THE DIFFICULT ART OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1957-1963

by

JOHN ANDREW MUNRO

B.A. University of British Columbia, 1962

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

International studies

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard.

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April, 1965. In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of

British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that per• mission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that, copying or publi• cation of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission,

Department of

The University of British Columbia,

Vancouver 8S Canada I

ABSTRACT

The question is, why did Canada's international stature

experience a seemingly spectacular decline during the

Diefenbaker era, 1957-1963. The problem lies not in a

documentation of this decline, but rather in determining

the reasons for it. There are basically four avenues of research.

Firstly, Canada's actual position in terms of international prestige and influence at the end of the Liberal era in 1957, must be realistically appraised. Secondly, the changing pattern of domestic restrictions on external policy must be analysed. Thirdly, the relationship of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs must be examined, and their capabilities as policy formulators deter• mined. Finally, the appropriateness of the major aspects of their external policy must be assessed.

Research on such a contemporary problem is necessarily limited due to a paucity of official documents and further, due to the fact that the chief protagonists are still alive and politically active. Thus, the writer finds himself relying on official debates and publications, interviews (where possible), the variety of periodical sources and a limited number of books (apart from the specialized subjects involved^ many of the writings available are far from satisfactory because they lack perspective).

This thesis would contend that Canadian international stature was far from secure in 1957; that the domestic XI requirements of external policy success were absent from the

Conservative scene, 1957-1963; that Messrs. ^iefenbaker and

Green were ill-equiped to formulate Canadian foreign policy;

and that their foreign policy, formulated in defiance of

Canadian reality, resulted in disaster. iv

Table of Contents

page I INTRODUCTION TO DISASTER 1 Resignation of Douglas Harkness 1 State of Conservative government, 1963 2 Role of United States 3 The problem 7

II CANADA AND THE WORLD STAGE OP 1957 9

Security of 1957 9 World War II 10 San Francisco Conference 12 Lester B. Pearson - Canadian limitations 13 World War II aftermath lli Relationship with the United States 15 NATO " 16 United Nations 18 The changing scence 19 Development of relations with United States 20 -military 21 -economic 26 Department of External Affairs 28 Lester B. Pearson - Canadian asset 30 Commonwealth reality 31 Emergent Nations 3k- Canadian reality 36

III FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS 38

Economic regionalism 38 American ownership I4.O Canadian reaction lj.1 Federal factor l\$ National unity I4.7 Bicultural s multicultural 50 General principles ^52" John Diefenbaker 53 Election 1957 53 Election 1958 55 Conservative Cabinet 56 Government caucus 56 Mandate 1957 57 Mandate 1958 58 Goals and means 65 THE POLICY MAKER

Prime Minister and External Secretary Liberal experience John Diefenbaker Sydney Smith Howard Green Department of External Affairs Bureaucratic power Diefenbaker and bureaucratic resistance Diefenbaker' s relations with the diplomats External policy responsibility Howard Green, 191^5-195 7 John Diefenbaker, 191+5-57

THE POLICIES OP INDEPENDENCE

Foreign policy and national interest Independence and the United States Commonwealth alternative Canadian reality NORAD Avro Arrow SAGE-Bomarc Cabinet split Two views of Canada in the world Third force Public confusion Canadian consequences Britain and E.E.C. Multi-racialism embraced Alienation of the Macmillan government Alienation of Washington Canada the unreliable ally Kennedy to Ottawa Berlin Crisis Cuban Crisis American intervension The Conservative vision 1

Chapter I INTRODUCTION TO DISASTER.

My dear Prime Minister,

For over two years you have been aware that I believed nuclear warheads should be supplied to the four weapons systems we have acquired which are adapted to their use. Throughout this period I believed that they would be authorized at the appropriate time. During the past two weeks particularly, I have made absolutely clear what I considered the minimum position I would accept, and several times have offered to resign unless it was agreed to. It has become quite obvious during the last few days that your views and mine as to the course we should pursue for the acquisition of nuclear weapons for our armed forces are not capable of reconciliation. Thus it is with a great deal of regret that I now find I must tender my resignation as minister of national defence. Until the last few weeks I enjoyed my five and a half years as a member of your govern• ment and I trust I have made some contribution to it and to Canada.

Yours regretfully Douglas S. Harkness.

This letter, a revised and abbreviated version of that sent to the Prime Minister, was released to the press on

February J4., 1963. It marks the demise of the government of

John Diefenbaker, as the events that followed it must be judged as anticlimactic. The resignation of Mr. Harkness as

Minister of National Defence represented more however, than the toppling of a government that seemed no more than the victim of its own indecision and ineptitude. Mr. Harkness's

1. as cited in, Spencer, Robert, "External Affairs and Defence," Canadian Annual Review For 1963. ed. J.T.Saywell. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 196I+. p. 298. 2 resignation was a most eloquent testimony to the existence of a definable reality in Canadian external relations; Mr.

Diefenbaker1s fate resulted from his bumbling defiance of that reality. The reality in question was that of Canada's relation• ship with the United States.

This is not to say that the overt actions of the United

States government were the cause of Diefenbaker's downfall/

Indeed, the circumstances of the Conservative minority govern• ment were far from normal in any context. As the new year of 1963 opened, "The acrid odour of death and decay hung over

the Conservative government;a sharp contrast to the situat• ion of ascendancy that had existed for another Diefenbaker minority government but five years before. Never in the twent• ieth century had a Canadian government been in such disarray; only the late nineteenth century Conservative government of

Mackenzie Bowell had experienced a remotely comparable ignominy.

The dramatic account of the Cabinet revolt presented by Peter

Newman3 need not be repeated here; the damning truth is contained in the resignation of Mr. Harkness, in the subsequent resign• ations of Pierre Sevigny and George Hees, Associate Minister of Defence and Minister Sf Trade and Commerce respectively, and in the decisions of Davie Pulton (Public Works), Donald

Fleming (Justice) and Ernest Halpenny (Secretary of State) not to seek re-election, to say nothing of the reported offers of resignation by four or five additional Cabinet members.

2. Saywell, John T., "Parliament and Politics," in Ibid, p. 3»

3. Newman, Peter C, Renegade in Power. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited7 19&3. PP* 355-1+00. 3

Such was the state of the Diefenbaker administration in the

early months of 1963, that it may be reasonably contended that

if the defence issue had not precipitated the collapse of the

government, the failure of the government to bring out a budggt

or the general stagmation of Parliament or some other issue

would have done the job.

As to the part played by the United States in that debacle,

there are perhaps two aspects. The first concerned the humbling

of the Conservatives in the June, 1962, election (the party of

Mr. Diefenbaker was reduced from two hundred and eight seats

to one hundred and sixteen in the House). The Explanation of

the Christian Science Monitor is perhaps appropos,

The clearest single issue - clearest because oversimplified - has been symbolized by the "Diefendollar," printed by the opposition and circulated to voters. This was a reminder that the administration cut the value of the . Canadian dollar from $1.03 United States currency to 92 l/2 cents. It seems almost forgotten now that when this took place the Canadian dollar's value did not rest sufficiently on Canada's foreign trade, but overmuch on American investment in Canadian industry - an investment that often threatened outside control.1|

The net capital outflow of $1,000,000,000 experienced by

Canada in the first quarter of 1962,^ which directly resulted

in the devaluation of the Canadian dollar, pointed to three

things. Firstly, the extent to which Canada was dependent on

the importation of foreign capital from the United States.

I4.. "Canada -Back to Coalition," The Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1962.

5. "The Realm, Crisis of Confidence," Time Magazine (Canadian Edition). Vol. LXXIX:, June 29, 1962. p. 5. k

Secondly, the failure of the Diefenbaker government to come to

grips with the problems of foreign-: ownership of Canadian

industry. Finally, the instability of Conservative leadership

in the nation; as the potential and actual wealth of the

Canadian nation had not decreased, the capital outflow rep•

resented a vote of want of confidence in the Diefenbaker gov•

ernment by foreign investors. The Liberals simply exploited

an issue to which the urban voters might associate other •

economic ills, such as unemployment, the cost of living, etcetera,

for which the Conservatives were held responsible.

The second aspect of the American role involves the overt

interference of the United States government in the great

Canadian debate over defence. The key to the defence debate

was whether or not nuclear warheads-were to be accepted to make

effective Bornarc missiles located at North Bay, Ontario and soon

to be located at La Macaza, Quebec. The point is that the

Conservative government had committed itself, not only to the

acceptance of nuclear warheads for the Bornarc, but also for the

"strike and reconnaissance" role of its European based air

squadrons and for the Honest John short-range rockets of the l|th Canadian infantry Brigade Group in Germany. In the first instance, the question of Canada's role in NORAD was raised;

in the latter two cases, Canada's role within NATO. It is essential to remember that the two protagonists in this public

spectacle were Douglas Harkness and Howard Green, Canadian

Ministers of National Defence and External Affairs respectively,

6. See pp. H6-118 5 not John Diefenbaker and some member of the United States

administration.

This is not however to say that John Diefenbaker was not

involved; essentially, his was the role of a Prime Minister

attempting to ease his government out of a most embarrassing domestic? and international® position. Nor is this to say that the erratic course of American defence planners did not in large measure lend a validity to his position, at least insofar as the Bornarc was concerned. The American course of action with regard to the development of the Bomarc-B missile left

something to be desired, in anyone's frame of reference.

Shortly after Canada had accepted the SAGE-Bomarc program,^

... Ottawa experienced the ultimate disappointment of another apparent change of the American mind Q;he first change involved the mistaken conclusion that the Soviet bomber threat was disappearing more rapidly than it was]]: the virtual termination of the BOMARC programme, as Canadians assumed was the case after hearing of plans for a drastic cut in BOMARC research and development funds. 10

It has been contended that the Canadian government pressured the United States for a continuation of its Bornarc program and that a primary reason for the continued American development

7. See pp. 121+-125 8. See pp. H^-ili.5

9. See pp. 117-11.8

10. Conant, Melvin, The Long Polar Watch. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1962. p. 225. 6 of the Bomarc lay in that pressure.11 Such an assertion lacks

credibility for two reasons; first, it ignores the possibility

of the Canadian defence establishment acting independently of

the Canadian government as a whole,12 and secondly, it ignored

the reality of the Nassau Conference of December, 1962. Nassau „ illustrated the brutality with which the Kennedy administration was prepared to pursue its defence goals; the Kennedy administ• ration sc&pped its Skybolt missile program on which the United

Kingdom as an effective independent nuclear force was dependent,

How long does it take to determine that a missile program is ineffective? Surely, it may be reasonably assumed that if the

American Defence Secretary, Mr. McNamara was able to testify to the virtual uselessness of the Bomarcs on February 6, 1963, then this was not a new conclusion on the part of the United

States government. Is it not ludicrous to conclude that the

Bomarc program was retained just for Canada's benefit when no previous defence program had ever been so retained?

Indeed, it might be concluded, as did Brigadier Warden, that

John Diefenbaker,

... was amply vindicated by U.S. Defence Secretary McNamara's evidence before a sub-committee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Represent• atives on February 6, 1963, published on Ma? ch 29, to the effect that the Bomarcs were practically useless except to "cause the Soviets to target missiles against them, and thereby increase their missile requirements or draw missiles on to these Bomarc targets that would otherwise be available for other targets." 13

11. Lyon, Peyton V., The Policy Question. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963. p. 97. 12. See p. 120

13. Wardell, Michael, " ' Renegade In Power' Reply to Newman," Fredericton Daily GI saner, November 16, 1963. 7

What then was at stake? If the Bomarcs were ineffective, it could hardly have mattered whether nuclear warheads were

"acquired" for them or not, insofar as the effective defence

of North America was concerned. It would appear that John

George Diefenbaker was the real issue. It may be reasonably

contended that the United States had come to question the reliability of his government as a partner in NORAD and in the

North American continental system that NORAD was designed to

defend. Further, it may be reasonably assumed that the overt

actions of the United States military1^- and State Department1^ were intended to do exactly what they did: to so bring into

focus the problems of the Diefenbaker government as to pre•

cipitate its fall.

Yet, looking back to the Canada of 1957, it seems hardly conceivable that any such overt action on the part of the

United States could have had the same effect. If Canada in 1957

appeared strong, united and at the zenith of its prestige and

influence in international affairs, unfortunately the Canada

of 1963 bore little resemblance either domestically or

externally. The question then, involves more than simply a

chronology of aggravations in the relations of Canada and the

United States over a period of almost six years.

Ik. See pp. 1^114.5

15. See pp. lij.8-11+9 8

It involves considerations beyond simply the formal policy decisions themselves; its primary concern is to determine the margins of external policy response. That is, what limitations, external and domestic, were imposed on Canadian policy makers in their efforts to further the Canadian national interest and further, how capable were those policy makers in employing the natural assets of their nation to compensate for its liabilitie s/ 9

Chapter II CANADA AND THE WORLD STAGE OF 1957.

When the government of John Diefenbaker took power from the

Liberals in June, 1957, the new administration inherited a seemingly secure position of prestige and influence in inter• national affairs. The British journal, the Economist, which is normally parsimonious with its praise, noted on June 15, 1957,

Since the war, Canada has come to occupy a unique international position. A keystone in the North Atlantic bridge, it has also helped to ease tensions between the West as a whole and those Asian and African countries that suspect both European colonialism and the new power of the United States.

The Economist went on to describe Canada as, "hot merely... a power with a mind of its own,"' but also, I!ian unusually constructive contributor to the world's councils."'1 It would seem that neither the Economist nor the new Conservative administration appreciated the precarious base on which this

Canadian image rested.

During the King-St. Laurent tenures, events had conspired 2 to present the small Canadian nation with the opportunity to meet the incomparable challenges of major participation In the

Second World War and its Cold War aftermath. That Canada was able to meet these challenges is a tribute to the resourcefulness of her land, her people and her leaders. However, the very existence of these opportunities is a testimonial to the abnormality of the times.

1. "'Ottawa Stampede,"' The Economist, Vol. 183. London, June 15, 1957. p. 953.

2. In 1941, Canada's population was 11,506,655; in 1961, it was 18,238,247. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada 1964. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1964. p. 10. 10

With, the fall of Prance In 1940, the newly sovereign Canada found herself standing second only to Great Britain in holding back the Axis machine. Canada readily abandoned the last vestiges of her inter-war "fire-proof house" isolationism and assumed the front seat position due her acceptance of such wide international responsibilities. Although Canada's importance, in comparative terms, was naturally diminished by the entry of the Soviet Union and the United States into the war, her tremendous contribution to the victory found ready and unsought recognition,

Relative to her resources her effort is second to none. In absolute terms the distance that separates Canada from the great powers is less than that between her ovm achievement and that of any other of the smaller United Nations.4

Thus, as the result of a war from which the greatest industrial potentials were excluded until enemy attack brought them into full play in 1941, the demands placed on the relatively small industrial resources of a nation of less than twelve million people were phenomenal. It was in this situation that Canada rose to the position of fourth industrial power among the

United Nations and to the status of Middle Power.

Nor was Canada long unconscious of her new-won position and its concomitant responsibilities. Perhaps the earliest

3. The formal process of Canada's achievement of complete autonomy in external affairs was not completed until the Statute of Westminster, 1931.

4. The Economist. London, May 29, 1943, as cited in, Martin, Chester, "'The British Commonwealth,'" The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. XXV. Toronto, 1944. p. 421. 11 intimation of the government's attitude in this regard is found in the remarks of Prime Minister King's parliamentary assistant,

Brooke Claxton in 1944,

Canada's part in the last war raised her to the status of a nation. Canada's part in this war has given her the opportunities and responsibilities of world wide interest. Today Canada stands in the shadow of no other land.

A moment later he continued, (

By furthering international co-operation we shall be furthering the highest interests of Canada as a free nation.5

From the moment of its acceptance of Canada's changed status, the King government sought to realistically maximize Canada's international influence. Exemplary was Canada's functional approach to the question of post-war international organization,

"'that power should be granted In proportion to the functional

Importance and contribution of each nation.'1'''' It is significant that the policies of the King government were in accord with the growing political maturity of the Canadian nation as a whole.^

5. Claxton, Brooke, "'The Place of Canada in Post-War Organization," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. X. Toronto, 1944. p. 421.

6. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1944. (August 4) pp. 5908-09.

7. Hodgetts, J.E., ":The San Francisco Conference:- Old Worlds for New.?* University of Toronto Quarterly, July, 1945.p.438.

8. A. type of Gallup Poll in January, 1945, clearly indicated the response of the Canadian people to a role of active participation in the type of international co-operation envisaged by the Dumbarton Oaks proposals: ninety per cent, were in favour of punitive sanctions (only fifty- one per cent, in Quebec). Soward, F.H. and Mclnnis, Edgar, Canada and the United Nations, New York, Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956, p. 16. 12

Thus, the Impressively competent® Canadian delegation to the

San Francisco Conference (April-June, 1945), sought in a'

totally responsible way "'to build the most efficient organization

possible" within the necessary context of great power

participation .-^

The San Francisco Conference provided Canada with a unique

opportunity to demonstrate the character of her new found

internationalism. The Sponsoring Powers (United States, Soviet

Union, United Kingdom and China) had been remiss in working out

the provisions for economic and social co-operation in their

Dumbarton Draft. The Canadian delegation submitted to the

conference a complete revision of the particular great power

proposals in amendments,

...designed to increase the authority and position of the Economic and Social Council, to strengthen the position of that body as a co-ordinator of the various Intergovern• mental specialized agencies for which the Proposals made provision, and to clarify the language of the Dumbarton Draft.

In addition to demonstrating their presence and competence, the

Canadian delegation were the authors of what may well prove to

have been the most important chapters of the United Nations

Charter.

9. Dean, V.M., The Four Cornerstones of Peace. New York, McGraw- Hill Book Company, Inc., 1946. p. 63.

10. Soward, F.H., Canada In World Affairs, From Normandy to Paris, 1944-1946. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1950.p.125

11. Ibid, p. 141. 13

Very much related to Canada's role in the Second World War

and in the organization of the peace was the nomination of one

of Canada's outstanding diplomats, Lester B. Pearson, for the

first Secretary-Generalship of the United Nations. The reason

for Mr. Pearson's unacceptability to the Soviet government is

found in the fact that as the Second World War ended, the Cold

War began to emerge. As Canada is the neighbour of the United

States and was identified with the West, it may be contended

that Mr. Pearson was automatically suspect in the eyes of the

Soviet Union, which as early as 1945 regarded the United States

with some hostility and was not willing to facilitate anything

that might place the United Nations organization more completely

in American control (although it should be noted that the Soviet

objection was phrased In geographical rather than in political

terms). Mr. Pearson's rejection was the first indication of the

severe limitations imposed on Canada'la effectiveness in inter•

national affairs by her proximity to and relationship with the

United States. As one commentator has noted of this and Mr.

Pearson's second failure to achieve the office of Secretary-

General,

Mr. Pearson's fate is an interesting reflection of the difficulties which Canada faces as a nation in her efforts to project herself onto the world stage.

12. Anglin, Douglas G., "'Lester Pearson and the Office of Secretary-General,'" International Journal, Vol. XVII Spring, 1962. p. 150. 14

However, there is little evidence of the above limitation

causing any great concern or even being appreciated as anything more than a fact of Cold War life by Canadians.

The political and economic aftermath of the Second World War

also served to enhance Canada's position of influence and prestige. In the wake of the dissolution of the inter-war great power structure, a revolutionary world had emerged in which two

super powers contested for the balance. The former Axis powers of Germany, Japan and Italy were politically and economically prostrate. The great power reality of Prance, the protestations

of General de Gaulle to the contrary, had disappeared with her

collapse in 1940. World War II had forced Great Britain to

accept the reality of her broken economy and reduced status as

the First World War never had. China could never aspire to

dominance in the Par East while she was consumed with civil war.

Eastern Europe had experienced social revolution at the behest

of the occupying Soviet armies and had fallen within the Soviet

orbit; the same fate awaited much of Central Europe. Western

Europe was in a state of economic chaos and incapable in her•

self to resist very long domestic and/or Soviet pressures for fundamental change. The revolutionary forces of nationalism were spreading in Asia and were soon to take root in Africa.

It seemed improbable that the forces of privilege in Latin

America could long immunize their nations from the winds of

social change. In contrast stood Canada. Canada was politically

and economically stable. The Mackenzie King government was beginning a third term in office, Its war and peace-time policies

respectably confirmed in the June, 1945, election. The Canadian 15

economy seemed viable. The Canadian state of affairs was

constant into 1957. The Cold War created no dilemma for

Canada, the entire course of her political, economic and

cultural development dictated that she side with the United

States. Thus, the simple fact of Canadian stability in a

chaotic world was bound to contribute immensely to Canada's

international stature, particularly since there were virtually

no other contestants in the race.

Probably the most important factor in Canada's international

stature, then as now, was her partnership In '"the much criticized

and greatly envied North American civilization of the twentieth ^

century."1-'-^ This partnership was reflected in the political

stability and high gross national product of the nation.

