £200 million. This clearly duplicates investment in Stratford. 2.6 If Old Oak is used as an international station, passengers would have to change at Old Oak and board a second (HS1) train in order to complete their journey to Europe. However, we do also need to be able to provide a single train service joining the North and the Midlands to the European network. We believe Stratford to be the best option for this. 2.7 Stratford International already has the facilities needed to be an international station. With the recent addition of the eastern egress walkway, the capacity of the station for traveller numbers has been doubled. Using Stratford can therefore relieve the pressure on Euston by dispersing excessive traveller numbers, providing a more sustainable solution. Utilising Stratford as an existing asset would create a more sustainable solution for the future needs of the capital—population growth around Euston has already peaked and the expansion needed to make Euston a station is already very considerable. 2.8 It can also link international business clients with Canary Wharf and the City in a fraction of the time it would take them to travel from St Pancras, Euston or Old Oak Common. It is vital we “sweat the use” of such a transport asset.

Clear demand 2.9 The stop at Stratford would create extra passengers from a large and distinct catchment area including much of London, Essex and East Anglia to join the trains. Stratford covers one of the widest catchment areas in Greater London and is easier to get to by car, taxi and public transport for most passengers, with the exception of those coming from West London. And as the planned economic development continues in the East, more passenger numbers will be generated. 2.10 Colin Buchanan Associates have demonstrated that stopping at Stratford now on High Speed One (existing Channel Tunnel line) is financially viable, would see two million passengers opt to use the station annually and deliver £600 million in user benefits in the evaluation period (based on the Department for Transport’s own methodology for valuing journey time savings). 380 From Periphery to Core: economic adjustments to high speed rail by Gabriel M Ahlfeldt (LSE) and Arne Feddersen (University of Hamburg) 381 High Speed Rail Command Paper, p.13 (Mar 2010) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w450 Transport Committee: Evidence

2.11 Some 30% of Eurostar passengers would switch to Stratford from St Pancras. An additional 51,000 passengers would be created through Eurostar stopping at Stratford. The revenue contribution from stopping at Stratford International has been conservatively estimated at around £5.5 million by 2016 and £7 million by 2026. The latter forecast in particular is likely to be on the low side when Crossrail—with five stations in Newham—is operational and additional West Anglia services are expected to be available by 2021.

Following existing economic growth trends in London 2.12 By 2025 when the line is built, many passengers will have East London as their end destination. Stratford is at the centre of a growing commercial district in East London. This stretches Old Street to the Olympic Park including the Prime Minister’s vision for a “Tech City” in East London, down to London’s only Enterprise Zone in the Royal Docks, and across to the O2, Greenwich peninsula, Canary Wharf and the City. This new growth corridor would be hugely supported by the ability to utilise Stratford as the international high speed rail hub it was intended to be. There is currently no major transport hub east of Liverpool Street to serve this growing business community. 2.13 We are expecting East London to become the economic powerhouse for the capital over the next two decades. Stratford holds a unique strategic position in the economic development of London and the UK as a whole. Within the next decade, it will have become London’s major metropolitan centre outside the City and West End, with the development of a high quality commercial, residential and retail offering, including Westfield Stratford City and the Olympic parklands. Stratford will be a prime visitor attraction; a vibrant area to work and do business; and a fantastic place to live. — Stratford is home to the Olympic Park, the biggest new urban park in the country. — It already has 5 million square feet of consented office space. — Westfield is opening the biggest urban retail development in Europe at Stratford. Westfield’s £1.5 billion scheme includes 340 shops opening in September 2011. — It is the growth hub along with the Royals for the Mayor of London’s Green Enterprise District. — Stratford already enjoys enviable transport connections into west London, the City and Canary Wharf. It currently takes around 12 minutes to travel to Canary Wharf, 20 minutes to Oxford Circus, and 25 minutes to Westminster (all direct services). This connectivity will be further supported by the opening of the DLR Stratford Internation extension in the summer of 2011 and Crossrail in 2017, which will link Stratford to Heathrow in the West. 2.14 Independent analysis by Oxford Economics shows that the potential for growth in East London is hugely significant and could have a national impact. However, the right infrastructure is absolutely vital to enable us to capitalise on potential for growth and regeneration. If we do not provide the right conditions for the private sector to invest over the next decade, it may not happen. 2.15 This explains the significant business backing we have for the Stratford case, from AEG (owners of the O2), Canary Wharf Group, Westfield Stratford City, and London’s largest international conference centre ExCeL, among others. It also has cross political party support. Lord Heseltine, Chair of the Regional Growth Fund advisory board has said: “The fact that we are still arguing about whether High Speed One trains should stop at Stratford after all of this time is mind blowing, and represents a massive failure of government.” May 2011

Written evidence from the London (Heathrow) Airline Consultative Committee (HSR 163) Inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail On behalf of the London (Heathrow) Airline Consultative Committee (LACC) and the Heathrow Airline Operators Committee (AOC) we are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the Strategic case for High Speed Rail (HSR). Our comments are focused exclusively on the need to provide a direct link to Heathrow as the nation’s hub airport and the implications for wider transport policy in general. In response to Question 2 as to how HSR fits with the Government’s transport policy objectives in the context of aviation, our understanding is that these would be best met by including Heathrow on the mainline HSR route. This primary alignment would meet the following criteria: — Satisfy the Government’s policy for the integration of transport systems; — Facilitate the effective migration from domestic aviation to the rail network; — Maximize economic benefits and the competitiveness of industry in the distribution network for goods and services; — Reduce carbon emissions through air/rail modal shift; and — Respond to European aspirations for full intermodality and connectivity with Europe’s fast growing high speed rail network. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w451

In order to meet these objectives, the view of the airlines at Heathrow is that a HS2 scheme, in terms of the routing, should provide the following attributes: — A “seamless” transfer for passengers and baggage at a HS2 rail station located at or near Heathrow to enable modal shift from air to rail; — Ideally that this station should be en-route on the HS2 mainline as opposed to a spur to maximize potential connectivity benefits; — The Heathrow HS2 station should be an intermodal solution which is fully integrated into the UK transport network along designs similar to equivalent hubs at Frankfurt, Paris and Amsterdam and which attract EU funding from the Trans European Network-T initiative (TEN-T).

The existing HS2 scheme and the Secretary of State for Transport‘s recommendations in December 2010 propose that the airport should be connected to HS2 via a spur to the north of the airport. This will be constructed in Phase 2, alongside links to Manchester and Leeds. We believe that although a spur would deliver benefits to Heathrow it will not maximise all the benefits that an en-route station would do, as detailed above. This has implications for both meeting Government objectives and the affordability of the scheme.

The LACC and AOC will be taking part in the Government’s consultation process with a view to improving surface access at Heathrow. Our aim will be to ensure the best possible outcome for both Heathrow and the UK transport system.

Whilst we fully respect the Government’s desire for economic balancing across the UK, the airlines are of the strong view that the strategic route for HSR must be fully integrated with an en-route station at or near Heathrow. Only this solution will meet the Government’s and the airlines requirements to enhance the air and rail passenger experience in a fully integrated transport solution aligned with European norms and developments. May 2011

Written evidence from Staffordshire County Council (HSR 164)

1. Staffordshire is one of a number of counties that make up the central “cross roads” of Britain and is consequently very much aware of the significance of the transport network to the well being of the economy and the people of Staffordshire. Part of this awareness includes the need for the networks, primarily road and rail, to work effectively and not suffer from unreliability and congestion. Consequently the County Council welcomes efforts to maintain or improve the network in these respects. Upgrades to the West Coast Main Line have and will continue to bring benefits in terms of service improvements to various stations/settlements across Staffordshire.

2. Maintaining and improving the economic well being of the County and its residents is the top priority of the County Council. Much of the County Council”s activities are focussed on this priority, including its own transportation policies and proposals. It is against this background that the County Council has come to its views with regard to the present High Speed Rail proposal.

3. The primary concern regarding the current High Speed Rail proposal with respect to the economy of Staffordshire is the prospect of deterioration in rail passenger services available at stations/settlements in the county, in particular in north Staffordshire. While HS2 highlight the potential benefits of available capacity released as a result of introducing the new line, there are no guarantees that viable services of the existing quality will be provided.

4. While Stafford may be served by a High Speed train service using the classic network to Liverpool, the likely absence of any other stop/s in Staffordshire on the HS2 “Y” network as a very consequence of its “need for speed” and limitation on stops, puts Staffordshire at an economic disadvantage with the prospect of loosing economic development both existing and new.

5. While specific to Staffordshire, similar concerns are relevant to authorities along the route/s most of which will not have stations on the High Speed network. Also in the wider context, the importance/value attached to station to station time savings as opposed to real full journey times (including time taken to get to and from the stations) is considered to have been grossly overstated. The wider economic benefits have been assessed as modest by HS2, and their advisers, and international experience has shown them to be limited in extent around stations and often simply local redistribution of development.

6. The County Council does not deny the need for improvements to the national transport network but is of the view that the current High Speed Rail Network proposal, intrinsically (by virtue of the essential characteristics and requirements of High Speed Rail) fails to maximize the possible benefits of such improvements across the country and presents a real risk of concentrating future economic development rather than dispersing it away from London and the south east. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w452 Transport Committee: Evidence

Specific Issues to be Addressed by the Committee 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 7. The UK does not need very expensive “off the shelf” new High Speed Rail infrastructure technology to provide the most worthwhile solution to its capacity problems and in the process improve economic prospects across the nation. The circumstances of the UK warrant a particular approach that recognises the quality and speed of existing services; the potential to improve them within the existing network and individual corridors; the need for greater flexibility in routing in order to protect the environment; and the need to serve many more centres than the few on the proposed High Speed network. 8. The “high speed” characteristics of the proposed infrastructure are unnecessary. Compared to other countries the existing speed of rail travel between major cities is already faster in the UK. The proposed increased speed levels provide only marginal real journey time (trip beginning to trip end) improvements for most journeys. Appropriate increases in the speed of journeys on the existing network can be achieved by the full use of existing technology in particular the use of European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) or in cab signalling, and specific targeted network improvements. 9. Various actions have been proposed as ways of increasing capacity on the railway network including lengthening trains, converting some first class seats to standard class, and providing specific targeted line improvements together with programmed improvements such as at Norton Bridge and Stafford, which can be implemented at significantly lower cost and with the prospect of much quicker benefits. 10. The case for economic benefit as a result of faster rail connectivity is unproven. Research into international experience clearly indicates that it is difficult to find well defined empirical and quantified evidence on the impacts of HSR. The wider economic effects of HSR could be significant but they are not always obvious or predictable and can vary significantly between different HSR projects. The possible economic consequence is just as likely to be a “drain” of any economic benefit into London as it is to be a “gain” for the locations on the route. Furthermore, the increased used of e-business solutions means that historical models that might link economic prosperity with rail accessibility are likely to be outdated. The benefits case for business (which makes incorrect assumptions such as the idea that time spent on the train is “lost” working time) is ill-conceived and overstated. 11. Even if a case could be made to link economic growth with rail, the presumption of limited stopping restricts the number of localities that could potentially benefit from any service improvements and consequently places those localities not served, included all of Staffordshire, at a potential disadvantage that can be made worse by the possible deterioration of services available as business and income is diverted onto the new high speed network. 12. In terms of environmental impact, the proposed infrastructure will have significant and inappropriate adverse impacts in terms of accommodation within the environment.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government”s transport policy objectives? 13. Inter-Urban Connectivity: HSR is partial in the extreme in its improvements to inter-urban connectivity and may actually cause a deterioration. This is by virtue of the limited number of stations that are proposed and indeed are required in order to achieve the speeds sought. The passenger numbers required to justify the HSR proposal while potentially providing new path opportunities for new services on the classic network, put in question whether they could be economically justified or that the necessary subsidies would be available. Consequently, there is a real prospect of deterioration in inter-urban connectivity for many major urban areas and significant settlements. 14. Carbon Reduction: The proposed HSR is at best carbon neutral and even this is based in part on the large increase in passenger numbers and speed of travel that are essential parts of the justification for the project. The Government is committed to reducing carbon emissions and yet is proposing transport infrastructure that, by virtue of these two fundamental requirements, is making no contribution to such a reduction. Contrary to the fundamental feature of HSR, Government/Department for Transport is positively seeking ways of reducing travel and in particular business travel. It is monetary value attached to time spent on such travel that is critical to the business case for HSR.

3. Business case 15. There is no doubt that the use of the railways by passengers and freight has been increasing over the recent past. Similarly there can be little to counter the prospect of this increase continuing for some time to come both of its own accord and positively encouraged by the diversion of traffic from less sustainable road and air travel. Improvements in transport and communications over history have undoubtedly had economic benefits for the country albeit with varying impacts on different regions/areas/places depending on the localities served or ignored/bypassed. 16. Some projections of future travel demand have been based on relationships with forecast levels of economic growth. This should not be the basis for assuming that economic growth is founded on increased cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w453

capacity to travel, rather that travel demand may be generated by increased personal wealth. The HS2 business case confirms this by anticipating 70% of future passengers/journeys will be for leisure purposes. 17. The basis for high future travel requirements needs to be questioned in the context of government aims to cut the need for business travel being investigated by Department for Transport. 18. There is much debate around the basis for forecasting future travel demand particularly over the long term which provides the context for the assessment of the high speed rail network. There is concern that the Government”s proposal and its justification are based on unjustified projections of travel requirements including substantial new demand expected to be generated by the existence of the high speed service, and with over optimistic expectations of modal shift. 19. Both policy and technology are working to reduce the need to travel. The Government/Department for Transport is positively seeking ways of reducing travel and in particular business travel as part of its “green” commitment. Technology forms part of this search with recent advances in e-technology including e- conferencing often removing the requirement to travel completely. As a consequence of these developments forward projection of travel demand should be approached cautiously. 20. The evidence for linking significant economic development with high speed train facilities is inconclusive. A particular set of circumstances would appear to be necessary for significant economic development to take place (well established or strongly developing service sector with extensive local public transport networks) and most of this development would appear to be simply diverted from other localities rather than totally new. 21. The material presented in support of the proposal with respect to new job creation shows a clear emphasis on it being located in and around London in the south east rather than remedying the north-south divide as claimed elsewhere. At the Birmingham end of the current defined route, supporters of the proposal show future economic activity focussed increasingly on central Birmingham and to a lesser extent near the interchange facility, to the detriment of other parts of the conurbation and the rest of the region including virtually all of Staffordshire. 22. Given the regular and consistent over running of major infrastructure project costs in this country there is little reason to expect the already high costs of the proposed high speed rail network to be anything other than a minimum cost. The benefits are at best contrived in terms of the amount and valuation of travel time savings and otherwise minimal (wider economic impacts) or un-quantified (the statements of support from business). The method of financial appraisal effectively pre-empts the form of the proposal, maximum speed with limited stops thus fundamentally questioning the appropriateness of the evaluation process used. 23. The level of government subsidy included in the HS2 business case already amounting to £17 billion is likely to exceed this level if project costs were to increase and the projected passenger numbers were to prove unrealistic overestimates. This was the case with HS1 and is increasingly becoming the experience in many parts of the world. Most recently reports suggest the Dutch high speed rail is rapidly heading for bankruptcy and several states in America are pulling out of the President”s high speed rail programme with fears that traffic forecasts are over-inflated. 24. The costs (or disbenefits) need to include the reductions in the number and quality of services from settlements/stations that currently have a good intercity service. While the potential released capacity on the existing/classic network might provide new paths for new services, whether they would be economically viable or receive the necessary level of public subsidy is a matter of conjecture.

4. The strategic route 25. As commented under other headings, the strategic route and stations proposed are essentially determined by the project requirements in terms of speed and necessary journey time savings. If these “essentials” are changed then the ability to serve more stations, either existing or new, with improved services is increased with potentially greater economic benefits for more settlements and communities. Alongside the north Staffordshire conurbation, Stafford and Burton within Staffordshire are recognised as potential growth locations that could benefit from inclusion on the enhanced network. 26. The idea of a phased roll-out of network improvements is fully supported but on a different scale to that attached to the current proposal, the first benefits of which would not be available until 2026 at the earliest. Incremental improvements to the existing network such as included in Atkins Rail Package 2 would allow benefits to be realised on a phased and more prompt implementation. 27. Linking directly to the High Speed 1 line to the Channel Tunnel would have potential benefits for more distant parts of the country including Staffordshire.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 28. There appears to be little evidence that HSR will/can promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide. As commented under other headings, international evidence appears to suggest the need for very specific circumstances to exist (well established or strongly developing service sector cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w454 Transport Committee: Evidence

with extensive local public transport networks) and that most development would appear to be simply diverted from other localities rather than totally new. 29. Furthermore, the evidence presented by HS2 would suggest that the greater part of the economic benefits will accrue to London and the south east thereby further enhancing the north-south divide.

6. Impact 30. While appreciating that to date much of the Appraisal of Sustainability has been of a strategic nature, it must be realised that this seriously underestimates the impact of the proposal. In particular, the visual impact on local communities has not been addressed or the impact on the local landscapes; the impacts on biodiversity are downplayed by underestimating impacts on designated sites and failing to address impacts on species and of fragmentation of ecological networks; impacts to Grade II Listed structures which, by their nature are also considered to be of national significance are currently ignored; vibration and noise from works and increased traffic along surrounding roads, as well as within the construction corridor may have a considerable impact. There are a number of shortcomings in assessments of noise impacts included in the Appraisal including: the absence of site surveys or baseline noise surveys having been carried out for the noise appraisal; probable need to adapt the assessment procedure to take into account the aerodynamic noise effects which occur at very high speeds; the need to take account of the potential adverse noise impact from the short term high pass by noise from individual trains; the possibility of locally lower ambient noise levels than those assumed in the Appraisal that mean for the section of the line through Staffordshire, being primarily rural and routed away from urban areas, the noise impact could be significantly greater than currently indicated. May 2011

Written evidence from British Airways (HSR 165) Introduction 1. British Airways welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Transport Select Committee’s inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail. The inquiry is timely and seeks to address the key themes in the current debate. 2. In this memorandum, British Airways has focussed its response on the impact of High Speed Rail (HSR) on UK aviation, and in particular, offers a perspective as a Heathrow-based carrier. It has addressed issues of concern to its business and the aviation industry. 3. British Airways is one of the world’s largest international airlines, carrying approximately 32 million passengers worldwide annually on around 750 daily flights. The airline employs almost 40,000 people, the vast majority of these at its sites throughout the UK. 4. The airline’s two main operating bases are London’s Heathrow and Gatwick airports, with a smaller base at London City airport serving New York and European business destinations. From these, British Airways flies 237 aircraft to 152 destinations in 75 countries. In addition to passengers, the airline also —more than 750,000 tonnes of cargo are carried around the globe each year. 5. In 2010, the airline completed its merger with Iberia of Spain to create the International Airlines Group (IAG). Our combined business offers flights to 205 destinations throughout the world on a fleet of 415 aircraft. It also commenced a joint business agreement with American Airlines, which further extends the benefits for its customers. The combined network of British Airways, Iberia and American Airlines serves 433 destinations in 105 countries with more than 5,180 daily departures.

Summary 6. British Airways believes the optimal High Speed Rail (HSR) scheme for the UK should operate the mainline via Heathrow between Birmingham and London and include a High Speed 2 (HS2) station at the airport. This would allow all trains to stop at the airport, maximising connectivity to destinations on the network and allowing maximum economic benefits and carbon reductions to be realised. This scheme would have the most compelling business case for airlines and would go furthest to realising the Government aim of air- rail substitution. 7. The above model is the one used throughout Europe for integrating new high speed rail lines with existing hub airports. At Paris Charles De Gaulle, Frankfurt and Amsterdam the high speed mainline runs via the airport with the station located at the terminal of the main network airline—Air France, Lufthansa and KLM respectively. British Airways believes that this model should be adopted for HS2. 8. However, the scheme currently proposed would see a spur from the HSR mainline connect to the airport from a northerly direction. This would allow some, but not all, HSR trains from the UK regions to access Heathrow directly. These HSR trains would terminate at the airport, whilst other London-bound high speed trains would not call at it. Heathrow would also be unable to directly serve passengers travelling to and from Europe on High Speed 1 (HS1). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w455

9. Whilst this scheme may provide adequate capacity for some UK air passenger markets to access Heathrow, it is less desirable when compared to a scheme that has the high speed rail mainline routeing through the airport. The scope for air-rail substitution, economic benefits and carbon reductions will be reduced. The proposed scheme could still be beneficial for airlines in terms of increased connectivity and access to UK and near-Europe markets, however the business case for investment would be much more challenging for airlines.

Section 1: What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 10. British Airways supports the strategic case for development of a HSR network in the UK that is directly connected to Heathrow, the UK’s only hub airport. Key arguments for such an integrated transport system include: — Improved connectivity across the UK and onward to international destinations. — Economic benefits from increased connectivity and productivity. — Potential for air-rail substitution—dependent on infrastructure, HS2 fares and codeshares (joint airline-rail marketing of services). — Reduced carbon emissions. 11. British Airways intends to respond to the Government’s consultation on development of the proposed network to discuss the scheme detail and business case for HSR from an aviation perspective.

Section 2: How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.2 Rail funding 12. British Airways believes the funding of HSR should not detract from investment on the “classic” network. In particular, there are a number of current schemes and proposals that could benefit Heathrow Airport, and it is important these are not sacrificed because of funding constraints. These include electrification of the Great West Mainline; a “Western Connection” from Terminal 5 allowing South West Mainline and Great West Mainline trains to connect directly to the airport; and increases in track capacity between Heathrow and Paddington. 13. There are also significant benefits that improved rail access in the London area (eg an “Airtrack”-type scheme) and better connectivity to South Wales, the South and South West England would deliver as well.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? 14. British Airways has provided detailed responses on the impact for domestic aviation in previous submissions to consultations by High Speed Two Ltd, the Department for Transport and the Mawhinney Review. These are available for the Committee on request. 15. In summary, we believe HSR will impact on air passengers travelling point-to-point between destinations served directly by the new rail network, for example between London and Newcastle, and Glasgow and Birmingham. Other regional point-point routes such as Southampton to Edinburgh or Exeter to Newcastle would be relatively unaffected. 16. The restriction of the HSR stations to Central London and the major cities of the UK regions will deter passengers travelling outside of these centres. Indeed, many point-to-point air travellers are not travelling between city centres—the catchment area for domestic passengers using Gatwick Airport is Kent, Sussex, East Surrey and South London. The HSR termini in London are not easily accessed from this area, and domestic air links from Gatwick may continue to operate. 17. It is worth noting that an HS2 station at Heathrow would provide a significantly more accessible alternative for travellers from the South West, South Wales and Southern England. 18. An assumption has been made that HS2 fares will be comparable with regular long-distance rail fares. Even if they are, air travel will remain a strongly competitive option for point-to-point passengers, as it is today. For international connecting passengers, the current rail fare offering is uncompetitive and this is unlikely to change. 19. Domestic flights to Heathrow Airport provide invaluable connectivity for the regions of the UK to the global marketplace, and vice versa. If HS2 is to replace all domestic flights then the network will need to serve the needs of air transfer passengers as well as point-to-point passengers. At Heathrow, an HS2 station at or near the airport is vital. Additionally, if airlines are to codeshare with the high speed rail operator as has been suggested, they will need assurance on the ability of HSR to provide the interline customer experience currently offered. 20. If these two elements are not in place as part of the HS2 offering, British Airways believes that domestic air links to London will continue, as well as cross-country routes. 21. HS2 will need to be competitive with both domestic flights and flights from UK regional airports to overseas hub airports as well. As happens today, if a UK air passenger cannot fly to Heathrow, they will fly cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w456 Transport Committee: Evidence

overseas to make their international connection. HSR must offer a competitive transfer product if it is to capture this market too. 22. In Phase 1 of the proposed scheme (London–Birmingham) there will not be any direct air-rail substitution impact as there are no flights between these cities. However, there will be opportunities for air passengers who today fly from Birmingham to transfer at overseas hub airports to use HS2 to travel to Heathrow instead and then fly directly to their destination. 23. In Phase 2 (London & Heathrow–Manchester & Leeds) there is the potential for air-rail substitution between the North of England and London, for instance Manchester—Heathrow flights. The potential for passengers who currently fly from regional airports to transfer at overseas hub airports to switch to Heathrow for connections will also be significantly increased as they gain direct rail access to the UK’s hub airport. However, as before, this depends on there being an HS2 station at Heathrow providing a competitive product and codeshare arrangements between airlines and the high speed rail operator. 24. In the longer term (London & Heathrow–Glasgow & Edinburgh), the scope for air-rail substitution is increased but is again dependent on a Heathrow HS2 station and codeshare arrangements. In particular, for stations located further from London the frequency, journey times, scheduled timings and customer offering of high speed trains will be critical. To compete effectively for domestic air passengers, HSR would need to offer journey times of around three hours and have early and late departures to allow for return day-trips, an important consideration for the business traveller. 25. Importantly, if there is a link between HS2 and HS1 that allows for through-running rail services from the UK to Europe then Heathrow must be part of the high speed mainline instead of located on a spur. 26. The proposed spur will only allow Heathrow to effectively serve HS2 passengers travelling from north of the airport. The spur will not allow it to serve passengers travelling to the UK on HS1, as they would need to interchange in London to reach the airport, making the journey unattractive. This would not be equivalent to access enjoyed by competing EU airports such as Paris-Charles De Gaulle, which would effectively gain access to the UK domestic air market under the current proposed scheme. A spur alignment to Heathrow would not support equal access to UK and European air passenger markets for Heathrow and other European hubs.

Section 3: Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 27. British Airways provided analysis to the Mawhinney Review included analysis of High Speed Two Limited’s forecasts for an HS2 station at Heathrow. We believe the forecasts underplayed potential demand. British Airways estimated that c 7,000 passengers per day would use a HS2 station at a 2-runway Heathrow by 2030. 28. The success of HS2 in securing air-rail substitution will depend on: — Competitive passenger interchange located at or near Heathrow Airport. — Airlines, in particular British Airways as the UK’s largest network airline, entering into viable code share arrangements with the high speed rail operator. 29. One of the key areas for concern is the fare levels for high speed rail services. As mentioned previously, High Speed Two Ltd has assumed that fares will be at a comparable level with regular rail long-distance fares. Whilst fares may be competitive with airline fares for point-to-point trips they are likely to be more expensive than airline fares for transfer passengers on UK domestic flights. Far-reaching commercial codeshare agreements to attract transfer passengers from the regions to Heathrow would be needed before airlines would remove domestic flights and then market and price HSR as a viable alternative. Without these agreements, British Airways is likely to maintain some domestic flights because of the important contribution domestic transfer passengers make to its network. 30. Simply building a rail network to meet forecast demand is no guarantee of achieving modal shift.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 31. From a pure air-rail perspective, there should be no requirement for additional demand management measures to promote high speed rail. The focus should be on ensuring that the estimated £40 billion investment in HSR delivers a competitive product for all passengers, allowing HSR to compete on a level playing field with aviation. There should not be any need for additional subsidy for HSR over and above rail industry norms or increased taxation on UK aviation with the aim of suppressing and then switching demand from air to rail. The quality of HSR rail infrastructure, particularly integration between air and rail at Heathrow, should determine the demand for high speed rail services. Further market interference in HS2 may begin to look like a solution in search of a problem. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w457

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

32. Terminal 5 and the Heathrow Expansion/Runway 3 projects offer important lessons for HS2. It is important that HS2 enjoys long-term planning stability supported by robust policy framework to ensure efficient, timely and successful delivery. Establishing strong cross-party support for the project is crucial to avoid politicisation of the proposed scheme. In the context of taking a hybrid bill through Parliament, this will be essential to maintain the required policy framework and planning stability. An objective and thorough evidence base to support the economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of the scheme is absolutely necessary to ensure investment is appropriately targeted. Alternative funding mechanisms such as EU TEN-T should also be pursued.

Section 4: The strategic route

4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

33. The choice of Euston as the London terminus for HS2 drives the requirement for Old Oak Common— which is needed for passenger dispersal onto the wider London transport network as Euston cannot handle full capacity HS2 trains.

34. In Phase 1 of the proposed HS2 scheme Old Oak Common will be the interchange for Heathrow. Heathrow Express and Crossrail are assumed to provide the onward connection to the airport. It is uncertain that Heathrow Express will operate in its current form when Phase 1 is complete—Network Rail has indicated a desire to move the service onto slower train paths to allow for increased capacity into Paddington for intercity services. Crossrail will be operational but it will provide a slower, stopping service into Heathrow. Whilst these services will provide good connectivity for passengers in the London area, they are unlikely to provide an attractive option for air passengers travelling from Birmingham and beyond to Heathrow.

35. British Airways is concerned that no full or proper assessment has been made of the benefits of using Heathrow as a “parkway” station for the wider South of England region. High Speed Two Ltd cites the significant benefits of Birmingham International station serving a far greater catchment area and being more accessible to the wider Midlands area than Birmingham Curzon Street terminus in the city centre. However, in the South of England, which has the largest market for high speed rail, both Old Oak Common and Euston stations are located deep in Central London.

36. Heathrow is far better-placed than any other London station to serve passengers outside of London as a “parkway” station. The size of its potential catchment market should be properly considered to fully assess the benefits of locating an HS2 station at the airport. A mainline Heathrow station would also make HSR more accessible to the South of England with increased frequency and better connectivity to the UK and Europe.

37. We believe that in terms of Heathrow’s catchment area, the more connectivity that HSR can provide and the greater the level of access that UK cities and regions can get to the airport the better. The challenge for HS2 is to balance the number of stops on the network (maximum passenger catchment and range of destinations) with the speed of the service.

38. There is no benefit from linking airports via high speed rail (eg Heathrow and Birmingham) to create a so-called “virtual hub airport”. This proposition will not deliver competitive minimum connection times or the necessary customer experience for transfer passengers. Without a competitive transfer proposition, passengers will choose to connect at other competing aviation hubs. Only passengers travelling from home to the airport will benefit from high speed rail.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?

39. From a Heathrow perspective HS2 needs to serve major UK cities that have air links to Heathrow and other overseas hub airports.

40. This will help to achieve the Government’s stated aim of air-rail substitution. HS2 must also make Heathrow more accessible and attractive for air passengers throughout the UK. If there is a sub-optimal link between HS2 and Heathrow, then air passengers in the UK regions will simply fly to foreign hub airports, as at present—thus bypassing HS2 and contributing to UK carbon leakage.

41. It is important that cities and regions not directly located on the eventual HSR network are connected to Heathrow too. This includes South and South West England and South Wales, which could be better connected through integrating “classic” rail routes with the airport, as well as cities in Europe that could be connected to London and Heathrow through the linkage of HS1 and HS2. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w458 Transport Committee: Evidence

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 42. It is likely that staged development is the best way of delivering the proposed HSR network. A connection to Heathrow in Phase 1 would enable the benefits of integration between the airport and HS2 to be realised sooner. Deployment of dual-use rolling stock that can run on both high speed and “classic” rail lines would allow Heathrow to be connected to more UK cities than those directly served by HSR and effectively enable connections to the UK’s hub airport at an earlier date than HS2 itself could deliver.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 43. No. British Airways believes both connections should be undertaken in the same phase. A link from HS2 to HS1 should not be progressed before Heathrow is directly linked to the HS2 network and is able to connect to HS1 services. Connecting HS1 to HS2 will enable through-running rail services between the UK regions and continental Europe. This will give major European airports direct access to UK air passengers, without a reciprocal benefit for Heathrow. The airport must be able to compete for air passengers in the UK and in Europe too, which requires equivalent access to both HS2 and HS1 services. 44. Heathrow and UK airlines will be at a disadvantage if a link to HS1 was developed before Heathrow was served by HS2 and if the airport does not have equivalent access to air passengers in Europe via HS1 that other airports such as Paris and Amsterdam would enjoy. 45. Early construction of links to both Heathrow and HS1 would deliver Government objectives sooner and should be timed together to ensure parity of access for UK and European airports.

Section 5: Economic rebalancing and equity 5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 46. Funding for public transport projects is predominantly based on “the beneficiary pays” principle. As far as Heathrow airport and its airline users are concerned, the commercial case for contributing to development of HSR is extremely challenging. Over the likely HSR construction period, airlines will continue to fund a significant capital expenditure programme at Heathrow designed to renew and develop the UK’s hub airport. In this context the airline community will not be able to support funding for HSR as their primary focus and responsibility is to the airport itself. 47. British Airways suggests the Government should seek support from the EU TEN-T programme as HSR has the potential to provide integrated and transformative transport infrastructure.

Section 6: Impact 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 48. We do not have research of our own to reference, but refer to BAA’s second submission to the Mawhinney Review. This details its analysis of UK carbon impacts of HSR development. From this analysis, it is clear the potential to reduce carbon increases if: — HSR serves Heathrow directly and an excellent passenger interchange facility supports commercial “codeshare” arrangements between airlines and rail operators. — The HSR network is fully developed and balances serving the maximum passenger catchment with speed of service. — The UK power grid supplying HSR decarbonises. 49. BAA’s analysis indicates that if HS2 directly serves Heathrow then between 226–262kt per year could be saved. These significant reductions require the above conditions to be met and demonstrate the value of running HS2 to the airport as soon as possible.

6.4 How much disruption will there be to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 50. British Airways believes that disruption to Heathrow Express and Crossrail services should be minimised as much as possible during construction of HS2. Proposals for connectivity in Phase 1 from Old Oak Common to the airport rely on both Heathrow Express and Crossrail services. It is important that fast and effective connections to the airport are maintained throughout construction and this will require co-ordination between Network Rail, franchise operators and HS2 contractors. 51. In a wider context, it is essential that disruption be kept to a minimum to ensure the smooth and efficient running of London as a world class city. London is a key driver of the UK economy and the impacts of cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w459

disruption will be keenly felt beyond its border. Euston also provides the major rail link to the north west of England and west of Scotland and it is vital that these links can continue uninterrupted as far as possible. May 2011

Written evidence from Stephen Plowden (HSR 166) 1. This reply concentrates on HS2, but many of the points would apply to any HSR proposal for Britain. Because of the committee’s and my own time and length constraints, the reply is not as full or as well referenced as I would like, but I would be happy to supplement it by answering any questions the committee may have. 2. The committee asks for the main arguments for or against HSR. I doubt if there are any arguments of any consequence for HSR in Britain, and certainly there are none for HS2. HS2 will work against some of the most important objectives of transport or other policy. Even apart from that, the business case fails.

The Harm that HS2 will Do Carbon emissions 3. Reducing carbon emissions should be a principal aim of transport policy. The government’s calculations suggest that HS2 would be carbon neutral. That conclusion is too optimistic. HS2 would lead to an increase in CO2 emissions.

4. The only way HS2 could lead to a more than trivial reduction in CO2 emissions would be if travellers who would otherwise fly on domestic flights to and from Heathrow switched to rail. But if that were to happen, the airlines would transfer the slots vacated by domestic flights to international ones, with a consequent increase in emissions. HS2 Ltd’s December 2009 report High Speed Rail London To The West Midlands And Beyond acknowledges (para 4.2.25) that such a substitution might occur, and could lead to an increase in emissions, but these are not possibilities but certainties. It was precisely because the Conservatives, when in Opposition, were persuaded that HS2 would provide a way of increasing the capacity of Heathrow for international flights without having to build a third runway that they decided to support it. In a conference last autumn, BAA’s chief executive, Colin Matthews, said “… BAA would like more passengers to arrive [at Heathrow] by train. High speed rail would attract people who currently arrive by short-haul flights, freeing slots for more long- haul flights” (page 34 of the November 2010 issue of Transport Times). As an indication of the effect on emissions, according to Climate Care, the carbon per passenger emitted in a flight from Heathrow to New York is 11 times that emitted in a journey from Heathrow to Edinburgh. Emissions per flight would be several times that (the capacity of a Boeing 747–400 is five or six times that of the Bombardier Q400, one of the most efficient short-haul aircraft). 5. HS2 will also lead to more international flights from airports other than Heathrow. It is hoped in Birmingham that the increased accessibility of its airport will enable it to capture some business that would otherwise have gone to Heathrow. If the current plans to extend HS2 northwards go ahead, they will provide very good access to East Midlands airport and airport. Easier access will generate more air travel. The hopes that by linking HS2 to HS1 some short haul flights to the near Continent could be replaced by rail are unrealistic. It is very difficult for rail to compete with air on time and cost over the distances involved, and even if it could, the market is too small to support an acceptably frequent service. 6. Even if the substitution of international flights for domestic flights could be avoided, HS2 is not a good way of dealing with carbon emissions from domestic flights, which in any case amount to a little less than 2% of those from road transport. Any reductions would be partly, perhaps largely, offset by emissions from the high-speed trains. In addition, most journeys on domestic flights are cross country and not susceptible to competition from HS2, even if it were extended to Scotland. According to HS2 Demand Analysis (HS2 Ltd, February 2010), HS2 would increase rail’s share of the market for travel between London and Glasgow from 34% to 50% (para 10.2.8), with almost all the rest held by air, and would reduce the number of domestic air passengers by only 11% (para 10.6.13). Reducing domestic air travel requires measures that would impinge on domestic flights generally, not only on those between Scotland and south-east England. For example, landing charges could be related to the carbon emissions of each flight; the type of aircraft to be used on domestic air services could be regulated; possibly speed limits could be imposed. 7. Everyone acknowledges that high-speed trains are less energy efficient, and so produce more carbon, than their conventional equivalents. It is also acknowledged that HS2 will generate some extra rail journeys. But another equally important effect, not allowed for in the calculations, is that HS2 will also lead to a lengthening of some of the journeys that would otherwise be made by conventional rail. For example, some people who commute to London would decide to live further out. People who without HS2 might have taken a city break in Eastbourne or Oxford might decide to go north instead. These longer journeys will produce more carbon. (Transport investment commonly leads to a lengthening of journeys through redistribution. The fact that this effect is not allowed for in the HS2 forecasts is a very serious defect which has other important implications.) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w460 Transport Committee: Evidence

The north-south divide 8. The predominance of London and the south-east vis-à-vis all other regions is a very serious national problem. It is bad for London as well as for the rest of the country. The coalition has rightly set itself the objective of rebalancing the economy with respect both to economic sectors and to geographical regions. That may explain why bridging the north-south divide seems to have become the centre piece of the government’s case for HS2. In the Daily Telegraph of 25 November 2010, Mr Cameron is reported as saying: “If we think about governments of all colours, they have all failed—over 50 years—to deal with the North-South Divide. With high-speed rail we have a real chance of cracking it … The most powerful regional policy is transport and the most powerful form of transport is high-speed rail.” 9. Regional benefits do not figure in the formal evaluation of HS2 in the report Economic Case for HS2 (DfT February 2011). When I asked the DfT where in the documents regional benefits were discussed, I was referred to paragraphs 4.4.9 to 4.4.11 of this report. But these paragraphs simply contain a general discussion, of rather a cautionary nature, of the circumstances in which a high-speed rail station could help local development. There is nothing in them which supports Mr Cameron’s extreme claim. 10. There is no need to dwell on this subject here, since I understand that it will be treated in other submissions, where it will be shown that HS2 would increase the present regional imbalance. This is hardly surprising, since it has been recognised for decades that improving connections between an economically strong region and a weaker one is at least as likely to suck activity out of the weaker one as to regenerate it. It is not clear that transport investment of any kind should be a major component of a policy to bridge the north-south divide. Education, the siting of universities, research centres and government offices, and all the traditional tools of regional planning may be much more important, But if transport investment does have a part to play, it should take the form of local improvements, or improving connections within and between the distressed regions, not their connections with London. To regenerate the north, invest in the north.

The countryside 11. The protection of the countryside should rank very highly indeed as a national aim. The damage that HS2 will do is not, as Mr Hammond and Mr Cameron seem to think, of concern only to people living close to the route, nor is their concern only about property values. This is like saying that the demolition of Durham cathedral would matter only to the citizens of Durham and then only because of the loss of revenue from tourism. Other people will be telling the committee of the impact of HS2. Perhaps a slightly less damaging route could be found, but an acceptable route could not be.

The failure of the business case 12. The case for HS2 is based on a completely inappropriate business-as-usual, trend planning approach. Even accepting that approach, other submissions will show that the likely growth of demand for rail travel has been exaggerated, and that if more capacity is needed, there are better ways of providing it. Even if the demand forecasts were correct, other ways of providing the desired capacity were not available, and the harmful effects discussed above could be set aside, HS2 does not give value for money. 13. Table 10 of Economic Case for HS2 estimates the benefit/cost ratio (BCR) of HS2 at 1.6 if the claimed wider economic impacts are not included and at 2.0 if they are. According to NATA Refresh: Appraisal for a Sustainable Transport System (DfT, April 2010, paras 39 and 43), 95% of recent transport investments achieved a BCR of more than 2.0, and these schemes were split roughly equally between those with BCRs of more and less than 4.0. Schemes with BCRs of 2.0 or less would therefore need very large benefits of a kind not included in the monetary evaluation to deserve a place in a transport budget. But the environmental and social effects of HS2 are highly adverse, which raises the question of whether it is right to subsidise HS2 (see para 23 below). 14. According to this table, the capital and operating costs of HS2 come to £24 billion but would be reduced by £13.7 billion by revenue from fares. The fare revenues come from the journeys that are predicted to transfer to HS2 from road and air and from the travel that HS2 is expected to generate.S2HHS In cost benefit analysis the welfare gain resulting from a project is given by the increase in consumer surplus plus the increase in producer surplus. The revenue from new rail travel clearly contributes to producer surplus and should certainly be included in the appraisal, but two questions arise: (i) What allowance should be made for the loss in producer surplus of the firms which, if HS2 were not built, would be supplying goods and services to the people who would constitute the new rail passengers if it were? (ii) Should fare revenues be treated as a reduction in costs or as an increase in benefits? 15. The DfT argues that the producer surplus of those suppliers who would lose revenue if people switched their expenditure to rail does not have to be included, since the loss would be spread over many firms who, over time, would be able to reduce their costs accordingly. It would be difficult to apply this argument to domestic air services, whose losses, according to these forecasts, would not be only marginal. It seems to me that some of the businesses who would experience proportionately smaller falls in income would also find it difficult to cut their costs accordingly. Even if they could do so over a 60-year period, as the DfT argues, their earlier losses should figure in the appraisal. (My correspondence with the DfT on this and other points can be cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w461

forwarded to the committee if it would like to see it.) I believe that a significant part of the producer surplus predicted for rail should be offset by losses to other suppliers.

16. Until last year, changes in indirect taxation were treated as changes in costs, but they are now, correctly in my view, treated as changes in benefits. I believe that the same considerations apply both to indirect taxes and to fare revenues, so that both should be treated in the same way. However, in a recent email to me the DfT gave the following argument for continuing to consider revenue from fares as a reduction in costs. “This is based on the reasonable assumption that fare revenue from operating rail services (after covering costs) is contracted to return to the Department for Transport and can therefore be offset against costs.” This argument might have some force if the DfT, or a Railway Division within it, were a separate, self-financing organisation. In fact, however, taxpayers in general are being asked to pay for building HS2, even though very few of them will benefit from it as travellers, and even though its construction will also lead to a loss of tax revenue. As some compensation, they deserve to receive the benefit of the increase in fare revenues that HS2 is predicted to bring. The money could then be spent on whatever purpose seemed then, in the distant future, to be most worthwhile, rather than being automatically earmarked for transport. Reclassifying fare revenues reduces the BCR from 1.6 to 1.26 without wider economic impacts or from 2.0 to 1.6 with them.

17. The appraisal period for HS2 is the construction period, which ends in 2025, and the following 60 years. Costs and benefits are discounted at 3.5% for the first 30 years from now and at 3% thereafter. The justification for looking so far ahead is that HS2 is expected still to be in good working order in 2084. However, I would have thought that the period should be determined by the working life of the facility or the length of time for which travel needs and behaviour can reasonably be predicted, whichever is shorter. The discount rate raises questions of our responsibilities to future generations. We have a duty to leave them a world in which they can live and which would be worth living in, but if, as the Treasury seems to think, they will be richer than we are, then in my view we have no other responsibility to them. The implication is that non-reversible environmental effects should not be discounted at all but narrower economic ones should be discounted very heavily. Such philosophical considerations apart, there are other very good reasons for reducing the appraisal period and increasing discount rates. Professor Peter Mackie, one of the architects of the DfT’s New Approach to Appraisal (NATA) methodology, suggested last year that in present circumstances it would be reasonable to revert to the pre-2003 rules of a 40-year appraisal period and a 6% discount rate (Local Transport Today,25 June 2010). This would greatly reduce the BCR.

18. HS2 is predicted to reduce traffic on motorways between London and Birmingham by 1%, so bringing reductions in congestion worth £1.8 billion and savings in noise and accidents approaching £400 million (Economic Case for HS2, para 4.3.14 and Table 4). Traffic on these motorways over the next 74 years cannot be predicted to within 1%. If a significant reduction in congestion did come about, the eased conditions would generate traffic, which would negate the gain. In addition, it seems that the diversion from cars was calculated by a formula based only on travel time and cost. Even if, which is not clear, the number of people in the party, and hence the cost per person, was taken into account, such a formula is inadequate. Anyone now travelling between city centres by car probably has some wider reason for doing so. For example, the car is needed for further journeys at the destination end, it is carrying awkward luggage or equipment, someone in the party has physical difficulties in using trains or getting to or from the stations.

19. Wider economic impacts are predicted to be worth £4 billion, £3 billion of which comes from agglomeration benefits. The figure of £3 billion is hard to reconcile with the caveats of the researchers at Imperial College on whose studies the estimate is based. In any case, everyone agrees that the benefits will not come automatically but depend on other actions being taken by the local authorities concerned. The cost of such actions is not included in the calculation of the BCR, but clearly it should be.

The values placed on business and commuting travel time

20. The values of business time used in the BCR calculations assume that this time cannot be used productively. It is probably true that time spent getting to and from the station or changing trains cannot be used, but the train itself provides a very good working environment. If the train is not crowded, commuters, as well as business travellers, can make good use of this time. Of course, not all business travellers will choose to work in the train. For example, it is understandable that a London-based businessman who has spent a long day working away from his base may want to relax on the way home, but such time should be valued at no more than the commuting rate.

21. It is argued in para 7.3.5 of Economic Case for HS2 that people transferring from cars to trains would not only gain a time saving but would also be able to do some work on the train, which would increase the benefits of HS2 to business passengers. This argument assumes, however, that it would not be possible to work when travelling on the classic railway. If that were possible, but some people chose to travel by car rather than taking advantage of this facility, it would be incorrect to increase the estimate of the benefits they obtain from HS2. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w462 Transport Committee: Evidence

The alternative to business as usual 22. The travel forecasts that underlie both the promoters’ case for HS2 and the DfT’s investment plans more generally are based on an extrapolation of recent trends. That approach makes sense only if those trends are desirable, or, whether desirable or not, nothing can be done about them. 23. The worst problems arise in road transport and there is plenty to be done about them. But the same principle applies to rail as to road: ways of reducing demand should be examined before any expansion is planned. Advances in technology have opened up huge opportunities to substitute telecommunications for rail both for business travel and commuting. Reforms to the legal and fiscal framework governing road transport, especially the most important reform of all, lowering and enforcing speed limits, which, given the political will, could be done very quickly, would remove one major justification for subsidising rail, to encourage people to use the less environmentally damaging mode. The other justification for is social, but that does not apply to long distance travel. Under BR, Intercity was rightly required to be self-supporting. Without subsidies HS2 is clearly not viable. The scope for substituting motorway coaches for rail also needs to be very carefully examined. That would be cheaper than rail provision, since the infrastructure already exists, and would be socially desirable since fares are much lower. 24. Of course, reforming the rules for the use of the roads would also boost the demand for rail and hence the case for investment in rail. It is hard to know what the net effect of all the reforms would be. But if more rail capacity did turn out to be required, that would not necessarily require building major new lines and it would certainly not justify HSR. The impact on the landscape, carbon emissions and the fact that HSR would lead to journeys becoming longer are sufficient to rule it out.

Recommendations 25. The plans for HS2 have caused distress and anxiety to a great many people and have already involved considerable public expenditure, all in pursuit of a scheme which should not have been put forward in the first place, or at least should not have got this far. I hope the committee will tell the government to withdraw the plans immediately. If that is not possible, I hope that at least the committee will insist that the DfT’s current inadequate and inappropriate consultation is scrapped and replaced by a proper inquiry, which, among other things, would allow objectors to cross-examine the promoters’ witnesses. 26. The fact that such a very bad scheme has progressed as far as it has, and would almost certainly now be implemented if it were not for the determined resistance of well informed people who feel threatened by it, casts a very disquieting light on the way that major proposals are formulated and scrutinised in Britain. I hope Parliament will now consider very seriously how such a thing could have happened and what must be done to stop similar things happening again. 27. Crossrail is an example of a scheme which should not have survived but has because no one, or no well organised people, feels threatened by it. It contravenes the coalition government’s objective of rebalancing the economy with respect both to economic sectors and geographical regions even more flagrantly than HS2—its whole raison d’être is to increase employment and productivity in London’s financial districts. Its BCR is far below what is usually required. Although work is in progress, there is plenty of scope to modify the scheme. I hope the committee will look at this urgently. 28. All the government’s plans for transport, whether road, rail or air, rest on the same business-as-usual, predict-and-provide approach. The defects of this approach have been pointed out for 40 years or more. The urgent need to combat global warming makes them even more serious. This approach should be replaced by one which addresses all the current problems and tackles them by reforming the user rules—the legal and fiscal framework within which transport decisions are made. With some local exceptions, no expansion of the infrastructure should be contemplated until the necessary reforms have been implemented. I hope the committee will launch an inquiry into this alternative approach. If that happens, then some good will have come from the sorry saga of HS2. May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w463

Written evidence from Interlinking Transit Solutions Ltd (HSR 168) HIGH SPEED TRAINS FROM LONDON TO THE NORTH AND SCOTLAND

HS2 HSN

The High Speed North (HSN) study commissioned by the 2M Group in 2008 demonstrates the most efficient way to implement high-speed rail in Britain. The schematics above indicate the comparative features between HSN and HS2. This submission is made by Interlinking Transit Solutions Ltd., a group of like-minded professionals keen to promote efficient rail solutions.

1. Main arguments High-speed rail for Britain will add tangible benefits both economically and environmentally, provided the fullest of integration is achieved. High Speed North (HSN) differs from HS2 with a strategy defined as “spine and spur”. The strategy permits connectivity and integration of the nine conurbations of England and Scotland with a network that has double the connections of HS2 and is more achievable in terms of cost and time. All those points will be touched on in this submission, but it needs to be highlighted from the outset that the spine and spur strategy of HSN was dismissed by HS2 Ltd for a handful of reasons. To redress those; HSN will connect directly with Heathrow, while along the M1 corridor has more manageable blight than a Chilterns route, and creates a quicker journey between London and Birmingham. The economic argument is also better addressed by HSN by of developing both the national and regional economies with inter-urban connections and a self-sustaining high-speed rail network, in terms of both finance and the environment. There are many advantages to the spine and spur of HSN, as set out below.

2. How does HSR fit the government’s transport policy objectives? HSN simply costs less than HS2 to construct and operate whilst also delivering twice as many inter-urban connections and 10 years sooner, including Scotland. HSN does not fit the government objective of producing a Y shaped network, but the design and construction of the “spine and spur” network would be quicker and within the time frame of this Government to consider. The profitability and secondary revenue streams created by HSN give rise to investment potential and self- sufficiency, that creates better arguments than Benefit Cost Ratio while reducing the strain on the public purse than HS2. The carbon footprint of HSN is less than HS2 by a factor of 10. The modal shift from cars is greater because of greater scale and scope, which then creates more incentives to “leave the car at home”. The inter-urban passenger trains will free up more capacity on the conventional networks than HS2, including freight, and these points all contribute to the CO2 modelling that makes HSN better. Proximity to the Midlands Mainline (MML), means the HSN network delivers greater benefits to the Strategic Freight Network. DfT proposals to connect the MML with Channel Tunnel could more easily go ahead because of what HSN can achieve for the MML in the future. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w464 Transport Committee: Evidence

Carbon reductions for HSN are circa 20 million tonnes per annum, compared with HS2 reductions of only 5 million tonnes per annum (Calculations supplied on request). This makes real contributions to the Climate Change Act.

Avoiding the Y configuration gives HSN a shorter construction time. This is extremely important in convincing government to change tactics for high-speed rail, whilst also assuring the profitability of HSN. From the outset HSN costs less to operate and includes Heathrow and Scotland.

ABERDEEN & HIGHLANDS EDINBURGH HIGH SPEED NORTH::

GLASGOW CORE NETWORK TO SCOTLAND

SUNDERLAND NEWCASTLE CARLISLE DURHAM MIDDLESBROUGH DARLINGTON

BLACKPOOL YORK

BRADFORD LEEDS PRESTON HULL BOLTON WIGAN LIVERPOOL M‘CHESTER

W‘TON S‘PORT DONCASTER CHESTER SHEFFIELD GRIMSBY

NORTH C‘FIELD CREWE WALES STOKE

STAFFORD DERBY NOTTINGHAM

PETERBORO’ SHREWSBURY LEICESTER

WOLVERHAMPTON BIRMINGHAM BIRM. INT. COVENTRY WORCESTER LUTON RUGBY MILTON STEVENAGE KEYNES

CHELTENHAM LEAMINGTON CRICKLE WATFORD -WOOD JN GLOUCESTER OXFORD KX/ CARDIFF SWINDON StP HEATHROW WAY B.P AIRPORT EUSTON BATH BRISTOL READING PADDINGTON

Speed is secondary to connectivity with the HSN strategy, because connectivity reaps larger dividends both economically and environmentally. The network will be designed for speeds of 360 kilometres per hour and cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w465

connect 42 destination pairings, double that of HS2. This translates into more revenue streams and less carbon impact. An operational speed on the network of 300 km/h delivers the best frequency, waiting times, energy demand and capacity while still delivering a three-hour journey between London-Edinburgh. HSN not only bridges the north-south divide it also makes the east-west connections that will gravitate people toward industry rather than only into London. The scale and scope of HSN creates real alternatives to short-haul flights and car journeys because the connections and frequency of service are convenient. Speed differentials between high speed and low speed trains are the primary justification for a separate high- speed network. Conventional networks can therefore be devoted to regional passenger services, plus freight trains that travel together at similar sorts of speed. Inter-urban transportation would benefit greatly from a segregated high-speed network serving the nine conurbations of Britain with frequencies up to 15 trains per hour travelling at speeds of 300 kilometres per hour. A separate high-speed network provides greater benefit to all sectors of rail and the High Speed North network does that with the least impact. HSN with its more ubiquitous rolling stock and speeds will be able to utilise conventional tracks and alignments at some terminus points like Heathrow and Birmingham New Street. Firstly, this creates the shortest walking distances when inter-connecting with other modes, while secondly, permitting the interim use of conventional tracks and alignments during construction of various portions of the high-speed network. The enduring argument for high-speed rail is that it should benefit both the economy and the environment. For this High Speed North “ticks all the boxes” in terms of capacity, connectivity, modal shift, pollution, economics and the desire for a sustainable business model. (Calculations available on request.)

