THE DIFFICULT ART OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1957-1963 by JOHN ANDREW MUNRO B.A. University of British Columbia, 1962 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of International studies We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard. THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April, 1965. In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that per• mission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that, copying or publi• cation of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission, Department of The University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8S Canada I ABSTRACT The question is, why did Canada's international stature experience a seemingly spectacular decline during the Diefenbaker era, 1957-1963. The problem lies not in a documentation of this decline, but rather in determining the reasons for it. There are basically four avenues of research. Firstly, Canada's actual position in terms of international prestige and influence at the end of the Liberal era in 1957, must be realistically appraised. Secondly, the changing pattern of domestic restrictions on external policy must be analysed. Thirdly, the relationship of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs must be examined, and their capabilities as policy formulators deter• mined. Finally, the appropriateness of the major aspects of their external policy must be assessed. Research on such a contemporary problem is necessarily limited due to a paucity of official documents and further, due to the fact that the chief protagonists are still alive and politically active. Thus, the writer finds himself relying on official debates and publications, interviews (where possible), the variety of periodical sources and a limited number of books (apart from the specialized subjects involved^ many of the writings available are far from satisfactory because they lack perspective). This thesis would contend that Canadian international stature was far from secure in 1957; that the domestic XI requirements of external policy success were absent from the Conservative scene, 1957-1963; that Messrs. ^iefenbaker and Green were ill-equiped to formulate Canadian foreign policy; and that their foreign policy, formulated in defiance of Canadian reality, resulted in disaster. iv Table of Contents page I INTRODUCTION TO DISASTER 1 Resignation of Douglas Harkness 1 State of Conservative government, 1963 2 Role of United States 3 The problem 7 II CANADA AND THE WORLD STAGE OP 1957 9 Security of 1957 9 World War II 10 San Francisco Conference 12 Lester B. Pearson - Canadian limitations 13 World War II aftermath lli Relationship with the United States 15 NATO " 16 United Nations 18 The changing scence 19 Development of relations with United States 20 -military 21 -economic 26 Department of External Affairs 28 Lester B. Pearson - Canadian asset 30 Commonwealth reality 31 Emergent Nations 3k- Canadian reality 36 III FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS 38 Economic regionalism 38 American ownership I4.O Canadian reaction lj.1 Federal factor l\$ National unity I4.7 Bicultural s multicultural 50 General principles ^52" John Diefenbaker 53 Election 1957 53 Election 1958 55 Conservative Cabinet 56 Government caucus 56 Mandate 1957 57 Mandate 1958 58 Goals and means 65 THE POLICY MAKER Prime Minister and External Secretary Liberal experience John Diefenbaker Sydney Smith Howard Green Department of External Affairs Bureaucratic power Diefenbaker and bureaucratic resistance Diefenbaker' s relations with the diplomats External policy responsibility Howard Green, 191^5-195 7 John Diefenbaker, 191+5-57 THE POLICIES OP INDEPENDENCE Foreign policy and national interest Independence and the United States Commonwealth alternative Canadian reality NORAD Avro Arrow SAGE-Bomarc Cabinet split Two views of Canada in the world Third force Public confusion Canadian consequences Britain and E.E.C. Multi-racialism embraced Alienation of the Macmillan government Alienation of Washington Canada the unreliable ally Kennedy to Ottawa Berlin Crisis Cuban Crisis American intervension The Conservative vision 1 Chapter I INTRODUCTION TO DISASTER. My dear Prime Minister, For over two years you have been aware that I believed nuclear warheads should be supplied to the four weapons systems we have acquired which are adapted to their use. Throughout this period I believed that they would be authorized at the appropriate time. During the past two weeks particularly, I have made absolutely clear what I considered the minimum position I would accept, and several times have offered to resign unless it was agreed to. It has become quite obvious during the last few days that your views and mine as to the course we should pursue for the acquisition of nuclear weapons for our armed forces are not capable of reconciliation. Thus it is with a great deal