The Intelligencer Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Volume 22 • Number 2 $15 single copy price Fall 2016 Volume 22 • Number 2 • $15.00 single copy price Fall 2016 • From AFIO's The Intelligencer © 2016 AFIO - Association of Former Intelligence Officers, All Rights Reserved Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies

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Is Long Overdue •• Russia, in particular, works to demoralize and confuse foreign publics and sow doubts about ur national security community their governments, cultures, and Western civi- has systematically neglected a lization. critical dimension of intelli- Ogence, counterintelligence, and diplo- •• Russia promotes cynicism so that foreign audi- Dr. John Lenczowski macy for many decades. This is the ences will not trust any source of information. AFIO Board and entire field of perceptions management, •• Russia and, to an increasing extent, China seek Guest Columnist propaganda, strategic deception, infor- to undermine unity within NATO and within mation warfare, and strategic influence – activities which individual nations. take their most dangerous form in the various elements of ◊ Russia does this by promoting extremist what the Soviet KGB called “active measures.” groups and individuals. Active measures, which a KGB general called “the ◊ It uses threats to prevent nations from par- heart and soul” of Soviet intelligence, constitute disinfor- ticipating fully in Western collective defense. mation, forgeries, and covert influence operations. These activities include front organizations, black propaganda, ◊ It demoralizes populations in neighboring strategic deception, discrediting adversaries, supporting nations by instilling doubts about NATO secu- political movements and guerrilla organizations, certain rity guarantees. commercial operations, psychological operations, and the ◊ It incites interethnic and interreligious con- subversion of governments and organizations. A broader flicts and separatism. definition adds propaganda, diversion, provocation, pen- •• Russia tries to alienate Russian populations etration and manipulation of domestic groups (which can abroad from their host countries by portraying have foreign policy effects), assassination, terrorism, and them as victims, while China appeals to its nation- support for terrorism. The purpose of these measures is als abroad to serve Chinese interests. to distort perceptions of reality and induce their targets to •• Both powers seek to discredit and isolate political take actions in the interest of the perpetrator. figures, parties, and nations that resist aggres- The Russians have been widely recognized as the most sion, expansionism, subversion, and organized intense practitioners of these dark arts. However, other crime. powers, including China, North Korea, Cuba, Iran, and the Islamic State use them as well. These powers use every •• Both powers work to define the intellectual frame- possible medium: broadcasts, social media, agents of influ- work through which foreigners perceive reality. ence, corporations, front groups, etc. Such methods are not •• Both powers use cultural diplomacy, diplomatic new for Chekist-run Russia nor for other communist states initiatives, and commerce for psychological dis- which share these techniques. But the skill with which armament by persuading foreign audiences and radical Islamist groups, particularly the Islamic State, leaders that they are not pursuing neo-imperial have used many of these techniques has taken Western strategies. governments by surprise. •• Their commercial operations seek to influence The problem here is not so much that bad actors use foreign elites by rewarding pro-Russian and these methods, but rather the failure of Western foreign pro-Chinese individuals and companies. policy elites to recognize them and mount countermea- • Russia supports groups in Western nations – like sures. This failure is the result of either professional • the environmental movement – to protest “frack- malpractice, ignorance of these dimensions of foreign ing” and other energy policies in order to weaken policy and war, bureaucratic cultural bias, organizational energy independence and other pro-security weaknesses, misallocation of funds, wishful thinking, or measures. willful blindness. Russia and China, for example, use these methods first •• Russia vilifies the pro-EU movement and new gov- for domestic purposes: ernment in Ukraine to sow doubts about them in the West, to instill fear among Russians in eastern •• To brainwash and atomize domestic audiences. Ukraine, and to serve as justification and cover for •• To rally domestic support for their foreign policies its subversion and invasion of Ukraine. by creating enemies. While there is growing consciousness of the Russian •• To justify the establishment of centralized author- conduct of these tactics – and there is some literature and itarianism. the occasional op-ed piece about it – there is nary a whisper In foreign strategic influence operations, Russia and about the Chinese use of these activities. China have several objectives: Meanwhile, radical Islamist movements use a variety •• They disguise their expansionism, authoritari- of these methods as key instruments of their jihad. Their anism, suppression of independent media, and purpose is to radicalize and recruit new cadres to overthrow human rights violations. “apostate” governments in the Middle East and elsewhere,