Implications for Domestic Aviation Heathrow’s short-haul domestic flights can be replaced by high-speed rail, but only HSN is offering direct connections into the Heathrow campus. Airport movements of 20,000 to 30,000 flights per year could be replaced by HSN and by utilising the existing tunnelled rail alignments at Heathrow. This encourages modal shift via market forces rather than taxation or increases in airport duties. The median of 25,000 flights per year is 7% of flights at Heathrow.

However, the spend-per-head with HSN is much less than HS2 in connecting Heathrow, along with CO2 reductions per passenger. Connecting Cricklewood to Heathrow via portions of the Great West Railway alignment into Heathrow would cost £4 billion. A tunnel extension west of Terminal 5 with the GWR would create a loop and bi-directional flows into Heathrow with benefits shared between Crossrail, Heathrow Express and High Speed North. HSN can connect planes and trains at Heathrow using a convenient and simply understood strategy. Additionally, transferring passengers within the airport campus creates opportunity to incorporate baggage and Border Control processes that make this a cost effective alternative to many short-haul flights. The connections create mutual benefits for both the airlines and Heathrow. High-speed rail does not replace Runway 3 in terms of capacity, but instead creates a mulit-modal hub for Heathrow that can move an extra 20 million people.

PASSENGER FLOWS EXPRESSED AS PEAK FLOWS PER HOUR WCML HSN

CRICKLEWOOD

2km LONG TUNNEL FROM WEST HAMPSTEAD TO PRIMROSE HILL TO EUSTON WCML/ MML/ ECML/ CROSSRAIL THAMESLINK THAMESLINK HIGH SPEED Heathrow NORTH EXISTING Loop TRACKS 10tph KX/StP EUSTON VICTORIA 12tph 6KM NEW VICTORIA NORTHERN GWML/ PICCADILLY BUILD PADD’T’N NORTHERNX2 CROSSRAIL MET/CIRCLE

14tph OLD OAK 24tph 24tph TCR LHR COMMON CENTRAL

WCML COMMUTER FLOWS 12tph DIVERTED TO CROSSRAIL cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w466 Transport Committee: Evidence

The sketch indicates the connection between Cricklewood and Heathrow with a dashed line. (Further specifications are available.) Connecting Heathrow to Scotland, Europe, and the Midlands is a priority made possible by the interchange at Cricklewood. For Heathrow this means frequency of three to five high-speed trains per hour, whilst also accommodating similar frequencies for Crossrail and Heathrow Express. The opinion here is that Gatwick and Heathrow should be connected and integrated by a proven transit system along the M25 corridor. All five terminal-areas at the two airports can be interconnected. This better justifies a new runway for London to be situated at Gatwick. A rapid transit system between the two airports could deliver 4 million passengers per year to Heathrow and High Speed North, from Surrey, Sussex and Gatwick. The High Speed North proposal, with its ubiquitous rolling stock and numerous connections, provides quicker journeys than many short-haul flights. Journeys to Paris and Edinburgh from Heathrow would be under 3 hours 20 minutes and just as important, this would be delivered with high frequency of service. HSN at Heathrow could deliver circa 16,000 passengers per day to the high-speed rail network who would otherwise take short-haul flights. (Estimates available.) High Speed North (HSN) does more to achieve the government aspirations to improve London’s status as a hub to the world simply by connecting high-speed trains “directly” into Heathrow.

3. Business Case The opinion here is that high-speed rail can be profitable for the sake of the country’s rail capacity and for the economy. Benefit Cost Ratios (BCR) are only briefly mentioned because the focus here is on profitability and what HSN can deliver to investors in terms of cost and revenue, that are better than HS2. Profitability and efficiency are at the centre of this plea to the Parliamentary Select Committee to review the case for HSN as the alternative to the HS2.

The greater balance of regional benefits and hardship, plus reduced environmental impact, mean that HSN can be put forward as both a Stakeholder programme and a PLC to secure the confidence of investors and government. Much design work has been completed on 1:50,000 mapping along with the intrinsic knowledge derived from that, to demonstrates the business case for HSN. 30000 Project Year

25000 RPKM’s Revenue Passenger Kilometres per year (millions) 20000 £m FareBox + inflation 0.01pa

PV Cum 15000 Repayments 10000

5000

0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 -5000

-10000

-15000

-20000 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w467

HSN delivers connectivity plus revenue streams into areas where they are most beneficial to the customers as well as the business model. The four phases can operate somewhat independently during construction so that high-speed trains can utilise portions of the conventional network while developing inter-urban connections and revenue streams. From the outset HSN is a national programme and that is one reason the M1 corridor is chosen. However, this corridor also delivers sooner construction to Birmingham and Leicester while introducing important revenue streams by year 4. The 933 km network for Scotland and England is divided into four phases of construction with CAPEX and finance also phased-in. The entire HSN network is estimated to cost £40 to £50 billion to build with the projections (graph) assuming: — 18% equity. — 5% finance with varying amortisations. — 15% internalised revenue or subsidy.

CO2 predictions are 10 times better than HS2, based on the greater connectivity of HSN. CO2 defines the network efficiency and its ability to create modal shift from cars and road-freight onto rail, along with airline passengers into trains. Internalised revenues of 15% of net cash are used for the projections. They would be derived from a list of Stakeholders that would include: — freight companies along the WCML, MML, & East Coast Mainline (ECML); — passenger rail companies along the WCML and Chilterns railway; — Heathrow airport; — Highways Agency; — City and County Councils at the terminus points; and — Government Agencies and regulatory bodies. Internalised revenue then becomes part of the Benefit Cost Ratio and this is estimated to be about 3 to 1 with the CO2 efficiencies of HSN acting as the harbinger for overall efficiency and financial success.

What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways? This question presently makes reference to the West Coast Mainline (WCML) in most peoples’ eyes. The problem with introducing higher speed trains to the conventional corridor with proposals like Rail Package 2 (RP2) proposal is that it introduces larger speed differentials between trains in the corridor, which either reduces frequency or creates demand for more lanes of track. Operating HSN on a separate network is the best way to introduce added rail capacity for the country while also introducing inter-urban connections. The conventional network can increase capacity while maintaining similar sorts of speeds. For example, Coventry and Milton Keynes will maintain present frequency of service to both Birmingham and London, which creates support for HSN from the Chilterns’ population who maintain their choices and for Coventry who maintain their present services. A segregated “spine and spur” network for HSN delivers regional benefits to slower trains travelling at circa 150 km/h and national benefits to high-speed trains that can travel un-impeded at 300 km/h.

What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects…? A stakeholder business model in the form of a Public Limited Company becomes the most effective model for HSN because it is profitable and has least social impact. The diminutive level of blight throughout the HSN network causes fewer regional differences and arguments about who is benefitting who such as exists between Buckinghamshire and Yorkshire. This balanced level of benefit and risk encourages more equal participation from the different regions. A Public Limited Company for HSN makes sense because there is the potential for direct profitability for the generation who are going to invest in it. Stakeholders and Investors acting in unison within a Public Limited Company will help to distribute the risks and the benefits and creates self-regulation; its a bit like a toll bridge where the tolls are equitably managed for the benefit of all. Lessons in managing prestige engineering project can be gleaned from a number of projects such as Concorde, the R101 Airship, Shinkansen, TGV, MagLev, the Isle of Sky Toll Bridge, Channel Tunnel, Eurostar, and Heathrow T5. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w468 Transport Committee: Evidence

Speed and connectivity are the two attributes that can be more equitably managed within the HSN strategy. This gives the best balance of capacity, environmental sustainability, profitability and speed, all in the same formula.

High Speed North will be a tangible asset to both this generation, who will be able realise their investment, and the next generations who will receive a legacy that is engineered to be future proof and not a financial burden.

4. The Strategic Route

Interfacing HSN with other rail networks will be more effective with HSN than HS2. This is why the Carbon footprint and ridership are as robust as they are.

Old Oak Common is still important, but rather than becoming an intercity interchange the HSN strategy advocates its use as a connection between WCML and Crossrail, primarily for the sake of commuters.

HSN proposes that Tottenham Court Road be connected with Euston and St Pancras with a new transit system. This makes the connection between Crossrail and HS1 and HS2 through Tottenham Court Road with a simple extension of concept already put forwarded by ARUP between Euston and St Pancras. Cost would be circa £400 million with benefits to all transport services around Euston.

Using Birmingham New Street along with reasonable 200 metre trains enhances the integration because that’s what customers would prefer and it made possible via the M1 route. Adding to that is the unique east- west connection through the Woodhead corridor of the Pennines that creates a bi-directional flow of people for the Midlands. This part of the HSN strategy strengths the sustainability of the business model while delivering better economic benefits to the country.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

HSN does more than just bridge the north-south divide. The intermediate phases of the network construction will strengthen the economy of the Midlands while later phases are designed to connect Scotland and add speed to the longer legs for the benefit of modal-shift and CO2 reduction.

The economic strategy helps industry remain in situ, while making fast connections to London for political and financial support.

Freight capacity to the Midlands uniquely benefits from HSN by its proximity to the MML and trans-Pennine freight routes.

HSN “does more” than HS2 to develop business and industry where it already exists because it implements the bi-directional flow of people and commerce from a broader high-speed network.

A privately operated high-speed network is possible with HSN, whereby the combination of a Stakeholder programme and Public Limited Company helps the Government to maintain regulation and ensure that profitability. The balances, made possible by the even spread of risks and benefits makes possible a more overall support for high-speed rail throughout the regions it serves.

Any number of successful infrastructure projects can be compared and this should prompt further investigation into HSN as a viable formula for a British high-speed rail network. HSN delivers the best speed, connectivity, and value for money.

6. Impact

“Modal shift” is the usual reason given for promoting high-speed rail. The number of people of who choose the train over the car or plane will need to be significant to justify this claim, and HSN achieves this through better scope and scale. In terms of CO2, HSN is better than HS2 by a factor or 10 because it makes more connections and does it with less construction and fuller trains.

In terms of economic impact, HSN the regional benefits and Benefit Cost Ratio are primary reasons for asking the Parliamentary Select Committee to ask seek further evidence from ourselves and others whilst also reviewing the HS2 proposal. May 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w469

Written evidence from Wendover HS2 Business Group (HSR 170) 1. Context and Aims of the Submission 1.1 Wendover HS2382 (WHS2) welcomes the opportunity to present evidence to the Transport Committee. Dr John Savin is happy to provide verbal evidence if requested. We focus the business case and what it says about regional impacts and the effect on the conventional rail network. 1.2 The case for HS2 is presented by the Government as: “When not If”—although the demand to support the new line has receded from 2033 to 2043. The rail report by Sir Roy McNulty suggests greater existing capacity utilisation and efficiency; a new line provides neither without network rationalisation. 1.3 Analysis of actual numbers in the business case (given in spreadsheets released only on 13 April) indicates that we should be asking instead: “Where and How?” There might be a strong national case for new high speed lines integrated into the rail network rather than superseding it. The current route design seems to be about supporting airports rather than delivering UK-wide regional benefits. 1.4 The rhetoric around HS2 has now shifted to the concept of “transformational” benefits and “once in a generation” opportunities. Analysis shows that HS2 delivers 88% of its benefits after 2043, so it offers in practice a once in a next but one or two generation opportunity. Can we bring forward the benefits of any new high speed/capacity lines? How certain can we be about the growth impact?

2. Detailed Conclusions 2.1 £60.25 billion (2009 prices) will be required to construct and renew the HS2 Y-network. 2.1.1 In the peak construction years, the average annual cost will be £3.3 billion in 2009 money. 2.1.2 The Y-arm costs look low compared to Stage 1, despite their longer length and need for four to six stations. 2.2 Under the current proposal, major regions with 76% of demand will not be properly served till 2033. 2.2.1 Serving more population centres minimises demand risk since the route is available to more cities. 2.2.2 Stage 1 deliberately avoids major population centres—possibly to maximise speed. 2.2.3 Alternative route options, which deliver greater national benefits sooner, have been discarded. 2.2.4 Benefits north of Preston and Leeds may be negative, due to more crowding and slower services. 2.3 The route seems to favour private airport operators at the expense of regional development. 2.3.1 Only 0.8% of HS2 Y-stage passengers use Heathrow (2,000 daily). 2.3.2 Air shift to HS2 (on an unconstrained model) at best moves 88 domestic to long-haul flights per day. 2.4 Move of base year to 2043 from 2033 is dictated by the need to have a doubling of passengers. 2.4.1 The sophisticated forecast predicts that there was no rail travel outside London before 1975. 2.4.2 An extra 70,000 new rail passengers need to travel over the inflated base demand of 170,000. 2.4.3 An obsolete long-distance demand elasticity continues to be used. This overstates demand by 34%. 2.4.4 Impact on road demand is minimal, eg 1,300 per day fewer cars between Manchester and London. 2.5 Most passenger benefits are not gained till after 2043. 2.5.1 Only 12% of business passenger benefits occur before 2043. 2.5.2 Even in Present Value terms, only 26% of benefits are gained before 2043. 2.5.3 Most Regions see little benefit till 2033—this delays any transformational benefits for 76% of users. 2.5.4 Business travellers in 2092 need to be nearly four times richer than their 2009 ancestors. 2.6 HS2 will drain the UK conventional network of £5.8 billion per year. 2.6.1 Cuts of up to £1 billion per year (2009 money) are planned once the Y-arms open. 2.6.2 A 2030’s Treasury may further cut residual conventional networks (Beeching 2.0?) to pay off debt. 2.6.3 A pension fund buying the annual HS2 surplus in 2043 might pay £8 billion—requiring a £76 billion write off. 2.7 Transformational impact is claimed but not substantiated. 2.7.1 Many projections confuse cause and effect in estimating the benefits from rail on local productivity. 2.7.2 The majority of transformational gains will occur after 2043, as they are linked to passenger benefits. 382 Wendover HS2 was formed in April 2010 at a public meeting held in response to HS2 proposals published on 10 March 2010. It is not specifically opposed to higher speed rail as a general concept but it is opposed to construction of high speed lines in the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) as it believes that an overwhelming national interest case has not been made and alternatives have not been adequately considered. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w470 Transport Committee: Evidence

2.7.3 Identifiable additional benefits are rising land prices next to stations and housing developments.

3. Is there really a rail demand issue?

3.1 Network Rail’s Route Utilisation Strategy of December 2010 stated that, with planned improvements like the new trains now arriving, the projected standing on weekday trains is as in Exhibit 1.

Exhibit 1

FORECAST TRAINS WITH STANDING PASSENGERS IN 2024 ON THE WEST COAST MAIN LINE Glasgow Birmingham Manchester Liverpool Crowded trains 16.1% 1.0% 5.4% 2.9%

Source: Figure 4.6 Page 71 West Coast Main line Route Utilisation Strategy

3.2 HS2 Ltd (HS2L) say the line is at capacity and solutions other than HS2 are “extraordinarily expensive”.

3.3 There is clearly a commuter problem into Euston now—which will get worse medium-term even if HS2 goes ahead. This needs immediate expansion of Euston, not a new rail line in 2026.

3.4 We support the work on Rail Package 2 (RP2) and Scenario B done by HS2 Action Alliance (HS2AA) and support its conclusion that incremental removal of bottlenecks would be cost effective. The upgraded Chiltern Line could take more Birmingham traffic, freeing WCML train paths on the southern section.

3.5 However, in the event that HS2 is built as the Government proposes, what is its real national impact?

4. What are HS2’s real costs?

4.1 Building HS2 is stated to be affordable for £2 billion per year. It is also claimed that it will not affect other rail investments. These are policy matters but we can look at the cash required.

4.2 The cost of HS2 in 2009 money (including indirect taxes) is shown in Exhibit 2. Including renewal costs, this is £60.25 billion at 2009 prices, before inflation. Inflation could push costs to £66.6 billion by 2033.

Exhibit 2

COST PROFILE OF CONSTRUCTION £4,500 £130,000 £4,000 £120,000 £110,000 2009 £3,500 £100,000 £3,000 £90,000 £80,000 £2,500 £70,000 £2,000 £60,000 £50,000 £1,500 £40,000

contstant prices) £1,000 £30,000 £20,000 £500 £10,000 Million cumulave cost

Costper Year (Million in £- £- 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2031 2034 2037 2040 2043 2046 2049 2052 2055 2058 2061 2064 2067 2070 2073 2076 2079 2082 2085 2088 2091

Annual Cumulave (2009 prices) Cumulave inflaon

4.3 The cost per Parliament is shown in Exhibit 3. This uses 2009 prices and also shows an inflation adjusted price—the Treasury budget. Note that the budget in the HS2L spreadsheets is £1.3 billion for this Parliament, possibly £1.6 billion with inflation; the cost announced in December 2010 was £750 million.

4.4 The HS2 predicted expenditure will average £3.3 billion annually from 2019 though to 2028. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w471

Exhibit 3 POTENTIAL HS2 EXPENDITURE (£ MILLION) BY PARLIAMENTARY TERM Parliament 2009 costs Inflated costs 2010-15 £1,357 £1,636 2015-20 £9,866 £12,761 2020-25 £16,886 £24,041 2025-30 £13,249 £21,214 2030-35 £3,744 £6,818 £45,101 £66,471

4.5 The cost to 2035 of the Y-arms may be an underestimate. The cost of Stage 1 is £20.3 billion and the cost of the Y-arms is £14.7 billion in 2009 money (excluding the £3.9 billion Heathrow link and £6.3 billion for trains). 4.6 The Y-arms are c 50% longer than Stage 1, yet costs are 27.5% lower. With no details of the Y-route till after the current consultation, these values cannot be scrutinised. This is a major risk. 4.7 The Y-arms presumably involve building at least four stations,383 maybe six if external Manchester airport and Leeds-York city interchanges are built by analogy with Birmingham proposals. 4.8 We expect major Y items to equal the high costs of Stage 1 Euston rebuilding and London tunnels.

5. Why is HS2 so slow to meet the highest regional demand levels? 5.1 The pattern of forecast demand calls into question the current route strategy (Exhibit 4). Looking at core rail demand (ignoring modal shifts), 67% of forecast passengers (to and from London) are from the North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, North-East and East Midlands. Scotland adds a further 9%. Exhibit 4 POTENTIAL BASE-LOAD RAIL DEMAND TO AND FROM LONDON IN 2043 Region 2043 demand % Scotland 23,008 9% North East 17,794 7% North West 61,537 24% Yorks and Humber 41,948 16% West Midlands 60,844 24% East Midlands 52,460 20% Total rail demand 257,591

5.2 This means that 76% of projected demand is not properly served till the Y is built in 2033, assuming the project runs to schedule. The West Midlands with only 24% of demand gets a seven-year head-start. 5.3 We note that significant parts of the East Midlands are not served by HS2 current routes. Spending on conventional services is planned to be cut by up to £1 billion per year (2009 prices) from 2033. 5.4 If the aim was to invest in the regions and RP2 or Scenario B was rejected, a direct M1 route with an arm to Manchester and spur to Birmingham would appear to be a more logical choice. The distances are roughly the same but any transformational economic impacts could be greater and come sooner. 5.5 If a new line is built, it makes sense to maximise cash fares by serving major population centres. Stage 1 deliberately avoids population centres, like Milton Keynes and Luton, which might benefit.

6. Is HS2 really about boosting Birmingham and London airports? 6.1 The Y-route air demand model for 2043 shows that 25% of air passengers might opt to take HS2: 13,155 passengers, of whom 9,199 travel direct to London, the others to and from the South East. This is using an unconstrained air demand model, so may exaggerate the likely numbers. 383 Manchester, East Midlands, West Yorkshire, Leeds. A new station at Preston is also a possibility. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w472 Transport Committee: Evidence

6.2 This frees only c 88 takeoff and landing slots, allowing 88 long-haul flights—which are more profitable for operators but generate much more CO2. However, only a proportion of flights saved will be at Heathrow. Most slots are freed at Gatwick, Stansted and Luton—where low-cost airlines will compete. 6.3 The March 2010 estimate is that only 2,000 HS2 passengers per day (0.8% of 2043 travellers) will use Heathrow, even with an HS2 Heathrow station. The HS2 link costs £3.9 billion in 2009 money. 6.4 However, why funnel regional demand via Heathrow rather than developing strong regional airports like Manchester? This is favouring a southern private airport over regional growth. 6.5 Effects on regional airports are not measured. One theory for the HS2 Stage 1 route is to boost Birmingham as the fifth London airport. If so, this needs to be explicit; it is not in the consultation.

7. Are HS2 demand projections realistic? 7.1 The predicted number of HS2 passengers between London and the regions is shown in Exhibit 5. We asked for, but have been denied, specific journey forecasts from HS2L. HS2L say they do not hold the data and have no interest in it. Exhibit 5 is derived from regional demand forecasts. 7.2 HS2L only project forecasts for two individual years: 2021 and 2036, based on a 2008 base year. The 2036 figures were extrapolated to 2043. 7.3 A model should be capable of extrapolating the past to be certain of having some future relevance. Unfortunately, a linear back-extrapolation of HS2L forecasts (Exhibit 6) predicts that rail travel outside London started in 1975. Such a test is over-simplistic, but investigating the historic validity of the model is important. How can it predict 34 years of growth if it cannot replicate the previous 33? 7.4 HS2 chose its target forecast year, 2043, on the basis that it provides enough demand to justify the project. This requires a doubling of demand from the 2008 base year. The previous target year of 2033 was linked to WebTAG guidance designed to limit forecasting errors; these rise with duration. 7.5 Forecasting of large projects is complex in operation but the core idea is a simple multiplier of GDP by an elasticity (a fixed multiplication factor). With HS2, the long-term GDP per capita growth agreed with DfT (once Treasury forecasts expire), is 1.91%. GDP forecasting one year ahead is highly uncertain. Exhibit 5 POTENTIAL HS2 PASSENGERS REGIONAL-LONDON HS2 USE IN 2043 Classic S1 Y-extra Total 49,372 London 83,000 68,666 151,666 Other 16,270 - 16,270 New rail 29,929 26,624 56,553 Air switch 4,990 4,209 9,199 Car switch 3,811 2,501 6,312 49,372 Total 138,000 102,000 240,000 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w473

Exhibit 6 LINEAR EXTRAPOLATION OF GROWTH PRODUCTION TO HS2L BASE AND PREDICTED GROWTH YEARS. 2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00 London) 0.50

- Millions of passengers daily (ex 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030 2034 2038 2042 2046 2050 2054 2058 2062 2066 2070 2074 2078 2082 2086 2090

Data points Extrapolaon

7.6 The HS2 business case requires a steady UK GDP growth to 2092 giving £104,865 per capita (up 348%) and possibly a population of 93 millio.384 7.7 HS2L is still using an outdated elasticity measure for long-distance demand growth relative to GDP (PDFH 4.1). It has been estimated by HS2AA that this old elasticity may be overstate demand by 34%. The new standard was ready for use in April 2010 but the Secretary of State has not approved its use. 7.8 If demand fell by 34%, the BCR of the Y-case (excluding economic benefits) could fall to 0.81 from 1.78. 7.9 The method also depends on a tight relationship between GDP growth and rail use. The correlation between GDP and growth on the WCML is 0.45.385 The correlation for UK rail growth was 0.26. A period of growth covering a major service upgrade is not a reliable basis for an ultra-long-term extrapolation. 7.10 The predicted 2043 drop in national road use (outside London) due to HS2 is 0.35%. Some bigger regional percentage falls are expected, eg between London and the North West an 18% fall might occur by 2043, but this is only 1,300 fewer car journeys and would be swamped by local traffic.

8. Passenger Benefits—the profit gain to the employers of very rich business travellers after 2043 8.1 Passenger benefits are monetarised but have no direct relationship to actual cash. They form the biggest identified benefits, so if HS2 is transformational, these must be the main engine of change. For this section, we focus on business passenger benefits, as these feed into wider economic impacts. 8.2 The benefits are shown in Exhibit 7 rising to £3.2 billion in 2092 (2009 money). In theory, these are direct productivity gains experienced by employers at 2009 prices. The Stage 1 (S1) and Y-arm benefits are separate rows. Although the number of Y-arm passengers is lower than in Stage 1, they travel longer distances so have a higher monetarised time gain. Leisure benefits are £1.4 billion in 2092. 8.3 However, Y-arm passengers may get even better journey times if the route is in a direct M1 corridor. HS2L has not explored this aspect as the route option has not been assessed. 8.4 The distribution of benefits is heavily skewed to the years after 2043: 88% of the total. Hence, today’s taxpayers are being asked to fund a scheme to meet the supposed needs of richer, post-2043 business travellers. The Present Value of the post-2043 benefits is 74% of the overall benefit PV. Some 87% of Leisure benefits are also gained after 2043. This is a high level of altruism for 2011 taxpayers. 8.5 There may be severe disbenefits to passengers north of Preston and Leeds who could suffer lower speeds on non-tilting classic-compatible HS2 trains with fewer seats and worse connections. 384 The population series stops in 2037 but we extrapolate to 2092 using the last 0.48% pa growth value. GDP growth per capita from 2051 is 1.91%. 385 1 is perfectly correlated and 0 is no link; the figure implies that at least half the variation is due to other factors. In other words, historic evidence shows no tight GDP-Rail growth link, yet this is the basis of HS2L’s 83 year forecast. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w474 Transport Committee: Evidence

Exhibit 7 BUSINESS PASSENGER BENEFITS FROM HS2 TRAVEL 1 3000

2500 Y Other

2000 SI Other Y Crowd 1500 S1 Crowd 1000 Y Time £ Billion prices) (2009 £ Billion 500 S1 Time Forecast year 0 0 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2047 2050 2053 2056 2059 2062 2065 2068 2071 2074 2077 2080 2083 2086 2089 2092

9. Over-valuing time—should HS2 be more cautious in its very-long term GDP growth assumptions? 9.1 All passenger benefits are based on the Value of Time (VoT). VoT is based on surveys from the 1990’s based on 2002 prices and adjusted for both the real growth in wages to 2009 and for inflation. 9.2 The business VoT 2009 is £48.64 per hour, equal to an employment cost of £94,856 per year estimated as a pre-tax salary of c £62,000. This is in the top income range for the UK. 9.3 This value is grown in real terms based on the DfT economic forecast of GDP for the century. By 2092, the business passenger’s salary has risen to maybe £240,000 (2009 money)—a 291% real pay rise. 9.4 These intangible passenger benefits might be mostly illusory. Many business travellers work on trains and many travel outside standard office hours to get to and from meetings. The VoT assumes that 100% of the business passenger benefit translates into improved productivity, and thereby GDP. 9.5 If Business VoT is only £18.48 ph, assuming 50% of time is either productive or wasted, the business benefit PV drops from £25.6 billion to £16.3 billion. The Y-route central case BCR (no economic impacts) falls to 1.34 from 1.78. The effect is mitigated by both VoT rises and the effect of discounting. 9.6 If VoT is constant from 2011, the BCR becomes 0.89; if passengers also fall by 34%: the BCR is 0.41.

10. HS2 will drain the UK conventional network of £5.8 billion per year in fares 10.1 Fare revenues are only recognised from new customers. Exhibit 8 shows the revenues. Fares are as in 2002, updated by inflation adjustment to 2009, and also increased by standard rail price rises, now RPI+3%. The 2043 annual revenue is £2.1 billion in 2009 money. 10.2 As it captures most high-paying passengers, HS2 also strips £5.8 billion from the WCML, ECML and MML combined. As a rough estimate, the HS2 franchise could have total fare income of £7.9 billion in 2043. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:13] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w475

Exhibit 8 HS2 INCREMENTAL FARES AT 2009 PRICES £2,500

£2,000

£1,500 Y Leisure Y Business £1,000 S1 Leisure £500 S1 Business

£- £ Billion RPI+3%) plus prices (2009 £ Billion 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2047 2050 2053 2056 2059 2062 2065 2068 2071 2074 2077 2080 2083 2086 2089 2092

11. What effect might HS2 have on the efficiency and value of the residual network? 11.1 The simple answer is that no one knows. HS2 claims a further benefit through cuts of up to £1 billion in conventional services. There are promises of improved local services. 11.2 The HS2 case relies on squeezing 240,000 passengers down one set of twin track rails into and out of London. Technically, we understand it is feasible if computer-based in-cab signalling works, if all trains are totally reliable and if enhanced braking systems are developed to allow shorter train headways. 11.3 This seems a fragile basis for a transformational rail link. On HS2, one failed train in rural Buckinghamshire would bring services between London and the North to a grinding halt. 11.4 We assume a subsidy of £5.3 billion to support the residual network. This may be an underestimate as few normal businesses can survive a massive demand fall off—especially faced with high fixed costs. 11.5 A 2030’s Treasury nursing a £66.6 billion bill may ask why residual services should be supported. Kent has seen other services become slower and worse due to HS1. HS2 could trigger Beeching 2.0: why maintain massive over-provision in rail systems that might be 30–50 years old at that time? 11.6 HS2 also has a very restrictive Y-design operating service pattern, linking only favoured cities and London, with little inter-connectivity. It is designed to be separate from conventional services (other than some Scottish services). This severely restricts network effects but benefits London again.

12. What financial impact might HS2 have on national finances? 12.1 We have done a possible cashflow for HS2, Exhibit 9. The average surplus cashflow from 2043 is £425 million. If a pension fund bought the revenues in 2043 (as with HS1), they might pay £8 billion requiring a £76 billion debt write off (assuming 3.5% debt interest). 12.2 HS2 cannot cover debt interest—so an interest-free subsidy is needed. Even with that, it would still “owe” c £20 billion by 2092 (in 2009 money). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w476 Transport Committee: Evidence

Exhibit 9 HS2 FULL PROJECT CASHFLOWS £1,000 -£1,000 -£3,000 -£5,000 -£7,000 -£9,000 -£11,000 -£13,000 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2031 2034 2037 2040 2043 2046 2049 2052 2055 2058 2061 2064 2067 2070 2073 2076 2079 2082 2085 2088 2091 £ Million prices) real (2009 £ Million

3.5% interest No Interest

12.3 Based on the fare elasticity reported in March 2010, we estimate that a revenue-maximising HS2 franchise holder would increase business fares by at least 30% and leisure fares by 10%. This maximises revenues but diminishes the implied benefits, as passenger numbers will fall. 12.4 The operator might expect profits of over £400m in 2009 prices even if fares are not optimised.

13. Where is the hard evidence that HS2 can be nationally transformational? 13.1 Massive regional benefits are assumed by bodies like Centro, Northern Way (now defunct) and Greengauge 21. Professor Graham (Imperial College) notes386 that we cannot be certain whether rail drives productivity or if rail is built to serve areas of high productivity. Benefits claimed by regional transport lobby groups could be illusory.387 Using Graham’s estimates, HS2 Stage 1 might deliver £8 million per annum of benefits. Even scaling up and adding GDP growth, this is only £266 million PV, c £19 million per annum in 2043. 13.2 Professor Banister (Oxford Transport Unit388) notes that the only extra measurable benefits are higher land prices and housing. This is very localised near new stations. Most Stage 1 jobs are in west London. 13.3 Greenfield development in the east Birmingham greenbelt, in Wilmslow outside Manchester (assuming an airport station), at any external Leeds-York station and between Derby and Nottingham could drive the relocation of businesses, pressurising the local infrastructure. These businesses will often relocate from local areas made less-favourable by HS2, so net job creation may be minimal. May 2011

Written evidence from Professor Robert Cochrane (HSR 171) Introduction 1. I have read the separate Evidence submitted to the Select Committee by Professor Peter Mackie of the Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds and agree with the points he has raised. My evidence is additional to his and does not repeat those points. 2. My evidence sets out some of the issues, primarily organisational and financial, which I believe to be important in the assessment of British high speed rail projects. It is based on my experience of high speed rail demand forecasting and operations in England, Continental Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. This includes both the 1970s studies for the Channel Tunnel Project, when I was a consultant with Coopers and Lybrand, and the British Railways studies for this project in the 1980s. The latter studies were carried out when I was responsible for introducing financial cost benefit analysis and project appraisal within the and subsequently as a Deputy Director of InterCity services. 386 Graham, D J and Kender , J V. Estimating the agglomeration benefits of transport investments: Some tests for stability. OECD discussion paper 2009–32 December 2009. This effect is termed reverse causality. Uncertainty in elasticity values is also a limiting factor and variables are often correlated. 387 Laird, J and Mackie, P. Review of Methodologies to Assess Transport’s Impacts on the size of the Economy. Leeds University Institute for Transport Studies. September 2010. This was a validation study commissioned by the Northern Way. 388 Banister, D and Thurstain-Goodwin, M. Quantification of the non-transport benefits resulting from rail investment. J. Transport Geography. 2011: 19; 212–223. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w477

3. My comments relate principally to the “business case” for the project—the financial feasibility, financial engineering and public sector financial support aspects of the HS2 project, which I consider to be the areas where the work to date has been weakest. In addition, I would like to amplify the comments made by Professor Mackie regarding the role of HSR in shaping land use in England.

WebTAG BCR—the Ratio of Benefits to Subsidy on an Integrated Rail Network 4. The HS2 project has been appraised using the DfT WebTAG principles, on which it has what is referred to as a benefit/cost ratio (BCR) of about 2. What is not widely appreciated is that this is not a conventional benefit-cost ratio. Putting to one side the secondary effects of indirect taxation, it is the ratio of the present value of benefits to the present value of costs less the present value of the revenue, with the a priori assumption that costs exceed revenues. Hence it is the ratio of the benefits received by the community to the Government subsidy required. So in simple terms, the time adjusted ratio of community benefits to Government subsidy is of the order of two. The ratio is calculated over a period of 60 years, using relatively low discounting factors of 3.5% and 3%. This means it may not reflect the ratio of benefits to Government subsidy in the early years. 5. The BCR is calculated for the rail network as a whole, assuming that the fares on the high speed trains will be similar to those on existing franchised services and that the service levels on competing services can be altered to balance capacity without changing fares. These assumptions correspond broadly to those which would be adopted for the appraisal of a nationalised railway network in which the high speed line is an additional Government owned service which does not charge a premium for what is clearly a premium service. 6. In reality, our railway network has an entirely different financial structure. Following privatisation, we have a rail network with a two tier structure in which private companies operate services under franchise over rail infrastructure provided by a not for profit company with a very substantial Government subsidy. This structure was adopted specifically to promote competition, yet the HS2 analysis does not take it into account. The McNulty Report contains recommendations for modifying this regime, but there is no political appetite for radical restructuring, so it is reasonable to assume that high speed rail services will be introduced under an organisational structure broadly similar to the present regime. 7. There is at present no business model setting out how HS2 services would be franchised within the existing (and, presumably, the future) structure, no discussion of the degree to which competition between franchisees would be permitted and no analysis of the impact of allowing the HS2 franchisee freedom to set fares in a profit maximising manner.

The Absence of a Financial Model of the HS2 Project 8. Promoters of private sector projects almost invariably prepare financial cash flow models of their projects, taking account of year by year expenditure, revenue and financing costs in the case of private sector projects or financing constraints in the public sector. Both the revenue stream and the operating cost streams take account of changes in fares and operating costs due to competitive reaction within the market which is to be served. 9. This is also the approach which we introduced into British Railways some 30 years ago at the request of the Transport Department and Treasury, to ensure that we could estimate both the short term annual financial effects and the long term benefits of rail investment. To my continuing surprise, no such analysis has been carried out of either the impact of HS2 on the overall level of annual financial support required by the railway network as a whole or of the financial performance of the HS2 services themselves. This is despite the rapid financial collapse of the two most recent Asian HSR systems, those in South Korea and Taiwan. 10. In the case of HS2, two related cash flow analyses are needed. At the national network level, we need an analysis of the annual cash flows for the network as a whole, so that the level of subvention (subsidy) required from Government, particularly in the early years, can be forecast. This analysis needs to take account of the use which is made of the released capacity on conventional lines. If this is taken up by local services, which generally have higher operating subsidies than the long distance services currently operating on these lines, the support costs for the conventional rail services could rise. A benefit—cost ratio of two for a project dependent on long term growth over 30 to 60 years may hide an increased short term rail financial support requirement in the early years. 11. We also need a detailed financial analysis of the HS2 services in isolation to evaluate the business structure under which it is to be operated and their separate capital and operating subsidy requirements. Economic theory indicates that there are situations (such as market failure, externalities, social justice and economies of scale) where operating subsidies may be justified. None of these arguments appear to apply to long distance travel by rail. 12. Theory also indicates that public welfare is maximised when prices (fares and other secondary revenues in the case of rail) are equal to the marginal cost of providing a service. There may be an argument for subsidising the capital cost of providing rail infrastructure, but theory suggests that except in very special circumstances operations (including labour, fuel, rolling stock, and maintenance) should be covered by fares. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w478 Transport Committee: Evidence

13. This also simplifies management, since operations can be transferred to the private sector under a franchise arrangement and operated without subsidy. On average, “InterCity” services currently appear to be operating close to this important economic, financial and management boundary.

14. In the absence of a separate financial analysis of HS2 construction and operation, it is not at all clear whether HS2 could be operated on a profitable basis without subsidy in the early years even if the Government absorbed the capital cost of the new infrastructure. Given the high level of subsidy which is certain to be needed even to provide the infrastructure, a year by year cash flow analysis which takes account of competition and assesses the change in subsidy needed as fares are varied (taking account of both revenue and operating cost changes) is essential to assess whether the service can operate without an ongoing operational subsidy, particularly in the early years, and to assess the risks associated with any shortfall in demand and revenue.

Distributional Issues—who pays and who receives the benefits?

15. Since HS2 passengers receive the benefits of premium service without paying premium fares, there is also a distributional issue—who pays for the new transport infrastructure and (possibly) operating subsidies, and who obtains the benefits. For a new railway, there are three issues to be faced. The first is that the public funds come in a large part from taxes paid by those living in areas far from the line and who will rarely use it.

16. The second point applies in particular to high speed lines. The benefits are predominantly obtained by those living close to the few railway stations—few, since otherwise the benefits of high speed operation are lost by frequent stops. But those living between the stations may suffer dis-benefits from construction and noise.

17. The third issue is that of the income distribution of long distance high speed rail passengers. There is a great deal of evidence provided by the Governments own ongoing National Transport Survey that long distance travel and long distance rail travel journeys in particular are predominantly made by higher income groups. The highest income quintile makes three times as many long distance trips as the lowest, and they make a higher percentage of these trips by rail.

18. The combination of these three factors means that the benefits of high speed train services primarily accrue to a small sub-set of the population which has to pay for the infrastructure and possibly, an operating subsidy in the early years. These are predominantly higher income personal and business travellers with origins and destinations relatively close to the few railway stations.

What will be the source of capital funding?

19. Very large projects such as a high speed line raise a fourth distributional issue—that of the efficient and politically fair distribution of available Government funds. When funds are in short supply, a basket of small projects tends to show better value for money than a smaller number of large projects and also spread the benefits of Government spending more widely.

20. HS2 is at the other end of the scale. In recent years, total Government financial support for railways has been of the order of £5 billion pounds per year. An analysis of the Government’s responsibilities suggests that on the one hand, there would have been little likelihood of this budget being increased even without the current financial difficulties and that on the other hand, the very severe problems of rail access into London on almost all lines (not just the WCML and the a lesser extent MML which are relieved by the HS2 proposals) will require at least this level of financial support, even with fares rising in real terms year on year.

21. Against this background, the initial stage of HS2 is likely to require capital funding of the order of £17 billion in 2009 prices with a peak expenditure of over £3 billion per year. A system covering the north of England as well would need about three times this sum. It is not clear where this money can come from. “New” money is currently unavailable and there is no scope for the transfer of existing funding for rail.

Wider Benefits and shaping National land use patterns

22. Finally, I turn to the question of the “wider benefits” of high speed rail to the economy which many supporters have emphasised without explaining in any detail what they are and who are the recipients.

23. The better understood additional benefits, such as agglomeration benefits, may add another 10% to 15% to the standard welfare benefits which are based essentially on reductions in travel time. There are also benefits to those with businesses or owning land close to stations, but research suggests that much of the development would have occurred over a larger area and is merely concentrated. The net incremental benefits are low.

24. However, there can be benefits if the line is used effectively to help trigger new development. Professor Mackie has suggested a new town. Interestingly, this approach has been used in Germany. New stations are introduced in spaces between the existing cities. The extra stops reduce the “headline” time savings over long distances but may be more effective in shaping future land use. But it will require a major change in the approach to the use of high speed rail in Great Britain, away from seeking the highest speeds over the longest cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w479

distances to assessing the role high speed rail can play in shaping long term land use over shorter distances of the order of 50 miles or so. May 2011

Written evidence from Marilyn Fletcher (HSR 173) Will HSR bring economic benefits? Can Dr Terry Gourvish’s “The High-speed Rail Revolution: History and Prospects” shed light on this? Dr Gourvish was commissioned by HS2 Ltd to write an appraisal of the global experience of HSR. I am not an economist, but I do pay attention when one of the UK’s leading academic authorities on rail from the London School of Economics says:

1.1 Economic Growth “Do HSRs stimulate economic growth? It is often assumed that the improvements in accessibility which are created will enlarge markets and increase the competitiveness and productivity of firms within a newly- connected region. However, most studies indicate that it would be unwise to pin much faith in new railways as an engine of growth. This is not to say that a growth stimulus is entirely absent. In 1997 the European Commission estimated that the major TENs would add only 0.25% to EU GDP, and 0.11% to employment over 25 years. The literature review of Preston and Wall produced the conclusion that the growth impact of HSRs was likely to lie within the modest range of 1–3% of GDP.” It should be noted that the 1997 estimate was published when money was being poured into HSR and yet the predictions of benefit from HSR on growth and employment were low. Dr Gourvish had nothing more to say on the matter.

1.2 Regeneration The researcher was equally lukewarm about any regenerative effect from HSR. Whilst Lille is often quoted as benefitting economically from HSR there are many places where regenerative effects have been modest or disappointing.

2. Dr Gourvish’s Credentials 2.1. Business History of the UK and Europe, especially railways, are among his special interests. 2.2. In addition to numerous papers, he has written several authoritative works on the subject: — Britain's railway 1997–2005: Labour's strategic experiment (2008). — The official history of Britain and the Channel Tunnel (2006). — British Rail 1974–97: from integration to privatisation (2002). — Los ferrocarriles como medio de transporte en Gran Bretaña, 1830–1990. (1999). — The regulation of Britain's railways: past, present and future. In: Andersson-Skog, Lena and Krantz, Olle, (1999). 3. I think the Committee would agree that what a leading academic says on the subject is more likely to be nearer the truth than an economist with other interests to protect. As the Committee will know, for a university academic, giving a balanced critique is extremely important. 4. The Committee may be interested to learn that although “History and Prospects” was commissioned by the developer, HS2 Ltd did not include Dr Gourvish’s appraisal with its other commissioned work in the List of Supporting Documents (page 246) of its March 2010 Report to Government. Gourvish and his work are only referred to in text on page 23 when rolling stock speed is being discussed. His paper was required to support the “basic model” for HSR in the UK (page 27 March 2010 Report to Government). This includes factors such as maximum speed and usage which have become contentious subjects. 5. I can only surmise that whilst HS2 Ltd was happy to refer to Dr Gourvish’s work when it suited the developer, it did not want to draw attention to his less favourable findings. May 2011

References The High-speed Rail Revolution: History and Prospects pages 26–28 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/ hs2ltd/historyandprospects/pdf/report.pdf London School of Economics Dr Gourvish http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/Experts/[email protected] cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w480 Transport Committee: Evidence

HS2 Ltd March 2010 Report to Government http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/ hs2ltd/hs2report/

Further written evidence from Marilyn Fletcher (HSR 173 A) A Summary of the Impacts of the HS2 Phase 1 Route on the Colne Valley Regional Park 1. The Colne Valley Regional Park lies on the extremity of the northwest and west aspects of Greater London. Its importance to the capital is due to it being “the first real taste of countryside to the west of London.” http://www.colnevalleypark.org.uk/ 2. The most dramatic aspects of the park are its complex vast water attributes: (a) River Colne; (b) Grand Union Canal; and (c) man-made lakes. Natural England confirms that the river system is “one of the finest in London”. http://www.naturalengland.org.uk/regions/london/ourwork/wildlondon/naturalsignatures/default.aspx 3. The Colne Valley Regional Park encompasses one of the capital’s landscapes—Natural England’s “London Natural Signatures”. 4. The Colne River Valley Natural Signature is 20 kms long, but only less than 1 km wide at its widest point. HS2 would cross the valley on a 3.6 km (2 ¼ mile) viaduct. Given the width of the Natural Signature, a major transport scheme such as HS2 has a potentially extreme negative impact on the public’s enjoyment of the regional park. Clearly, the viaduct would dwarf this landscape. 5. HS2’s proposed route particularly severely impacts on the Colne valley because the route travels in a NW/SE orientation as it crosses the valley. HS2’s impact is not mitigated by its being juxtaposed to any other built structure. 6. Because of the shape and size of the Colne Valley Regional Park, the viaduct will have a considerable effect on the public’s enjoyment of the park: (a) Walking/cycling/boating along the Grand Union Canal are an important facility offered by the park. (b) The River Colne, lakes and the canal are rich in wetland wildlife and present a considerable public amenity. The park contains several Sites of Scientific Special Interest. (c) The lakes adjacent to the proposed HS2 route are used extensively for sailing and angling. 7. Clearly, if a spur were to be constructed to Heathrow that was orientated parallel to the River Colne in the regional park, it would have further serious consequences on the public’s enjoyment of this amenity. 13 September 2011

Written evidence from the Airport Operators Association (HSR 176) 1. The Airports Operators Association (AOA) is the trade association that represents the interests of UK airports. Our membership comprises some 70 airport companies, representing the nation’s international and major regional airports in addition to many serving community, business and general aviation. 2. This submission relates to the Transport Select Committee’s call for evidence into the strategic case for High Speed Rail (HSR), under section two: “How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives”. It specifically addresses question 3 in this section: “What are the implications for domestic aviation?”.

Summary of Key Points 3. The AOA supports investment in all types of public transport infrastructure, including aviation, rail and others. The benefits to business and individuals of better transport infrastructure are well documented. In addition to providing more infrastructure, HSR offers the opportunity to better integrate air and rail infrastructure. They are complementary; not alternative modes of travel. 4. The AOA supports the Government’s proposal for a new HSR network, linking key urban centres throughout the country. HSR should be seen as complementary to air travel. Passengers should have the choice of using air and rail, rather than air or rail. 5. The AOA would like to see plans for HSR and connectivity to airports brought forward to the extent that they are practical and affordable. However, the Government should bear in mind that in a tough business cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w481

climate, airports’ capital programmes and therefore their ability to fund surface access projects for airport connections, will be more limited. 6. HSR’s environmental benefits, compared with aviation, should not be overstated. By 2050, even with an extensive and fully integrated European HSR network, the Government’s independent advising body on climate change, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) has estimated that less than 2% of aviation’s emissions will be saved by passengers switching to HSR.389 7. HSR has potential to release some airport capacity, but this should not be overstated. In its second submission to the Mawhinney Review, BAA estimated that an initial “off airport” connection might enable a reallocation of up to 20,000 flights. This number should be kept in perspective: a large proportion of journeys between HSR cities (such as Manchester, Newcastle and London) already take place by rail; and there are no commercial flights at all between Birmingham and London. As an example, the flights that can be substituted through a connection to Heathrow, represent approximately just 2% of air traffic movements from UK airports. Moreover, the air transport network provides vital connectivity between a vast network of urban centres in the UK. The HSR network planned cannot provide a substitute for this, due to its limited nature. This is shown illustratively in Annex 2 to this submission. 8. AOA takes no position on the particular route that should be selected for HSR, or exactly where and when connections to airports should be made. However, as a trade association taking a national perspective, we favour maximum connectivity and integration across the network, with airports as directly linked to the HSR network as possible. It is important that the Government considers the future development of the network in the plans it is now making, in order that increasing numbers of airports can be connected to the HSR infrastructure over time.

AOA Supports Investment in all Types of Public Transport Infrastructure 9. The AOA supports investment in all types of public transport infrastructure, including aviation, rail and other forms of transport. The benefits to business and individuals of better transport infrastructure are well documented. In addition to providing more infrastructure, HSR offers the opportunity to better integrate air and rail infrastructure. 10. The 2006 Eddington Transport Study390 looked at the relationship between transport investment and economic growth in detail. Eddington reviewed the best available research on transport and economic growth and concluded that investment in transport infrastructure had a complex relationship with growth. It affected it in a number of ways, such as increasing business efficiency, encouraging investment and innovation, making labour markets more flexible, and increasing competition and trade. 11. Eddington further noted that while standard cost benefit analyses can estimate overall gains in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by investing in transport, there are also a number of “micro drivers”, such as those set out above, which are also important. Eddington recommended that the benefits of these factors should also be considered when appraising new transport schemes.

The AOA Supports HSR 12. The AOA supports the Government’s proposal for new HSR lines providing connectivity for surface and air travel to and from key urban centres in the UK. 13. While the project is long term, AOA believes that it will produce connectivity benefits, including additional benefits not captured by the current appraisal, through better integration of the overall UK transport network and greater mobility of labour, goods and services.

The Government should Progress HSR, Provided it is Practical and Affordable 14. AOA would like to see plans for HSR and connectivity to airports brought forward to the extent that they are practical and affordable. 15. Regarding airport connections, the Government should bear in mind that in a tough business climate, airports’ capital programmes and therefore their ability to fund surface access projects, including HSR, will be more limited. 16. Any HSR proposal should be self-supporting from a funding perspective. Some interest groups, such as Greengauge 21, have argued that an HSR network should be part-funded by a hypothecated charge on aviation users.391 The aviation industry already more than pays its way, and air passengers should not be treated as a source of funding for rail. Excluding Air Passenger Duty, aviation’s tax to Gross Value Added (GVA) ratio was 32.5% in 2007–08, slightly higher than the economy average 32.1%.392 389 Committee on Climate Change, Aviation Report, 2009. See: http://www.theccc.org.uk/reports/aviation-report pp66–82. 390 Eddington Transport Study, 2006, HMSO. 391 http://www.greengauge21.net/assets/FastForward_Greengauge21.pdf, p.55. 392 “What is the contribution of aviation to the UK economy?”, OXERA report for the Airport Operators Association, Nov 2009. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w482 Transport Committee: Evidence

17. HSR investment should be additional to, not at the expense of, other much-needed-investment in rail (for example, the required measures to address congestion at the “Northern Hub”, which affects the whole northern region). There is little point in providing passengers with the option to travel up and down the country in two hours, for them to find that an East-West connection to travel a short distance to complete their journey takes a similar length of time.

HSR’S Environmental Benefits, Compared with Aviation, should Not be Overstated 18. The environmental benefits of HSR, compared with aviation, should not be overstated—simply HSR will not tackle emissions from aviation. In 2009, the Committee on Climate Change considered the potential for air-rail substitution.393 Even in its most favourable scenario (with full power sector de-carbonisation and the UK’s high speed line fully integrated into an upgraded European network), only about 2% of aviation’s emissions can be saved by passengers switching to HSR. AOA has summarised the CCC’s findings in Annex 1 at the end of this document. 19. A 2007 report by Booz Allen Hamilton, commissioned for the DfT, supports the AOA’s view that HSR’s environmental benefits should not be overstated. The report found that: “The London to Manchester base scenario results indicate that none of the rail options under consideration achieve emissions parity (ie the emissions saved from aviation exactly compensate for the increased emissions from rail ie achieve a net carbon saving), even at 100% rail share. In other words, if a new line is constructed and operated on this route, regardless of the rail technology employed, the amount of emissions generated would not reduce to the level emitted in the do nothing scenario.”394

HSR’S Potential to Release Airport Capacity should Not be Overstated 20. BAA looked at the potential for capacity release in detail in its submissions to the Mawhinney Review of HSR.395 In its second submission, BAA estimated that an initial “off airport” connection might save some 20,000 flights. While this number is significant, it must be kept in perspective. Taking a national perspective, a large proportion of journeys from the cities that HSR can compete with (such as Manchester, Newcastle and London) already take place by rail; and there are absolutely no commercial flights between Birmingham and London. 21. The flights that can be substituted through a connection to Heathrow represent approximately 2% of air traffic movements from UK airports. 22. Regarding competition, it is unlikely HSR tickets will be significantly cheaper than air tickets unless they are subsidised. To do so would raise questions about whether and to what extent taxpayers should subsidise inter-city journeys on HSR. Walk on fares for long distance rail journeys remain high compared with domestic air travel and therefore the likelihood of passengers switching as a result of price alone will be limited. 23. Successful integration between air and HSR also depends on creating the right passenger experience. Achieving efficient and seamless connections between the UK’s key cities and international gateways depends upon a number of critical factors including interchange location, ease of interchange, service frequency, through-ticketing, baggage management and wider connectivity. While HSR has the potential to release pressure at congested airports, the impression it is a panacea for otherwise overstretched UK aviation infrastructure is mistaken. 24. Moreover, HSR should not be seen as a replacement for short haul and domestic air journeys. Unlike airports which can, broadly speaking, be connected to any other airport on earth by the establishment of an air route, rail depends on geographically fixed infrastructure—a track—which cannot simply link any two points in the UK, particularly where there is a major sea crossing involved. For example, every year some half a million passengers fly between Gatwick and Belfast’s two airports; and around three quarters of a million make the journey between Belfast and Heathrow. 25. Air travel and connectivity is no less vital between smaller urban areas. For example, every year more than 15,000 people fly between Aberdeen and Exeter, a route which is very unlikely to see substitution to HSR as a real option. The UK’s airports provide a vast network of connectivity between urban centres in the UK. They allow passengers to travel in all directions between a huge range of locations in the country. By contrast the HSR network with its necessarily limited reach, cannot provide a substantive alternative to this complex network. The connectivity of the UK’s domestic air links is compared with that which HSR has the potential to provide in Annex 2 to this submission. 26. Whilst there are currently a number of options for the route of the new HSR network, it is clear that there is a compromise between the straightest (and thus fastest) route, and a route which includes the UK’s 393 Committee on Climate Change, Aviation Report, 2009. See: http://www.theccc.org.uk/reports/aviation-report pp 66–82. 394 http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/researchtech/research/newline/carbonimpact.pdf; the environmental case for a London—Scotland HSR route is stronger, however, due to the expected amount of modal change. The assumptions underlying the Booz Allen Hamilton work are open to question. They are conservative in their assessment of the likely scale of improvement in aviation’s environmental performance to 2050, but equally they are conservative in their view on the likely sources of electricity to run an HSR network. 395 http://www.scribd.com/doc/39878496/High-Speed-Rail-Access-to-Heathrow-BAA-Submission-to-the-Lord-Mawhinney-Review cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w483

major cities, but in so doing adds distance and reduces the maximum speed a train could travel at. The need to reach a workable compromise limits the ability of HSR to provide the same level of connectivity as is provided by air. 27. Rail networks inherently lack resilience, due to their dependence on fixed infrastructure with limited scope for alternative routing. A fire in the Channel Tunnel in 2008 closed the tunnel for two days; and a full service was only restored in early 2009, after repairs were completed. At the time, service levels were reduced to 90% of Eurostar services, 60% of Eurotunnel passenger vehicle shuttles and 70% of the HGV shuttles.396 Reduced services and a lack of alternatives present problems to businesses dependent on transport links, and reinforce the importance of alternatives such as aviation. Conversely, an airport’s resilience is only constrained by political and regulatory policy, and Government intervention, in terms of its allowed runway and facilities capacity.

