I' I 1
Chapter 9
Governors and the Executive Branch
Ethan Rarick
The history of modem American politics cannot be written without discussing Cali~omia governors. One former governor (Ronald Reagan) went on to serve as president ofthe United States, of course, but in addition to that three others ran for president (Earl Warren, Jerry Brown, and Pete Wilson), one served as chief justice of the United States (Warren), and another was a global celebrity who could not seek the presidency only because he was a foreign-born immigrant (Arnold Schwarzenegger). The status of the office as a potential presidential launching pad caused at least two other national political figures-U.S. Sen. William Knowland and former Vice President Richard Nixon-to 'run for governor, and although Nixon lost his gubernatorial bid he ofcourse went on to eventually win the presidency. Aside from national elective politics, California's chief executive governs more Americans than anyone save the pre~ident, sits atop a state with the world's ninth largest economy, and often occupies a place on the world stage similar ta the leaders ofmiddle-sized nations. The incumbent as of 2013, Jerry Brown, is no exception to any of these trends. H~ ran for president three times his election to a third term in 2010 garnered national and even international m;dia attention, and were he a younger man, ~e woul~ sur~ly be consr·dere. d one of the frontrunners for the Democratic .preside.ntial nomination in 2016. In short, California governors have been major national
219 220 221 Governors and the Executive Branch Ethan Rarick
figures for more than half a century, and will remain so for the f d many states adopted the .so-callhed 0 the other ban , tive branch officials, t us future. · oreseeabJe the Jegisla~re. ;iy separately elected exe~~bility Often the governor ·· In that regard, California chief executives are different than th • ~:;"ballot.'' ~::0~~s:ontrol_and of go~emment. he state · parts e1s~whe~eb: sm· ce no other A~en·can state is a_s large as Californeiarr, ncouonttheer; 0 •r~:~;;,,~c:,:::h 1 state so invana y guarantees nanona1 stature for its governors. But in th dil•ti::i::err at oddswitbu:;~::~mors acquired mo7 ;:~~a~v:,!nded in C lif . b th . ·1 o er re- specin ~ governors are ow suru_ ar to and di_fferent from other gover- foun the 20th century, d th length of gubemato~1a 1 fr m the states \tmia1 In cracy, an e . . 1 wer shifted away o . f nofrs. e~r orma power~ a:e roug hy typical ofAmencan governors, and many 1 1 1 budget and bur~;~t the same time, politic~ iio because ofthe vast expa?s1on o o the po icy resu ts are sum ar toot er states as well. And yet the state's unusu rnany states.: ational government, espe~ia yf the federal income tax m 1913, al political culture-for example, the highly professionalized nature ofthe state and toward t e n ht about by the creation o less owcrful, many ob legislature-can sometimes create gubernatorial dynamics different than those experienced elsewhere. federal powe~ bro:~orld War II. As the states beca~:creasfngly filled with in the New Dea; a~elieve that state governments ;e~e962 the New York Times's This chapter seeks to describe California's executive branch, focusing espe cially on the governor but also somewhat on the other statewide elected officials servmep~tec;m;ffi:ials, includihng the gtryo;seTe~~i.ngnpolitical journalists, W:-~te tb~t who are components of the executive branch. First, the role of governors in Jcaomes Reston, then one o"ft re thcoeunir heads in problems and up to their xnee. s mt American political history is described. Second, there is a discussion ofthe roles state governments were ove tion governors became less prommen and powers of California governors, especially as compared to other states. idgets ,,3 Perhaps reflecting that percep '1 ted president between 1948 and Third, we examine who typically becomes governor in California. And fourth, l ~:yers in national politics; of the five men e ec - . we explore the outcomes ofgubernatorial proposals-what are governors actual P1972 none had served as a governor. rts have seen a revitalization of ' h ever many expe · · · ly able to do-again in comparison to other American chiefexecutives. In more recent years, ow . , h 1 ad them Even national policy in- d fthe governors w o e • · state governments, an o . . I ment solutions, frequently granting lt Governors in American History itiatives now often rel~ on _states to /~~n~ exam les are the No Child Left Be l them some degree of di~cretlon. Two; Bush whth called on states to develop 'I The office of governor is actually older than the United States. 1 British colonies hind Act signed by President ?eorge . . and Affordable Care Act signed by \ testing standards, and the Patient Protection tablish health insurance were typically overseen by powerful governors appointed by the mo_narch and President Barack Obama, which called on state~ to es . often empowered not only with a veto but even with the ability to disband_ the "exchanges" where individuals can buy coverage. , · legislature completely. These colonial governors were widely seen by Arnencan This increased ability to influence policy, combined with a governor s pow- revolutionary leaders as examples ofexecutive power run amok, and as a result, er as a si.ngle chi.ef executi.ve (compared to, say. , the status of a U.S. senator as early governmental structures in the newly independent United States t~nded to merely one among 100), has made gubernatorial service increasingly popu ar create weak executives. Most governors held only a one-year term, m some 1 with elected officials. In one recent survey of current and former govemo~s, po cases with a two-term limit creating a maximum tenure ofjust two years. So1e litical scientist Alan Rosenthal found that of the 12 former governors serving as governors were chosen by tile legislature rather than the voters. Only ~o ear Y senators in the th Congress, but one said they preferred their time as governors had any form ofveto power over the legislature. Often the legtslaturh ed, U.S. 111 all governor to serving in the Senate. As one former governor put it, worst ~ay rather than the governor, made key appom. tments to top state Jiobs, or at least aa "~r the ability to confirm or reject the governor's appointments. In shhort, aar\y tahs_governor was better than my best day as a United States senator. ReflectJ.~g general rule, early Arnen.can legi.slatures were c1ear1Y more Powerful t .an"the ere is_~ort o5fperspective, Rosenthal titled his study of governors, "The Best Jo~ Ill American governors. Or as gubernatorial scholar Larry_ Sabat~ has P:1 ~h1 e early j Pohti~s:" Simultaneously, governors have become major players on the nation were many checks and few balances in the governorships designed Y 1 al POhtical stage once again. Of the six men elected _president between 1976 and state constitutional conventions.',2 · . ome re- I In the first half of the 19th century, governors gained power 1;. s ct elec l 3 ------spects and lost it in others. The veto became far more commo~ and tre_n rela I ---4 Quoted in Sabato, l. tion by the voters became the standard, enhancing gubernatonal power 1 graph~r a~ excellent example of the evolution described in the previous two para 1 ·. · • Sabato (19S:3), tinuin ha shift toward greater federal influence beginning with the New Deal and con · Two good summaries of the history of gubematonal power are st 1-12, and (2006), l..;..21. statesgt~ rough t~e middle part of the 20th century, followed by a later resurgence ofthe 2 Ferguson l Sabato, 4. I histo~ 0~~o~iding g~eatcr _opportunity for policy innovation by governors-see the ,l s R. encan social pohcy by Ron Haskins, in Sribnick (2008), 76-103. osenthal (2013), s. · · 1 I 222 Governors and the Executive Branch Ethan Rarick 223