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Association of Former Intelligence Officers 7700 Leesburg Pike Ste 324, Falls Church, VA 22043. Web: www.afio.com. Email: [email protected] to fight jihad against the West and Israel, and to establish prisons, where criminal elements find in Islamism a new Caliphate. Their methods are manifold: a justification for criminal acts. •• They use many media, including digital social •• The Islamists specialize in the “propaganda of the media, to reach potential recruits, promoting deed.” This is one of the key functions of terrorism several themes: and its glorification in the gruesome portrayal of ◊ They anathematize Western culture as a beheadings and other crimes on professionally degraded society of unbelief. made video recordings for digital media. The goals of such actions are: 1) to provoke a Western ◊ They discredit Western education as contrary reaction against Islam as a whole; 2) to conflate the to Islam. radical Islam that is motivated by secular political ◊ They portray the West as being at war with Islam objectives with that Islam that is more spiritually and then declare it an obligation to conduct focused, politically moderate, and capable of jihad against those conducting that war. coexisting with other religions; and 3) ultimately, ◊ Their glorification of suicidal “martyrdom” to hijack all of Islam to the radical agenda of the offers the chance of heroism to ordinary youths, “Caliphate.” ne’er-do-wells, and criminals. Unfortunately, our national security community has ◊ They attract new cadres with various rewards, systematically neglected these activities. By 1981, US intel- including women, slaves, (including sex slaves), ligence had stopped collecting on propaganda and active housing, and other amenities that they will measures and our public diplomacy and strategic influence never receive. capabilities were severely weakened. Although the Reagan ◊ They supply meaning to lives that have never administration reversed these trends, collection, analysis, found meaning. and countermeasures had effectively stopped by 1988. In ◊ Their apocalyptic vision of Armageddon lends mid-1990s, newly independent Ukraine accused Moscow urgency to their cause: this is the jihadist’s “last of conducting active measures against it – but no one in chance” for martyrdom. Washington noticed. Sound national security policy must recognize that •• They encourage immigration and building sepa- these perennial instruments are much more effective than ratist Islamic communities in the West. our policy elites have ever acknowledged, and that they •• They urge these communities to avoid assimila- require a robust counterintelligence and strategic com- tion and to conduct what the Moslem Brotherhood munications response. But this necessitates recognition calls “civilizational jihad.” This consists of efforts that counterintelligence is not simply counter-espionage: to establish special provisions for Moslems in it also includes countering the other activities that foreign Western countries, including a parallel track intelligence agencies conduct. for Shariah law, which is ultimately designed to What must be done? First, we must collect intelligence replace Western legal systems. on all these activities, analyze it, expose the falsehoods, •• Saudi Arabia and other Moslem nations fund the agents of influence, and psychological maneuvers, and construction of new mosques and supply Wah- disseminate this information to all concerned. (This was habist imams to lead them. (Of course, there is the work of the 1980s Interagency Active Measures Work- no reciprocity in such arrangements. It never ing Group.) Next, we must study foreign and domestic occurs to Western governments to demand that public opinion – a form of “opportunities intelligence,” or Saudi Arabia permit the externally-funded estab- “cultural intelligence” that has taken the form of audience lishment of Christian churches on its soil as a research by our international broadcasters or “human condition of Saudi proselytization in the West.) terrain mapping” by our armed forces. We must revive our public diplomacy, information operations, and political, •• Meanwhile, the Saudis offer large sums to estab- psychological, and ideological warfare capabilities and lished mosques in Western countries on the con- begin to reward excellence in these fields. We must create dition that they replace their politically moderate a culture of integrated strategy that includes this entire imams with radical Wahhabists. dimension of statecraft. Finally, we must remind those who •• Islamists establish front organizations that pres- are queasy about these activities that their discomfort with ent themselves as “mainstream Moslem” groups non-violent instruments of conflict and strategic influence that publicly deny support for terrorism. A number deprives us of the key tools to address hybrid warfare, and of these “mainstream” organizations have been makes it ever more likely that force will have to be used to exposed – particularly in American courts – as defend our vital interests. J terrorism supporters after all, and some of their leaders have been convicted for terrorist activities. Dr. John Lenczowski, a member of AFIO’s Board of •• Islamist front organization agents in the West seek Directors, is Founder, President, and Professor at The positions of influence enabling them to approve Institute of World Politics. He served as President the appointment of favored imams as chaplains Reagan’s principal advisor on Soviet affairs. in Western prisons and armed services. These imams then recruit new cadres – particularly in These comments are distilled from Dr. Lenczowski’s presentation to the NATO Warsaw Summit Experts’ Forum, 8 July 2016.

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