THE AOA takes No Position on the Particular Route that should be Selected for HSR 28. The AOA takes no position on the particular route that should be selected for HSR, or exactly where and when connections to airports should be made. However, as a trade association taking a national perspective, we favour maximum connectivity and integration across the network, with connections to airports as close and direct as possible. 29. It is important that the Government considers the future development of the network in the plans it is now making in order that increasing numbers of airports can be connected to the HSR infrastructure over time. May 2011

Annex 1 SUMMARY OF THE COMMITEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE’S FINDINGS ON THE SCOPE FOR AIR- RAIL SUBSTITUTION REPORTED IN ITS 2009 AVIATION EMISSIONS REPORT 30. In 2009, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC—the Government’s Independent Adviser on climate change and the budgets associated with the Climate Change Bill) produced a report on aviation emissions. Its purpose was to consider options for meeting the target of reducing UK aviation emissions to real-2005-levels by 2050, set by the previous administration. As part of its analysis it considered the scope for air-rail substitution with and without a second high speed line in the UK. The report is available on the CCCs website.397. AOA’s summary of its key findings is below. The CCC assumed that: —Onjourneys less than 400 km conventional rail is faster than air for point-to-point journeys (London to Manchester is 296 km by rail, London to Brussels 373 km). —Onjourneys less than 800 km HSR may lead to switching to rail (London to Edinburgh is 632 km by rail, London to Amsterdam 605 km). — Above 800 km air is faster. A competing rail option would need to have other advantages (eg significantly lower prices) to be competitive. For example, cities such as Berlin (1,204 km from London by rail), Milan (1,406 km) and Madrid (1,942 km) are beyond the 800 km range. 31. The CCC used these assumptions to analyse the scope to cut emissions through switching from air to rail. In 2005, domestic and short-haul aviation up to 1,000 km was some 13% of total UK aviation emissions (ie, up to 5 MtCO2). 32. However, as regards the scope to cut this by switching to rail, the CCC noted that: — Not all flights are substitutable by rail (eg across the Irish Sea). — Not all destinations will be connected by high-speed rail. — Even for connected destinations, these will not achieve 100% market share—particularly for longer routes and where there is only partial integration of the European high-speed network. — There are emissions associated with rail/ high-speed rail (ie in building new infrastructure, and in running trains to the extent that the electricity grid is not fully decarbonised). The CCC Commissioned modelling work which considered all these effects, alongside different combinations of oil and carbon prices.

Switching Domestic Flights to Rail 33. In relation to switching and high speed rail, the CCC concluded that, with a high speed line in place in the early 2020’s, rail market share could rise to 40% between Manchester and Heathrow. This figure could potentially be increased further with integrated air and rail services (including ticketing and baggage transfer. 396 Today’s Railways UK. February 2009. 397 Committee on Climate Change, Aviation Report, 2009. See: http://www.theccc.org.uk/reports/aviation-report pp 66–82. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w484 Transport Committee: Evidence

34. By 2050 with a new high-speed line, rail market share is projected to increase from current levels of 20–35% to 75–90% on Anglo-Scottish routes and small increases on other key routes eg from 88% to 97% on London to Manchester.

Travelling to Europe by HSR instead of Air 35. The CCC believed that future rail market share on routes from London to mainland Europe would be largely dependent on integration of the European network. A number of European countries have, or plan to have, high speed rail networks. The analysis commissioned by the CCC concluded that with integration, high- speed rail could gain a market share of 30Ð60% on routes such as London to Amsterdam, Dusseldorf and Frankfurt, and see some increase possible on routes already well served by high-speed rail (eg London to Paris and Brussels). But, there is limited scope for significantly increased market share on longer distance routes, such as London to Berlin, Milan, or Madrid.

36. In total, the analysis suggested that switching to HSR has scope to reduce emissions by 0.4 MtCO2 to 2.2 MtCO2 in 2050. The larger savings would only be made if the UK power sector is completely de-carbonised. 37. Assuming a new HSR line in the UK, and a fully integrated European high-speed rail network, there was potential for an 8% demand reduction (about 45 million passengers) and a 1.7 MtCO2 emissions reduction by 2050. While this emissions savings should be welcomed, it should be noted that by 2050 aviation emissions are projected to be about 81 MtCO2. This means that by 2050, with a fully integrated European HSR network alongside, the scope for UK HSR to reduce aviation emissions, as a result of switching, is still limited to about 2% of UK aviation’s total emissions. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w485

Annex 2 ILLUSTRATIVE COMPARISON OF CONNECTIVITY PROVIDED BY THE DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT NETWORK AND A SECOND HIGH SPEED RAIL LINE

Inverness Aberdeen

Glasgow Edinburgh

Newcastle Belfast

Leeds

Manchester

Liverpool Norwich Derby Birmingham

Bristol London Cardiff

Exeter Newquay cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w486 Transport Committee: Evidence

Written evidence from Friends of the Earth (HSR 177) Friends of the Earth (FOE) is pleased to respond to this inquiry. We are a supporter of the environmental NGOs’ “Right Lines Charter”,398 with its four identified principles. In this submission—because the Transport Committee is reviewing the strategic case for HSR—we are placing particular emphasis on its first principle: “High Speed Rail proposals need to be set in the context of a long-term transport strategy stating clear objectives”. In FOE’s case the fundamental purpose of that strategy must be to ensure that transport policy and investment makes its necessary contribution to the overall national challenge of Greenhouse Gas emissions reduction. FOE has a strong network of autonomous local groups—some of whom will have made their own submissions to this inquiry.

TC1: What are the main arguments either for or against HSR FOE believes there is a clear need for an agreed strategic assessment framework which identifies the primary issues against which the HS2 proposal should be evaluated. We believe that the proposal must be tested against the following questions, and that it is the responsibility of government to provide clear answers before a decision in support (or not) of HS2 is made.

FOE Q1: What is the contribution of HS2 to long-run UK transport policy? Set against the DfT policy backdrop of the last 30 years—with its pattern of repeated failures: abandonment of the ; bus deregulation; “Roads to Prosperity”; rail privatisation; aviation expansion; and finally the “lost decade” of the —the proposed commitment to expansion of the rail network represents a refreshing change of strategic direction. If this represents a fundamental shift in favour of “strategic Rail” as against “strategic Road” (and also “strategic aviation”) then FOE strongly supports this, but it must be embedded within both a long-term national transport policy which gives certainty to this new direction, and a comprehensive expenditure programmes through to 2030, organised around carbon reduction and also contributing to overall sustainability.

FOE Q2: What priority should be accorded to high-speed rail compared to other potentially competing priorities within a national transport policy and associated investment programmes over the next two decades; and then within overall UK expenditure, in the context of the need to fund the hugely challenging task of carbon reduction in a cost benefit sequence? HS2 will cost around £17 billion (£32 billion for Y-network), it is understood that funding will commence at £2 billion per year after Crossrail is completed in 2015. It is vital that expenditure on HS2 does not compromise spending on other important transport priorities—particularly those which will deliver the urgent carbon reductions needed from transport well before HS2 opens. In Western Europe/OECD economies, capital investment in inland transport averages around 0.8% GDP per annum,399 for the UK this would imply a figure of around £11.5 billion,400 in fact the current, actual UK figure is around £7.7 billion401—the UK does not invest as much in transport as other countries. A (non exhaustive) list of urgent transport policy and investment priorities will include, in our view, investment like: — Rapid transit networks in our major cities (ultra light trams in 12 cities—£2 billion).402 — National Programme of Smarter Travel Choices (£200 million per year over 10 years). — Electrification and capacity upgrades on existing rail network. — Cycling England plan to triple cycle use in five years (£0.5 billion). — Charging infrastructure for electric vehicles. If HS2 goes ahead the Government must show how it will continue to fund these (and other) urgent transport priorities which will contribute significantly to carbon reduction in the short term. It should be noted that 57% of car journeys are less than five miles and 64% of carbon emissions from cars comes from journeys of under 25miles (90% from under 100miles).403 Funding for policies and infrastructure investment that reduces carbon from these shorter journeys which are responsible for the bulk of transport emissions must not be sacrificed in order to fund HS2. 398 http://www.cpre.org.uk/what-we-do/transport/rail/update/item/1683-a-charter-for-high-speed-rail 399 Transport investment and economic development—David Bannister and Joseph Berechman 2000 page 4. 400 UK GDP 2010 $2.29trillion = £1.44trillion ($1.60 exchange rate). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_United_Kingdom 401 Page 11 HMT CSR document DfT Capital allocation. http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_completereport.pdf 402 All costed schemes from: “A Low carbon Transport Policy for the UK, 2008” http://www.bettertransport.org.uk/system/files/A_low_carbon_transport_policy_for_the+UK.pdf 403 DfT—Low Carbon Transport (2009) http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/sustainable/carbonreduction/ cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w487

So, the relative priority of HS2 must be considered within the wider context of a national transport policy through to 2030, with its associated expenditure programmes, which is what the Government must provide. It is not possible to assess the priority of HS2 expenditure in isolation.

FOE Q3: Is there a demonstrated need for HS2? The government case is that HS2 is the best response to a “long term capacity challenge” p34. It predicts that there will be a progressively increasing shortfall in both WCML and ECML capacity in the 2020s and then beyond (1.46Ð52). However other commentators have pointed to evidence that travel demand may have peaked and that it is not linked to any growth in GDP.404 In this uncertain context, FOE believes any new rail line should primarily be designed to achieve modal shift from less sustainable modes and set within a policy context designed to achieve this. Public policy should also seek to reduce the need to travel—for example, in the context of long distance travel this implies support for technology to replace business travel like video conferencing. There is also the question of whether any new capacity be provided via a new high-speed network or alternatively by upgrading the existing infrastructure?—see also our response to question TC3/2.

FOE Q4: Since FOE is an organisation whose aim is to promote sustainable development, what is HS2’s contribution to overall sustainability (all three pillars: economic, social and environmental)? As an organisation campaigning for sustainable development (SD), our preferred approach is to identify both benefits and disbenefits in relation to all three “pillars” (economic, social and environmental) and then integrate them to an optimum outcome. In the specific case of HS2 this will involve a complex assessment of, for example, a (re)distribution of economic benefits along the length of the route and spreading outwards from it, and the balancing of different kinds of impact (eg negative environmental impact in the Chilterns versus possible positive economic impact in more northern regions). We urge the Committee to test whether all three component parts of SD have been adequately modelled and accessed.

FOE Q5: What will be HS2’s contribution to climate change emissions reduction, firstly in the priority decade to 2020, then in the period to 2030, and finally through to a 2050 end date? See our responses to Committee question TC2 and TC6/1 on this critical issue.

FOE Q6: Are there particular arguments for or against the current specific proposal and route? In our view a decision to proceed with HS2 must be contingent on the Government providing the correct policy context and overall funding strategy for transport. With these two conditions met, HS2 is one option for providing additional rail capacity. However, we have serious concerns about the development and transport integration implications of the current proposal for a Birmingham interchange station—see TC4.

Conclusions FOE recognises that the HS2 proposal is a hugely important decision point in long-run UK transport policy. We welcome the national debate—but we believe it is now for the Government to answer the questions we have identified. — If the Government is able to demonstrate that HS2 can be a positive component within a wider national transport strategy, focused around carbon reduction, contributing to overall sustainability, and affordable alongside other more urgent investments in necessary national infrastructure, then FOE would be able to support its continuation into more detailed development, including addressing environmental impacts along the route. — But if the government is not able to answer these questions, or if its assessment throws up fundamental incompatibilities, then FOE will continue to question the proposal. The Transport Committee report itself will in due course be an important contribution to that national debate and strategic assessment, and we will await its findings.

TC2: How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives One of the Secretary of State’s two stated priorities on accepting his appointment in May 2010 was to cut carbon emissions from transport. It is critical that HS2 is set within an overall transport carbon reduction strategy that will deliver the GHG savings to enable our carbon budgets to be met. In the long term this means HS2 needs to be an agent of modal shift from more carbon intensive modes—air and road. To achieve this, the right companion policies must be in place so that rail is price competitive and is well integrated with other public transport. The grid must be de-carbonised by 2030 and there must be a strategy to make released “classic network” rail capacity achieve further modal shift for freight and passengers. 404 Various studies including UCL reported in FT: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/de6c9b48–6ddc-11df-b5c9–00144feabdc0.html#axzz1MgyM3Mfl and IEA reported in “Wired” http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011–01/05/traffic-peak cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w488 Transport Committee: Evidence

Before opening in 2026 at least HS2 it cannot play a part in carbon reduction for the first three carbon budgets, and only a minor role if any in the 4th (2023–27). For the next 15 years or more, carbon reduction from transport will need to come entirely from other policies. It is also likely that emissions reduction ambition will have to be increased for two reasons: (1) the Committee on Climate Change has recommended tightening the first three carbon budgets—increasing the 2020 target from 34% cut (from 1990 levels) to 42%405 and (2) bio-fuels emissions reductions assumptions are unsound—the TSC will be familiar with recent evidence406 on indirect land-use change which undermines the carbon reductions assumed for bio-fuels. So, the Government needs to urgently revise its transport carbon reduction strategy and expenditure prioritisation framework to ensure any commitment to fund HS2 does not mean a reduction in funding for more urgent carbon reduction initiatives. In the short term these will need to focus on travel behaviour change.

1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? As we noted under FOE Q2 above there are other transport investment priorities to be reviewed alongside HS2, and which must not be jeopardised by its development. However because HS2 expenditure will be undertaken over decades it may be possible to accommodate all these priorities and spending programmes if the government is able to demonstrate how and that they intend to do so; so far they have not done this. Expenditure on new rail capacity should be accorded a much higher priority than that on the strategic road network; a decision to investment in the former offers the opportunity to signal a decisive positive shift in national transport policy.

2. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? The identifiable problems are that the consultation document identifies that the WCML will be “full up” (in 2024) some EIGHT years before the second stage extension to Manchester is opened in 2032. No equivalent assessment is provided for the ECML, which has not had a recent comprehensive refurbishment. In addition there are major issues on the “classic” network requiring attention—electrification and “pinch points”. Therefore the government has to identify, alongside the specific HS2 proposals, how it also intends to dovetail these with continuing classic network expenditure where this is necessary.

3. What are the implications for domestic aviation? Some modal shift away from domestic aviation has been demonstrated in Europe as a result of high-speed rail. However in the context of the UK’s overall carbon emissions it is important that any surplus airport capacity which HS2 provides is not simply filled with more long haul flights with their attendant higher emissions. FOE suggests that a policy of “retiring” any freed up airport capacity should be deployed. This would have the additional benefit of making our busiest airports more resilient to major disruption, from (for example) bad weather.

TC3: Business case 1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? The business case makes questionable assumptions that the cost of flying continues to fall, petrol prices remain broadly stable (£1.25 at 2009 prices in 2030)407 and road user charging is not introduced. It is difficult to envisage that oil prices will not increase significantly in the next 20 years and that some sort of alternative Government income stream from electric cars to replace fuel duty will not have been introduced. Using more realistic assumptions could significantly boost the business and environmental case for HS2, the Government must model a far wider range of sensitivity tests.

2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? Since in our view the primary purpose of any new line should be to achieve modal shift, alternatives including, perhaps, a new dedicated freight line, should be examined through this policy “lens”. Upgrades of 405 DECC announcement 17/5/11: “Government will continue to argue that EU moves to a 30% 2020 target” this implies 42% reduction from UK http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/cb_oms/cb_oms.aspx 406 “Driving to Destruction” http://www.transportenvironment.org/Publications/prep_hand_out/lid/612 407 DECC Oil retail price assumptions, used by DfT: http://decc.gov.uk/publications/basket.aspx?filetype=4&filepath=Statistics%2FProjections%2F69-annex-f—fossil-fuel-and-retail- price-assumptions.xlsx&minwidth=true cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w489

existing lines have the disadvantage of the considerable disruption they would cause, however their local environmental impacts are likely to be significantly less.

3. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? We don’t believe that managing demand for rail travel, whether generally or specifically on the HS2 corridors, should be achieved by pricing people off the railway, which is the likely impact of current fares policy.408 UK rail fares are already amongst the most expensive in Europe.409

4. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? Friends of the Earth: There is evidence that rail projects in Europe are considerably less expensive than in the UK.410 The completed McNulty review is likely to bear down on infrastructure costs. We hope the Government will act on its recommendations.

TC4: The strategic route 1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? It is important that the line serves city centre stations rather than “parkway” style stations to minimise urban sprawl and maximise integration with other public transport. Birmingham Curzon Street must not be axed in any future cost cutting exercise. Through trains to destinations off the high speed line (ie Nottingham and Derby) should be favoured over creation of a “catch all” East Midlands parkway station. We also have serious concerns about the proposed “Birmingham Interchange” station, a separate station to the current “Birmingham International” on the West Coast main line. This will create urban sprawl and is a wasted opportunity to create a direct interchange with other public transport at Birmingham International.

2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? If HS2 goes ahead we believe the Y network represents the right choice.

3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? Yes, because this allows the expenditure to be spread over two decades, thereby making it more affordable in a context where a decision has to be taken in 2011–12 at a time of investment austerity. However it is equally essential that a legal commitment is made at the same time to the second stage extension of the Y network beyond Birmingham, in order to provide certainty for long-term planning purposes in the northern regions.

4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase2. Are those the right decisions? We believe that there should be a link to HS1 in order to secure the integrated network benefits through to the European HS system. However we don’t believe that a link to Heathrow should be a priority.

TC5: Economic rebalancing and equity 1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? The consultation document identifies a net positive BCR of 2.6 but also admits that HS2 “would deliver significant nonmonetised benefits, such as its contribution to job creation and regeneration and its potential to promote sustainable and balanced economic growth. It is these non-monetised benefits which underpin the strategic case for high speed rail”—however research for the DfT also highlights that agglomeration benefits will mainly come from making best use of freed up capacity to provide new regional services and dense mixed use development near stations.411 408 Hansard Answer: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101110/text/101110w0001.htm#10111060000015 409 Passenger Focus: http://www.passengerfocus.org.uk/news-and-publications/press-release.asp?dsid=4831 410 McNulty interim findings: Network Rail renwal expenditure is 30–50% less efficient than comparable European railways: http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/strategyfinance/valueformoney/interim/pdf/interimreport.pdf 411 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/appraisalmaterial/pdf/ widereconomicreport.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w490 Transport Committee: Evidence

There are also other, as yet unresolved questions around regional benefit. Connecting important regional centres like Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds to London via HS2 could have a positive or negative effect on those economies; in other words in which direction will benefits travel along this “two-way road” (SACTRA)? Then will there be possible economic impacts on regional centres some distance from the HS2 route eg Bradford rather than Leeds, Liverpool rather than Manchester. Studies suggest these can be mitigated by introducing new local and regional services using freed up capacity.412 It is therefore vital that this is factored into the Government’s plans.

2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? The emphasis should be on larger scale regional regeneration and we believe this along with environmental safeguards should influence the shape of the network.

3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? An argument has been put forward that wealthier people will be the disproportionate beneficiaries of HS2: “Spending £16 billion to encourage rich people to travel a lot to London is not a priority” (John Whitelegg).413 It is important that any High Speed line contributes to modal shift across socio economic groups. To achieve this the relative pricing of modes must favour rail, all policy levers including road fuel taxation, aviation taxation and Road User Charging will need to be considered.

4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? We have no comment to make on this.

TC6: Impact 1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? The government’s wider position on the contribution that rail (including HS2, and electrification) could make to the national Carbon Budget and emissions reduction trajectory is set out in paragraphs 5.11–17 of the DECC Carbon Plan (March 2011). The CCC says that HS2 will be broadly carbon neutral: “We estimate that the effects of the high-speed rail proposals on surface transport emissions (ie the combined effect of the increase in emissions from electricity generation and any reduction in car emissions through modal shift) would be negligible.”414 This position is then set in context: over 90% of those total transport emissions are currently generated by road transport—which is therefore where the main policy emphasis has to lie 1.67; and then in a wider sustainability context, folding in economic and social benefits as well: “HS2 could provide a relatively low carbon form of transport, offering the opportunity to deliver a major improvement in capacity and journey time between our major cities to support economic growth, without an increase in carbon emissions.” 5.63 But the most important context of all is that which requires the almost complete decarbonising of UK electricity generation by around the same date that the extended HS2 network would come into operation (approx 2030). Consequently achieving this objective has to be a fundamental precondition for then proceeding with electrified high-speed rail, as well as for electric road vehicles.

2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? No comment.

3. What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? HS2 if built, should free up capacity on the congested West Coast Main Line, the primary North-South UK rail freight route. Rail freight is and is likely to remain a significantly lower carbon way of carrying goods compared to road or air.415 So significant carbon reductions ought to be possible through modal shift to new rail 412 High Speed Rail—lessons for policy makers: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2010/201003.pdf 413 http://virtual-lancaster.blogspot.com/2011/03/16-billion-should-not-be-spent-on-high.html 414 Page 185 CCC 4th Budget report: http://downloads.theccc.org.uk.s3.amazonaws.com/4th%20Budget/CCC-4th-Budget-Book_with-hypers.pdf 415 Railfreight emissions per kg/km carried = 35% of road or 3% of air: http://www.cefic.org/Documents/IndustrySupport/Transport-and-Logistics/Best%20Practice%20Guidelines%20- %20General%20Guidelines/Cefic-ECTA%20Guidelines%20for%20measuring%20and%20managing%20CO2%20emissions %20from%20transport%20operations%20Final%2030.03.2011.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w491

freight services on the “classic network” particularly intermodal services,416 providing the policy framework is in place. The Government must develop a strategy to achieve this which will need to include expansion of freight terminals.

4. How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? No comment. June 2011

Written evidence from the Chiltern Countryside Group (HSR 178) The Chiltern Countryside Group (CCG) was established at the time of the National Air Traffic Service’s Terminal Control North Public Consultation 2008 as a natural evolution of local groups with the same aim of preserving the character and peace of the Chilterns and its Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). Following this consultation, the whole SE airspace area is now being reviewed. Our submission is not confined to the locality of the Chilterns. The CCG and its supporters are not against the principle of high speed rail. Whilst the Chilterns and its AONB would be heavily impacted by the current HS2 proposals, we recognise that the concept of a HSR provision for the UK is of great national importance, therefore our evidence is focused on the question: “Are the present proposals truly in the nation’s best interests?” Our considered view is that the current proposals from the Department of Transport (DfT) are not in the nation’s best interests. We give below our supporting evidence which we hope the Transport Select Committee will accept and fully consider when reaching their decisions.

Summary of Key Points 1. The Chiltern Countryside Group is not against the concept of High Speed Rail but is not persuaded that the HS2 proposals currently out for Public Consultation are in the nation’s best interests. 2. The principal arguments for HSR of improved capacity and connectivity, reduction in journey time and reliability are not unique to HSR and can also be true for improvements to existing rail routes and development of local infrastructures. 3. There is scant evidence to prove a causal link between HS2 HSR and regeneration to those areas most in need, evidence is inconclusive. 4. Principal arguments against HS2 HSR are economic—should the UK taxpayer fund a project of uncertain benefits when essential services are being cut? Such a long-term commitment is extremely high risk; the passenger demand forecasts are highly questionable. Costs do not take rising inflation into account. 5. In the present and foreseeable future, the world and domestic situation is politically and economically unstable. Committing the vast sums of taxpayers’ money required to finance HS2 HSR will inevitably take away from investment in the “classic” network. 6. HS2 HSR will not reduce carbon emissions. At best it will be carbon neutral but even this depends on a high load factor. 7. If HS2 HSR went ahead, the preferred route would set a precedent since 2000 (CROW Act) for the approval of infrastructure of this scale through an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. 8. Those areas which HS2 HSR passes through without any stations will suffer degeneration environmentally and thus, inevitably financially. 9. Investment in transport will not achieve optimal benefits without simultaneous investment in business opportunities. Moving people from place to place does not itself generate economic expansion or regeneration. It may well simply transfer money. 10. Modal shift, upon which the environmental and financial success of HS2 HSR depends, is not reliable and can be easily transformed by other factors eg improved technology, unanticipated national or world issue, unexpected competition. People will still use domestic and Continental aviation where flights are cheaper and offer a total journey time of less than three to four hours. Cost is a key motivator. Where groups of people travel together by car, the cost per head and convenience is unlikely to produce a modal shift to air or train. 11. The Government is investing £530 million in the UK’s broadband network—more people will need to travel less. 12. Omissions have been found in relevant legislation, policy and objectives in HS2 Ltd’s Appraisal of 416 “Capturing the Benefits”, Greengauge: http://www.greengauge21.net/wp-content/uploads/Capturing-the-benefits-update.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w492 Transport Committee: Evidence

Sustainability (AoS). This has led to concerns that the DfT, HS2 Ltd and its consultants have failed to give sufficient weight to conserving designated land in route design. This may give rise to unplanned cost implications which impact on the business case. 13. When designing a route, it is important to avoid, or minimise the length of route, in AONBs and National Parks. When such a route is demonstrated to be in the national interest, a tunnelled option throughout the length of the designated land should be included for public consultation. Tunnelling produces much less spoil than deep cutting per km, as well as producing a far superior environmental landscape solution. HS2 Ltd’s severe underestimation of spoil generated in the Chilterns will add to construction costs. 14. Without full and exhaustive information on noise and its effects no sensible analysis of the environmental costs and benefits can take place. A full Environmental Impact Analysis can be the only basis for such a decision and this is not available. This is a grave error. 15. The HS2 HSR programme is seriously flawed in its judgement of demand, its claim on the UK taxpayers’ purse during the present planning stage and years of construction and in its environmental impact. This is a long-term project which may never achieve the benefits it seeks to portray but will cost each UK constituency c £51 million and every UK taxpaying family c £1,200. During its first stage construction of at least seven years, it will bring physical, economic, environmental and social degeneration to those communities through which it passes, from which they may never recover. 16. HS2 HSR should be withdrawn and more robust planning using correct modelling undertaken including for those alternatives which could offer greater benefit with more affordable costs and the local connectivity sought by many areas. A regional approach, which is not London centred, could offer better opportunity for a truly national regeneration of greater fairness and access. 17. The CCG find that the DfT in its response has not adequately addressed the recommendations made by the Transport Select Committee following the 2010 Inquiry into Transport and the Economy. (ref 1) 18. The CCG finds the Government and the Treasury have still to establish an overall integrated & sustainable transport policy which is affordable & makes best use of the nation’s budget.

Q1: What are the main arguments for or against HSR? The principal arguments to support High Speed Rail are: — Increased capacity. — Improved connectivity. — Reduction in journey times. — Reliability. However, these outcomes are not unique to the HSR programme but are also true for improvements to existing rail routes and development of local infrastructures. These additional benefits are promoted by Government, but it is highly questionable they will be achieved; Government has given little concrete evidence to support their claims that HS2 HSR will be “the engine for”: — Regeneration of deprived and impoverished areas. — Bridging the “North-South economic divide” in the UK. In the 2010 report by Dr Terry Gourvish, commissioned by HS2 Ltd to research the global experience of high speed railways, Dr Gourvish states: “most studies indicate that it would be unwise to pin much faith in new railways as engines of growth”. The EU Commission estimated that HS rail networks “would only add 0.25% to EU GDP and 0.11% to employment over 25 years.” (ref 2) Other leading experts in economics have expressed their doubts. Some of the arguments against the current HSR programme are: (i) Basic cost of planning and building HS2 HSR—commitment to spending a minimum of £33 billion (2009 value) of taxpayers’ money over several decades is required to fulfil the programme’s stated objectives. (ii) British construction costs are higher than others in Europe. HS2 Ltd’s commissioned study (ref 3) shows “civil engineering costs in the UK are up to twice what they are in other comparable European countries”. This not only increases the funding required but places greater risk of non- profitability and bankruptcy. (iii) Insufficient weight has been placed on environmental cost regionally and nationally. (iv) The UK does not need to “catch up” with Europe, as it has had a high speed rail system for years, with routes already capable of trains running at 125 mph (official definition of high speed rail). Virgin Trains Euston-Birmingham fastest train 1 hour 11 minutes. (ref 4) (v) The UK does not have long distances between major centres of population compared to other nations to justify the cost and environmental impact of the ultimate speed of 250 mph for the proposed HS2 route (64 mph faster than top speed of HS1) with only 35 minutes time saving on phase 1. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w493

(vi) Reliance on the high risk strategy of one contentious and expensive project (HS2) to primarily resolve the UK’s economic future. Reduced ticket revenues might not even service the debt from construction. (vii) The DfT appear to have ignored the economic lessons of HS1, the franchise of which was sold at a loss in 2010. HS2 construction (2009 estimate) is £100 million per km. (ref 5) (viii) Environmentally, the programme is reliant on modal shift and high load factor to break even. (ref 6 p 53) If this is not achieved, then neither is sustainability. (ix) Modal shift is unlikely to be achieved domestically as cost and convenience will dictate choice. Good local and cross-country connections which do not drag the consumer to a large conurbation he is only visiting as a transit point are more likely to be attractive and lessen carbon footprint by reducing time and miles travelled. (x) Increase in capacity is only necessary at peak times, which may be for a few hours daily and in extremity, weekly (eg Friday evenings). HS2 HSR is a very expensive and highly disruptive solution to this. (xi) Almost complete rebuilding of Euston, a major main line and local station with its associated severe disruptions to all users over a minimum of seven years. (xii) To support running costs, ticket prices are likely to attract the highest paid employed population sector, unless tickets are subsidised, in which case, the travelling taxpayer pays twice. (xiii) Reliability may not be achieved as the proposed HS2 HSR programme uses untested technology. (xiv) Those areas and communities “by-passed” by HS2 HSR are likely to see their wealth and potential transferred to those places served by HSR. The UK may see a transfer of wealth rather than an actual increase in wealth. (xv) Employment may increase in those areas served by HS2 HSR but this may well reduce the employment and skills pool for those areas which are not. This would result in a location transfer of skilled and professional workers rather than an actual increase in numbers. (xvi) No value cost has been placed upon the impact of construction on those areas through which the currently proposed HS2 HSR route passes, nor on the social/health cost to those communities. (xvii) No environmental or health value or cost has been placed on the increased aural and light pollution to communities and the individual.

Q2: How does HSR fit in with the Government’s transport policy objectives? Q2.1 The DfT sets out five goals for transport: climate change; productivity and competitiveness; equality of opportunity; health, safety and security; quality of life and natural environment. HS2 HSR fails to satisfy any of these goals. (ref 7) 2.1.1 Inter-urban connectivity is important, but London already has good high speed rail links to other major UK cities. Moving away from a London-centred approach to give better East-West & regional links would have many benefits in removing pressure from the congested SE and London networks, reducing travel time and cost for those who are only using London as an interchange, not a final destination. For example, currently, travellers by rail to the NE from the Northern Home Counties have to go South into London & then out again or drive tens of miles, clogging roads, to access the London-NE rail network. 2.1.2 Local and regional developments such as the Northern Hub (ref 8) could generate prosperity within those regions, improve wider social inclusion and opportunity through an integrated transport connectivity which is accessible and affordable (in capital and travel costs). Funding for this is estimated at £530 million. Can the UK afford this and the HS2 HSR programme? Which offers the best Cost Benefit Ratio? will come on stream first? offers greater benefit to more people where it’s most needed? Regional developments may of course impact on HS2 HSR passenger demand and thus profitability. 2.1.3 Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond speaks of the high cost of the UK railways: “Britain has one of the most expensive railways in the developed world. According to the independent regulator, up to 40% more expensive than our main competitors...public subsidy running at £5.5 billion a year..this has to change”. (ref 9) Whilst this is ambiguous, we presume the change sought by Mr. Hammond is cost reduction. We are unclear how committing public funds of £33 billion to HS2 HSR will enable such change, especially if further annual public subsidy is necessary to keep its ticket costs at affordable prices. 2.1.4 The Sustainability Commission in its outgoing report finds the richest 10% of the population benefit from receiving four times as much public spending on transport as the poorest 10%. Its recommendation to Government on transport is for “policy-makers to prioritise reducing the demand for transport; encouraging more sustainable modes of transport and improving the efficiency of existing modes of transport over increasing the capacity of the transport system”. (ref 10) The CCG totally endorses these recommendations.

Q2.2 2.2.1 It is challenging to see how committing £17 billion over the next 15 years and a similar further amount to the HS2 HSR project will not reduce the amount of Treasury money available for investment in the “classic” cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w494 Transport Committee: Evidence

rail structure. The CBI (20.9.10) recommends: existing transport assets to be maintained; all public sector transport projects to undergo more rigorous value for money assessments. The CBI warns (ref 11) of “squeezed household budgets, weak wage growth, high wage inflation” and “rising commodity prices putting more upward pressure on inflation”. Not only will this slow growth, challenge demand for HS2 HSR, but also heavily impact on eventual capital costs. 2.2.2 The experience of HS1 for Ashford commuters is that “journey times are only a little, if at all, quicker than..before. Many high-speed trains run almost empty. Conventional services that people actually do want to use have significantly deteriorated”. (ref 12) 2.2.3 And for Southeastern commuters—In 2010 Southeastern reduced their new high speed Javelin London- Dover service as demand fell away. Commuters said “passengers for Victoria lost their peak period services” ... “an even more expensive service ..which terminates in a place no one wants to be”. (ref 12a) 2.2.4 In France, one-third of existing high-speed lines lose money and older, non-high speed and suburban lines are poorly equipped and maintained as investment is put into TGVs. Guillaume Pepy, president of the French state railways, SNCF, says they are ‘decaying..facing a financial impasse...and heading for the wall’. (ref 13)

Q2.3 2.3.1 There will be no modal shift from air to HSR in the first £17 billion London-Birmingham leg, as there are no flights between the two cities. Sir David Rowlands (former chairman of HS2 Ltd, now chairman of Gatwick Airport) has rejected claims by the SofS that a HSR route from London-Scotland will solve capacity at Britain’s congested airports. (ref 14) 2.3.2 Transporting people around the UK to London airports for them then to fly overseas increases their carbon footprint, time and use of resources. This should be discouraged, not encouraged. 2.3.3 Research indicates that HSR is currently not competitive with air for journeys longer than approximately 800 km. (ref 15) 2.3.4 BAA have indicated that should short-haul slots at Heathrow become vacant through passenger fall- off, they will fill these with long-haul flights, with consequent greater air, noise pollution and carbon emissions. Therefore, HSR is unlikely to reduce aviation, merely change flight destination. Expansion at other airports will add to carbon impact.

Q3: Business case Q3.1: Forecasting and modelling 3.1.1 The Public Accounts Committee describes the DfT’s knowledge of how many people use which parts of the rail network and when as “inadequate, sketchy and so gives a poor basis for decision-making”. (ref 16) 3.1.2 The transport model used to design and appraise the proposed route for HS2 was not able to realistically model the balance of long distance travel between air, car and HS2 and the effects of different HS2 designs on this. Thus it cannot provide the scientific evidence base to support the business case and in particular the benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR). The model could not be used to assess the various options for serving Heathrow (eg stopping at Heathrow, near Heathrow or ignoring Heathrow). The transport model’s origin-destination pattern was based on rail ticketing data which would bias in favour of where people currently buy tickets to. For eg people buy tickets to London, even if they are travelling to rail destinations outside the city on the other side. This model would not be capable for example, of modelling the connection to HS1. The transport model does not have a destination choice model to forecast the effect of changes in the transport infrastructure on the origin-destination pattern of travellers. Therefore it would not be capable of investigating alternative HS2 routes properly and would give HS2 routing solutions which copy the current set of rail routes—as in this case to parallel the West Coast Mainline. A properly specified destination choice model would reflect the effect of changes in people’s origin-destination pattern on HS2. As HS2 offers a considerable change in transport service provision, these effects are likely to be potentially huge, so a properly specified transport model could find a completely different HS2 solution to that proposed. 3.1.3 Even for a public transport scheme much smaller than HS2 (eg £50 million), DfT modelling guidance require the transport model to be composed of a full hierarchy of choices: choice of trip frequency, mode choice, time period choice, destination choice and route choice, interconnected in such a way that one choice correctly influences the others by connecting one choice model with the logsum from the model below it. The model they used had route choice and some other ad-hoc models which did not cover the same area and were totally disconnected from each other. The model should have sufficient spatial detail to be capable of modelling the infrastructure in question. This model has about 250 zones (which could be suitable for a £50 million scheme but would be too few zones for say a £200 million scheme) whereas for infrastructure of the scale of HS2 the model should have several thousand zones. 3.1.4 The HS2 model was based on simple elasticities to determine the additional travel which could be generated by HS2 providing a faster and better service. These elasticities were calibrated on relatively small cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w495

changes to the train speed and service pattern and are designed to be applied on small rail schemes, new stations etc. Simple elasticities are inapplicable for something of the scale of HS2. The HS2 model is using these elasticities well outside their calibrated range and it is no wonder that the numbers they come up with are so out of kilter with reality. Elasticity models say nothing about where this additional HS2 travel is to come from. This additional HS2 travel is unlikely to come from other modes of transport because travel (especially car travel) is declining and has been for the past five or so years (which pre-dates the recession so is real). 3.1.5 The model forecasting of future levels of travel used very high growth assumptions—much higher than would normally be used for rail schemes—which are unlikely to be achieved. Even the “normal” rail growth assumptions are unlikely to be achieved. “Normal” rail growth forecasts are based on the trend of rail growth since privatisation—before this, rail travel growth was much lower. Privatisation of the rail system led to a better rail travel “product” and better marketing so that rail travel grew at a higher growth rate than before privatisation. This new rail travel has now been captured plus travel in general is declining, so rail travel is unlikely to grow at the rate assumed by HS2. The HS2 BCR is on the cusp of acceptability so adopting more realistic growth assumptions could well make it not worth building. 3.1.6 HS2 Ltd. should build a proper transport model of the country with a full interconnected choice hierarchy to sufficient spatial detail so as to do the job properly. They would then have the right tool to be able to design the right scheme on a sound scientific evidence base with a properly supported BCR. Only then can they select a route and only then can they be in a position to be able to persuade people that it is necessary to build it (if indeed it is).

Q3.1: Demand 3.1.7 The assumptions for demand are not robust—these are based upon economic growth not the precarious financial climate of the foreseeable future. 3.1.8 Demand will be heavily dependent upon ticket affordability. This affordability will be challenged by the change of formula governing increases in regulated fares from RPI+1% to RPI+3% from January 2012. (ref 17) A recent Passenger Focus survey quotes fares in Britain already being 1.59% higher than than any other European country (ref 18) with some SE commutes costing over £5,000 per annum. The Campaign for Better Transport comments “Politicians need to...understand that people simply cannot afford to pay a fifth of their income just to do a day’s work”. (ibid) “Government has allowed Southeastern to increase fares by 7%, 3% above July 2010 RPI. But this masked higher increases approaching 13% on some routes”. (ref 19) 3.1.9 People facing these challenges will seek alternatives to rail commute—home based work, more local employment or road-based options such as coach or car, or simply become unemployed. The 2010 Labour Force Survey1 (ref 20, p 7) identified several benefits for home-based working, including a better home-work life balance, reduction in business costs and time and money spent travelling. Encouraging more home-based or closer to home working will reduce peak commuter demand and congestion and support local services. The 2010 Spending Review (1.39) provides £530 million over the next five years to develop the UK’s broadband network. Current HS2 HSR proposals fail to consider these changes and their potentially considerable effect upon demand and viability. 3.1.10 Unless HSR is integrated into a complete door-to-door service it will not attract passengers (ref 21) DfT figures (2009) (ref: ibid 2.33) show 50% of all trips are leisure, 18% business or commuting with 95% of all trips less than 25 miles and 67% under five miles. This indicates the narrow market share of all transport forms which a long distance HSR rail service is seeking to capture. 3.1.11 The UK would be well advised to heed the experiences of other European nations. In Holland, the Dutch high speed operator could face bankruptcy; the service has not attracted sufficient users with some trains having just 15% occupancy; fares have been forced to drop by more than 50%. (ref 22)

Q3.2 3.2.1 The Sustainability Commission (ref 10) states HS2 HSR will encourage long distance commuting which is “inherently unsustainable ... [what is needed is] more distributed development and local jobs rather than encouraging people to travel longer and longer distances”. Further, the Commission says that a small proportion of the £17–33 billion HS2 budget could transform local transport and offer more equal accessibility & connectivity in towns and cities across Britain. 3.2.2 The CCG outlined some alternative capacity solutions in their Submission to the 2010 TSC Inquiry. (ref 23) 3.2.3 Sir Richard Branson, chairman of the , claimed that “if the Government gave the private sector more freedom to innovate, a further upgrade of the London-Glasgow WCML could reduce journey times sharply (London to Birmingham could be reduced by 22 minutes) and be self-funding”. (ref 24, 20.9.09) Only one “relief” train to cope with the Friday peak (18.43 Euston-Crewe) has been allowed to operate—why cannot these restrictions be addressed to give immediate relief? Virgin lose the franchise in April 2012. 3.2.4 There are already five to six trains per hour throughout the day between London Euston and Milton Keynes. However in peak times Northampton has only a half hourly service. It is these peak hour trains where cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w496 Transport Committee: Evidence

capacity is a problem. These could be doubled by a grade separated junction South of MK (estimated cost £243 million) and new, higher performance rolling stock. These could be delivered within five years at a cost slightly less than one-third of the £17 billion HSR spend. (ref 25) 3.2.5 Long distance WCML Inter City trains have only limited overcrowding presently and by increasing the number of carriages, conversion of one first-class carriage per train to standard, overall standard class capacity could be increased by 112% without any significant infrastructure spend. (ref 25) HS2 HSR is a sledgehammer to crack a nut. 3.2.6 The Spending Review October 2010 has provided £14 billion for Network Rail for major work on the WCML & ECML. (ref:Executive Summary p 7) We would expect this considerable sum to bring some positive resolution to key issues such as capacity.

Q3.3 3.3.1 Rail travel demand can be managed more effectively by encouraging tele-commuting, smart ticketing, more flexible working hours. Research shows that virtual meetings, video chat and conferencing are overtaking traditional communication methods as increasingly businesses use virtual ways for face-to-face meetings. (ref 26) 3.3.2 The Government is calling for evidence following the Local Transport White Paper 2011 Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon on alternatives to travel for business and commuting. Increasingly, people are seeking ways to reduce their time and travel costs. With increasing uptake of electronic communication, this is unlikely to fall. 3.2.3 The Public Accounts Committee (ref 27, 9.10.10) recommends the DfT conducts a fundamental review of the railway industry structure as it “provides little external challenge to its vested interest in its own growth” and to “ensure..value for money..restraining the tendency to seek solutions through growth”. This is essential to the prosperity and economic stability of the UK rail network.

Q3.4 3.4.1 Inflation is rising which will impact on construction costs and CBR. How will this be accommodated?

Q4: The Strategic Route Q4.1 4.1.1 “The really time-consuming part of travelling from the West Midlands to London is getting to Birmingham city centre. Live in the wrong suburb with no open railway station and it can take nearly as long to get to New St as HS2 is proposing to get to London”: Telford commuter 5.5.11. This is true for all HSR stations outside the main urban centre. Eurostar has encouraged travellers from air as it delivers them straight to central Paris, a smaller urban centre so shorter time to reach ultimate destination. 4.1.2 A Leeds resident writing to the Leeds local Guardian (21.3.11) calls not for future London-Leeds high speed links but good links now between Leeds-Sheffield, Leeds-Manchester and around all three with a fraction of HSR costs being invested in electrification and more rolling stock.

Q4.2 4.2.1 It may well be worthwhile connecting Liverpool, Manchester to Bradford, Leeds, York with a cross- Pennine higher speed rail. These are close major cities which are currently poorly connected by rail and have relatively few rail trips between them—indicators of high potential benefits. With a proper transport model, which could model changes to people’s origin-destination pattern, such a scheme would offer a step-change in transport provision and could provide considerable economic regeneration benefits. HSR could connect-in to this at some point so that services can be offered from these cities to places north, south, London and Europe. Alternatives like these need to be tested in a properly-specified transport model.

Q4.3 4.3.1 Appropriate modelling should be used to inform choices, including a non-London centred approach. The biggest potential financial benefits are likely to be for the phases from Birmingham-North, where urban interconnectivity is poor and need for regeneration is greatest. 4.3.2 Building in stages may spread cost over time & gives some flexibility to accommodate eg demand changes. However it runs the risk of phase 1 running over time and budget, and thus impacting negatively on future phases, with the possibility that should not be discounted, that they become unaffordable or uneconomic. This is particularly true for the currently proposed phase 1 (London-Birmingham) which ignores the present good intercity rail services, offers the lowest CBR as the total journey is less than 200km, yet has the highest environmental impact cost on an AONB. The worst case, which is not unrealistic, is that the Chilterns AONB will suffer severe degradation through phase 1 without any benefit to the UK as later stages are never built. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w497

Q4.4 4.4.1 Direct links between HS1 and HS2 are important but need not necessarily be via London. A link with Heathrow assumes that increasing the volume of travellers using Heathrow is desirable. CCG questions this.

Q5: Economic rebalancing and equity Q5.1 5.1.1 There is scant evidence to prove a causal link between HS2 HSR and regeneration to those areas most in need, evidence is inconclusive. The DfT’s response to the TSC’s recommendations from their Inquiry into Transport & the Economy 2010/11 (ref 1, Recommendation 9) sheds no further light. 5.1.2 Expecting one expensive project (HS2) to resolve the complex and diverse problems of regional poverty, decline and comparative regional discrepancies of wealth, opportunity and resources is an extremely high risk strategy. Business leaders hold disparate views. Government relies heavily on quoting large sums of money/benefits which it predicts will be generated by HS2 without substantial or adequately researched information to support these claims. 5.1.3 Whilst “captains of industry” speak in favour of HS2 HSR, it is notable that there is a lack of private capitalists seeking to invest in the project. 5.1.4 HS1 has failed to generate employment in Ashford. The town’s “unemployment rate has fallen more slowly than the Kent average, the SE average and the GB average”. Other towns off the line have done better. (ref 28) 5.1.5 The DfT predicts that HS2 construction will generate 9,000 jobs, 1,500 operational on-the-line and 20,000 new jobs at Old Oak Common, 2,000 at Euston, 3,800 at the Birmingham interchange and 4,500 at Birmingham New Street. Of the 30,000 “new” jobs, 73% will be in London. (ref 6 p 18, 45) 5.1.6 We remain unconvinced that being able to catch a fast train to the North will encourage people in the South to travel there, particularly if jobs are harder to find, salaries are lower and train fares higher. HS2 is more likely to attract travellers from North to South, which is where they will spend their disposable income.

Q5.2 5.2.1 Expectation would be that such a public spend would support local and regional economies. Government predicts that every working family in the West Midlands will benefit by £2,600 (ref 29)—but this excludes the costs, resulting in net benefit of £1,400 per working family. However benefits will not be equally distributed; spending on railways benefits the better off much more than the lowest income families, and will do little to help the 9.8% unemployed in that region. So investment in the network, and changes to its shape, give a poor rate of return to support local economies. We suggest investing in directly supporting business and enterprise now is more beneficial.

Q5.3 5.3.1 Limited and lack of integrated accessibility and ticket costs will exclude lower income groups. Prime users will be urban dwellers with high disposable incomes. 5.3.2 The £123 million Masterplan for Birmingham’s Eastside & City University regeneration will be abandoned as HS2 needs the site, despite the £30 million already invested—and the University wants this back. Is such a fundamental change wise in the current economy? Can Birmingham’s residents and taxpayers and the Government afford to waste such amounts when all Councils are cutting services? (ref 30)

Q6: Impact Q6.1 Carbon emissions 6.1.1 The DfT’s vision is to “target[ing] investment in new projects that promote green growth”—HS2 HSR does not fulfil this criteria. The 2008 Climate Change Act sets out legally binding targets for an 80% reduction in greenhouse gases by 2050. Already (May 2011) businesses say this is unrealistic. HS2 will not help. 6.1.2 The Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon White Paper 2011 recognises the need to reduce carbon impact on longer journeys, but places dependence on modal shift from car to achieve this. Convenience and cost will act against this. HS2 Ltd estimate as little as 1% of motorway traffic will shift to HS2. HS2 HSR requires a high load factor to be even broadly carbon neutral (ref 6 p 53) and during the construction stage will add to environmental pollution. Higher speeds consume more energy and emit more carbon. 6.1.3 The first phase of HS2 will have fewer carbon savings as lower shift from car to air and carbon emissions from its construction are estimated at 0.3–2.1 million tonnes. (ref 31) 6.1.4 The Call for Evidence following the White Paper states it is medium distance (10–25 mile) trips which are responsible for the highest volume of carbon emissions and some one-third of emissions come from cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w498 Transport Committee: Evidence

journeys less than 10 miles. (ref 32, 2.15, fig 2.3) HS2 HSR will do nothing to change this and indeed these figures indicate that investment in regional and local options offer better carbon reduction potential. 6.1.5 By freeing up capacity at Heathrow, the government’s HS2 high-speed rail project is likely to increase total UK carbon emissions. Further questions surround the scheme’s broader sustainability credentials. (ref 33)

Q6.2 Environmental costs and benefits 6.2.1 In designing the UK’s high-speed railway sufficient weight must be placed on conserving natural beauty of designated land. The business case takes into account construction costs. Those costs reflect design decisions which are driven by key legislation, policy and objectives protecting AONBs and National Parks. 6.2.2 HS2 Ltd says its Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) (ref 34, p 7) is in line with SEA requirements (ref 35). The developer’s SEA Summary indicates its AoS includes the relationship of its own plan (HS2) with other relevant plans and programmes. However in its AoS documents (ref 34, ref 36), relevant legislation, policy and objectives are either: (i) Not included. (ii) Are insufficiently informative. (iii) Or the government’s obligation is not alluded to. If the AoS is incomplete then costs to the natural environment, and hence the potential monetary costs, cannot be correctly estimated.

6.2.3 Countryside and Rights of Way (CROW) Act 2000 s85 In the context of AONBs, the Definition of Sustainability Term presented by HS2 in its Appraisal Process (ref 34, Annex 2) is the CROW Act 2000. Although the developer states “the single purpose of the AONB designation is to conserve and enhance the natural beauty of the area” it fails to emphasise that any Minister of the Crown has a duty of “regard to the purpose of conserving and enhancing the natural beauty of the AONB” (section85). Since the enactment in 2000, so far as we can see, there have been no major infrastructure developments receiving legal approbation in any AONB on the proposed scale of HS2. Nor have there been any in National Parks on the scale of HS2 since 1995 when the same Ministerial duty was included in the Environment Act section 62. Clearly HS2 Ltd needs to be aware of this duty in making design decisions.

6.2.4 Planning Policy Statement 7 PPS7 states that AONBs and National Parks are confirmed as having the highest status of protection in relation to landscape and scenic beauty. The policy recognises major development may have serious impacts on the natural beauty of such areas and recreational opportunities they provide. It says major development should not take place except in exceptional circumstances and the proposed infrastructure should be demonstrated to be in the national interest. (ref 37) 6.2.5 In only a brief reference to PPS7 (ref36,p41) in its AoS documents, HS2 Ltd does not describe the status of protection of designated land, nor the Government’s recognition of the impact major development would have on such land. In addition, HS2 Ltd has not referred to PPS7 in its Appraisal Process document (ref 34) despite Government’s “Practical Guide to the SEA Directive” stating Planning Policy Statements are relevant (ref 35, App 2). Hence the AoS is insufficiently informative which could give rise to unplanned increases in construction costs related to impacts on designated land.

