G E N O C I D E B Y P L E B I S C I TE The Bosnian Serb Assembly and Social Construction of ‘Turks’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina Emir Suljagic ​Published by October, 2020 1 Content Abstract 3 Introduction 3 Genocide as Social Reality 5 Social Construction of Genocide 7 Re-conceptualizing Bosniaks 8 Bosniaks as “Outside the Political Community” 13 Bosniaks as Existential Enemy 1​5 Bosniaks as Sub-humans 17 The Assembly and Genocidal Intent 19 Conclusion 21 2 Abstract Based on an extensive archival research and content analysis, this article focuses on the role the Bosnian Serb Assembly played in the process of socially constructing Bosniaks as “Turks” during the period between October 1991 and December 1995, within the context of the genocidal policies pursued by agencies, institutions and organs under the assembly. The article argues that the assembly—both its individual members, as well as an institution—played a central role not only in deciding upon policies that ultimately led to genocide, but also in the process of reconceptualization of Bosniaks as cultural aliens whose very existence presented a mortal threat to the existence of the Serb people. Introduction The town of Srebrenica fell on 11 July 1995 to the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) troops under the command of Ratko Mladic. Around noon on that day, Mladic and his entourage entered the town. With the town centre in the background, Mladic posed for the cameras and said: “Here we are, on 11 July 1995, in Serb Srebrenica. On the eve of yet another great Serb holiday, we give this town to the Serb people as a gift. Finally, after the Rebellion against the Dahis​1,​ the time has come to take revenge on the Turks in this region”.​2 More than four years earlier, in December 1991, Rajko Dukic—speaking in the capacity of the President of the Executive Committee of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), at the head of the rebellion whose ultimate expression would be the genocidal operation in Srebrenica—addressed the separatist assembly that had been established few months earlier. In commenting on what he saw as the arrogance of Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and Croat political leadership in the country, Dukic stated: “If they continue with this kind of behaviour, I am convinced that December 21, 1991 will be the beginning of the Rebellion against the Dahis”​3.​ It is highly unlikely that Dukid and Mladic ever discussed or strategized this rhetorical approach prior to either statement. Yet, Mladic in 1995 echoed Dukic’s words from 1991, when the genocidal violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina seemed at worst a very distant and improbable prospect. Thus, it would seem obvious that Mladic’s pronouncement was deeply embedded in the Serb “knowledge” about Bosniaks and in the conceptualization of the “Turk” constructed by the Serbian political and academic elites. The fact that Dukic and Mladic used the same frame of reference and that this frame of reference was sustained over the course of three and a half years is at the centre of this study. 1 Rebellion of the Serbs against local Ottoman rulers in Serbia in 1804 and 1815. 2 Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Judgment, 22 November 2017, p. 1257; See also Lee, C.H. Julian, Halilovich, Hariz, Phipps, Peter, Sutcliffe, Richard and Landau-Ward, Anni, 2019, Monsters for Modernity: Glob​al Icons for our Critical Condition. Kismet Press: ​ ​ London, pp. 109-123. 3 th Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4 ​ Session, December 21, 1991, p. 38-39, Rajko Dukić ​ 3 As the dissolution of Yugoslavia dramatically accelerated, the Serb members of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held a meeting on the premises of the parliament building in Sarajevo, on October 24, 1991​4.​ The outcome of the meeting was the establishment of an illegal parallel and distinct legislative body, the so-called Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina—a coup d’état​ by all legal standards—declaring openly that the Serbs would “remain in Yugoslavia” whatever the outcome of the crisis would be​5.​ In the four years that followed, the Bosnian Serb Assembly would act as supreme law-and-decision making body in part of the Bosnian territory held by the VRS. Along its formal members, the assembly was often attended by the SDS functionaries as well as the party cadres in the executive branch (both of its own parallel government in the form of the Serb Autonomous Areas or SAO​6 ​ and the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and later the Government of Republika Srpska). Ideological allies from Serbia and abroad, including members of Serbia’s royal Karadjordjevic family and dignitaries of the Serb Orthodox Church, were also in regular attendance. Even though the media was often prohibited from attending certain sessions—in whole or in part—all sessions were meticulously recorded. 