Tablet. Governors of California, Since World War II incre,,asm. g gubematorial po. wer, and is generally re- ically be seen as . merican gubernatonal powers. . . Name wou!d ~the long-term tre~d m A_ al political profile of governors, California Party Date .__ flecuve o of the increasmg nation , ver-increasing population has made Earl Warren R In terms ince the state s e , • · Goodwin J. Knight Jan.1943-0ct 19531 - d the way, of cour~e, s . uence Ironically, Schwarzenegger s im~rugrai11 R Oct. 1953 - Jan. 1959b has le d larger national mfl . ·h. d tenure meant that neither of Pat Brown D •t larger an , ge durmg ts secon . Jan. I 959 - Jan. 1967 I a and Jerry Brown s a a residential contender, but there is every Ronald Reagan R Jerry Brown Jan. 1967 - Jan. 1975 s~:~: two recent governor~ has ~=e:titi~n of such unusual circumst~ncest ~ture D Jan. 1975 -Jan. 1983 George Deukrnejian rteason to. believe othrsatwbillarrinalmgoast aputom'at'ically be considered potential presiden- R Jan. 1983-Jan. 1991 Califom1a govern Pete Wilson R Gray Davis Jan. 1991 - Jan. 1999 rial candidates. . D Jan. 1999 - Nov. 2003c Arnold Schwarzenegger R Roles and Powers of the California Governor Je.rry Brown Nov. 2003 - Jan. 2011 D Jan. 2001 - lays many roles, most of which are common · to alldstahte' sf, a Earl Warren was appointed Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court by Any governor p preeminent=-chief executive an c re President Eisenhower. He resigned as governor October 4, 1953. including California.1 Two roles are b Goodwin J. Knight resigned as Lieutenant Governor on October 4, 1953, succeed legislator. . age most of the public agencies that ing Earl Warren. • Chief executtve--Governors man oint many of · c Gray Davis was the first governor to be recalled in California, on October 7, 2003. im lement the laws and programs of government. They app . the heads of these agencies, issue executive orders regardmg their opera tion and generally oversee their management. 2012, four were former governors-Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, • Chi~f legislator-Although not a member of the ~egislature and unable_to and George W. Bush-a stark contrast to the earlier post-World War TI era. introduce legislation, governors still exert great influence over the le~ts How have these national trends compared to the California experience? lative process. Governors help to set the legislative a~enda b~ making Some of the early national experiences are not relevant, ofcourse, since Califor major policy proposals that command public and media attention. They nia did not become a state until 1850. But in many ways the national experience advocate or oppose pending legislation, so~_etime~ usin~ their ~owers _of is instructive. When the original California constitution was drafted, the framers appointment or budgetary control as bargaining chips with spec1~c legis created the sort of divided executive branch that was then popular as an expres lators. They sign or veto legislation once it is passed by. the legi~lature. sion ofJacksonian democracy. There were initially six separately elected execu And they typically have the ability to call the legislature into special ses tive branch officers -governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, atto~ey sion. general, treasurer, and controller-and a superintendent of public instruct1~n Other gubernatorial roles are less dominant. was added just two years later. Furthermore, over the course of time California • Chief of state--The governor serves as the symbolic head of the state has followed the national trend toward longer gubernatorial terms, stronger veto government, performing many public functions. power, and greater gubernatorial control of the budget. Initially California gov ernors served only a two-year term, although in little more than a de~ad~ that • Chief judge-The governor typically holds the power of granting par dons or clemency, frequently without any check by the other branches of was lengthened to four years. The governor's original veto power was s113:1ilar to government. the presidential power -to veto an entire bill but not merely a portion of it-but that authority was expanded in 1879 to incJude a line-item veto, and i? l.92~ to • Military chief-Governors serve as commander-in-chief of the National Guard, a role that can be especially important a when the ability thallow the governor to simply reduce individual items as an option to ehmmatmg in crisis, em entirely. Also in 1922, the state added constitutional language directing the to activate the Guard can be crucial. 1 governor to submit an annual budget to the legislature," Each of these changes • ?tergovemmental liaison-Governors typically serve as the representa a longer term, a stronger veto, and clear authority to draft the initial budget- tive of the state in negotiations with the federal government or other
6 ~7 ------. For changes to the veto power and budget authority, see Wilson (2011), 119-20· There are many d . . f . . For a good escnpt1ons o the vanous roles played by Amencan governors. example, see Ferguson (2006), 7-9~ ·. . ·· -- ,. t J '
224 Governors andJhe Executive Branch Ethan Rarick 225
"- states. Given Califomia's size and prominence, California .. 1 th weakest chief executive possible. On Overnor would be rated as a sc'or:3 5 on this scale, although they range sometimes even play a role in relations with other countries. governors S ch a g · governors · (l 6) u the 50 Amencan . (4 3) to Vermont's weak one . . • Party boss-As the highest-ranking elected official in the stat th . ernor is effectively the head ofhis or her party. . e, e gov. avera~;w York's po~erfu~ e;ecu~;~o; rank? The job scores a 3.4, just below [romSo bow does Cahforn1~ ~ go_th Oregon and Virginia for 35th among the These roles-especially the two primary roles of chief executive a d hi legislator-are pursued by employing a series of powers, some formal ::ndc ~f the national average)a~: t~~os:1examination, however, Californi~'s govern: 0 ers informal. A closer examination ofthe formal powers possessed by Cali'!' • • states. (See Table 2. l fi re in some respects, and a we~k one m o!hers. h . th . . . lOI'D.Ja ranks as a very p~werfu these five formal gubernatonal powers 1s exam- governors s ows that 111 some respects ey are similar t.o those of other g . sections, eacbguof nors around the country, and m. other respects they are quite different.. over- the following C lif ia's executive. ined with regard to a I orru In the 1960s, political scientist Joseph Schlesinger developed a system fo ranking th: formal, institutional powers of Americ~n. gove~o~. More recently: Veto Power these rankings have been updated by another political scientist, Thad Beyle. This ~ystem _uses a sca!e to rank five separate institutional powers possessed by . . . ernors can veto entire bills, and they can al~o eliminate or re- a typical chief executive: veto power, budgetary control, appointment power California g~v . . ding bills while still approving the rest of. the l . . · d1' 1'dual line items m spen · . • · 44 f . over key managerial positions, the ability to run for reelection, and the number du•ncesm hv "line-i.tem,, v.eto i.s typical ofAmerican gove· rnors-.. 1t exists m o of separately elected officials within the executive branch.8 These ratings are l b1 . uc a 9 b ·t 1·s not possessed by the president of the United States. 0ver then combined to create an overall rank ofthe power ofeach governor, from one ) the 50 states - u · h. • d · h h use to five, · · I riding a gubernatorial veto in Califo_rnia req~ires a two-t If. s vote_m eac . :; in of the legislature, a supermajonty reqm_rement that 1s agam ty~1c These formal powers do not predict how .much influence is wielded by a statehouses. This gubernatorial ability to d1sca_rd ~e .