6.2.6 Statutory Designation Criteria HS2 Ltd’s Appraisal Process (ref 34) does not refer to the Statutory Designation Criteria (ref 38) for AONBs (Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000) and National Parks (National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949). Criteria include intactness of landscape, presence of incongruous elements, sense of remoteness, landform from vantage points, natural looking woodland, presence of traffic noise, strong aesthetic qualities, a relative lack of human influence, association with written descriptions, a sense of return to nature, peace and quiet. These are all qualities that may influence design decisions. These serious omissions have led to concerns that the DfT, HS2 Ltd and its consultants have failed to give sufficient weight to conserving designated land in route design which may give rise to unplanned cost implications. 6.2.7 When designing a route, it is important to avoid, or minimise length of route, in AONBs and National Parks. When a route through designated land is demonstrated to be in the national interest, a tunnelled option throughout the length of the designated land should be included for public consultation. HS2 Ltd has failed to design such a route for phase 1 of the proposed high-speed line (HS2). If the decision is made to proceed with HS2, as this would create a precedent in an AONB (6.2.3 above), it is imperative that any encroachment into the AONB be tunnelled. The Secretary of State for Transport has said: £We will do everything we can to mitigate the impacts on areas like the Chilterns”. (ref 39) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w499

6.2.8 HS2 Ltd designed a route with engineering works on a massive scale in the Chilterns AONB with consequent impacts on landscape. It will involve two viaducts each 500 metres long and considerable land- take from deep cuttings. HS2 cuttings are typically 15 metres deep and 70–90 metres wide even when partially retained (ref 40). These deep cuttings total 9kms in length. (ref 36, p 84) 6.2.9 Tunnelling produces much less spoil than deep cutting per km, as well as producing a far superior environmental landscape solution (although there would be tunnel vents every 2kms). Because of the total length (9kms) of deep cutting in the Chilterns AONB, the volume of spoil generated here is massive: 12 million cubic metres (ref 41), 74% of which is generated from deep cuttings. 6.2.10 HS2 Ltd estimated its scheme would generate just 0.68 million cubic metres of spoil in the Chilterns. (ref 42) This is not supported by recent more thorough research by the Chilterns Conservation Board and Dr M. Fletcher of the Chiltern Countryside Group (ref 41) which showed that in the Chilterns alone the scheme will generate 12 million cubic metres of spoil. The reasons for the discrepancy are HS2 Ltd did not allow for the Amersham tunnel being twin-bore, it omitted the spoil from deep cuttings and it did not include a bulking factor (x1.75) for loose spoil. Less than 10% of the spoil generated can be used in the Chilterns. 6.2.11 Spoil removal from the Chilterns via the route seems likely to be problematic without doing excessive damage to the AONB, due to the terrain, non-patency of adjacent tunnels and the large amount of lorry traffic. To move 12 million cubic metres of spoil by road would create over 1.7 million lorry movements—ie a journey on local roads every 26 seconds every working day for five years. Thus spoil removal will involve financial and environmental costs which have not been correctly assessed. 6.2.12 In the light of this discrepancy on spoil in HS2’s AoS, and omission of relevant objectives, policy details and legal obligation of Government to the AONB, is its AoS reliable in assessing other impacts of its scheme? 6.2.13 The DfT needs to re-appraise its preferred route to allow for its impact on the Chilterns AONB and make commensurate adjustments to its business case. Similar cases may arise when the business case for the “Y” is considered. (ref 43)

Q6.2 Noise (i) Appendix 5.4 (ref 35) contains the noise aspect of the Appraisal of Sustainability. The Noise examination needs to fulfill two essential requirements: To inform all stakeholders and interested parties of its extent and degree. To define the sustainability noise impact in terms of costs and benefits. 6.2.14 The AoS is a strategic document that is not final. In terms of noise it concentrates on operational airborne noise at residential areas. Other aspects have been appraised at either quantitative or commentary level. No detailed work on any subjective aspect of noise is included and the information provided can only be indicative and not definitive. 6.2.15 The method of assessment of railway noise is based upon a widely used, but not exclusive, method that equates the actual varying noise levels over a period to a construct of an equal energy constant noise level over the same period (LAeq,T). This is both confusing to the layman and can be argued as removing any significance of the varying character of the noise to aggravate a response. 6.2.16 The World Health Organisation expressly state that for situations where distinct noise events are present, such as aircraft or railway noise, measures of individual events should be obtained. In short LAeq,T should be augmented with Lamax. If it is accepted that LAeq,T is the best metric to use, HS2 Ltd have taken the period 0600:2400 whereas in other contexts 0700:2300 is used to define daytime. The selection of a shorter night time period reduces the amount the HS2 traffic will seem to intrude into this sensitive period. This reduces the consideration of the noise impact and the effects in the early morning or late night. 6.2.17 HS2 Ltd have indicated the areas of potential impact by reference to the dwellings that would be exposed to their chosen criteria: (a) High Noise Level > 73 dB LAeq, 18hr (b) Qualification for noise insulation > 68 dB LAeq,18hr (c) In an area of noticeable increase in railway noise — These criteria are misleading in their relevance to this AoS: (a) is taken out of its defined context and is expressly excluded from use outside this context; and (b) for a dwelling to be subject to noise insulation should not be taken that the noise is mitigated. Noise within gardens and outside areas is ignored. 6.2.18 This criterion is very confusing. For areas already exposed to railway noise the judgement line is taken as the level of the existing railway noise + 3 dB. For areas with a low railway noise the value taken is 53 dB. For areas with no railway noise the value is taken as 50 dB. There is no consideration for areas with a background level of say 45 dB which would be required to have a 5 dB penalty imposed rather than the cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w500 Transport Committee: Evidence

suggested 3 dB if railway noise already present. There is also the factor that it is now accepted that a change of level of greater than 1dB increases the likelihood that there will be an adverse reaction to the noise. 6.2.19 The AoS does not set out the nature of airborne noise at residential dwellings. There is no description of the possible effects of the noise during the day and scant reference to night time noise. 6.2.20 There is concern as to the data used to calculate the HS2 Ltd Noise maps. Source levels for the trains assume future improvements of train set noise. Assumptions are made about the effectiveness of noise barriers that are at best first approximations. Given the level of assumptions made and the inherent degree of accuracy of any computational modelling exercise it is considered that the noise levels calculated could be 5–10 dB different from reality. 6.2.21 The information is on daytime exposure and exposure only to dwellings. Night time noise will occur and the WHO Night Noise Guidance Levels seek to impose much reduced levels at this time and would additionally weight night time railway movements. Both of these factors have been ignored in the AoS. No consideration has been given to areas of quiet that presently exist along the route or of the special areas that are held in trust for the nation. The AONBs must be considered sacrosanct and warrant a much greater degree of consideration than has been applied in the AoS. — The first requirement of a noise examination is therefore seen not to have been met. Without full and exhaustive information on noise and its effects no sensible analysis of the environmental costs and benefits can take place. — It therefore follows that the second requirement is not met. The information that has been made available does not allow a proper consideration to be made as to whether the project should go forward to the next stage. A full Environmental Impact Analysis can be the only basis for such a decision. 6.2.22 It will be appreciated that this submission can only raise the questions of the inadequacies of the AoS and thus the validity of the costs and benefits that have been assumed. These points can be expanded in a verbal presentation to the Committee.

Q6.3 6.3.1 Released capacity for the “classic” rail network is one of the given benefits for HS2 HSR. But, if as suggested, this capacity will be filled by more passenger trains, the opportunity to increase freight will be limited. However, as the need for additional capacity has been identified at solely peak times, if this is resolved, then freight trains can still be increased outside peak hours. We question whether current freight trains on the WCML are operating at their maximum load—many flatbed wagons are often empty. 6.3.2 The CCG believes there are opportunities, not yet fully considered, to provide more scope for rail freight; releasing freight from main transport corridors (road & rail) onto designated freight lines with properly planned HS1, Channel & Northern sea ports connectivity has many advantages.

Q6.4 6.4.1 HS2 will cause considerable disruption to existing services at Euston as it will need to be completely rebuilt over seven to eight years (ref 6, p 54; ref 44, p 39); to GWML services due to reconstruction of Old Oak Common station and to Chiltern Railways services with work between Northolt and West Ruislip. These are significant.

Conclusion In its vision statement, the DfT specifically refers to seeking “the best possible advice ... on impacts..investment … and [the] objective to seek good value for money”. The CCG find that the DfT in its response has not adequately addressed the recommendations made by the Transport Select Committee following the 2010 Inquiry into Transport & the Economy, particularly with regard to recommendation 9 concerning regeneration benefits. (ref 1) Information in HS2’s Appraisal of Sustainability is insufficient, or in some instances incorrect, to allow a reliable assessment of the environmental impact of HS2 HSR to be made. This is likely to impact on its business case. The Government has a National Infrastructure Plan (2010). The CCG suggests that the DfT and the Coalition Government do not appear to have a cohesive, considered and integrated approach to transport planning or forward vision linked to agreed objectives. The HS2 HSR project plans to spend billions on a new route which is questionable in terms of sustainability and economic benefits and, to be financially viable, encourages travel. It will be accessible physically and financially to a UK minority. The White Paper “Creating Growth, Cutting Carbons” asks businesses and commuters to reduce travel, seek green alternatives and advocates investment in local transport infrastructures. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w501

These two visions are contradictory. In the present global financial situation, it would be wise to identify priorities which are complementary and realistically achievable. It may well be in our technologically fast-moving world that the UK has missed the optimum “window” for investment in HSR. As people find new ways of communicating and doing business there is a risk that HSR could be out of date by the time it comes on stream. A lesson may be learnt from the planning of the new city of Milton Keynes est. 1967. This “state of the art” city now has one of the slowest broadband connections in the UK for, at the time, its planners did not place sufficient weight on technological and demand changes. (ref 45) May 2011

References 1. Transport & the Economy: Government response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2010–12 HC473. 2. Gourvish, T (2010) The High Speed Revolution: History and Prospects. 3. Comparison of High Speed Lines CAPEX Nov 2009/DfT HS2 Economic Case p 38. 4. Virgin Trains Euston-Birmingham 1h11m/wikipedia WCML 5. HS2 Report to Government March 2010, 3.5.14. 6. High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. Consultation Feb 2011, p 53 and 54. 7. Delivering a Sustainable Transport System http://dft.gov.uk/pgr/regional/policy/evidenceresearchstrategy/2) 8. www.networkrail.co.uk/north 16.2.11. 9. Conservative Party Conference 4.10.10. 10. http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/pages/fairness-in-a-car-dependent-society.html 11. CBI News Release 9.5.11. 12. Gilligan, Daily Telegraph 4.4.11; 12a Evening Standard 4.5.10. 13. Independent 9.4.11. 14. Guardian 25.1.11, Transport Times Aviation Conference. 15. http://cfit.independent.gov.uk/pubs/2004/hsr/index.htm 16. Public Accounts Committee Conclusion 3 Increasing Passenger Rail Capacity 9.11.10. 17. Passenger Focus 11.5.11. 18. Daily Telegraph 31.12.10. 19. Milward, Daily Telegraph 31.12.10. 20. http://dft.gov.uk/consultations/open/DfT-2011–10/Home; http://www.statistics.gov.uk 21. Passenger Focus 2010c; http://www.dft.gov.uk/about/vision 22. Reuters 1.2.11. 23. Chiltern Countryside Group submission to TSC Inquiry into Transport & the Economy: http://www.chilterncountrysidegroup.org/ 24. http://www.ft.com/ 20.9.09. 25. Chris Stokes, rail consultant, Bucks. CC HS2 Summit 15.4.11. 26. Forrester Research, Computer Weekly Nov 2010. 27. Public Accounts Committee Conclusion 6 Increasing Passenger Rail Capacity. 28. Gilligan, Daily Telegraph 4.4.11/Office of National Statistics. 29. Secretary of State Philip Hammond, Conservative Central Office 14.4.11. 30. Birmingham Post 16.3.11. 31. http://www.greengauge21.net 32. Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon White Paper: Call for Evidence 2.15, fig 2.3. 33. http://www.endsreport.com/28048/ 28.3.11. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w502 Transport Committee: Evidence

34. HS2 Appraisal of Sustainability The Appraisal Process Appendix 1. 35. A Practical Guide to the SEA Directive http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/pdf/practicalguidesea.pdf 36. HS2 Appraisal of Sustainability Main Report Volume 1. 37. Planning Policy Statement 7 Sustainable Development in Rural Areas paragraphs 21,22. 38. Guidance for Assessing Landscapes for Designation as National Park or Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty in England page 3 and Appendix 1 http://www.naturalengland.org.uk/Images/NEB%20PU23%2005%20Annex%201_tcm6–25319.pdf 39. http://www.moneyex.co.uk/news-590.htm 40. HS2 maps 7 and 8. http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/library/maps/map-7; http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/library/maps/map-8. 41. HS2—over 1 million lorry movements predicted http://www.chilternsaonb.org/news_detail.asp?ID=174 42. HS2 Appraisal of Sustainability Main Report volume 2 Plans and Appraisal Framework page 34. 43. High level assessment of the wider network options—Reverse “S” and “Y” network, 4.22. 44. InterCity West Coast Consultation January 2011 p 39. 45. http://www.adamchapman.com/mkbag/issue/ May 2011

Further written evidence from the Chiltern Countryside Group (HSR 178A) THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF HS2 ON THE CHILTERNS AREA OF OUTSTANDING NATURAL BEAUTY This report presented to the Transport Select Committee is derived from Appendices C and D of the submission by the Chiltern Countryside Group to the High Speed Rail Investing in Britain’s Future Consultation. These papers are available for inspection on the Chiltern Countryside Group website www.chilterncountrysidegroup.org. These are full papers with detailed maps, tables of spoil volumes and complete reference lists. References provided in this report presented to the Transport Select Committee are numbered in accordance with those in the full papers.

Summary 1. Environment (a) Purposes of an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) are: — To conserve and enhance the natural beauty of the landscape. — To meet the need for quiet enjoyment of the countryside (Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 s87). These purposes clearly foster tourism as a function of AONBs. (b) The Misbourne Valley currently has a high amenity value in terms of tourism and is well-connected by road and local rail services. This role would be severely impacted by the HS2 project which travels on the surface for 14kms in the Chilterns AONB. (c) The scheme risks the permanent future use of the Misbourne Aquifer as an amenity supplying water to a large area of the northwest Home Counties. The Appraisal of Sustainability fails to take into account the Department for Transport’s WebTAG requirement that the rarity of a water attribute must be considered in designing transport infrastructure. The HS2 scheme could also potentially cause the River Misbourne—a globally rare chalk stream -to run dry by lowering the water table. (d) Nearly 11 hectares of ancient woodland in the AONB will be lost to HS2. In total 46 hectares will be lost or fragmented in the AONB. This habitat is irreplaceable. HS2’s plans conflict with The Natural Choice White Paper (June 2011) where Government affirmed its commitment to conserving priority habitats—such as ancient woodland—“with no net loss”. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w503

2. Spoil (a) Research shows that HS2’s route will generate a potential surplus of 6.43 million cubic metres of solid spoil in the Chilterns (see full paper for details www.chilterncountrysidegroup.org ) For comparison purposes, some four million cubic metres were produced at the Kent coast from boring the Channel Tunnel. (b) In designing transport infrastructure it is normally assumed that spoil from cuttings and embankments cancel one another out. In the Chilterns, however, only some 10% of the spoil generated will be needed for construction purposes. There are few other requirements for local spoil: roads that cross HS2 in the Chilterns will remain on the level, and availability of sites for noise bunds in the AONB is limited. (c) When bulked, 6.43 million cubic metres of solid spoil equate to over 11 million cubic metres (loose). Could this be moved via the route? There are obstacles—non-patent tunnels and HS2 crossing the Chiltern line/A413. Could it be moved by rail? There would be limited capacity on local lines. (d) Assuming the spoil is to be moved by 15 cubic metre capacity trucks, this equates to over 1.5 million lorry movements—a lorry movement every 30 seconds for 10 hours a day, every working day for five years. The safety aspect of heavy lorries needing to integrate with pedestrians and traffic on narrow rural roads and village high streets would be considerable. (e) A satisfactory disposal site is not apparent. Current potential sites are limited by restricted vehicle movements, lack of planning permission, site capacity and inadequate transport links. (f) The developer has said that concerns over spoil would be raised at a later stage, but the issues here raise the question “Is the current route in the Chilterns viable?”

1. Tourism and the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (a) Purposes of an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) are: — To conserve and enhance the natural beauty of the landscape. — To meet the need for quiet enjoyment of the countryside (Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 s87). These purposes foster tourism as a function of AONBs. (b) The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 s85 and Planning Policy Statement 7 (paragraphs 21 and 22) are concerned with protecting AONBs. These are discussed in the Chiltern Countryside Group’s first submission to the Transport Committee. Moreover, the Government indicated its renewed commitment to protecting AONBs as recently as July 25 2011in the draft National Planning Policy Framework paragraph 167. (c) The Chilterns AONB is just 20 miles from the capital. It is the only AONB between London and Birmingham. (d) HS2’s route in the AONB will travel for some 14kms on the surface in the Misbourne Valley north of Amersham. This part of the Misbourne Valley functions as a readily accessible tourist amenity. It offers rural tranquillity and yet is part of the AONB well connected by local roads and the Chiltern line to London, its conurbations and other towns. (e) Current plans for HS2 will urbanise the AONB’s Misbourne Valley north of Amersham. Urbanising features include two 500m viaducts; nine tunnel portals; a fully retained wall section; and HS2 raised on embankment. Land from nearly 8km of deep and very deep cuttings typically 65–90 metres wide at the top and 15 metres deep will be removed from the AONB to build HS2. (f) Under these plans HS2 would have a severe impact on the use of the Misbourne Valley north of Amersham as a rural amenity for walkers, cyclists, horse-riders and for those seeking a tranquil respite away from urban life. The corridor will effectively act as a steel and concrete barrier to these activities and prevent the valley north of Amersham from providing the natural scenic beauty that is its function in the AONB. Thus HS2 will have the effect—in the long term—of discouraging visitors to the Misbourne Valley, unlike the A413 which brings them to the area. (g) Twenty five rights of way would be severed by HS2 in the AONB.1 These include national and regional walking and cycle trails. Many more rights of way will be affected due to loss of tranquillity and detrimental impacts on views. (h) Scenic views and tranquillity currently offered in the vicinity of five popular destinations will be severely impacted by HS2: Great Missenden, Wendover, Old Amersham, Little Missenden and The Lee. These destinations would lose their attraction in terms of daytrips since the Misbourne Valley would become urbanised if the current plans for HS2 went ahead.

2. The Misbourne Aquifer and River (a) The Misbourne aquifer supplies drinking water to a large area of the northwest Home Counties. In designing the HS2 project the developer has failed to take into account the Department for Transport’s cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w504 Transport Committee: Evidence

WebTAG requirement which state that the rarity of a water attribute must be considered in designing new transport infrastructure (2 HS2’s Approach: Does it Protect Groundwater Resources? Journal Inst. Water 169 64–65 Fletcher, M. 2011). The Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) should have taken into account the fact that southeast England currently faces extreme water stress due to population pressure on current water sources.3 Extreme water stress in SE England was highlighted in the Cave Report (2009) http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/water/industry/cavereview/documents/ cavereview-finalreport.pdf If HS2 goes ahead as planned it potentially risks the use of the Misbourne Aquifer as a source of drinking water to future generations.4 (b) The River Misbourne supports biodiversity characteristic of chalk streams including nationally protected species. Such water courses are globally rare. The HS2 scheme could potentially cause the river to run dry by lowering the water table.4

References 1 Statement of Environmental Impact on the Chilterns AONB http://www.chilternsaonb.org/downloads/high_speed_2/statement-of-environmental-impact-on-the-chilterns- aonb.pdf 2 WebTAG paragraph 1.2.9 http://www.dft.gov.uk/webtag/documents/expert/unit3.3.11.php 3 How water availability may change, as temperatures, population and industrialisation increase http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7821082.stm 4 Bailey, H Concerns arising from the Geology and Hydrology of the ground underlying the High Speed (HS2) routes through the Chilterns http://www.chilternsociety.org.uk/hs2/paper02.php

HS2 Spoil in the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty: Is the Route Viable? 1. Chilterns Spoil Quantities The author’s research shows that HS2’s route will generate a potential surplus of 6.43 million cubic metres of solid spoil in the Chilterns. For comparison purposes, the surplus amount produced at the Kent coast from boring the Channel Tunnel was some four million cubic metres.5

Tunnels The developer originally claimed that the Chiltern tunnels would produce just 0.68 million cubic metres of solid material,1 but this was amended (15 July) just 14 days before the end of the five month consultation period to produce a similar estimate to that of the author.

Cuttings However, HS2’s amended spoil quantities do not include any value for Chilterns cuttings which appear to generate vast quantities of surplus waste: 4.82 million cubic metres (Table 1 below and Tables in full paper www.chilterncountrysidegroup.org Appendix D). In designing transport infrastructure it is normally assumed that spoil from cuttings and embankments cancel one another out. The Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) tells us this is the assumption for the HS2 project.6 In fact, it is likely that only some 10% of spoil generated in the Chilterns can be used in the area: Table 1 VOLUME OF SURPLUS CUTTINGS SPOIL AFTER EMBANKING HAS BEEN ALLOWED FOR Cuttings/Embanking Volume of Spoil (solid) Cuttings (9.2kms long incl. green tunnels) 5.25Mm3 Embanking Requirements 0.43Mm3 Volume of Surplus Cutting Spoil 4.82Mm3 (see Table 2*) cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w505

Table 2 TOTAL VOLUME OF CHILTERN SURPLUS SPOIL Location Volume of Spoil (solid) Amersham Tunnel (9.6kms long) 1.42Mm3 Little Missenden Tunnel (1.26kms long) 0.19Mm3 Volume of Surplus Cutting/Embanking Spoil (see Table 1)* 4.82Mm3 Total Chiltern Surplus Spoil 6.43Mm3

2. How Much Spoil will be used for Construction Purposes in the Chilterns area? (a) There are few embankments. Total embanking within the AONB, including the route north to Stoke Mandeville, is estimated to use just 6.2% of the spoil the Chilterns route will generate (of 6.86 million cubic metres gross, 0.43 million cubic metres to be used for embanking). (b) Engineers might expect spoil to be needed to build bridges for roads that will cross the railway, but lanes in the AONB are planned to remain at their present levels (HS2 Maps 7–9). (c) Elsewhere on the route excess spoil is expected to make bunds for noise and visual mitigation, but this raises concerns within the AONB (see below).

3. Bulking-up Will Impact on Spoil Transport When bulking-up is taken into account, the surplus 6.43 million cubic metres of solid material equates to more than 11 million cubic metres of loose spoil. Assuming trucks carry 15 cubic metres, to move the predicted bulked Chiltern spoil quantities by road would create over 1.5 million lorry movements which is equivalent to a lorry movement every 30 seconds on local roads every working day, 10 hours a day for five years.

4. Surplus Spoil cannot be Left by the Route in the AONB The developer may be considering simply leaving spoil on nearby land in the AONB. This would conflict with law, current and draft Government policy, and objectives concerned with protecting the landscape of designated land (Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 s85; Planning Policy Statement 7 paragraphs 21 and 22; draft National Planning Policy Framework paragraph 167; Statutory Designation Criteria—Guidance for Assessing Landscapes for Designation as National Park or Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty.11 In addition, it is simply not conceivable considering the vast quantities involved: if excess loose spoil were to be left as a one metre deep layer in the AONB, it would occupy an approximate 500 metre-wide swathe on either side of HS2’s surface route. This would extend for some 15kms of the AONB (from Amersham to north of Wendover, avoiding settlements and woodland). The Department for Transport (DfT) intends that excess spoil should be consumed by building bunds in the AONB.13 However potential locations for bunds would be limited, for example by: (a) Eighteenth century Shardeloes Registered Park; (b) Eight ancient woodland sites; (c) Setting of an earthworks Ancient Scheduled Monument; (d) Being on a steep slope; and (e) Lack of requirement due to green tunnels and viaducts. Apart from a few exceptions, of the remaining sites where bunds could potentially be built they would be of questionable use for noise mitigation due to lack of nearby habitation and the route being in deep cutting.

5. How Will Spoil be transported from the Chilterns? Research to-date has detected no safe or practical method of transporting large spoil quantities from the Chilterns: (a) Via the route: There are obstacles to building HS2 from the embryonic route in the Chilterns. The non-patent Little Missenden and Amersham Tunnels, and the need to cross the Chiltern line at Little Missenden would appear to prevent spoil generated between the two tunnels from being transferred via the route (HS2 Map 7). Spoil produced from AONB cuttings north of Little Missenden Tunnel cannot apparently be moved via the route unless a means for transporting heavily laden earthmovers is built over the combined Chiltern line/A413 crossing south of Wendover (HS2 Maps 8 and 9). In addition there are environmental objections to conveying Chilterns spoil to the Aylesbury Vale (item 6 below). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w506 Transport Committee: Evidence

(b) By rail: This appears highly unlikely considering the disruption to Chiltern lines, the volumes of spoil involved, and the destruction of yet more of the AONB to put in the necessary branch lines. If the destination for the Chilterns spoil was Calvert landfill, the branch line to Calvert from north of Aylesbury is too constrained—being single track—to take the required volume of traffic for the carriage of over 11 million cubic metres of loose spoil. (c) By Road: The impact from transport of spoil on local roads—particularly on lesser roads leading to disposal sites—would be massive. The safety aspect of heavy lorries—one every 30 seconds 10 hours a day each working day for five years—having to integrate with pedestrians and traffic on narrow rural roads and village high streets would potentially have serious consequences on the numbers of road accidents and casualties.

6. Can the Developer Make Use of Chilterns Spoil Elsewhere on the HS2 Route? Concerns have been raised over the use of Chilterns spoil for making bunds elsewhere: (a) There will be obstacles—the Chiltern line and non-patent tunnels as noted previously—to using the route to carry spoil away from construction work in the Chilterns. (b) The carriage of 11 million cubic metres of loose spoil to distant locations will impact on HS2’s carbon case. Carbon from construction plant equipment is currently set at zero in the AoS (item 9 below) so the environmental cost of such an exercise has not been included. (c) It is likely that 90% or more of Chiltern spoil will be chalk. Concerns have been raised over vast quantities of chalk affecting the pH—and therefore the biodiversity—of adjacent water courses, wildlife sites or other important habitats in the Aylesbury Vale. (d) The construction of noise bunds must not impede the flow of flood water in the Vale. (e) There could be potential problems with interim spoil storage. (f) Is chalk a viable material for constructing bunds? In a response to a Freedom of Information (FOI11–204) request HS2 says “the use of chalk spoil for landscaping is dependent on the type encountered. Generally we would expect to be able to use chalk spoil for the construction of bunds, but HS2 Ltd recognises that this might not always be possible.” (g) There may be excess spoil generated from the many deep cuttings in Warwickshire and Northamptonshire which would provide a further source of spoil for HS2 in the Aylesbury Vale.

7. Where will the Chilterns Spoil be Dumped? Research into potential sites in Buckinghamshire and Chinnor Quarry in South Oxfordshire shows that there are no obvious sites for disposal of HS2 spoil: lack of planning permission, insufficient site capacity, inadequate transport links and restrictions for consented vehicle movements on access roads being the reasons.

8. Impact of Cuttings on Ancient Woodland Nearly 11 hectares of ancient woodland will be destroyed in the Chilterns AONB and in total over 46 hectares of ancient woodland will either be lost or fragmented. This woodland is irreplaceable. In addition literature shows HS2 is highly likely to cause drying up of soil from the construction of nearby deep cuttings.24 There are also concerns over pollution of ancient woodland from the hundreds of thousands of construction vehicle movements from generating and transporting Chilterns spoil. Probable results would be a reduction in biodiversity and size of nearby ancient woodland sites. Since the date the route was published (February 2011), the Government has affirmed its commitment to conserving priority habitats—such as ancient woodland—“with no net loss” in The Natural Choice White Paper (June 2011).22

9. Embedded Carbon—Usage of Construction Plant Equipment Set at Zero The AoS tells us its embedded (construction) carbon has been estimated from carriage of construction materials, from carriage of spoil from tunnelling, from operating tunnel boring machines, from the manufacture of materials such as concrete and steel and from the manufacture of trains.8 However, HS2’s AoS says the estimate for carbon emitted from the usage of construction plant equipment— such as earthmovers, lorries, grabbers, diggers, bulldozers and dump trucks—has been set at zero.8 There are 90kms of deep and very deep cuttings (10–20 metres deep) on HS2’s phase 1 route.13 This length amounts to virtually half (49%) the phase 1 route. At such cuttings, construction plant equipment will be involved in massive spoil generation, its transferral along the route to where it might be needed, and then finally using the spoil for construction purposes. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w507

The omission of carbon from usage of construction plant equipment from the total quoted embedded carbon is not referred to in the government’s Consultation document: Investing in Britain’s Future.

10. Financial Cost of Chilterns Spoil Disposal In a response to FOI requests (FOI11–220 and FOI11–220B) the developer states it has assumed disposal of excavated spoil at the rate of £75–80 per cubic metre where: (a) The cost includes landfill tariff and spoil carriage. (b) The cost relates to the disposal of un-bulked solid material. Based on these assumptions the cost of disposal of 6.43 million cubic metres of solid material is £482 million to £514 million. This would be an increased cost of nearly £½ billion (£431 million to £460 million) on the developer’s cost of its original estimated waste quantity for the Chilterns (0.68 million cubic metres).

11. The Developer’s Miscalculations and Amended Total Spoil Quantity The Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) is a comprehensive 782-page report produced to support the case for HS2 and is the result of years of work led by highly qualified teams of civil engineers, environmentalists and economists. Yet it contains an extraordinary series of simple errors and miscalculations on waste which were detected by the author less than three months after its publication. Out of a total of eight sites listed in the February 2011 AoS where spoil would be generated, five were wrong. HS2 originally estimated that the total spoil generated by the London-Birmingham route was just 1.83 million cubic metres of spoil (solid).1 On 15 July—just 14 days before the end of the five month public consultation period—an erratum was issued. HS2’s estimate for total spoil was now almost three million cubic metres. Why did the DfT wait to publish the erratum until 14 days before the end of the public consultation period despite the errors in the Chilterns and Warwickshire tunnelling being pointed out to the developer in May (Chiltern Conservation Board and FOI11–238)? This amounts to with-holding relevant information from consultees for nine weeks and then not given them a chance to respond in their submissions. An amendment, made on this basis and at such a stage, conflicts with paragraph 3.5 of The Government’s Code of Practice on Consultation. In addition, despite the developer amending its data, the spoil generated from excavating for the subterranean Old Oak Common Station box —which amounts to nearly 1 million cubic metres—as well as potentially the Chilterns cuttings, as described previously, have been omitted from the 15 July amended value for the project.1 Altogether the author estimates the phase 1 route between London and Birmingham could potentially produce, including surplus from the Chilterns cuttings, a total of 8.72 million cubic metres of spoil (solid). HS2 tells us that its AoS is “in line with” the requirements of the EU’s Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) (27). In stating this, it is accepted by government and the public that information in the AoS is of a standard that can be relied on for accuracy and transparency. Clearly this is not the case.

12. Is HS2’s Route Viable? There is insufficient evidence that the preferred HS2 route in the Chilterns is viable in the light of: the potential vast surplus spoil quantities; the resulting massive impact on safety on local roads; the paucity of landfill sites; and the viability of transporting vast quantities of spoil from the Chilterns to the Aylesbury Vale. Correspondence (20 July) from Secretary of State Philip Hammond to David Lidington MP (Ref MC/ 4916) states: “We have not attempted at this stage to calculate the total amount of spoil that would need to be transported, or over what distance, as it would depend on the amount we could re-use along the route and how much spoil we could move within the railway corridor rather than on local roads. If the Government goes ahead with the line we would do the detailed design work and would calculate the amount of spoil produced and how and where it would be disposed of or re-used.” “Should a decision be taken to proceed, the relevant work on construction logistics would be done at the next stage of design, and would form part of the Environmental Impact Assessment.” As outlined here and in detail in the full paper www.chilterncountrysidegroup.org, spoil volumes can be estimated using the developer’s own dimensions of cuttings and embankments from HS2’s detailed maps. As discussed, observations can be made on features which would restrict Chiltern spoil usage and transport. The Government’s response appears to be grossly inadequate in addressing the concerns raised about the viability of the Chilterns route with regard to spoil, and the developer—to date—seems unwilling/unable to refute the evidence presented in this paper. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w508 Transport Committee: Evidence

Considering the concerns raised here over the potential vast quantities involved, it would appear to be sensible planning for the developer to be asked to provide further information at this stage as to how and where it plans to dispose of the surplus spoil generated in the Chilterns.

13. Are concerns over Chiltern Spoil recognised by the developer? The author understands that kilometres-long deep cuttings in the Chilterns are giving HS2 cause for concern. The evidence for this is an HS2 Ltd seminar held for local councillors in mid-July. On this occasion HS2’s Senior Engineer John Castle was quoted as saying: HS2 are “seriously considering extending the (Amersham) tunnel” towards Great Missenden. “The more we look at the cutting, the more problems we see”. HS2’s Alison Munro, Chief Executive, was present at the meeting. http://www.buckinghamshireexaminer.co.uk/south-bucks-news/local-buckinghamshire-examiner-news/2011/07/ 21/appalling-new-threat-from-hs2–114018–29095843/

Acknowledgements Fellow of the Institution of Civil Engineers Derek Godfrey has provided technical information and commented in a professional capacity on the full paper which is gratefully acknowledged. I would also like to thank Steve Rodrick, Chief Officer of the Chilterns Conservation Board, for his encouragement and advice, and Neil Jackson, Conservation and Landscape Officer of the Chilterns Conservation Board, for producing all the raw data and maps in the full paper and advising me on AONB features.

Qualifications to Express an Opinion: Marilyn Fletcher B.Sc. Ph.D. Dr. Fletcher is a researcher in Biology and graduate of the University of Sheffield. After qualifying for her Ph.D. at the University of London, Dr. Fletcher lectured to under-graduates at the university for 15 years. She also supervised post-graduate students for Ph.D. and has published papers in Biology. She is now an independent researcher specialising in the environment and sustainability. 20 August 2011

References (Numbered in Accordance With Those in the Full Paper) 1 HS2 Appraisal of Sustainability Main Report volume 2 Plans and Appraisal Framework page 34 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/library/documents/appraisal-sustainability 5 Channel Tunnel Marine Works, Shakespeare Cliff http://www.maddrell-consultancy-services.co.uk/uk.php 6 HS2 Appraisal of Sustainability Main Report Volume 1, page 121 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hs2-aos-report01_0.pdf 8 HS2 AoS Appendix 2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions pages 11 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hs2-aos-appendix02.pdf 11 Guidance for Assessing Landscapes for Designation as National Park or Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty on England, page 3 and Appendix 1 http://www.naturalengland.org.uk/Images/B1DesignationGuidanceMar11_tcm6–26242.pdf 13 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future Consultation pages 108, 109 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/ sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsr-consultation.pdf 22 The Natural Choice: Securing the Value of Nature, White Paper http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm80/8082/8082.pdf paragraph 2.9. 24 Corney, PM, Smithers, RJ, Kirby, JS, Peterken GF, Le Duc, MG & Marrs RH (2008) Impacts of Development on the Ecology of Ancient Woodland http://www.woodlandtrust.org.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/pdf/policy-and-campaigns/woodwatch/impacts- development-on-ecology-ancient-woodland.pdf 27 The Appraisal Process Appendix 1 Appraisal of Sustainability page 7 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hs2-aos-appendix01.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w509

Further written evidence from The Chiltern Countryside Group (HSR 178B) THE CHILTERN MAINLINE: COMPETITION FOR HS2 AND THE WEST COAST MAIN LINE A New Fast Line Between London And Birmingham Opened 5 September A newly upgraded fast line between London and Birmingham opened 5 September http://www.chilternrailways.co.uk/mainline. Details of the Chiltern Mainline have recently been made available:

1. Journey Time The fastest Chiltern Mainline trains will do the London-Birmingham trip in 90 minutes. They will operate at peak periods and journey times will be competitive with the West Coast Main Line (WCML) (journey time 84 minutes).

2. Connectivity London The Chiltern Mainline London terminus is Marylebone. The Heathrow Express at Paddington Station is just two tube-stops away from Marylebone. Oxford Street similarly is just two tube-stops away. Apart from Marylebone having its own underground station, Baker Street Underground is five minutes’ walk away. This is served by the Jubilee, Bakerloo, Circle, Hammersmith and City and Metropolitan lines. Baker Street provides quick links to the City and Canary Wharf.

Birmingham Chiltern Rail’s Moor Street and Snow Hill are a similar distance from the city centre as the WCML’s New Street Station. All these stations are more conveniently situated than HS2’s planned Curzon Street Station.

3. Cost of Travel Chiltern Mainline London-Birmingham standard off-peak return is £50, super off-peak return is £25 and anytime travel return is £75. This can be compared with the WCML. Standard off-peak return London-Birmingham tickets by Virgin and London Midland cost £43.30 and £44.30 respectively, and anytime travel return is £74.70 and £149 respectively. Super off-peak fares on the WCML are £19-£26. (Cheaper WCML tickets can be bought but only for tickets booked in advance for specific trains.)

4. Working on Trains Chiltern Rail is promoting comfortable carriages, landscape windows and freshly cooked food on its Mainline service. We are told free WiFi was available in every Chiltern Mainline carriage at the launch of the service. Chiltern Rail clearly sees a niche in meeting the needs of passengers wanting to work while travelling: Mainline trains will have dedicated Business Zones. These areas will have extra large seats, more spacious tables with free WiFi, at-seat power sockets, and a host allocated for their catering requirements. Tickets in the Chilterns Business Zones are not first class, and can be obtained with just a £20 supplement.

5. Comments (a) Capacity From the date when the new Chiltern Mainline rail service came into operation—5 September—passengers from Birmingham have a choice of fast trains into either Marylebone or Euston with a similar journey time and cost. Given that Chiltern Line journey times will have been cut by 20%, and that the service will have good connectivity, superior comfort and attractive working arrangements, the Chiltern Mainline service will undoubtedly draw passengers from the WCML releasing capacity there. Passengers using the Chiltern Mainline will release capacity on local Chiltern Line trains. Commuters in the Chilterns can drive to their station of choice to access either local Chiltern or WCML stations and will doubtless take advantage of this extra space on the local Chiltern trains, thus again releasing pressure on the WCML. It is clear that there is underused capacity on the Chiltern Line with scope to absorb passengers, thus releasing capacity on the WCML. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w510 Transport Committee: Evidence

Is there then a case for spending £17 billion on a new line—HS2—serving the same population centres?

(b) Time Working on Trains is not Wasted It is clear that Chiltern Rail’s forward-planners for its Mainline have met the needs of an important market sector: passengers wanting to work on board for a relatively small fare-increase. Chiltern Rail’s decision to install Business Zones on Mainline trains demonstrates one of the mistaken premises of HS2 Ltd’s business case: assuming time spent on trains is wasted.

Environment 1. HS2 and Strategic National Corridors Strategic National Corridors (SNCs) are designated to reflect the significance of transport links between the largest urban areas, ports and airports. These corridors have been identified as carrying the largest volumes of long distance passenger and freight traffic (1). HS1—the Channel Tunnel Rail Link—travels over-ground almost exclusively in association with SNCs in Kent—the M20, A2 and M2. In contrast, the vast majority of the proposed phase 1 HS2 route does not follow SNCs. In the Chilterns the planned HS2 route travels in association with the A413. This road is not an SNC.1 In addition, the A413 is mostly single-lane in each direction. Nor does this road carry the volume of traffic, nor anything like the volume of freight traffic, of an SNC. Thus the noise and visual impact of HS2 is much greater than if it were associated with SNCs.

2. HS2’s Appraisal of Sustainability acknowledges the Route—as planned—will adversely affect the AONB 1. HS2 travels for 20.5km in the Chiltern Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). HS2’s Appraisal of Sustainability tells us that 14kms of this is on the surface2 ie 68%. Is this appropriate considering the level of protection afforded AONBs (Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 s85; Planning Policy Statement 7 paragraphs 21 and 22)? 2. The Appraisal of Sustainability2 acknowledges that the route—as currently planned—would result in “adverse impacts on the character” of the AONB. It suggests, however, that the effect on the character of the AONB would be made acceptable by the introduction of bunds: “At this stage of design development, the length of the surface route (including cutting) through the AONB is about 14km and adverse impacts on the character of this area would occur. But revisions to the scheme design have reduced the magnitude and it would be possible with further earthworks to provide bunds (earth banks) and false cuttings that would further conceal the alignment”.2

Comments (a) Use of the word “character” with reference to landscape has a specific meaning.3 An AONB is a “precious landscape whose distinctive character and natural beauty are so outstanding that it is in the nation’s interest to safeguard them”4 (Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000; PPS7 paragraph 21 and 22; draft National Planning Policy Framework paragraph 167). Thus, by definition, bunds introduced in the Chilterns AONB will not help protect the character of the AONB, as the developer seems to believe; rather, they will contribute to altering it and damaging it. (b) If bunds were to be provided in the AONB, they would be limited by the presence of natural and historic features (2nd TSC submission Chiltern Countryside Group: Spoil). In addition, many question the need for bunds for noise mitigation in the AONB because, apart from a few sites, for much of its length the route in the AONB is in deep cutting and is travelling through sparsely populated areas. (c) If bunds were to be constructed, land-take and alteration of the AONB landscape would potentially be considerable: ie a reasonable width allowance for a five metre-high bund would be in the order of 30–35 metres allowing for a gap between the top of the cutting and the perimeter of the bund (Derek Godfrey FICE pers. com.). Thus a bund built on both sides of deep cuttings (65–90 metres wide at the top) would produce a corridor 125–160 metres wide in the AONB. Such cuttings make up nearly 8 kms of the HS2 route in the AONB. In conclusion, HS2 was right to acknowledge that the line would result in “adverse impacts on the character” of the AONB. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w511

HS2, however, was wrong to suggest in the same paragraph that this damage could be mitigated by providing bunds. Given this, is the route in the Chilterns AONB valid? 6 September 2011

References

1 Promoting Connectivity between the Capital Cities of the United Kingdom http://www.parliament.uk/deposits/ depositedpapers/2010/DEP2010–1733.pdf

2 Appraisal of Sustainability Main Report Volume 1 page 84 paragraph 8.4.5

3 Landscape Character http://www.naturalengland.org.uk/ourwork/landscape/englands/character/default.aspx

4 National Association of Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty http://www.aonb.org.uk/wba/NAAONB/naaonbpreview.nsf/Web%20Default%20Frameset?OpenFrameSet& Frame=Main&Src=%2F__ 80256cd200319c8e.nsf%2FPublishedContent%2F823f5de80ad3429580256cc2007292cc!OpenDocument%26 AutoFramed 7 September 2011

Written evidence from the Strathclyde Partnership for Transport (HSR 179)

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

1.1 Capacity: Network Rail’s West Coast Rail Utilisation Strategy (December 2010) concluded that the southern end of the line would soon run out of capacity. To cater for expected growth the only effective solution would be to build additional capacity. This scenario will be repeated in the future on both the East Coast and the Midland Main Lines.

1.2 Speed: This is a more important benefit for North of England and Scotland where rail still has a relatively low share of the inter-city travel market and where only HSR can facilitate a “speed step change” in modal share from air to rail.

1.3 Local Rail Travel and Freight: Capacity will be released on existing main lines in particular the West Coast, which will cater for additional local and freight services

1.4 Economics: The link between economic development and transport connectivity has been long established. Combined with effective Land Use and Development Strategies, HSR can act as a catalyst to sustainable economic growth in the regions.

1.5 Redistribution of wealth: Experience in other countries has shown that HSR can help stimulate economic activity out-with the Capital City.

1.6 Environment: Increased capacity and reduced journey times will stimulate transfer from car and air to rail. Rail is the only mode with the potential to transport large volumes of passengers over long distances between city centres in a sustainable manner, especially if an increasing proportion of the primary energy source becomes renewable.

1.7 Against: Any arguments against (other than local disruption and noise/visual intrusion which do not form part of this consultation) could be based on opportunity cost arguments—iethat other investments (whether on transport or not) would be more cost effective—and/or that greater priority should be given to local transport improvements.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

2.1 Inter-urban connectivity, whilst the primary policy objective, is not the sole objective that will be met through HSR. Wealth re-distribution and more sustainable transport would also be achieved via HSR.

2.2 Whilst some of these objectives could be met by investing in other transport modes, when compared with roads, rail is more environmentally sustainable (air quality, energy use, land use) and is better suited for travel between and access to city-centres. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w512 Transport Committee: Evidence

Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.3 Impact on investment elsewhere on the rail network need not be compromised given that major rail schemes have, currently and in the past, been delivered without directly affecting funding for the “classic” network. 2.4 There is already commitment to invest in a significant number of classic rail projects, such as Great Western Main Line electrification, Intercity Express Train Replacement Programme (IEP) and significant further enhancements to the East and West Coast Main Lines—Manchester and Liverpool area etc.

What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.5 Whilst the experience in the UK and on the continent is that some domestic flights are withdrawn where HSR operates on the same corridor, the specific impacts will depend on the precise nature of end to end journey times, fares and potentially reliability. 2.6 However, out of the 8.8 million air journeys, as many as 6.7 million start or finish in Edinburgh or Glasgow so in order to make significant modal change, it is vital that in the longer term, the construction of a high speed rail network also includes new lines across the Border. 2.7 The 2009 rail market share of the Edinburgh/Glasgow to London rail/air market was around 20% with rail journey times of typically 4 hours 30 minutes. 2.8 The freeing up of London Airports slots could go to domestic air routes that do not directly benefit from High Speed Rail, such as Aberdeen and Inverness, so that these cities do not “fall behind” in respect of London connectivity.

3. Business case How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network? 3.1 A number of fairly in-depth studies have been undertaken into a UK High Speed rail Network in addition to the HS2 study, in particular the following three major studies: — Atkins study (on behalf of SRA), later updated for the Government in 2008. — Network Rail “New Lines” study (2009). — Greengauge21 “Fast Forward” study (2009). 3.2 These studies looked at different HSR solutions and had different objectives behind their proposals. However, there were common strands such as a north-south network linking in the major cities between London and as far as Edinburgh and Glasgow. They all showed positive cases for a HSR network with benefit/cost ratios in the region of 2—> 3.5 and costs and passenger forecasts comparable with those found in the HS2 study. 3.3 Passengers transferred from car and air could gain productive working time. This is likely to be most valuable for those making longer distance trips (eg Scotland/Northern England to the south) and may not wholly be reflected in the appraisal process.

What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.4 The most recent upgrading of the WCML saw significant added costs in terms of disruption to services and reduced capacity during construction. If these costs are added to the £9 billion (the most recent cost estimate) for a scheme that will give less additional capacity than a new line, it is almost certain that such an upgrade will not be better value than a new line. 3.5 A new conventional line (restricted to c125 mph) would largely resolve the capacity issue but would not enhance journey-times and would have more limited benefits to the North of England and Scotland where journey times become increasingly important. Without journey-time savings, there will not be a significant shift to rail from the less environmentally sustainable modes of car and air. The cost of a conventional line would have to be substantially cheaper than the cost of a High Speed line before substantial cost/benefits would accrue from such a scheme.

What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.6 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would push passengers back onto less sustainable modes such as car or air. Similarly journeys not undertaken in the first place could be damaging in overall socio-economic terms. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w513

3.7 There must also be doubts if price alone could realistically manage to reduce demand sufficiently to avoid investing in additional capacity. Currently regulated fares on the UK rail network are already amongst the highest in Europe and increasing these fares further in real terms could make rail travel only affordable by the more well-off in society again damaging in socio-economic terms.

What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.8 Recent construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in Scotland has a reasonably good record in keeping to time and budget, eg Airdrie-Bathgate opening.

4. The strategic route The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International & Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1 The most important issue for high speed rail is that stations serve the city centre. Rail is the most efficient mode in respect of land use to access city centres and without city-centre termini the advantage of high speed rail will be seriously eroded. Any station locations out-with city centres will depend on local circumstances. 4.2 Additional stations should only be provided where there is sufficient demand for long distance rail travel. Any temptation to add stations to cater for high volumes of shorter journeys such as commuting, should be presumed against as it would erode the journey-time benefits of HSR.

Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.3 Most studies have considered networks that include London, Birmingham, Manchester, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow. These should be considered as the core cities for the high speed network. The “Y” network would fit in well with this scenario.

Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.4 It makes sense to start the HSR network with the London-Birmingham section. It is the most capacity restrained section on the West Coast Main Line and potentially the most complicated section to plan and construct. The link to London is the most essential element of the HSR network, so should the London- Birmingham section be rejected, it is unlikely that a national network could evolve. 4.5 Future phases do not necessarily have to be in a consecutive northwards order. The most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the English-Scottish border so consideration should be given to start construction from both ends. In this respect greater commitment to plan the future network north of Manchester and Leeds should be shown by the Government.

The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.6 The link to HS1 should be part of phase 1 for technical reasons but it will also cater for West Midlands- Europe traffic. 4.7 Heathrow could be catered for through the Old Oak Commons interchange as part of phase 1 so it is reasonable that further expenditure on this link could come later.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.1 European experience has shown that most cities directly connected to the high speed network achieve higher economic growth and there is no reason why this should not be the case for the UK. 5.2 The 2009 Greengauge21 study also found that Regional economic benefits from a “full” HSR network between London and Glasgow/Edinburgh would amount to around £80 billion and would be widely distributed but with Scotland, the North West and the South East benefiting most.

To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.3 The most important element of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity between main centres of population in the UK particularly with London. By serving strategic City Centres, high speed rail will indirectly support regional regeneration. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w514 Transport Committee: Evidence

Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.4 The release of capacity on the existing network will benefit other travellers and commuters in particular, as such, all socio-economic groups would benefit from HSR. 5.5 The majority of the population of the UK enjoys reasonably good links with the Cities that will be directly served by a future HSR network extending as far north to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Many cities will also experience improved connectivity by increased service levels on the classic network so most of the UK will benefit from HSR. 5.6 Certain locations will benefit less or more indirectly (eg North of Scotland, parts of Wales and the South West of England) and transport investment in these areas could be identified (for example rail electrification or, for the north of Scotland, improved air connectivity) to ensure distribution of benefits.

How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 5.7 There may be examples from other countries with HSR that could be used as models. 5.8 As a UK HSR Network will “replace” current classic rail links that form part of TEN, support should be sought from relevant EU budgets.

6. Impact What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1 HSR has a considerably lower carbon footprint than car and air and also matches that of classic rail when the higher capacity of HSR trains are taken into account. If it can be assumed that the primary energy source is renewable, the carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction) should be relatively small.

Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2 Yes.

What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.3 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular the West Coast Main Line, should in part be utilised by rail freight services so the impact on freight services by HSR should be very positive.

How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4 Disruption could be reduced through service changes/improvements to some of the existing local services terminating at Euston. Additional East Coast Main Line services could cater for some Scottish traffic but, if at all possible, longer distance services should be maintained during construction. May 2011

Written evidence from Wiliam Barter (HSR 180) 1. Summary 1.1 To test alternatives to High Speed 2, the DfT commissioned Atkins to prepare scenarios representing different approaches to delivering capacity and journey time benefits on the West Corridor by conventional upgrades to the West Coast Main Line (WCML). Only one scenario, designated RP2, survived financial appraisal. This, with some further enhancements, is being promoted by opponents of HS2 as an alternative to HS2, claiming that capacity increases are equivalent. 1.2 In particular, HS2 Action Alliance (HS2AA) have published a report “More capacity on WCML: an alternative to HS2”, suggesting that options based on the DfT/Atkins “RP2” would provide at least as much additional capacity as HS2 would offer. However, the HS2AA report contains a fundamental flaw, in that it takes an invalid measure of “capacity”, and fails to consider the implications of peak service levels. RP2 and variants to it suggested by HS2 Action Alliance will not match the capacity required, and that would be delivered by HS2, at the critical peak period. 1.3 Further, from the point of view of local and regional services: — RP2 will damage local and regional services through omission of stops at intermediate stations on the West Coast corridor South of Birmingham. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w515

— RP2 will rule out desirable enhancements to local and regional services on the West Coast corridor South of Birmingham.

2. Background

2.1 I am a professional rail planner, with experience under British Rail in operational planning for major projects, but working since 1994 for consultancy firms or as an independent consultant. I teach Operational Planning and Railway Economics for the Institution of Railway Operators, and am a Fellow of that Institution.

2.2 Milton Keynes is forecast to grow to become a city in the same league as Newcastle or Nottingham. Its station also acts as a railhead for large parts of Buckingham and South Northamptonshire.

2.3 For London commuters, as trains operated by the current InterCity West Coast (ICWC) franchise do not stop at Milton Keynes in peak hours, the frequency of fast services to London is very limited. This is particularly acute in the evening peak when, because the commuter and InterCity peaks overlap, there is severe pressure on the available route capacity so that only 2 fast commuter trains operate per peak hour.

2.4 There are currently 11 InterCity West Coast services from Euston in the evening peak hour, using the Fast line. The two Northampton Line trains in that peak hour also use the Fast line, making a total of 12 Fast line departures.417

2.5 For commuters to Milton Keynes, as trains operated by the current Virgin franchise do not stop at Milton Keynes in peak hours, the opportunities to travel from locations in the West Midlands are limited.

2.6 For business travellers to Birmingham, the frequency of service is no better than hourly, as of the three Euston–Birmingham trains per hour, only one stops at Milton Keynes so as to minimise the journey time for through passengers.

2.7 There is a significant flow of traffic between Milton Keynes and stations to Harrow, and the West London Line, serving Kensington Olympia (for employment areas in Hammersmith), Clapham Junction and Croydon. However, because of limited route capacity, this service is no better than hourly, and in the morning peak hour the gap in service is as much as 72 minutes.

2.8 It is peculiarly difficult to make a journey by rail between Milton Keynes (and indeed the whole South Midlands growth area) and Yorkshire/the North East. There is no obvious good route, and services on the variety of possible routes are slow and inconvenient.

3. Evidence

3.1 HS2 Action Alliance study

3.1.1 In assessing “capacity”, HS2AA have calculated nothing more than the number of physical seats in the proposed rolling stock fleet. This would be a fair proxy for capacity in the case of a service operated at standard levels throughout the day, but not for the WCML/ICWC where both demand and service provision are significantly peaked. The capacity available to passengers is of course (but as HS2AA overlook) a function of both the numbers of seats on each train and the numbers of trains that actually run in a given time period.

3.1.2 The numbers of trains in the present service reflect peak periods by increasing frequency compared with off-peak. However, the number of peak trains is constrained by the infrastructure limitations, so that little further increase is possible without major enhancements.