However, other advantages did accrue to Canada from this

historic relationship. As the lines of the Cold War hardened,

the non-communist world began to look to the unfamiliar figure

of the United States for political leadership and for economic

aid. Of all the nations in the world, Canada was the most

familiar with United States thinking, institutions and practices;

this enabled Canada to sometimes play the role of intellectual

buffer between the United States and other Western or neutral

states. Secondly, he.r familiarity with the Washington "political

jungle"' sometimes allowed Canada an otherwise impossible

effective lobby. However, he.r most important diplomatic credit

lay in the trust and good-will automatically accorded Canada by

13. Sutherland, R.J., "'Canada's Long Term Stategic Situation,"1 International Journal, Vol. XVII, Summer, 1962. p.205. 16

the United States. This sentiment is reflected in the fact

that Americans were willing to pay their supreme compliment to

Canadians,"'why you're almost the same as us.'"14 It was this

situation that resulted in the relative readiness of the United

States to listen to Canada, even on major policy questions.

As the reaction against the Soviet Union, and particularly

against Soviet territorial acquisitions in Europe, hardened in

the United States under the Truman Administration,, a similar

reaction took place in Canada. In a speech in the House of

Commons on April 29, 1948, the Canadian Prime Minister, Louis

St. Laurent, in fact urged the extension of American moves to

contain Russia when he said,

We must at all costs avoid the fatal repetition of the history of the pre-war years when Nazi aggression picked off its victims one by one. Such a process does not end at the Atlantic... Without sacrificing the universality of the United Nations, it is possible for the free nations of the world to form their own closer association for collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations...It may be that the free states, or some of them, will soon find it necessary to consult together on how best to establish such a collective security league. It might grow out of plans for "Western Union"' now maturing in Europe. Its purpose, like that of "Western Union,"' would not be merely negative. It would create a dynamic counter- attraction to Communism-the dynamic counter- attraction of a free, prosperous and progressive society, as opposed to the totalitarian and reactionary society of the Communist world. The formation of such a defensive group of free states would not be a counsel of despair but a measure of hope.15

14. Lyon, Payton V., "!Is Canada Overdrawn on Its Diplomatic Credit?"' Toronto Globe and Mail, January 17, 1961.

15. Turner, Arthur C, Bulwark of the West, Implications and Problems of NATO. Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1953, p. 9. 17

The United States was moving in the direction of the North

Atlantic idea with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan and,

most importantly, with her support and encouragement of the

Brussels Pact. Thus, it was in the context of an emerging

Western alliance that Canada employed the full potential of

her stature in forwarding existing Western policies to a

logical and, hopefully, the most meaningful conclusion. As

Robert A. Spencer was to note,

Middle Powers rarely formulate policies for Great Powers to follow. Yet Middle Powers do have opportunities to suggest and to guide policy, if they possess ideas and the skill and determination to pursue them. And though available evidence makes it impossible to be certain, this is what appears to have happened in those critical months of 1947 and 1948.16

The North Atlantic Treaty however, does contain a lasting

testimony to the limitations of effective Canadian Initiative

in the much acclaimed Article 2.

The Canadian stand on this question was opposed by both the United States and the United Kingdom; but after a struggle which was described as bitter and contentious, it was agreed to include the non-military provisions as Article 2^

16. Spencer, Robert A., "'Triangle Into Treaty: Canada and the Origins of NATO, "'International Journal, Vol. XLV, Spring, 1959. p.97.

17. Ibid, p.95 Article 2 provided that the parties undertake,"'.. .the further development of peaceful and friendly inter• national relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them; as cited in, The NATO Handbook: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Paris, NATO Information Service, 1959,p.12. 18

Canadian idealism had overextended Itself by.insisting that

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization become something that

its two most important members had no intention of making it.

Article 2 was included in the Treaty but never implemented in

substance, and the organization remained a defensive alliance,

apparently effective in containing the Soviet advance in Europe.

Because of the Cold War, the United Nations organization

lost its original rationale.- It was, however, largely because

of the Cold War that Canada was able to play as effective a

role within the UN as she has. Had the two super powers

co-operated in the fields of collective security and economic

and social activity, any Canadian contribution, no matter how

responsible, would have been rendered much less significant

than was the case In the absence of effective Russian

participation. This is not to belittle the responsibility of

Canadian statesmen in accepting this less-than-perfect peace

league in the first instance and in the second instance making

the best of opportunities afforded to make the Canadian

contributions meaningful. Throughout the Liberal period,

Canada effectively contributed to the varied and changing

functions of the United Nations, whether as a member of'all

the UN peace keeping activities^- or through the Economic

and Social Council, Specialized Agencies and the various

18. For a brief, factual account of Canada's peace-keeping activities, see: "Tn the Cause of Peace,"' Department of External Affairs, External Affairs. Vol. XIV. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, July, 1962. pp. 198-204. 19

Functional Committees and Commissions.

Much of Canada's international stature in the first post•

war decade related to the fact that the world stage was not

crowded. However, by 1957 Canada's international environment

had changed, and with the recovery of France and West Germany

(the case of the latter was most directly affected by NATO

decisions resulting from the advent of war in Korea in 1950-

the halt of German deindustrialization and subsequent (1955)

rearmament), the Canadian position within the Western Alliance 20 was eclipsed. External Affairs officials saw nothing unnatural in this state of affairs,

...in the late forties and early fifties, Canada basked in the glory of her contribution to the liberation of Europe during the Second World War, and latterly to her assistance in reconstruction programs. As the North Atlantic alliance took shape, Lester B. Pearson, then the Liberal External Affairs Minister, played a prominent role in the formation and his counsel was heard and respected, Mr. Pearson's dominant role In the UN, notably as President of the General Assembly in 1952-53, vaulted Canada into a somewhat exalted position. But as time healed the war wounds and the countries of Europe made their remarkable recoveries, Canada's assistance became no longer the great necessity it once was. With the economic recovery came the political recovery of the European nations and their return to positions of power in the world's councils.

19. For an account of Canada's decent, if modest, financial contributions to the United Nations, see: "Canada's contribution to the United Nations, "Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, Vol. XIV. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, December, 1962. pp. 361-374.

20. Spencer, Robert A., "Let's Get Rid of our Phony Image,"; Toronto Telegram, March 23, 1963. 20

Gradually, Canada has found herself being shunted away from the environs of the inner circle into the limbo of middle power.21

Similar to the West German position was that of Japan, whose

industrial recovery was also stimulated by the Korean War.

In addition to the recovery of such traditional powers,

Communist China had since 1949 made a great leap forward to

the centre of the Asian stage, although not within the con•

text of existing international organizations. A>lso, as

nations emerged from colonial or semi-colonial status, such

as India, Tunisia and Nigeria, their voices were heard on the

world stage. The above situation led Peyton V. Lyon to

conclude that, "We may never again be quite so significant

as we were in the first post-war decade.",2^

Ironically, Canada through her support of plans such as NATO

and the Marshall Plan facilitated both the economic and

political recovery of Europe and her own international

decline.

Perhaps the greatest significance of the S'econd World War

for Canada was Its effect on Canada-United States relations.

While Mackenzie King might well have preferred otherwise,

inter-war Canada was still largely inclined to look to Britain

for leadership. However, with the outbreak of war in 1939,

a pattern of closer military, economic and political relations

with the United States began to emerge and develop in response ^

21. Gray, Walter, "'Some Pride in the East Block,"' Toronto Globe and.Mail, March 9, 1961.

22. Lyon, Peyton V., "'Problems of Canadian Independence,"' International Journal, Vol. XVI, Summer, 1961.p.257. 21

to the ever growing recognition of common interests; a

pattern that has remained unbroken to this day. A\ measure

of the depth of this relationship is to be found in.the

comments of a writer for the Mew Republic on the effect of

what was certainly one of the most serious crises In Canadian-

American relations during the long Liberal tenure, the

'"Norman Affair'",23

...This episode has not done irreparable harm to the relations between the two countries for the simple reason that nothing, within reason, could-Canada is too dependent on the U.S. and the U.S. is more dependent on Canada than on any other country.^4

The interdependency of Canada and the United States, in a

military sense, found formal recognition in the Ogdensburg

Agreement of August, 1940, and in the subsequent creation of

23. The "'Norman Affair'" involved the presentation of evidence concerning a prominent member of Canada's diplomatic corps before the United States Senate Sub-Committee on Internal Security in 1956. This evidence concerned the youthful left-wing activities of Mr. Herbert Norman, Canadian Ambassador to the United Arab Republic; and it was presented in apparent violation of a Canadian trust as the R.C.M.P. had made certain confidential documents available to American authorities from which the testimony in question appeared to be derived. It was generally assumed in Canada that pressures from the investigation of this un-American activities sub-committee played a .substantial part in driving Mr. Norman to his tragic death by suicide that same year.-see Eayrs, James, Canada in World Affairs, October 1955 to June, 1957. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959. p. 157. Professor Eayrs contends that the reappearance of '"the malaise of McCar thyism'" in the above noted hearings brought forth, "'the most widespread out• burst of popular indignation against the United States within living memory,"'' in Canada.-see Eayrs, James, Northern Approaches. Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1961. pp. 10-11.

24. Deane, Philip, "'Canada-US; Inevitable Allies,'" New Republic, Vol. 136. New York, April 29, 1957. p.9. 22

the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence,

Formal and explicit recognition was thereby given the mutuality of Canadian and U.S.. interests in a shared effort for the defence of North America.25

The Hyde Park Agreement of 1941, which brought immediate

relief to Canada's exchange problem with the United States,

extended interdependency to defence production by applying

the principle that, "'each country should provide the other

with the defence articles which it is best able to produce"2

Through the formation of a series of joint intergovernmental

agencies to deal with common wartime problems and through th

virtual pooling of Canadian-United States resources, "A

community of interest and action was established unequalled

in scope by any other United States' association during

World War II.",2^ However, at the war end the American quest

for "normalcy"1 resulted in the dismantling of all the war•

time agencies excluding the Permanent Joint Board on Defence

The permanency of the P.J.B.D. was, in the 1945 context,

naturally of greater importance to Canada than to the United

States.

Weapons developments during World War II had created the

long-range bomber and the atomic bomb. These achievements,

in conjunction with the Cold War, had radically altered the

25. Conant, Melvin, ":Canada and Continental Defence; An American View, "'International Journal, Vol XV, Summer, 1960. p. 219.

26. Stacey, CP. "Twenty-one Years of Canadian-Amerlean Military Co-operation, 1940-1961,"' Canada-United States Treaty Relations,ed.- David R. Deener, Durham, Duke University Press, 1963. p. 107.

27. Conant, op. cit. p. 219. 23

strategic position of Canada. If, in the event of the Cold

War turning hot, Soviet bombers were to take their most

probable route in attacking the United States, it would be

from north to south over Canadian territory. The interest

of the United States in renewed defensive arrangements with

Canada is obvious. For Canada, the decision to co-operate

in these arrangements was inevitable, if less than obvious

to some in retrospectNeutrality was never considered

by Canada as a plausible course of action; at any rate, after

the Soviet Union acquired atomic arms, had neutrality been

possible, it was no guarantee of safety in a "halance of

terror"1 situation. Canada was automatically on the side of

the United States, and had any doubts lingered, the fact

that the largely integrated Canadian-American economies

constituted a single target system was sufficient to

eliminate them. Regardless, the United States could not

have allowed Canada the luxury of choice,

In the final analysis, a Great Power will take whatever action it finds necessary to the maintenance of its security. It must do \s this or cease to be a Great Power, and the United States is no exception.30

Post-v/ar defensive co-operation began with American

proposals of a fairly modest nature made through the

Permanent Joint Board on Defence in 1946. In February of 1947

28. Minifie, James M., Peace Maker or Powder-Monkey. Toronto McClelland and Stewart,. 1960.

29. Sutherland, R.J., "'Canada's Long Term Stategic Situation,"1 International Journal, Vol. XVII, Summer,1962.p.204..

30. Ibid, p.203 2k

an agreement was reached between the two governments pro•

viding for "peacetime joint security"' measures; these

involved limited personnel exchanges, weapons standardization

and a limited exchange of training facilities. The first

visible signs of this new co-operation were two weather

stations in the Canadian north, operational in the autumn

of 1947. A new impetus was given to the slowly progressing

defensive arrangements by the announcement on September

23, 1949, that the Soviet Union had recently exploded an

atomic device. Although Ottawa was already fully committed

•2-1

to policies of "collective defence," the extent of

American demands caused the Liberal government some concern

for Canadian sovereignty. Melvin Conant contends that, It was the Canadians' sense of responsibility and restraint, mixed with a realization that the security of Canada was wholly tied to the United States, that permitted Ottawa, despite

misgivings, to embark on the next phase of an „0 expanded military relationship with Washington.

The only alternative was for Canada to meet the cost of

warning systems adequate to United States requirements, and 33

the cost was prohibitive. By 1954 the "'Pine-Tree" line

was completed and the Mid-Canada line was being sited; by

1957 the Distant Early Warning line was under way. Thus,

a new and comprehensive early warning defence system

comprising three warning nets running from the United States-

31. Stacey, op. cit. p. 111.

32. Conant, op. cit. p. 222.

33. Ritchie, Ronald S., "'Problems of a Defence Policy for Canada,"1 International Journal, Vol. XTV, Summer, 1959. p. 204. 25

Canada Border to the Arctic circle went into operation.

Col. Stacey notes that, "'On the whole...the £ Canadian]

public was not much disturbed"1 by this expenditure of 34

American money and Canadian territory. To anticipate,

NORAD was the next logical step in this fast developing

North American defence system, In which the effective

Canadian contribution seemed to decrease in direct proportion

to the increase of sophistication in defensive techniques.'-'5

Intimately connected to the ability of Canada to make an

effective (independent) contribution to North American

defence was the continued existence within the Canadian

economy of a defence Industry employing many thousands of

technically skilled workers and pouring hundreds of millions

of dollars into that economy. By 1957, the writing was on

the wall, the approaching replacement of manned bombers by

intercontinental ballistic missiles spelled the end of the

independent Canadian defence contribution, and the end of

a substantial portion of Canada's defence industry. The

consequence would involve more than simply further questions

of Canadian sovereignty, it would affect Canada's ability

to effectively deploy those displaced technical skills on

whose retention her industrial power was dependent, and it

would affect her post-war boom insofar as domestic defence

spending was a bulwark of Canadian prosperity. Ultimately,

34. Stacey, op. cit. p. 115

35. Ritchie, op. cit. p. 204.

36. Stacey, op. cit. p. 116 Harbron, John D.,";The Conservative Party and National Unity,": Queen's Quarterly, Vol. LXIV. Autumn,1962.pp.356-357. Eayrs, Northern Approaches, p. 22. 26

it would affect the political stability of the nation.

It has been mentioned above that Canada and .the United

States constituted a single target system because of the

degree to which their economies were integrated. One

economist, writing in 1957, described the situation thusly,

Beginning during World ¥fer II, a basic geographic reorientation of Canadian trade has continued until today the United States provides markets for more than three-fifths of Canada's exports and the source of three- quarters of her imports. During 1956, total Canadian commodity exports were valued at $4.8 billions, imports at $5.7 billions, creating a merchandise deficit of $0.9 billions. The United States claimed $2.8 billions of Canada's exports and provided $4.2 billions of her imports.57

An examination of the lists of the major Canadian exports

and imports for the 1952-1956 period reveals the formidable

extent to which Canadians were "hewers of. wood and drawers

of water"1 in complementing the production facilities of the

United States. One expert commenting on the economies of

the two nations, noted the extent to which this is a

natural phenomenon,

Climatic and resource differences and resemblances taken in conjunction with the differences in ratios of population to resources, make the two countries highly complementary, in the absence of artificial barriers to trade, In their commercial relations with each other.39

37. Mclvor, R. Craig, "'Canadian Foreign Trade and the European Common Market,"' International Journal, Vol. XIII, Winter, 1957-58. p.5.

38. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada 1957. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1957. pp. 195-196.

39. Viner, Jacob, "!The Canadian-American Problem: An American View,The United States and Canada, ed. J.S. Dickey. Columbia University, The Twenty-fifth American Assembly, 1964. Ch.pt. 4. p.3. 27

Professor Viner's comment, "'in the absence of artificial

barriers to trade,"' accurately points to the major difference

between Canada's inter-war and post-war economic positions.

The reorientation of Canadian trade from a primarily trans-

Atlantic pattern to a north-south pattern had in large part

resulted from the severing of traditional Canadian markets

by the Second World War, the pooling of Canadian-American

resources during the war, the Cold War impetus to a freer

flow of defence resources and most importantly, the economic

integationist policies of CD. Howe, as economic czar within

the Mackenzie King and St, Laurent governments. Partially

resulting from this reorientation (and from the absence of

other sources of foreign investment) was the compounding

factor of American capital investment in Canada. Total

United States investment in Canada at the beginning of 1946

was $5,400,000,000., at the end of 1956, it was #11,500,000,000.

To put these figures in their proper perspective, in 1957, ec Canada's gross external liabilities amount C 0 to over $16,000,000,000 of which more than half represents foreign investment in Canadian enter• prises controlled by non-residents. A substan• tial part of the remainder covers portfolio investment In Canadian corporations by non• residents .41

Dependence on external sources for some types of capital...have led Canada to a degree of foreign ownership and control of Industry unique in economic history. By the end of 1957 foreign

40. The Canadian Forum, Toronto, Vol. 36, May, 1956. p.29.

41. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, op. cit. p. 198. 28

investment accounted for 64 p.c. £ 59 p.c. at 1953 endj. The mining industry was also 56 p.c. £59 p.c. at 1953 end] foreign-controlled. Manufacturing other than petroleum refining was 50 p.c. [44 p.c. at 1953 endjf foreign-owned and 56 p.c. £46 p.c. at 1953 end} foreign-controlled.42

The degree to which the Canadian economy had grown dependent

on the American market and the degree to which Canadian

industry was controlled by American capital led John

Diefenbaker to declare prior to the 1957 election,

...if the St. Laurent government is re• elected, Canada will become a virtual forty-ninth economic state in the American union.43

It would not seem rash to conclude that the probability of

American interference in Canadian affairs increased in direct

proportion to the growth of Canadian dependence on the

United States in defensive and economic terms. If this

seemed less than apparent44 at the beginning of 1957, it

may well be simply a reflection of the diplomatic skill of

the Canadian External Affairs Minister, Lester Pearson, and

his department, or perhaps a reflection of the lack of

independent Canadian policies,.or both.

42. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada 1960. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1960. p. 219.-the bracketed figures are taken from, Dominion Bureau of S'/tatistics, Canada 1957. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1957. p. 198.

43. Barber, Joseph, Gfood Fences Make Good Neighbours. Indianapolis-New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1958. p. 123.

44. The "'Norman Affair,"' as irritating as it was, did not necessarily indicate more than the inability of the United States administration to control Congressional Committees, although it is improbable that they would have dealt similarly with a British diplomat. 29

It was in fact the Department of External Affairs and its

Minister that in the latter period of the Liberal tenure

gave Canada a prestige and influence unwarranted by her

physical resources In international affairs. In relative

terms, Canada's External Affairs Department had experienced

an amazing growth from a total of thirty-two officers,

whose talents were divided between Ottawa and seven posts

abroad in 1939, to where in 1957, there were one hundred and

fifty officers in Ottawa and two hundred and fourteen at 45

sixty posts abroad. However, the Canadian foreign service

was not large In comparative terms and there were very

definite limits imposed on its performance because of this.^'

But what it lacked in quantity, it compensated for in

quality; indeed, Sir William Hayter has described it as,

"!one of the highest-powered foreign services in the modern

world.Ailistair Buchan, Director of the Institute for

Strategic Studies, has contended that Canada's diplomatic

corps, comprised perhaps the most brilliant and influential collection of minds in the world...and £ that they Jappeared to give Canada an influence in world politics out of all proportion to her physical resources

45. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, op. cit. p. 5.

46. Gray, op. cit.

47. Sir William Hayter, The Diplomacy of the Great Powers (London, 1960) as cited in, Soward, P.H., ,,!0n Becoming and Being A. Middle Power: The Canadian Experience,'" Pacific Historical Review, Vbl.XXXII. p. 122:.

48. Spencer, op. cit. 30

Canada was fortunate to have as leader of this illustrious 49

band of diplomats the internationally popular Lester B .

Pearson. Mr. Pearson's career had been brilliant in the

Department of External Affairs and equally brilliant as

Minister of that department. Prom his highly impressive

showing at the Pood and Agricultural Conference at Hot

Springs , Virginia in 1943, to his winning of the Nobel

Peace Prize in 1957, his record was associated with that of

his nation's; whether as nominee for the UN and NATO

Secretary Generalships, or as arbiter of NATO (an organization

he helped to found) as one of its "'Three Wise Men"', or as

President of the United Nations General Assembly. His

greatest constructive triumph lay in his being the right man

in the right place at the right time during the Suez crisis.

His triumph in gaining acceptance for the creation of the

United Nations Emergency Force (backed by Mr. Dulles, and

for the ultimate good of the Western Alliance) was a

diplomatic masterpiece in that it satisfied the divergent

needs of Egypt, Britain, Prance and Israel and most

importantly, kept the bushfire from spreading (and prevented

a total alienation from the West of the Afro-Asian nations).

49. "'...his popularity was a tribute to his personal qualif• ications..."' Anglin, op. cit. p.150.