~?rk of the legislature, given individual governor at a particular moment in time. Often, the governor's I which one scholar has termed the "power of rejecnon, 1s a key component of static, formal powers are less important than a set of temporary, informal condi I 1 . h ity IO tions such as his or her political popularity, the partisan composition ofthe legis executive aut on ...... I Not surprisingly, California governors usetheir veto authonty often, though lature, or the length of time remaining in the governor's tenure (for example, is j exactly how often depends largely on party. Generally, one would expect more he newly elected or a lame duck?). Nonetheless, the formal powers combine to 1 c~at~ a reasonable measure of the power of each state's governorship as an in vetoes when one party controls the governorship and the other party co?tro_ls the stitution. For example, without regard to the individual officeholder, a governor legislature. When one party controls both branches, there is a greater l~kehhood w?uld_ be considered extremely strong ifhe or she can veto acts ofthe legislature that the governor and legislature will agree, and thus fewer vetoes will occur. with little fear of an override, make most of the key decisions about the state's That has been the historical experience in California. Since 1975, when Jerry budget, directly appoint key state managers with no need for legislative approv Brown became governor the first time, Democrats have held continuous control al, seek reelection an unlimited number oftimes, and is the only statewide elect of the state Senate, and almost continuous control of the Assembly. During that ed official of the executive branch. Such a governor would be rated as a 5, the period of steady Democratic control in the legislature, Republican governors st n:io powerful governor possible. On the other hand, a governor would be con have issued vetoes at twice the rate of Democratic governors. The Republi cans-George Deukmejian, Pete Wilson, and Arnold Schwarzenegger-vetoed sidered_ extremely weak ifbe or she possesses a veto that is easily overridden by 19 thstae l~gislature, has little ability to control the state budget, does not appoint ~e -1% of the bills passed by the legislature. Democratic governors-Gray Davis te s top managers, has only a two-year term with a two-term limit, and is I an~ the two tenures of Jerry Brown-vetoed just 9.6% of bills. Control of the merely one of many statewide elected officials within the executive branch. legislature changed during Ronald Reagan's time in office, but the results repre 8 I sented the same trend: During the six years ofDemocratic control, he issued ve- - th ~ f In :act, e Schlesinger/Beyle rankings contain a sixth measurement, party control ~~es/t 1~ higher rate (6.9%) than during the two years of Republican control o the legislature O th d . . . arty ·s a 5 . . th ' n e groun s that a governor 1s more powerful if his or her P 1 f · 1/o). (For the rates ofindividual governors, see Table 3.) !:'aJlonty. For e purposes of this section however I have omitted use of the party con «o measurement sine I b 1· · · ' ' ffi and I n l ore ak.In. to a tran .t e .e ,,ieve It 1s less a r. o◄ rmal institutional power ofthe o hice, nk-· J ings cited he si cry, m'.orma! power that changes over time. The data for t e ra --;------/gub · re are available on Beyle's website
Table z. GQvernor'sJnstitutionalPowers ors' Veto Rates 3 Govern · · Rank SEP TP AP C BP VP Tabl.e ~•--~~~~· ~==~~;;~;~~;;~~======}P~e~rc~e;;;n;j;ta~g~eio~f~B~illij;s~Vli:~et!)o:.;edf=== .I New York 410 5.0 A~ 3.5 4.0 5.0 ~--nor . blicancontrol ofLegisla- 4.5% ~ '1 Reagan (Repu 50-StateAverage 2.9 4,] .. 3,,0 3.1 4.5 mre) . . . (D moctatic control ofLegisla 6.9 3.5 Reagan e 35 California LO 4.0 4,0 3.0 5.0 3.4 mre) Brown (first tenure) 4.6 Jerry . .. 15.5 50 Vermont George DeukmeJ1an 2.5 2;0 3.5 3.0 18;9 2.0 2.6 Pete Wilson 17.6 Higher numbers represent gtea:ter.gubematorial power. - Gray Davis . 26,4 SEP == Separately elected executive branch officials. 5 - only governor or gover Arnold Schwarzenegger nor/lieutenant governor ticket elected. 4 - governor/lieutenant governor ticket and some Jeny Brown (second tenure) 13.1 process officials elected. 3 - governor/lieutenant governor ticket and process and policy officials elected, 2 - governor (no ticket) and six or fewer officials elected. I - governor (no ticket) with seven or more officials elected. TP == Tenure potential. 5 - four-year term, no limit on reelection. 4 - four-year term, Table 4. Gubernatorial Veto Rates by Decade only two terms, 3 - four-year term, no consecutive terms. allowed. 2 - two-year term, no limit on reelection, I - two-year term, only two terms. of Bills AP == Governor's appointment powers for major posts. 5 - governor appoints, no Decade Percentage Vetoed approval needed. 4 - governor appoints, approval needed. 3 - ,someone else appoints, 1970s 6.6%. governor approves or shares appointment 2 - someone else appoints, governor and oth- 1980s 11.7 ers approve. I - someone else appoints. · 1990s 17.5 BP== Governor's budget power. 5 - full responsibility, legislature may not increase. 2000s 22.2 4 - full responsibility, but legislature can increase in certain conditions. 3 - full responsi bility, but legislature may change in any way. 2 - shared responsibility, legislature may change. l - responsibility shared with other elected official, legislature may change. . -I . . . · 'lli D . rats who controlled the VP= Governor's veto power. 5 - has item veto, special majority to override. 4 - has creasingly found themselves at odds wi emoc · . California item veto, simple majority to override. 3 - has item veto, majority of legislators present to f legislature and thus. vetoes became more common. Then agam,h . . d override, 2 - no item veto, special majority needed to override. J - no item veto, simple I governors 'may h. av.e grown m. ore w1.-11m- g t·o· i·ssue vet.o.es because t. ey 1eamNe· majority ~ override. I l there 1.s ve.ry h.ttle chance they w1.11 b. e overnidde· n. by the legislatubre. o !I gubernatorial veto has been overridden since 1979, when two vetoes Y 1e~ 1 Brown were reiected by a Democratic legislature. Some lawmakers have noft~t · Governors have also used their veto pens more often in recent years.. (See that if they are~never willing to overn.de ii veto, the Iegi·s1atur·e loses. some o t s Table 4.) The veto rate has increased from just 6.6% in the '70s, to 11.7% m the power m. relati.on to the executi.ve branch. 1n effiect, a governor's veto becomes '80s, to 17.5% in the '90s, to 22.2% in the '00s. Nor is all of that explained by nearly absolute. When Republi.cans sought to overnide a Jerry Brown. veto ear1Y partisan alignment Jerry Brown vetoed just 4.6% ofbills during his first tenure i in 20 I 2 even a Democrat who opposed the attempt noted the reality of greater as gov~mor;· but 13.I% during the first two years of his second tenure. As f~r t executi.v'e in. fluence. Sen. Mark Leno, a Democra. t from S· an Franct·sco,. noted Repubhcans, each succeeding governor has used the veto pen more often: 6.J¾ that if the legislature never flexes its override muscles, "we lose some of our for Reagan, 15.5% for Deukmejian, 18.9% for Wilson, and 26.4% for I power."12 · · Schwarzenegger. . . · · · _There co~ld ~e many reasons for the increasing use of the veto. Increasi?g I partisan polanzat10n, for example, might mean that Republican governors m- ! 12 . . "Repubh.cans fai.l m. rare attempt to overri.de governor•s veto," Los ,Ange. les T.im'ces/s Governors Say N0?.,. s· c · . . b 1 2012. N b . · .. enate omm1ttee on Governance and Finance, Octo er , · ;~h12ti1cal . blog, January 1~, 2012,