3.1.3 As a significantly greater level of train frequency is already offered in the peaks than in the off-peak period, running extra trains can contribute little to peak capacity. In fact, compared with the present level of ICWC peak service, RP2’s output in terms of evening peak hour trains is just ONE extra InterCity West Coast service—there would be one Birmingham and one Manchester train additionally, but offset by a actual decrease in the Liverpool and Glasgow services.418

3.1.4 So any additional peak capacity can arise primarily from only the extra coaches on each train plus the reconfiguration. After introduction of 11-car Pendolino sets, the trains would each have a capacity for 600 passengers, a total capacity for passengers of 6,000. Capacity of all trains could, it is claimed under HS2AA’s most optimistic scenario, be increased by 106 seats to 706, by addition of a 12th coach and conversion of one First Class coach to Standard Class seating. 417 Other Watford and Northampton line suburban trains depart on the Slow line. 418 There would also be two more Northampton line commuter trains, but these are outside the direct comparison with HS2 services, and could operate after HS2 anyway so are common to both alternatives. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w516 Transport Committee: Evidence

3.1.5 There would thus in this evening peak hour be one completely additional train, and 11 current trains lengthened. The extra capacity resulting is: — 11 x 106 = 1,166 — + 1 x 706 = 706 — = Total of 1,862

3.1.6 This is an increase of just 28.4% in the evening peak hour, rather than the increase claimed by HS2AA for their proposal over the 2013 “Do minimum” case of just over 100%.419

3.1.7 The full benefit deriving from both seats on trains and numbers of trains can only be achieved outside the peaks, when of course the need for extra capacity is minimal. It follows from this that the lower load factors claimed by HS2AA for their proposals are largely a result of capacity being provided off-peak when it will hardly be used, rather than contributing much of significance at the times of day when extra capacity is actually needed.

3.2. InterCity West Coast—assessment of capacity requirements

3.3 I now go on to calculate how evening peak hour capacity out of Euston would build up over the years, starting with committed schemes for train lengthening, then comparing RP2, the HS2AA proposals, and HS2.My analysis concentrates on ICWC trains leaving London Euston in the evening peak hour (17:00 to 17:59). This represents the period of both high-value business and greatest demand, so is when the greatest single portion of benefits are generated. This is taken as being a more valid representation of reality than the all-day average implied by HS2AA’s analysis.

3.4 Scenarios considered are: — RP2—suggested conventional upgrade to WCML as set out in the February 2011 update to the High Speed 2 Strategic Alternatives Study (DfT/Atkins), featuring 11-car operation and infrastructure changes to accommodate additional trains. For this purpose, RP2 and RP2a are identical. — RP2HS2AA—additional scenario proposed by High Speed 2 Action Alliance, based on 12- car trains and conversion of one First Class coach to Standard Class. — HS2 + ICWC—the sum of capacity on HS2 and ICWC trains, ie the overall capacity on the West Coast Corridor served by HS2 and the West Coast Main Line (WCML). HS2 capacity is of course zero before 2026. The basis of the calculation is 11 trains per peak hour, as set out in the Technical Appendix to the 2009 set of reports by HS2 Ltd.

3.4.1 These capacities are then compared with a Capacity Target. I do not have an actual base figure for the 2008 evening peak hour to apply this growth to, so have taken the 2008 capacity as being equal to the demand, a reasonable starting point for peak services. The best interpretation of this line, therefore, is to take it as representing the growth in capacity required to maintain the balance with demand at its 2008 level.

3.4.2 The 2008 base capacity, with 11 ICWC departures, each with 442 seats, is the starting point for all scenarios. I am aware that one of the 11 trains is in fact formed of 2 x 5-car Voyager (492 seats), but have assumed Pendolinos throughout as this is a likely future scenario within the next franchise, and for simplicity.

3.4.3 The 2013 step based on conversion of all evening peak hour trains to 11-car sets is also common to all options other than HS2.

3.4.4 Key events in the evolution of capacity for RP2 are then: — 2026—one additional evening peak 11-car departure.420 This service might be introduced earlier than 2026 but schemes to enable this have not been developed to the point of being able to assume this.

3.4.5 Key events in the evolution of capacity for RP2/HS2AA are then: — 2018—introduction of 12-car trains with reduced First Class accommodation. This date is purely nominal, since as far as I know no timescales have been determined, but it is likely that enabling works would be completed before 2026. — 2026—one additional evening peak departure, as for RP2, but of 12-car formation with reduced First Class. 419 My calculation from HS2AA figures—HS2AA themselves make their comparison with the current train length of nine coaches, even though they accept that a proportion of the fleet is committed to be lengthened to 11 cars, and themselves refer to that as the “Do Minimum” scenario. By doing this they are able to present a headline capacity increase of 165%, of which much derives from a committed scheme. 420 Additional suburban (Northampton line) departures are also proposed, but are not part of ICWC services, and could equally be delivered after HS2. In fact, I believe such services could be operated anyway, but accept that this requires more detailed investigation. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w517

3.4.6 Key assumptions in the evolution of capacity for HS2+ICWC are then: — Capacity for HS2, introduced in 2026, is based on 4 x Captive departures to Birmingham, each with 1100 seats, and 7 x Classic Compatible departures, each with 550 seats, made up of 2 x Liverpool, 1 x Glasgow, 1 x Preston and 3 x Manchester. — Opening of Phase 2 is assumed in 2033. — On opening of Phase 2, I have not assumed any extra trains, but simply that the Manchester trains will be converted to Captive with higher seating capacity. There will of course be extra trains, but as the implication is that these will be to Leeds they are regarded as not relevant to this WC comparison. Heathrow and HS1 services are also outside this comparison. — Other means of increasing capacity through the operating concept may exist—eg running two Classic Compatible sets coupled to Manchester then split for Liverpool and Glasgow, but have not been assumed. — It is currently unknown how many residual trains there will be after 2026. My assumption is six per evening peak hour—this is four serving Milton Keynes as suggested in my April 2011 article in Modern Railways, plus two others—simply a plausible working assumption to populate this analysis, and slightly less than now on the expectation that capacity will be absorbed by extra stops compared with now. 3.4.7 The 2008 capacity has been uplifted by the weighted average of the forecast growth from 2008 to 2033 for the key WC locations of Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow and Liverpool given in the Demand and Appraisal Report, which represents growth of approximately 150%. This equates to an annual growth rate of 3.8%, is in line with the range of growth rates identified by Network Rail in the WCML Route Utilisation Strategy to 2025. 3.4.8 The assumed growth rate would have to be reduced to 2.3% per annum in order to bring the target and the RP2/HS2AA figures into line in 2033. The actual annual growth rate for franchised long-distance operators since 2002/3 is about 5.5% (National Rail Trends). 3.4.9 The following chart displays the findings from this analysis:

16000

14000 Capacity target

RP2 12000 RP2/H2AA 10000 HS2+ICWC 8000

Seated capacity Seated 6000

4000

2000

0 2008 2013 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043 West Coast Corridor - evolution of capacity, evening peak hour from Euston

3.5 RP2—disadvantages for local/regional rail services 3.5.1 Under RP2, the present 12 fast line trains in the evening peak hour would become 16, of which two would enhance the fast service to Leighton Buzzard, Milton Keynes and Northampton. So for Northampton line commuters, there would be 11 evening peak hour trains instead of the present 9. This is good in itself, but no more than would be possible after HS2 without further investment. The argument for RP2 is simply that this benefit would be available in a shorter timescale than HS2. 3.5.2 In fact, I believe it would be possible to run additional commuter services now, in the form of a shuttle service between Euston and Milton Keynes. This would avoid the issue of the crossing move by using the Fast cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w518 Transport Committee: Evidence

line all the way, and would match ICWC running times by running non-stop to Milton Keynes, using Voyager sets displaced from Chester services by the pending electrification. 3.5.3 But beyond RP2, there is no realistic scope for further enhancing service levels for commuters on the West Coast Main Line. So RP2 rules out, for ever, the following improvements that are clearly desirable now and would be possible after HS2: — Enhancing the Milton Keynes—Birmingham service from 1 train per hour to 2. — Half-hourly frequency for the Milton Keynes–Kensington–Clapham Junction–Croydon service. — Reasonable rail options to connect Milton Keynes/Bucks/Beds/Northants and Yorkshire/ North East. — Improved frequencies for other Euston local and commuting services. — Commuting services to Milton Keynes from the West Midlands. 3.5.4 Worse than that, RP2, working as it does within constrained capacity, attempts to improve journey times by omitting intermediate stops. In the following respects, the service at stations between London and Birmingham would become worse under RP2: — Milton Keynes–Coventry/Birmingham: Services only run via Northampton, with extended journey time. — Coventry–London: Reduced to two direct trains per hour instead of three as alternate Birmingham–Euston trains would not stop. — Birmingham International–London: reduced to two direct trains per hour instead of 3 as alternate Birmingham–Euston trains would not stop.

3.6 HS2—benefits for local/regional rail services, ruled out by HS2 3.6.1 In its April 2011 edition, the journal “Modern Railways” published my article reviewing possible enhancements to the train service at Milton Keynes after HS2. A copy of this article is attached for your information. 3.6.2 Key opportunities from that analysis that would be enabled by HS2 are: — Enhancing the Milton Keynes–Birmingham service from one train per hour to two. Although the bulk of through London–Birmingham traffic would transfer to HS2, I am confident that there would be sufficient residual and intermediate business to support two trains per hour between Euston and Birmingham via Milton Keynes, where both would stop. This would also enhance the service at Watford and Rugby. — Commuting services to Milton Keynes from the West Midlands would also be improved in both frequency and speed by this service pattern. — Half-hourly frequency for the Milton Keynes–Kensington–Clapham Junction–Croydon service, as called for by today’s traffic levels. — Improved frequencies for other Euston local and commuting services. As well as the two additional fast Northampton line services stopping at Milton Keynes that would be enabled by both RP2 and HS2, HS2 leaves capacity for a general uplift of about 50% in semi-fast and stopping suburban services on the Watford/Milton Keynes/Northampton line. — With Phase 2 of HS2, Milton Keynes and Yorkshire/North East would linked by a journey with just one change of trains—at the Birmingham Interchange. 3.6.3 Subject to its own business case, it would also become possible for South Northants to have its own station, at Blisworth, close to both the A43 and M1, and currently ruled out by the frequency of through trains at the site. May 2011

Written evidence from the Federation of Small Businesses (HSR 181) The Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) has taken a neutral approach nationally to the development of high speed rail. Small businesses recognise that the UK rail network needs to be upgraded and brought in line with European standards to ensure connectivity with the continent. Having said that the cost of HS2 is astronomical in relation to the amount spent annually on the road network. FSB regions, affected by HS2, will hold differing positions on the economic and environmental impact. Some members hold the view that it will bring economic benefits through speedier journey times to major cities; however, the flipside is that members along the HS2 line will be adversely impacted during and after construction. Only 9% of FSB members consider establishing a high speed rail network a priority and in general terms small businesses are moderate users of the rail network, with only 4% considering trains crucial to their cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w519

business operation. A further 21% of small businesses state that trains are quite important to them. Only between 4% and 6% respectively considered train, air travel and bus to be crucial to their business operation. The main reason small businesses are not using rail is the cost. Around half of small businesses say they have been, or will be, negatively impacted by recent rail fare rises. Other businesses have said that the locations they need to visit, often out of town business parks, are not conveniently reached by rail, so they have no choice but to use their car. The majority of small businesses are dependent on their cars and vans for their business operations. Conversely, as many as 72% of small businesses say their car is crucial to their business. Public transport in any form is therefore not likely to replace the use of a car/van for small businesses. The nature of the work carried out by those businesses using a car/van is such that it is not possible to replace the car journey with a public transport journey. Nearly half of small businesses, or 43%, even said that nothing would encourage them to use the public transport network more. The state of repair of roads therefore is a crucial element in creating an environment in which small businesses are able to grow and prosper. Small businesses typically operate their car/van within a 40 mile radius of their base and are more concerned about petrol prices, the state of the road network, congestion on local roads and the rising cost of insurance mainly as a result of damage to their vehicle caused by potholes in roads. Sixty per cent of FSB members say the state of roads impacts negatively on their business.421 Key messages: — The FSB calls on the Government to undertake a full assessment of transport priorities before signing off on the HS2 project. — Small businesses are moderate users of the rail network and the main reason for not using rail is cost. — Small businesses rely on the road network and 6 in 10 have no choice but to use a car/van for business purposes. June 2011

Written evidence from Dr Sandra Tuppen (HSR 182) This paper concentrates on Section 4 in the terms of reference, The Strategic Route.

1. Summary 1.1 The Government claims that its proposed Y-shaped high-speed rail (HSR) network would deliver a huge increase in rail capacity, ease overcrowding on existing railways, transform the country’s economic geography and help to bridge the north-south divide.422 It claims that no other option would match the new high-speed network in terms of capacity, connectivity and reliability.423 However, there is evidence, on the contrary, that the capacity, connectivity and reliability of parts of the UK’s north-south rail network would actually be compromised by the Government’s proposed Y-shaped strategic route. 1.2 A key element of the Government’s choice of strategic route is its linkage to the classic north-south rail networks, the West Coast and East Coast Main Lines (hereafter WCML and ECML). The Government’s Y- shaped route linking to the WCML and ECML has major flaws, and could have a detrimental effect on the rail services of many towns and cities in the Midlands and North of England and in Scotland, leaving some areas with a worse service than before the construction of the line and less well connected to the country’s major economic centres. Flaws in the strategy include: — the decision to funnel all north-south fast long-distance services between Scotland and London up and down one twin-track line (the “trunk” of the Y)—presenting a serious risk to service delivery and reliability; — the reliance on unproven technology to deliver the required 18 trains per hour on the trunk of the Y; — lack of spare train paths on parts of the classic rail network, meaning HS2 classic-compatible trains would be competing with existing services for train paths when on the classic network; — the mixing of high-speed trains with regional services and freight on the northern half of the classic network, bring reliability issues and longer journey times for many outside the core Y network; 421 All stats in this response are taken from the FSB Small Business Survey Panel February survey on Infrastructure. The survey had 1739 responses. 422 High-Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. Consultation, Feb. 2011, pp 7–9. 423 Consultation, p 12. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w520 Transport Committee: Evidence

— potentially fewer seats on the proposed classic-compatible trains than many of the trains they would replace (550 seats on HS2 classic-compatible compared with 589 on the 11-car Pendolino it would replace); and — lack of “tilt-mode” on classic-compatible trains, which would run more slowly on the WCML than the Pendolinos they would replace. 1.3 The Government’s chosen strategic route would be detrimental to many in the West Midlands, where under current proposals passengers would have no opportunity to join the network at Coventry or indeed (with one exception) connect with any northbound high-speed services at the proposed Birmingham Interchange station. It would also have a negative impact on towns such as Lancaster and Carlisle which would, under the current proposals, lose their fast direct services to London, and also on the busy stations at Milton Keynes and Watford, which would no longer figure on the UK’s principal north-south rail route.

2. The Strategic Route 2.1 A key feature of the Government’s strategy is that the HSR line should be linked to the classic north- south rail networks. In Phase One, the new London–West Midlands line would link to the WCML near Lichfield, permitting onward travel to Manchester, Liverpool, and Glasgow; in Phase Two, there would be links from the “arms” of the high-speed Y network to the WCML north of Manchester and to the ECML north of Leeds.424 A set of specially-designed classic-compatible trains would be needed, capable of running on both the new high-speed line and, in northern England and Scotland, on the classic rail network. In addition, “captive” high-speed trains would run shuttle services solely on the new line between London and Birmingham (and to Manchester and Leeds in Phase Two). 2.2 It is important to note that these new classic-compatible trains would in most cases replace, rather than supplement, the long-distance services currently operating over the classic north-south rail network. Describing the Day 1 Phase One assumptions on which the case for HSR is modelled, and the services which would transfer to the HSR line and those which would remain, HS2 Ltd state in their 2009 Technical Appendix that “For the purpose of this exercise and for the avoidance of doubt, unless stated otherwise, this specification supercedes all existing Virgin West Coast and London Midland services to and from Euston”.425 That this is still the current strategy can be seen from a recent FOI response (FOI10/157), in which HS2 Ltd referred the enquirer to the 2009 Technical Appendix.426 The draft tender for the next WCML franchise states that “it is likely that the first phase of High Speed 2 would fundamentally alter the nature of the InterCity West Coast franchise once operational”.427 2.3 The Government has published the service assumptions on which its business case is based.428 It could, of course, be argued that these are just service assumptions, used for demand modelling, and that an operator could in practice vary the stopping patterns. However, the Government’s business case, on which the project is being appraised, is predicated on these precise service assumptions. Any additional stops would have a negative impact on journey times, and thus on the “Value of Time” benefits which are so critical to the Government’s business case for HS2. It is therefore important, I believe, to look at the Government’s modelled service assumptions and their impact. Its Day 1 scenario is for three shuttle services to run each way between London and Birmingham per hour (four in peak hours) and six or seven classic-compatible services to run over the WCML and high-speed line:

Table 1 ASSUMED SERVICE PATTERN FOR PHASE ONE Trains per hour Route Calling at Rail line 3 London-Birmingham Old Oak Common (OOC), Birmingham Interchange, HS2 (4 in peak Curzon St Birmingham Curzon St hours) 3 London-Manchester OOC, Stockport, with 1 per hour calling also at HS2 + Piccadilly Wilmslow WCML 2 London-Liverpool OOC, Stafford, Crewe, Runcorn (1 per hour) HS2 + Lime St OOC, Warrington (1 per hour) WCML 1 London-Glasgow OOC, Warrington, Wigan and Preston HS2 + Central WCML 1 (peak London-Preston OOC, Warrington, Wigan HS2 + only) WCML

424 Consultation, p 29. Precise connecting points between the Y and classic lines will be announced later in 2011. 425 HS2 Technical Appendix, Dec. 2009, p 4. 426 http://hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77815 427 InterCity West Coast Franchise: Draft Invitation to Tender, May 2011, p 29. http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/passenger/franchises/InterCityWest/InterCity-West-Coast-Franchise-draft-tender-invitation/pdf/ tender-invitation-document.pdf 428 Economic Case for HS2, pp 58–61. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w521

2.4 The Government proposes that, aside from the three London–Birmingham Curzon St shuttle services, all the above trains would pass non-stop through the Birmingham Interchange Station. Having no stop at Birmingham seems odd if the intention is to improve inter-urban connectivity. However, if a Birmingham Interchange stop were to be included on long-distance services between London and the North, a time-penalty of about six minutes would need to be added per train429 and the business case “Value of Time” benefits would have to be revised down accordingly, potentially weakening the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) significantly. 2.5 The same is true for stations on the northern WCML at which the Government proposes no classic- compatible high-speed rail services would stop. Stations omitted from the HSR service include Lancaster, Carlisle, Oxenholme and Penrith. Adding stops at these stations would mean that an improved London–Glasgow journey time would not be achievable, and that the business case benefits would have to be revised down to take account of longer end-to-end journey times. The improved journey times for London- Glasgow come at the expense of connectivity for other northern towns such as Carlisle and Lancaster. 2.6 On completion of Phase Two, the Government assumes it will be able to run all of the following on the Y network, some of which would also run onto the WCML and ECML classic lines:

Table 2 ASSUMED SERVICE PATTERN FOR PHASE TWO Trains per hour, Y route Route Calling at Rail line 3 (4 in peak London–Birmingham Old Oak Common (OOC), Birmingham HS2 hours) Curzon St Interchange, Birmingham Curzon St 3 (4 in peak London–Manchester OOC, Manchester outskirts, Manchester HS2 hours) 3 London–Leeds OOC, Birmingham Interchange (1 per hour) HS2 OOC only (1 per hour) OOC, East Midlands HS2 station, South Yorks HS2 station (1 per hour) 1 London–South Yorks OOC, East Mids HS2 station HS2 HS2 station 2 Birmingham Curzon Manchester outskirts HS2 St–Manchester 2 Birmingham Curzon East Mids, South Yorks HS2 St–Leeds 2 London–Liverpool OOC, Stafford, Crewe, Runcorn (1 per hour) HS2 + WCML Lime St OOC, Warrington (1 per hour) 1 (2 in peak London–Glasgow Wigan and Preston HS2 + WCML hours) Central 2 London–Newcastle York, Darlington HS2 + ECML 1 Birmingham Curzon East Mids, South Yorks, York, Darlington HS2 + ECML St–Newcastle

2.7 Some double-counting seems to be in evidence in the Government’s HSR Consultation document, where the Government appears to claim that the new high-speed line would allow 14 or more extra trains (larger and longer with up to 1,100 passengers) to be run per hour, and also that transferring long-distance services to the high-speed line would free up capacity on the classic lines for new regional services.430 The 14 or more trains extra trains per hour that would run on the high-speed line cannot both be new services and transferees from the classic lines whose paths would be taken by new local services.

3. Risks of Diverting Almost All North–south Long-distance Services Down the Trunk of the “Y” 3.1 The transfer of the bulk of the UK’s north-south long distance rail traffic from the classic lines to the high-speed line for part of its journey presents strategic risks. Funnelling almost all the north-south long- distance services that currently operate over the WCML and ECML down the “trunk” of the Y is a highly risky strategy. It is proposed that HS2 is a twin-track line, not 4-tracked, so if one train fails on the trunk of the Y, or there is damage, the potential for disruption to what will have become the country’s main north-south rail route is enormous. If the southern portions of the WCML and ECML are given over to local rail services, it will not be feasible to divert long distance trains back onto the classic network in case of a failure on the trunk of the Y, and in any case the “captive” high-speed trains would not be capable of running on the classic network. 3.2 In order to maintain sufficient services following the diversion of long-distance services to the new high- speed line, the Government proposes that, in Phase Two, 18 trains per hour would run at peak times, in each 429 HS2 Technical Appendix,p5. 430 Consultation, p 13. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w522 Transport Committee: Evidence

direction, along the trunk of the Y. However, the HS2 Technical Appendix states that the 18-train-per-hour scenario is reliant on “anticipated improvements in train control systems and train braking technology”.431 Although these technological developments are not yet proven, the Government’s choice of a Y shaped strategic network is reliant on them for delivery of sufficient services to meet demand for long-distance services.432 There appears to be no provision in the Government’s strategy for the failure of such technological advances to materialise. This seems a highly risky strategy to pursue.

4. Infrastructure Capacity 4.1 It is not clear how, on the northern half of the WCML, the classic-compatible services will co-exist with semi-fast inter-urban services when there are already capacity constraints on the line, for example in the Carlisle area. Network Rail describes the area around Carlisle as one with “minimal or no capacity for growth” and a “Key timetable constraint that determines the timetable elsewhere on the route”.433 Yet it is proposed that a stopping service between Penrith, Carlisle, and Preston should operate in addition to the HS2 classic-compatible service, in order to enable those passengers to change, as is proposed, onto the HS2 train at Preston.434

5. Train Capacity 5.1 Long-distance “captive” services between London and Birmingham (Phase One) and London and Manchester and London and Leeds (Phase Two) could utilise larger trains, with up to 1,100 seats if two 200m trains were coupled together. However, for most destinations on the northern WCML, only a single 200m classic-compatible set could be used without extensive platform lengthening. HS2 Ltd therefore assumes a capacity of 550 seats per train for trains running onto the WCML.435 From April 2012, 11-car Pendolinos are expected to come into service on the WCML, raising capacity from 439 to 589 seats.436 For stations on the WCML, other than Birmingham in Phase One, and Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds in Phase Two, which could accommodate double-length trains, this potentially means a lower seating capacity than will be available on the 11-car Pendolino, for which investment in platform lengthening will by then have been made. 5.2 HS2 Ltd notes, of their proposed London-Glasgow classic-compatible services: “In modelling these services we identified high levels of demand resulting in some severe crowding during the peak. In reality there would be a number of ways in which to deal with this, which could include a reconfiguration of the timetable or minor upgrades to the route. These options would require further detailed analysis and planning but for simplicity we have modelled 400m-long trains on this route”. This contradicts their statement that only 200m classic-compatible HSR trains could operate on the WCML. The fact that 400m-long trains would not be able to stop at WCML stations without major upgrade work (and that platform lengthening to allow 400m trains is unlikely to be feasible at Glasgow Central) does not appear to have been taken into account.

6. Time-saving Benefits 6.1 The Government claims its strategy of joining the high-speed line to the existing network offers the benefit of improved journey times to certain destinations outside the core Y network, by enabling long-distance classic-compatible trains to travel at high speed on the new line and at regular speeds on the classic network.437 However, there is a flaw. As HS2 Ltd states, classic-compatible trains “would not be able to exploit the maximum classic line speeds on certain sections of the WCML north of Lichfield, as they would not be fitted with tilting equipment. So, over certain WCML route sections, there would be some time lost against today’s services.”438 6.2 In other words, passengers whose journeys include a stretch on the new high-speed line would benefit from faster journeys on that segment of their journey. For long-distance passengers travelling north of Lichfield (or Manchester in Phase Two), this benefit would be partly negated by the fact that the classic-compatible train would travel slower than the Pendolino on the WCML. Those passengers whose journey takes place on a classic-compatible train entirely on the WCML, for instance between Preston and Glasgow, potentially face a slower journey than at present—and on a smaller train than the 11-car Pendolino. 6.3 HS2 Ltd, in response to FOI 10/169, included the following statement from their engineers: “We did some journey time analysis comparing the journey times from Lichfield (as a proxy for the point at which the HS2 route would rejoin the West Coast Main Line) to Glasgow Central. We compared a 125 mph tilting Pendolino with a 110 mph non-tilting Pendolino, to measure the worst case with the existing infrastructure. The difference between these two runs was just over 13 minutes (ie nowhere near the 30 minutes quoted) ... So with some minor modification to the existing infrastructure (little more than changing speed signs) it should 431 HS2 Technical Appendix,p6. 432 Economic Case for HS2, p 61. 433 West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy, Draft, Dec. 2010, p 33. 434 HS2 Technical Appendix, p 12. 435 HS2 Technical Appendix,p6. 436 Network Rail’s RUS 2014 baseline assumes four new 11-car Pendolino 390s, and 31 existing 9-car sets lengthened to 11 cars, have been introduced by then. 437 Eg London to Liverpool, 1 hour 37 minutes; London to Glasgow, 3 hours 30 minutes (Consultation, p 20). 438 High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A Report to Government by High Speed Two Limited, Dec. 2009, p 148. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w523

be possible to reduce the 13 minute deficit to around six or seven minutes, primarily by increasing the 110 mph limit for non-tilting trains to 125 mph on the straighter sections.” HS2 Ltd state that “As the whole-route journey times demonstrate, for London journeys the limited time lost is far outweighed by the savings achieved on HS2.”439 Not everyone using HS2 will be travelling to and from London, however.

6.4 A major factor in the claimed time-savings for certain passengers using stations beyond the “Y” is the fact that that many stations hitherto served by fast trains on the WCML would lose their fast direct services. To achieve a four-hour London-Glasgow journey in Phase One—in the face of a 13-minute deficit on the Lichfield to Glasgow stretch—and a 3.5 hour journey in Phase Two, the London-Glasgow trains would no longer call at Lancaster, Carlisle, Penrith or Oxenholme.440 HS2 Ltd envisages southbound passengers from these stations taking a Pendolino, which would “connect into and out of” the HS2 service at Preston, enabling passengers, if they choose, to change onto the faster HS2 service to London.441

6.5 In order for a southbound semi-fast Pendolino to connect into and out of the HS2 service at Preston, it would need to arrive before and leave after the HS2 service from Glasgow. HS2 Ltd set out its assumed journey times in Appendix 2 of the Technical Appendix. Although HS2 Ltd state, in FOI 10/157 cited above, that this is a train service specification for demand modelling and not a timetable proposition as such, these are the service patterns and journey times assumed for the consultation and underpinning the business case calculations. Passengers from Carlisle, it is assumed by HS2 Ltd, would on Day 1 have an end-to-end journey time to London Euston of 3 hours 44 minutes on the direct “semi-fast” Pendolino (compared to 3 hours 12 minutes today). If they changed at Preston onto the HS2 train, they would have a 3 hour 8 minute journey. A similar increase in direct journey times to London is envisaged on Day 1 for passengers from Oxenholme, Penrith and Lancaster. It is regrettable that the potentially negative impacts of the proposals on some northern towns and cities have not been made explicit in the 2011 consultation documents, and can only be found in archived documents from 2009.

6.6 The pro-HSR lobby group Greengauge 21, in their 2009 paper Fast Forward: A High-Speed Rail Strategy for Britain, highlighted some points that should be considered when planning a new HSR line linked with the classic network: “First, there is going to be a need for interoperable rolling stock, to be able to run over the West Coast Main Line without losing the journey time advantages that the Pendolino fleet offers. This almost certainly means there is a need for a trainset capable of operating at 320 km/h over new high-speed lines and at 200km/h+ in tilt mode.”442 By opting for ultra-high speed (400km/h max) on the HSR line, rather than the more moderate 320km/h, HS2 Ltd has seemingly ruled out the possibility of using tilting trains, and therefore journey times on the WCML are worse after the introduction of HS2.

6.7 HS2 Ltd acknowledges that some passengers could experience longer or less frequent services— particularly “those on the Great Western Main Line who would have an extra stop at Old Oak Common or from some stations on the WCML”—and that some services could see increased crowding with more passengers using rail and Underground services to connect to high speed services. However, they believe that these impacts and the disbenefits they generate are outweighed by the large benefits to be gained by HS2.443 However, the people receiving the benefits and disbenefits are not one and the same: the Government’s current strategic route would see Manchester and Glasgow passengers benefitting from faster journeys at the expense of other northern towns and cities, and Birmingham at the expense of Coventry and other West Midlands towns.

7. Conclusion

7.1 HS2 Ltd states that the core rationale for considering a new high-speed line is the shortfall in capacity.444 A major question is whether the UK actually needs all the additional capacity that HS2 would provide. However voluble the proponents of HS2 may be, the fact remains that HS2 Ltd itself is inclined to caution on the benefits of such a project. “The case for high speed rail rests in part on its relative merits when compared against other options... There may be other options for increasing capacity and lowering journey times on the London–West Midlands corridor”.445 Given the amount of public expenditure involved, and the flaws in the Government’s strategic Y shaped route outlined above, I would welcome a detailed feasibility study into the Government’s proposals for HS2 and an independent assessment of the alternatives before the proposal is taken further. June 2011

439 High Speed Rail … A Report to Government, p 148. 440 In the current modelling, HS2 trains between London and Glasgow would call, during Phase One operation, at Warrington, Wigan and Preston, and after the Y was constructed, at Wigan and Preston only. 441 HS2 Technical Appendix, p 12. 442 Fast Forward: A High-Speed Rail Strategy for Britain, p 39. 443 High Speed Rail … A Report to Government, p 175. 444 High Speed Rail … A Report to Government, p 13. 445 High Speed Rail … A Report to Government, p 33. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w524 Transport Committee: Evidence

Further written evidence from Dr Sandra Tuppen (HSR 182A)

Further to my earlier submission (Submission 182), I should like to make the following additional observations, and would be most grateful if these and the accompanying attachment concerning the impact of HS2 on Liverpool's services could be treated as supplementary evidence. I note that in his evidence to the Transport Committee last week, Mr Tony Page of West Coast Rail 250 was at pains to stress the benefits that HS2 would bring from Day 1 to users of the West Coast Main Line (WCML). I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to HS2 Ltd’s own “Day 1 Train Service Assumptions for Demand Modelling”, published in December 2009 but not included among the 2011 consultation documents. This document provides a set of assumptions as to how passenger services could be configured on HS2 and the existing WCML after HS2 is built. HS2 Ltd stresses that this is not a timetable but a set of assumptions used to model likely passenger demand across the two lines. In it they seek to address “the potential use of capacity that is released on existing routes”. Although services could undoubtedly be configured in ways other than in this document, its importance, I think, lies in the principle that seems to underpin both it and indeed the whole HS2 strategy. This could be summarised as follows: — HS2 would connect key cities of the UK, freeing up line capacity on the WCML for more local and regional trains to run. — The WCML line capacity is freed up by transferring long-distance services from the WCML to HS2, ie by removing some long-distance services from the WCML. — HS2 services will call at major cities only, so some towns currently served by long-distance WCML services will not receive HS2 services and many will face a worsening of classic services when WCML long-distance services are withdrawn.

Some existing WCML long-distance services will clearly have to be retained if those towns not served by HS2 are to remain on the network. Many towns will, however, suffer a reduced service, either in terms of number of trains per hour or journey times. After all, if all existing WCML long distance services were retained exactly as they are today, in parallel with HS2, there would be no spare line capacity for any new local or regional services on the WCML.

In other words, one town’s gain is another's loss: you cannot pour a quart into a pint pot.

Journey times on classic Pendolino services between London and the following destinations would be longer, in HS2 Ltd’s model, as the residual WCML long-distance services would call at more stations: Liverpool (+1 hour) Runcorn (+1 hour) Stafford (+1 hour) Crewe (+0 to +1 hour) Glasgow (+30 mins) Carlisle (+30 mins) Penrith (+30 mins) Oxenholme (+25 mins) Lancaster (+20 mins) Wolverhampton (+10 mins) Sandwell & Dudley (+10 mins) Birmingham New Street (+10 mins) Birmingham International (+10 mins) Coventry (+10 mins) Rugby (+5–10 mins)

In HS2 Ltd's model, the following stations on the WCML would also suffer a reduced number of services per hour: Coventry (3 tph reduced to 1tph) Birmingham International (3 tph reduced to 1tph) Birmingham New Street (3 tph reduced to 1 tph) Stoke on Trent (2 tph reduced to 1tph)

(Coventry and Stoke have been mentioned by other commentators but I am not sure the reduction in services to New St have been noted.) It would interesting to know whether these negative impacts have been taken account of in the HS2 business case.

The attached brief paper shows the potential effects on Liverpool's services of HS2 Ltd's service assumptions, which divert Liverpool's classic Pendolino services via Birmingham and lead to a reduction in viable passenger capacity, post-HS2. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w525

HS2 and Reductions in London–Liverpool Services 1. Summary 1.1 In its high-speed rail consultation document the Government stated that HS2 would enable journey times between London and Liverpool to be reduced from 2hrs 08m to 1hr 37m, and would provide a significant increase in passenger capacity on all long-distance services. 1.2 However, HS2 Ltd’s Technical Appendix(i) suggests that although HS2 would provide an increase in off- peak capacity for London-Liverpool passengers, it would not provide them with a viable increase in capacity at peak times, Instead it would: — provide fewer peak time seats on the HS2 London-Liverpool service than will be available in 2012; and — add one hour to journey times on the London-Liverpool Pendolino service by routing it via Birmingham.

2. Peak time intercity trains from 2012 By December 2012, two Pendolinos per hour will operate at peak times on the West Coast Main Line (WCML) between London and Liverpool, the trains having been lengthened from 9 to 11 cars and providing 589 seats each (ie 1,178 seats per hour).

3. Peak time HS2 trains from 2026 If HS2 goes ahead as proposed, between 2026 and 2033 two HS2 classic compatible trains per hour would run all day between London and Liverpool, partly on the HS2 Phase 1 line between London and Lichfield and partly on the WCML classic line between Lichfield and Liverpool, taking 1hr 50m (a saving of 18 mins). HS2 Ltd states that each train would have 550 seats (ie 1,100 seats per hour).

4. Peak time HS2 trains from 2033 From 2033, with the extension of the high-speed line to Manchester, one of the two London-Liverpool trains per hour would run via Warrington, completing its journey from Warrington to Liverpool on the classic line and further reducing the London-Liverpool journey time by 13 minutes to 1hr 37m. The second train would still take 1hr 50m, as it would have to continue to use the WCML beyond Lichfield in order to call at Stafford, Crewe and Runcorn. The number of London–Liverpool seats would remain at 1,100 per hour in total.

5. Withdrawal of existing LondonÐLiverpool intercity service from 2026 5.1 HS2 could have provided Liverpool with an increase in capacity at peak times were it not that, in order to meet the Government’s strategic goal of freeing up space for more commuter and regional services on the southern part of the WCML, HS2 Ltd proposes that the existing Liverpool–London intercity service should be withdrawn in 2026. Instead, the London–Birmingham New Street service (operated today by Virgin) and Birmingham–Liverpool service (operated by London Midland) would be combined to form a single through service between London and Liverpool via Birmingham New St. This would free up two paths on the southern end of the WCML at peak times for new suburban services, but would leave the journey time of the intercity service between London and Liverpool lengthened by one hour. 5.2 HS2 Ltd describes this “residual” intercity service as follows: “London–Birmingham–Wolverhampton–Liverpool Residual West Coast Euston–Birmingham–Wolverhampton service, serving all intermediate stations currently served by Virgin Pendolino services. Service doubles as a Birmingham–Liverpool fast service, providing Wolverhampton with a fast link to Crewe and the north, and replacing an existing London Midland Birmingham–Liverpool semi-fast service.” 5.3 With a journey time between London Euston and Liverpool Lime Street of 3hrs 10m, and 12 stops en route, this projection represents a severe downgrading of the existing intercity service between Liverpool and London, currently with between two and four stops en route. It seems unlikely that business passengers (or indeed many leisure travellers) will wish to spend an additional hour travelling, so the only viable services for most people travelling between London and Liverpool will be the two HS2 services per hour, containing a total of 1,100 seats per hour—a reduction of 78 seats on the 1,178 seats that will be available from the two peak-hour 11-car Pendolinos from 2012. This decrease comes despite a forecast increase in demand on the London-Liverpool line. 5.4 Passengers travelling between London and Runcorn would also face a reduction in viable capacity in HS2 Ltd’s scenario. From 2012 they will be served by two Pendolinos per hour at peak times, each with 589 seats. From 2026 they would be served by one HS2 train per hour (550 seats), plus the Pendolino routed via Birmingham, taking one hour longer than today. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w526 Transport Committee: Evidence

6. Impact on freed up WCML capacity 6.1 With the removal of the two peak time direct London-Liverpool Pendolino services and extension to Liverpool of two existing London-Birmingham services per hour, two peak time slots on the southern WCML would be freed for new suburban services between London and Northampton. HS2 Ltd’s model of likely passenger demand on the WCML after HS2 indicates that it would be possible to free two further peak time slots per hour by withdrawing one of the existing London–Birmingham Pendolino services and one London–Manchester Pendolino service. In this scenario, the building of HS2 would thus free up just four peak time slots on the southern end of the WCML for new services. 6.2 This in itself seems a meagre return for such a huge investment. Its reliance on the removal of two London–Liverpool services for half of these freed slots has, as far as I am aware, not been noted by other commentators.

Reference (1) HS2 Ltd: Technical Appendix, Appendix 2: Day 1 Train Service Assumptions for Demand Modelling (including use of Released Capacity), Service C, London–Liverpool (High Speed), pp. 11, 20 and Service J, London–Birmingham–Wolverhampton–Liverpool, pp 17, 21. URL: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/ hs2ltd/technicalappendix/pdf/report.pdf (second appendix in this publication). 12 September 2011

Written evidence from the seven statutory Scottish Regional Transport Partnerships (HSR 183)

Introduction The seven regional transport partnerships in Scotland were established by the Transport (Scotland) Act 2005 and are responsible for strategic transport planning at a regional level throughout Scotland. The seven chairs of the partnerships met on 1 June to consider their response to this consultation. This response supersedes the version from six of the Scottish RTPs forwarded to you earlier. The seven partnerships strongly support the development of a national HSR network that must include Scotland. The particular changes are that the response is now on behalf of all seven regional transport partnerships and therefore geographically covers the whole of Scotland. The joint chairs particularly are of the view that they do not support the strategy of a phased development of HST starting from London and moving northwards. They believe that the long time delay before reaching Scotland under this strategy would be detrimental to the Scottish economy and would therefore wish to see an alternative strategy deployed whereby construction started at both ends of the network in a similar timescale. This view is reflected in the revised wording in paragraphs 2.6; 2.8, 2.11 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 of this response.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR 1.1 The main arguments for HSR are; Economic growth and a balanced economy, Rail Capacity and Journey times and the Environment. 1.2 Economic growth and re-distribution of wealth: The positive link between economic growth and transport connectivity has been long established. Experience in other countries has shown that HSR stimulates economic growth outwith the Capital City such as for Lille in France and will therefore re-balance the national economy and reduce the current north-south divide. Improved accessibility to the north of England and Scotland will in addition provide opportunities for growth as a whole in the UK economy. 1.3 Rail capacity: The West Coast RUS concluded that the southern end of this line would soon run out of capacity to cater for expected growth and the only effective way to deal with this scenario would be to build an additional line. The East Coast and the Midland Main Line would also in due course experience a similar situation. The construction of HS2 would then release capacity on existing main lines, in particular the West Coast, which will cater for additional local rail services and freight. 1.4 Reduced End-to-End Journey time: This is a more important benefit for North of England and in particular Scotland where rail still has a relatively low share of the inter-city travel market and where only HSR can facilitate a step change in modal share from air to rail whilst at the same time enhancing UK regional connectivity as part of a sustainable economic growth strategy. 1.5 Environment: Increased capacity and significantly reduced journey times will stimulate transfer from car and air to rail. Rail is the only mode with the realistic potential to transport large volumes of passengers over long distances between UK cities and regions in a sustainable manner, in particular with an increasing proportion of the primary energy being renewable. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w527

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 2.1 The objectives of HSR go well beyond improving inter-urban connectivity through improving overall network capacity and enhancing regional connectivity by reducing journey times. Other objectives that will be met through HSR would be to redistribute wealth and enhance regional prosperity by reducing real and perceived peripherality within the UK and to make transport more sustainable, in line with Government Climate Change objectives. 2.2 Some of these objectives could be met in part by investing in other transport modes but when compared with roads, rail is in particular more environmentally sustainable (air quality, energy use, land use) and is best suited for travel between and to access city-centres.

Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the “classic” network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.3 There are already significant “high-cost” rail projects under construction, in particular London Cross Rail (approximately £15 billion over around seven years) and Thameslink (approximately £5.5 billion over around eight years) and it does not appear than these schemes have affected funding for the general “classic” network. 2.4 These two schemes will be very close to completion by the time construction would start on the proposed HSR between London and Birmingham in around 2016. At an approx. cost of £17 billion over 10 years, the peak expenditure on the London-Birmingham HSR should be no higher than for Crossrail alone, never mind the combined peak expenditure of the two London projects. 2.5 There is already commitment to invest in a significant number of classic rail projects, such as Great Western Main Line electrification, Intercity Express Train Replacement Programme (IEP) and significant further enhancements to the East and West Coast Main Lines (eg Hitchins and Stafford flyovers) 2.6 The development of a comprehensive and regionally inclusive HSR network, which includes commitment to constructing high speed lines to/from Edinburgh and Glasgow from the outset, must be viewed as a UK Treasury priority. It is essential that a UK HSR network delivers comparable “step change” journey time and capacity benefits for all of the regions, including Scotland.

What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.7 In 2009, approximately 8.8 million domestic UK Mainland air passenger journeys were undertaken between the main cities that it is anticipated will eventually be directly served by a UK HSR Network (London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow). With significantly faster rail journeys, there should be a major shift from air to a much more sustainable rail travel mode. 2.8 Out of the 8.8 million air journeys, as many as 6.7 million either start or finishes in Edinburgh or Glasgow demonstrating the much more significant modal change potential that exists in extending the full HSR network to Scotland. It is therefore imperative that the construction of a high speed rail network also includes new lines across the Border and that the UK Government’s strategy for delivery of HSR includes a clear and unequivocal commitment to the funding and construction of HSR lines starting from Scotland within the initial stages of the project. 2.9 The 2009 rail market share of the Edinburgh/Glasgow to London rail/air market was around 20% with rail journey times of typically 4 hours 30 minutes. For the Newcastle to London rail/air market, rail held around 60%, with a rail journey time of around 3 hours and for Manchester–London journeys, rail held around 76% of the rail/air market with a typical rail journey time of around 2 hours 10 minutes. For the Leeds to London air/rail market, rail held more than 95% of the market, with a typical rail journey time of 2 hours 15 minutes. 2.10 A 30 minutes reduction in journey time (which should be achieved with high speed rail between London and West Midlands), could therefore see a shift from air to rail of nearly 1.5 million of today’s long-distance passenger journeys. This should increase to more than 3 million with the extension of the network to Leeds and Manchester when it must be assumed that domestic flights between Manchester/Leeds/Newcastle and London will end. It is acknowledged however that modal split is also affected by other factors such as frequency and fares and ease of airport access. 2.11 In addition, there would also be significant growth in the total long-distance travel market beyond what took place in 2009 so the overall transfer from rail to air with the introduction of a high speed rail network to/ from Scotland will be considerably higher. 2.12 3.8 million out of the 8.8 million air journeys quoted above are to or from London Heathrow so there should be significant scope to redirect valuable take-off and landing slots to other routes. Some of these Heathrow slots should go to domestic air routes that do not directly benefit from High Speed Rail, such as cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w528 Transport Committee: Evidence

Aberdeen and Inverness which will not directly gain from the HSR network due to their geographical peripherality, so that these cities and surrounding regions do not “fall behind” in respect of London connectivity.

3. Business case

How robust are the assumptions and methodology—for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the “classic” network?

3.1 A number of fairly in-depth studies have been undertaken into a UK High Speed rail Network in addition to the HS2 study, in particular the following three major studies: 1. Atkins study (on behalf of SRA), later updated for the Government in 2008. 2. Network Rail “New Lines” study (2009). 3. Greengauge21 “Fast Forward” study (2009).

3.2 The studies looked at different HSR solutions and had different objectives behind their proposals. However, there were common strands such as a north-south network linking in the major cities from London to Edinburgh and Glasgow. They all showed positive cases for a HSR network with benefit/cost ratios in the region of 2–3.5 and costs and passenger forecasts comparable with those found in the HS2 study.

3.3 A recent argument is that assumptions on time spent on trains is “un-productive” has overestimated the benefits of HSR. A recent study by Greengauge21 (where time spent on train would be regarded as “working- time”) did however show that the opposite was the case (although only marginally so). Passengers transferred from car and air would gain more productive time than in the original estimate and this would outweigh the “over-estimate” (in the original study) of working time gained by passengers transferred from classic train services. It could also be argued that HSR will create a better working environment than current rail services and also that there will be a limit as to how long it is reasonably practical to work on a train.

3.4 The study by HS2 surprisingly did not include Edinburgh–London services in its modelling and business case for the London–Birmingham/Litchfield High Speed Line although the Edinburgh–London market is around 30% greater than the Glasgow–London market. Edinburgh–London Services via the West Coast and HS2 would be around 30 minutes faster than existing services (as for Glasgow services) so by including Edinburgh–London services should make the business case even stronger.

What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

3.5 Upgrading the West Coast Main Line could only be limited in scope in respect of capacity and the Network Rail RUS concluded that the only longer-term capacity solution would be to construct a new line between London and West Midlands.

3.6 The most recent upgrading of the West Coast Main Line also saw significant added costs in terms of disruption to services and reduced capacity during construction. Adding these costs to the actual upgrading cost of around £9 billion (the most recent cost estimate) for a scheme that will give less incremental capacity than a new line, it is almost certain that such an upgrade will not be better value than a new line.

3.7 A new conventional line (restricted to 125 mph) would largely resolve the capacity issue but would not enhance journey-times and would therefore be much more limited in benefits to North of England and Central Scotland where journey times become increasingly more important. Without the journey-time savings, there will not be such a significant shift to rail from the less environmentally sustainable modes of car and air. Greengauge21 has also shown that the cost of a conventional line is only marginally cheaper than a High Speed line. In summary, the potential regional and UK economic and environmental benefits would be significantly diminished compared to investment in HSR.

What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

3.8 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would push passengers back onto less sustainable modes such as car or air, or journeys would not be undertaken in the first place which would be damaging in overall socio-economic terms.

3.9 There must also be doubts if price alone could realistically manage to reduce demand sufficiently to avoid investing in additional capacity. Regulated fares are already the highest in Europe and increasing these fares much further in real terms could make rail travel only affordable by the more well-off in society, contrary to wider equality and social inclusion objectives. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w529

What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

3.10 Construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a reasonably good track record in terms of time and budget, e.g. HS1 and the recent Airdrie-Bathgate project. There will also be a large number of European High Speed projects that have a good record in this respect.

4. The strategic route

The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

4.1 The most important issue for high speed rail is that stations are well located to serve the key UK cities and major centres of population and, through excellent connections with regional rail networks, their surrounding regions. Rail is the most efficient mode in respect of land use to access city centres where this can be achieved and without city-centre termini the advantage of high speed rail will be seriously eroded.

4.2 Station locations outwith city centres will depend on local circumstances but the general rule of thumb should be that not all services will necessary stop at non-city-centre stations and that in general, distances between stops should not be less than hundred miles or so.

4.3 Stations should only be provided where there is sufficient demand for long distance rail travel. The temptation to add stations to cater for high volumes of shorter journeys such as commuting, must be resisted on the basis that such a strategy would erode the benefits of HSR.

Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?

4.4 Most studies have demonstrated that a UK network that includes London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow derives greatest benefits and offers best value. These should be considered as the core cities for a north-south high speed network (which could be expanded by a western network). The UK Government’s proposed y-network supports this scenario but needs to be extended to Scotland.

Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

4.5 The proposition that phases should be constructed moving northwards from London is fundamentally challenged. The most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the English-Scottish border. In addition, as indicated above, various studies have confirmed that an HSR network including Scotland will deliver significantly greater economic and environmental benefits. Consequently, detailed consideration should be given to starting construction of northern sections at a much earlier stage rather than as “last legs”, with cross-border sections being progressed as soon as possible.

4.6 The UK Government has decided that phase 1 of the HSR network should be the London-Birmingham section. It is the most capacity constrained section on the West Coast Main Line and it is probably also the most complicated section to plan and construct. Furthermore, the link between Birmingham and London is accepted as being crucial to the future development of a more extensive UK HSR network.

4.7 In particular, the Government should show greater commitment to early planning and construction of the network to/from Edinburgh and Glasgow in recognition of the greater benefits that a comprehensive HSR national network, including Scotland, will achieve.

The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

4.8 The link to HS1 must be part of phase 1 due to technical issues but will also cater for the current West Midlands-Europe market.

4.9 The Heathrow market will to a large extent be catered for through the Old Oak Commons interchange as part of phase 1 so it is reasonable that further expenditure on this link should come later. However, the Heathrow link should be built in a way so that High Speed Trains for Heathrow from the north can continue on the classic network south of London to also serve important destinations such as Gatwick Airport and south coast cities. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w530 Transport Committee: Evidence

5. Economic rebalancing and equity What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.1 European experience has shown that most cities directly connected to the high speed network experience higher economic growth and there is no reason why this should not be the case for the UK. A Greengauge21 report also found that areas of Kent experienced rapid growth following the construction of HS1. 5.2 The 2009 Greengauge21 study also found that Regional economic benefits from a “full”HSR network between London and Glasgow/Edinburgh would amount to around £80 billion and would be widely distributed but with Central Scotland, the North West and the South East benefitting most.

To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.3 The most important element of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity between the main centres of population in the UK and in particular connectivity with London. By serving City Centres, high speed rail will indirectly support regional regeneration.

Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.4 A Greengauge21 study advised that the business case for high speed rail was robust when based on current fare levels for long-distance rail travel and would cater for both business and leisure travel. Furthermore, the release of capacity on the existing network will also benefit other travellers and commuters in particular, as well as users of rail-freight. As such, all socio-economic groups would benefit. 5.5 The majority of the population of the UK enjoys reasonably good links with the Cities that will be directly served by a future HSR network extending to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Many cities will also experience improved connectivity by increased service levels on the classic network so most of the UK will benefit from HSR. 5.6 However, it must be recognised there will be areas that will benefit significantly less such as the Northern half of Scotland, Wales and the South West of England and Northern Ireland. Transport investment in these areas should be identified to reverse their relative decline (such as rail electrification programmes or, for the north of Scotland, improved air connectivity) to ensure a fair distribution of benefits.

How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 5.7 There may be examples from other countries with HSR that could be used as models and there may also be lessons learned from London Crossrail project. 5.8 A UK HSR Network will “replace” current classic rail links that form part of TEN so support should be sought from TEN-T and other relevant EU budgets.

6. Impact What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1 HSR has considerably lower carbon footprint than car and air and also matches that of classic rail when the higher capacity of HSR trains are taken into account. If it can be assumed that the primary energy source is renewable, the carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction completion) should be relatively very small.

Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2 It could perhaps be argued that studies have erred on the “safe” side so that overall environmental benefits have not been fully expressed.

What would be the impact on freight services on the “classic” network? 6.3 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line which is the busiest rail freight corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by rail freight services so the impact on freight services by HSR should be very positive. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w531

How much disruption will be there to services on the “classic” network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4 Experience from the St Pancras redevelopment indicates that this should be manageable. Disruption could also be reduced through service changes/ improvements to some of the existing local services terminating at Euston. For example, some local services on the West Coast Main Line as far out as Northampton could be incorporated into the Crossrail network through a connection in the Willesden/Old Oak Commons area, extending planned Crossrail services from the East that would otherwise terminate at Old Oaks Commons. This could take away up to seven train arrivals/departures per hour from Euston Station.

Written evidence from Birmingham Airport (HSR 184) Introduction 1. This is an independent response from Birmingham Airport to the Transport Select Committee’s Enquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail. It should be read in connection with a submission provided by the Airport Operators Association (AOA). 2. The AOA is the trade association that represents the interests of many UK airports. Membership comprises some 70 airport companies, representing the nation’s international and major regional airports in addition to many serving community, business and general aviation. 3. The AOA has made a submission to the Select Committee. 4. It is understandable that an organisation such as AOA, which represents geographically disparate Airports, each within their own zone of economic activity, has to find a fair compromise between its members when making submissions to enquiries which could influence fundamental travel patterns, and hence profitability, of its members. 5. Birmingham Airport is providing this submission as a supplement to, and not replacement of, the submission made by the AOA. 6. Where no comment has been made to the contrary, the Committee should assume that the views of Birmingham Airport are aligned with those of the Airport Operator’s Association. 7. This document seeks to outline areas where are differences in opinion, interpretation, or indeed strategic emphasis. 8. Our starting point is that UK Plc must not be wedded to one mode of transport. Just as rail is not the complete answer, neither is road—or air. Each mode should be used to best advantage—whether domestically or in creating vital International links with commerce. 9. Transport links are the lifeblood of UK Plc; they are enablers of wealth and commerce. They should be integrated and “seamless”, to make travelling and switch between modes, stress-free. Scarce resources should be used to best advantage. 10. It is hoped that by providing an alternative vision, Birmingham Airport will assist the Select Committee in examining options from a national perspective.