4 Seventy-two MPs were members of Radovan Karadžić’s Serb Democratic Party, one a member of the far-right Serb Renewal Movement whereas four came from the left-leaning Alliance of Reformist Forces, a party established originally by the last Prime minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Marković. Report on the Work of the People’s Assembly of RS from October 1991 to October 1992, Pale, October 1993, page 3 5 Report on the Work of the People’s Assembly of RS from October 1991 to October 1992, Pale, October 1993, page 3; See also ​ The Decision Establishing the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Official Gazette of the Serb People in BiH, January 15, 1992, Sarajevo 6 Initially, the assembly was masquerading as part of the political and power structure of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But as part of the process of disassociation of the Serb community from the seceding republic both politically and territorially, SDS established a number Serb Autonomous Region (Srpska Autonomna Oblast/SAO) – variously referred to as oblast or region (both literally mean district and were used interchangeably) – at first using the existing legislation allowing ​ municipalities to form associations based mostly on economic grounds. In fact, the entities that would become building blocks of Republika Srpska started out inconspicuously enough as a network of “communities of municipalities” or “community of self-managing municipalities in the other.” The true motive behind their formation was concentration of power away from the central government of the Bosnian state. The following SAOs were established: Autonomous Region of Krajina (Western Bosnia), Autonomous District of Herzegovina (South and Southeastern Bosnia), Autonomous District of Romanija-Birč (Eastern Bosnia), Autonomous District of Semberija (Northeastern Bosnia), and finally Serbian Autonomous District of Northern Bosnia. “Decision on Verification of the Proclaimed Serb Autonomous Districts in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Official Gazette of Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 1, 15 January 1992, page 8 4 Genocide as Social Reality The point of departure of this article is the assertion that reality is socially defined. However, as Berger and Luckmann underline, the essence of socially constructed reality is not necessarily in what are the “historically available conceptualizations”, but in the individuals and groups with whom the definitions of the reality are embedded​7.​ It is for that reason that at the centre of this analysis is one of the main definers of reality: a political class, elected in a legal, multiparty and democratic elections, that found itself at the centre of both a secession and a genocidal enterprise, making decisions on war and peace, life and death. There are several important reasons for placing the Bosnian Serb Assembly at the centre of the analysis in the context of Bosnian genocide. First, whereas it pays due attention to the role of elites in genocides, expands both definition of the elite as well as the understanding of their ability to maintain control of social and political factors; VRS, for instance, numbered near 200.000 men throughout the conflict, while SDS maintained firm control of the governmental machinery throughout the genocidal enterprise. Whilst authors such as Benjamin Valentino are right in assuming that “the impetus for mass killing usually originates” from the elites, the Bosnian Serb Assembly could in no way be described as a “small group of powerful political or military leaders”​8.​ On the contrary, the assembly had 83 members, most of whom attended the majority of the sessions and discussed the details of the policy of extermination​9–​ sometimes even bragging about their criminal actions. In addition, the Bosnian Serb Assembly was “who is who” of the Serb political and academic elite, and “several PhD holders, university professors, ten doctors, as many writers, three lawyers, ten economists and many professors, engineers, an innovator (…) a priest and a president of university”​10.​ Likewise, the actions by the Bosnian Serb Assembly show that elites sometimes arrive at decisions to pursue genocide as a result of strategic​11,​ rational choice, as Midlarsky emphasizes​12;​ at other times, however, these elites may also engage in the processes of social construction which ultimately result in genocide. This is done discursively, when elites create new social realities, reconstruct “the identities of 7 Peter Berger and Thomas J. Luckmann, “The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge”, Penguin Books, 1991, London, p. 134 8 Valentino, Benjamin A. “Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century”, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2004, p. 2 9 Report on the Work of the People’s Assembly of RS from October 1991 to October 1992, Pale, October 1993, pp. 18-19 10 th Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 25 ​ Session, January 19-20, 1993, p.