50. Holmes, John W., "'The Relationship in Alliance and in World Affairs,"1 in J.S. Dickey, op.cit. chpt. 3. pp. 10-11.

51. For a retrospective view of Suez and its significance, see, Pearson, Lester B., u'& New Kind of Peace Force," MacLeans. Toronto, May 2, 1964. p. 10. 31

Undoubtedly Mr. Pearson was motivated in his mediatory role

by the sure knowledge that,

The stark and inescapable fact is that today we cannot defend our society by war since total war is total destruction and if war is used as an instrument of policy eventually we will have total war.52

The fact that Mr. Pearson's convictions found expression in

effective action rather than being limited to heroic

expressions, enabled Canada to bask in the sunlight of his

achievement

For many Canadians, especially those of the mold of

Howard Green and John Diefenbaker, there existed an Image

of British and/or Commonwealth strength that might be used

to give Canada a greater voice in the world's councils.

The reason that these images remained unshattered until the

end of Liberal reign in 1957, was that the Mackenzie King-

S't. Laurent governments had been prevented by a lack of

inclination and a quantity of good sense from what would

have been a futile pursuit in calling on either Britain or

the Commonwealth to redress the balance of the North

Atlantic triangle. Professor Underbill's remarks in

February, 1957, convey the truth of the situation,

52. Lester Pearson, Speech at Oslo, Dec. 11, 1957, quoted in r the New York Times, Dec. 12, 1957 (as cited in, Kissinger, Henry A., The Necessity for Choice. New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1962. p. 175).

53. Gray, loc. cit. Holmes, John W/., "'Canadian External Policies Since 1945," International Journal, Vol. XVIII, Spring,1963.p.138. For a eulogy of Mr. Pearson, diplomat par excellence, see, Robertson, Terence, Crisis, The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy. Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1964. 32

The British corner of the triangle is no longer weighty enough...Some sentimentalists in English-speaking Canada like to think that we can...call in the British Common• wealth to redress the balance. They are what Arnold Toynbee would call our Canadian Archaists. But the Commonwealth is not a power aggregation in international politics. ...Britain...has sunk to be simply a European power. The members of the British Commonwealth do not agree with each other on the fundamental questions of the twentieth century.54

Post-war British strength had been shown for what it was at

Suez in 1956; in addition this picture of Mother "caught

stealing hats in Oxford S/t."1 had given Commonwealth unity,

such as it was, a "'severe moral shock.'"55 The real problem

however, lay in the divergent interests of the various

Commonwealth members. Britain, particularly after 1956 and

the preliminary agreement reached that summer on a European

Common Market,0" was beginning to gravitate toward a

European destiny.

The United Kingdom...had throughout the postwar period been inhibited from closer association with the continent by her important interests in the Commonwealth and by her preference for continued direct relations with the United States. But once confronted with the real possibility of less favourable terms of competition in continental markets and the prospect of

54. Underhill, Frank, In Search of Canadian Liberalism. Toronto, the Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1961. pp. 259-260.

55. Ibid, p. 260.

56. The countries involved were France, the Benelux nations, Italy and Germany. 33

stronger competition from continental industries in other markets as well, the British Government began activity consider• ing how it could share in the European plans without prejudicing its special overseas interests.5?

In 1957, it remained to be seen If Britain could effectively

reconcile her economic interests in a European Free Trade

Area, outside the Common Market'that was to come into effect

in March of that year. While it was impossible to determine

Britain's future course, there was nothing to suggest that if

put to the test, the British government would sacrifice an

economic recovery within Europe in order to pursue some

Commonwealth dream at Canadian behest-particularly when past

experience had shown that only the Motherland was expected 5 8

to make sacrifices. Australia and New Zealand, to a degree

like Canada, were attempting to adjust to a changing pattern

of relationships with the United States and the United

Kingdom. In addition, they had problems peculiar to all-

white nations on the Asian periphery. The Union of South

Africa was becoming increasingly isolated from the rest of

the Commonwealth and the world through her preoccupation

with Apartheid-the racial segregationist policies of the

Nationalist (mainly Africander) government. In any event,

Afrikander nationalism was less than at home within the

Commonwealth. If an effective unity of purpose (based on

a common interest) seemed, at best, improbable among the

57. The Bank of Nova Scotia, "IA Common Market-in Europe," Monthly Review. Toronto, May. 1957. p. 2.

58. For example, the Ottawa Economic Conference of 1932. 3i+

white nations of the Commonwealth, who at least had common

institutions and traditions, it became virtually impossible

when the Afro-Asian members are considered.

The non-white nations of the Commonwealth had problems

unintelligible to most Canadians; '"poverty, illiteracy,

demagoguery in high places,'"5® which bore little resemblance

to any Canadian experience. Their Commonwealth relationship

was not based on an emotional attraction to things British,

other than of course, British industrialization; anti-

Colonialism was in fact the closest thing they had to

nationalism. They remained with the Commonwealth in anti•

cipation of political and, most importantly, economic

advantages

The Commonwealth myth remained; and associated with it

was the picture of Canada's relationship to the world's

emergent nations,

... Canada ... has a network of intimate and valuable links with nations beyond America, notably the countries of the Commonwealth; and, despite her broad territories, she is a small or medium power, and consequently does not inspire the distrust incurred by the great.^1

59. Harbron, John D., '"The Conservative Party and National Unity,'" Queen's Quarterly, Vol. LXIV, A-utumn, 1962. p. 355.

60. Holmes, John W., "'The Commonwealth and Africa,"1 Inter• national Journal, Vol. XVII, Spring, 1962.pp. 133-136, For a more hopeful view of the Commonwealth see, Holmes, John W., "'The Commonwealth: White Man's Burden or Blind Man's Bluff?'" Speech given to the Empire Club at Toronto,, March 11, 1965. reprinted by The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1965.

61. Brady, Alexander, "'Canada and American Policies,"1 Queen's Quarterly, Vol. LXVI, Autumn, 1959. p. 365. 35

The chief advantage of Commonwealth membership was that it

provided a club-type meeting place outside the formality of

the United Nations for those nations that had experienced

some form of British imperialism. Upon occasion it did

bear fruit; the co-operative, self-help program of the

Colombo Plan was a direct result of the Commonwealth Foreign

Ministers Meeting in 1950. On other occasions, it has done 62

little to smooth over differences, and the racial policies

of the Union of S'outh Africa presented almost insurmountable

barriers to understanding. Indeed, it was not so much

Canada's Commonwealth membership or her size that made her

valuable to the Afro-Asians. She was accepted as dis•

interested largely "because they never heard of ...[her]

before"1 and valuable because she had "'influence in

Washington and a high gross national product."' Without

these advantages Canada was simply another "well-fed white

minority,"^5 with discriminatory immigration policies.^6

62. Rajan, M.Sl., "'The Indo-Canadian Entente,1" International Journal. Vol. XVII, Autumn, 1962. pp. 358-384.

63. Holmes, John W.., "Canada and The United States In World Politics,"' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, October, 1961, p. 115.

64. Anglin, Douglas G., "'Toward A Canadian Policy On Africa,"' International Journal, Vol. XV, Autumn, 1960.p.306..

65. Sutherland, op. cit. p. 205.

66. Corbett, David, "'Immigration and Foreign Policy in Australia and Canada, "'International Journal, Vol. XIII, Spring, 1958. p. 122. 3$

Robert Duffy, parliamentary correspondent for the Toronto

Globe and Mai 1, suggested in 1959 that in international

relations, Canada was like "a smallish young man at a

crowded cocktail party,'" who had to "move nimbly and speak fi7

clearly to avoid being stepped on-or worse, Ignored.

This analogy might be aptly applied to the Canada of 1957-

the world stage was becoming crowded, Canada was becoming

increasingly dependent on the United States in economic and

defensive terms, war and peace depended on the whims and

fancies of the two super-powers, the world had divided

clearly into '"haves'" and "have-nots'" (a dichotomy that

separated white and non-white as well), the diverse interests

of the Commonwealth members was increasingly apparent-with

each of these developments the freedom of Canadian action and

the probability of any Canadian action being effective were

diminished. Canada had but four cards to play: a reputation

for effective counsel; an ability to make strategic

contributions in foreign aid (for example, the 1959 Mekong

River Survey); a paid-up membership in the Worth Atlantic

Treaty Organization"(in the sense of her comparatively

respectable contribution to European defences); and her

friendship with the United States - a friendship that con•

tained within it the potential destruction of the first

three cards while at the same time allowing their existence.

67. Duffy, Robert, '"Canada's Foreign Policy in Transition,'" International Journal, Vol. XIV, Autumn, 1959, p. 296. 37

At best, a clever manipulation of Canada's four assets by her statesmen could produce the artificially - based prestige and influence in international affairs enjoyed by

Canada in early 1957. In any case, the advent of such revolutionary changes as the "''Sputnik'" could only serve to mute a Canadian voice still heard and listened to in 1957. 38

CHAPTER III FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS.

Governmental policy is not formulated in a political vacuum and it Is inconceivable that Canadian external policy would not have reflected, in some degree, Canadian domestic consideration within the 1957-1963 period. If the changing world imposed limitations on the scope of Canadian foreign policy, that policy was to be further restrained by domestic considerations. B.S. Keirstead, in an analysis of Canadian foreign policy in the 1951-1953 period, succinctly outlined the major restraining factors involved,

Chief among these restrictions, if we may so call them, are the regional nature of the Canadian economy, the federal structure of the Canadian state and the multi-cultural pattern of Canadian society.1

• In explaining the first of these restrictions, there seems to be no major difference between the period of Keirstead's analysis and the 1957-1963 period,

Our foreign commercial policy had to achieve a compromise between a growing dependence on the American market for the produce of the

Central Provinces COntario an^ Quebec] and British Columbia, and an attempt to help restore British purchasing power (in dollar countries) for the benefit of the Prairies and the MarItimes,2

Any differences between the pre-1957 and post-1957 periods lay in degrees of intensity. As noted elsewhere, by 1957,

1. Keirstead, B. S., Canada in World Affairs September 1951 to October 1953. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1956. p. 30.

2. Ibid, p. 32. 39

this was a double-headed problem as the United States provided "markets for more than three-fifths of Canada's exports and the source of three-quarters of her imports."'5

In 1956, the United Kingdom only accounted for some seventeen per cent of Canadian exports amounting to $0.8 billions, leaving Canada with a favourable trade balance of $0.3 4 billions. However, the United Kingdom remained essential to the compromise Professor Keirstead suggested.

The United Kingdom ranks second as both an export market and a source of imports £l957j. Principal exports to that country include grains, especially wheat, non- ferrous metals and forest products, while Imports consist mainly of manufactured goods such as textiles and certain types of machinery, equipment and electrical apparatus. In contrast to the expansion of trade with the United States, Canada's trade with the United Kingdom has diminish• ed in relative importance over the last thirty years. Exports, although larger in absolute terms have fallen from about one-third to about one-sixth of the Cana• dian export total. The contraction of the United Kingdom market for grains, dairy products and cattle and for bacon and fish has accounted for most of this relative decline.5

There existed an obvious solution to the problem, divert

Canadian purchases from the United States to Great Britain thereby restoring British purchasing power and facilitating

3. Mclvor, R. Craig, "'Canadian Foreign Trade and the European Common Market, '"International Journal, Vol. XIII, Winter, 1957-58. p. 5.

4. Ibid, p. 6.

5. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada 1957. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1957. p. 191. an expansion of the British market for Prairie and Maritime

produce; and generally stimulate the activity of Canadian manufacturers and producers in markets other than the

United States. The difficulty in this, solution is that the

first part ignores the fact that any solution had to be

achieved within the context of the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.), which prevents restrictive

and discriminatory controls over imports.

Complicating this problem was the degree of American

control over vital sections of the Canadian economy which had

resulted from a Canadian need to import developmental g

capital. Not only had this increased Canadian economic

dependence on the United States but it also posed a number

of other problems, actual or potential: that American owned

companies would not be allowed to fully exploit their export and import capacities; that limitations would be imposed on research in Canada, thus preventing a proper Canadian

exploitation of twentieth century technology; that there would be a disregard for Canadian workers and a failure to 7 allow development of Canadian executives. There was also

the problem of American parent companies refusing to publish Q separate reports of their Canadian subsidiaries. 6. See pp.

7. Conway, John S., '"Canadian-American Relations:' Co-operation or Conflict?'" International Journal, Vol. XVIII, Summer, 1958. p. 209.

8. Mutchmor, J.R., '"The Moon's the Limit,'" The Christian Century, Vol. 75, March 19, 1958. p. 340. hi

Thus, those concerned, with foreign policy formulation

had to achieve some compromise between what was an uneven

continentalization of the Canadian economy, American control

of Canadian production and questions of Canadian sovereignty.

This was a problem of considerable complexity in itself,

however, the probability of any meaningful solution became

increasingly less as a public reaction, directed particularly

against large-scale American investment in Canada, grew. The

Gordon Royal Commission was to testify to,

a deep, though intangible, sense of disquiet over the social and political implications of large-scale and continuing United States ownership and control of Canadian industry.

This reaction continued unabated throughout the entire

Diefenbaker period; Douglas V. Le Pan, Secretary to the

Gordon Commission, could note in 1964, with equal candor,

The nagging suspicion remains that Canada's independence is being sapped and undermined as the ownership and control of many of its most important industries falls increasingly into American hands.10

A. "'cultural lag"' ascribed by one author to politicians alone

in 1956, did indeed apply to the entire nation,

As the United States-Canadian continental s system develops, the resentment expressed v by politicians appears as a cultural lag

9. As cited in Eayrs, James, Canada in World Affairs October 1955 to June 1957. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959. p. 14.

10. Le Pan, D.V., ":The Canadian-American Problem; Jk Canadian View."5 The United States and Canada,ed. J.S. Dickey. Columbia University, The Twenty-fifth American Assembly, 1964. Chpt. 5, p. 9. 1+2

in which the old ties of loyalty to Great Britain and the emerging sense of nation• alism conflict with economic realities»H

It would appear that the majority of Canadians agreed in

1957 with the Opposition parties' charges that the Liberal

administration and particularly, CD. Howe had sold the

nation's birthright for a mess of pottage. It may be

relevant here however, to refer to a survey appearing in

Maclean's in June, 1964, if we may reasonably assume that

Canadian attitudes reflected in it, while perhaps less

articulate in 1957, were nevertheless similar. We may note

then something of the ambivalence in the Canadian attitude

toward American capital; seventy-four per cent of Canadians

supported government action in restricting further takeovers 12

of Canadian industry by American capital;; however, sixty-

five per cent of Canadians favoured economic union with the 13 1 United States (twenty-nine per cent favoured total union). The Liberal government might have traded the Canadian birth•

right for a mess of pottage, but, as the Economist contended

in 1957, "'Canadians have acquired a taste for pottage."115

11. Porter, John, "'The Economic Elite and the Social Structure in Canada,"' The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XXIII, August, 1957, p. 378.

12. Newman, Peter C, "'The U.S. and Us,"' Maclean's. Toronto,

June 6, 1964. p. 16.

13. Ibid, p. 14.

14. Ibid, p. 12.

15. "'Ottawa Stampede,"' The Economist,Vol. 183. London, June 15 1957. p. 954. k3

A Canadian government was then presented with the problem of

satisfying itself that some solution adequate to the protect•

ion of Canadian sovereignty be found to relieve a growing

dependence on the American market, while at the same time

enjoying full benefit of that market. Further, it was

obliged to prevent the total capture of Canadian industry by

American capital without jeopardizing Canada's economic

viability and high gross national product which were intimate

related to the presence of foreign developmental capital. A

quietly amiable solution to these problems, had one been

possible, was prejudiced by a growing anti-American sentiment

in Canada. Professor H. G. Johnson contended, in 1961, that

Canada's failure to reconcile Canadian aspirations with

Canadian possibilities had brought to the fore, "'the most

undesirable features of the Canadian national character,'" in,

... the mean and underhanded anti-Americanism which serves many Canadians as an excuse for their failure to accomplish anything worthy of genuine national pride ... also ... the small-town pettiness of outlook that is the shadow side of many Canadian virtues.16

...anti-Americanism becomes a way of evading recognition of the inconsistency between Canadian aspirations and Canadian possibilities, and finding emotional consolation for inevitable failure. It is a poor kind of consolation, and a destructive one; and It diverts Canadian energies Into a rather unattractive mixture of bombast and self-pity.I?

16. Johnson, Harry G., "'Problems of Canadian Nationalism,'" International Journal, Vol. XVI. Summer, 1961. p.238.

17. Ibid, p. 245. It may be contended that a reasonably accurate measure•

ment of Canada's national maturity has always been found in

her relations with the United States. Hugh L. Keenleyside

noted in 1955 that,

The development of Canada as a successful nation, and the maturity of Canadians as a people, can be measured by the decline in anti-American sentiment north of the border.18

Canada in 1955 was still reasonably secure in her identity;

thus, she could afford to be tolerant in her approach to

problems In Canada-United States relations. Canadian anti-

Americanism in the Diefenbaker era, like many expressions of

nationalism, was "rooted in important elements of insecurity."'-1

An economic insecurity was testified to by the Gordon Royal

Commission. As early as 1952 a "'dismay and distrust of

American leadership"1 engendered a Canadian Cold' War - 20

insecurity. An insecurity about North American defensive

arrangements was perhaps foreshadowed by the outburst of

Maj.-Gen. W.H.S. Macklin, retired adjutant-general of the

Canadian army, at the Couchiching Conference. Thus, the

basis for what Professor Johnson described was well laid by V

18. Keenleyside, Hugh L., "'Canada and the United States,"' Current History, Vol. 2.9, July, 1955. p. 5.

19. Canadian-American Committee, The Perspective of Canadian- American Relations, National Planning Association, 1962. p. 7.

20. Keirstead, op. cit. p. 36.

21. Macklin charged that the Liberal government had surrendered Canadian sovereignty in defensive matters to '"quack strategists"' from Washington: Texts of addresses delivered at the 25th Couchiching Conference, 1956. pp. 74-75. kS

1957; it required simply the insecurity engendered by the

increasingly apparent and seemingly inescapable reality of

Canada's position within North American defences and within

the world's councils to bring into full bloom the historical

stem of Canadian anti-American sentiment.

The federal structure of the Canadian state is, on the

other hand, a constant among factors limiting the response

of those responsible for the formulation of Canadian foreign

policy. There Is no meaningful provision in the British

North America Act, 1967, for the implementation of treaties

by the Dominion; only the puzzling Section 132,

The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries.2^

Professor Dawson outlines the general principles affecting

the implementation of treaties as enunciated by the courts,

(a) Section 132 does not apply to all treaties to which Canada is a party, but only to those which she enters "'as part of the British Empire,'" namely, those obligations arising as a result of action by the Imperial Government. With the growing emphasis on Canadian autonomy in all such matter, this group of treaties has now become obsolete. (b) The implementation of treaties which fall in the other group - those to which Canada is a separate party by virtue of her new status as an international person - is not covered by any special section of the British North America Act,

22. The British North America Act, 1867. British Statutes, 30 Victoria, Chapter 3. as reprinted in, Dawson, R.M., The Government of Canada. Toronto, The University of Toronto Press, 1954. p. 619. 1+6

and must therefore depend upon the normal distribution of legislative power between the Dominion and the provinces (c) The enlargement of the Dominion powers In the international field and the steady growth of provincial powers in the domestic field thus pull in opposite directions in the area of treaty performance. It is now quite possible for the Dominion to negotiate and ratify a treaty and yet be left in default by provincial refusal to carry out the terms of the agreement.... (d) The implementation of treaties is thus determined... in most instances, by the devious process of unravelling Sections 91 and 92-.[of the B.N.A. Act, 1867)....23

Sometimes international embarrassment was the result; for

example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted

by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, could not be

implemented by the Canadian government because it involved

legislative powers assigned to the provinces under Section

92: of the B.N.A. Act. ^ However, the constitution was no

great impediment to major Canadian diplomatic involvements

in the post-Second World war world. In 1957, Professor P.H.

Soward found it impossible to believe that any Canadian

Foreign Secretary would pursue a foreign policy that did not

take constitutional limitations Into consideration.2^ He

went on to realistically contend that as long as national

unity remained strong, "federalism must be rated as a

23. Dawson, R.M. The Government of Canada, pp. 114-115.

24. Soward, F.H., "External Affairs and Canadian Federalism," Lower, A.R.M. and Scott, F.R., Evolving Canadian Federalism. Durham, Duke University Press, 1958. p. 145.

25. Ibid, p. 151 complicating but not a disabling factor in Canadian external

relations.'"26

Professor Soward provided interesting criteria for strong

national unity,

The threat of an atheistic Communistic imperialism, as a French-speaking Canadian might describe it, to the liberties of the free peoples, the adroit leadership of Canada during and since World War II, the possession of a well-filled purse and an expanding economy....27

One might logically suggest that if these conditions altered

and if consequently the degree of national unity decreased,

that the result would make Canadian federalism a much more

complicating, or even a disabling factor, in Canadian

external relations.