Background: Birmingham Airport London’s other Airport? Maybe—but Birmingham also has an important regional role to play. 11. The Airport launched its current Airport Master Plan “Towards 2030: Planning a Sustainable Future for Air Transport in the Midlands” in November 2007. The Master Plan sets out a framework for the sustainable development of Birmingham Airport up to 2030. It illustrates how the Airport intends to meet the regional demand for air travel over the plan period of 23 years. 12. Sitting beside the Master Plan is the Airport Surface Access Strategy entitled “Moving Together” (see the Surface Access Strategy section for more details). 13. The Airport’s Master Plan is a response to the 2003 Government White Paper “The Future of Air Transport”,446 which projected the demand for aviation growth across the UK up until the year 2030. The strategic advantages of Birmingham Airport with its proximity to motorways and the rail network are recognised in the White Paper. 14. The Airport Company recognises that changes in Government Policy towards aviation in the South East, together with proposals for HS2 (neither of which are reflected in the Master Plan or Surface Access Strategy) could have a fundamental effect on its customer base in future years. However, with the current runway infrastructure, Birmingham has the capacity to expand beyond the projections set out in the Master Plan. 446 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/about/strategy/whitepapers/ cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w532 Transport Committee: Evidence

15. Birmingham Airport’s site hosts over 140 businesses, and supports over 6,000 people. The Airport has a positive effect on the regional economy, by acting as an International Gateway. 16. Birmingham Airport hosts over 40 Airlines, and serves over a 100 direct destinations with hundreds more by connecting flights. It is very capable and can even accommodate A380-the World’s biggest Airliner. 17. By 2014 a Runway Extension will provide more direct long-haul capability where it is needed—and will make Birmingham as capable as any other Western European Airport. 18. In May 2011, the Secretary of State for Transport opened the “new airport”—which has the capacity to take another nine million passengers immediately. The Airport’s Master Plan envisages this figure rising to 27 million by 2030, and it is a matter of record that over 30 million passengers per annum can be catered for off a single runway. 19. Thus between now and the 2030s, it is reasonable to conclude that Birmingham Airport at least the same capacity of that which would have been provided by a third, short runway at Heathrow. At best, Birmingham Airport is probably only realising about a third of its potential as a transport node. 20. This provides a tremendous opportunity for those planning and integrating National Infrastructure.

Current Transport Links with Birmingham Airport 21. Birmingham has the best road and rail connectivity of any UK Airport and it is a winning combination; however to maximise use of a scarce national resource, it will be essential to maintain and improve such connectivity in the future. 22. Road connectivity is good and will benefit from upgrading in future years; it is recognised this is outside of the scope of the current enquiry. 23. The current West Coast Rail Franchise, which offers links to London, is reaching capacity. Journey times between London and Birmingham are only six minutes shorter than they were in the 1970s.447 24. A typical journey from Birmingham International to Euston takes 70 minutes; the airport has suggested that the next franchisee might offer a “headline” time of 59 minutes.448 25. Rail Links to Derby, Sheffield, East Midlands and the Northwest are often slow and uncompetitive when compared to road travel. 26. Longer term, HS2 has the ability to mitigate all of these issues; either by releasing capacity on the “classic” network, or by providing direct services with attractive journey times.

HS2 Serving Birmingham Airport 27. Birmingham Interchange—located at or very close to Birmingham Airport and the National Exhibition Centre would provide additional connectivity. New direct rail services from across the region could link with High Speed Rail as well as international flights. 28. The Passenger Transport Authority, CENTRO, recognises the opportunities afforded by creating such a node. 29. Birmingham Interchange also provides a channel for the South East to access additional aviation capacity (Birmingham Airport has significant spare capacity and thus is a valuable resource to be exploited). 30. Without Birmingham Interchange, there is a risk of long-term economic decline across one of the most successful parts of the Midlands. There is also a risk of unintended consequences. Our Airport Master Plan to 2030 envisages the creation of thousands of jobs—both at the Airport and in the wider region. The same situation applies at the adjacent National Exhibition Centre. It is essential that modern transport links are maintained, and that best use is made of Strategic National Assets. 31. Our stance on High Speed Rail is that it complements Air Travel. Whilst we are very supportive of a station in Central Birmingham we believe that there are very compelling reasons why the Birmingham Interchange should also be adopted. 32. Birmingham Interchange would provide connectivity over and above that provided in central Birmingham. For instance, North Warwickshire and Coventry would be economic beneficiaries (not least through the continued employment of many of their population at the Airport/NEC), as well as those located around the Midlands “Motorway Box”, for whom travel to Birmingham City Centre would be problematic not just to themselves but to the capability of the A38 infrastructure and to City-Centre parking. 33. A recent survey by the British Chambers of Commerce suggested that 44% of Businesses in the West Midlands would use Central Birmingham, whilst 56% would use a station at or near the Airport/NEC. 447 ???????? 448 Great Britain Timetable 1974, table 66. Journey time 89–91 minutes every half hour. 2011 Virgin Trains Timetable—84–85 minutes, every 20 minutes. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w533

34. Birmingham Interchange, located at or very close to Birmingham Airport and the National Exhibition Centre (where there is already a “main line” station), would not only provide additional connectivity to the wider region, and link with an existing transport hub; it would also “plug in” to the M42 corridor— acknowledged as a major economic driver of the region449 and the only significant location in the Midlands which outperforms National GVA. It would also provide a route to additional aviation capacity.

Airport Surface Access Strategy 35. Surface access—including High Speed Rail—will be key to the development of Birmingham Airport and the economic regeneration of the Midlands. The current published Airport Surface Access Strategy450 does not reflect HS2 or any changes in Government Policy, and it is being reviewed in the light of emerging policy. 36. The Airport is not wedded to one mode of transport. Just as rail is not a panacea, neither is road—or air. Each mode should be used to best advantage. The alternative to HS2 would appear to be very significant increases in the UK Motorway network, with consequent land take (perhaps three times that of HS2). 37. Adding additional tracks alongside the existing Victorian Infrastructure would destroy the heart of many towns that owe their existence or expansion to the railways. It would also be expensive and as the £9 billion upgrade of the West Coast route demonstrated, it might not deliver the intended outcomes. The Airport doubts whether this approach would deliver a truly High-Speed, High-Capacity railway. 38. The above approach would not release capacity to permit the development of new routes (for example, those that would use part of the current WCML for an element of their journey)—for Example, Kenilworth to Birmingham International, Leicester to Stratford-upon-Avon. 39. Further upgrade to the existing infrastructure will, in any case, be required to ease existing “bottlenecks and pinch-points”. This is already happening. 40. With regard to reported cost, the Airport’s view is that Crossrail is spending about £2 billion per year on a commuter railway through central London and its suburbs. As that £17 billion + project is completed, we would envisage that £2 billion per annum would “roll forward” annually to High Speed Rail projects. 41. It would appear equitable that investment also be made outside of London, which reportedly has a disproportionately subsidised transport infrastructure, compared to the rest of the UK.

Impact of a Government Review into Aviation 42. The Government has already suggested that Airports in the South East should be “better not bigger”.451 Without pre-empting the outcome of the forthcoming review, it is reasonable to assume that at least part of it might seek to make better use of existing resources. Existing resources, such as Birmingham, can be unlocked— so long as they are integrated into a wider transport network, and provided that awareness is increased.

Rebalance of the UK Economy 43. Many commentators seem to consider HS2’s primary aviation role to be as a feeder to Heathrow Airport. This appears anomalous to the “Better not Bigger” agenda, and counter to plans to rebalance the UK economy. 44. However, the use of HS2, to match aviation demand with spare capacity, could bring very significant regional economic benefits and would be in line with the Government’s desire to rebalance the economy. 45. Whilst Birmingham provides an early opportunity to integrate HSR and Aviation, there are other airports—with significant spare capacity—capable of being linked to the High Speed Rail network. 46. It is possible that some Airports will remain silent on the issue of High-Speed Rail, as they have to remain sensitive to their relationships with their Airline customers. 47. As High Speed Rail develops, it should be regarded as complementary to Aviation, and not necessarily as a replacement. High Speed Rail should be used to connect a network of International Gateways—offering choice to consumers and airlines, and providing balanced economic growth.

High-Speed to Heathrow? 48. It is important that London’s largest Airport have a link to the High-Speed network. However, it is unclear which terminal would be served by High Speed Rail. 49. Depending on which terminal was selected, it is possible that changing from HS2 to an enhanced “shuttle” service from Old Oak Common would offer the quickest alternative for people travelling to the 449 See Realising the Potential of the M42 Corridor, Final Report to Advantage West Midlands, most pages but page 17 for GVA. http://www.advantagewm.co.uk/Images/realising%20the%20potential%20of%20M42%20corridor%20march%202009_ tcm9–20388.pdf 450 http://www.birminghamairport.co.uk/meta/about-us/planning-and-development/airport-surface-access-strategy.aspx 451 http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/detail.aspx?NewsAreaId=2&ReleaseID=413870&SubjectId=2 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w534 Transport Committee: Evidence

majority of the terminals at Heathrow. In other words, the optimal solution (both in cost and journey times) may not be a direct link using HS2 trains. 50. Any link to Heathrow should not be to the detriment of everyone travelling from the North to London and beyond. If every HS2 train were to be diverted via Heathrow (with, reportedly, nine minutes extra journey time or more), one suspects that this would have a very significant negative effect on productivity and on the overall business case for HS2.

Integration and Awareness 51. Awareness increases through a variety of methods; these include end-to-end ticketing (what is the difference between flying New York-Heathrow and catching a train to London, and Flying New York- Birmingham and catching a train to London?) the possibility of a “congestion charge” for very busy airports (leading to the creation of secondary markets elsewhere), and of course adequate marketing activity. 52. High Speed Rail and Aviation should be integrated for the purpose of journey planning and ticketing. This already happens in Germany, with a very forward-looking partnership between Lufthansa and Deutsche Bahn. Airline-style tickets are issued, which include some legs by rail, and others by air.452 53. Integration of UK domestic rail into Aviation’s Global Distribution systems would be a pre-requisite of changing travel behaviours, and bringing more choice on price and journey time to the market. For High-Speed rail to be properly integrated into a Global Transport system, through ticketing will be essential. 54. Successful integration of air and rail also depends upon a number of critical factors including interchange location, ease of interchange, service frequency, baggage management and wider connectivity. Air passengers will not be tempted onto HSR unless it is capable of providing efficient and seamless airport connections. This includes seamless security, baggage handling, border control and other associated security issues. 55. Such a process should begin now, with the existing domestic rail system. However, it is not clear who act as catalyst and lead such a project or whether it would work on a voluntary basis, as it would almost certainly meet resistance in some areas. This is a matter for Government to decide.

Confidence Building prior to HS2 56. Changing transport behaviours and travel patterns, through policy and effective marketing of choice, can start a confidence-building exercise that will demonstrate to stakeholders, a microcosm of what HS2 might bring. 57. In Birmingham Airport’s case, a greater willingness to engage on the part of the West Coast franchisee (perhaps to include through ticketing and joint marketing), could lead to mutual and measurable benefits. 58. A greater willingness of the Control Authorities to work on remote “check in” and clearance might simplify procedures on arrival and contribute to the “seamless experience”. 59. With hard data available, the Airport and its shareholders may be in a better position to evaluate the benefits of investing in a future joint Airport/HS2 Terminal at the HS2 Station. 60. It is important to trial new systems and working practices within the existing system, to create an “evidence base” for potential future investment.

Classic Rail Versus HSR 61. HSR investment should be additional to, not at the expense of, other much-needed-investment in rail (for example, the required measures to address congestion at the “Northern Hub”, which affects the whole northern region, or the “four tracking” of the similarly-congested Birmingham to Coventry Corridor).

Conclusion 62. Birmingham Airport supports High Speed 2 and the creation of a High-Speed Rail network for Great Britain. However, transport modes are not mutually exclusive, and they must be better integrated if they are to be fit for purpose in the mid 21st Century. Customers should have a seamless journey experience, and should be able to easily access through journey information—including times and prices. 63. It is important that the customer-service attributes (including through ticketing, security/customs clearance etc) for the High-Speed Network are trialled and any issues resolved, within the current rail structure. 64. The new InterCity West Coast Franchise (to be let in 2012, and currently being negotiated) would appear to be an excellent test bed for any proposals. It is suggested that there is still opportunity to build some of the above concepts into that franchise. 452 http://www.lufthansa.com/us/en/AIRail-just-like-flying cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w535

65. Birmingham Airport would be willing to work with airlines and with the franchise operator on issues of mutual interest, provided that there is Government support and encouragement for the process. May 2011

Written evidence from Robert H Parker (HSR 185) High Speed Rail and Alternatives to Travel: Contradictory Policy Agendas The Department for Transport is, of course, the recognized driving force behind the scheme to build a High Speed Rail network in the U.K., in particular HS2. Less well known is the Department’s pursuit of an objective that, if successful, would undermine much of the present case for HS2, radically reducing the need for such an immense project, and this objective is made explicit in the Department’s Alternatives to Travel agenda (details of which can be found on its website). It might be supposed that in such a large department, the left hand does not always realise what the right is doing; indeed, in the ongoing HS2 Public Consultation roadshow, no adviser (all confirmed as DfT officials) could be found who had even heard of the Department’s Alternatives to Travel agenda. But at the top there is no such ignorance, for both the Secretary of State for Transport and one of his two Parliamentary Under Secretaries, Mr Norman Baker, have spoken out in enthusiastic support of first one and then the other of these opposed initiatives, each in calls or speeches of his that have sometimes been less than weeks apart—or less than minutes apart in Philip Hammond’s case. However, neither minister has, it seems, been publicly challenged to reconcile the contradictory objectives inherent in HS2 and Alternatives to Travel, each having so far managed to avoid the discomfort of being required to wear his two departmental hats at the same time. It is true that Mr Hammond (IBM START Conference, 20 Oct. 2010), in noting his Department’s adoption of Alternatives to Travel, at least recognized that his audience might detect in it something odd, for as he said: “… you might be surprised to know that the most innovative change we have made in the Department for Transport in the last four months is to introduce a portfolio responsibility for ‘non-travel’.” Yet even so astute a politician as Mr Hammond failed to see that this portfolio he had assigned to Mr Baker—perhaps originally conceived in the context of local transport problems—concerned a technology that could and would affect transport on much more than a local scale, and, if implemented with determination, would almost certainly have adverse consequences for national transport schemes of supposed alleviation like HS2, dependent as much of the case for it is on continuing high demand. Said Mr Hammond: “Promoting alternatives to travel is a key part of the sustainability agenda … So my colleague, Norman Baker, is working with colleagues at DCMS, in BIS and in other Departments to look at reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business. Encouraging home working; promoting the use of high-speed broadband for both business and leisure purposes and encouraging the uptake of video conferencing as an alternative to long- distance travel.” [My italics] Reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business? But this is the very custom usually deemed essential to the HS2 business case by Mr Hammond himself. It is not as though Mr Hammond had failed to mention HS2 in that same IBM speech, or failed to extol its merits as usual, but in the space of ten minutes or so he managed to treat Alternatives to Travel and HS2 as if the one had not the least bearing on the other. Mr Hammond revealed a similar failure of joined-up thinking at the “Age of Energy” debate in Victoria on 1 March 2011 (see below), where he seemed to forget for a moment that he even had an HS2 hat to wear, and in referring mainly to motorways he admitted a rare truth that applies equally to railways. He said: “…our roads aren’t congested most of the day, our railways aren’t actually congested most of the day ... we’re spending billions of pounds to build something that is only used for a couple of hours in each day …” and the “challenge is … to get much better value for money as a nation out of the infrastructure we’ve already invested in, whether it’s trains, train tracks or … motorways”. In view of the above evidence, it is hard to conclude that High Speed Rail fits easily and without contradiction into the Government’s transport policy objectives—or, at least, into a significant part of them— and I submit that owing to the apparent lack of both ministerial and departmental awareness that such a disjunction exists, the Committee’s own examination would be welcome and to the public good.

Mr Hammond and Mr Baker As Advocates Of Alternatives To Travel “Don’t Travel, says Transport Minister” (Parliamentary Under Secretary for Transport, Norman Baker’s own website, 12 July 2010) Transport Minister Norman Baker has launched an initiative to reduce travel. He says this will benefit the economy, the environment, and the individual. The plans include more working from home, and greater use of video conferencing facilities. — Economic benefits, resulting from reduced congestion on the roads and on public transport, as well as reduced demand for office space. — Environmental benefits, as carbon emissions will decrease as demand for transport falls. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w536 Transport Committee: Evidence

— Benefits to quality of living, as people will be able to balance their work and home lives more effectively. — Mr Baker has also asked his own Department, and the rest of government, to set an example by making greater use of videoconferencing to cut back on their own travel. — “Reducing demand for travel will reduce congestion, pollution and stress in our daily lives.” — Twenty-first century transport choices should fit a twenty-first century world where we shouldn’t just use smart cards to travel, we should be smarter about when we travel and when we use office technology for virtual travel instead. — The results will be tangible—reduced congestion, reduced carbon emissions, improved quality of life. “Indeed, I am the first Transport Minister to say ‘don’t travel’!” Transport Minister, Norman Baker, in a 14 July 2010 conference speech (Dept for Transport website) “We currently think of transport in terms of four different modes—road, rail, air, and water,” he said. “I want us all to start recognising that ‘communication’ can be the 5th mode … and that communications technology can provide an alternative to travel in the first place.” “So I’m looking into ideas and measures that enable people to do business without having to leave their homes or offices, for instance through the use of broadband-enabled technologies.” Working from Home (BBC Radio 4, Costing the Earth, 15 September 2010). On this programme, Transport Minister Norman Baker spoke enthusiastically for home-working and against the over-use of transport: It was, he said “… a development that would benefit both the economy and business. Take video- conferencing, for instance: if you can have a business meeting without the need to travel, then that is not only more efficient for business but could reduce carbon emissions significantly, ‘a plus for the environment and a plus for business’.” “I am working today with colleagues … at reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business.” Norman Baker: Speech to the Fleet News Green Summit, Hurlingham Club, 12 October 2010. (from Dept of Transport website) “In the current economic climate, it is more important than ever to minimise driving costs—and if possible consider whether journeys are necessary in the first place. “It is for this last reason that I have become the first ever Transport Minister to have official responsibilities for alternatives to travel. “When this new brief was announced in the summer, I was rather pleased when it was welcomed by the Campaign for Better Transport as a ‘huge step forward’, and by the CBI. “But to be perfectly honest, it is something that should have been done long before now. “Just like the fleet manager’s job, the job of a transport minister has changed. “Today, you and I are not only responsible for getting people and goods from A to B … We are also responsible for the impact of transport. On budgets. On the effectiveness of business. On the environment. And on people. “Within your organisations, you are absolutely pivotal. “You keep your businesses mobile. But increasingly, you can also help identify alternatives to travel that can significantly reduce the costs of transport. “That’s why in the months and years ahead I want to work with the fleet sector to support initiatives that can reduce employee travel. “… And why I am working today with colleagues at the Department for Culture Media and Sport, Department for Business Innovation and Skills and in other Departments to look at reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business. “That might mean encouraging home working; staggering people’s working days so roads and trains are less congested at peak times; promoting the use of high-speed broadband for both business and leisure purposes; and encouraging the uptake of video conferencing as an alternative to long- distance travel. “Of course it is not the mission of the Department for Transport to stop people travelling, but unnecessary travel is expensive in environmental and financial terms and, if we can help businesses to operate more efficiently with a need for less travel, we will be advancing both their agenda and our own.” “…encouraging the uptake of video-conferencing as an alternative to long-distance travel.” Philip Hammond repeating Norman Baker’s own words in his speech entitled Sustainable Transport, delivered on 10 September 2010 at the IBM START Conference: Business Summit, Day 3. (DfT website: “Sustainable Transport”) “… But you might be surprised to know that the most innovative change we have made in the Department for Transport in the last four months is to introduce a portfolio responsibility for “non- travel”. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w537

“Promoting alternatives to travel is a key part of the sustainability agenda. And although it has not traditionally been thought of as a transport responsibility, I have decided that we should integrate it into our transport agenda. So my colleague, Norman Baker, is working with colleagues at DCMS, in BIS and in other Departments to look at reducing the demand for travel, particularly for business. “Encouraging home working; promoting the use of high-speed broadband for both business and leisure purposes and encouraging the uptake of video conferencing as an alternative to long- distance travel.”

Mr Hammond as Advocate of High Speed Rail Since the election and his appointment as Secretary of State for Transport, Mr Hammond has made many speeches, taken part in many interviews and written many replies in support of High Speed Rail, and of HS2 in particular, and they are too numerous and well known to need repeating.

Mr Baker as Advocate of High Speed Rail “I congratulate HS2 on producing a route that, I think, minimises environmental damage while maximising the usefulness of the line.” (Shadow Secretary of State for Transport, Norman Baker MPin the House of Commons debate on the Labour Government’s official announcement of its intention to build HS2, 11 Mar 2010: (Hansard, Column 453). “Protests won’t stop High Speed Rail link …” (Birmingham Post, 14 January, 2011) It reported the Transport Minister Norman Baker in Birmingham urging local supporters of High Speed 2 not to be put off by protests against the link, and gave his enthusiastic support for the HS2 plans. He said that the economy of the West Midlands would benefit enormously from the new line, and added enthusiastically: “You must make sure your voice is heard.” “Scots asked to back UK’s high speed rail plan”, (as reported by Damien Henderson in 18 March 2011 edition of the Scottish newpaper, the Evening Times: “Scotland has been asked to back UK plans for a high-speed rail network—that won’t extend north of the Border for at least 20 years … Speaking in Glasgow, UK Transport Minister Norman Baker said Scotland’s voice was vital in supporting the initial phase of a 250mph new route from London to Birmingham, as local campaign groups in England mobilise against it. “Norman Baker issued the rallying cry whilst visiting Glasgow to highlight the benefits high speed rail could bring to Scotland.” (from the DfT website, 17 March 2011) Scottish politicians and business leaders were today urged to support proposals for a new high speed rail network or risk missing out. Transport Minister Norman Baker issued the rallying cry whilst visiting Glasgow to highlight the benefits high speed rail could bring to Scotland. Transport Minister Norman Baker said: “High speed rail has the potential to shrink the UK and bring our great cities closer together in a way that has never been possible before. “HS2 would deliver significant benefits for Scotland, which must not be ignored. Our proposed line runs from London to Leeds and Manchester, but experience in Europe has taught us that high speed rail networks are built in stages. If this network is to be built and if Scotland is to link up to it, it is vital that we hear vocal support now and that everybody understands the transformational impact it would have on the economy.”

Mr Hammond Considers the Network as It Is Mr Hammond speaking on 1st March this year at a debate in Victoria organized jointly by Shell and the Daily Telegraph with the title “The Age of Energy” (transcribed from a sound recording.) “… our roads aren’t congested most of the day, our railways aren’t actually congested most of the day... we’re spending billions of pounds to build something that is only used for a couple of hours in each day …” and the “challenge is … to get much better value for money as a nation out of the infrastructure we’ve already invested in, whether it’s trains, train tracks or … motorways”.

Written evidence from the Cardiff Business Partnership (HSR 188) Given plans for High Speed 2, which will bring every major English and Scottish City at least 30 minutes closer to London (for example Manchester to London in one hour 15 minutes) then an upgrade to the Great Western Mainline (GWML) is essential if Cardiff is to remain competitive in both UK and European terms. This is especially important given that Greengauge21/KPMG found that HS2 would have a negative impact on the Welsh economy, thereby restricting Cardiff’s capacity to address Wales’ deteriorating GVA/capita Vs the UK average. The Cardiff City Region, home to 1.4 million people, half the Welsh population, has the potential to transform Welsh economic performance. Cardiff itself contains a Leading UK Russell Group University; has a cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w538 Transport Committee: Evidence

diversifying employment base, has achieved amongst the largest growth in the private sector in UK and now has ~80,000 inward commuters in a total work force of nearly 200,000 or one third of the entire city region workforce. From a business perspective transport connectivity is crucial—especially inter and intra regional transport. For example, Admiral Insurance’s (one of Wales’ leading private sector companies) recent statements as regards public transport provide a stark warning: — Admiral would not locate in Cardiff today with >2 hour travel time to London. — Improved connectivity to Heathrow maybe needed to maintain a Cardiff HQ in the long term. In March 2011, the Department for Transport (DfT) announced that the GWML would be electrified as far as Cardiff; returning Cardiff–Paddington journey times to those that existed in 1980, at 1 hour 45 minutes. That work will be completed by 2017 alongside other upgrades including introduction of ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) and a fleet of new Inter City Express Programme (IEP) trains. In May 2011, First Great Western (FGW) announced their intention not to take up the option to extend their franchise beyond 2013, bringing forward the tendering process for a longer term and perhaps more strategic arrangement. The Cardiff Business Partnership believes that the electrification programme and franchising process should be a catalyst for the implementation of long term and incremental upgrade of the Great Western Corridor. This position acknowledges that whilst a dedicated new high-speed line is desirable, it would be at least 25 years before such a scheme could be delivered at a cost of over £15 billion. A pragmatic approach would see a series of ongoing upgrades to the existing rail corridor, with electrification as the foundation that can deliver significant benefits in terms of capacity, journey times and Heathrow access by 2025 which collectively will help provide a stimulus to the Welsh economy. A deliverable target is: — Cardiff to London journey times of less than 80 minutes at least twice an hour. — Cardiff to Heathrow journey times of less than 90 minutes at least twice an hour.

Figure 1 ILLUSTRATION OF POTENTIAL ENHANCEMENTS TO THE GREAT WESTERN LINE

GWML Corridor Upgrade priorities: 1. GWML electrification & new rolling stock 2. Upgrade sections for faster running (>140mph) 3. Direct Heathrow Access/Reading-Heathrow Express 4. Some new sections/4 tracking (eg Didcot-Swindon) 5. New Severn Crossing (perhaps over a Barrage) < 40 mins

<30 mins

<80 mins

<30 mins

Swansea City Bristol City Cardiff City London & Region (pop. 0.5M) Region (pop. >1.0M) Region Heathrow (pop. 1.4M)

It is anticipated that the above performance criteria can be delivered from a range of enhancements to both infrastructure and service patterns, as suggested in the following sections.

1. Heathrow Access In the first instance, for inclusion in CP5 (Network Rail’s 2015–19 planning period), a new western link should be constructed to Heathrow from the GWML. BAA recently cancelled plans for Airtrack, which would have linked Heathrow Terminal 5 to the Staines–Windsor commuter line from Reading (in blue below). A far better option for Swindon, Bristol, Cardiff and the Thames Valley is to see a new western route into Terminal 5 to link up with the existing Heathrow express line as shown in red below (from NR GW Route Utilisation Strategy). This would allow a Heathrow express service to operate from Reading to serve passengers from South Wales and South West England. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w539

Figure 2 EXCERPT FROM NETWORK RAIL’S GREAT WESTERN ROUTE UTILISATION STRATEGY RE: HEATHROW ACCESS

GWML GWML/AirTrack New section Heathrow “western access”

WEST HAYES & SLOUGH DRAYTON HARLINGTON LONDON PADDINGTON

READING LONDON WATERLOO WOKINGHAM WINDSOR & HEATHROW ETON RIVERSIDE T5

(to Guilford, Gatwick)

VIRGINIA STAINES WATER

(to Surbiton)

(to Guilford)

The HS2 focussed exploration of Heathrow access should be extended to include the GWML so that direct services could eventually run to a new HSR station at Heathrow from Cardiff and Bristol. As the DfT found in its 2002 review of UK airport capacity, “Future Airport Capacity in the UK”, Wales and SW England has the greatest need for better access to Heathrow than any other region in the UK (outside the SE England). The study found the leakage of passengers to other regions, mainly South East England Airports and specifically Heathrow, was about 65% for both Wales and South West England, the highest in the UK. For each region, the total annual trips were estimated at 3.4 million and 7.2 million respectively. That was 10.6 million in total, with about 6.5 million using airports in the SE England and in particular, Heathrow. Most of these Heathrow journeys are by car indicating a latent demand for better Great Western Main Line connectivity to Heathrow. The DfT reports also made some other relevant statements: “… it does appear that Wales is suffering in attracting inward investment because it does not offer a wide range of air services to European centres.” “It is important for Wales to maintain access to key London airports, especially Heathrow and Gatwick. Even if Cardiff was to provide a much wider range of services and frequencies than it currently offers, it is likely that a large number of Welsh air passengers would continue to use airports in the South East of England.” “Their [South East England airports] route networks especially for long haul, will continue to be wider than the route networks offered by regional airports. Links to London are also important, particularly for the business community.” There are also at least 10 return flights per day from Cardiff and Bristol airports to Schipol. Better access to Heathrow could deliver a significant modal shift and reduce the need for this number of short haul flights and resulting CO2 emissions. This position should be set against a situation in which Wales continues to be disadvantaged by competitive transport investment elsewhere in the UK and a significant deterioration in services from Cardiff Airport since 2002.

2. A Series of Incremental Upgrades to the GWML Determine the theoretical maximum speed of the GWML based on the curvature of the current alignment, etc. Then, identify sections of track that may restrict this theoretical maximum speed (> 125 mph) as a result of constraints in curvature, junctions, signalling, etc. Then suggest and scope works (re-alignment, 4-tracking, junctions, signalling, ballast, etc) and costs to address. For example: — Wootton Bassett grade separated junction. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w540 Transport Committee: Evidence

— 4-tracking of Didcot to Wootton Basset and perhaps Bristol Parkway. — A new Severn Crossing. — New/upgraded section(s) of the South Wales main line (eg Newport by-pass. — Estimate costs of each of the incremental infrastructure upgrades to achieve sustained higher speed of >140mph (track, ballast, signalling, gantries, other civils, safety, etc). Assess impact of speed upgrades on route pathways (eg between Bristol Parkway and Yate Junction for X- country services to the Midlands) and the need for 4-tracking to accommodate different service patterns and traffic speeds. Explore different stopping patterns (eg less stops between Cardiff and London), schedules, etc, and their potential impact on capacity, operational costs, passenger revenues and journey times; also review impact on freight usage. One of the most congested sections of the GWML is actually between London and Reading (as shown below from Network Rail’s Great Western Route Utilisation Strategy). If a new line is built, one section could be from London via Heathrow to just west of Reading where it can connect to the existing GWML. This should be included in the consideration of HSR rail access to Heathrow as set out in plans for HS2.

Figure 3 EXCERPT FROM NETWORK RAIL'S GREAT WESTERN ROUTE UTILISATION STRATEGY RE: CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

Given the ~145 miles distance between Cardiff and Paddington, an 80-minute journey would require an average speed of approximately 109 mph. As a comparator, the WCML service between Manchester Piccadilly and Euston, as a result of its £9 billion upgrade, now provides a 1 hour 58 minute service for the 185 mile journey, at an average speed of ~95 mph (on a line with a max running speed of 125 mph). Even achieving this average speed on the GWML between Cardiff and Paddington, would deliver a journey time of approximately 90 minutes.

3. Other GWML Corridor Considerations — What maximum speed will be specified for the new inter-city trains to be procured as part of the IEP programme? Given the potential for the track to cope with speeds of >140mph then it would be prudent to specify >140 mph. — What is the freight impact (can’t run >140 mph trains if <80mph freight train in the way) especially between Didcot and Bristol with only two tracks; will this strengthen the case for further 4- tracking? — Electrification to Swansea and the Valleys. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w541

— Electrification of the diversionary route via Kemble and to Birmingham from Bristol and Cardiff up both sides of the Severn at the same time via Cheltenham and Gloucester). — In terms of “termination” stations in South Wales, aside from Cardiff Central, Swansea and Newport, consideration should be given to: Pontypridd, Cardiff Airport (new on site-station) and Swansea Parkway (new station). The franchise tendering process for First Great Western and Arriva Trains Wales services presents an opportunity to explore these options more fully. — In addition to the improvements to the GWML, there is also the potential to provide more effective and seamless connectivity to both HS1, HS2 and Crossrail. — As part of HS2, a new interchange is proposed at Old Oak Common in West London to enable transfer between the GWML, HS2 and Crossrail. A direct link is also proposed from HS2 to HS1 to provide through services for all Northern and Scottish cities. A link should also be provided from the GWML so that through trains can access HS1 and the Channel Tunnel and European destinations from Wales and SW England. If not, every other major UK city will have this capabilitybut not Cardiff and Bristol. — Would it be possible to run the occasional Intercity express onto/into Crossrail and into central London?

Recommendations Given plans for major upgrades on the GWML corridor in the next 10 years, the introduction of the IEP trains and the upcoming tendering process for the FGW Franchise, there is now an opportunity to develop a more strategic vision for this route. This would place the economic needs and expectations of the major cities along the GW Corridor at the heart of the review and recognise the importance of the Great Western Line to the Welsh Economy. It is therefore recommended, that a comprehensive and strategic, Great Western Corridor study is undertaken to examine: — The costs, practicality and benefits of a range of GWML infrastructure upgrades that will contribute to a reversal in the decline in Wales GVA/capita Vs the UK average, by achieving the following performance objectives. — Cardiff to London Journey times of less than 80 minutes at least twice an hour. — Cardiff to Heathrow journey times of less than 90 minutes at least twice an hour. — Changes to TOC franchise and service patterns should be explored if they can also contribute to achieving the above targets. — Improved access to Heathrow from the GWML(west). — Access and interchange with HS1/HS2 services and the running direct service from GWML to HS1. — Access and interchange with Crossrail. — Further electrification of the network to Swansea, Plymouth and beyond. — Identity potential funding sources (these could include direct government capital investment, TOC contribution, Local Authority borrowing, other transport providers, etc). The objective is to develop a clear business case, with a focus on the wider economic benefits, for a programme of incremental upgrades to the GWML. This work should be undertaken on the same basis as the work undertaken to date by the DfT in developing the business case for HS2. June 2011

Written evidence from Dr. Moshe Givoni and Professor David Banister, Transport Studies Unit, School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford (HSR 189) Summary We welcome this opportunity to submit evidence to the Transport Committee’s review into the Strategic Case for HSR, as all forms of transport must be seen as part of an integrated strategy that facilitates door to door travel in reasonable time and to a high quality. This is one reason why the car is seen to be an attractive option, as it provides such a service. It is not just the HSR element of a journey, but the means by which it allows people to respond positively to a high quality door to door experience, and so the total travel time should be a key consideration and not just the HS element of that journey. Access to and from the HS rail station is a key element in the journey. Secondly, HSR is often marketed in terms of its maximum speed, not even its average speed, and when the access and egress times are also considered, this means that total door to door travel time may bear little relationship to the maximum speed. Here we argue for the notion of reasonable travel times (and speeds), as this balances the desire among some for high speed with the costs (financial and environmental) of providing such a service. In this short submission we make a series of cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w542 Transport Committee: Evidence

substantive points, together with a clear conclusion on the need to review HSR as part of a coherent passenger transport strategy that covers all modes of transport including the car.

1. Introduction In Europe, HSR has increased its share of rail travel from 15.9% of rail passenger-km in 2000 to 23.9% in 2008 (and 62% in France). Yet, despite this rail renaissance, passenger rail accounts for only 6.3% of all passenger-kms (9.8% in France) down from 6.6% in the EU27 countries in 1995. Furthermore, while the HSR network has more than doubled in length between 1995 and 2008, the railway network as a whole lost about 6% of its route km in that period, and HSR lines still represent only 3% of the European rail network in 2008.453 In the UK, demand for rail services is at record high, but railway’s mode share has not changed dramatically and is still relatively minor. HSR development in the UK would probably result in similar trends as seen across Europe, and this limits the benefits of HSR. In the current transport paradigm, travel time is considered to be “wasted time” and a disutility. This means that travel time needs to be minimised and consequently speeds need to be increased, and this argument has been central to investment in HSR. “Time is money” and therefore “faster is better” is a central concept in transport planning. It is therefore not surprising that “speed” gets the headlines in the HSR development discussion, but even the concept of “speed” is open to discussion (Banister, 2011). The “speed” that dominates the debate is the maximum operating speed, but the travel times that passengers experience are a factor of the average-speed, of which the maximum operating speed is only one factor (Givoni and Banister, 2011). The number of stops on the HSR line and the percentage of the line on which maximum speed can be achieved are both crucial factors. Each additional stop (station) can “cost” 5–10 minutes and often trains must “slow-down” through cities, even if they are not stopping there. While maximum speed of 350kph is considered the new standard for HSR, most HSR services are provided at a much lower average speed, and the world’s most successful HSR line in terms of passengers carried, between Tokyo and Osaka in Japan operates at an average speed of less than 240 kph (for the fastest service).454 Passengers are not necessarily primarily concerned with the station-to-station travel time when deciding on their mode choice. Door-to-door travel time is of importance, together with the convenience and reliability (and the cost) of the entire chain of journeys from the beginning to end of a trip. The characteristics of the HSR favour a minimum number of intermediate stops, and this factor becomes more important with increases in the designed maximum operating speed (as the costs of additional stops and deviation from the shortest start-to-end route will increase time more than proportionally). This means that HSR, like with air travel, results in most of the travel time (and effort) being spent on getting to and from the HSR station, and this constitutes the bulk of the journey travel time. Hence this submission questions the primary concern of a National Strategy that is only concerned with the “High Speed” element of the total journey, the impacts on the “Lower Speed” network that is already well established, the environment, the priorities for evaluation and the role of air transport as a complementary rather than a competitive part of the Strategy.

2. Door to Door Travel Time and the Travel Experience HSR travel is not attractive for many travellers, despite its faster maximum speed compared to other modes, especially when the origin and/or the destination are not close to an HSR station. In addition, any time savings on the rail journey from the high speed section might be lost as a result of the additional time taken for access and/or egress journeys to/from the HSR station. Faster rail services often result in shorter travel times (in absolute terms and in comparison with other alternatives) on only a few selected corridors, and only for certain locations within them. As the high speed network is often sparse, the total travel journey distance may be considerably increased when using HSR, and this again reduces its attractiveness. Given the choice between time spent on the train and on getting to it, it is likely that passengers will prefer to reduce access time. These comments have important implications not only for the number of stations on a given HSR line, but also for their location, which should be accessible to the rest of the transport network and especially to the urban (public) transport network, the conventional rail network, the main airports, and to car drivers. The changing (normative) definition of what speed is “high-speed” in rail operation has become inconsistent. The European Commission official definition (used to collect statistics on HSR operation), seems a reasonable one as it defines the operating speed as being in excess of 200 kph. In China, which is in the midst of constructing the world’s largest HSR network (even when considering Europe as one country), the government has ordered the maximum operating speed to be cut to 300 kph, from 350 kph. But the speed that really counts is the average speed on the total journey. More important than average speed is the journey reliability, comfort, security and safety and service frequency, all of which make up the journey experience. Achieving high quality values for these components of a journey that include a rail segment might often mean compromising on the maximum speed achieved just over one part of that door-to-door journey. 453 European Commission (2010) Energy and Transport in Figures, EC. 454 The world record for average speed of a commercial HSR service is 313kph, held by a non-stop service between Wuhan and Guangzhou in China (2009). Since then the speed on this route was reduced and a station added, reducing the average speed. Before that a French TGV service held the record with an average speed of 279 kph. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w543

3. Journey Time vs Connectivity and Accessibility Improving journey time does not necessarily translate to improving connectivity, and therefore does not necessarily improve accessibility. The nature of HSR means that the reduction in travel time it offers can play important element in improving accessibility, but this also depends on the frequency of service and its integration with the rest of the transport network, and especially the rail network. Adopting an HSR technology whereby the HSR can also use the conventional rail network is an important condition, but not a sufficient one, as many (regional) lines would still not be served by HSR. Given the limited number of HSR stations, it is crucial for these stations to be central nodes on the conventional rail network, to allow passengers from a much larger catchment area to benefit from HSR services. The difficulty and inconvenience associated with the need to transfer between modes of transport must be fully acknowledged, and it is possible that current attempts to monetize this inconvenience may underestimate its importance.455 When travel time and connectivity are central objectives in rail planning there is a high value for a through station, as opposed to an end of the line station on a spur/branch from the main line. The nature of through stations means higher frequency of service (in theory as all trains on the line pass the station). This is crucial in the case of HSR as it will also mean higher demand, which is a necessary condition for HSR services.456 HSR in the UK will have substantial effect on the geography. In many respects it will “shrink” it, but for many (more) places it will expand the UK. HSR might turn the geography of the UK upside down, with cities closer to London by distance being further from it in rail travel time and convenience aspects.457 This is likely to have adverse socio-economic implications for such places as proximity to London has proven to be critical458 and is likely to impact on transport demandif accessibility to London is higher for places farther away. Overall, it might result in more travel and even more travel by car depending on the reduction in the level and quality of rail transport on the conventional rail network, and the extent to which HSR stations might be more accessible by car than by other modes.

4. Rail vs HSR—Funding and Network Issues Rail and HSR are often considered as one mode of transport from an overall public policy perspective. Yet, the promotion of HSR is often at the expense, and not in addition, to other rail initiatives. The financial discussion surrounding HSR rail development is based on the construction costs, while the substantial operational and maintenance costs, which may not be covered by the revenues, are not explicitly accounted for. This situation can result in direct competition for public funds and policy attention between the high-speed and conventional rail networks and services. Most of the passengers transferring to HSR from other modes are likely to have used conventional rail services before. In such a competitive situation, the HSR investment is likely to take preference over other rail investments. This can result in deterioration of conventional rail services, and may in turn reduce the overall viability of rail transport across a country or region, even if HSR gains significant market share on the few city-pairs it services. Such effects can be seen in France and Spain. The existing rail network is already well established and it does not need to be started from scratch, as would be the case with HSR. The real benefits for HSR would be when a network is established so that there are many routes that could be used, and such a network has only really been achieved in France, Spain and Japan, and now China. But the funding requirements are substantial. Improving the quality and capacity of existing rail may make better use of available resources. In the UK there is little potential for a HSR network, as the population centres and the distances are not really suitable for HSR operations. Shifting the focus away from speed to the other elements is key for rail to gain market share from other modes.

5. Environment

The emission of CO2 from the construction and operation of HST between London and Manchester is estimated to total 14–20Mt CO2 for 40 years, including 11–18 MtCO2 related to the operation of the HST 455 Current HS2 plans suggest a new HSR station will be built in Birmingham city centre, only several hundred meters from, arguably, the most central station on the conventional rail network, Birmingham New Street. New Street station is currently being redeveloped to create a “transport hub for Birmingham and the West Midlands”. 456 The planned HSR station in Birmingham is on a spur from the London-Manchester line. This means many of the London- Manchester (and Scotland) HSR services will bypass Birmingham, and Birmingham city centre would have much lower frequency of services than otherwise to the rest of the HS2 cities. If services from London to the North stop at Birmingham city centre, this will entail considerable travel time penalty (and the need to “turn” the train). Only recently, the city centre railway station in Antwerp, Belgium, which was on a spur from the line leading from Brussels to the north, turned into a through station to accommodate the new HSR line from Brussels to Amsterdam, a case worth examining in detail in the Birmingham case. 457 Martínez Sánchez-Mateos and Givoni (2010) analysed travel time accessibility to London in a study of stations on the conventional network close to London, Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool (and based on Network Rail proposal for HS2) and concluded that in terms of ranking the cities by travel time before and after HSR development there were substantial changes. At the extreme cases, Buxton and , close to Manchester, were ranked 114th and 98th respectively in terms of current travel time to London amongst the 114 cities in the sample. With HS2 in place, these cities will see their ranking go up by 79 and 76 places respectively, turning them into one of the closest cities to London. At the same time, Loughborough and Radcliffe which before HS2 were ranked 22nd and 31st amongst the cities in the sample will see their rankings drop by 69 and 72 places respectively. It is clear how HS2 can turn the geography of the UK upside down—cities which are about 100km closer to London will experience longer travel times to it (by rail). 458 Leuning T, Swaffield J and Hartwich O M (ed.) (2007) Cities limited. Policy Exchange, London. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w544 Transport Committee: Evidence

services on the route (Miyoshi and Givoni, 2011). The analysis shows that overall CO2 reduction is relatively small at about 90,000 t CO2 per annum in 2033, which is less than 0.02% of the total UK domestic emissions in 2007. This is mainly because modal shift from air and road is relatively small on the London-Manchester route, and the UK electricity used to power rail transport relies heavily on non-renewable energy sources.459 If the UK electricity generation mix does not improve in the future, and continue to rely on coal and oil, an additional 1.1 Mt CO2 will be generated by HST over 40 years. It is clear that energy efficiency improvement and attracting demand from car and air are important determinants of the environmental benefit from HST. Overall, the Miyoshi and Givoni (2011) analysis suggests that for meeting the UK stringent carbon emission reduction targets, HST development does not offer much. The main justification for the construction of HST in the UK is to increase rail capacity and avoid congestion on the rail network, and not environmental benefits.

Rail emissions accounted for only 0.4 % of the total UK domestic CO2 emissions in 2007. The total CO2 460 emission from car in the same year was 74.4 MtCO2, from rail 2.2 MtCO2 and from air 2.3 MtCO2. The UK Government ambition carbon emission reduction target suggests mode substitution must play a role in achieving this, but the development of HST it appears might not contribute substantially in this respect. In the current financial climate, investments in HSR will almost sure result in a postponement of the plans for electrifying the UK conventional rail network (with some projects already cancelled), and will likely delay environmental benefits.461

6. Evaluation The main rationale for the development of HSR in Japan and France was to increase capacity, not reduce travel time. Likewise, the need for HSR in the UK arises from the realization that the main rail corridors on the conventional network are near capacity and there is a need, if rail is to provide a greater role in providing mobility needs, to expand capacity. However, this initial capacity increase motivation, objective is quickly forgotten and travel time (savings) “calculations” overtake capacity (enhancement) “calculations” in the evaluation of HSR. At the same time, the cost of higher speeds in terms of energy consumption and CO2 emissions are not “calculated” at all. Even the overriding focus on travel time savings (TTS) should be questioned. Up to 80% of the user benefits come from TTS and the strong embedded assumption is that travel time is “wasted time”. The calculations are based on well established (although questionable) values of time. There is a new literature that questions the notions of how time is actually used when travelling, and the particular benefits of substantial amounts of time spent within a train. Some of this research is empirical (Jain and Lyons, 2007; Metz, 2008; Watts and Urry, 2008), looking at how people read, use computers, communicate, and work—this means that this time is not “wasted”. Secondly more theoretical research examines travel time as a social construct, the quality of which should be maximised and more highly valued (Cresswell, 2006 and 2010). There needs to be a greater understanding of how people use and experience travel time, as it is not just a matter of time and speed that determine the value of travel, but important personal (emotional, relational and experiential factors), cultural (societal factors) and social factors that are also instrumental in everyday decisions about travel (Banister, 2011).

7. HSR and Air Transport Policy The railways, including HSR, have a strategic role to play in the UK’s air transport policy. It is therefore surprising that the current debate only focuses on connection (or not) to Heathrow airport without due consideration for the entire UK air transport system and policy. Furthermore, in parallel to the Government consultation on HS2, another consultation is taking place on a “sustainable framework for UK aviation”, which makes no explicit reference to HSR, but does mention the Government’s decision to refuse permission for an additional runway at any of London’s major airports. Given the nature of HSR (planning and operation) and the Government’s general transport objectives and that for air transport, the two consultations should be considered together, as part of a National Transport Strategy. With the issue of additional runway capacity in the South East still open, there is a possibility that (a future) Government would make a decision to expand an airport other than Heathrow (eg Stansted airport), and this would change the location of London’s and the UK’s future main (hub) airport. This would mean that Heathrow would remain with an expensive connection to HS2 but no need for it. Consequently, it is likely that current decisions on HS2 will dictate the UK air transport policy in the South East and therefore the rest of the country.462 HSR development decisions are likely to lock-in UK’s air transport policy for decades, and this decision will be taken before air transport policy is decided. Therefore the two must be considered together. 459 The London-Manchester air travel market is relatively small (eg, 817,000 passengers and 47,000 tonnes CO2 in 2006) compared to the whole London-Scotland air travel market (eg, 8.6 million seats and 0.43Mt CO2 in 2006) (Miyoshi and Givoni, 2011). 460 Energy White Paper: Meeting the Energy Challenge, CM7124. Department of Trade and Industry UK, May, 2007. 461 Givoni et al (2009) calculated that electrifying the entire UK rail network, to replace all passenger services currently operated by diesel trains with electric trains, would save about 200,000 t CO2 per year, based on 2006 UK electricity energy mix. This will increase to 250,000 t per year in 2020 with the expected changes in the electricity mix. The value of such reduction, over 50 years, is valued at about £300 million in net present value. 462 Another overlooked issue is that of Birmingham International airport. Under current HS2 plans this airport will be 40 minutes from London and more accessible to many than Heathrow. Birmingham International airport is not designed and planned to be able to meet this additional demand. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w545

At present, the voice of the UK air transport industry is relatively silent in the public HS2 debate and on the issue of a possible connection to Heathrow. This strategy might be due to the industry’s priority on promoting additional runways as solution to the lack of airport capacity, but in any case the opinion of the industry must be sought and included in such an important debate on HSR Strategy. The need and importance of a direct rail (and HSR) connection to Heathrow airport has been explained in past submissions.463 Such a connection will require substantial investment, but is expected to be beneficial. Yet, the emerging solution of a “loop” or a “spur” is likely to result in perhaps lower cost but very likely with no substantial benefits. A better approach would be to make an informed decision on whether to include Heathrow in HS2 via a station on the line, or not include it at all. We recommend the former.464

8. Conclusions Embarking on construction of new HSR lines that strive to set new standards for speed may have a series of important implications: (a) It may reduce the role of rail transport within a national perspective, even if absolute number of passengers continues to increase. (b) There is a risk that efforts to develop new HSR services will reinforce current trends, where HSR gains an increasing market share, but the share of rail overall remains largely unchanged or declines. (c) From a spatial perspective, many more “places” will see rail travel diminish in attractiveness as compared with those seeing it improving. Thus, overall HSR will reduce connectivity, especially for rail transport and therefore accessibility. The discussion must give due consideration to the regional and wider spatial effect of developing HSR. (d) The environmental case for additional speed (and noise) should be set against the greater benefits from lower speed rail travel on a more extensive network. (e) Funding for HSR should not come at the expense of funding other rail projects, and the alternatives should all be seen as part of an overall rail strategy that in turn is consistent with a National Transport Strategy. (f) The attraction of ever greater speed for part of any journey needs to be set against the additional costs of access and egress, the need for understanding the total journey experience, and the ways in which passengers use time spent travelling. (g) If increasing rail capacity is the motivation for HSR development, then the best value for money alternative for increasing capacity, and not reducing travel time, should be adopted. Currently, there is no comparison between alternatives in terms of the capacity they provide. (h) HSR must be developed in full integration with other current and future transport infrastructure projects and transport policies. This approach will ensure HSR contributes to an integrated transport system and not to further fragment it. Current plans partially acknowledge the need for integration, but they have not been thought through and are likely to prove costly and probably ineffective. The HSR debate seems to be led by engineering and not planning objectives and by financial and not economic considerations. 16 June 2011

References Banister, D (2011) The Trilogy of Distance, Speed and Time, Journal of Transport Geography 19(4): 950–959. Cresswell, T (2006) On the Move: Mobility in the Western World London: Routledge. Cresswell, T (2010) Towards a politics of mobility, Environment and Planning D 28(1): 17–31. Givoni, M and Banister, D (2011) Speed—the less important element in High-Speed Train. Viewpoint point submitted for the Journal of Transport Geography. Givoni, M, Brand, C and Watkiss, P (2009) Are railways “climate friendly”, Built Environment 35(1): 70–86. Jain J and Lyons G (2007) The gift of travel time. Journal of Transport Geography 16(1): 81–89. Martínez Sánchez-Mateos, H S and Givoni, M (2010) The accessibility impact of a new High-speed Rail line in the UK—a preliminary analysis of winners and losers. Paper presented at the 50 ERSA conference, 19–23 August, Jönköping, Sweden. 463 Givoni M and Banister D (2009) The future of aviation. In House of Commons Transport Committee, The Fututre of Aviation, First report of session 2009–10, Volume II, Oral and Written evidence, EV305–EV310. 464 Current HS2 documents suggest that the increase in travel time on the journey between London and Birmingham with a stop at Heathrow would be under two minutes and will add a £2 billion to the cost. A third runway at Heathrow would require a 6th Terminal. Terminal 5 at Heathrow cost £4.3 billion. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w546 Transport Committee: Evidence

Metz, D (2008) The myth of travel time saving, Transport Reviews 28(3): 321–336. Miyoshi C and Givoni M (2011) The environmental case for high speed train in the UK: examining the London-Manchester route. Paper submitted for publication in International Journal of Sustainable Transport. Watts, L and Urry, J (2008) Moving methods, travelling times. Environment and Planning D 26(6): 860–874.

