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Universität-Gesamthochschule Paderborn Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften Lehrstuhl für Personalwirtschaft Dissertation THE DAIMLERCHRYSLER AG TAKEOVER FAILURE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FAILED DAIMLER-BENZ WELT AG STRATEGY vorgelegt bei: Herrn Prof. Dr. Martin Schneider betreut durch: Herrn Prof. Dr. Martin Schneider und Herrn Prof. Dr. René Fahr Abgabetermin: October 16th, 2012 vorgelegt von: John Riach Studiengang: Wirtschaftswissenschaften EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Although the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover was the largest industrial takeover in history (1998), this case study shows that the acquisition of Chrysler was a sub-strategy within Daimler-Benz CEO Jürgen Schrempp’s plan to place Daimler-Benz and the Mercedes brand as the focal point of a global Welt AG for the passenger and commercial vehicle industry of the 21st century. The reasons for the failure of both DaimlerChrysler AG and the Welt AG are rooted in the inherent contradictions of the two strategies. The lack of attention paid to post takeover integration processes combined with the shift of focus to Schrempp’s Asian strategy made the hegemony of the Welt AG plan and the lie of the ‘merger of equals’ metaphor clear to German, American and Japanese stakeholders. As a result, the takeover failed to realize any of the goals of increasing shareholder value, implementing operative synergy effects, and enhancing customer satisfaction. In addition, the failure of DaimlerChrysler AG can be traced to the failure of Mercedes-Benz Car Group, Chrysler Corporation and Mitsubishi Motor Corporation to perform satisfactorily in their respective markets. It is particularly salient to show how the significant drop in the quality of Mercedes products was a direct result of the decison to globalize and mass produce the brand. The drain of German managers needed to troubleshoot issues at Mitsubishi Motors and Chrysler only supplemented and accelerated the downfall of the Welt AG. The DaimlerChrysler AG takeover failure provides no proof for the necessary failure of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, the failure highlights the strategic role of consistent communication and trust in the process of integrating differing company national and organizational cultures. Finally, the resiliency of national institutions as evidenced in the DaimlerChrysler takeover failure draws attention to the fact that it is still premature to envisage the creation of a truly global company. I TABLE OF CONTENTS THE DAIMLERCHRYSLER AG TAKEOVER FAILURE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FAILED DAIMLER-BENZ WELT AG STRATEGY ..................................................................................... I INDEX OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. VI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. VII THE DAIMLERCHRYSLER AG TAKEOVER FAILURE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FAILED DAIMLER-BENZ WELT AG STRATEGY .................................................................................... 8 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 8 1.1 Key research questions ................................................................................................... 8 1.2 Methodology ................................................................................................................. 11 1.3 Main themes .................................................................................................................. 13 1.4 The structure of the case study ..................................................................................... 23 1.4.1 Goals of the takeover and reasons for optimism ...................................................... 23 1.4.2 Conventional and unconventional approaches ......................................................... 24 1.4.3 Daimler-Benz’s Welt AG strategy (1983-1998) ...................................................... 25 1.4.4 Measuring the takeover failure ................................................................................ 26 1.4.5 The “merger” lie and trust ........................................................................................ 28 1.4.6 Lessons learnt ........................................................................................................... 29 2 THE GOALS AND RATIONALE FOR THE TAKEOVER ..................................... 31 2.1 Reasons for optimism ................................................................................................... 35 2.1.1 Initial DaimlerChrysler AG facts and figures .......................................................... 36 2.1.2 Initial stock market reaction ..................................................................................... 38 2.1.3 The reaction of the respective boards ...................................................................... 40 2.1.4 The reaction of the unions ........................................................................................ 41 2.1.5 The reaction of the financial analysts ...................................................................... 43 2.1.6 The reaction of the politicians .................................................................................. 44 2.1.7 The reaction of the shareholders .............................................................................. 45 2.1.8 The reaction of industry experts .............................................................................. 47 2.1.9 The reaction of the press .......................................................................................... 48 2.2 Historical merger and takeover precedents at Daimler and Chrysler ........................... 49 2.3 The car industry in the 1990s: lean production and merger frenzy .............................. 52 2.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 59 3 CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS ....................... 60 3.1 The literature on the DaimlerChrysler AG takeover .................................................... 60 3.2 Can intercultural differences explain the takeover failure? .......................................... 64 3.2.1 The car industry: A global and national phenomenon ............................................. 66 3.2.2 Hofstede’s theory of cultural dimensions ................................................................ 72 3.2.3 Hofstede applied to the takeover failure .................................................................. 74 3.3 Was the takeover a conflict between Varieties of Capitalism (VoC)? ......................... 81 3.3.1 How VoC helps to understand the takeover failure ................................................ 84 3.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 88 4 EMERGENCE OF DB’S WELT AG STRATEGY (1983-1998) ............................... 90 4.1 Shift from craft to mass production .............................................................................. 94 4.2 The MIT study and the creation of a new industry paradigm ..................................... 100 4.2.1 MIT study impact on Daimler-Benz strategy ........................................................ 104 4.2.2 The “quality” strategy: Daimler-Benz ................................................................... 106 II 4.2.3 The “innovation and flexibility” strategy: Chrysler ............................................... 107 4.3 Diversification at Daimler-Benz ................................................................................. 108 4.4 The emergence of Schrempp’s expanded Welt AG strategy ...................................... 111 4.4.1 The fight for control of Mercedes inside Daimler (1995-1997) ............................ 113 4.4.2 Die Welt AG .......................................................................................................... 121 4.4.3 The impact of shareholder value at Daimler-Benz ................................................ 123 4.4.4 Mercedes as the focal point of the Welt AG strategy ............................................ 129 4.5 Chrysler’s motivation to merge .................................................................................. 133 4.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 136 5 MEASURING THE TAKEOVER FAILURE ........................................................... 138 5.1 Financial failure to increase shareholder value .......................................................... 138 5.1.1 DCX: The first truly global share .......................................................................... 138 5.1.2 The Standard and Poor’s 500 mistake ................................................................... 140 5.1.3 The resiliency of national institutions .................................................................... 143 5.1.4 DCX after Schrempp .............................................................................................. 147 5.2 If Mercedes knew what Mercedes knew: lack of standards ....................................... 148 5.2.1 The Executive Automotive Committee and brand protection ............................... 153 5.2.2 Marketing and the last attempt to merge ...............................................................
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