The threat of an atheistic Communistic imperialism continued

throughout the Diefenbaker era. But this formula required

two constants. Quebec was becoming increasingly industrialized,

urbanized, commercially conscious, subject to cultural

influences outside the church. This was a Quebec that was

becoming increasingly less the parochial preserve of Roman

Catholic ultramontanism; and with the death of Maurice

Duplessis and the subsequent defeat of the Union Nationale,

the last major bulwark of the church would disappear. Further,

the church and a variety of Bleu and semi-Fascist elements

within the province had, by 1957, some thirty years "mileage"

26. Ibid. pp. 159-160

27. Ibid. i+8

out of the threat of international Bolshevism - a threat

that was used to justify everything from the "'Padlock

Law,"'28 to a failure to participate fully in the Second 29 ^ World War, to the collapse of the Maurice Duplessis Bridge.

It would seem reasonable that as education within the province

improved, as secular influences increased, that the effect

of this "bogey"' would diminish making the threat of inter•

national communism seem less real than it was. The event,

in the sense of a definable secularization, that this reason•

ing anticipates did happen on June 22, 1960, with the election

of Jean Lesage - there began the "'quiet revolution."7

Fortunately, the effect of these changes was not immediately

felt, and it was not until after the period considered here

that apparently serious talk at the Quebec Cabinet level

was heard advocating the participation of Quebec in certain

foreign policy matters. Thus, the changing character of

French Canada, which could not but adversely affect the

criterion of national unity, was not readily apparent in

foreign policy questions and observers saw no Inconsistency

in French Canadian attitudes,

28. Communistic Propaganda Act, passed by the Quebec legislature in 1937, which in practice gave Provincial authorities the power to arbitrarily close up-padlock-any premises within the province in ferreting out propagators of an undefined Bolshevism.

29. Mclnnis, Edgar, Canada. New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1959. p. 499.

30. In 1951, the Maurice Duplessis Bridge over the St. Maurice River collapsed due to faulty construction. Mr. Duplessis, Premier of Quebec, charged that the collapse had been the work of Communist saboteurs, see, The Canadian Forum, Vol. XXX, March, 1951.p.268. k9

French Canada has gone along with Canadian participation in NATO and in the United Nations forces for Korea, the Middle East, and the Congo....31

By 1957 the other criteria of national unity were beginning

to disappear; the collapse of Canada's international image

was imminent; the Canadian purse was filled with borrowed

money and her American creditor was extracting a formidable

price for his services; and a recession that would last until

1962, was under way. Canadian history had provided the lesson

that the most effective element of national cohesion was

economic prosperity; if the policies of the Dominion govern•

ment could be publicly associated with conditions of general

Canadian prosperity, the unity of the sections and even of

the races was highly probable. Conditions of economic

depression or recession however, were automatically

associated with the policies of the Dominion government, and

*• consequently the rise of sectional interests was facilitated.

In this latter circumstance, the position of the Ottawa

government was bound to be effectively weakened. Insofar

as external policies reflect domestic conditions, the

reality of Canadian federalism could be a very potent force

in either strengthening or weakening the hands of those

concerned with foreign policy formulation. In the five

year period beginning In June of 1957, the latter was to be

31» Ropp, Theodore, "'Politics, Strategy, and the Commitments of a Middle Power,"' Canada-United States Treaty Relations, ed. D. R. Deener. Durham, Duke University Press, 1963. p.. 91. 50

the case; the national unity of the 1958 election was simply

a chimera as it bore little relation to economic reality.

The major fact ignored by both the public and the politicians

in the post-1957 period was that Canadian foreign policy

was more dependent on a situation of Canadian national unity

for its success than was national unity dependent on foreign

policy success for its existence.

When Louis St. Laurent was Secretary of State for External

Affairs, he delivered the 1947 Duncan & John Gray Memorial

Lecture. In it he stated the basic principles of Canadian

foreign policy; they were, he contended,

...general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad support of large groups of the population.32

The first of these principles was "'National unity.'" Professor

Keirstead has drawn our attention to this policy consideration

(or restriction) as '"the multi-cultural pattern of Canadian

society."1 Both men were referring to the historic Liberal

preoccupation with the unity, or more accurately, the absence

of hostile disunity between Canada's English-speaking and

French-speaking populations. Insofar as the solution here

lay in a conscious effort on the part of Canadian statesmen

to avoid a '"let's Institute conscription'" attitude and at

the same time, to work within the collective security

provisions of the UN and NATO and to avoid anything that

might smell of British imperialism, the earlier quotation

32. Sit. Laurent, Louis, The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1947. pp. 17-25. 51

from Professor Ropp indicates a near total success. James

Eayrs contended that the problem of Quebec's "What concern

is this of ours"!-attitude had diminished by 1957, to a point

where, apart from obvious issues, it was not particularly

a restrictive factor in Canadian foreign policy,

No longer did the single word "'Quebec11' validly excuse a timorous renunciation of international responsibilities.53

The question that is not raised in any of these discussions

is, "Would a Canadian foreign policy this negative In one of

its major objectives long be enough as an agent of unity?'"

In any event, the multi-cultural pattern of Canadian life

was beginning to be just that. The basic Anglo-French

pattern was beginning to broaden. Over a million immigrants

had arrived in Canada in the 1945-1954 period comprising

some 6.7 per cent, of Canada's population; about 67 per cent,

of those arriving were non-British.54 The problem was that

English-Canada had never been able to emulate the melting-

pot situation of the United States (French-Canada received

very few immigrants and so never had the problem) in

creating a commonness of basic political, economic and cultural

values. In 1951, out of a total population of 14,009,429

some 1,415,983 (other than native Indians or Eskimoes) had

a mother tongue other than French or English; in 1961, out

of a total population of 18, 238,247 some 2,288,031,35

33. Eayrs, James, Canada in World Affairs October 1955 to June 1957. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959. p. 14.

34. The Canadian Forum. Toronto, May, 1956. p. 29

35. These figures are compiled from, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada, 1964. Ottawa, Queens Printer, 1964. p. 13. 52

These figures are put in their proper perspective when It is

considered that in 1961 the foreign-born population of

Canada (excluding the Commonwealth and the United States)

numbered 1,542,753; those who spoke neither English or

French as a mother tongue constituted roughly 12.6 per cent,

of the population, whereas the foreign-born constituted only

8.4 per cent.

However, there is little evidence of these ethnic groups

being consolidated insofar as an effective articulation of

foreign policy needs were concerned. They nevertheless did

constitute a possible new force that could be considered if

the political dividends were deemed great enough by Canadian

policy makers.37

The other basic principles of Canadian foreign policy

enunciated by Mr. S't. Laurent in 1947, were political liberty,

the rule of law, fundamental human values and international . 38 responsibility. These were basic values established by

36. Ibid, p. 10.

37. The 1961 Census revealed the following,

Mother tongue - Magyar, 85,939 Polish, 161,720 Russian, 42,903 Slovak, 42,546 Ukrainian, 561,496 TOTAL: 694,604 potentially right-wing votes. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, op. cit. p. 13.

38. St. Laurent, op. cit. 53 consensus within the Canadian nation; it was expected that all Canadian foreign policies would be compatible with these values.

It may be contended that party fortunes, more particularly, the political fortunes of one man - John George Diefenbaker - added another restriction to the list of the Canadian external policy formulator. The delegates to the 1956 Progressive

Conservative leadership convention elected as their leader a man who had stood throughout his political career as a radical within the Tory party. The party was, after a twenty- two year journey in the political wilderness, enthusiastic for power, and John Diefenbaker appeared to be the necessary vehicle to power - the fact that Is most often ignored is that in selecting Mr. Diefenbaker as their leader, the lead• ing delegates to the convention correctly judged the Canadian nation as well. Diefenbaker probably saw the Conservative leadership as the second to last step in the achievement of his personal destiny - the attainment of the Prime Minister's office. Unfortunately for the Conservatives, and ultimately for all concerned, in electing John Diefenbaker their leader, they began a process that would turn '"their"' party into his, the Diefenbaker party. Peter C. Newman notes of the 1957 campaign,

Diefenbaker made sure there would be few ideological barriers to those who wanted to become his disciples. In order to Involve non-Conservatives in his struggle, he deliberately discarded \^ most of his party's traditional policies Sk

and transformed it into an organ of personal aggrandizement. '"It's time for a Diefenbaker government I"-the main Tory Campaign slogan-became something of a non-partisan rallying cry.39

In spite of New-nan's overstatement of John Diefenbaker's

personal control of the 1957 campaign, the truth does come

through. Conservatism was being abandoned for Diefenbakerism.

Many Toronto Tories might well be narrow and rigid in their

political thinking, but at least their concepts were definable

and their philosophy was both economically and politically

safe. Diefenbakerism sought to attract support beyond the

thirty per cent, of the electorate who were already

Conservatively inclined (at least they had voted for George

Drew in 1954). Tory concepts were replaced by a personal

"Vision;"' Diefenbaker declared time and time again in the

1957 campaign, "We have a choice - a road to greatness in

faith and dedication - or the road to nonfulfilment of

Canada's destiny."40 The Canadian electorate was being

asked to keep an appointment with an undefined destiny; a

"'vision'" whose meaning was dependent for its success at the

polls on the imagination of the Individual voter and for

its implementation on the ill-thought out policies of

Diefenbaker and his advisors. Fortunately, the vote that

39. Newman, Peter C., "'John Diefenbaker," Maclean's. March 23, 1963. p. 46.

40. This was the theme of Conservative campaign literature in 1957, as cited in Newman, Peter C, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963. p. 52. 55

brought the Conservatives under Diefenbaker into power in

June, 1957, was only eight per cent, greater than their

1954 vote; the party could still define its position in

traditional terms and could reasonably expect its influence

to be reflected In government policies. With the 1958

election, any chance of definable Conservative principles

creating the boundaries of government policy, domestically

and externally, disappeared. The Canadian electorate had

responded from its heart and had given John Diefenbaker and

his "Vision"1 two hundred and eight parliamentary seats (out

of two hundred and sixty-five) and a popularity rating of

sixty per cent.41 The Prime Minister's party had the

greatest mandate in Canada's history; and there was no

question as to whom the party belonged; no backbencher or

cabinet minister could effectively challenge the decisions

of Diefenbaker. In a sense, the absence of principles or

defined party doctrines is more of a restriction on the policy

maker than their presence. The policies of expediency, no

matter how beneficial, lead to instability and a defensive

posture because they lack a philosophic rationale in the

sense of a definable set of limitations and goals; they lack

direction.

The party had become John Diefenbaker; this man of

interesting appeal but of uncertain quantity, was his party's

only policy rationale. The election of 1958 then made

41. The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion report, as cited in, Ibid, p. 76. 56

impossible the role of the Cabinet as defined by Professor

Dawson,

The outstanding duty of the Cabinet is to furnish initiative and leadership: to provide the country and Parliament with a national policy and to devise means for coping with present emergencies and future needs.42

The Diefenbaker Cabinet was hardly this "mainspring of all

the mechanism of Government,"' if Mr. Newman is to be

believed,

The Cabinet That Administered The Nation's Business during the Diefenbaker Years com• prised a disparate mixture of patriotic radicals and weak-kneed reactionaries, earnest statesmen and artful dodgers. It failed to provide the Conservative regime with constructive policy leadership, not because its members lacked administrative ability or dedication of purpose, but because of the uncertain and erratic direction they received from John Diefenbaker.43

Diefenbaker gave the impression that he regarded his cabinet as a handy political sounding-board rather than as an assembly of senior and influencial advisors.44

It would seem hardly possible that in this circumstance

the government party caucus could perform any function other

than that of adulation to a leader to whom a majority owed

their political success. Professor Dawson's contention that

42. Dawson, op. cit. p. 233

43. Newman, op. cit. p. 92.

44. Ibid, p. 93. 57

any government caucus would direct their attention

...to the task of improving the terms of the Cabinet's proposals, ensuring that they will be such as to secure approval in the country, and expediting their passage in the House;

and that because of this the government,

... finds the caucus an extremely useful laboratory in which It can test its measures by inviting friendly criticism and suggestions,45

could hardly be the case. The caucus could never exercise

an influence on government policy; it, like the Cabinet,

could only approve.

There is an obvious difficulty in determining with any

degree of exactitude the nature of Mr. Diefenbaker's mandate

Insofar as foreign policy matters were concerned. The

election of June, 1957, was not much of a mandate for

anything; the Conservatives had a plurality of seats in the

Commons, but the Liberals had retained a two per cent.

popular margin. The election was hardly more than a severe

reprimand to a Liberal government grown fat and arrogant.

J.H. Aitchison in an analysis of the issues, contended,

There is no evidence that foreign policy played any significant role in the election and a great deal of evidence that it did not. Mr. Diefenbaker made the end of economic domination by the United States one of the major issues, but this apart, he did not mention foreign policy in any of his statements of the issues of the election.46

45. Dawson, op. cit. pp. 244-245.

46. Aitchison, J.H., "Canadian Foreign Policy In the House And On The Hustings,"' International Journal, Vol.XII, Autumn, 1957. p. 285. 58

External policy statements and actions by the Diefenbaker

government subsequent to the June election however, must be

taken in the context of the Nev/ York Times1 contention the

following November that, "Mr. Diefenbaker, as head of a

minority Government, is already campaigning for the next

ATI

election"'. As there is no question of Mr. Diefenbaker's

mandate to act after the March, 1958 election, his stand on

issues in the approximately nine month campaign between the

elections is of vital importance to understanding the specific

nature of the 1958 mandate.

Three areas of activity are readily apparent. The Con•

servative party had long been critical of the Liberals '

neglect of. the Commonwealth; something that French Canada

found less than reassuring. The Quebec newspaper, Le Droit,

described this Tory preoccupation as the "'disquieting 48

fidelity"5 of the Conservatives to London. Undoubtedly this

'"fidelity"' was consolidated by a London press that welcomed

Mr. Diefenbaker to the June 25 - July 5, Prime Ministers

Conference as the Commonwealth's new '"strong man.'" The

chief result of the conference was the acceptance of the

Canadian proposal that Commonwealth finance ministers meet

at Mont Tremblant to discuss trade relations within the

Commonwealth following the Washington meeting of the Inter•

national Monetary .Fund that September. When questioned by

47. New York Times Magazine, November 10, 1957. p. 40.

48. As cited In, Aitchison, op. cit. p. 287. 59

reporters on what he had in mind for expanded Commonwealth

trade, Mr. Diefenbaker suggested a fifteen per cent, diversion

of Canadian purchases now made in the United States to

Britain. This "purchase diversion"' proposal was not an off•

hand remark resulting from a momentary overenthusiasm as

some critics were to contend.4® During the Commons debate

on the International Wheat Agreement on August 6, 1956,

Mr. Diefenbaker supported the views of James S. Duncan,

Mr. James S. Duncan, former president of Massey-Harris-Ferguson Limited, and now chairman of the dollar sterling trade council, set out In a recent issue of Farmer's Advocate principles that I believe are necessary. He said:

'Unless Canadians awake to the necessity of preserving and strengthining their historical and traditional markets with the United Kingdom and the sterling area by increasing imports from them, the outlook for the long term sale of some of ^ our primary products is not at all bright.'50

Mr. Diefenbaker contended that a ten per cent, increase in

purchases from the United Kingdom might solve the problem

as Mr. Duncan presented it. The Prime Minister was serious

eleven months later when he made the proposal Blair Fraser

C-1

accredited to excusable ignorance. x In spite of the fact

that the United Kingdom government responded ungenerously

to the serious, if in terms of the specific proposal-

49. Meisel, John, "'Guns and Butter: Foreign Affairs in Canada's Twenty-third Parliament,"1 International Journal, Vol. XIII, Summer, 1958. p. 187.

50. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1956. p. 7058. - the underlined words are this writer's.

51. Fraser, Blair, "'Overseas Report,"' Maclean's, October 6, 1962, p. 2. 60

impractical, offer of the Canadian government,

... there is no doubt the U.K. government found the 15 per cent, trade switch pro• posal extremely ill timed in view of the delicate stage negotiations had reached concerning Britain's participation in a European Free Trade Zone. Hence the propaganda offer of an Anglo-Canadian free trade area made by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Thorneycroft, at last year's Mont Tremblant meeting,52

the Conservatives remained committed to an increase in

Commonwealth trade.

On August 1, the Conservatives, to their later regret,

committed themselves to a further integration of Canadian-

United States defences with the creation of the North

American Air Defence Command (NORAD). Under this arrangement,

nine squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force passed under

the command of an American general at an integrated Colorado

Springs headquarters. Why? A reliable source contends

that the new Conservative administration was duped by its

own military advisors. Had the implications of NORAD been

properly explained, Mr. Diefenbaker would hardly have accepted

a defensive arrangement that even the Liberals had been

reluctant to consider. This assertion gains credibility

when it is considered that NORAD involved a further surrender

of Canadian sovereignty and a further dependence on the

United States (the headquarters was to be integrated but

there was a world of difference in the positions of the

American general and his Canadian Deputy).53 It would be ^

52. Grenier, David, "'Trade and an Expanding Commonwealth,"'' International Journal, Vol. XIII, Autumn, 1958.p.259.

53. Stacey, CP., "'Twenty-one Years of Canadian-American Military ^ Co-operation, 1940-1961,"Deener,op. cit. p. 115. 61

curious to say the least, that Mr. Diefenbaker, who was to

challenge every other aspect of Canadian dependence on the

United States, who was acutely concerned with the fate of

the Commonwealth, who aimed his electoral appeal at every

nationalistic fibre in the Canadian personality, should

have acquiesced so readily to these new American demands had

he understood their implications.

Thus,

...the impression in Canada that the decision to establish such a headquarters, was made, in effect, by Canadian military officers without the full and proper approval of the cabinet - that a fait accompli produced what the incoming Conservative government would not have approved readily,54

was correct.

We have then, the anomaly of the Diefenbaker government's

apparent advocacy of integrated North American defences and

'"deintegrated"1 Canadian-American economies. In September,

at Dartmouth College, Mr. Diefenbaker made these public

comments,

This concentration of trade in one channel, we believe, contains inherent dangers for Canada in that it makes our economy too vulnerable to sudden changes in trading policy in your country.55

54. Conant, Melvin, "'Canada and Continental Defence: An American View,1" International Journal, Vol. XV, Summer. 1960. pp. 223-224. - for an elaboration u of Conant's conclusion see, Conant, Melvin, The Long Polar Watch. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1962. pp. 80-86.

55. Barber, Joseph, Good Fences Make G-ood Neighbours. Indianapolis-New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958. p. 257. 62

The Canadian government was thus committed to a policy of

greater economic independence, in terms of the United States

markets. It is then of some interest to note that American

trade policies were held at least partially responsible for

the growing Canadian trade deficit. Mr. Diefenbaker repeated

earlier charges,

What the United States is doing is simply this. With its vast surpluses of wheat, cotton and the like it is going to under• privileged areas In various parts of the world, making available amounts of these surpluses and receiving a credit in the form of local guarantees and then using these local guarantees for economic assistance in those countries. What the , United States is doing in fact by that ^ policy is breaking up the market for farm commodities all over the world. It is part and parcel of its give-away fire sale assistance agricultural policy.56

There appeared to be some justification in the charge that

these American policies were adversely affecting traditional

Canadian markets; United States wheat exports between the

1955-1956 and 1956-1957 crop years rose 200,000,000 bu.

whereas, in the same period, Canadian wheat exports fell

48,000,000 bu.57

Diefenbaker in making these complaints and others in

relation to Canadian difficulties with the United States

rejected the Liberal method of confidential protests; he

had in the past condemned these methods as "pusillanimous

and puerile';:" Regardless of the fact that it suited his

56. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1956. p. 6876

57. Barber, op. cit. p. 258.

58. Aitchison, op. cit. pp. 282-283. V 63

political campaign, Diefenbaker's method of shouting his

complaints from the house tops was the only alternative.

As the New York Times put it,

Certainly the new government can be expected to proclaim any differences with the United States more forcefully and publicly than did its predecessor, which ^ preferred to express them privately to Washington in memoranda that often were merely noted and filed.59

Mr. Diefenbaker was not hesitant to extend this public

challenge to United States economic policies to a challenge

to United States diplomatic method in the Cold War. Mr.

Sidney Smith voiced this challenge on December 4, before

the House Standing Committee on External Affairs, on the

eve of the NATO Conference in Paris,

It is not the view of the Canadian government that we should always say 'no', or 'not yet', to a Russian proposal.

I must say frankly that I am distressed at the reception by 'official sources and reliable spokesmen' in Washington to any proposal for a high level Conference.60

The Economist described the Canadian action thusly,

...for all the submissiveness to United States requirements for the defence of the ty/ North American continent, Canada's constant, underlying uneasiness about American diplomats and political views reached a new intensity before, during and after the NATO meetings.61

59. New York Times Magazine, op. cit. p. 40. ^

60. Vancouver Province, December 5, 1957. (v

61. "Canada: the Candid Ally," Economist, Vol. 186. London January 4, 1958. p. 44. 6k

When they contemplate the Washington policy• makers Canadians are getting unhappily near to adapting the saying of the Duke of Wellington: ";I don't know what the Russians will think of them; but, by God, they frighten me.62

Canadian diplomacy^Diefenbaker promised^would be vocal and

harassing (he would find that this was as close to

independence as Canadian diplomacy could come). The '"smooth

blend of anti-Americanism and pro-Canadianism'"63 that had

characterized his 1957 campaign had become less subtly anti-

American.