uthority· . do California governors wield in picking the people California's gove . . . . . How much a ? . 10 days of the rnors propose the state' b . . nance.. mall manage this great bureaucracy. who will ac ~ost of California's top government managers are appointed by which then year, the governor must se s udget each Year w· . 1 In genera but these appointments must be confirmed by the state Senate. it back to tbs:;:~::: n:xt s~x ~onths rev:~n~~~iled b~dget t~ th~~~ng~he first 1 the ¥~vemor,governors appoint hundreds of people to state boards and comrnis- lev 1 f b r ror his s1gnatur T spending pl b is ature 11 e o udgetary auth • e. his is far and an efore se din' A.dd1t10na· Y,generally requm· ·ng Senate approval. Such boards and commt.sst.ons ture's control of th onty ~mong American ove away the most con g I ~ionsd, agh~ighn ly visible and important panels such as the California Public Utili- that the legislatureec1:dget is equal to that o/the In theory, the ,:fa~ inclu e 1 • :~:s. J . c mmission and the University of CaliIforru.a Board of Regents, but also m. - O overri~e a gubernatorial v:~mpletely ~ewr}te the budget~~~or even greater, in nesd art-time appointments responsi•ble for reIan.vely narrow dun.es. spending provision o, even a hne-1tem veto that add can subsequently f 1 · In · resses one p . cu History shows that in general, the California Senate has typically been very reality however articular d fere~tial to governors with regard to appointments. (See Table 5.) Since the si ' , governors have th • b:ginning of the George Deukmejian adm_inistration in January of 1983, gov~r n:nncseont~:\~a~i~e~:~rst, ~ the boss of b:t~p&:~:10:7:~i! ~omes to dec!- nors have submitted more than 5,500 appomtments to the Senate Rules Commit rnents fu d db . ary iscal agency-and the v . ~ rtinent ofF1- l tee for confirmation. 14 The Senate has confirmed more than 80% of these ap- · kn e y the budget, the governor has c anous agencies and depart, n 15 . owledge than the legislature. Second the omma?d o~ ?Teater expertise and pointments. Even when there is a partisan split between the governor and the tial budget proposal frames the debate. 'Th. ~ovemo~ s ability _to present an ini 1 Senate, the vast majority of gubernatorial appointments are confirmed. Republi cause the governor m· addin t _is is especially true m California, be- ! can Arnold Schwarzenegger had the lowest success rate, but still saw better than ' on o presentmg · · · 1 seven in 10 of his appointments approved. His fellow Republican George sends to the legislature a rev· . f th an untia draft budget in January th. "M ision o e budget each M A , Deukmejian dealt with a Democratic Senate throughout his time in office, but IS ay Revision" sets in ti th . ay. s a practical matter I enjoyed a confirmation rate for his appointments of more than 90%. but there is relatively little tirn1:ot on e senous bud~et negotiations each year: l Furthermore, the Senate was especially deferential to gubernatorial ap next fiscal year begins July Th~ c?mplte the drafting work before the state's l 1 budget is so much · IS IS on Y worsened by the fact that the state's I pointments at the beginning of new administrations, when a governor is typical 1 i ly making many of his or her most important appointments, such as cabinet sec ten the le isl tu arger and more complex than those of most other states. Of l R ' . . r a re simply lacks the time for a fully detailed review of the May retaries and department heads. For appointments made during a governor's first ti scalexr n the most detailed recent analysis of the California budget process two months in office, the confirmation rate was more than 87%. This may re isca expert John Decker concluded that given the governor's greater staff re~ ~ect the political popularity of newly elected governors, but the practical effect sources and the "power of th fi t dr ft ,, h .. . l 1s that California governors are given a remarkably free band when they first h . e irs a , t e executive branch typically holds 1 t e upper hand in creating the state's spending plan. "The legislature generally take _office and stock their administration with many of state government's top defers to the governor during the budget process " Decker concluded.l' officials. In addition to these factors, governors may 'hold the upper hand on budget I ~ i:natters because of inherent traits in the relationship of the executive and leg l islative bran~~es in state government generally, although this tendency may be somewhat mitigated by the highly professional nature of the California Legisla 14 Th' . th nk . is includes appointments submitted through January 16, 2013. The author ture. For more on these factors, see the sections later in this chapter called "The i J gub s Lisa Matocq of the Senate Rules Committee for providing the raw data regarding · Power of American Governors" and "Budget Proposals in California." ematorial a · , .I 15 • ppomtments. Analysis by the author. I bemat Th. is percentage and those that follow may actually understate the degree of gu- Appointment Power· l represent 1 Success for those cases where confirmation is vigorously pursued. These rates 0 I gard ~ thm~rely the percentage of total appointments that were confirmed, without re ! 1 In a state the size of California governors sit atop a vast executive branch. pointm t inal status of those that were not confirmed. Some of the nonconfirmcd ap 5 Though not all state employees repdrt to the governor, the state g~v_e~ment asal~ J versy ~nt thers rejected by the Senate or withdrawn by a govemor in the face of contro some'oth ot ers are cases where the governor might have withdrawn the appointment for whole employs approximately 350,000 people, and their respons1bihties ar~ te ,j l confinnat reason, where the statutes governing the position were changed during the most endless: from law enforcement to health care to education to road marn • it is impo'0\frocess, or where records are incomplete. Without a case-by-case analysis, ) these per/81 e to detennine the exact cause for the lack of confirmation. Nonetheless, 1 finned. entages reflect the rate at which gubernatorial appointees were, ultimately, con- 13 Decker (2009), 28-29, 42-45. 1 J l C 1 ~ 230 Governors and the Ex . . T b . . . eout,ve Branch a le 5. Percenta ...... Ethan Rarick 231 Senate · •. ge of. Gubernatorial Ap·p· · . . · · . . . . . ointments C ...... onfir111e11 by . SiZCOfExecuti. ve B.ranch· California has eight elected ?fficials heading up various portions of the ex Entire . branch-the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, secretary George Deukmejian .. . Administration ~1W· o ecuttve · · d f br . . d . of state, treasurer, co~troller, supthennten enfrt o pud 10 ms~ct1obn, an msurance · Pete Wilson : · 91.8% Months · · oer This 1s one of .· e most acture executive ranc1ies of any 86.0% comm1s510 · Gray Davis 77.1% state. 16 (See Table 6.) · . . . · 80.0% 89.5% The other statewide elected officials are accountable to the voters rather Arnold Schwarzenegger • 71.9% 78.9% than to the governor, and at ti~es disputes have erupted among differing of;fi Jerry Brown {20) I-current). 91.7% 85.3% cials within California's executive branch. In 2004, for example, when the city Overall 96.9% of San Francisco began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, Gov. Ar 80.4% 87.4% nold Schwarzenegger noted that this was a violation of state law and publicly re leased a letter to Attorney General Bill Lockyer stating, "I hereby direct you to take immediate steps to obtain a definitive judicial resolution of this controver Ability to Seek Re-election sy." Lockyer acknowledged that as the state's lawyer, he was obligated to de fend state law, but bis spokeswoman also took pains to note that the attorney . . general is not the governor's subordinate. "The governor cannot direct the attor . California governors could once seek ...... ney general," Lockyer's spokeswoman said. "He can direct the Highway Patrol. Warren was elected to the office three u~muted number of Earl ti an terms, i He can direct 'Terminator 4.' But he can't tell the attorney general what to Brown was elected in 1958 an mes, m 1942, 194_6, and 1950. Pat I do."11 . . although he lost to Ronald R d 19~ and then sought a third term in 1966, ! More troubling are the rare occasions on which disputes have erupted be-: make a governor mar inall eagan. theory, _the lack of a term limit should ! I tween the governor and lieutenant governor. Under the California Constitution, entire term as a I g y more powerful, since he or she