Written evidence from James Russell (HSR 190) 1. I have a extensive experience in the senior management and science of transport, especially in air, freight and public transport. Having had the opportunity to examine the written evidence submitted to the High Speed Rail Inquiry after consulting colleagues I believe that I can make two responses that may assist the Committee and thus be of sufficient utility to be accepted at this stage. 2. The evidence on carbon and climate change impacts in response to question 6, 1 lack any authoritative discussion of the science appropriate to the climate change impact of increasing or decreasing the volume of Electric Traction. Such a discussion makes understanding and assessing the widely varying viewpoints much more practical. In the course of a study in which I have been involved Professor Nash has identified Professor Kageson as a key authority. I believe that Professor Kageson’s paper 'Environmental Aspects of Intercity Transport' will be of great assistance to the Committee and ask that they take it into evidence. Professor Kageson establishes that the impact of electric rail is to increase the level of coal burning above what it would otherwise be. He also treats some aspects of modal transfer and thus of congestion relief. The effect of his findings is to indicate that until Carbon Capture and Storage can be implemented on at least a pan European basis the carbon intensity of electric propulsion energy is that of coal not the average carbon intensity of the generating fuel mix. The carbon intensity of coal as a generating fuel is around double that of the current average of the generating fuel mix so the estimated propulsion emissions of high speed rail must be doubled and the estimation that that HS2 will be carbon neutral seems unviable. The requirement that CCS be implemented on a pan European basis arises from the operation of interconnectors and [eventually] super grids. If a state, such as France, with little or no coal burning increases its use of electricity for traction it has less low carbon electricity to sell to replace coal burning in Germany or remoter parts of the EU. Similarly if new sources of low carbon electricity are bought on stream but total electricity demand is increased by electric traction some or all of the low carbon electricity is not available to reduce coal use. For illustrative purposes Professor Kageson assumes that CCS might be implemented on a sufficiently wide scale by 2025 but he does not examine the realism of this assumption which may be highly optimistic given the technical uncertainties and extent of the area over which existing power stations would have to be replaced. A joint examination by the Transport Committee and the Committee on Energy and Climate Change of the timing for adequate introduction of CCS to support transport electrification would be valuable. The possibility that an area larger than Pan Europe must be considered arises when coal burning is reduced by increasing consumption of lower carbon generating fuels such as gas. In a world with limited gas supplies the pre-emption of supply by one user may enforce coal burning on another. The Professor Kageson’s report can be found here.465 I have corresponded with Professor Kageson and he has confirmed that recent research has established that an RFI of 1 is the e carbon intensity appropriate to short haul domestic air services. His paper uses an RFI of 1.5 which substantially overestimates the carbon intensity of domestic air services. Professor Kageson concludes “… The rail sector, however, often claims that investment in rail infrastructure will bring large environmental benefits (Banverket, 2008, UNIFE 2008, UIC 2008). Independent research, on the other hand, concludes that these benefits are not so important (de Rus, 2008, WSP and KTH Järnvägsgruppen, 2008, Nilsson and Pydokke, 2009). The results of this report support the latter view. Investment in high speed rail cannot be expected to contribute much to climate change mitigation. Investment in conventional fast trains may in some circumstances be significantly more beneficial. It may be time for many environmentalists to reconsider their attitude to high speed rail …”. 3. The submissions offered in response to questions 2 and 5 seem inadequate in the context of the recently completed Inquiry into Transport and the Economy. Many respondents do not consider how far projects of greater economic value may be unaffordable due to a commitment to HS2. Unfortunately the current regime does not facilitate judgements of how far commitments to what Eddington describes as “grands projets” and “solutions in search of a problem”, displace higher value projects which enhance the existing road and rail network. There are indications in the SW region that existing rail “grands projets” may be having this effect. The value of the inquiry will be greatly increased if the respondents can be pressed to examine this aspect further, at least to the extent of identifying what funding they seek for other projects whose value is equal or higher than that of HS2. 465 http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/5kmmnc9dlcbs.pdf?expires=1308839165&id=id&accname=guest& checksum=FA8425038A8594C83E4EA1B0D7A969DB cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w547

Some other projects may be found to be essential on implementation of HS2 but may not yet have been identified and have a low intrinsic value. For example since DfT has shown that across all journeys by train to and from London 25% involve a trip to the train by road so there may be highways works necessary to provide improved access to rail stations.

4. My intention in offering these comments is more that of a friend to the inquiry than that of a witness but if I can assist the inquiry by expanding on 2 and 3 in any way I shall do my best to respond. June 2011

Written evidence from Robert McDonald (HSR 191)

Please forgive the lateness and the manner of this approach, but I believe it is extremely important that the Select Committee’s inquiry into High Speed Rail does not overlook the opportunity presented by Pendolino and other tilting trains.

As I’m sure you are aware, Pendolino trains currently operate on the West Coast Main Line and in many countries in Europe. Their great advantage is a tilting mechanism that allows the trains to operate at high speed on conventional tracks.

The Pendolino trains used on the West Coast Main Line have a design speed of 140 mph but are currently restricted by lack of modern signalling to operate only at speeds of up to 125 mph. Newer generations of Pendolino trains already run at 155 mph. technology continues to be developed across the world and its versatility is well suited to geography such as ours.

This information is important to the Committee because it demonstrates the opportunity to increase the speed of inter city train services without the expense of a new track and infrastructure. By improving signalling and migrating to newer trains over time, Pendolino and other tilting trains can run considerably faster on the existing tracks and integrate with the present network more efficiently than the proposals for HS2.

I would strongly suggest that the Committee probe this alternative approach to HS2, and if possible speak with companies and forward thinking experts who are involved in future train technology. June 2011

Written evidence from David Hodgson (HSR 192)

HS2

I recently saw a broadcast on the BBC Parliament Channel showing your questioning of representatives from a) Network Rail/ATOC/Passenger Focus/RFG and b) SNCF/Eurostar. The answers to two specific questions seemed inadequate, so I should like to help “fill the gap”.

High Speed Railways operating 18 trains per hour

I believe an MP from Northamptonshire asked about this, and the SNCF Director was quite right to say that nowhere in the world operates 18 HSTs per hour (in each direction). However, it was not made clear that SNCF experience and elsewhere is for a two track railway. My understanding is that the full 18 trains per hour service would operate on a four track railway.

The initial construction MAY only be two track but the preparatory works will have been done to allow relatively easy expansion to four tracks later. However, this will depend on the view taken about the migration of services onto HS2, essentially “phased” or “big bang”.

Given that the initial construction seems likely to reconnect with the classic WCML near Lichfield, the first tranche of services to use HS2 is likely to be the “West Coast set”: nominally: — Birmingham 2 per hour — Manchester 2 per hour — Liverpool 1 per hour — Glasgow 1 per hour — Sub-total 6 per hour

Only when the “East Coast set” and the “Midland Main line set” are added in does the total come anywhere near 18 per hour, again nominally: cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w548 Transport Committee: Evidence

— Leeds 2 per hour — Newcastle/Edinburgh 2 per hour — East Midlands/Sheffield 2 per hour — Sub-total 6 per hour — Overall total 12 per hour Some direct services via HS1 to Paris, Brussels and Europe may boost the eventual total.

Services on the classic West Coast Route. Once HS2 has opened It is my understanding (confirmed by the SNCF contributor) that HS2 should provide direct services, with few if any intermediate stops. Taking one route as an example, current services between London and Manchester take two alternative routes, stopping variously at Watford Junction, Rugby, Stafford, Crewe, Stoke-on-Trent, Macclesfield and Stockport. Once HS2 has opened, all these locations will still require express services to London and Manchester and to each other. This is likely to require at least one train per hour each way, compared with the two trains per hour currently. Thus only one path per hour would be released for other use. Even that may be questioned further. Similar thinking has to be applied to all the other routes, in order to come up with a total number of train paths “released”. My own view is that there are MANY intermediate locations (listed below—around 45 places!!!) currently enjoying express services to/from London and various points North: ECML: Stevenage, Peterborough, Grantham, Newark, Retford, Doncaster, Wakefield, York, Darlington, Durham, Alnmouth, Berwick-upon-Tweed, Dunbar. MML: Luton, Bedford, Kettering, Wellingborough, Leicester, Loughborough, Chesterfield WCML: Watford, Milton Keynes, Rugby, Coventry, Wolverhampton, Stafford, Stoke, Macclesfield, Crewe, Chester and stations to Holyhead, Stockport, Runcorn, Warrington, Wigan, Preston, Lancaster, Oxenholme, Penrith, Carlisle, Lockerbie, Motherwell. These places will not cease to exist once HS2 comes in, and they will not accept simply being by-passed: they will, rightly in my view, expect broadly the same level of services as they currently have. My assumption at this stage is that most if not all of these places will be served via the classic routes, so the train paths they currently occupy will continue to be required. Genuine HS2 services (London–Birmingham non-stop; London–Manchester non-stop, etc) may well come to be ADDITIONAL to the existing “Inter City” multi-stop services.

Additional Witnesses The contributions I watched were all perfectly valid, and I would suggest that that your committee should also take a close look at the German high speed network (ICE) in so far as it is much more a true network, some of the distances between conurbations are shorter, and there is greater use of the historic routes ie less new build lines. June 2011

Written evidence from Reynolds Hardiman (HSR 193) 1. For various reasons of law that I cannot go into here, I was not able earlier to allow you to place some of our correspondence before the Select Committee. On those previous elements that remains the case. 2. I am however now able today to ask you to present this and the attached forwarded e-mail to your Committee in evidence on a point that has not been raised, in my knowledge, in any other submission. 3. The key associated HSR policy issue is that HS2, in reality, is the intended backbone of any future HSR network in UK north of London and there is great uncertainty about how many operating paths it can operate at per hour in each direction at peak. DfT’s own economics evidence in the HS2 public consultation says that 19 is the planned evaluation (for their BCR assessment) at the “Y” junction and that the BCR is so calculated on that basis for a two track “Y” form leg south of the proposed “Y” junction—seemingly somewhere near Lichfield. 4. The world wide HSR pathing achievement, and most notably Japanese Railways in particular with over 40 years HSR experience, cannot get anywhere near that figure. I believe that the best that Japanese Railways achieve consistently, and consistently is the vital operating issue here, is 13 paths per peak hour on a two track HSR of the nature being proposed as the UK HS2. 5. My interest is to see taxpayers’ funds (including my own contributions) for any HSR well spent and without waste or neglect by DfT and anyone involved in HSR in UK development, provision and operation. This does not mean that I support HS2, or indeed any HSR in UK, it means merely that I do not want money cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w549

thrown away on mere guesswork, speculation and unaccountable opinions if any HSR is decided upon by Parliament by legislative effect. 6. To that end I have asked the Secretary of State today to give an undertaking so that mere arguable guesses about the key HSR pathing issues are dealt a total blow and are replaced by a definitive quantitative analysis and a legally enforceable performance and damages regime via material legislation and indemnity. Both will focus minds and pockets and that is what is needed to control this HSR policy development in UK. There must be no guesses: far too much is at stake. 7. Every path is very valuable and failure to achieve the BCR based on “x” pathings per hour is material at root to the viability and financial return of any such project—most especially the HS2 proposal with a materially imbalanced pathing in the wrong operating order: four tracks north of Birmingham but only two tracks, in the key part, south of Birmingham to London. The correct capacity order should be the other way round—or four track the “Y” leg properly to London (or have two two track HSR railways one each to the NW and NE as the WCML and ECML are today). 8. Please would you place this e-mail to you and the copy forwarded attached e-mail before the Committee in evidence.466 I will promptly alert you and, via you, the Committee of any material reply from the Secretary of State. Please would you confirm the Committee’s acceptance of the point and the said two e-mail communications as evidence. June 2011

Written evidence from Mr and Mrs S Loosley (HSR 194) I am writing to register our vehement opposition to the multi-billion-pound proposed HS2 high speed rail link between London and Birmingham. Our objections are many, but essentially come down to: prohibitive and irresponsible cost; the availability of less expensive alternatives; the wildly optimistic predictions used to calculate the demand for the new service, which brings the whole project into question; and the inexcusable damage it would do to areas of outstanding natural beauty—an unwelcome legacy that has not been factored in. I would like you to register our opposition to the plans, on the following 10-point basis: 1. It would represent a ridiculously enormous outlay at a time when our country’s economic frailty is likely to last for years. According to HS2 Ltd (the company the government set up to bring the HS2 line into being) the cost of a railway between Birmingham and London (including the trains) would be £25.5 billion. To take HS2 all the way to Scotland would mean a total cost of £88 billion. Yet, this figure excludes the additional cost of linking it to Heathrow or HS1 and, of course, the final bill is likely to exceed this proposed budget, as all large public projects tend to do. How on Earth can we afford this? It is an extravagant and irresponsible use of our national funds. This sense is exacerbated by the predicted revenue for HS2—with it being suggested that it would take an extraordinary stretch of 60 years to even reach E15 billion in revenue. So, it would probably take half a century to even claw back half of the outlay of the London-Birmingham project. 2. The wider economic gains are valued by HS2 Ltd at only £3.6 billion over the same 60-year period. Even then, HS2 Ltd is unable to be precise about who would gain and where these benefits would be delivered. A study by Imperial College London shows that overall economic benefits would be negligible and more likely to lead to business re-location than any genuine regeneration. 3. No consideration appears to have been given to cheaper options. When you consider the enormous rail network already in existence right across the British Isles you wonder why sections of this cannot simply be upgraded to High Speed at a far lower cost. Some sections, such as the West Coast Mainline is already capable of sustaining trains at speeds exceeding 180 mph (which is faster than the designated EU definition of “high speed”). Only financial pressures reduced these speeds to 125 mph. This could be easily rectified. 4. The main argument for HS2 is for increasing capacity on the rail network. However, HS2 Ltd recently admitted itself that meeting this capacity need could be achieved by simply increasing the capacity available on existing rolling stock and increasing the frequency of service on existing lines. On top of this, the company has based its calculations on the incredible claim that an additional 38,000 passengers per day would use the new line just because it existed. This is surely not credible when existing usage of the West Coast Mainline is just 45,000 per day. In fact, it is a laughable claim. 5. National statistics show that the UK public’s demand to travel has remained static and unchanged since 1995. Yet, somehow, HS2 Ltd has forecast a projected growth in demand of 267% by 2033 (from 45,000 to 145,000 per day). This is very optimistic, to put it politely. Ludicrous, to put it more bluntly. 6. The number of passengers switching from planes to HS2, according to HS2 Ltd, would only be 466 Attachments not printed with this submission. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w550 Transport Committee: Evidence

3.5nnillion per annum—fewer than 7% of all passengers using HS2 and less than 5% of all passengers using Heathrow Airport. So where’s the big switch from aviation? 7. HS2 Ltd has assumed that time spent on a train is wasted and therefore there is a monetary value assigned to the 20 or so minutes that might be saved for all travellers per journey. In reality most travellers already make good use of time on a train, especially for business purposes—therefore, it is not wasted. Furthermore, the value HS2 Ltd has assigned to that time saved is exaggerated— it is equivalent to the average business traveller earning £70,000 per annum in today’s prices, which is hardly realistic. What is more, this whole argument is flimsy when you consider that research has shown that passengers want reliability and value for money much more than high speed. 8. No value at all appears to have been assigned to the damage to the environment, let alone to the nationally protected Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, that the HS2 preferred route would wreak. Swathes of this treasured AONB would be irrevocably spoilt. We should be protecting the few jewels we have left in this country, not despoiling them. And, what about the money that tourism (both domestic and international) brings into the area because of its status? Surely it is folly to damage one of southern England’s main assets? Historic buildings, parklands and countryside would be ripped up, torn down or forever blighted. 9. In its justification for the need for this particular high speed rail link, HS2 Ltd assumes a worst case scenario for aviation emissions, when the CAA expects aviation emissions to show a significant improvement by 2030. Similarly, if HS2 means domestic flight slots are simply displaced at airports by long haul flights, then HS2 will have in fact triggered an increase in aviation emissions. Hardly “environmentally friendly”. 10. Similarly, the carbon emissions generated by the construction would be massive, and the energy used by high speed trains will be at least double that of existing inter-city electric trains and could end up using more than four times the energy. In conclusion, I would like to quote Andrew Gilligan from an article in the Daily Telegraph, who neatly summed up the situation like this: “The burning need in public transport is not for sexy, pointy-nosed high speed trains whose economics simply don’t stack up. It’s for boring unglamorous improvements to the services we actually use.”

We do not object to high speed rail travel, just to this unnecessary and irresponsible HS2 project, which we want to see cancelled. June 2011

Written evidence from Janusz Rawicz-Szczerbo (HSR 195)

The Business Case for HS2 Perhaps I should start by explaining my competence for criticising the business case for HS2.

Apart from my professional engineering qualifications listed above,467 I started my industrial career as an engineering Apprentice working on the factory floor, and retired as Chief Executive of a substantial and successful Group of light engineering companies, having worked in the North, the Midlands and London. Subsequently I held non-executive directorships in two large quoted companies and acted as Chairman of certain of their Subsidiaries, as well as being Chairman of three management buy-outs and one buy-in. I also started and still own a small private company. One of the essential practices in all the companies I managed and which underpinned their profitability and success, was the securing of maximum value for money in product design, manufacturing processes, purchasing and above all ensuring the optimum value of our products and service for our customers. Applying this principle to the HS2 Project shows that it clearly fails in a number of areas.

Value for Customers The “customers” in this case will be the tax-payers who will be required to fund the £30 billion cost of construction (estimated at £1,000 per household) and subsequently subsidise the operation. As clearly some 99.9% of them will never use it, this is of no value to them.

Reading the revealed comments attached to the 46,467 people from the South coast to Scotland (so far, increasing daily) who have signed the petition to abandon HS2, all object most strongly to what they perceive as a colossal waste of money and resources, which they wish to be put to better use. 467 Not printed. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w551

The North-South Divide Mr Cameron has claimed that a 250 mph rail link with the North will reduce the “North-South Divide” and has publicly asserted twice that “HS2 will go ahead”, and this first before the much publicised and highly expensive (and unnecessarily complicated) Consultation process had even begun and then in the middle of it. This, of course, begs the question of its true purpose and validity. Unfortunately some now begin to suspect it as a smoke-screen for a firm decision already taken. However, elementary common-sense suggests that if you improve the communication between a smaller region and a much larger one, the “gravity” of the latter will pull business and people to it at the expanse of the former. This has been amply demonstrated in practice by extensive studies of the results in various countries of this effect. Interestingly, DfT’s own projections show that some 6 out of 10 jobs created will be in London. And I suspect that is just another understatement. Consequently the REAL effect will be to INCREASE the North-South Divide by making commuting to London from, eg Leeds, more attractive, thereby encouraging the most entrepreneurial, ambitious and able to move and work in London, and so denude the North of their capabilities and contribution.

Journey Times Is there a benefit to business travellers from a 20 minute shorter train journey time—as claimed for HS2? The short and long answers are “No” and “Absolutely Not” (see next section). Even if there was—is an expenditure of £30,000,000,000 justified just to save 20 minutes to the outskirts of Birmingham (then requiring a transfer to another link to the City centre, taking how long? Not specified …) As against a journey targeted by Virgin Trains to be only 10 minutes longer direct to New Street Station (in the centre) with a range of connections to other destinations on the spot? Effectively a faster and more comprehensive service.

“Wasted Time on the Train?” Mobile telephone technology now allows voice, messaging and e-mail communication while on the train, as well as internet access. So the time spent on a journey need not be wasted—thus removing one of the main arguments in support of HS2 for business. In addition, Skype software applications for iPhone, iPad and iPod allow Skype-to-Skype voice and video calls, (using Voice over Internet Protocol [VOIP]) enabling voice and even video conferencing with several colleagues and business contacts. (My son, who runs a high technology business, already uses the train as an extension of his office by using these facilities. He is not alone in this—everyone can do it.) One can only conclude that the assertion by the DfT that journey times are a waste and a hindrance to business is either a result of profound ignorance of these capabilities or deliberate obfuscation, thus inevitably casting doubts about the reliability of any other of their assumptions and forecasts underpinning their case. Surely it makes much greater sense from a business point of view to invest much more cheaply in more or longer trains and make business use even easier by providing free internet connectivity? Some trains are already internet enabled but at an extra price. Also improve the interior design of carriages to make it easier to set up and work with a laptop/iPad/iPhone?

How Reliable Are These Forecasts? The preamble to the Consultation Document states the following: “While the Department of Transport (DfT) has made every effort to ensure the information in this document is accurate, DfT does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of that information and it cannot accept liability for any loss or damages of any kind resulting from reliance on the information or guidance this document contains.” This really says it all. The business case for HS2 relies on forecasts of traffic and usage up to some 75 years ahead. This is not only ridiculous, but thoroughly unprofessional, especially as a close look at the DfT calculations and assumptions reveals that the most optimistic scenarios have been chosen and the lesser ignored. In fact, their estimate of future demand for travel is several times higher than other rail industry forecasts, but these have not been factored in to provide a balanced range of financial outcomes. In other words, the DfT presents a wholly unbalanced prospectus, on the basis of which, and on the caveat about the accuracy etc of the information in the above preamble, we are as taxpayers asked to commit £30,000,000,000 to a wholly unnecessary and useless project, whereas very much cheaper and more efficient alternatives such as the RP2 progressive enhancement to the current network, are available much more quickly cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w552 Transport Committee: Evidence

and are more socially, economically and environmentally sustainable. They will also allow costs to be controlled in line with actual demand and generate much larger benefits for the costs incurred.

Throughout my long business career we exercised very detailed budgetary control, with annual budgets and detailed monthly management accounts. The budgets were both a performance target and a cost-control mechanism. The target was developed after detailed study of all relevant market conditions, and was intended to be realistic. Only one thing was certain—it would prove to be wrong—and we would perform better or not as well depending on external and economic factors. But costs were controlled as we went along and the results were always satisfactory.

We did once consider a five-year plan but dismissed it as basically irrelevant. To base the DfT prospectus on estimates of load and traffic factors and public travelling intentions some 75 years ahead in order to justify this expenditure and claim that a good return on investment would be obtained is sheer fantasy. A weather forecast would probably prove more accurate.

Are There Valid Comparisons?

We do not have to look very far. The original case for HS1 has proved so far off the mark that it has recently been sold at a fraction of the original investment, having consistently made a loss. Why should we trust the same people to make a more believable case for HS2?

The Dutch HS Rail is making losses and I understand is liable to be declared bankrupt. Major problems have also been encountered by HS Rail in China and Spain. All result from excessively optimistic projections, not borne out in practice and with prosperity increasing in the bigger cities at the expense of the smaller. A third of France’s existing high-speed lines lose money, and as a result inevitably less money is available to spend on maintaining the rest of the railway system, which is degenerating.

Can we not learn from this?

How Complete is the Business Case?

The proposal to have up to 36 electric trains per hour between 5.00 am and midnight travelling at 250 mph will require a tremendous amount of power. This will not be available from current generating capacity so additional capacity will have to be provided. I have not seen any DfT estimates of the amount and of the costs of building or extending power stations and these presumably have not been taken into account. They could be considerable and must be included in the assessment of the case for HS2. (Wind farms will be irrelevant.)

I recommend that you should consider the summary of an extensive assessment of the energy implications of HS2 on: http://www.voxopp.org.uk/449/where-will-the-electricity-come-from/

I have also not seen a breakdown of the £30 billion estimate. Is this only the cost of constructing the line? What is the cost of all the trains and has that been included? What are the running costs, namely payment for the electricity consumption, staffing, maintenance of track and rolling stock (very high wear at those speeds both of the track and the wheels, motors, brakes, overhead cables, collectors etc) depreciation and so on? What effect will these have on ticket prices at the DfT’s expected numbers of passengers per annum? Alternatively, how many passengers will be required at the projected ticket prices, assuming these will be competitive to attract the passengers in the first place? And is this a realistic number? Will interest be paid on the money invested or is this a write-off? How much subsidy is envisaged? Will the sum of all these items make commercial sense?

Why are Some Business Enterprises in Favour?

Need one ask? A bite at the £30 billion pie is irresistible to the construction industry, and the suppliers of equipment, catering and even portaloos. It is significant, however, that none of these self-interested parties are proposing to contribute any cash or make an investment.

The Obvious Conclusion?

From a business and any other relevant standpoint, this gross expenditure is not in any way justified and the project should be cancelled forthwith, thus saving the bulk of the HS2 Ltd development budget of some £1 billion currently committed. July 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w553

Written evidence from Maurice Hopper (HSR 196) There are three topics that seem to be missing from the (public) debate about High Speed 2. The debate lacks an international dimension (1 below), the consideration of loading gauge (2) and the lack of economy in working terminal stations (3). (1) High Speed 2 seems to have been conceived as an isolated piece of high-speed railway only serving the United Kingdom north of London. Where is the planning that would integrate it into the European rail network with a direct high-speed connection to HS 1, the Channel Tunnel and Europe? This would link Birmingham to the rail network of North West Europe allowing direct connections to Lille, Brussels, Paris, Amsterdam and Cologne and beyond. Such a connection could provide attractive through journey times from Birmingham to Paris of about 3 hours or Birmingham to Cologne of 4 hours 30 minutes, city centre to city centre. As HS 2 is presently planned such journeys will require a taxi, a bus or a walk down the Euston Road and another extended check-in at St Pancras, putting the UK rail network at structural disadvantage for years to come when competing for international traffic. No air transport development would have such a restricted view of the potential routes, operation and increased connectivity. (2) It is a statement of the obvious that the new high-speed line needs to be built to the Berne loading gauge to allow French TGV and German ICE trains to make through journeys. Consideration also needs to given to the requirement for larger loading gauge freight traffic to help realize the full potential of the Channel Tunnel and high-speed lines for night time freight movement, including piggyback lorry trains and other long distance European traffic, without the need for non-standard, smaller rolling stock. The resulting removal of large numbers of lorries from the roads, by opening up the UK rail network to such traffic, would make a strong case for the new construction not yet articulated. (3) It is well known that city terminal stations are operationally less efficient than through stations. This is widely recognised across Europe as indicated by station developments in Brussels (1949–52), Antwerp (1998–2007) Berlin (2002–06) Leipzig (2004–09) to name just a few. The concentration on Euston (or Old Oak Common) as a terminal brings many problems of large numbers of people changing trains at the same location. If there were a number of stations on a through line under London, points of congestion would be greatly reduced. Such a line could also be used as a second Thameslink, say linking Euston to Victoria, Waterloo and beyond, carrying both high speed and regional trains, thus integrating HS2 into the wider UK rail network.

Additional Comments The isolationist vision described by the media (both railway and popular) and indeed the UK Government of High Speed 2 linking London to the North is only part of the true economic potential of this project. It would be sad to see initial investment being overtaken by events (reduced availability of international air travel) with a repeat of the financial waste and the poor image of railway investment displayed by the Government and the rail industry at Waterloo International (£130 million for a ten year operational life). This mean-spirited substitute resulting from the initial lack of HS 1 was hardly an indication of serious strategic thinking in railway infrastructure development. It is so typical that one of the finest modern railway buildings in the country, Waterloo International, now stands unused. Please do not allow this important project to repeat so many of the mistakes made in railway planning and investment in the UK since the earliest days of the industry, many associated with poor routing,468 in-built high operating costs469 and ridiculous restrictions.470 25 July 2011

Written evidence from Glenn Lyons and Steve Atkins, Centre for Transport & Society (CTS), University of the West of England, Bristol (UWE) (HSR 197) Context CTS at UWE has been responsible for taking forward research into how individuals use their time when travelling and what meaning and value this has for them. Specifically, in relation to the HSR Inquiry, CTS has designed questions that have been included in the National (Rail) Passenger Survey in Autumn 2004 and Autumn 2010. Such questions have addressed: (i) what rail passengers do with their time on the train; (ii) how worthwhile they consider this time to be; (iii) how they equip themselves for using their time; and (iv) the extent to which they plan in advance how to use the time on the train. The research has not been oriented specifically towards an attempt to economically evaluate travel time and travel time savings. However, the 468 The historic lack of support by UK governments for the construction of a coordinated railway network, when set against vested interests and land ownership, often leading to higher operating costs and long term inefficiency. 469 For example in the case of HS 2 the suggested route via London Heathrow that would increase route length, and therefore both building and operating costs while linking to a potentially declining destination 470 The Royal Commission of 1846 decided that mainline stations should not be allowed inside the ring of terminal stations around central London, effectively closing down any thought of establishing proper connectivity for the mainline rail network across London. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w554 Transport Committee: Evidence

empirical evidence does challenge the orthodox approach of economic appraisal (applied in the economic case for HS2) that assumes travel time during the working day to be unproductive such that savings in travel time convert unproductive time into productive use which has economic value.

Empirical Evidence For the comparative analysis of 2004 and 2010 response data, sample sizes were as follows: 2004—22,866; and 2010—19,715. These are very large sample sizes lending the findings a high degree of credibility. Results are weighted to be representative of rail services across Great Britain. A full write up of the analysis is available on request from [email protected]. Key findings are as follows: (1) 27% of all rail passengers spend some time working/studying on the train—this increases to 54% when considering business travellers. The figures are relatively stable between 2004 and 2010. (2) One third of business travellers (34%) indicate that the activity they spend most time on while on the train is working/studying. (3) Across all passengers, the incidence of working/studying as the main activity is greatest for journey times of 1–3 hours: ½–1 hour—16%; 1–2 hours—20%; 2–3 hours—18%; and 3+ hours—13%. (4) 43% of business travellers spend some time reading for leisure (25% spend most time on this); 46% window gaze/people watch (13% spend most time on this). (5) Technology use is apparent—32% of business travellers spend some travel time on text messages/ phone calls for work (up from 21% in 2004) and 31% spend some time checking emails. (6) Only 1% of business travellers spend most time being bored (the figure is 2% for all passengers). (7) Commuting in the UK is considered to be outside the working day. 27% of rail commuters spend some time on the train working/studying—13% spend the most time on this. (8) 30% of all passengers consider they make very worthwhile use of their time on the train (up from 24% in 2004); 55% consider they make some use of their time; and 13% consider their time spent on the train as wasted (down from 19% in 2004). 91% of business travellers consider their time on the train to be very worthwhile or of some use. (9) For travellers for whom the activity they spend most time on is working/studying, 46% consider their time on the train very worthwhile (up from 40% in 2004). Only 3% consider it wasted time. (10) 8% of passengers plan a lot in advance how they will use their travel time on the train. 68% do not plan at all or plan very little because they always use their time in the same way. 64% of passengers who plan a lot in advance consider their time use very worthwhile; this compares to 21% who do not plan in advance at all. (11) The proportion of rail passengers having and using a laptop computer on the train has increased by two-thirds in the past six years. 54% of those who have a mobile phone with them are now using it on the train compared to 36% six years ago. (12) The proportion of passengers equipped for sound and those making use of this has more or less doubled in the last six years.

Earlier Research Earlier qualitative empirical work lead by CTS has highlighted the different meanings and experiences of travel time to individuals. Travel time can be seen as a gift—important in social relations—to other people at a journey’s destination—measured as the cost to the traveller of creating that co-presence. Travel time can also be a gift to oneself, with three intrinsic meanings: “time out”—escaping from the pressures and obligations of complex lifestyles, “me time”—time for personal self indulgence, and “transition time”—allowing space between the different demands of workplace and home, preparing for the activities at the destination. The distinction can also be made between clock time and experienced time. The latter can be stretched or compressed according to the traveller’s state of mind and activity engagement. For example experimental work has shown how journeys can be made more acceptable or “remedied” through assisted planning in advance of travel and by provision of suitable artefacts for use during the journey. In this way we can improve the perception of how travel time is used and experienced.

Implications for the Inquiry In the “Economic Case for HS2” report, the analysis and commentary is at pains to “head off” the problem underlined by the empirical evidence above, namely that the core assumption in the orthodox approach to appraisal of travel time being unproductive is flawed. Significant proportions of travellers, particularly but not exclusively business travellers, work or study during their journey and assess this time as being very worthwhile. The implication is that the time being saved by faster journeys by HS2 is not as valuable as is being assumed—thus the benefits of HS2 may be less than assumed overall. The report rightly contends that if travel time use is to be considered in economic appraisal then account must also be taken of the positive impacts of reduced crowding (through greater capacity provision) and (potentially) greater time use productivity for individuals switching from road to rail. Its consideration concludes that the orthodox approach remains cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w555

robust in terms of the outcome values. This may be true but this consideration itself makes its own assumptions about the nature and extent of “positive utility” derived from travel time use on rail and alternative modes. What is clear, across transport investment, is that it is not acceptable to treat travel as simply a disutility— a means to an end. It has, or can often have, positive value and this is irrefutably true of travel by rail. Our empirical findings tend to suggest that this value (economically and potentially socially) is increasing over time—the proportion of rail travellers who consider their travel time very worthwhile has gone up by a quarter in six years. As the information age further advances, how will this change over the 60 year time horizon considered in appraisal? The overall research results given above reveal quite clearly that people get positive value from their rail travel time—although it will not be the same across all parts of the network and for different travelling conditions. A key question for rail investment is whether the priority is increasing capacity or speeding up journeys. Recognition that travel time use has a positive utility may undermine the value of the latter; meanwhile it may add substantially to the economic value of the former. Investing in getting more out of travel time may be as important to consider as investing in getting more travel time out of travel. We do not wish to express a view either for or against high speed rail. However, given the critical importance of travel time valuation to the economic appraisal of the HS2 investment we are strongly of the view that further investigation of the economic and social values of travel time use by rail travellers and users of alternative modes is urgently needed before there can be sufficient confidence in the economic case. A rethink is long overdue. 5 August 2011

Written evidence from Dr Paul Hoad (HSR 198) Summary 1. This paper has been written by Dr Paul Hoad who has 16 years’ experience in Transport Modelling and Planning. Dr Hoad has worked on a wide range of transport projects, in the UK, East Asia and the Gulf, including the economic assessment of transport schemes. 2. This note considers a number of issues relating to the transport modelling work undertaken for the HS2 study and calculation of economic benefits. Documents provided at the public exhibitions plus further documents and Spreadsheets available from the HS2 website have been the basis for this review. 3. The general approach to the assessing the scheme has a number of problems including the following: — The choice of Euston as a London Terminus is poor as the connections to other rail services will be irrelevant. — The costs do not include improvements to London Underground even though HS2 recognise the need for such work. — The choice of Curzon Street as the Birmingham Terminus is poor owing to the poor connectivity and was abandoned as a passenger terminal 150 years ago as it was located too far from the city centre. — The HS2 model has only been used to produce forecasts for 2021 and 2043, despite the fact that the opening year is 2026 with subsequent improvement in 2033. The ability to understand the requirement of the system and design accordingly is therefore in question. 4. From the available reports it is evident that the model used HS2 to determine the transport benefits has serious weaknesses. This evidence includes warnings from HS2’s consultants about the limitations in the model which do not appear to have been addressed. 5. Weaknesses in the model include the following: — The benefits claimed may merely be due to random noise in the model. — There has been lack of observed data upon which to build the model. — The increase in overall rail patronage forecast is likely to build up much more slowly than anticipated. 6. Furthermore, due to the availability of Spreadsheets used by HS2 to derive the economic benefits of the proposals, it has been possible to carry out a detailed review of the calculations involved. From this it has not only been possible to identify a number of errors in the methodology but also to correct and repeat the calculations used by HS2 and produce revised Benefit Cost Ratios. These errors include: — An over-estimation of the number of working days in a year. — The cost of paying for tickets has not been included when calculating the transport benefits even though the resulting Revenue is recognised as being of significant size. — Artificial time penalties applied to replicate travel behaviour have been included in the economic benefits as if they were real times. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w556 Transport Committee: Evidence

— The Value of Time for Rail Business Passengers is too high. — The average occupancy of cars has been overestimated thereby over-estimating the Value of Time for cars. 7. In each case the resultant Benefit/Cost Ratios show a decrease, demonstrating that the benefits have been over-estimated. In particular correcting the failure to include the cost of ticket purchase seriously weakens the economic argument for HS2. Taken together it is demonstrated that there is no net economic benefit from the system. 8. This paper therefore questions the validity of the model used to support the proposed High Speed Rail, and demonstrates that the Benefits derived from its construction will be outweighed by its Cost, at best giving only 70p back for every £1 spent.

1. Introduction 1.1.1 This document has been written by Dr Paul Hoad, who has 16 years’ experience in Transport Modelling and Planning. Dr Hoad has worked on a wide range of transport projects, in the UK, East Asia and the Gulf, including the economic assessment of transport schemes. The evidence set out in this report is based upon the scrutiny of documents provided by the High Speed Rail Public Consultation, some of which were available at the public exhibitions and some of which were available via the HS2/DfT webpages, with particular reference to modelling issues. Particular scrutiny has been paid to Microsoft Excel Spreadsheets which detail the Cost Benefit analysis undertaken by the High Speed Rail consultants and which are available on the internet. 1.1.2 This work has been undertaken solely by Dr Hoad, with the purpose of checking that the proposals meet the necessary requirements to ensure value for money, and has not been funded by any third party. This note has been written for submission to the House of Commons Transport Select Committee, and formatted in accordance with the committee’s requirements, including the need to confine the report to six pages. 1.1.3 This note comprises two main sections; firstly there are comments on the general methodology of the investigation into the viability of High Speed Rail; and secondly a more detailed examination of the calculations used to determine the economic benefit, making use of the Spreadsheets actually used by HS2 in their analysis.

2. General Issues with HS2 Methodology 2.1.1 The following issues have been identified in HS2’s methodology to determine the value for money of their proposals, and which undermine the validity of the conclusions. 2.1.2 There has been a failure to include the significant costs associated with improving Euston Underground Station even though HS2 have recognised that the service would add 5,500 extra passengers to the Tube in the three hour morning peak (Para 5.4 of the HS2 Consultation document) equivalent to six completely full Tube trains and that the Tube services would already be heavily crowded. 2.1.3 There is a lack of information on where the “Wider Economic Impacts” would occur and how the forecasts have taken into account constraints such as Green Belt designation, or whether this would result in unwanted urbanisation of rural areas. Similarly, the HS2 model forecasts a significant increase in trip making, but no information is given about where these extra trips would come from, again meaning that the model results could be based upon increased development in unreasonable areas. 2.1.4 The transport model used by HS2 has been used to produce forecasts for only 2021 and 2043, yet the proposed opening date is 2026. Therefore the ability to design for the opening years of the new system is weak and the approach is contrary to DfT Guidance on the need to provide forecasts for the opening year (WebTAG Unit 3.5.4 Para 4.2.3). 2.1.5 There is a lack of information on the viability of the West Coast Mainline once passengers switch to HS2, which even with reduced services to reduce costs may no longer be economic to run (particularly in the years immediately following the opening of HS2. 2.1.6 The documentation for the HS2 model indicates that there is poor convergence between the supply (the available network and services) and the demand (ie the trips) contrary to DfT Guidance (WebTAG Unit 3.10.4, Section 1.5), meaning in real terms that the model is subject to a high degree of randomness and therefore any benefits may simply be random noise rather than real impacts. 2.1.7 The documentation for the HS2 model indicates that it is recognised that there is a lack of observed data upon which to base it, making its reliability as a forecast tool open to question. 2.1.8 The Highway component of the HS2 model is unreliable due to its inclusion of fixed traffic flow values, making it unsuitable for forecasting future flows and the subsequent derivation of economic benefits. 2.1.9 The HS2 model does not include the representation of local road congestion, which can be a key factor in choosing between road and rail travel. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w557

2.1.10 There is no evidence of First and Standard Class Passengers being dealt with separately in the model, and hence its ability to properly deal with capacity issues is seriously in question as it will not be able to reflect how Standard Class can be full yet First Class can be almost empty.

2.1.11 Although HS2 should be commended for identifying that the increase in trip numbers forecast by the model will not appear instantaneously from opening, the assumption of 80%, 90% and 95% of this extra demand for the first, second and third years respectively is still likely to be optimistic, over estimating both the travel benefits and the additional revenue gained.

2.1.12 In a report dated February 2010, Atkins advised HS2 “When the project proceeds to a detailed design and public scrutiny stage, it is expected that additional independent validation data would be collected to allow further and more detailed scrutiny of the model and inform detailed design decisions.” However this advice does not appear to be followed as the development of the HS2 model is detailed in a report also dated February 2010. Despite this, the public consultation exercise was still carried out.

2.1.13 The justification for High Speed Rail set out in the consultation is based strongly on the argument that the UK should have HSR2 simply because other countries have invested in it. However there is no evidence presented to demonstrate the economic case of these systems, indicating that this is simply a matter of jealousy of other countries rather than rational argument, and that therefore the study carried out is a matter of attempting to prove a decision that has already been taken.

2.1.14 The choice of Curzon Street as the site for the Birmingham terminus is poor due to its lack of interchange with conventional rail and bus services, and was abandoned 150 years ago as a passenger station owing to its distance from the city centre.

2.1.15 The choice of Euston as the site for the London terminus is poor as it connects to the Underground via a station that is already overcrowded. There will be little valid connections with conventional rail services as few people are likely to use the HS2 line from Birmingham to Euston then travel back northwards on the West Coast Main Line.

3. Analysis of HS2 Appraisal Spreadsheets

3.1 Overview of the HS2 Appraisal Spreadsheets

3.1.1 Twenty four Microsoft Excel Spreadsheets used to assess the economic benefits of the High Speed Rail are available on the internet via “http://www.hs2.org.uk/supporting-documents-temp”. These Spreadsheets are for scenarios examined. The files of primary interest are listed below. File Name Scenario Modelled Central Case MM67b Day 1 (revised 060711).xls The initial London-Birmingham network Central Case MM88 Y Network (revised 060711).xls The London-Birmingham network plus extensions to Manchester and Leeds

3.1.2 The final figures in these Spreadsheets are very close to, but not exactly the same as, the economic figures provided in the DfT/HS2 document “Economic Case for HS2, The Y Network and London-West Midlands”, February 2011 provided at the HS2 exhibitions. The minor differences would presumably be due to the implied revisions made on 6th July. (NB The identities of the files are also confirmed in document “http://hs2.org.uk/assets/x/78218” from HS2, in a Freedom of Information response, which makes reference to these file names, although without the revised date suffix.)

3.1.3 These two Spreadsheets have been reviewed and a number of items have been identified for which there has probably been an error made in the calculations. Corrections have therefore been applied to the Spreadsheets providing updated results for the economic analysis. These issues are set out below in the form of tests carried out by the author, examining the effect of each correction individually, including the effect on the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) of each as derived from the corrected Spreadsheet. In addition a final test is detailed where the corrections were applied together to assess their combined impact.

3.1.4 In accordance with the data presented in the economic report, two BCR values are given, both with and without the Wider Economic Impacts (WEIs).

3.2 Test 1: Too High Annualisation Factors

3.2.1 Annualisation factors are values used to convert the forecast Daily values taken from the model into total Yearly values (and ultimately the 60 year assessment period). The values used in the Spreadsheets are set out below, although it should be noted that values under “HSL” do not appear to have been used, with Rail covering both High Speed Rail and conventional rail. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w558 Transport Committee: Evidence

Journey Purpose Rail HSL Air Highway Business 273 273 291 365 Commute 279 279 n/a 365 Other 353 385 395 365

3.2.2 The factors used for Business and Commute are too high. These trips are weekday trips, and not likely to occur during the weekend. As set out in the guidance for DfT’s TUBA (Transport Users Benefit Appraisal) Software, which would normally be used to undertake the economic assessment and which the Spreadsheet should replicate, there are 253 working days in the year (365 days, minus 52 weekend days and eight Public Holidays). 3.2.3 Business and Commute Annualisation factors were therefore corrected by setting them to a value of 253. The factors for Other trips were kept the same. Although they appear very high, these are not unreasonable if the need to consider time saving during the unmodelled weekend is to be included. However, there is an additional question of whether time savings during the weekend can be considered as valid for inclusion in the economic benefits (it is not unusual for economic assessments to exclude the weekend period completely). Therefore a further test was carried out setting all factors to 253 to derive the transport benefits, but setting the total revenue to equal that calculated when only the Business and Commute factors were corrected. This latter element is important as the Annualisation factors are used to derive the total annual revenue, and even if Weekend time savings are assumed not to contribute to the economic benefit, the passengers are still paying the fares. The results of the testing can be seen below: Uncorrected Corrected Change in Test Network with/without WEIs BCR BCR BCR Business and London— BCR without 1.61 1.45 −10.1% Commute Factors Birmingham WEIs set to 252 BCR with WEIs 2.01 1.82 −9.4% Y Network BCR without 2.20 1.96 −11.0% WEIs BCR with WEIs 2.59 2.35 −9.2% Business, London— BCR without 1.61 1.34 −16.9% Commute Birmingham WEIs and Other BCR with WEIs 2.01 1.71 −14.8% Factors set to 252 Y Network BCR without 2.20 1.83 −17.0% WEIs BCR with WEIs 2.59 2.20 −15.1%

3.2.4 From the results it is clearly evident that the correction of the Annualisation factors does have a significant effect upon the BCR values. This impact is in greater proportion than the actual change in the factors, owing to the fact that not only are the forecast annual transport benefits reduced but also the forecast annual revenue decreases thereby increasing the net cost to government.

3.3 Test 2: Absence of User Charges 3.3.1 Examination of the HS2 Spreadsheets has found that the User Charges included in the analysis are in likelihood incorrect which has resulted in the Transport Benefits being seriously overestimated. User Charges cover financial payments paid by travellers and includes such elements as road tolls and, more importantly for HS2, rail (and air) fares. From Tables 2 and 10 of the “Economic Case for HS2” report it is clear that significant additional revenue is expected to be raised. Yet despite this there are no corresponding values in the User Charges to show travellers having to make these payments. Such charges effectively offset part of the benefits gained and can have a material effect on the economic assessment. 3.3.2 An example of this is the two existing alternative rail services between Birmingham and London: the New Street—Euston service and the Snow Hill—Marylebone service. The latter is the slower of the two but is cheaper. For someone currently travelling on the Snow Hill—line, it would be possible to transfer to New Street and gain a time saving but will suffer the loss of the increased fare, and so the choice is a trade-off between the time saved (and the Value Of Time of the traveller) and the additional financial cost. 3.3.3 Reviewing the Spreadsheets has shown that there are calculations of User Charges for Rail passengers but the values being dealt with are so small as to be zero when rounded to the nearest million pounds in accordance with the other larger values considered. For example, for the “Day 1” Birmingham—London scenario, the total Revenue over 60 years (in 2002 prices and discounted to 2002) is £7,753,695,520 but the corresponding total User Charge is a mere £1,657. For the “Y” network the values are £15,444,335,550 and £859 respectively. The User Charges are therefore more than a million times smaller than the revenues despite the fact that the Revenues must derive from the User Charges. In addition to this, reviewing all the available Spreadsheets shows Revenue values varying quite widely but the User Charges staying relatively fixed. For example, the forecast 2021 annual revenues vary between £107 million and £451 million, whilst the User charges vary between £33 and £97. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w559

3.3.4 The cause of this error is suggested by Item 8 of the minutes of the HS2 Analytical Challenge Panel for Thursday 23 April 2009. (NB On the HS2 website this is incorrectly identified as 2011.) In this item it is stated that the revenue modelling should be included in the benefits modelling. It is therefore probable that the calculations were updated to add the Revenue into the calculations but the corresponding need to include the User Charges was overlooked. 3.3.5 In order to correct this, a simple assumption has been made to correct the Spreadsheets, setting the User Charges equal in size to the Revenues although they are set as negative values as they are a cost to travellers. In the original Spreadsheets the User Charges were added to the Transport Benefits, implying the money was being paid out by HS2 to passengers, not being paid by passengers. Having applied this change to the Spreadsheet a further correction was found to be necessary in the “Y Network” calculations as the cost of the User Charge was being applied twice. 3.3.6 It should be noted though that the User Charges should be higher than the Revenue. Travellers accessing the stations by taxi will be paying out taxi fares which will not be recouped as Revenue. Car parking costs will also be incurred which may not be recouped by the government. Even if HS2 operates its own car parks in order to capture these payments, this will still miss out those users of the conventional rail system who use car parks not controlled by Network Rail, and consideration would also need to be given to the additional costs of operating such car parks. It can therefore be seen that the setting the User Charges to equal the Revenue is a conservative assumption.

3.3.7 The results of the testing can be seen below: Uncorrected Corrected Change in Network with/without WEIs BCR BCR BCR London—Birmingham BCR without WEIs 1.61 0.56 −64.9% BCR with WEIs 2.01 0.91 −54.6% Y Network BCR without WEIs 2.20 0.95 −57.1% BCR with WEIs 2.59 1.36 −47.4%

3.3.8 As can be seen, there are very significant decreases in the BCR owing to the considerable size of the Revenues and consequently also the User Charges. Although the magnitude of the Revenues provides a major benefit of paying for roughly half the cost of Capital and Operating Costs, they also have the disadvantage of decreasing the net transport benefits. Although many people will have the benefit of shorter journey times at the same fare level, new travellers and those transferring from road (who are the ones providing the additional revenue) will be gaining less than was originally calculated.

3.3.9 For the initial London-Birmingham network the total benefits are less than the actual cost, even with the WEIs. As result it is not a case of considering the relative value for money but a case of not being value for money at all. For the enlarged “Y Network” the scheme appears more marginal, with the WEIs providing sufficient additional benefits to push the scheme over the 1.00 level. However the original testing this scenario by HS2 assumes that the full network opens all together, rather than having only the initial (loss making) London-Birmingham for the first seven years. In addition, as was reported in the “Economic Case for HS2”, delaying implementing the scheme actually increases the BCR, by roughly 5% a year. By ignoring the first seven years (2026 to 2033) when only the London-Birmingham section is in operation the BCR of the “Y Network” would have therefore been increased by 40%. Correcting for this is therefore likely to reduce the BCR with WEIs from 1.36 to below 1.00 and hence in all scenarios the scheme would be an economic loss.

3.3.10 The calculation of economic benefits includes the effect upon tax revenues. Additional money that is paid out by travellers would have otherwise been spent elsewhere and would have been taxed to some degree (whereas rail fares are not). The calculations in the Spreadsheets do include this aspect but this is linked to the Revenue input whereas it should be linked to the User Charge. Although this means that the error of having too low a value has been avoided, given that User Charges are likely to be higher than the Revenue, this would still need to be corrected for. DfT’s TUBA software uses the User Charge as an input from which the Revenues (public and private) are then derived, rather than assuming separate inputs and calculations to derive User Charges and Revenue, and the Spreadsheets should follow the same processes.

3.4 Test 3: Boarding and Crowding Penalties

3.4.1 In order to determine route and mode (ie road, rail, air) choice, the HS2 model not only includes actual travel time but also additional time penalties that affect travel behaviour. These include Boarding Penalties and Crowding Penalties for Rail travellers. The former would be a perceived penalty of using transport service and would be applied for each service is boarded. This reflects the inevitable preference travellers have for private car as opposed to public transport and also militates against a series of connecting services. As the actual travel time, the time taken waiting for a service and the time taken to access and exit the public transport system are covered under separate items, the Boarding Penalty would not be a real time delay merely a perceived penalty required to replicate passenger behaviour. However these values have been included in the economic assessment, meaning that incorrect additional benefits have been claimed for the proposals. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w560 Transport Committee: Evidence

3.4.2 It is also notable that the analysis claims that there is an actual overall positive benefit from the Boarding Penalties. Given that there is an overall increase in Rail usage, and the HS2 will not reduce the need for intermediate interchanges, it would be expected for there to be an increase in the number of Boardings. This in turn should give a negative rather than positive benefit (if these were to be included) yet a positive benefit is claimed. 3.4.3 Similarly, Crowding Penalties are applied to reflect the physical constraints of rail capacity and reflect the decreasing attraction of rail travel as the level of usage increases and carriages become more crowded. This should be seen as a perceived penalty not an actual time penalty and hence it should have been excluded from the economic assessment. Whilst it might be argued that the effect of crowding will be to degrade the opportunity to carry out productive work on a train, this would be to ignore the fact that the Value of Time for Business users on rail is already much higher than for car users, so to add further penalties would be double counting. The level of Crowding has however been included in the economic assessment, meaning that incorrect additional benefits have been claimed for the proposals. 3.4.4 The Spreadsheets have therefore been corrected by applying zero values to both the Boarding and Crowding time penalties. The results of this test are shown below. Uncorrected Corrected Change in Network with/without WEIs BCR BCR BCR London—Birmingham BCR without WEIs 1.61 1.37 −15.1% BCR with WEIs 2.01 1.70 −12.4% Y Network BCR without WEIs 2.20 1.91 −13.2% BCR with WEIs 2.59 2.30 −11.2%

3.4.5 As can be seen, there are significant decreases in the BCR values of between 10% and 15%. The bulk of this reduction is in fact due to the removal of the Crowding Penalties, although both elements contribute to the lower values.

3.5 Test 4: High Value of Time for Rail and Air Business Passengers 3.5.1 As has been argued by other parties, the Value of Time (VOT) for Rail and Air Business passengers is much higher than for car Business users. The VOT is effectively the penalty paid for being unproductive during travel, and it can be seen that someone travelling by train or air is likely to be more productive than someone in a car. For Business trips the existing car occupancy is 1.2 (from DfT’s WebTAG Guidance), or in other words for every six cars, five have only the driver and only one has an extra passenger. Even with high levels of crowding, rail and air passengers will still be able to get more work done than a driver. 3.5.2 In order to test the impact of the high VOT for rail/air business users, the values have been adjusted downwards. Two alternatives are reported below, firstly setting the air/rail VOT to the same value as for road (a reduction of 31%) then applying a 50% reduction to reflect an overall lower VOT. A reduction of 50% is to some extent speculative but such a decrease was discussed in the Analytical Challenge Panel of 30 June 2009. (N.B. Minutes of these meetings are available at http://www.hs2.org.uk/acp although there are some errors in these links, including mislabelling the year of some meetings.) 3.5.3 The results of these tests are shown below: Rail/Air Business Uncorrected Corrected Change in VOT Network with/without WEIs BCR BCR BCR = Road Business London—Birmingham BCR without WEIs 1.61 1.35 −16.0% VOT BCR with WEIs 2.01 1.73 −14.1% Y Network BCR without WEIs 2.20 1.85 −16.1% BCR with WEIs 2.59 2.23 −13.8% reduced by 50% London—Birmingham BCR without WEIs 1.61 1.19 −25.7% BCR with WEIs 2.01 1.55 −22.7% Y Network BCR without WEIs 2.20 1.63 −25.9% BCR with WEIs 2.59 2.01 −22.3%

3.5.4 As can be seen, this test produced significant decreases in the BCR values, reducing them by about 15% where there is equality between Rail/Air and Road VOT and by 25% when the Rail/Air VOT is decreased by just under another 20%. 3.5.5 It is recognised that changing the VOT would require the model to be updated accordingly and rerun, rather than simply revising the Spreadsheets. A lower rail VOT would be expected to mean a greater attraction for rail services but this is potentially misleading. Changing the VOT would require the base year model to be revised not simply the forecasts. The process whereby the model splits trips between road and rail travel would therefore be recalibrated to the new values but to the same observed values as used before, damping out the impact in the future. Therefore rerunning the model is unlikely to gain any further benefits to offset the decrease in benefits shown above. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w561

3.6 Test 5: Too High Car Occupancy 3.6.1 Car occupancy is important to the economic assessment as it is necessary to convert between person trips used in a Rail/Air model and vehicle trips use in a Road (or Highway) model. In the Spreadsheet it is stated an average occupancy of 1.6 has been assumed with a comment stating “Ideally update HW [Highway] to vary by year/time period as occupancy varies—but impact relatively small”. There is a calculation of vehicle occupancy for the years up to 2031, but these are incorrect and show too low a decline, and anyway have not been used in the final calculations. 3.6.2 The level of car occupancy is declining slowly but steadily and DfT guidance is for this to continue up until 2036. The guidance gives a decrease in occupancy of about half a per cent per annum, but over 36 years (the baseline data being from 2000) compounded year on year this does have an effect. Indeed the fact that it is included on DfT Guidance (WebTAG Unit 3.5.6) shows that it should be taken account of. 3.6.3 The economic benefits of the proposals are derived for a sixty year period, starting in 2026 for the “Day 1” network and 2033 for the “Y Network”. All but a very small proportion of period will therefore have the 2036 level of car occupancy. It was therefore possible to derive a correction factor, comparing the calculated car occupancies for 2036 against the assumed average of 1.6. The correction factors were as set out below: Journey Purpose Calculated 2036 Occupancy Correction Factor Business 1.18 0.737 Commute 1.12 0.701 Other 1.58 0.989

3.7 The results of these tests are shown below: Uncorrected Corrected Change in Network with/without WEIs BCR BCR BCR London—Birmingham BCR without WEIs 1.61 1.58 −1.8% BCR with WEIs 2.01 1.98 −1.6% Y Network BCR without WEIs 2.20 2.16 −1.9% BCR with WEIs 2.59 2.57 −0.8%

3.7.1 As can be seen, although the correction factors are significant, the overall effect is fairly small, at less than a 2% reduction. This is because the Highway benefits are a relatively small component of the total travel benefits (and a smaller proportion when the WEIs are included). However, as the Highway model has issues which may need correcting, it is important that the occupancies are included as it could have a greater impact with a revised model. 3.7.2 It should be noted that a change in occupancy would affect the VOTs assumed in the Highway mode, and hence would require the network model to be rerun for a definitive test to be applied, although as with changing Rail VOTs the effect is likely to be small. However such an update would be necessary in order to ensure the accuracy of the model.