Nor did Diefenbaker ignore the United Nations; it would^he

declared, in his first UN speech, remain "'the cornerstone of

Canada's foreign policy."' On disarmament that same speech

promised with altruistic conviction,

'Canada will do anything at all feven give up her own membership on the disarmament sub• committee J , short of her safety and survival, in order to bring what must come if mankind is to continue to live.'64

Thus, the Conservative party's foreign policy platform was

outlined in relation to the Commonwealth, the United States,

and the Cold War. Diefenbaker's 1958 mandate: pursue closer

relations with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions;

integrate North American defences but challenge American

economic policies detrimental to Canadian interests;

62. Ibid, p. 45.

63. Atwater, James, "Do They Really Hate Us In Canada?'" The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 236, April 6, 1963. p. 19.

64. McDonald, Lloyd, "Diefenbaker Urges Wider Arms Talks,'" Vancouver Sun, September 23, 1957. 65 challenge the methods of American Cold War leadership while asserting Canadian leadership in the United Nations and in disarmament negotiations. There was a further mandate, one that had seemingly received a double support: the "berative diplomacy" of John Diefenbaker was evident to all who would see throughout the life of his minority government - not only did the electorate approve his methods, they had repudiated the Liberal party now led by the man who epitomized the myth "that Canada's greatest glory has been her ability

to cumpromise," 65in the person of Lester B. Pearson.

In the 1951-1953 period the Liberal government had established general foreign policy principles; a stable and a peaceful world through Western strength; the economic recovery of Western Europe (particularly the British market)- they sought in Western Europe a counterweight to Washington in policy matters; the maintenance of the Commonwealth connection; and a full utilization of the UN in the search 66 for a lasting peace. These goals, while hardly original, were realistically correlated with Canadian means; that is, here were essentially reasonable and moderate goals'pursued in an era in which the restrictions, domestic and external, imposed on Canadian foreign policy were at a minimum. The point is that the Conservative policies were, if anything, more ambitious than the above mentioned Liberal ones in spite of measureably increased restrictions on the scope of Canadian 65. McNaught, K.W., "Canadian Foreign Policy and the Whig Interpretation 1936-39," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 195?. P» k3* 664 Keirstead, op. cit. p. 37* 66 external policy. Conservative policy makers ignored the lesson that,

... Above All it is necessary for Canadian policy to grasp not only the nature of Canadian interests but the true dimensions of Canadian power. °7

A government that failed to realize such a lesson was on a disaster course.

67. Spencer, Robert A., "Let's Get Rid of Our Phony Image," Toronto Telegram, March 23, 1963. 67

CHAPTER IV THE POLICY MAKER.

One of the major handicaps of Canadian, foreign policy in the 1957-1963 period was that in matters of policy formulation,

John Diefenbaker elected to be in effect his own External

Affairs Minister, regardless of whether the portfolio was officially filled by some one else or not. Nor was this a covert arrangement; the major piece of Conservative national campaign literature in 1962, The Record Speaks I loudly proclaimed,

Canadian prestige abroad has never been higher. Under the stirring leadership of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, Canada has entered a new era in prestige and influence / in world affairs. The leadership he has V given to the nations of the commonwealth and other middle and small powers has opened new prospects for peaceful settle• ment of existing differences. The Prime Minister has brought hope and encouragement to the peoples of many lands still struggling for their freedom.1

These statements open a section entitled "External Affairs,"' p the text of which runs some one hundred and sixty lines.

This section is revealing in that no less than one hundred and forty-five lines extol the virtues and achievements of

John Diefenbaker (either explicitly or implicitly), whereas

Howard Green, the Minister of External Affairs, appears as next to nonexistant rating only fifteen lines under a

1. Macadam, Pat, The Record Speaks I Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, 1962. p. 13.

2. Ibid, pp. 13-16. 68

"Disarmament1" sub-heading (and even here sharing his "glory" with Mr. Diefenbaker). This division (90#-10$) may be taken as a fairly accurate reflection of the actual division of authority between the Prime Minister and the External

Secretary in the Diefenbaker period.

This is not to suggest that there was anything necessarily to move the Prime Minister to the sidelines In foreign policy formulation after either Sydney Smith's or Howard Green's appointment. The Department of External Affairs was until

1946 controlled by the Prime Minister himself. Thus,

Canadian foreign policy was largely, if not solely, deter• mined by the Prime Minister (it might be well to remember that it was Mackenzie King who provided Diefenbaker with a political pattern to follow5). Louis St. Laurent was Canada's first Secretary of State for External Affairs; evidently

Prime Minister King did not surrender freely his control over foreign policy formulation, and it was only the strength of

Mr. St. Laurent's position within the cabinet that allowed him to demand of King, and be granted, a reasonably free hand in directing Canada's external policy. Bruce Hutchison notes that in 1946. "'St. Laurent took the Department over not only in name but in fact ....'"4 Hutchison further discusses the conflict whereby St. Laurent had gained large measure of policy control from King by the end of 1947,5

3. Hutchison, Bruce, Mr. Prime Minister, 1867-1964. Toronto Longman's Green and Co., 1964. p. 320.

4. Hutchison, Bruce, The Incredible Canadian. Toronto Longman's Green and Co., 1952. p. 434.

5. Ibid. 69

When Mr. St. Laurent became Prime Minister in-1948, he willingly gave his Foreign Secretary, L. B. Pearson, a scope comparable to the one he had himself extracted from

Mackenzie King. The St. Laurent cabinet functioned as an effective board of directors, with Mr. St. Laurent as chairman of the board; in this context policy responsibilities were easily delegated. Given Prime Minister St. Laurent's lack of interest in a glorified image (he,'"expected every• thing to end the day after next so that the question of my personal prestige was of little consequence."')^ and Mr.

Pearson's professionalism (Pearson was not a politician but a diplomat by training), the question of who should take credit for foreign policy successes was of little consequence.

However, it would seem ludicrous to assume that the Prime

Minister's influence in foreign policy formulation dis• appeared; for surely insofar as he controlled his cabinet, as every good chairman, however subtly must control his board, his general influence over external policy was inescapable. Even taking Mr. Pearson's ideal description

(In 1958) of his relationship with the Prime Minister during the Suez Crisis at face value,

"Mr. St. Laurent was more than a Prime Minister to me, he was always a very close friend. 'Don't worry,' he told me. 'Do what is best. Do the right thing, and I'll back you.'",7

6. Stevenson, William, "'Canada and the World,"' Toronto Globe and Mail, December 22, 1961.

7. Eayrs, James, Canada in World Affairs, October 1955 to June 1957. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959. p. 9. 70

the phrases "what is best"! and "the right thing" indicate a necessary agreement between the two men on foreign policy matters, with the Prime Minister as final judge in instances of dispute. Thus, no hard and fast lines had been drawn as to the position of the prime minister's office vis-a-vis that of the secretary of state for external affairs on matters of foreign policy formulation because no such lines were possible. Further, there is no evidence that John Diefenbaker ever considered the St. Laurent-Pearson relationship as establishing anything of a precedent in his relations with either Sydney Smith or Howard Green.

John Diefenbaker held the external affairs portfolio at the beginning of his government in June, 1957. At the time, there seemed nothing unusual in this decision as a temporary expedient; reviewing the thin ranks of the minority govern• ment's members in the House of Commons, there was no obvious choice for the position. Mr. Diefenbaker had of course been foreign policy spokesman for the official opposition in the House since 1953 and a member of the Standing

Committee on External Affairs since its inception in 1945.

In addition, he was relatively widely travelled and seemingly conscious of the importance of Canada's international relationships (perhaps overly conscious of the Commonwealth relationship, or lack of it). In retrospect, it vrould seem that Mr. Diefenbaker never contemplated surrendering the direction of Canadian foreign policy to anyoneJ it is equally apparent however, that a combination of administrative 731 responsibility and public pressure would not have allowed him to retain the official portfolio for long.

In September, 1957, Sydney Smith's appointment to the portfolio was announced. It might be contended that Mr.

Smith was acquired by the government as something of a status symbol. He was one of the very few outstanding academic leaders in Canada whose association with the Conservative party was of long standing. He was respected, and widely known as the President of the University of Toronto. 1957 was a year of uncertainty for the minority Conservative government, thus, a year when solid public images were of utmost importance if the limited trust of the Canadian electorate was going to be justified and a greater trust warranted. Mr. Smith, at the time of his appointment, seemed to bring an unchallenged intellectual prowess to the government in external affairs; this combined with the dynamic posture of the minority government as a whole, created an

Image that would be difficult for a tired Liberal party to best. However, it was evident from the beginning that the

Prime Minister never intended the presence of Mr. Smith to affect his own preeminence in foreign policy matters; that

Smith was not to have a voice independent from the Prime

Minister's. Charles Lynch provides the following inter• esting example,

Among Conservatives he (^DiefenbakerJ had been a moderate critic of Canada's policies over Suez .... Then came the appointment of Sydney Smith.... who J right after his swearing-in 72

ceremony indicated his admiration for the Pearson policy at the time of Suez. The prime minister shushed him-but in / his subsequent months in office, * departmental officials found Mr. Smith's views to be well to the left of Mr. Pearson' s• Mr. Smith was held in check by the prime minister....8

Undoubtedly part of Mr. Smith's difficulty was his position

of negligible influence within the Cabinet. Firstly, he had

no previous experience with either external affairs or

parliament. Secondly, any chance of his carrying his

academic prestige into the Cabinet was lost when he was

remiss in handling his duties during the initial period of

his tenure.® Finally, he was surely suspect in Diefenbaker's

eyes; Smith had been a past contender for the Conservative

leadership and as late as 1956 has been touted as a compromise

leader to head off Diefenbaker's victory10 (in addition, one

of Canada's leading magazines, Saturday Night, had virtually

pleaded with Conservatives to make Smith their leader in

1956).11 Diefenbaker, at any rate, did little to bolster

12 Smith's self -confidence, &n<± Smith remained throughout

simply "'chief foreign policy adviser to the prime minister,"

8. Lynch, Charles, "'Policies Full Circle,"! Vancouver Province,/ June 5, 1959. also see, Winnipeg Free Press. December 12, 1958.

9. Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 1957, No's 1-2. pp. 7-58.

10. Newman, Peter C, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years. Toronto, McClelland and Steward Limited, 1963.p.252.

11. "The Front Page,"' Saturday Night, Vol. 71, November 10, 1956. pp. 5-6.

12. Newman, op. cit. p. 253. 73

never able, in spite of the fact that he had begun to

master his job before his. death, "'to exert a strong foreign

policy influence in the cabinet."' Needless to say, the

Prime Minister felt no obligation to accept any advice that

did not conform with his own foreign policy ideas and pre•

conceptions .

With Sydney Smith's death in March, 1959, Diefenbaker

again held the portfolio until Howard Green was appointed

Secretary of State for External Affairs in June of that year.

Mr. Green was an experienced parliamentarian who had sat

continuously in the House of Commons from 1935. This man,

once described by C. D. Howe as, "A perambulating prognosti-

cator of doom stalking the halls of Parliament with a Bible

in one hand and a stiletto in the other,"'14 was sixty-four

when promoted from Public Works to External Affairs.

Sincere, of unquestionable integrity, hard-working, tenacious,

are all words that describe Mr. Green; their emphasis in the

character of the new External Affairs Minister were at best

an inadequate compensation for the qualities he lacked.

Although he, "had not been abroad since his service in the

1914-1918 war, and ... had rarely visited the United States,"15

he nevertheless had exhibited a keen, if rigid and naive,

interest in external policy. He had been a member of the

House Standing Committee on External Affairs from his

13. Duffy, Robert, "Canada's Foreign Policy in Transition," International Journal. Vol. XLV, Autumn, 1959. pp. 296-7. also see, Eayers, James, The Art of the Possible. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961. pp. 27-28.

14. An cited in, Stevenson, op. cit.

15. Spencer, Robert, "External Affairs and Defence,"' Canadian Annual Review for 1960,ed. John T. Saywell. Toronto, Urn versitv of Toronto Press. 1961. DD. 75-76- Ik

aggressive advocacy of its creation in 1945, through to

1954. He was in addition ,,;an old personal friend of the

1 Prime Minister'"^ and belonged to the '"Charmed circle'"- -'''

of those enjoying the trust of John Diefenbaker. Mr. Green

was senior member of the Cabinet and thus functioned as

acting Prime Minister in Mr. Diefenbaker's absence. Insofar

as Mr. Green was willing or able to represent their views,

the Department of External Affairs would be more clearly

heard within the Cabinet than was the case under Mr. Smith.

However the pattern of the Prime Minister's relationship

to his foreign minister had been established during Smith's

tenure. A columnist in the Vancouver Sun, writing immediately

prior to Green's appointment noted,

The man who goes into external affairs will find himself in the shadow of the -^y' prime minister throughout his tenure...,

Thus, for the first time since the initial period of Mr. St.

Laurent's appointment, there appeared,

... a Secretary of State for External Affairs who, unlike Mr. Pearson, did not have a virtually free hand, and yet had the full confidence of the Prime Minister.19,

It might be contended that in the final crisis of the

16. Ibid.

17. Newman, op. cit. p. 95.

18. Gould, Tom, in Vancouver Sun, May 25, 1959. i/

19. Spencer, Robert A., '"Parliament and Foreign Policy, 1960." International Journal, Vol. XV, Autumn, 1960. p. 331. 75

Diefenbaker government, Green emerged as "strong man":

within the Cabinet. It would be dangerous to draw any

implications from this contention as to a growing Influence

within the Cabinet on Green's part during his tenure as

External Secretary. Any judgement must take into consider•

ation the fact that the defence policy crisis (in which

Green's "magnificent obsession"' was jeopardized) arose

simply because the Prime Minister was unable to choose

between a defence policy to which he had already committed

his government and a foreign policy that seemed more

palatable politically. Diefenbaker accepted Green's position

not because of Green's cabinet strength but because he

judged it to be the most expedient in terms of the ballot

box, and because the Cabinet crisis had finally forced him

to choose between Howard Green and Douglas Harkness. Green

remained simply a trusted advisor to Diefenbaker because he

was politically safe.

As the Prime Minister's chief foreign policy advisor,

Green was not held in check as Sydney Smith had been for the

obvious reason that he was not likely to go anywhere. He

was impervious to influences within his department that

might conflict with his o?/n preconceptions and prejudices In

20. The general indecision of the Diefenbaker government, and in particular that of the Prime Minister, on the question of acquiring nuclear warheads for Bomarcs located on Canadian territory led to a Cabinet revolt that nearly succeeded on February 5 and 6, 1963. - for a full discussion see pp. 1-2. 76 policy matters. Indeed, one might reasonably wonder if he was sophisticated enough to convey new concepts meaningfully to the Cabinet and Prime Minister. His passion for the

Commonwealth was shared by the Prime Minister. His "plain talk"' at the international conference level had been initiated by Diefenbaker when Smith was in office. Dis• armament was as politically safe a "magnificent obsession'" as could be found; and few Canadians were willing to disagree with his repetition ad nauseam of Canadian virtues.

Surprisingly perhaps, the Department of External Affairs was a limiting factor in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy in the 1957-1962 period, in rather a negative way.

The impressive talents of the department, elsewhere des• cribed, could have continued to serve Canada well, even in a situation of declining influence in world affairs, for

Canadian diplomats had long since mastered the art of constructive contribution. The responsibility for the failure to effectively employ these talents lies both with

the department itself and with the Diefenbaker government.

It may be contended that the virtual absence of resign• ations among Canada's bureaucratic elite following the

Conservative victory indicated that the upper echelon of the

civil service at Ottawa was particularly desirous of effecting a smooth transition between the changing govern• ments (if not consciously for democratic reasons, then at

least as a measure of their professionalism). It further may be contended that this desire was particularly acute 77

within the Department of External Affairs because this

department was so much the creation of the outgoing Liberal

administration and so intimately associated with the new 21

Liberal leader, Lester B. Pearson.

It is perhaps important to note the real position of

the higher civil servant in our society vis-a-vis Parliament

and the Cabinet. In a normal situation (majority party

government), the House of Commons is a prisoner of the

Cabinet-the complex nature of governmental activity in a

modern industrial society has made government by discussion

a thing of the past. The average member of parliament can

understand no more than the general principles of the

technically complex legislation that he is called upon to

enact. A country is neither run nor controlled by legislative

generalities. Because of this and the cohesive tendencies

natural to our parliamentary parties and the effective

discipline within them, the Cabinet, through its majority,

is able to control Parliament. -The Cabinet in turn is largely

dependent on, and thus, largely controlled by "!the thin

overlay of directional senior civil servants'" who provide

most of the ideas and all of the specifics for the legislative

program the Cabinet guides through Parliament. The laws of

the land and the variety of Cabinet directives are sub•

sequently interpreted and totally administered under the

21. The Liberal party convention elected L. B. Pearson as leader on January 16, 1958. 78

direction of these same civil servants. Allowing for the

different function and differing organization of the

Department of External Affairs, the pattern of power traced

above applies to it as well as to the other departments of

government. The point of this discussion is that while the

senior civil servants.sought a smooth transition from

government to government, they were in a position to resist

changes that did not conform to some broad bureaucratic

definition of national interest.

The Conservatives under Diefenbaker approached the higher

civil servants with suspicion,

22. This discussion is a conscious oversimplification, nevertheless the truth is readily apparent because of It.

23. James Eayrs provides this interesting example (The Art of the Possible. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961. pp. 155-156), "In February 1960 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Howard G-reen, suggested in his first major review of foreign affairs in the House of Commons that the time had come "to drop the idea that Canada's role in world affairs is to be an 'honest broker' between nations. We must decide Instead that our role is to determine the right stand to take on problems, keeping In mind the Canadian background and, above all, using Canadian common sense. In effect, the time has come to take an independent approach."1 This statement was on the whole well received throughout the country, with one exception. Members of the Department of External Affairs were disturbed at the implications of their Minister's remarks, and even relatively junior foreign service officers (who one would have thought might

respondv enthusiastically to such a call to greatness) privately expressed misgivings about his "magnificent obsession1" and his '"politique de grandeur."' 79

During the period preceding the 1957 election, there was a growing distrust, in Conservative circle, of what was usually thought of as the "Liberal Establishment." / This vague term referred to senior civil ^ servants (most of whom were regarded as pro-Liberal)....24

The short period of minority government, June, 1957 to

March, 1958, did not allow either the bureaucrats or the

politicians to cement their positions. However, their

positions became rigid after the 1958 election. John

Diefenbaker's party had won the greatest electoral triumph

in the history of the Canadian nation; a greater mandate

for the implementation of his "Vision"', however poorly

defined, could hardly be conceived,

But "The Vision"' ... died on the Prime Minister's lips. He had sold the electorate of 1958 on the idea, but he had not won over and later he would not woo the thin overlay of directional civil servants who had steered the long Liberal era of King and St. Laurent like an oiled machine and who remained hostile to the political change.25

As foreign secretary, Lester Pearson "virtually had carte

blanche from his prime minister."26 Undoubtedly the shared

expertise of Mr. Pearson and his department allowed Canada's

24. Meisel, John, ":The June 1962 Election: Break-up of Our Party System?" Queen's Quarterly, Vol. LXIV. Autumn, 1962. p. 337.

25. Harbron, John D., "'The Conservative Party and National Unity,"1 Queen's Quarterly, Vol. LXIV. Autumn, 1962. p. 352.-It is perhaps of some significance to note that Harbron's remarks gain credence in this writer's eyes as this situation was common enough talk, even at'the division and constituency levels, throughout the 1959-1962 period within the Conservative party.

26. Duffy, Robert, "'Canada's Foreign Policy in Transition," International Journal, Vol. XIV, Autumn, 1959. pp. 296-7. 80

higher diplomats a freedom similar to that received by their

minister from Mr. St. Laurent. Understandably, their

"mandatory exercise" was affected with the change in govern•

ment and by the absence of professional standards at the

ministerial level.

... there could be no doubt of sensitivity in a department which had become accustomed over the years to keeping the amateurs at bay with its expertise. Diefenbaker's probings into a department he did not know were resented... and Lester B. Pearson in absence loomed somewhat larger than life.2?

The Department of External Affairs had never before been so

exposed to the realities of Canadian domestic political life.