never serves an I whenever the governor leaves the state, all ofhis or her powers transfer automat marginally I ame ~~k. B:y contra5t, a governor facing a term limit should be ,1 th ess powe . during the final term, since political opponents know ·, ically to the lieutenant governor, In the 1970s, when Jerry Brown was governor e_tgdvoemor will leave the political stage relatively soon and can simply be the first time, Republican Lt Gov. Mike Curb took advantage of Brown's occa wa1 e out. · . ' sional absences from the state to take substantive actions. On one occasion, . In 19.90 California voters approved term limits for both governors and legis- when ~rown left the state for 40 bouts to testify before Congress, Curb used his 1ators, _Governors now face a two-term lifetime limit. A limit of two four-year authonty as acting governor to appoint a judge to the presiding seat on a state te~s 15 by far the most common system for American governors. About two appeals court, an important post. When Brown returned to the state he was able, thirds of the s_tates impose a two-term limit, although some allow a governor to :r techni~al reasons, to rescind the appointment, but such incidents pointed to return a third term after sitting out at least one election. e potential for problems when the.governor and lieutenant governor are elect fo: ed separately. . . Ironically, California's current governor, Jerry Brown, was•able to seek a third term even after the two-term lifetime limit was enacted. That was because Over the years, many reformers have suggested that California should ere ~he 1990 ballot proposition creating term limits applied only to officials electe_d ele a more unified executive branch by reducing the number of independently· m 1990 or thereafter. Thus, Brown's first two terms did not count against lits I e ~cted officials. In the 1990s, for example, a state commission on constitutional rel orms recommended that the governor and lieutenant governor should . be life~im.c limit, and he was eligible to run in 20 IO, and would be eligible to run ( l e ected as a comb· d · k l"k · · · h again m 2014. (Deukmejian could also run again, but given his age i~ not ex w. Id b me tic et, 1 e the president and vice president, so that t ey th ( urer. e 0_f the same party. The commission also recommended that the treas- pected to do so.) Thus, barring a change in the constitution, Brown will be e r, supenntendent of public instruction, and the insurance commissioner be last three-term governor, and, if reelected in 2014, could become the only four f term governor in California history. I ! 16 trum feine states elect at least seven statewide officiais. At the other end of the spec- comb,ina eedwt' sktates e1ect onIY the governor and lieutenant governor, and those two run on a 11 "S : et Gray and Hanson (2008), 212-J3. . . . . ·gily 2004, Al.c warzeaegger seeks halt to marriages," Los Angeles Times, February 21, 231 Goyernors ahdcfhe Ex ...... e9Utwe Branch' Ethan Rorie~ . Tab!e l>. P~rtisan Control ofE .. .· . . 233 . . . xecutive Branch " . ority majority" states, those where whites make up less than half the popu- 1990 1994 ~,n 19 Nonetheless, all modem California governors have been white men 1998 1auon. . · · Govemo:r (The state's only Latino governor was Romualdo Pacheco, who served for less .:: -~;i.;..._: than a year in 187~.) In ~e l 980s and '90s, Democrats repeatedly nominated di Lt, Governor • • verse candidates, mcludrng Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, who was African American, in 1982 and 1986, and two women, Dianne Feinstein in 1990 and Attorney Kathleen Brown in 1994. More recently, Republicans nominated a woman, General tI business executive Meg Whitman, in 2010. But all of those candidates lost. Secretary of r Since the mid '90s, when the state began to vote almost exclusively for Demo l State I crats in statewide elections, the Democratic Party· has nominated only white Treasurer j men: Gray Davis in 1998 and 2002, Phil Angelides in 2006, and Jerry Brown in 2010. When Brown eventually leaves office, however, the diversity of future l governors may finally begin to reflect the diversity of the state. As of 2013, two Controller state constitutional officers were women-Attorney General Kamala Harris and II Secretary of State Debra Bowen-and another was an Asian American, Control Insurance ler John Chiang. Additionally, the mayors of major California cities included a Commissioner Latino, an Asian American, and an African American (respectively, Antonio Villaraigosa in Los Angeles, Ed Lee in .SanFrancisco, and Kevin Johnson in ·.. Note: white boxes indicate Democ . . . publican officeholders. ratic officeholders and gray boxes. indicate Re- Sacramento). Shadings represent election victors . d d . . . and replacement appointment G Gan o n~t necessanly reflect later resignations Partisan Affiliation Schwarzenegger was elected s. ov._ . ray Davis was .recalled in 2003 and Arnold although a statewide ele t d tffio tak~ his. pl_ace. The Supenntendent ofPublic Instruction, Since the New Deal, a majority of California's voters have been Democrats. · . . ... c e o ice, IS,not hsted because it is nonpartisan, Still, for many years Republicans often won statewide races, including those for governor. Between 1900 and 1994, in fact, Democrats won only five gubernato appointed by the gov . th th rial elections-Culbert Olson in 1938, Pat Brown in 1958 and 1962, and Jerry . emor ra er an elected. None of these recommendations Brown in 1974 and 1978. Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, Democrats be was ever adopted howe d · .c. • • • , ver, an m tact voters seem to like the idea of electing gan to dominate statewide elections; including .those . for governor. ma?y separate officials. In 1988 voters adopted Proposition 103, which created Schwarzenegger was an exception, but in addition to his celebrity it is important an mdependently elected post of insurance commissioner. to note that he was first elected governor as part of'.the anomalous 2003 recall election, when he did not have to win a Republican primary. He was reelected in Who Becomes Governor 2006 as an incumbent presiding over a relatively strong economy. Other than Sc~warzenegger, no Republican gubernatorial candidate has received more than Diversity 421/o of the vote since Pete Wilson in 1994. Given the recent record and the fact I that as of2013 Democrats held all elected statewide offices, it seemed that Re I , . . n general, Amencan governors have over time become more diverse. As l publicans face steep hurdles to electing a governor. Early in 2011, Jim Brulte, a of 2013, five governors were women and five were' ethnic minorities.18 Given i former Republican leader in both houses of the California Legislature who went th I on to he elected chair of the California Republican Party, noted candidly, "Cali- e s~ate's population, one might expect California to be at the forefront of in 20 I fornia is.a state that, all things being equal, wants to vote Democrat." · creasmg diversity, since as of 2011, California was one of only four so-called I I is Th .·. I 19 · .· ·.. .. ·. . · Nikki · · e women governors included Jan Brewer ofArizona, Mary Fallin ofOklab~ma, 1 ofN;:aley _ofSouth Carolina, Ma~ie Hassan ofNew Hampshire, an~ Susana ~art1nez. The others were Hawaii NewMexico and Texas. Data from the U.S. Census Bu , SMexico. Haley and Bobby Jindal ofLouisiana are Indian Amencan, Martinez_aocl ::au,
