Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Dissertations (1934 -) Projects Humor, Power and Culture: A New Theory on the Experience and Ethics of Humor Jennifer Marra Marquette University Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Marra, Jennifer, "Humor, Power and Culture: A New Theory on the Experience and Ethics of Humor" (2019). Dissertations (1934 -). 1015. https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/1015 HUMOR, POWER, AND CULTURE: A NEW THEORY ON THE EXPERIENCE AND ETHICS OF HUMOR by Jennifer Marra A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin May 2019 ABSTRACT HUMOR, POWER, AND CULTURE: A NEW THEORY ON THE EXPERIENCE AND ETHICS OF CULTURE Jennifer Marra Marquette University, 2019 The aim of this dissertation is to offer a new theory of humor that takes seriously both the universality and power of humor in culture. In the first chapter, I summarize historical and contemporary theories, and show how each either 1) fails to give any definition of humor, 2) fails as a theory of humor, and/or 3) underappreciates, dismisses, or does not consider the power of humor in experience. The second chapter explains the failures of prior theories by understanding the problem in terms of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. These forms of culture are perspectives through which we express and understand our world, and each presents its own unique perspectives through which we can understand ourselves and the world. In the third chapter, I argue that humor is one of these necessary and universal symbolic forms of culture. I argue that confusions in the philosophy of humor stem from approaches to humor that understand it as part of some other symbolic form rather than as a form itself. In the fourth chapter, I argue for the function of humor as that which reveals and exposes epistemic vices –laziness, arrogance, and closed-minded thinking about ourselves and the world. I support this argument by showing not only that all previous theories of humor have within them epistemic revelation as a consistent commonality, but also by showing that this revelation is necessary to the form of humor while it is, at best, accidental to other forms. In my final chapter, I suggest that we ought to approach humor objectively, and that the normativity of the symbolic forms guides us toward such an approach. I offer two objective questions to ask about a given instance of humor: 1) does the humor idealize a liberated end? and 2) does the humor fulfil the cultural function of the symbolic form it represents by disrupting epistemically vicious thinking? If the answer to both of these questions is affirmative, then it is likely that the humor in question is morally praiseworthy. I conclude by offering suggestions for further study. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This project would owes its genesis to three events. My philosophical world was dramatically enlarged by Dr. Theresa Tobin’s assurance that philosophy need not be limited to those ideas and scholars who fit the traditional mold. Within academic institutions, philosophy appears to be an elite field for particular people with particular concerns, only fit for those who have the time and economic advantages necessary to devote oneself entirely to the aggrandizement of its superiority. Dr. Tobin gave me the confidence I needed to see myself as an authentic philosopher despite the fact that I do not fit this description. I joined the most enthusiastic group of philosophers, The Lighthearted Philosophers’ Society, in 2013. They are warm, honest, funny, and passionate scholars eager to help and grow the field. The conferences are a consistent joy – two days of celebration of thought and scholarship, a reunion of thinkers with genuine goodwill and love for each other. I am proud to be a member of this family of brilliant goofballs. They have encouraged me, mentored me, and trusted me, from coursework to job applications, for five years. Elizabeth Victor, Thomas Brommage, Steven Gimbel, Eugenio Zaldivar, Elizabeth Sills – cheers to you. Dr. Sebastian Luft is a performative example of the sort of scholar I hope to be. He combines an encyclopedic knowledge of cultural history with rigorous philosophical critique, and presents this information in perfectly digested and creative works that speak to contemporary concerns. His concern is always for clarity, though never at the expense of rigor. His work maintains the humanity that many metaphysically and epistemologically inclined treatise ignore. Never does he forget that philosophy informs life, that is, truly living as social beings that laugh, fight, poeticize, and dance. When he introduced me to Cassirer, I suddenly realized the lineage of this love of