Under Mackenzie King, St. Laurent and Pearson, their's had

been an "Ivory tower" diplomacy far away from the mundaneness

of domestic political wrangling. Canada's senior foreign

service officers, like their fellow bureaucrats in other

departments, had lost sight of their function in a democracy

and had, under Liberal tenure, assumed the mantle of a Family

Compact in which the "busy little malices of Little York11,

were not readily identifiable. Ironically, their position

was challenged by a party calling itself Tory and they

reacted against the threat posed to the established traditions

of Canadian diplomacy by bitterly accusing their prime

minister of audaciousness in that he dared to exploit their

preserve "for headline-making ventures"1.2® It is hardly

27. Stevenson, op. cit

28. Ibid. 81

conceivable that such a situation facilitated the adequate

performance by these civil servants of their defined function,

in

... advising and assisting ... £ their ~] Minister^ not only to carry through a policy ... but to defend that policy against criticisms and attacks....29

If Canada's career diplomats were dismayed and embarrassed 30 by the Diefenbaker government's actions, John Diefenbaker hardly regarded them in a more tolerant light,

He regarded most of them as intellectual snobs and, even worse, as Pearson partisans. "'They \s don't do enough to keep themselves warm," he once told a political associate. In private conversation, Diefenbaker frequently referred to External officials as "the Personalities ,"i3l

Indeed, Mr. Diefenbaker constantly teased Mr. Green about the

"'striped pants boys"' - it is difficult to determine where

small town, prairie humour left off and where disparagement

began, if in fact the two were separable. By the same token,

the absence of any number of political appointments as Heads

of Missions testifies to the desire at least on the part of

the External Secretary (whose authority in departmental matters

does not seem to have been tampered with by the Prime Minister)

to keep the department as contented as possible.

If Mr. Diefenbaker did not place much faith in the advice

29.- Eayrs, op. cit. p. 36.

30. Newman, op. cit. p. 252.

31. Ibid. 82

of his External Affairs Department, it would seem equally

certain that the department itself did not do enough to

reassure him. In any case, the effect of this distrust is

perhaps exemplified by the encounter of Mr. Diefenbaker and

Canada's High Commissioner to Ceylon, R.G. Nik Cavell,

during the Prime Minister's world tour in 1958. Apparently

Diefenbaker dismissed Cavell's explanation of Prime Minister

Bandaranaike 's Marxism with a curt, "'I know you, You're a

Liber al."*32

However, the fact that the Prime Minister did not

consult often with the Undersecretary of State for External

Affairs, Peter C. Newman's contention to the contrary,33

does not necessarily prove anything. Had effective liaison

between the Prime Minister's office and the department been

possible, It could have been achieved either through the

Secretary of State for External Affairs himself, at least

under Smith, or through the person of the Prime Minister's

special advisor on foreign policy (who was a member of the

External Affairs Department on loan to the Prime Minister).

The fact that no such effective liaison existed is testified

to by the appearance of Canadian Ministers at international

conferences without adequately prepared drafts of proposals

32. Stevenson, op. cit. - Stevenson notes an inability to confirm this, he suggests that gossip to this effect was common enough in high places to be believed.

33. Newman, op. cit. p. 252. 83

they were to present.

One of the great weaknesses of the Prime Minister was

readily apparent in his dealings with the Department of

External Affairs; that was his failure to realize the Burkean

lesson that,

Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom; and a great empire and little minds go 111 together.35

This was a lesson that also appears to have been lost on the

Department of External Affairs. There was no great empire

for Canada to fritter away but a considerable reputation

built around the "unobtrusive competence'"36 of our foreign

service was substantially dissipated.

34. Peyton, V. Lyon provides a partial example: ":l recall... a moderately useful but premature Canadian suggestion that the United Nations be asked to participate in the policing of a new Berlin settlement if and when one was negotiated with the Soviet Union; this was announced with such a fanfare by the Canadian ministers that foreign diplomats were incredulous when the details of what we envisaged were explained to them." Lyon, Peyton V., The Policy Question. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1963. p. 92. Mr. Lyon was rightly concerned with the overselling of Canadian initiative; the point is however, that the Canadian Three Point Plan for bringing a UN "presence" into Berlin through Security Council action to.control Berlin access routes was proposed without benefit of specific details. The fact that those specific details did not exist at the time that the proposal was made public turned a situation of bad diplomatic form Into one of absurd posturing.

35. Burke, Edmund, '"Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies (1775)"', ed. W.J. Bate, Edmund Burke Selected Works, New York, Random House (The Modern Library), 1960. pp. 175-6.

36. Greening, W. E., "Great Britain, U.S.A., and Canada,'" Contemporary Review, Vol. 187, January, 1955.p.26. 81+

Allowing the above criticism of Canada's civil service

and in particular of the Department of External Affairs to

stand, a clarification is required lest the responsibility

for Canada's external policy be blurred. Given the fact that

Canada's immediate post-war prestige and influence was, at

a minimum, a constant in the Diefenbaker "Vision"', and that

Diefenbaker and Green were unwilling, Indeed incapable of

realistically correlating Canadian foreign policy goals and

means, at best a whole hearted effort on the part of our

diplomats could only have modified the degree of Canada's

international embarrassment.

A. situation envisioned in the abstract by Lester Pearson

in 1954 had become an unfortunate reality,

... the danger of the well-meaning but limited mind creating rigidity and thereby preventing growth - because its imagination of the moment is not equal to the almost infinite variety of fact and circumstance in any given situation.37

In the last analysis, the adequacy of external policy in

protecting and forwarding the interests of the Canadian

nation is dependent on the capacity of her policy makers to

understand the ever changing complexities of national need

and international climate, and to formulate policies

accordingly. Thus, the extent to which the principals

involved in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy were

limited in their response by considerations of personal

preconception and ability is of great concern. The prin•

cipals concerned are Howard Green and John Diefenbaker -

37. Pearson, L.B., "'Some Thoughts on Canadian External Relations,"' The Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1954. p. 70. 85 unfortunately it is impossible, for lack of evidence, to deal here with Sydney Smith. They may be reasonably and expediently judged (primarily) on their reactions to the creation of the United Nations Organization, the necessity for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Suez

Crisis. These three events may be taken as involving the three most important diplomatic involvements of Canada as an established Middle Power in the pre-1957 period.

Howard Green readily accepted the necessity of post-war collective security; his concept here is found in a quotation he had taken from Sir Norman Angell,

' It is this exceedingly simple and basic principle: unless the Community- whether it be a community of persons or of states-is prepared to use its combined power for the defence of the individual member who is made the victim of lawless

violence, there can be neither law, nor A peace, nor justice, nor stable civilization.' 38

Mr.Green went on to demand a total commitment to the United

Nations' peace-keeping role. While Mr. Green showed -an understanding of the need for such an organization, he gave indication of having a limited grasp of its operational' principles.^ He was at a complete loss as to the government's purpose in employing the functional approach to inter• national organization; the concept of Canada as a "Middle

Power" was to him, unreasonable. Green seemed to

38. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 19k5» P» 111+.

39. For example see, Canada, House of Commons Debates. 1914-5. PP. 9&V91. 86

feel that Canada's role was properly within '"the great

world power"' called ";the British commonwealth of nations"'40

Indeed, Green seemed to be a Canadian imperialist of the old

school; a 1956 definition by the Economist of the Canadian

usage of '"imperialist'" would be apropos here,

It is used to connote deep-rooted ties with the motherland. So closely was it associated with the great early days of the Conservative party that one might well say, "'Tory imperialists."41

One difficulty brought to light by Green's stand in the

House of Commons on the UN, is that of understanding exactly

what Green had in mind for the Canadian-Commonwealth relation•

ship. It would appear in 1945, as it did on a number of

subsequent occasions, that he was advocating a Borden-Meighen

type consultative Commonwealth foreign policy. However, he

was not consistent-although he failed to realize it- in

that he continually envisaged Canada as an independent great

power,

I suggest to you Mr. Speaker, that the destiny of Canada is ... to be a great world power standing beside the other nations of the commonwealth and beside our trusted ally, the United States.4^

Mr. Green's misunderstanding of the realities of Canada's

international position is most clearly shown by his constant

40. Canada, House of Commons Debates„ 1945. pp. 116-118.

41. ""Further Thoughts in Canada,'" Economist, Vol. 181. London, November 17, 1956. p. 607.

42. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1947. December 10, pp. 156-157. 87

emphasis on the need for Canadian participation in a Pacific

pact - a reflection of his concern for the fate of the

Commonwealth and Empire in Asia, and a reflection of the fact

that his was a Pacific coast riding. The startling aspect of

this concern, in retrospect at least, is that it seemed to

preclude an adequate appreciation of the European situation

and more particularly of Canada's stake in Europe's fate.

For example, the Soviet Union, between 1940 and 1945, had

annexed or placed under Soviet administration 132,000 square

miles of European territory. These lands included part of

Finland, the entire Baltic States, part of German East Prussia

part of Poland, part of Czechoslovakia and part of Rumania.

The population of these lands amounted to some 23,398,000

peoples. BetY/een 1945 and 1948, the Soviet Union consolidated

her hold over 393,547 square miles more of Europe. In so doin

the Soviet Union, without the slightest pretence, forced out

any semblances of democracy In Eastern Europe and much of

Central Europe. East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Albania,

Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and the 91,832,000 people

therein were locked behind the ";Iron Curtain." The

U.S.S.R. in this same period, encouraged civil war in Greece,

tried to promote a communist government in Iran, made

territorial claims on Turkey and stirred up trouble over

Berlin. Also, as intimated elsewhere, the whole of Western

43. All figures are taken from, NATO publication, Vigilance the Price of Liberty. Netherlands, The Atlantic Treaty Assoc., 1959. 88

Europe was threatened by this Soviet advance - and thus was

threatened the way of life Green so obviously held dear.

On the fourth day of April, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty

was signed primarily as a means of containing the Soviet

advance - this alliance was to remain ineffective until the

Korean War galvanized it Into something approaching a

functioning organization in 1950.44 Mr. Green seemed

strangely oblivious to this situation during the Supply

Debate on National Defence on April 7, 1949, when he pre•

sented this analysis,

Unfortunately the threat to freedom today is not confined to Europe and the north Atlantic. It may be that in that area the soviet is already well contained. In Asia, however, the soviet is going ahead by leaps and bounds.

In fact in that part of the world it looks as though the soviet is winning by default.

I believe Canada is so directly affected by what goes on in the Pacific area that she should be taking the lead in advocating a Pacific defence pact.45

Indeed, it was true that Canada had a stake in the Pacific;

however the problem there was not "the soviet"', but emergent

nationalism, compounded not by the Soviet ability to exploit

as much as by the Western inability to understand. However,

Canada's primary Interest-political, economic, cultural-lay

44. Ismay, Lord, NATO, The First Five Years, 1949-1954. Netherlands, Bosch-Utrecht, 1954. p. 32.

45. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1949. p. 2412.-the underlined words are this writer's. 89

in the preservation of a Western Europe that was far from

secure In 1949.

Mr. Green's reputation as, "a rank imperialist of the old

Diehard Tory school,'"^ was cemented by his stand against the

Liberal government's position on Suez in 1956. Howard Green

ignored the fact that Britain had broken his cardinal

principle - Egypt had been made ,,!the victim of lawless

violence.'" He ignored the fact that the British action turned

the world's attention away from Budapest and thus facilitated

the Soviet Union's unimpeded crushing of the Hungarian

Revolution. He was oblivious to the threat to World Peace

and to the lesser questions of the West's position among the

Afro-Asian nations and the rift in Anglo-American relations.

To this future Canadian Secretary of State for External

Affairs, Great Britain was a blood relation, the Motherland,

there was but one correct Canadian response - "Ready, Aye,

Ready.'" The actions of the Liberal government were to him

near criminal. He said in the House of Commons, on November

27,

Now this government, by its actions in the Suez crisis, has made this month of November, 1956, the most disgraceful period for Canada In the history of this nation.

He continued,

It is high time that Canada had leadership more in line with the forthrightness and

46. "Mr. Green's Job - To Clarify Our Cloudy Foreign Policy," Vancouver Sun, June 15, 1959. 90

courage of the Canadian people. It is high time Canada had a government which will not knife Canada's best friends in the back.47

There is no reason to believe that Mr. Green has since

changed his mind. When he described himself as, "A Canadian

first, a British Columbian second, a commonwealth man third,"48

he could see no possible contradiction in these positions be•

cause they were so interdependent as to be in reality not

three but one.4®

There can be no doubt that Howard Green was well meaning;

there neither can be any doubt that his conception of the.

realities of Canada's international position was rigid and

naive. Insofar as he understood international policies,

everything was either white or black; of the infinite varieties

47. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1956. p. 51.

48. Lynch, op. cit.

49. A. further measure of this man's mind might be found in the prejudiced, unimaginative stand he took on the status of Japanese Canadians. The war with Japan was over in 1945, when he declared,

...the most serious aspect of all, Japanese are emperor-worshippers; the emperor is their god.

How can one expect the vast majority of them to be loyal Canadians first?

...the great majority of the Japanese who became naturalized did so in order to get fishing licences.

The solution was obvious, deny them their rights. The international implications of Green's position aside, his actions are those of prejudice and of .. blind patriotism. Canada, House of Commons Debates. 1945. p. 2417. 91

of gray he knew nothing. He could never be a liberalizing

agent in the formulation of foreign policy under Diefenbaker,

at best he could only consolidate the preconceptions of his

"'Chief111, at worst he could inject a further element of

rigidified misconception into Canadian foreign policy during

his tenure as Foreign Minister.

John Diefenbaker is a little more complex than Howard

Green in his stand on various issues. It would seem that the

solid faith Mr. Diefenbaker expressed in the proposed organ•

ization of collective security51 during the House debate

that preceded the San Francisco Conference, was not at all

what it appeared, for a few minutes later he offered a curious

elaboration,

I emphasize the necessity of a full realization of the collective security which has been ours by reason of our membership in the commonwealth and empire. Nor can we ever forget that between 1931 and 1939 we relied upon collective security outside the league of nations and within the empire. In spite of the setting up of an international organ• ization, such as will be set up, I believe that we must maintain collective security within the commonwealth as well.

Ind until we in the commonwealth, under a common allegiance, obtain a solidarity that was not ours in the matter of collective security in the days before the war, we

50. It should be noted that an undercurrent of what might in the most liberal of terms be described as a suspicion of the United States pervades Mr. Green's utterances on foreign policy and related matters throughout the 1945-1957 period.

51. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1945. p. 160. 92

cannot expect a broader co-operation from without.52

That John Diefenbaker neither understood the meaning of

collective security nor the reality of the Commonwealth is

apparent. In addition, he rejected the Middle Power concept

during this debate. Diefenbaker's doubts about the UN

seemed to disappear after he accompanied the Conservative

House Leader, Gordon Graydon to the San Francisco Conference

(Graydon was a member of the Canadian delegation, Diefenbaker,

apparently determined to attend the Conference, went along

as Graydon's "'advisor'"),

As for me, I never had an experience that influenced, me and my thinking as much as • the opportunity given me by my leader to go to San Francisco as advisor to the Progressive Conservative delegation there. 4

From this point, he was able to express his faith and hope

that the United Nations '"shall function efficiently and pro•

vide the foundation for the building of a new world."55

Again the words meant less than they appeared to; this future

Prime Minister and director of Canadian foreign policy had,

perhaps rightly, grave doubts about the great power function

within the United Nations,

52. Ibid, p. 164.

53. Ibid, p. 162.

54. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1945. p. 1305.

55. Ibid. 93

The charter provides the basis to end war, but it does not terminate the prerogative of any of the great powers to wage war. It prevents aggression among small nations. In theory it allows powerful nations, who alone have the power and resources to make war, to go unpunished if any of them commit acts of aggression.56

The United Nations Organization was not and could not be a

World Government, it was an association of sovereign states

dependent on the willingness of the great powers-particularly

the United States and Soviet Union-to continue their Grand

Alliance in to the peace. Mr. Diefenbaker's criticism was

simply misplaced idealism.

He did show imagination in his early grasp of a fundamental

problem, that of the control (international) of atomic energy;

and a realistic appreciation was shown by him of the escalating

threat to peace posed by the independent control of atomic

weapons. However, he offered no intimation as to how a

"•'Second San Francisco Conference"' might approach the control

of a weapon possessed by the United States alone.57

Obviously seeing no contradiction in his earlier statements

on "Commonwealth collective security" and his declarations

of faith in the UN, he concluded with a new|j>6nfusion,

It is my settled conviction that the charter will not lessen the responsibility of each of the nations within the British commonwealth of nations and empire of

56. Ibid, p. 1307

57. Ibid. 9k

maintaining its own defences, and maintaining such defences that a system of collective empire security may readily be established should danger threaten.58

One can draw from Mr. Diefenbaker's positions in the

House of Commons debates on the UN, a glimmer of Idealism,

a touch of realism, a faith in the Commonwealth and Empire,

and a double measure of confused thinking.

If John Diefenbaker did not put much stock in the United

Nations as an effective peace-keeping organization, he soon

found other employments for it; its debate (the work of the

Commission on Human Rights, 1946-1948) on the drafting of

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided him with

ammunition in his personal crusade for a Canadian Bill of

Rights. Here was an apparently valuable political lesson:

external affairs could be intimately related to domestic

political considerations (with dividends paid at the ballot

box?).

On the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

John Diefenbaker made no comment in the House of Commons;

however, he was conscious of the threat of Communism whether

domestic (even though he effectively stopped the proposed

Conservative party campaign In 1948 to outlaw the Labour

Progressive (Canadian Communist) party)00 or external.61

'58. Ibid, p. 1308.

59. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1947. p. 427.

60. Newman, op. cit. p. 25.

61. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1949. p. 2594. 95

Diefenbaker's stand on Suez was not as extreme as Howard

Green's. He had seen great justification In the British

position prior to the actual invasion and considerable

reason for Canada's support of that position,

As far as the Suez Canal is concerned, if the canal is closed the danger to Britain's life-line and to freedom's defence is fearful to contemplate.62

Britain was, in his eyes, engaged in a life and death economic

struggle with the Soviet Union. The subsequent British action

did not alter those convictions; he declared on November 27,

Let no one say that the U.S.S.R. was not preparing with Nasser to undermine and to destroy every vestige of British and French power in Africa as well as in the Middle East.63

While he did consider UNEF, '"a step in the right direction,"^4

he gave little indication of grasping the wider implications

of the Anglo-French-Israeli action. He hardly showed him•

self to be the international affairs expert that he, at

least, believed himself to be.

A rather interesting insight is provided by the foreign

policy position taken by Diefenbaker during the 1956 Supply

Debate on External Affairs,

I feel that Canada's position in the world in which we live might be one far beyond its economic power and population. Disarmament conferences there have been, although they are postponed now apparently until after the

62. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1956. p. 6793.

63. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1956. p. 140.

64. Ibid, p. 143. 96

United States election. Peace and its achievements should not be dependent upon or suspended by elections in any of the free nations, as I see it. Be that as it may, free men today must not weary. All of us must endeavour to do our part to achieve a climate of peace, maintain our strength and practice the principles in which we believe. We should make democracy work in our own midst and in the market places of world competition, the competition of coexistence, be able to show that our product is better than theirs. That is our responsibility in the long run. In the shorter view it is to preserve peace by the maintenance of our defences, by the realization of what free• dom means and at the same time by doing our part to be sure that those nations behind the iron curtain, who love freedom as we love freedom, have not been and will not be forgotten.65

What was this man who was to assume directorship of Canada's

external relations within the year saying? This strange

expression of ideals and sentiment contained the dream of a

uniquely Canadian greatness in world affairs, an expression

of anti-Americanism, a realization of the necessity of

Western strength, and finally, an appeal to Central and East

European Canadians to vote Conservative. He was proffering

something that amounted to bombast as an alternative to the

rational foreign policies of the government then in office.

John D. Harbron, a conservative editor, offers an inter•

esting explanation of Diefenbaker's appeal to the ethnic

communities,

This appeal was based on his strong and genuine belief that the common identity of the ancient Slavic, Germanic and Latin

65. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1956. p. 6797 97

cultures now in Canada must be associated with the historic role of the Conservative Party as the party which created the Canadian nation. But it was also based on an equally opportunistic political reference to Canada's role in the cold war. Diefenbaker concentrated on the receptive Slavic-Canadian communities and assured them that he would never forget the sufferings that many of their number had experienced under Communism. He guaranteed them that his government would stand firm in the international bodies of the world against the intrigues of world Communism. 66

In relation to this latter consideration, he never seems to

have considered the possibility of the ethnic communities

being less than naive in considering the extent to which they might effectively employ his expressions of sentiment to

ameliorate the suffering of those of their number still living

under Communism.

John Diefenbaker was primarily a politician who had learned

to understand the Canadian voter in the small towns and rural

areas; he did not have the understanding or vision of a

statesman. He saw the need for defence and the need for dis•

armament, although he could never reconcile the two in policy

formulation. He held the Commonwealth in profound aspect,

never really understanding it or admitting the possibility

of its changing importance for Canada. He saw the world as

static, and Canada's position as rising within it - he was

confounded by changes for which he was unable to formulate

adequate policies. His anti-Americanism lay in the threat

posed by the United States to the Canadian identity. Sincere,

66. Harbron. op. cit. p. 354. 98

well-meaning, honest, sometimes idealistic, often confused -

a politician who patterned himself on Mackenzie King but

who never acquired any of Mr. King's adaptability. As the

Winnipeg Free Press noted of his willingness to reconsider

established goals and prejudices, "Mr. Diefenbaker stands

firm."67

It is hardly conceivable that a truly dynamic and mean•

ingful foreign policy could have been achieved under a

DIEFENBAKER - Green foreign ministry. Yet, in many ways

these two men, and the Prime Minister in particular, were

not unrepresentative of the nation they represented at the

world's councils. If a nation's external policy was intended

to reflect domestic conditions, no two men were better suited

for the job of formulating that policy.