j,. ...: 236 · Govemors a:n4ihe £xequriveBranch Ethan Rarick 237 0 s~e•••. Both sid~ have incentives to deal, and budget bargainin ~ .stanng match thatpatient governors often,win.25 · g ecomes a . . 1 tive strength bas, at least to some degree, come at the expense of Thi~ legis a rs. Kousser and Phillips studied the legislative success of The result ofthese two different dynamics is that among th. California. g:f.:n°overnors, three before professionalization of the legisl~ture 1·e..d, ..1egi·slators enacted, to at least some degree 66% ·of· the beudpropo·dsals stud- seven Cahfo ~ . They found that on average, governors enacted a higher d b and four a~e~:rs~roposals (on both budget and policy issues) during the era pose y governors, but onIy 54% ofpoli.cy prop'osals..· The biggesgtedtiff1 eas pro..- th b d percentage . legislature. It was also true that governors tended to make . at on u get proposals, governors are much more likely to win a cI erence. 1s f th old, part-time . . th . , I k 1 d 1 ompronuse o e · . the earlier era as ifnow recogruzing e1r. potentia wea - so un·on, an ·1ess likey to see their· proposal reje· cted en· ti.rely.26 Proposa1s m · ' ' . . nfaressm, othrey tt;1.t th. err. agen.das to. a f.ew.key item. s and concentrate their strength m Budget Proposals in California those areas. . . d m California governors are hardly at the mercy of legis- Nonetheless, mo ers succeed more often than they fail. The Kousscr/Phillips •t In fact govemo · · d · h In general, those findings about budget proposals are consistent with the ob 1 . a odrs. for exa' mp1· e, examiined four govern. ors who have hel. d offifc.etJ u. nbngdt e servations of many California experts. Elected officials, journalists, and other stu y, rofessional legislature. Overall, they enacted 78% o mr u_ get observers of the California capitol have long noted that governors generally get era of the p o o of their olicy ideas." Even in the modem ~ra of full-t~me, much of what they want on budgetary issues. However, it is also true that Cali. proposa.ls and 57: . th~r words California governors convmce the legisla well-paid lawhma ers, itn of what they' want and their strength is especially pro- fornia's legislature is more powerful-and less deferential to the executive ture to give t em mos o ' . branch-than its counterparts in many other states. Legislatures vary tremen dously across the country. Some are part-time bodies that meet for short periods nounced on bu?g~tary matters. 11 one relatively recent change to California's Although 1t 1s too soon to te ' · In 2010 voters passed oftime each year (or even, in some cases, every other year), with members that budget process co~ld strengthen gove~o? :':o~em::~hold for ~assing the an are paid far too little to live on, and who must therefore hold full-timejobs doing Proposition 25, which lowered the_legt a iv_ ity In general this was designed other things. Other legislatures are full-time professional bodies that meet al nual budget from two-11:irds_ to a simp e maJon . the votes'needed to pass the most year-round, with members that are paid salaries large enough to live on. to make it easier for legislative leaders t~ro~~: :f being delayed long after the Kousser and Phillips found that the gubernatorial advantage in budgetary mat 0 budget, and thus to reduce the ~~ ofh e e; also specified that legislators ters is much smaller in states with legislatures that meetfor long periods oftime, legal deadline. The same proposition, owev ' this rovision is so new, there as opposed to those where the legislature meets only briefly. This is presumably would not be paid ifthe budget wa~ late. Beql~e. a! over many years, but in because legislators who normally meet most ofthe year can afford to wait just as has been no chance to comprehensively studyt~ h:~:had some impact in reduc long as the governor during the budget negotiations. The governor is less able to at least one year the new rules already s~eiol th . legislature passed the budget win a "staring match" with legislative negotiators.27 • • ing legislative patience. In the summer O 1 e however declared that the The professionalization of legislatures is especially relevant in Cal~fomia. by the legal deadline of June 15. Gov.. Je°!'. 8r~~n,rovisions'or Prop. 25, Con 1 In the mid-1960s, California voters enacted a proposition to make the legislature budget was out ofbalance and vetoed ~· Citing wh:then quickly enacted ~ re a full-time, professional body. Salaries were raised to a full-time level, and leg troller John Chiang refused to pay legislat,or~-'k· nd which earned his signa islative staff resources were greatly increased to strengthen the institu~on. Al vised budget that was more to _the.governor s 1 ~g,aa was important to them. "l though there have been critical changes in years since, California, continues to ture. At least some legislators indicated the loss O P y . 't be able to pay the · d d hter that we won d have one of the nation's most muscular legislatures. Based on legislator sala_rY, now have to explain to my wife _an aug 31 R dless of whether the seeon staffing levels, and the amount of time a member must devote to Iegi•~Jatrv· e bills," said Assemblymember Mike Gatto. re/:;t the provisions of Prop. 25 work, the National Conference ofState Legislatures has rated the Califomia leg i l budget was b~tter than the first, to the deg e ovemor preferrecl, the new sys islature one ofthefour most professionalii:edfo the nation.28 t caused the legislature to.enact a budge; that t~ g d the relative power ofthe ) tern decreased legislative patience,' and thus mcrease · . I t
.,~ . ~ •· Kousser and Phillips, 30-31. 26 27 Kousser and Phillips, 115. Kousser and Phillips, 119, 146-48. •...... an·1·a· 29 2s · . . · d p nosy v · Kousser and Phillips, 21~9. . . . The other three in the top category are Michigan,New York: an : . ·. · 1 . 3 J __ -;-....,i' 238 Governors and the Ex . . . ecutzve Branch Ethan Rarick executive. More study ·11 b . 239 ffi · wi e needed e ect is common or significant.32 over a longer period ofr . 34 the country, but stand little chance of passage at home. If future Cali- . . . nne to see if this d t".arou•n oovemors, like thei·r predecessors, eye the Whirte House, gubernatorial ef- Pol~cy Proposals California . in fieocrntiiave"'ness may ~e r~duced. Th1's 1.s 1ess 1·Ike1y to happen m. smaller states where presidential cand1dac1es are more unusual. . On policy proposals, the Kousser/Pl illi try, governors typically are more cff . u ips study found that acros Direct Democracy ~ar~e p~rcentage of seats in the legis~::;3o/~~n the govemor's Partys:~~io:m- egislative majority helps governors F' . ere ar~ two reasons that a Io s a As noted in Chapter 5, California voters have been especially energetic in that the governor and the legislature. ha~:\osuch a ~1~atio_n typically suga:~er using the tools of direct democracy. In the past century, Californians have ap and therefore are more likely to . ughly similar ideological lea ? ts proved more statewide initiatives than _any ~ther s~ate, and many of these have abl t thr agree on issues Second ti1 nmgs e o eaten to veto bills, knowin that he · . , ~ governor is bette; restricted the options of elected officials, mcludmg governors. For example, den by the legislature, and the threat ;fa t _or she ts less hkely to be overrid- with regard to the state's finances, voters have capped property taxes, made it e n; . h ve O lS a powerful n f . . a 1 orrua as been no exception t thi ego tatmg tool. 1 harder to raise new taxes, and set aside large portions of the state budget for spe I cific purposes. All of these decisions, whether good or bad, reduce the maneu ter 11 of this volume, an extensive h~sto;c~~:~11 trend. A~ out~ined in Chap I posals shows that party unity typical] d dy of Cahforma policy pro- I vering room of legislators and governors as they craft annual spending plans. b · Y pro uces results· the p The same is true of initiatives that set state law for specific policy areas, such as ematonal proposals enacted into law increases sh . ercentage of gu- I 1 environmental issues, the definition of marriage, affirmative action, or criminal controls both the governorship and the legislature Barply when t~e same party i sentencing. Generally speaking, these measures cannot be changed except by crease~ when partisan control is split. . y contrast, gndlock has in- l another vote ofthe people. It 1s certaml~ true that California has seen some intraparty bickerin . In the This problem has grown worse in the past few decades. Californians used l 960s Democratic Gov. Pat Brown feuded with Democratic Assembly ~peaker the initiative heavily when it was first adopted a century ago, then largely aban 0 Jess Unruh. More recently, Gov. Gray Davis struggled to get along with Senate I doned the process in the middle of the 20th century. But after 0~ pa~sage . f leader John Burton, though both were Democrats. Nonetheless, these feuds have Proposition 13 in 1978, Californians once again turned to the 1mtl~t1ve with ofte~ been more personal than ideological, and despite these famous feuds, Cali greater frequency. Governors themselves have sometimes been the chiefP:opo fornia h~s been broadly reflective of the national tendency: policy proposals are nents of initiatives, but they are still bound by the result, with less flexibility to enacted mto law most frequently when one party is in charge. implement new policies or reform old ones. . . 