3.8 Test 6: Combined Test 3.8.1 This test combines the individual tests as follows: As Test 1: Annualisation Factors for Business and Commute travellers set to 253. As Test 2: User Charges added equal to the Revenue, but as negative benefits. As Test 3:.Boarding and Crowding Penalties removed from Economic Benefits. As Test 4:.Business Value of Time for Rail/Air Business travellers set to equal Car travellers’. As Test 5: Future Year Car Values of Time corrected for Occupancy. The results of this test are as below: Uncorrected Corrected Change in Network with/without WEIs BCR BCR BCR London—Birmingham BCR without WEIs 1.61 0.00 −99.7% BCR with WEIs 2.01 0.30 −85.0% Y Network BCR without WEIs 2.20 0.20 −91.0% BCR with WEIs 2.59 0.72 −72.2%

3.8.2 As might be expected from the individual tests the BCR values are significantly lower than the 1.00 break-even point, the worst case producing no net benefit and the best case giving only a 72% return on the investment. Therefore the proposals would not provide any real value for money. 3.8.3 It should be noted that the less stringent of the two options for Test 1 was applied, as was the case for Test 4 hence there is the potential for the BCR values to be further diminished. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w562 Transport Committee: Evidence

4. Conclusions 4.1 It is evident that the model used by HS2/DfT has significant weaknesses and would need to be improved before it can be considered reliable. Therefore if the project is to continue in any way, the focus should first be on improving the model, after which retesting of the proposals can be undertaken. This would not in itself be likely to identify any additional benefits but should provide real confidence in the results. As it has been stated that delaying the implementation of the scheme would lead to a higher Benefit Cost Ratio (about 5% extra per year of delay) it would not be unreasonable to take the time needed to build a robust model, costing a small fraction of the overall benefit claimed for the delay. Even if the High Speed Rail proposals are still found to be impractical, this would lead to the creation of a more reliable national rail model which could be used to make better use of conventional rail. 4.2 investigation of the method of calculating the benefits of the proposed scheme has shown a number of errors, which when corrected demonstrates that the Benefit to Cost Ratio is much lower than presented to the public, and that this shows not just that the scheme is of lower value for money than other potential investments but that it does not even provide value for money, having a greater cost than it benefits. 4.3 In conclusion therefore is can be said that based on the evidence there is no justification to proceed with the High Speed Rail proposals as the scheme will cost the country more than the benefits it will produce. 11 August 2011

Glossary of Technical Terms Annualisation Factors Factors to convert Daily Values derived from the HS2 network into yearly values. The values should reflect what proportion of the total yearly journeys is represented in the actual model. Annualisation factors will vary by Journey Purpose due to the different proportions of travel in periods that are not modelled. Benefit Cost Ratio/BCR The sum of the benefits (comprising elements such as changes in travel time, vehicle operating costs) divided by the sum of the costs (comprising elements such as the capital cost of construction and yearly operating costs). A value of 1.00 therefore indicates that the Benefits equal the Costs and the higher the value is the greater the overall return on investment. Convergence Most transport models follow an iterative approach in deriving forecasts in order to take account of the interaction between travel demand (ie the number of people travelling) and the transport supply (ie the capacity and connectivity of the network). For Highway trips, increased usage causes congestion imposing additional time penalties; for Public Transport increased usage leads to Crowding which penalises travellers. In a model such as HS2 have used, the supply element is fixed by the user and it is a case of the model deriving the level of demand (ie the number of trips between each origin and destination) as well as the routeing once that demand is set. This is a complex process, where an averaging method or other algorithm is required to allow each iteration to make smaller and smaller changes than the previous one, so that the result converges to a final answer. Poor convergence implies that there are large differences between iterations and it can be difficult to achieve a good level of convergence, particularly in deriving the overall demand. Poor convergence can lead to large differences being observed between scenarios which are solely caused by the fluctuations between iterations but can be mistaken for actual scheme benefits. Achieving convergence within a model can be time consuming and there is the risk of sacrificing convergence in order to produce model results within a short time-frame. Journey Purpose The subdivision of travellers into different categories, to reflect different behaviour. In the context of the HS2 model the Journey Purposes are: Business (otherwise referred to as Work) trips which are trips taken during work time and funded by the employer and have a high Value of Time when compared with; Commute trips which are the movements between home and work during the travellers own time; and Other (otherwise referred to as Other Non-work) trips which are the remaining trips made by travellers in their own time. Mode of Travel The means of travel, such as Air Rail or Car (or Road). TUBA The DfT’s Transport Users Benefit Appraisal software, developed to provide a standardised method of calculating economic benefits from transport improvements. User Charges Financial costs paid by travellers in the course of their journey, such as rail fares, and tolls. This does not include the cost of fuel etc. for cars which are considered under the category of Vehicle Operating Costs. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w563

Value of Time (VOT) The opportunity cost of the time that a traveller spends on his/her journey, in effect the value to be gained by the economy for each unit of time saved. WebTAG The DfT’s website for guidance on the conduct of Transport Studies (http://www.dft.gov.uk/webtag/index.php) Wider Economic Impacts Benefits indirectly caused by changes in transport and travel costs, and not (WEIs) included in the Transport Benefit calculations

Written evidence from David Henderson and David Sawers (HSR 200) Summary (i) The HS2 proposal offers too low a prospective return to deserve governmental support. On the government’s best estimate, the line to the West Midlands would produce discounted benefits of £20.7 billion for costs of £24 billion. The government would lose £10.3 billion on its investment. These results must be uncertain; benefits may be over-stated, and they are based on forecasts of traffic extending for 60 years, though growth is capped at 2043.There will be a wide range of possible outcomes. A project that would produce environmental losses should produce a surplus of benefits over costs if it is to be accepted. (ii) There is no evidence that HS2 would help to rebalance the economy. Most of the £4.1 billion of benefits from wider economic impacts are attributed to increased efficiency produced by attracting businesses to the areas around railway stations. These estimates are questionable; £1 billion is more plausible than £4.1 billion. Estimates of benefits to more distant regions are trivial. The reasons for giving so large a subsidy to the project are unclear. Subsidising this project is inconsistent with the government’s policy of reducing support for the railways. (iii) The method used by the government to present the results is misleading. It treats the financial loss to the government as the cost against which the benefits should be set; it is usual to compare the total cost with the benefits. The government thus claims that HS2 London-West Midlands provides a benefit-cost ratio of 2.0, although a conventional approach gives a BCR of 0.86. The government’s method was devised to allocate funds within the Department for Transport’s budget. HS2 might displace higher yielding transport projects in that budget; in any case it would compete with other government expenditure. (iv) The government’s claim that a high speed network would produce greater benefits than any alternative is not justified by the evidence. The alternatives to HS2 as ways of increasing capacity on the West Coast Main Line have not been studied with sufficient thoroughness to establish what would be the best option. The methods used in the Strategic Alternatives Study should have been more objective. The study may therefore exaggerate the expenditure needed to increase the capacity of the WCML. It suggests, however, that the forecast increase in traffic on the West Coast Main Line could be met by incremental improvements. (v) We recommend that the high speed rail project should be abandoned. Efforts should be concentrated on improving the performance of the existing network, with more emphasis on reducing the subsidy to the railways.

The Economic Case 1. The most significant feature of the economic case for the HS2 is that it relies on estimates of revenue extending over 60 years. Although growth in traffic is capped in 2043, the risk that basic assumptions like travel habits, available technologies, and the rate of economic growth will change and affect revenue becomes greater with the passage of time. If forecasts of traffic are made for so long a period, a wide range of assumptions should be employed, which implies that the results would have to be expressed as a broad range of possible outcomes. Presenting the results as a single figure, as the Department for Transport has done, gives a false impression of certainty. A better approach would be to calculate the results over a shorter period, perhaps 30 or 40 years. 2. Despite incorporating expected benefits for so long a period, the forecast return on the HS2 is low. Employing the government’s discount rate of 3.5%, reducing to 3% after 30 years, the present value of costs is expected to exceed that of benefits by £3.4 billion. The internal rate of return has not been published, but is probably less than 3%. The government should reveal this figure. The return on the longer Y route is forecast to be higher, with benefits £0.6 billion less than costs, but the costs of the longer route have not been studied in enough detail for the estimates to be considered reliable. A rate of return of less than 3% cannot be considered adequate for a large industrial project like HS2. It would represent an inefficient use of national resources. 3. The return on the project could well be even less than the DfT’s evaluation suggests. Apart from the uncertainty created by the 60 year timespan of the revenue forecasts, traffic is sensitive to the level of fares, and so to government policy on subsidies to the railways. The main traffic forecast assumes that fares rise by 1% a year in real terms; if they increased by 2% a year, the sensitivity analysis in The Economic Case for HS2 shows that traffic in 2043 would be 24% lower, and benefits would also fall. What is more, the benefits to business travellers from faster journeys may have been over-estimated. This class of benefits, which provide 54% of all benefits, assumes that travel is unproductive time; but many travellers work in a train. The benefits cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w564 Transport Committee: Evidence

of faster travel may therefore be smaller than predicted. If benefits to business travellers were halved, the benefits from HS2 would be £8.9 billion less than its costs. 4. The cost estimates for HS2 contain a large contingency allowance, derived from experience of overruns on previous projects, and should therefore be reasonably accurate. The estimates do not, however, include costs that may be incurred by London Underground. The introduction of HS2 is predicted to lead to a near-doubling of peak hours traffic on the underground at Euston by 2043. If so large an increase in traffic occurred, the investment needed on the underground could run into billions. 5. The return on HS2 is all the more inadequate when the construction of its track would cause substantial but uncosted damage to the environment, as the result of building its track through unspoilt and attractive countryside, and inflicting noise on those living near the track. DfT states that 7,400 homes would be within 100 metres of the line, but that only 4,700 would experience a noticeable increase in noise. This assertion is somewhat surprising. An effort should have been made to value the environmental costs, and include them in the economic appraisal. If they could not be valued, their description should have been incorporated in the economic appraisal, and not hived off into the separate Appraisal of Sustainability. A project that would cause significant environmental damage could only be justified if it produced large economic benefits to offset the losses. HS2 is not likely to produce such benefits. Its construction is not therefore justifiable.

Wider Economic Impacts 6. The DfT forecasts that the HS2 will produce wider economic impacts worth £4.1 billion over 60 years. These benefits derive mainly from increases in the economic efficiency of businesses which, it is predicted, would gather around the new stations on the HS2 route and the existing stations on the WCML as a result of the improved train service. The service to intermediate stations on the WCML, such as Milton Keynes, is assumed to improve after HS2 is opened, because there will then be spare capacity on the WCML. It is assumed that these new or enlarged collections of businesses will be closer to one another than they would otherwise have been, and will therefore be more efficient than they otherwise would have been. This effect is estimated to produce benefits worth about £3 billion over 60 years. It is also predicted that there will be further benefits, worth about £1 billion over 60 years, from the effects of better train services, which are expected to open up areas in London and the West Midlands to the effects of wider competition and wider markets. 7. These benefits are not very plausible. New railway stations on a high speed line are likely to attract businesses, but it is a bold step to assume that these businesses would be more efficient than they would otherwise have been, because they are closer to one another than they otherwise would have been. This seems to be no more than an assumption. What is more, these businesses will have moved to the HS2 station from some other location, as the Sustainability Appraisal recognises; and there could be losses from this move. The density of businesses in the former locations may well decline, and so would the efficiency of the remaining businesses there. This loss should be set against any gain in efficiency among the businesses collected around the HS2 stations. The £3 billion of benefits attributed to this factor are best ignored: their generation is uncertain, and they may be offset by losses elsewhere. 8. It is widely accepted that improvements to transport services, especially of commuter services into urban areas, can improve economic efficiency by producing “agglomeration” effects—enlarging labour markets and increasing the interaction between businesses in the area. The £1 billion of benefits attributed to this effect are therefore more plausible; the improvements in train services made possible by the construction of HS2, especially any consequential improvement in commuter services on the WCML, may produce benefits— especially in London. 9. The estimates of WEIs therefore appear excessive, and much of the more probable benefit appears to arise in London. There is no evidence, in the appraisal of HS2, to support the assertions of Ministers that high speed rail would reduce inter-regional economic differences and rebalance the economy. Indeed, HS2 Ltd commissioned Daniel J Graham and Patricia Melo of Imperial College to advise on the assessment of WEIs, and they concluded: “Thus, while urban economic theory does not preclude the existence of agglomeration benefits across inter-regional distances, the empirical evidence suggests that these may be very small indeed”471 10. Their illustrative examples were that an increase of 25% in travel speeds that affected 25% of long distance rail journeys might produce agglomeration benefits of £8 million, while a 50% increase in speeds might produce benefits of £16 million. High speed rail cannot affect inter-regional economic links and reduce inter-regional economic differences unless these estimates are in error by a factor of one thousand or so. 11. This conclusion should not surprise anyone. It is evident that the UK is a small country, that it already has a well-developed—if often congested—transport system, and that journey times between major urban centres are already short. The Eddington Transport Study of 2006 emphasised that the UK is already well connected, and suggested that the key economic challenge was to improve the performance of the existing network. Investments which unblocked pinch points were expected to offer the highest returns. But large projects, with speculative benefits and relying on untested technology were not expected to generate attractive returns. 471 Advice on the Assessment of Wider Economic Impacts: A report for HS2. Daniel J Graham and Patricia Melo 2010. P. 37. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w565

The Appraisal Method 12. The government has presented the results of the HS2 project in a misleading way. It treats the government’s loss on the project as the relevant cost, and so obtains a cost-benefit ratio of 2.0. The normal method of presenting the results of an investment appraisal is to compare the total costs with the benefits. The costs of HS2 exceed the benefits, even on the government’s estimates, so a conventional appraisal would conclude that the cost-benefit ratio was 0.86. The internal rate of return is also commonly used to assess the merit of a project, and the return it produces will be compared with the organisation’s target return. In the government’s case, its target is 3.5%, falling to 3% after 30 years, and the return from HS2 is probably less than 3% on the government’s estimates. The government should publish the internal rate of return earned by HS2, to clarify the position about the return it might produce. 13. The government’s method of calculating the cost-benefit ratio for HS2 was originally chosen to help allocate the budget of the DfT, because the department’s criterion for selecting investment projects was the amount of transport benefits they would produce for each pound of government expenditure. Even at this level, the criterion is defective; a government department should be concerned with the efficiency with which national resources are used. At the level of the HS2, the criterion has no merit at all. There is no DfT budget for so large a project, so far into the future. If it was to be built, the DfT budget would have to be greatly increased. The cost of HS2 would be competing with other possible government expenditure a decade from now. 14. Further, the DfT already has a large portfolio of projects that have been appraised, so their expected returns are known. It is relevant to compare the expected returns to HS2 with those from the other projects in that portfolio, which it could displace or preclude. Without knowing whether these alternative projects are expected to yield more or less than HS2, it is impossible to judge whether HS2 would represent a good use of limited DfT funds. 15. The government in fact needs to consider whether it should provide any finance at all for a project like HS2. When the railway system was run by a nationally owned corporation, it was told that investment in long- distance travel should be judged by a purely financial criterion. Now the railways have been privatised, it is ironic that such investment should be judged by cost-benefit appraisal, and that of an idiosyncratic kind. We believe that the best test for investments like HS2 is whether the public is expected to be willing to pay enough for the new service to make it profitable. Faced with the results of the government’s present appraisal, decision- takers should compare total costs with benefits, and recognise the uncertainty of the forecasts.

The Strategic Alternative 16. The government has published a report, the Strategic Alternatives Study, which shows how the expected need for additional capacity on the WCML could be met by upgrading the existing track, to show what investment might be needed if HS2 was not built. Its authors, Atkins, state that the proposed works would make the WCML four track throughout and grade separated as far north as Crewe, and would provide extra terminal capacity at Euston and Manchester. 17. The Study provides for more work on the WCML north of the junction with HS2 than does the HS2 proposal, which assumes that high speed trains would run to Manchester. It therefore plans to increase the capacity of the WCML to permit just as much traffic as would be carried by conventional trains in the alternative case. Surprisingly, it considers that fewer improvements are needed than Atkins does in the alternative case. The HS2 proposal allows for some work on infrastructure and signalling in the Stafford area, but no work in the Manchester area because improvements there are already planned. The Strategic Alternatives Study proposes three extra platforms at Manchester Piccadilly station and grade separation at Ardwick, costing £395 million. At Stafford, it proposes spending £1,111 million on three grade separated junctions and a stretch of new line to bypass two stations. 18. South of Stafford, the larger proposals in the Alternatives Study are providing four tracks for nine miles between Coventry and Birmingham at a cost of £903 million, to allow fast trains to overtake slower trains, and providing a grade separated junction south of Leighton Buzzard at a cost of £243 million, so that trains can switch between fast and slow lines at 100mph. 19. It is not self-evident that it is necessary to provide nine miles of four track, rather than one mile, or just to provide additional tracks in some stations, to permit fast trains to overtake slow trains, nor that it is worth spending £243 million to permit trains to change tracks at 100mph. Combined with the heavy expenditure proposed around Stafford and Manchester, one wonders whether the proposals represent good value for money. 20. The defect in this study lies in its methods: it does not try to establish whether the proposed improvements represent the best value for money. The scale of the increases in capacity on the WCML that are worth undertaking can only be established by calculating the return that each increment in capacity will produce. This methodical approach is essential if the scale of the desirable investment is to be established. The Alternative Study relied on expert opinion to establish what investment was worth undertaking, not methodical analysis, but such an approach is unlikely to produce the optimal answer. Our subjective judgment of the exercise is that it suggested more expenditure than is likely to be proposed by the rational analysis we recommend. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w566 Transport Committee: Evidence

21. For all its limitations, the Alternatives Study gives an initial impression of the scale of improvements needed on the WCML to accommodate the anticipated growth in traffic; and this impression is that the scale is small. The Study identifies only three projects between London and Birmingham that it considers worth undertaking, and the biggest of them—four tracking nine miles between Coventry and Birmingham—is one of the more questionable of the proposals. This small number of infrastructure schemes comes despite the failure to incorporate longer trains as a means of increasing capacity; it appears technically feasible to increase the length of trains from 11 to 12 coaches, but this option was ignored. 22. The deficiencies of the Alternatives Study imply that the government cannot claim that HS2 offers the greatest benefits of all possible means of increasing capacity on the WCML. A rationally-conducted Alternatives Study might well produce a means of increasing capacity that gave a better return than the HS2. The ability to phase any increases in capacity to match increases in demand—which the builder of a new line does not possess—also increases the potential return from investments that increase the capacity of an existing line. Incremental improvements therefore seem a better policy than large scale investment. They would also fit better with a policy of improving the financial performance of the railways. 23 August 2011

Written evidence from John Killip (HSR 201) Please can you raise the issue of MAGLEV for discussion and comment at the Transport Select Committee on the 6 September 2011 My concern is that MAGLEV not been considered when it is: (a) for connectivity to the stations on the HS2 proposals it would be half the cost; (b) it would be much faster 500kmh rather than 360kph, it accelerates and brakes much quicker as the carriages are much lighter and there is no locomotive; (c) it is much more flexible and is able to follow existing transport corridors such as the M62 thus avoiding the need for the Y route; (d) It is several orders of magnitude quieter as there is no contact with the track; (e) the footprint is much smaller no unsightly gantries less tunnels; (f) it would not be affected by weather as there is no engine to get blocked by the wrong kind of snow and there would be no problems with leaves or snow on the track; (g) it uses 21st century technology rather than old 19th century wheel on rail techology no wear and tear as no wheels or rails therefore maintenance costs much less; (h) it is tried and tested technology which has been running from Shanghai airport to Shanghai for some years; and (i) a trial could be built from Edinburgh to Glasgow now rather than waiting for HS2 in a minimum of 25 years. Give it some thought it would be far more prestigious than slow noisy wheel on rail systems. 23 August 2011 Note: I have no connection with Ultraspeed but I do think they should be allowed to make presentations to the Select Committee

Written evidence from Mr Geoffrey Toull (HSR 202) Executive Summary This submission focuses on four specific sets of issues that impinge on the Transport Secretary’s HS2 scheme being planned by HS2 Ltd, draws conclusions, and makes recommendations. The issues are: — Government-sponsored infrastructure project cost and time realities and the need to factor them into the HS2 figures; — the need to set HS2 in its operational timeframe; — the inevitability of the adverse impact on HS2 passenger-demand forecasts of electric vehicles and telepresencing (with a brief on the latter); and — shortcomings of HS2 analyses and their consequences. One background thread running through the submission is the background of ministerial assertions about the scheme and about those who oppose it. The assertions demonstrate a particular, indeed peculiar, characteristic of project authorities, that of having been ‘captured’, being in thrall, to their projects. Thus the submission ends in an After-note entitled “the inherent risk in the exercise of authority”. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w567

Given that throughout the past 25 and more years project following project has over-run the budget and timetable set down at authorisation, the lessons learned should have been applied to HS2. It appears that this has not been so: DfT has no such material. The submission argues that this must be rectified, the lessons be applied to HS2, and the Chancellor double and more the money to be set aside for the scheme were it to go ahead. Passenger-demand forecasts have been on the basis of projecting forward year on year the growth experienced in recent years. The background scenario for the forecasts was one of no change, no advance, in ways of conducting business, or of society’s changing milieu, in the operational timeframe of HS2. It was not in the HS2 brief to examine the issues of electric vehicles or telepresencing, yet they will have a huge impact on HS2 passenger numbers. These issues are given the light of day in the submission, issues that must be addressed with serious intent. The above demonstrates particular shortcoming in analyses conducted by HS2 and its consultants, and highlights, briefly, other inadequacies. They must be rectified, forecasts must brought into line with the business and societal realities of the HS2 in-service time-frame, and the as yet unknown-unknowns of the scheme tackled with vigour. It is recognised that HS2 scrutiny must be a considerable burden on the shoulders of individual members of the Transport Select Committee. It is recognised, too, that the scheme covers a wide range of specialised disciplines, some falling naturally with the remit of other Select Committees, the members of which might possibly be willing to share that burden. The submission suggests therefore that this be explored, with your own Committee acting as Office of Prime Responsibility and co-ordinator. It is felt wholeheartedly that a scheme of the cost, complexities, and risks inherent in the HS2 scheme are of such magnitude that unstinting help, submissions included, should be put at the service of your Committee. And I therefore commend this submission to you and your Committee colleagues.

Background When challenged by members of the public about aspects of HMG’s High-speed Two (HS2) railway scheme, the responses by particular government ministers throughout these last 12 months have ranged from the deliberately shallow, the dismissive, at best, obfuscatory at times, the banal, and to calculated and carefully calibrated innuendo. Examples abound, a very few being set out in Annex A to this submission. Just one pair of examples is included hereunder in order to make three interrelated points. The examples. The Transport Secretary (SoS), belabouring people living in the Vale of Aylesbury and opposed to the government’s high speed rail plans]: “I hear lots of arguments about whether the country can afford it, value for money and the business case”. “But 95% of these arguments come from people who just happen to live in Wendover or Aylesbury or Amersham. I don’t blame them for fighting their corner but they should be honest that their objection to this project is that it comes through their backyard. It is not a principled objection”. Moreover, the SoS had asserted previously that objectors from Wendover and areas nearby were merely “nimbys”, nothing more, and thus any factual evidence as to the un-soundness of the HS2 scheme presented by them could be dismissed out of hand by ministers]. In essence the SoS has said: “95% of those that I hear, who challenge affordability, value for money, and soundness of the business case are, because of their places of residence, unprincipled no matter how strong their evidence”—words chosen by him, as ever, with care and forethought. Put another way the SoS had said in essence: “I have counted only five people out of every 100 in the area who have sufficient integrity and moral compass to respond objectively—the other 95 out of every 100 lack integrity, so it is legitimate for me (as SoS) to ignore any evidence that they might adduce”. The first of the three interrelated points is that the above examples are just two of the many that make clear the absolute determination of the SoS to ignore, to dismiss out of hand, all evidence that undermines his case for the HS2 scheme. Note that although the SoS alluded to “affordability, value for money, and soundness of the business case” he failed, as ever, to address those issues. There must be a reason. The second point is that, when presented with “negative” evidence by members of the public, the SoS resorts, time after time, to studied self-serving and sweeping assertions that on examination are lacking in credibility. The third point stems from the SoS’s claim that “I have travelled right around the country speaking to people about our plans. I am confident there is large-scale support for this project in the North and Midlands and among the business community across the UK”. Doubts arise unbidden in one’s mind: what did he actually say; to how many: was it balanced and objective—cons as well as pros—were they serious two-way engagements? On what solid evidence does the SoS base his confidence of “large-scale support among the business community across the UK”(?)—quite proper and legitimate questions to the SoS. Collectively the illustrations at Annex A472 and above make clear the SoS’s absolute determination that HS2 is to go ahead regardless of the mass of well-founded evidence telling against the scheme. Agreed, some of the evidence (compelling evidence) has indeed come from specialist working groups of experts in the Wendover, Aylesbury, and Amersham areas. Commensurately powerful evidence has come from groups and 472 The Annexes to this submission are not printed with this document. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:14] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w568 Transport Committee: Evidence

others much further afield, groups and internationally reputable economic institutions that likewise bring to bear the expertise of acknowledged and objective professionals. In sum, the picture is one of stark contrast: careful professional analysis and well founded factual evidence by study teams and professional institutions on the one hand, countered by ministerial rhetoric, innuendo, dissimulation, and refutation on the other, coupled with the flawed scenario on which the HS2 scheme has been founded. It is the latter, the scenario, that this submission addresses, and on which the submission’s formal aim is based. The submission is not intended to replicate evidence presented to the Select Committee by the several and more groups of experts. The aim is cast more narrowly.

Aim The aim of this submission is to expose to the members of the House of Commons Transport Select Committee the following sets of issues that ought to be brought to bear in the examination of the validity and soundness of the business case for the HS2 scheme as portrayed by HS2 Ltd, and to draw conclusions and to make recommendations. The issues are: — HMG-sponsored infrastructure project cost, time, and effectiveness realities; — setting HS2 in its operational timeframe; — the impact of Electric Vehicles; — modern tele-enabled business systems and their impact on business enterprise and societal culture; and — HS2 Ltd analysis shortcomings, consequences and DfT assertions.

HMG-sponsored Infrastructure Project Cost, Time, and Effectiveness Realities No major national infrastructure projects equivalent, or similar, in scope and complexity to HS2, have been completed on time and on budget throughout the past 25 years. Yet government ministers and their officials of the day must have endorsed as “robust” the assessments of project and in-service costs, and the timetable for each, that were presented them by officials. Equally each scheme would have been risk-assessed exhaustively, and the competence of the implementation executive-team assessed in terms of track record. To suggest such processes were without such rigour would be to traduce the integrity and probity of all concerned. Nevertheless, project costs and timetables have proved, time and again, to be double, treble, and more,473 the figures that had been put confidently “on the table” by ministers for Treasury or Cabinet endorsement. Importantly, several of those projects were significantly less complex and demanding474 than the proposed HS2 scheme. In the outcome the HS2 scheme’s assessed cost and timetable would almost inevitably be double, and more, the figures on which the Cabinet would be asked to “sign off”. Protestations by today’s ministers and officials to the contrary would undermine government credibility. The old saw that: “Ah, yes, but this time it will be different, you will se”, would ring hollow. Astonishingly, the Department for Transport, in response to a Freedom of Information (FOI) request—copy at Annex B—has replied that the department has no central record of previous major infrastructure project performance; thus no body of information against which to calibrate the assessments provided to it by HS2 Ltd; thus, too, no document available for DfT’s own use and use by HS2 Ltd that sets down guidance drawn from the many investigations into past-project shortcomings. If none exists elsewhere within the department, or within HM Treasury, the National Audit Office could well be an informed source—or be invited to draw on its many post-project investigations to compile one for the DfT and the Treasury. Such a compendium would be worth it weight in gold to ministers and official alike. HS2 Ltd is without one but, when challenged during one of the Consultation Road Shows, one of its senior executives replied that “but we had had a chat with HS1 people” [today’s people?]: the planners, cost estimators and project implementers of those now distant years would no doubt have been long gone to distant pastures. Based on the above, the Chancellor of the Exchequer should extend the civil works phase, reserve at least £36 billion [£36,000 million—all too easy to confuse the Bs and Ms] denominated in today’s prices, and factored for 15 years-on-years of cost and price of inflation, to fund the HS2 Phase One scheme, should it go ahead, and add equivalent up-ratings for each subsequent leg. More profoundly, one would expect the Chancellor, secure in his declared prudence, to instigate an independent thorough-going, evidence-based, investigation into HS2 Ltd’s cost analyses, and what the company has missed, drawing to the full on its own, and National Audit Office (NAO) records of past outcomes. 473 The author is not entirely a “layperson”‘ in this respect, having worked within the Whitehall complex for some 8 years in policy, planning, infrastructure-project scoping, specification and initiation, followed by a further eleven years from the outside as contractor and consultant—and co-author of a 1994 report into shortfalls in HMG procurements of complex large-scale information systems. 474 Also at local-regional level: Edinburgh and Croydon tram systems, the Scottish parliament building, the Cambridge redundant rail-track bus route—some incurring five and more year overruns, with comparable cost increases. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:15] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w569

Setting HS2 in its Operational Timeframe During the recent series of Road Shows by HS2 Ltd, when faced with challenging questions, numbers of the company’s senior officials claimed that the work was still only at high level and thus it was not possible to satisfy the questioner’s request. One justification given was that the fine detail of the topographical line of route had yet to be determined—a known unknown. “Unknown-unknowns” were inconvenient subjects. One such unknown-unknown, and hugely important, is hydrology, yet to be scoped and studied by the HS2 Ltd team. Some aspects of hydrology may well not be amenable to resolution; other aspects may require a considerable injection of funds and lengthy extension of the civil works phase: unknown-unknowns indeed. All told, the duration of construction of Phase One as calculated by the company is over optimistic. Even if the calculations were accurate the first HS2 train would commence operational service until some 15 years from now. HS2 would continue in service (if not bankrupt) into and beyond the 2050s. Will the business and societal practices of the 2020s-2050s, be those of yesterday and today? Would the British populace have denied itself the benefits of the manifold technological innovations that will have swept across the world beyond our shores? HS2 Ltd and its sponsor department believe this to be so, to answer: “yes, it would deny itself”. For, in its forecast of passenger demand for an HS2 the company has taken it as axiomatic that past growth rates will continue year on year into the long term. Ms Theresa Villiers, Minister for Transport has, in a very recent interview, expressed total confidence in this HS2 Ltd forecast. Moreover, during one of the consultation Road Show sessions several HS2 Ltd senior officials were likewise as confident. None were able to put flesh on that particular bone, though, and when asked the extent to which they had considered the impact of disruptive technologies on their forecasts there were blank looks. They did not understand the term475 let alone show any awareness of the transformative technologies that would shatter HS2 passenger number calculations. What are these transformative technologies that will prove disruptive to HS2? Many objectors to HS2 have cited two particular ones in their letters to the press and to MPs. What has been missing from many of the letters has, however, been evidence to back the assertions. This submission focuses on two sets of these technologies. One is Telepresence business systems and their derivatives. The other is electric vehicle (EV) technologies and associated advances in electric power distribution. There is huge progress on each of these fronts. Amazingly HS2 Ltd senior strategists seemed unaware of what is happening in these burgeoning fields, let alone their consequences for an HS2. They seem cocooned, shut off from all this, yet the impact of each on the economics of the scheme are momentous. Why this is so remains, for the public at large, an open question. Each technology will have gone through 15–20 years of further productive development and innovation by the time an HS2 could become operational. The two technologies will be major factors in the ways in which business is conducted and in which society sets itself in this new era. The two merit attention here, beginning with EVs.

The Impact of Electric Vehicles Elsewhere that particular Road Show week the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) was hosting a series of professional lectures, conferences, and workshops having a bearing on HS2 (see Annex C). One series, led by automotive industry technical executives, focused on progress in EV engineering progress, and battery technologies. The companion series focused on current work toward the “smart” electric power grid and associated technical standards for the EV age (further evidence, too, that the automotive and the power generation companies, are committed to a future more “green” than now). None of this work is being undertaken in isolation within the UK. Note that HMG’s Department for Transport is much engaged in assisting, promoting and subsidising this transformational field. When will this EV world come to pass? Not this year. Current battery technology limits EVs to a range of some 90 miles. Across the international automotive industry [Renault to Rolls-Royce] the sums being invested in EV and in battery development are enormous, and consistent with each company seeking competitive edge (Renault: £3.5 billion invested, and 1,000 staff engaged in its programme). Similar sums are being invested in new vehicle-transmission drive systems and electric motors. Renault is just one of many, and was at the forefront at IET’s recent conference week. Views from within the industry, confided no doubt to the DfT, are that affordable vehicles with 500-mile ranges will be commonplace well before 2026. Will this encourage the 2020s business folk to switch from their convenient and “green” vehicles to HS2? HS2 Ltd has not tested this area, and, seemingly, nor has its paymaster, the DfT. Renault UK’s Andrew Heiron, authorities such as Ian McDonald, technical director of future transport systems, member of the IET transport policy group and chair of the IET EV Infrastructure technical, group, and the Society of Automotive Engineers are well able to provide an industry-centred briefing—one from the coal-face—to the Select Committee. Equally, DfT technologists should be well placed to provide a complementary brief to the Committee on the subject and on the department’s initiatives and ambitions for this field: EV, battery and drive-train advances, the “smart” grid, charging stations and networks, et al, including 475 An example offered them related to concerns in the late 1890s that the streets of London and other major cities would be a foot deep in manure within 10 years because of the continuing increase in demand for public and private horse-drawn transport. Come the year, the motor vehicle was supplanting the horse (and its droppings)—disruptive technology. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:15] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w570 Transport Committee: Evidence

the “green” dimension. They may well have done so already, so adding an EV Annex to this submission would be superfluous. This is less likely to be so in respect of Telepresence and other tele-enabled business systems.

Modern Tele-enabled Business Systems and their Impact on Business Enterprise and Societal Cultures The SoS has asserted that the lack of a [an ultra] high-speed rail service is the over-riding impediment to the success of the business community of today, placing the enterprises at serious disadvantage. No robust evidence that this will be so during the projected HS2 operating timeframe has been tabled for independent scrutiny. What has substance is that through the adoption of telepresence and its derivatives, private companies large and small have re-cast their business methods to great commercial advantage. Years ago the forerunner, video- conferencing, was hugely expensive and perceived as “clunky”, awkward to use, conveying a sense of separation rather than one of togetherness, so was adopted by relatively few. The contrast to today’s technologies is startling. They are easy to use, effective, and enable businesses to drive down their costs, including travel budgets, achieve associated time-savings, improve individual efficiency, and enable businesses to do things not possible previously [a much vaunted HMG ambition for the private enterprise sector]. Particular Select Committee members will know that government, too, is taking advantage of the most basic of these benefits. Departments have been instructed to require, unless there is a sufficiently convincing “business-case” that justifies travel, the use of departmental telepresencing-teleconferencing (Tp-Vc) systems. This is demonstrated amply in Annex D, which summarises responses476 to a series of FOI requests made during December 2010. Note the further goal of carbon emission reduction in three of the five departmental justifications. Note, too, that the Department for Transport (DfT) cites travel costs, time saving and “green” issues as prime justifications for insisting on the use of Vc-Tp. Astonishingly, and putting the DES to one side, not one of those departments holds records of resulting cost or time savings (or is prepared to collate them)—not even the DfT—so, seemingly, HMG has no means of measuring the value for money of its departments’ Vc-Tp investments. However, undoubtedly departmental chief accounting officers will have been required by the Treasury to cut travel budgets savagely, and should therefore have “before and after” travel budget details, details relevant to the HS2 scenario. However, other benefits might be accruing to departments, and it would be helpful to know what and how great they are. Savings made within the private enterprise and charity sectors tend to be measured, and can be impressive [Guide Dogs: £200k invested in videoconferencing equipment brought travel costs down by £600k—one major British-based international bank must be getting at least as good rate of return, its staff having rung up some 200,000 Tp sessions during a recent 12-month period]. These systems are available for purchase, for lease, and for use on a pay-as-you-go, walk-in, basis. They are being snapped up. Evidence? To save Transport Select Committee researchers undue time, a series of relevant extracts from reputable weeklies and professional institutions, and accompanying commentary, is set out in the briefing document at Annex E. The annex provides a flavour of what is here today, and what lies ahead in the immediate future.477 It is recognised that the subject comes naturally within the remit of the Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee, which might possible have listed it for review (?). If so, those members may well look at how the technologies might evolve throughout the years into the mid 2020s. Realistically, the first phase of the projected HS2 would not come into operational service until or beyond that period. The likely business customers of that time and into the mid-life of an HS2 would be the highly computer-literate teenagers of today, grown to maturity. They are people for whom a laptop, a display system, a smart phone, Facebook, LinkedIn and more, are already indispensable accoutrements: They have technology at their fingertips, in their ears, and in their faces. They are the children of the age of instant communication, looking for always for more, and for the attention grabbing latest innovation. The social milieu would keep in step. And who are these children, the future potential business executives of the 2020–40s? They are likely to include the presently young children of members of the Transport Select Committee, of Prime Minister Cameron, his Shadow Edward Miliband; Danny Alexander Chief Secretary of the Treasury, and of Michael Gove et al. Are those children to be prevented from immersing themselves in today’s and tomorrow’s telecomms-based technologies and societal norms, and from engaging on equal terms with their technologically-literate peers, in order to rescue the business case for the HS2 scheme and its economic justification? It would be a grave mistake for the DfT and HS2 Ltd to continue to base HS2 rail passenger projections for the mid 2020s and beyond on the answers to their questions of today’s typical middle-aged business persons— persons who in the main will have been long retired by then, and whose understanding of technology and its 476 It would have been useful to complete the picture. Unfortunately, requests for such information from other government departments, made in January via constituency MPs, “went astray” in the respective MP’s in-trays. Hastening has taken place. If received in time, any positive outcomes will be offered as an after-note to this submission. 477 As yet there is no professional or trade body representing this new sector. However, there are vendors and users more than able to brief on the market place, on value for money, and on the impact on businesses and on their bottom-lines. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:15] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w571

use will be limited to that of a bygone age. HS2 passenger projections, to have validity, must be set firmly within the technological and societal era of that period. That this has not happened is an inexcusable omission by HS2 Ltd and ministers. It must be corrected. There is much, much, more in the technological offing, as evinced in Annex E. In sum, such technologies and ways of working and doing business really are transformational and will affect societal norms. There will be two important benefits to 2020s–40s society that are of direct relevance to HS2. One will be the opportunity for all parties to focus much more on localism and Big Society issues, in that the need to travel to work or on business will diminish hugely. The other key benefit will be the contribution from much reduced travel [and adoption of EVs] to the onerous carbon-reduction targets to which HMG has internationally committed the nation.

HS2 Ltd Analysis Shortcomings, Consequences and DfT Assertions A great deal of thought has been put HS2 Ltd’s staff and retained consultants into the drafting, phrasing and cosmetics of the plethora of documents that have been put into the public domain. It is apparent that the material has been crafted such as to allay reader anxiety and to put an attractive gloss on the HS2 scheme. In part this has gone too far, to the point on occasion of misleading the average reader. Two related examples, chosen because, although so blatantly obvious to those affected, could be taken by others as reassuring, including off-routers who have doubts about HS2. The examples appear in HS2 Ltd’s Appraisal of Sustainability Main Report Volume One and its companion Non Technical Summary. The latter, in its paragraph 4.1.5, and the former in its paragraph 3.3.4, inform the reader that “The proposed scheme would … follow the A413 corridor … before passing to the south-west of Wendover and Aylesbury”. This is shown visually in Figure 2 of Volume One, which depicts the line of route as not encroaching on either place. It does encroach: the line of route lies within Wendover Village boundary and within the southern boundary of Aylesbury. The average, without this prior knowledge of the local geography, could assume, happily for the DfT, that “south-west of” would mean distant from—by a mile, five miles? Misinformation, disinformation—or clever “word-smithing”? That wording was not casual. When it happens the credibility of an entire document is undermined, often fatally, with a knock-on to its corporate supervisor and is true for HS2. Equally not casual was the use of the phrase “the A413 corridor”, chosen deliberately and with care. The SoS had already asserted incorrectly that the A413 is a major trunk-road corridor. Thus, implicitly, using its line-of-route would be wholly consistent with government policy of confining railway lines to such corridors whenever and wherever possible. It is yet another illustration of self-serving and misleading propaganda. Also detracting from the scheme’s credibility was the treatment of “HS2 noise” during the several Road Shows. Sound-reducing, still-air, booths had been erected in the halls for visitors to listen via headphones to the difference between recorded countryside noise and the noise to be heard at a distance of 150 metres from a supposedly HS2 railway engine and carriages travelling at relatively high speed—no buffeting pressure wave accompanied the sound. The difference in noise intensity was little less intrusive and loud than the noise made by a car being driven past the hall at less than 30mph. Such a contrast between the headphone-based noise and the real-life thundering blast of noise and buffeting heard and felt in nearby Berkhamstead, standing out in the open at a distance of 150 metres from the town’s railway line, while the main-line trains thunder past. But what science was being used HS2 Ltd’s specialist acoustic-engineering consultants to gauge noise and pressure waves from yet to-be-designed 250 mph trains and carriages? When asked during one of the Road Shows about the physics, the person to whom the question was put immediately changed the subject. Instead, he confided that sound recorders had been taken to the Continent and to Kent and noise levels measured (so, what physics, what science?). That is not the sole area in which applied-science seems to have been absent: hydrology478 being one, and which would come within the general remit of the Environment Select Committee. But why draw the attention the foregoing five paragraphs and the examples in Annex A to yourselves, the members of the Transport Select Committee, which from outside parliament would seem to be the HS2 “lead” Committee—and risk the charge of impertinence? Put simply, it is an aide mémoire that speaks for itself. And this section of the submission ends, appropriately, with a scrutiny of remarks made by the SoS and one of his Departmental “sources” as to the numbers of responses to the HS2 Consultation Questionnaire. The remarks: Transport department sources, pointing to what they insisted was a relatively low number of responses, said the last major transport consultation, on building a third runway at Heathrow Airport, drew almost 70,000 submissions. The proposed takeover of BSkyB received 156,000 responses they added, while more than 100,000 suggestions were put forward as part of the Treasury’s “Spending Challenge” ahead of last year’s Spending Review, and more than two million people responded to a petition in 2007 on road pricing. Mr Hammond said: “over the last five months we have made every effort to offer those affected by our proposals the chance to learn more about the scheme and to respond to the consultation. Despite those unprecedented attempts to engage as many people as possible the relatively low level of 478 Including the destructive effects on aquifers, on streams feeding reservoirs, and consequences for near-route and on-route settlements as well as natural environments. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:15] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w572 Transport Committee: Evidence

submissions suggests that there is not a widespread groundswell of opposition to the plans that the anti campaigners from the Chilterns have claimed.” The scrutiny: “Relatively Low Numbers” Third runway, almost 70,000 submissions. How simple, how quick, to type in a simple no or yes. BskyB, 156,000 submissions. How easy, how quick, to type in a simple no or yes, The Spending Challenge, more than 100,000 suggestions—how simple, how quick, to type one’s pet phrase, Road pricing, more than two million responded. How simple, how quick, to type in “No”. Contrast these four with the complexity of the HS2 Consultation questionnaire: nine carefully crafted questions on which there was need to cogitate, each question demanding a thoughtful and considered response—with, note, a limit when responding on-line of 2,000 characters. Adding to the conciseness challenge, when well into the last answer, the “system” had demanded that one registered first. The site was unhelpful in this, providing the daunted with a reason for giving up. Registration, surprisingly, had not been the on-screen start point, yet so obvious. (Why?). All told, the questionnaire really was a challenge, and one that the very considerable number, 40,000 souls, accomplished. “The Chance to Learn More and Respond” Every effort to offer those affected … the chance to learn more. Note the choice of wording, “those affected”: in other words only the citizens who live hard-by the Phase One London–Birmingham route. Unprecedented attempts to engage as many people as possible. Implicitly, therefore, engaging only those people living hard-by the Phase One route, not people off-route. Not a widespread groundswell of opposition to the plans as … have claimed. 40,000 is actually a very considerable number of people who put themselves out and invested what could well have been considerable time and thought. in order to accede to the invitation to respond. Not simple, not quick. And note the continuing self-serving and consciously misleading wording of the remarks quoted on the preceding page: one further exemplar. The Road Shows were held actually at just a few places likely to be affected adversely by an HS2, none held at significantly off-route locations. The substantive question is therefore: “In what ways, where, and for how long, did the DfT engage ‘as many people as possible’ living off-route, made them aware of the consultation, and encouraged them to respond to its questionnaire?” The count of off-route non-respondents must not be allowed to be proclaimed as having demonstrated “that there is not a widespread groundswell of opposition”. Effectively, those living off-route were not consulted by the DfT. One wonders how many off-route local newspapers carried DfT material about HS2 and its pros and cons, how many off-route newspapers publicised the Road Shows, and the distance of the venues from the readership population? One wonders, too, what initiatives were taken by the DfT to engage off-route populations via local radio stations? Valid questions. And how many local MPs were alive to the scheme and its manifold consequences? The mid July reply by one very busy West Country MP to a constituent’s letter urging the MP to challenge HS2, speaks volumes. It began “… this is an issue that I have tried (not) to get involved in, as it has little immediate relevance to … and the west country…” We hear on broadcast news and read that this “nothing to do with me” position is held by numbers of “off-route” MPs—yet another cogent reason for the Transport Select Committee to invite HS2 submissions from informed and qualified professionals, and to put the outcome of its examinations into the public domain, and in the House of Commons Library.

Summary It is evident from the foregoing that the Secretary of State for Transport is implacable in his determination to force the HS2 scheme through parliament. [Such blind determination is a characteristic of those who have become prisoners of their policies and programmes—because of its direct relevance to HS2 a brief after-note (pp 11–12) has been included in this submission]. The SoS has been impervious to challenge and dismissive of even the most compelling evidence that is not consonant with his goal. This should not be used to bury that evidence, that shows, indeed can prove, that HS2 would be both an economically and environmentally destructive investment of the nation’s at-risk treasure. This submission has concentrated on the inevitability of significant cost and time over-runs were the scheme to go ahead. It highlights the need to set the scheme in its operational timeframe. It highlights, too, the technological and societal issues of the period that will affect adversely HS2 economics and its business case. In other words the impact of the widespread use by then of electric vehicles, and the wholesale use by private and public organisations of tele-business systems that will enable the organisations to cut business travel to the bone. The submission points out that none of these three realities has been factored into the HS2-passenger cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:15] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w573

forecasts into the long term,479 and asks why. The submission leaves the reader to ponder on the potential for conflict between four policies: carbon reduction targets [drastic reduction in travel]; support for manufacturing industry [low no-emission electric vehicles], encouraging business efficiency and competitiveness [adoption wholesale of tele-enabled systems that do away with much of the need for travel] on the one hand, and HS2 realities on the other. The submission continued by dissecting parts of key HS2 Ltd documents and ministerial statements that can be construed justifiably as misleading, and sets out and scrutinises numbers of sweeping assertions by the SoS regarding the HS2 consultation process and the numbers who responded to the associated DfT questionnaire. In particular it has pointed-up more than once, instances where two things, unrelated one to the other, have been conjoined to create a propaganda picture, which on closer scrutiny is wholly lacking in substance. In sum, the submission poses many important questions that need serious study and factual answers, thereby fulfilling its aim of exposing the issues to the members of the Transport Select Committee. Yet some of the issues would seem to come legitimately within the individual remits of the Business [Tp], Energy [Electricity Smart Grid and EV charging network; carbon reduction measures], Environment [hydrology and much more], Communities [impact on local communities and businesses] and Treasury [application of lessons from other major projects; soundness and limitations of HS2 Ltd; economics and value for money]. Equally, should a lessons-to-be-learned guide not be available from the National Audit Office, the NAO could be invited to brief the Transport Select Committee (all Committees?) to their advantage on lessons it has drawn from its own reviews of comparable infrastructure and other major government-sponsored projects. One way forward would be for your committee members to commission specialist consultancies to examine each of the facets italicised in the parentheses above, and report their findings. On the other hand it would seem especially advantageous for those other the five named Select Committees to be invited to take on their appropriate shares of the overall HS2 review (and with the opening for each to commission external professional studies). This would limit the considerable burden facing Transport Select Committee membership. More importantly it would bring the separate and additional experience to bear on matters that one would not expect Transport Committee members to have gained. The further advantage, to parliament and to the “democratic process”, would be to enable those many more MPs to contribute and be able, therefore, to communicate their informed judgements about the pros and cons of the HS2 scheme to their constituents.

Conclusion From the foregoing it is concluded that the cost-benefit calculations and the economics assessments of the HS2 scheme are incomplete in having: assumed that HS2 passenger numbers would without question continue their present year-on-year rise into the distant long term; set HS2 in terms of yesterday’s business and automotive technologies; ignored the adverse consequences for HS2-passenger demand of the business and automotive technologies that will be commonplace during the in-service life of an HS2; invested insufficient intellect in confounding issues including noise and hydrology; and not taken into its assessments, forecasting, costing, and timetabling the lessons from over-runs, omissions, and mistakes of the many government-sponsored major infrastructure projects initiated throughout the past 25 years—and which have been the subject of National Audit Office (NAO) investigations. It is concluded, further, that were these factors to be examined by professionally qualified outside experts, the cost-benefit figures and economics of the HS2 scheme would be entirely negative, and the civil works timeframe and costs considerably greater. It is concluded, also, that considerable lengths are being gone to, to seduce the population at large into believing SoS’s assertions: assertions to the effect that all and any evidence that exposes weaknesses in the HS2 case by people, even of unimpeachable probity, who live on or near the route, is tainted by “nimbyism” and thus can rightly be dismissed legitimately. It follows therefore that the Select Committee, could at its next hearing seize the opportunity to require hard factual evidence from the SoS that could justify his propaganda mission and continuing calumny. It is concluded, moreover that a wealth of knowledge is available in the industrial world for the Committee that could be used to illuminate: Telepresence and Tele-robotic penetration of the private sector, including major manufacturers, the banking industry, contract production companies, and design establishments, and the nature and extent of the benefits that are accruing to each; automotive industry intentions and production programmes in respect of EV products, and the benefits that will accrue to the nation; and 479 Those canvassed in any fresh forecasting must be informed unambiguously of the Tp and EV scenario that will have come to full fruition, and what these hold out for work-life and leisure by the anticipated HS2 mid 2020s in-service date. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [02-11-2011 17:15] Job: 015988 Unit: PG01

Ev w574 Transport Committee: Evidence

the status of technical standards, plans and schedules for a smart electric-power grid to provide for the EV, and the developing scenario of EV batter-charging points. It is concluded, lastly, given the spread of HS2 issues that impinge on the remits of other Select Committees, that there would be great technical and parliamentary advantages were the Transport Select Committee to delegate relevant aspects to the relevant specialist Committees.

Recommendations It is recommended that the Transport Select Committee: invite the Business, Energy, Environment, Communities, and Treasury Select Committees to take on, on behalf of itself, those aspects of the HS2 scheme that fall naturally within their individual remits— he Transport Committee acting as co-ordinator and office of prime responsibility; in respect of Telepresence and derivative business systems (DBS): commission, possibly in conjunction with the Business Select Committee, a study by, say, the specialist Market Research company) Gartner, or Frost & Sullivan, to review the field, the uses to which Tp and DBSs are being put as a service offering, on the one hand, and as a procured product on the other, in the private and public sectors, to ascertain and quantify targeted and realised benefits, to research innovative ways of exploiting the technologies, and to forecast growth and sectorial penetration; and invite authoritative and knowledgeable executives from the TP sector to brief the Committee on the technologies, latest advances in the field, the areas of application and take-up. in respect of EVs and associated electrical energy supply provision: invite in conjunction with the Energy Select Committee, authoritative figures such as Ian McDonald, technical director of future transport systems, member of the IET transport policy group and chair of the IET EV Infrastructure technical, group, from the Society of Automotive Engineers, say Andrew Heiron, of Renault UK and from the UK Power industry to brief the Committee on developments and product intentions leading to the take up of EVs from the early 2020s and their supporting energy infrastructure scenario. in respect of HS2 issues: in the absence of NAO reports held by the DfT, invite the NAO to provide summaries to the Committee and to HS2 Ltd of their reports on the failures, and their causes, that dogged the many government-sponsored major infrastructure projects initiated throughout the past 25 years; task HS2 Ltd with applying the content of those summaries to the HS2 scheme, and reporting the outcomes; task the DfT and HS2 Ltd with re-setting the company’s HS2 passenger-demand forecasting in the mid 2020s-mid 2040s and taking proper account of the impact of TP-DBSs and EV take- up, and reporting back; in concert with the Environment Select Committee, call on HS2 Ltd to address the consequential issues of hydrological disturbance along and in the vicinity of the Phase One line of route, and the costs of avoidance and remediation, and report back; and call upon the Secretary of State for Transport to provide the Committee and the public at large with hard factual evidence sufficiently robust and objective, that could justify his stream of dismissive and pejorative assertions and questioning the morality and probity of those who provide evidence that undermines his case for the HS2 scheme. September 2011

Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery Office Limited 11/2011 015988 19585