67. Winnipeg Free Press, op. cit 99

CHAPTER V THE POLICIES OF INDEPENDENCE. ^

The reality of Canada's position after 1957, both in terras of her declining international importance and in terms of acute domestic problems, suggested that Canadian diplomatic initiative would normally be less than that of the pre 1957 period. Yet, this was not to be the case; as Raymond Daniell of the New York Times noted in July, 1958,

It has now become clear that earlier speculation that the Diefenbaker Govern• ment would play a less active part in international affairs in favour of concentration on domestic issues was ill-founded.l

Indeed, here was the problem, that "earlier speculation"1 probably reflected the rational assumption that "'the fundamental concern In the formulation of a national foreign policy is the national interest,"'2 and that the Canadian national interest in 1957 and subsequently, required a concentration on domestic problems. Such an assumption, however rational, misses the fact that Canada in 1957, and in particular 1958, was anything but rational. If the 1958 election may be taken as a measure, there was on the part of the Canadian electorate something of an "hysterical adoration"3 of John Diefenbaker, the man whose vision of Canadian greatness studiously ignored a less than

1. Daniell, Raymond, "'Canada To Expand Activity Abroad,"'' New York Times, July 27, 1958.

2. "Going It Alone,"1 Christian Science Monitor, Boston, February 29, 1960.

3« Round Table, Vol. XLVIII, 1957-8, p. 291. as cited in, Eayrs, James, The Art of the Possible. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961. p. 27. 100

pleasant Canadian reality. The Conservative mandate in 1958

was the mandate of a nation hopefully on the march. Mr.

Diefenbaker had appealed to a sense of Canadian growth and

importance of which the chief ingredients were,

Rapidly rising totals of national production, opening of new mineral areas, expansion of oil and gas developments, building an Atlantic seaway, the strength of the Canadian dollar ....4

The Conservative mandate was one that sought its rationale

in the essentials of national unity. In fact, only a Canada

strong In terms of its national identity, particularly its

economic identity, could sustain a foreign policy such as

that proposed by the Diefenbaker administration. Ironically,

a Canada secure in its national identity would probably

never have given Mr. Diefenbaker a mandate at all. This was

a Canada painfully aware of its increasing dependence on the

United States; but this was also a Canada that apparently had

little stomach for the cures proposed by men like James

Coyne.3 Thus, given the leadership of a man whose Identification

4. Mutchmor, J.R., "'The Moon's the Limit,"' The Christian Century, Vol. '75, March 19, 1958. p. 341.

5. James Coyne, then Governor of the Bank of Canada, began a speaking tour in 1959 to convey to the public at large the dangers of living beyond their means In terms of the increasing threat posed by American ownership of Canadian industry to Canada as an economic and political entity. He seemed to suggest a "belt-tightening"' period in which the Canadian economy would be repurchased through a government controlled forced-saving program and the virtual exclusion of future American investment. 101 with his "'fellow Canadians'" was complete,6 there is little cause to wonder at the course of Canadian foreign policy in the Diefenbaker years. Canadian foreign policy was to be given an impossible task; that of creating the domestic 7 prerequisites of its success by its success.

If, as one analyst contended, public "anxiety about national independence had-] become almost a neurosis, "8 that neurosis was to be reflected in the policies of those concerned with Canada's external relations. For the United

States threatened the rationale of John Diefenbaker's political career and government. J.D. Harbron perceptively contends that in particular, two tenets of the Diefenbaker philosophy were jeopardized, ... national economic development, beginning with the under-developed and under-capitalized parts of Canada, and the concept of Canadians as a single race.9 Had Mr. Diefenbaker's dream been realizable in any context, one thing was certain, that a meaningful Canadian nationality based upon a uniform Canadian level of prosperity and

6. Hutchison, Bruce, Mr. Prime Minister, 1867-1964. Toronto,

Longmans, Green and Company, 1964. pg# 3LL1.-3I4.9.

7. See pp.

8. Lyon, Peyton V., The Policy Question. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963. p. 51. 9. Harbron, John D., "'The Conservative Party and National Unity,"; Queen's Quarterly, Vol. LXIV, Autumn, 1962. pp. 357-358. 102

economic growth and on an "unhyphenated Canadian! sm"'-1-1-1 was

not' reconcilable with the reality of a developing Worth ^/

American continental system. The problems of economic

regionalism11 testified to the failure of the continental

system to promote a uniformly viable Canadian economy. Further,

American mass culture seemed to preclude the achievement of

a distinct Canadian nationality12 (not that the degree of

racial homogeneity envisaged by Mr. Diefenbaker was at all

probable anyway). It would seem however, that the concern

of Mr. Diefenbaker and the public at large for Canadian

independence, however defined, was rather perverse in that

neither were prepared in any meaningful sense to face the real

problem: the increasing presence of American capital determined

at almost any price to own Canadian industry.^3 This general

10. See p. 96

11. See p. 38

12. It is of some interest to note that the Liberals, not distinguished in the St. Laurent period for an over- awareness of the dangers of American capital invest• ment, had, in 1956, justified their 20% tax on the advertising revenues of special Canadian editions of foreign magazines by asserting that it was a necessary protection of Canadian magazines and that, Canadian magazines were a cultural necessity.

13. The outstanding example here was the fate of White Rose Oil Co., the last major Canadian owned oil company; the American offer was so far above the market value of the company's shares that the board of directors felt that the interests of the shareholders dictated their unwilling sale. 103

failure is attested to by the fact that,

... Canada's net international indebtedness increased from |5,000,000,000 at the end of 1951 to about $18,000,000,000 at the end of 1961, about $1,000 for every man, woman and child in Canada.^4

Maclean's estimated in 1964, that, "by 1980 Americans will

own between 80% and 90% of all our business assets ...."15

Walter Gordon, the Minister of Finance in the present Liberal

government, contends that Canadian independence can not long

survive in such a circumstance,

The problem is that in the normal pursuit of their profit maximization, the non-resident owners reach decisions that don't take adequately into account purely Canadian interests and objectives.16

Be that as it may, the fact remains that, for whatever

reasons, Canadian independence of the United States was the

chief concern of the Diefenbaker government and as a consequence,

independence was the theme of Canadian foreign policy in the

Diefenbaker years.

The response of Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Green in

attempting, albeit misguidedly, to provide a Commonwealth

solution to the problem of Canadian independence seems to

14. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada 1962. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1962. p. 241.

15. Newman, Peter C, ";The U.S. and Us,": Maclean's, Vol. 77, June 6, 1964. p. 16.

16. As cited in Ibid, p. 16. (The Conservative, 1960, cancellation of exemptions from the 15% withholding tax on foreign earnings did not represent a realistic appreciation of the problem, and if as Newman suggests (Newman, Peter C, Renegade in Power. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963. p. 209) it "planted the seeds of the exchange crisis which exploded during the 1962 election campaign,"' then, it only served to further illustrate the magnitude of the problem involved. 10J+

have been conditioned by personal prejudices, party traditions

and by a seeming lack or economic alternatives. For both

Messrs. Diefenbaker and Green, the Commonwealth connection

was an article of faith; these men were, and had been the

strongest supporters of the Commonwealth within the Conservative

party. Their inherent anti-Americanism simply gave weight

to their Commonwealth devotion. By tradition, their party

was dominated by English-Canadians devoted to the maintenance

of political, institutional and legal traditions all symbolized

by the British connection in the Commonwealth. Indeed, It

may be contended that Mr. Green regards the Conservative party

as the party of "'British-Canadians."' It may be reasonably

assumed that the presence of fifty Conservative M.P.s from

Quebec following the 1958 election in no way altered the

Commonwealth focus of the party leadership. Kenneth McNaught

in an analysis of the Conservative party's relations with

Quebec, rightly points out that,

... the most significant part of the Tories' unimpressive history is the Diefenbaker record itself. After his landslide victory ^ Diefenbaker continued to accept the advice of his party professionals ... that the Tories could dispense with Quebec.I?

The point is that for Messrs. Diefenbaker and Green the

Commonwealth represented an automatic alternative to the

United States. George Hogan, in one of the few attempts at

an articulation of Canadian Conservative principles, perhaps

17. McNaught, Kenneth, "What the Tories Still Don't Know About Running Canada,"1 Saturday Night, Vol. 80, April, 1965. pp. 25-26. 105

explains best their position on the question of the Common•

wealth vis-a-vis the United States,

Indeed, if they have fought to uphold the Commonwealth, it is not because they are imperialists, but because they are in some degree nationalists, as indeed Conservatives in every country must be if their object is to maintain the heritage of that country. Before we can even begin to maintain our country's institutions, we must maintain its independence; and for a large but thinly populated country like Canada, located next to a mighty nation with a population and an economic power more than ten times our own, this has been no easy task.18

To reinforce Canada's independence and identity, Canadian Conservatives have reversed Canning's dictum and, as Professor D.G. Creighton has said,, called the Old World into existence to redress the balance of the New.19

Thus, in traditional terms there was little difference between

Macdonald's "fA British subject I was born, A British subject

I will die,'" Borden's "'No truck nor trade with the Yankees,"'

and Dief enbaker's "'Not anti-American, but pro-Canadian."'

The real difference lay in the nature of Canada's ability

to resist the American threat to the Canadian economic and

political identity. Canadian Imperialist and anti-American

sentiments had under Macdonald and Borden complemented each

other in the preservation of a Canada distinct from the

United States; the definable structure of the British Empire

had been a bulwark of Canadian independence in her relations

18. Hogan, George, The Conservative in Canada. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963. p. 62. - it is of interest to note that in the elections of 1957, 1958 and 1962, Mr. Hogan was John Diefenbaker 's campaign tour manager and that he has been prominent in the executive leadership of both the Ontario and • National Conservative parties,

19. Ibid, p. 63, 106

with the United States. In the Diefenbaker period the

forces of American economic expansion and American mass

culture were far more formidable a threat to the Canadian

identity than anything before experienced. In addition,

the last vestiges of the Empire structure had disappeared,

insofar as Canada was affected by them, with the war in 1939;

the Commonwealth was an organization chiefly noted for Its

lack of organization. Further, as the Empire continued to

diminish and as the United Kingdom gravitated increasingly

towards Europe,'"nothing in Canadian-British relations ...

looked in the least familiar to Canadian Conservatives."'20

Yet, Mr.- Diefenbaker rigidly adhered to his 1958 mandate in

seeking an archaistic solution to a problem so intensified

as to be virtually new. Perhaps an extenuating circumstance

could be found in the seeming irreconcilability of the

Canadian economic structure, and resultant attitudes, with

changing patterns of world trade. Professor H.G. Johnson

aptly described Canada's position,

... the European Economic Community ... together with the prospect of the formation of regional blocs elsewhere, threatens to damage Canadian interests in world trade outside the United States and to drive Canada into closer economic and political relations with the United States. At the same time, both increasing competition from a revived Europe and a developing Japan and prolonged dependence on American trade and capital investment have fostered the growth of protectionist, and specific• ally anti-American domestic political

20. Harbron> op. cit. p. 355. 107

attitudes. Thus, paradoxically, Canada finds herself facing a trend towards the regionalization of world trade - quite the reverse of what was expected to result from postwar world economic recovery - and severely limited by domestic political attitudes in any attempt either to counter the trend by continuing to press for fiirther multilateral nondiscriminatory reductions in world trade barriers through GATT, or to con• form to the trend by negotiating a regional arrangement with the United States (or Britain or Europe), since either alternative would require substantial tariff concessions reducing the protection now enjoyed by some important Canadian industries, while in addition necessitating the reversal of deep- rooted Canadian national attitudes.21

It is conceivable that in such a circumstance the Diefenbaker

government placed a disproportionate value on the only

remaining part of the old Empire structure affecting it

economically, the Imperial Preference system. The ineptitude

of the Diefenbaker administration is found not in the fact

that their initial policies were faulty, but rather In the.

fact that these perverse policies were retained in spite of

the fact that they yielded an almost predetermined result -

failure. The total inadequacy of Messrs. Diefenbaker and

Green as external policy formulators is testified to by the

fact that these men were oblivious to the failure of their

policies.22 Throughout the Diefenbaker period, Canadian

external policy remained in the anomalous position of seeking

a solution to a problem that the Canadian government would

21. Johnson, Harry G., "'Canada's Foreign Trade Problems,"' International Journal, Vol. XV, Summer, 1960. p. 234.

22. See p. 1]+9 108

not squarely face,23 through the employment of an organiza•

tion that could never provide a semblance of the structure

required for such a solution.

Professor Spencer has noted a continuity of fundamental

foreign policy considerations that, in terms of the Canadian

national interest, link the St. Laurent period to the present.

... Canadian independence is necessarily limited by our membership in three clubs - NATO, the United Nations, and the Common• wealth - and by our existence alongside a friendly and vastly more powerful neighbour, the United States.24

There is no question but that the Diefenbaker administration

recognized the existence of these considerations. However,

there was an essential, in fact, a fundamental difference

between the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker governments in terms

of their approach to these questions. Liberal foreign policy

success had been based on a strength derived from Canada's

relationship with the United States;25 ^he Mackenzie King

and St. Laurent governments had never failed to avoid placing

stress on the most tenuous Commonwealth link.26 jf these

relationships were presented in order of a precedence deter•

mined by the Canadian national interest, there is little doubt

that the first-ranking would be that with the United States.

23. See pp. 102-103 24. Spencer, Robert, "Let's Get Rid of Our Phony Image,"' Toronto Telegram, March 23, 1963.

25. See pp.36-37 26. See pp.32-3^ 109

If the Liberals had so correlated their foreign policy to

Canadian reality, the Conservatives under Mr. Diefenbaker,

sought to negate that reality. A highly placed member of

the Diefenbaker cabinet has testified that in order, of

precedence, the four cornerstones of Canadian external policy

in the 1958-1963 period were the Commonwealth, the United

Nations, NATO and the United States.27 This is substantiated

by Prime Minister Diefenbaker's public advocacy.,..} on the eve

of his world tour in 1958, of a Commonwealth "'third force"

rivaling the power of both Washington and Moscow in inter•

national affairs; Newsweek, an American mass circulation

weekly news magazine not noted for devoting coverage to

Canadian affairs, credulously portrayed the Prime Minister's

position thusly,

The Prime Minister has indicated recently that he is thinking of the Commonwealth as a ";third force"' in international affairs, be• tween Washington and Moscow. This third force, as he sees it, would not be part of a. / neutralist bloc; he makes it clear on whose " side Canada stands in the cold war.28

It may be reasonably assumed that Mr. Diefenbaker's position

was not devoid of idealism; his thoughts probably paralleled

Mr. Hogan's,

In the age of the cold war, when two great ideologies are locked in deadly grapple for the very souls of men, the Commonwealth stands as history's greatest achievement in

27. Unfortunately this writer is not at liberty to identify the source in question, other than to attest to his reliability as a source of information in external policy matters (from this point onwards, information received from this source will be footnoted as Reliable Cabinet Source).

28."Global Prime Minister,"7 Newsweek, Vol. 52, October 27, 1958. p. 53. 110

international understanding. Vast portions of the earth, and teaming multitudes of humanity, have emerged from British colonial• ism, not in wrath, but in friendship. Every race of men is here, by choice, and of their own free will.29

However, the theme of Canadian Independence was ever

present. Had Mr. Diefenbaker been able to achieve the

virtually impossible in defining Commonwealth bonds in a

pro Western, Cold War context, a counterweight to Washington

in Canadian affairs would have been achieved.

Unfortunately for the Conservative government, Canada's

international position was not simply a question of black

and white. While Messrs. Diefenbaker and Green strove

zealously to achieve their Commonwealth dream, the reality

of Canada's continuing relationship with the United States

did not simply go away. In this sense, Canadian defence

policy posed what was probably the most perplexing problem

faced by their government. The North American Air Defence

Command (NORAD) had been established under Diefenbaker in •

1957, on an "'interim basis,'" pending the "'Conclusion of the

formal governmental agreement between the two countries .'"30

NORAD had grown naturally out of North American defensive

arrangements begun as early as 194751 and was '"an indication

of how rapidly and extensively the air defence problem was changing.'"32 it would seem reasonable to assume that the

29. Hogan, op. cit. p. 72.

30. New York Times, May 20, 1958. as cited in Conant, Melvin, The Long Polar Watch. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1962. p. 81.

31. See p. gli

32. Conant, Melvin, "'Canada and Continental Defence: An American View,"' International Journal, Vol. XV, Summer. 1960. D• 224. Ill

necessity of integrated North American air defences was

realistically accepted for what it was by the Canadian Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the Department of National Defence.

NORAD was a necessary partnership for continental defence;

a partnership to which Canada, in 1958, might still make

independent contribution through the production and employ•

ment of the most Impressive interceptor, the Avro-Arrow

CF-105.33 However, the prospect of the Arrow did not hide

the fact that Canada's importance in continental defence was

diminishing insofar as her ability to contribute anything

other than men and territory was concerned. In this light,

the much criticized relationship of the American Commanding

Officer and his Canadian Deputy was the best that could be

hoped for. As Col. Stacey was later to point out,

... NORAD may be said to represent an improvement over those remote integrated headquarters, composed of Americans and Englishmen, under which large Canadian forces served in Italy and Northwest Europe in 1943-45.34

Indeed, considering the fact that the defensive reality

of North America altered radically with the explosion into

space of the Soviet Sputnik before the finalization of the

NORAD agreement, to say nothing of this scientific

revolution's obvious affect on the international position of

powers like Canada,35 NORAD may be considered a not ungenerous

33. Ibid, p. 225.

34. Stacey, CP., "'Twenty-one Years of Canadian-American Military Co-operation, 1940-1961,'" Canada - United States Treaty Relations, ed. David R. Deener. Duke University Press, Durham, 1963. p. 115.

35. Maclean' s contended that ICBMs made Canada a "'non-power."' 112

arrangement in terms of the authority given its Canadian "

Deputy Commanding Officer;36 and as such an unprecedented

recognition of American - Canadian interdependence on the

part of the United States.

Bs that as it may, as suggested elsewhere,3? the

Diefenbaker government's acceptance of Norad was not on the

same basis as that of the Canadian military. Certainly, the

Conservative administration did not realize the political

implications of NORAD when they agreed to it. General Pearkes,

the Canadian Defence Minister from 1957 to 1960, probably

accepted the conclusions of his departmental advisors much

In the same way as he would have accepted staff advice in

the army, without thought as to possible domestic reper•

cussions. Mr. Diefenbaker, although not the defence "expert"

36. In the absence of the commander In chief (NORAD), "it is within the power and duty of his Canadian deputy to alert the air defence forces of the entire continent / ...." Conant, Melvin, The Long Polar Watch. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1962. p. 81.

37. See pp. 60-61 The source referred to there is the same source described in Chpt. V. ff 27. In addition, it is worth noting Peter Newman's position. Newman's contention that, "'Instead of reviewing the terms of the NORAD agreement when he came to office John Diefenbaker, who was then acting as his own Secretary of State for External Affairs, merely gave his verbal approval of the scheme to John Poster Dulles. He consulted neither his cabinet colleagues nor officials of the External Affairs Department," seems somewhat overstated. Who brought the agreement to Diefenbaker's attention? There is nothing in his parliamentory record prior to 1957 to suggest that he considered himself an expert on defense matters; Is Newman's statement to suggest that he was advised on this matter by no one? Newman's further reference to the ignorance of Sydney Smith and the External Affairs Department as to the "'Compact's details'" well into 1958 seems hardly credible, see, Newman, Peter C, Renegade in Power. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963. p. 347. 113

in his party, had been critical of the adequacy of existing

defensive arrangements when in opposition.38 Mr. Smith at

the time was floundering in his new duties as External

Affairs Minister and thus, was hardly in a position to exercise

an influence one way or the other. The general confusion of

the Diefenbaker administration is evidenced by their pathetic

public defence of NORAD both prior to and subsequent to the

exchange of notes between Canada and the United States

formalizing that arrangement in May, 1958.

Unfortunately, unconvincing and often conflicting statements were made by the Conservative government in support of the agreement. Not only did the Defence Minister and the Minister for External Affairs disagree as to whether the NORAD agreement required parliamentary approval, but each reversed his own position before the agreement was finally submitted for debate.-39

As the government's NORAD policy was quite defensible and

as the government's chief military advisor, General Charles

Foulkes,4^ chairman of the Chiefs of Staff committee, was

38. Mr. Diefenbaker in fact suggested that the Dew Line was obsolete. If this was anything other than a debating trick, he may well have been more receptive to the proposals of the Canadian defence establish• ment than he otherwise would have been, see, Canada, Plouse of Commons Debates, 1956. pp. 5319-5323.

39. Conant, op. cit. p. 85.

40. "The decision to create a North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) owed much to the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Charles Foulkes, turning his powers of persuasion upon inexperienced ministers immediately after the change of government in 1957."' Eayrs, James, The Art of the Possible, p. 97. 1114-

y

quite articulate in the defence of his policies,4-'- it must

be assumed that reasons other than the government's lack of

experience accounted for their Ineptitude in handling their

public defence of NORAD. Perhaps the reason lies in Mr.