'f"he importance of unified partisan control is especially relevant to Califor 35 nia, given the Democrats' dominance of state elections in recent years. In 2010, Modern California Governors the party swept statewide elections and increased the size of its margin in the legislature. As of 2013, Republican voter registration was at an all-time low, and To evaluate how these broad trends of gubernatorial power have been _tra~s!ated · th · · · · ·b · fl th history ofeach md1v1dual the party increasingly has had difficulty fielding viable candidates for statewide into e California expenence, we examine ne Y e offices. If these trends continue, given the findings about partisan control, the governorship since the late 1950s. state is likely to have Democratic governors who will have certain key ad- Pat Brown vantages as they seek to enact policy proposals. · ! A final factor that is ofparticular note to California governors is the te~d~n w rid War II as the f Many Californians now look back on the years after O h cy of presidential ambitions to reduce policy effectiveness. Kousser and Phtl~r , h f th t riod Pat Brown, as state s Golden Age, and the governor for muc o 8 pe ' found that generally, governors considering a presidential bid enact a sma er cometo embody the era. portion of their policy agenda, at least partly because their agenda tends to r: l fleet proposals and issues that are appealing to presidential primary vote J 32 . • . d found that sale· 34 Kousser and Phillips, 125-27. . rs Two sources that Kousser and Phillips examined the size oflegislanve salaries an . smaller or 35 C -;- · bematonnl caree · . There arc many summaries of a1irorma gu _ , and Ronald Reagan.' Deukmejian was a former legislator and California attorney gener~l who was elected governor in 1982 and served two terms. He was.nota?le for his lo~' key personality and the fact that he is unusual among California governors m tiv Unusual among Cal~fomia governors, Ronald Reagan had never held elec that he never seriously eyed the presidency. .. e office before defeatmg Brown and winning the governorship in 19. 66 An Perhaps because the legislature was dominated b~ De?1ocrats-DeukrneJ1an actor and · h · · . movie star, e was well known as a conservative Republican activist, was a Republican-he pursued relatively modest legislative agendas. He had a a~d he r~ on stem rhetoric promising to crack down on government waste and successful record of enacting the policies he sought, however, sue~ as an effort m1sbehavmg students, . to crack down on child abuse. The major public works effort of his tenure ~as . Once in office, however, Reagan proved far more flexible than his cam the construction of prisons, and California saw a skyrocketing pris~n population paiW1; rhetoric. He raised taxes substantially and later signed a bill liberalizing during his time in office. Deukmejian also generally opposed tax mcr~ses and . . · . • H b fited from the scononuc boom abortion law. Reagan also worked with legislative Democrats to hammer out a pursued conservative econonuc po1ICles, · e ene · welfare reform package that increased benefits. On environmental issues, he ofthe late l 980s. . · . · · · · . · ou ht blocked construction of a freeway across a wilderness area in the Sierra Nevada Deukmejian elected notto seeka third term in 1990, and never agam s g and stopped plans for a controversial dam in northern California. On law-and public office. · order issues, however, he remained firmly conservative, cracking down on pro- .,\ testers in Berkeley. · · · · · . Pete Wilson Reagan left office after two terms, and eventually was elected president of · . , ff f ued under Wilson, who the United States in 1980. . Republican control of the governor s O ice con m . and then ran left the U.S. Senate when he was first elected governor m l990 Jerry Brewn ' again in 1994. . t ro-choice Republi- Initially Wilson-who was widely seen a~ a modera e, pd railed however, , . t da His plans were e • can-sought a broad and act1v1s agen · · . h . t with a yawning As Pat Brown's son, Jerry Brown inherited a politically v~uable name and when the economy collapsed early in his !erm: leavmgo~~~ta;ilson eventually network. Although he considered becoming a Catholic priest as a young ~an budget shortfall. Under pressure from l:g,slattve ~em se a'lienating him from and. spent.several years in t~e seminary, he eventually followed his father:Ot agreed to close part of the shortfall with a tax mcrea ' · politics and was elected California secretary ofstate. In 1974, when he was. Y more conservative members ofhis ownparty· . , h f h•s tenure Wilson had 36, he was elected governor. · · . · •. . • 5 . Given the economic probl~ms that plagued mu~ui°ty ~cally h; got most of Brown was famous for his free-form: style of governance, w~th meeting_ little choice but to. pursue relatively modest goals, P frequently running late into the night amid long discussions of philosophy, ra· 24i Governoffqfti!..fh:eExecutive BralJth · • EthanRarick 243 what he wanted from the legislature. During his final years in offi~e th . . . my" sharply improved amid the economic boom of the 1990s and w' . e econo- without regard to .party-created the perfect environment . for . successor . . . . . " . able to return to tbe more vi.gorous agenda that had been frus, trated d1uri1sonn was. Schwarzenegger to "':m. overnorship is difficult to summarize, becau~c he fre- first term, He proposed large-scale spending, for example, to reduce clas g.his 1U. . publ'IC SCh001s. s sizes Scbwarzenegger s g_ d goals During his first year, he won widespread l ed his tactics an · d fi · l I · nd quently C rang . th t helped close a huge budget C icit. D us seco Wilson also signed the state's "Three Strikes and You're Out" law incr support for a bond isiue h :r conservative ballot initiatives that, among other ing prison sentences_for m~ny crim~s, and _sup~orted a 1994 ballot me;sure ~~; year he proposed a rendi d attacked public employee unions. Voters re sought to deny public services for 11legal 1rnm1grants, a decision that has been thin~s, capped state s~en ~n~:is and his popularity dropped dramatically: bysome as alienating Latinos the Republican Party. . seen from jected all the go~emor s prSphwa~enegger reversed course again, propo_smg a · Always ambitious, Wilson ran forpresident in 1996, but could gain nb trac The following yeU:, · c . t fund long-term infrastructure mvest- tion andquickly dropped out I massive public borrowing _ca:ea!