philosophy, that it stretched back into the interpreters of Kant – the very philosopher with whom I first deeply connected as a college freshman. Both in the classroom and in guided readings, tracing the evolution of ideas in German philosophy with Dr. Luft allowed me to see a bridge between my background in Kantian philosophy and my interests in the experience of humor. I also thank Dr. Stanley Harrison, for whom I wrote my first paper on the philosophy of humor, Myron Jackson for resuscitating this project, Gaye and Randy Auxier and the Society for the Philosophy of Creativity for their summer fellowship support, and the Arthur J. Schmitt Leadership Fellowship and Marquette University for their institutional and financial support. I am indebted to my family, James South, Michael Monahan, Drucilla Cornell, Nancy Snow, Kevin Gibson, Marisola Xhelili Ciaccio, J Tyler Friedman, Alexander Neubauer, Marcus McCoy, Adam Curtiss, Trey Fernandez, Jeff Jorgenson, Tyler Dalk, and Jake Kesler for their friendship and support. Finally, my love and thanks to Maury Bruhn, the Young Bruhn Family, and Brandon Henrigillis – your love and influence changed the course of my life. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………….…………i CHAPTER INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………..……1 I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMOR……………………….…………...12 1.1 Humor versus Comedy versus Laughter……………….….…12 1.2 Historical Accounts……………………….…………..……...14 a. Plato and Hobbes – Superiority Theory………..…...…14 b. Aristotle, Aquinas, and Meredith – Relaxation Theory.23 c. Freud – Relief Theory……………………………...….30 d. Kant and Schopenhauer – Incongruity Theory………..32 e. Henri Bergson, 1913…………………………………..40 1.3 Contemporary Accounts………………………..……………42 a. Clark and Morreall – Revised Incongruity Theories…..43 b. LaFollette and Shanks – Epistemological Theory.…....46 c. Hurley, Dennett, Adams – Evolutionary Theory…..….48 d. McGraw and Warner – Benign Violation Theory…….50 e. Conclusion…………………………….……………….52 II. CASSIRER’S PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS……...…….54 2.1 Introduction………………………………..…………………54 2.2 Ernst Cassirer and the Methodology of the Marburg School .54 a. Ernst Cassirer, 1874-1945……………………………..54 b. The Methodology of the Marburg School………….....55 iii 2.3 Philosophy of Culture as the Philosophy of Symbolic Form..58 a. A Critical Philosophy of Culture………………….......58 b. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms……………..……61 c. Plurality of Forms and Rejection of Cultural Hierarchy68 2.4 Key Features of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Culture………...…75 a. Philosophy of Culture as Necessarily Interdisciplinary.75 b. Philosophy of Culture as Necessarily Revisable……...76 c. Philosophy of Culture as Necessarily Normative……..78 2.5 Conclusion………………………………………..………….82 III. HUMOR AS A SYMBOLIC FORM………………………………..84 3.1 Introduction………………………………………………….84 3.2 Criteria for Symbolic Forms…………………………………84 3.3 Cassirer on Humor…………………………………………...88 3.4 Humor as a Symbolic Form……………………..…………...91 a. Humor as Irreducible…………………………………102 b. Cassirer and “The Comic”…………………………...104 c. Play...………………………………………………...105 3.5 Answering the Questions of Prior Theories………………..110 3.6 Conclusion………………………………………...………..111 IV. THE FUNCTION OF HUMOR………………………….………...113 4.1 Introduction……………………………………….………..113 4.2 The Epistemic Theme in Theories of Humor………………113 4.3 The Function of Humor……………………………..……...117 iv a. Epistemic Vice and Epistemic Virtue………………..117 i. José Medina and Epistemic Vice…………......120 ii. Epistemic Virtue…………………………….123 b. Humor and Epistemic Virtue………………………...125 4.4 Connection between Theory and Practice…………………..131 4.5 Concluding the Argument for Humor as a Symbolic Form...134 4.6 Conclusion……………………………...………………..…142 V. TOWARD AN OBJECTIVE ETHIC OF HUMOR…………...……144 5.1 Introduction……………………………………………........144 5.2 The Trouble with Subjective and Exemption Approaches…145 5.3 Theory: Symbolic Forms and Idealization………………....152 5.4 Application: The domestic violence joke…………………..158 5.5 Conclusion………………………………………………….161 BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………....164 1 INTRODUCTION The philosophy of humor has been a neglected field, spoken of briefly by a few canonical philosophers here and there, with a recent resurgence in the last thirty years. The latter can also be said of Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer, who, while popular and influential in his time, was forgotten rather quickly, as was the philosophy of culture to which he was dedicated. Cassirer died shortly after taking an appointment at Yale University, having fled Nazi Germany years earlier. His major contribution, a philosophy of symbolic forms,