of regret that I now find I must tender my resignation as minister of national defence. Until the last few weeks I enjoyed my five and a half years as a member of your govern• ment and I trust I have made some contribution to it and to Canada. Yours regretfully Douglas S. Harkness. This letter, a revised and abbreviated version of that sent to the Prime Minister, was released to the press on February J4., 1963. It marks the demise of the government of John Diefenbaker, as the events that followed it must be judged as anticlimactic. The resignation of Mr. Harkness as Minister of National Defence represented more however, than the toppling of a government that seemed no more than the victim of its own indecision and ineptitude. Mr. Harkness's 1. as cited in, Spencer, Robert, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review For 1963. ed. J.T.Saywell. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 196I+. p. 298. 2 resignation was a most eloquent testimony to the existence of a definable reality in Canadian external relations; Mr. Diefenbaker1s fate resulted from his bumbling defiance of that reality. The reality in question was that of Canada's relation• ship with the United States. This is not to say that the overt actions of the United States government were the cause of Diefenbaker's downfall/ Indeed, the circumstances of the Conservative minority govern• ment were far from normal in any context. As the new year of 1963 opened, "The acrid odour of death and decay hung over the Conservative government;a sharp contrast to the situat• ion of ascendancy that had existed for another Diefenbaker minority government but five years before. Never in the twent• ieth century had a Canadian government been in such disarray; only the late nineteenth century Conservative government of Mackenzie Bowell had experienced a remotely comparable ignominy. The dramatic account of the Cabinet revolt presented by Peter Newman3 need not be repeated here; the damning truth is contained in the resignation of Mr. Harkness, in the subsequent resign• ations of Pierre Sevigny and George Hees, Associate Minister of Defence and Minister Sf Trade and Commerce respectively, and in the decisions of Davie Pulton (Public Works), Donald Fleming (Justice) and Ernest Halpenny (Secretary of State) not to seek re-election, to say nothing of the reported offers of resignation by four or five additional Cabinet members. 2. Saywell, John T., "Parliament and Politics," in Ibid, p. 3» 3. Newman, Peter C, Renegade in Power. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited7 19&3. PP* 355-1+00. 3 Such was the state of the Diefenbaker administration in the early months of 1963, that it may be reasonably contended that if the defence issue had not precipitated the collapse of the government, the failure of the government to bring out a budggt or the general stagmation of Parliament or some other issue would have done the job. As to the part played by the United States in that debacle, there are perhaps two aspects. The first concerned the humbling of the Conservatives in the June, 1962, election (the party of Mr. Diefenbaker was reduced from two hundred and eight seats to one hundred and sixteen in the House). The Explanation of the Christian Science Monitor is perhaps appropos, The clearest single issue - clearest because oversimplified - has been symbolized by the "Diefendollar," printed by the opposition and circulated to voters. This was a reminder that the administration cut the value of the . Canadian dollar from $1.03 United States currency to 92 l/2 cents. It seems almost forgotten now that when this took place the Canadian dollar's value did not rest sufficiently on Canada's foreign trade, but overmuch on American investment in Canadian industry - an investment that often threatened outside control.1| The net capital outflow of $1,000,000,000 experienced by Canada in the first quarter of 1962,^ which directly resulted in the devaluation of the Canadian dollar, pointed to three things. Firstly, the extent to which Canada was dependent on the importation of foreign capital from the United States. I4.. "Canada -Back to Coalition," The Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1962. 5. "The Realm, Crisis of Confidence," Time Magazine (Canadian Edition). Vol. LXXIX:, June 29, 1962. p. 5. k Secondly, the failure of the Diefenbaker government to come to grips with the problems of foreign-: ownership of Canadian industry. Finally, the instability of Conservative leadership in the nation; as the potential and actual wealth of the Canadian nation had not decreased, the capital outflow rep• resented a vote of want of confidence in the Diefenbaker gov• ernment by foreign investors. The Liberals simply exploited an issue to which the urban voters might associate other • economic ills, such as unemployment, the cost of living, etcetera, for which the Conservatives were held responsible.