~ni:um wage and, perhaps_m?st important, ' ments. He also agreed to recalli n the state to reduce its ennssions of grc~n Gray Davis signed a landmarkmeasure ~adm!s~tively, approving the bonds and reelecting ! house gases. Voters respon e p After 16 years of Republican control of the governorship, Gray Davis ( Schwarzenegger. er Schwarzenegger struggled almo~t con- I During his second term, h;7iev hich reduced his political popularity and brought the office back to Democrats by winning election in I 998. Years before; l Davis had served as the chiefofstaffto Gov. Jerry Brown, and thenhad gone on stantly with huge budge~ sh~~ ~ ~, w In the end Schwarzenegger left office stymied most majo~ poh.cy T1t1:!1;:! as Davis ex~erienced during the recalL to serve in the legislature, as controller, and as lieutenant governor. with an approval rating virtua ly Davis took office amid the roaring economy ofthe dot-com boom, when the state enjoyed large surpluses every year. He successfµlly sought education re~ Jerry Brown . . forms and achieved such political popularity that he was hailed in Time Maga zine as 'The Most Fearless Governor in America?" and occasionally mentioned . . Jerry Brown spent a penod out After leaving the governorship th~ fir~t t•~~Os to win election as mayor of as a potential presidential candidate. At the same time, however, he and the leg islature approved huge increases in public employee pensions, planting the seeds of public office, but then reeme~gtfo~:a:ttomey general in 2006. In 2010 ~~ Oakland and then eventually as a . ily (Brown's first two terms o.. ofwhat would later become amajor financial obligation for the state. sou ht a third term as governor and won ibernatorial term limits in 1990, so When the economic bubble burst Davis and the legislature found them- ' . curr~d before California vote:s ~na,~t~d _gu~~o terms under the new system). selves facing huge annual deficits. Even before that, an electricity deregulation they did not count toward his lifetime hm_1t o budget shortfalls, but he had ;~o scheme enacted under Wilson had brought about rolling blackouts and huge. Brown came to office facing .e would not raise taxes without a vote o . te price increases for power. Facing higher utility bills and a collapsing econo.my, . · th t he wou · · fi a tax m- promised during his campatg~ rffi he asked the legislature to re er h rt of voters grew angry, and Davis's popularity plummeted, He managed to win a • h' fi t year m o ce · g Brown s o People. Durmg is trs . fu ed to go along, 1eavm · an· cl close reelection in 2002, but then:as veter anger continued to grow h~ was re- b t Repubhcans re 5 · pered over, called in October of2003. · · crease to the voters, u d b ded The budget gap was pa h I gislature the two-thirds vote threshol e need that he would circumvent t e e ea.sure Arnold Schwarzenegger the following year ~:o~n announce voters for a tax increase. The : four and use a ballot initiative to ask ~~e .sing sales taxes for th~ follo~1 ;ears. I reached the ballot and voters ?ass_e it, :a~amers for the followmg SC\ c~oughly I Superstar actor Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected governor when Davis r years and income taxes on high-incom crease brought the state_ ?udge_t to for was recalled, an unusual circumstance that may have allowed SchwarzeneggeJ { Combined with spending cuts, the taX !~crease was a huge poht1cal v~~cc1ent to win the office. Under normal circumstances, Schwarzeneggerwould have ha into balance. Voter approval °.f ~e m:~t he might be elected to an unp to win a Republican primary a difficult challenge for a candidate who wanted ~o Brown and increased the possibihty_t. ·· ·. · · . 2014 keep aborti•on legal and who 'held positt. .ons that were wi.dely seen as sym· path·etic ed fourth termas governor in · to environmental causes and gay rights. The recall election-e-in which vo:;~ · i r were first asked ifDavis should be booted out. and then were asked to choo I )6 ' . ' ' Time tnagazjne, October I l, 1999. " ~I , , 244. Governors andthe Executive Branch Ethan Rarick 245 Conclusion I References Politically, California's governors are among the most prominent in the nati Given the state's vast population, our chief executives typically rise to the toponf The Council of State Governments. ~012. The Book of the States, 2012 ed., vol. any list of prospective presidential candidates-two recent anomalous cas0 44. Lexington, Kent.: The Council ofState Governments. notwithstanding. As California continues to grow, and as its diversity spreads ;s Decker John. 2009. California in the Balance: Why Budgets Mauer. Berkeley, the rest of the nation, there is every reason to believe this political prominenc~ caiif.: Berkeley Public Policy Press. will continue. Given the state's strong Democratic leanings, this means that a F guson Margaret R ed. 2006. The Executive Branch of State Government: er Peo;le, Process, a;d Politics. Santa Barbara, Cali!·: A~C Clio. . future list oflikely Democratic presidential contenders will probably include the Gray, Virginia, and Hanso~, Ru~sell L, eds. 2?08. Po/1t1c~ 111 the American States: governor of California. Oddly, through the election of 20 I 0, only white men have been elected governor. . A Comparative Analysts. Ninth ed. Washington, D.C.. CQ Press. J b John and A. G. Block. 2006. "The Governor: Managing a Mega-State." In What can California governors do in office? It is true that they are barred acod~verni~ig California: Politics, Government, and Public Policy in the Golden from seeking more than two terms, and that they must share the executive State, ed. Gerald C. Lubenow. Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of Governmental branch with seven other independently elected statewide officials, but overall, Studies Press. . the governor's formal powers are roughly typical ofcounterparts in other states. Kousser, Thad, and Justin H· Phillips· 2012· The Power ofAmerican. Governors. Historically these have translated into substantial influence. California gover nors: New York: Cambridge University Press. · , , Rarick, Ethan, ed. 2012. California Votes; The 2010 Governors Race. Berkeley, • Possess a vigorous and frequently used veto authority, which is rarely overridden, Calif• Berkeley Public Policy Press. h. Rosenthai: Alan. 1990. Governors & Legislatures: Contending Powers. Was mg- • Draft the proposed annual state budget, which significantly influences the ton, D.C.: CQ Press. . . . . H, Governors Sue- final contents. Rosenthal, Alan. 2013. The Best Job m Politics: Exp1onng ow • Appoint the top managers of state government, and the Legislature is ceedAs Policy Leaders. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. . h. generally deferential to their appointments. Sabato, Larry. 1983. Goodb.ve to Good-time ChQarlpie: The American Governors ,p . ~ovemors are somewhat weakened by two important aspects of California Transformed, 2nd ed. Washingto~ iunti:~~ith Charles S. Clark. 2005. politics that are not common nationally. First, since the 1960s California has had r~: Smith, Kevin B., Alan Greenbla~: an o . D C . CQ Press. o~e of the most professional legislatures in the nation, and in budget disputes 1 Governing States andLocalities. Washington,_ ·. G.. ors andPublic Poli- ';' th the gov_emor, this well-paid, full-time body has historically shown more pa s. n'bm.ek, Ethan G., ed. 2008. A Legacy ofJ11nov. atp10n. overn tience t~an Its earlier, part-time counterpart. Second, compared to other states cy. Philadelphia: University of~e~syl~anl 18 re~- cramento: California State a_nd ~arhe_r eras, California voters since the late l 970s have been unusually ac Wilson, E. Dotson. 2011. Califorma s Legis ature. a !1ve m_ usmg the tools of direct democracy to tie the hands of elected officials, Assembly. mcludmg governors. Nonetheless, despite these two countervailing factors California governors ~u~cccd more often than they fail when it comes to ena~ting their policy and .., u gc_t proposals. Like their counterparts across the country they are most in- fluennat when deal· . · h th b ' th mg wit e udget, but they are never powerless. th At e end of the day, California governors occupy a position that would be st e e1: of mo politicians in America. Typically they get most of what they ruwann mftbhe legislature, they are given a free hand to pick the people who will one o t e largest gove · Am . · I Pol1·tt·ea1 • mrnents m enca, and they are figures of nanona ...... unportance. . . ·, ') > J ., I' ;,i 11 ! I