Diefenbaker's too late realization of the essential

incompatibility between his NORAD policy and his determination

to maintain and strengthen Canadian independence of the

United States. Perhaps the storm of public protest that

broke about their heads caused the Conservatives to hesitate;

although with their fantastic majority in the House, they

could have easily ridden out any storm. Their vacillation

in this matter simply resulted in encouraging their critics,

who ranged "from undergraduates to retired generals,"1 to

become "more vocal with the passage of time."'42 It may be

contended that the diverse positions taken by the Minister

of National Defence and External Affairs indicated an initial

lack of co-ordination between the two departments, but

nothing comparable to the later rivalry of these two depart•

ments was then evident. There is no doubt that Mr. Green,

and probably the Prime Minister himself, came to regard

NORAD as the most serious mistake of their government.43 At

41. Poulkes, Charles, Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear ^ Age. Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1961.

42. Stacey, op. cit. p. 115.

43. Reliable Cabinet Source. 115

any rate, the curious picture emerges of Mr. Diefenbaker

attempting to protray NORAD as something it never was, part

of NATO. Typical was his 1961 position,

On June 12, 1961, Prime Minister Diefenbaker again put forward the Canadian view of the preferred relationship of NORAD to NATO when ^ he spoke of the defensive strength of NATO. and "particularly of NORAD under it."'44

Prom the day the Soviet Sputnik was launched into outer

space, the threat of manned bombers decreased and the threat

of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) Increased.45

Indeed, this event sharply focused the position of the Avro

Arrow,

... in the fall of 1957, a flying model [of the Avro ArrowJ was put into the air, on the day the Russians exploded their first Sputnik into space.46

The sad history of the Arrow, a history not unrepresentative

of Canadian defence production,47 is succinctly presented

by one expert on the subject,

At its inception in the early 1950s, the Arrow interceptor (CP-105) of A.V. Roe of Canada, Ltd., was perhaps superior in design to interceptors then being planned by U.S. companies. Its performance, especially that of its jet engine, was regarded as a con• siderable improvement over existing and pro• jected aircraft, and Its cost of production was expected to be substantially lower. In short, the Arrow promised to be a high- performance vehicle that would be a partic• ularly important contribution to the defence

44. Conant, op. cit. p. 87. (it may be noted that Mr. Dief- enbaker's strange concept of the NORAD-NATO relation• ship was- enunciated as early as May, 1958).

45. Eayrs, James, Northern Approaches. Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1961. pp. 21-30.

46. "The Atlantic Report: Canada,"1 The Atlantic, Vol. 203, June, 1959. p. 20.

47. Por example, the Canadian Army's "Bobcat."' 116

of North America and, possibly, of Western Europe as well. Unfortunately, the length of time it took to move beyond the design and prototype stage proved excessive. In the interval the major improvements introduced into Soviet long-range bombers dictated a large number of changes in the Arrow's electronic equipment and weapons. Since this equipment, of special and advanced design, could be acquired only from the United States, the estimates of per unit cost also had to be raised very substantially making the air• craft no longer competitive. Finally, the delay in putting the Arrow into quantity pro• duction meant that U.S. interceptors of superior design would be available earlier.4® ^

By 1959, the Canadian government had poured about $700

millions Into the development of the Arrow, in defence in•

dustries49 directly employing 14,000 workers and affecting

the jobs of at least that many again.SO However, the

Canadian government could not afford the luxury of producing

an apparently obsolete and unmarketable aircraft especially

when the 1958-59 budget forecast a $648 million deficit.51

On February 20, 1959, Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced

the replacement of the Avro Arrow to the House of Commons,

The government has carefully examined and re-examined the probable need for the Arrow aircraft and Iroquois engine known as the CF-105 in the light of all the information available concerning the probable nature of the threats to North America in future years, the alternative means of defence againstrsuch threats, and the estimated costs thereof. The conclusion arrived at is that the development of the

48. Conant, op. cit. p. 155. y

49. Harbron, op. cit. p. 357 (Harbron's figure represents the extreme of estimates that begin around $400 million).

50. Stacey, op. cit. p. 129.

51. Budget figures taken from Newman, op. cit. p. 129. 117

Arrow aircraft and Iroquois engine should be terminated now.52

... the government has decided to introduce the Bomarc guided missile and the Sage electronic control and computing equipment into the Canadian air defence system ....53

The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is, therefore, examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc ... defensive weapons ....54

Again the government failed to get its message across to

the public.55 The degree of public shock and indignation

52. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1958. p. 1221. I/' 53. Ibid. p. 1222.

54. Ibid. p. 1223.

55. Professor Eayrs contends (a view that in its Implications rather sharply contrasts with Conant's above cited description of the Arrow's development) that, "'Certainly the Government of the day made no effort to tell Canadians what really happened. What had really happened ... was something like this. The Arrow program began as an airframe program only; into the airframe was to be fitted an American or British engine, an American weapons system (the Sparrow II), and an American communications and electronic system. In the expectation but without any guarantee that these vital components would be acceptable and available, the work of the CF-105 was put In hand. A year or two later a Canadian firm came up with what seemed like a promising engine for the Arrow, and the Canadian government ... decided to develop not only the airframe but the engine as well. Meanwhile the Sparrow II program was dropped by the U.S. Navy, and the Canadian government decided to take it over too. Finally, the American communication and electronic system on which the government had counted was also abandoned; when it too was taken over, the Canadian authorities found themselves...'(paying]entire cost of the air• craft."7 (Conant's account complete's this sorry tale). Eayrs, James, "'Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues,"' The United States and Canada, ed. J.S. Dickey, Columbia University, The Twenty-fifth American Assembly, 1964. Chpt. 2. p. 12. 118

at this unusual admission of reality on the part of their

government was exacerbated by the hasty substitution of

the nuclear armed Bomarc-B missile for the abandoned Arrow.

As the manned bomber decreased in terms of defensive value,

United States defence planners were developing the Semi-

Automatic Ground Environment system (SAGE) which Involved

a more sophisticated employment of the radar-net system.

The weapon designed for SAGE was the Bomarc missile.

Meivin Conant contends that despite the well known fact that

the Bomarc-B was still, "'the subject of intense controversy

within the United States Government,"1

... the Canadian Government, to cover its disappointment over the enforced cancellation of the Arrow, too quickly accepted a modest v BOMARC missile and site program.56

Mr. Conant appears to give only a partial explanation of

Canada's acceptance of the Bomarc program - the immediate

need for a defence policy. It may be assumed that if there

was "Intense controversy"1 over the Bomarc within the American

government, there was none within the councils of the

Canadian-American military leaders concerned, and that

Diefenbaker simply compounded his earlier errors by again

accepting their policies.

It is from this point that an obvious split is apparent

in the Conservative cabinet. Mr. Green made no secret of

his opposition to the acquisition of nuclear armed Bomarcs

56. Conant, "'Canada and Continental Defence: An American View,"' p. 225. 119

or to the offensive role (deterrent role) of European based

Canadian air squadrons.5? The essential issue, as far as

Mr. Green was concerned, lay in the seeming Irreconcilability

of Canada's role in NORAD and NATO and in the world's dis•

armament ^ councils. Charles B. Lynch, one of Canada's leading

journalists, explained the contradiction between Canada's

defence and foreign policies thusly,

Mr. Green says we should believe the Russians want to disarm ... but defence planners refer to them as the potential enemy. Mr. Green says there must be no more nuclear tests. At the same time the defence department orders weapons that can only be developed through further nuclear tests. Mr. Green says there can be no survival in nuclear war. But the defence department denies this and launches a program for national survival after bomb attacks. Mr. Green advocates an independent attitude in foreign affairs. But defence policies lead the country into increasing subservience to U.S. Mr. Green says policies are made in the department of external affairs and not in the department of-defence. Yet .... official policy is increasingly by two great military alliances - North American Air Defence Command, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.58

Mr. Green might question James Eayrs' assertion that,

"'despite the new importance of the military establishment

in the making of national policy, the traditional ideal of

civilian supremacy was in no way impaired."'59 Indeed, it

57. Eayrs, James, The Art of the Possible, p. 97.

58. A report of Charles B. Lynch's address to the Men's Canadian club of Vancouver, March 22, 1960 - "' 'Back Green's foreign policy stand,' 111 Vancouver Province, March 23, 1960.

59. Eayrs, op. cit 120

is reliably contended that the view of the Department of

External Affairs, at least during Mr. Green's tenure as

Minister, was that there was a constant political conspiracy

between the Canadian and United States military; an extra-

governmental arrangement that formulated defence policies

without regard to either the Department of External Affairs

or the State Department.60 This view of course may simply

represent a rationalization of the weakness of the External

Affairs' point of view within the Cabinet as against that

of National Defence.

The amazing thing in retrospect is that Mr. Diefenbaker

was able to pursue so long a defence and external policy so

diverse in their implied views of Canada's international

position. Mr. Douglas Harkness, Conservative Defence

Minister after General Pearkes' retirement, perceptively

portrayed the reality of Canada's position - a reality that

was reflected in his policies - when he declared,

Devoid of our unique influence in Washington and deprived of the sources of Intelligence which makes us one of the better informed middle powers ... we should be relegated to the rear ranks of the neutral chorus. At the same time, no country of remotely comparable power has Canada's opportunity to exercise influence in Washington and NATO. The responsible player in the international game makes the most of the cards he has been dealt. We should invite jeers rather than cheers if we attempted to play India's game with Canada's hand.6.1

60. Reliable Cabinet Source.

61. As cited in Conant, The Long Polar Watch, p. 117. 121

Mr. Diefenbakerrs foreign policy view was articulated by

Mr. Green during the 1960 Supply Debate on External

Affairs. Professor Spencer described Mr. Green's remarks

thusly,

He prefaced his tour d'horizon with two general points. "Canada,"'' he declared, "has only friends and no enemies,"1 a statement which was at best misleading in view of the political reality of the great global conflict, and the sharp differences over trading relationships and defence arrangements to be negotiated with friends. His second point was that the time had come for Canada to re• nounce the role of "honest broker"' and to take an Independent approach,'" above all, using Canadian common sense,'".a view that was likely to be interpreted as indicating a desire to pursue a politique de grandeur in defiance of the limitations Imposed by Canada's status as a middle power.62

Professor Spencer's rather tentative criticisms point to the

exact position of Mr. Green. The remarks of a member of

the Diefenbaker government suggest that the formulators of

Canadian foreign policy did indeed have a curious view of

the world; Canada's diminishing position within a changing

world power structure was accepted - she was viewed as the

world's '"ninth1" ranking power,63 but as still the world's

62. Spencer, Robert, "External Affairs and Defence,'" Canadian Annual Review For 1960, ed. J.T. Saywell. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961. p. 85.

63. They saw a clearly definable division between the super, great, middle and small powers. The super-powers were the United States and the Soviet Union. The great powers were the United Kingdom, Franee, West Germany, China, Japan and India. Canada was the world's "leading middle power1". 122

"leading middle power"' (unfortunately this writer was given

no intimation as to how the Diefenbaker administration

managed to solve the problem of accurate power classification,

a problem whose solution has defied all students of the

subject). On the other hand, it was contended that as

Canada's real power diminished, her international stature

increased, and as Canada's stature increased, so then,

they reasoned, did Canada's role on the world stage expand.

And further, it was held that the basis of Canada's role

in international politics was her "Independence" per se.64

Thus, Canadians were presented with the dichotomy between

a realistic defence policy that sought to fully utilize

Canada's natural assets and an external policy that

ludicrously portrayed Canada and the world,

... in tints so roseate that it often gave the impression that Mr. G-reen was dealing with another country, another planet and another age.65

Mr. Diefenbaker indeed displayed a remarkable talent in

that he managed to keep the lid on his cabinet for as long

as he did.

It was in 1960, that a third force began to make itself

felt within the Cabinet. This group apparently realized

that Canadian economic independence of the United States

was not to be achieved through Britain and the Commonwealth;

64. Reliable Cabinet Source.

65. Toronto Star, as cited in, Spencer, Robert A., "'Parliament and Foreign Policy, 1960," International Journal, Vol. XV, Autumn, 1960. p. 315. 123

a view that found substantiation in the failures of 1957

Mont Tremblant Conference, the 1958 Commonwealth Economic

Conference, and the Canadian trade mission to Britain to

produce anything of substance. The view of this group was

retrospectively portrayed by Mr. Alvin Hamilton, Conservative

Minister of Agriculture, as seeking to balance the vertical

pull of economic relations with the United States by means

of a trade policy of "'horizontal expansionism"^6 into the

world's markets. The emergence of this group, whose views

apparently did not substantially alter the Commonwealth

faith of Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Green, was heralded by the

appointment of Mr. George Hees as Minister of Trade and

Commerce and by his Export Promotion Conference of December,

I960.67 The Victoria Daily Times in commenting on Mr.

Hees' promotion policies perhaps illustrated a more general

problem,

However, until the government had a well-defined trade policy, business must remain doubtful and uncertain about Its own plans. Exhortation and pep talks from Mr. Hees are all very well, and conducted with his usual enthusiasm - but they are no substitute for government policy.68

If the business community was disturbed by a lack of

government policy, or more kindly, an inadequately

66. Hamilton, Alvin, a speech given in Vancouver on April 15, 1965 to a public meeting sponsored by the Young Progressive Conservatives of British Columbia.

67. Canadian Trade Commissioners were recalled to Ottawa to meet with Canadian business men in an effort to promote Canadian exports.

68. As cited in, Porster, Donald, "'The Economy,"' Canadian Annual Review For 1961, ed. J.T. Saywell, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962. p. 224.

i 12k

articulated trade policy, how then did a Canadian public

react to the foreign policy confusion so manifest in the

inability of Mr. Diefenbaker to reconcile the public

positions of Messrs. Harkness and G-reen? Perhaps the

public criticism of a substantial part of the McGill Univer•

sity faculty in December, 1961, provides some Indication;

they said in part,

We believe that your civil defence policies encourage complacency with regard to Canada's ability to survive and defend herself ....

We are perplexed by the ambiguity of your policy with respect to the arming of Canadian forces with nuclear weapons.

[on the Berlin crisis] We hold that lack of candor in this vital matter does not assist international understanding.69

Apart from the fact that such a memorial was remarkable In

itself as Canadian universities have seldom employed such

practices, it gains'.greater significance in that it was

representative of a national insecurity; the insecurity

obvious in the election of 1958 had been exacerbated by the

actions of the Diefenbaker government. The Canadian public

may well have pressured for "great independence and more

Canadian initiative,"' in international affairs, "'all to be

extravagantly publicized,"70 but what they sought was

leadership in terms of definable and positive policies.

69. "McGill Faculty Members Criticize Foreign Policy," Montreal Star, December 15, 1961.

70. Lyon, Peyton V., op. cit. 125

The electorate at large,, or at least the urban portions of

It, was not so unsophisticated as to be long reassured by

the bland and endless reassurances emanating from the offices

of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for

External Affairs. The Canadian public might well have

accepted Mr. Green's contention that,

No other nation in the world is in a

finer position to provide world leadership, 1

had not the inconsistencies in the Conservative position been

so forcefully driven home by the Diefenbaker - created

defence policy dilemma. They were only perplexed by a

governmental response that only tended to cloud the real

issues with a seemingly endless reiteration of Canadian

virtues, and postures of "'complacent self-esteem."' George

Bain of the Globe and Mail described this governmental

attitude as, ... an infinite belief in the rightness and goodness of every Canadian undertaking, and arising from that, an excessive readiness gratuitously to bestow home truths on others for their own good.72

The personal limitations of Messrs. Diefenbaker and Green73

are particularly evident in their inability to provide

anything approaching the leadership national unity demanded

of them. Incoherent and unarticulated policies, domestic

71. "Green Sees Canada as World Leader,"' Vancouver Sun, November 23, 1959.

72. Bain, George, "'A. Nudge Prom the President,"' Toronto Globe and Mail, May 19, 1961.

73. See pp. 85-98 126 and foreign, resulted in the alienation of Quebec, most of the provincial governments, the bulk of Canada's urban population and of Canada's two best friends, the United States and the

United Kingdom. In the end, these policies resulted in the defeat of the government they sought to sustain and in the partially paralyzing disunity of the political machine that had brought them to power.

Perhaps the least fortunate aspect of Conservative foreign policy lay in the fact that Britain's preoccupation with her

European destiny denied Messrs. Diefenbaker and Green the opportunity of testing, in practical terms, their Commonwealth dreams. The hard fact, assuming that the Canadian administration had until then somehow missed the point, of the Macmillan gov• ernment's interest in negotiating entry into the European

Economic Community (E.E.C.) was driven home at the meeting of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council at London in

September, I960. The interest of the British government in

E.E.C. was easily explained; and readily appreciated by many

Canadian economists - for example, S.P.Kaliski contended that,

The United Kingdom's reasons for wishing to join the Common Market are many, complex, and perhaps largely political. But they do have an economic component also. The United Kingdom has in the post-war period repeatedly suffered balance of payment crises. It has also been dissatisfied with its rate of growth. It seems to be the view pf tje British govern• ment, and they should know better than we, that these two related difficulties may be solved by joining the Common Market. Ih-

7lj.. Kaliski, S.F., "Canada, the United Kingdom and the Common Market," International Journal, Vol. XVII, Winter, 1961-62. p. 21i. 127

Indeed, the British government would most probably have

accepted the Economist1 s contention that, "'Both Britain

and the Commonwealth will lose if Britain remains cut off

from the six."'"73 The Canadian view of Britain and Europe

was the exact opposite, and was pugnaciously presented at

that September, 1960, meeting by Donald Fleming and Gordon

Churchill, Canadian Minister of Finance, and Trade and

Commerce respectively. Not only did the Canadians vigorously

oppose even an investigation of E.E.C. possibilities by

Britain,76 Mr. Fleming publicly threatened economic

retaliation,

If there is any tampering with the advantages now enjoyed by Canadian exports in the United Kingdom market, we would have to re-examine the terms of access of British goods to the Canadian market.77

Canadian policy makers were alarmed by what they feared

might be the economic consequences for Canada if Britain

joined E.E.C. These fears were real enough as the United

Kingdom market was for Canada second only to the United

States (the fact that it was a poor second probably made it

more, rather than less, important). Further, Britain was

central to Canada's hopes for expanded Commonwealth trade;

without the British market, the Imperial Preference system

was meaningless. If the United Kingdom entered the Common

75. Economist, The Commonwealth and Europe, as cited in Spencer, op. cit. p. 134.

76. Spencer, Robert, "External Affairs and Defence,"1 Canadian Annual Review For 1960. p. 135.

77. as cited in Ibid. 128

Market and Canada's access to the British market was

adversely affected (as it certainly would have been) and

given the improbability of Canada's being able to seek

associate status within E.E.C, then, the automatic result

would be to push Canada into a greater economic dependence

on the United States - this in itself would go a long way

in explaining why the E.E.C became something of an anathema

to the Diefenbaker administration.

John W. Holmes perhaps overstated the case when he

claimed that,

... the unprofitable attitude on the part of Canadians to the political consequences of the completed Common Market is one of defeatism.78

The Diefenbaker government's attitude was unprofitable; it

was slightly ridiculous for the Canadian government to

threaten Britain publicly with the economic consequences

of her proposed course of action (the Canadian market

contained but 18,000,000 potential consumers, the Common

Market contained 170,000,000 potential consumers). However,

there were questions beyond the purely economic. Indeed,

it is reliably contended that Canadian policy formulators

regarded the entire European policy of the Macmillan govern•

ment as deluded. To the Diefenbaker government, the

Macmillan "Vision1" of leading the United Kingdom back to a

Europe that she would dominate politically, could never

78. Holmes, John W., '"Political Implications of the European Economic Community,'" Queen's Quarterly, Vol. LXIV, Spring, 1962. p. 10. 129

succeed. If Macmillan persisted, the Commonwealth would

dissolve and all that Britain would achieve in the process

would be the unenviable fate of becoming a "'fifth wheel1" on

a de Gaulle cart.179 Thus, the Canadian government's position

was not devoid of devotion to the Motherland; not only the

Commonwealth (and Canada) but the United Kingdom, per se,

had to be saved from the ill-conceived policies of the

United Kingdom government.®0

That Mr. Diefenbaker was determined to preserve the

Commonwealth is testified to by his stand at the London

Prime Ministers' Conference in March, 1961. It is reason•

ably confirmed that he played a major role in forcing South-

Africa's withdrawl from the Commonwealth, in the face of

initial British opposition.8! The comments of the Union of

South Africa's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister give

79. Reliable Cabinet Source. - this source further contends that the Macmillan government was in part motivated by the fear that if the United Kingdom did not succeed in becoming part of E.E.C. that the United States would "'dump her in favour of a partnership with West Germany. The Canadian government regarded this British premise as part and parcel of Macmillan's general delusion; American public opinion the Canadian leaders contended would never allow such a British fate at the hands of the U.S. administration.

80. It Is worth noting that had the constitutional status of the United Kingdom been altered, as It would have been by her membership in E.E.C, Canada would have faced the problem of repatriating her constitution and of opening up the entire question of her federal structure at a very inopportune time.

81. Spencer, Robert, "External Affairs and Defence,'" / Canadian Annual Review For 1961, ed. J.T. Saywell. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962. pp. 116-118. 130

some intimation of the magnitude of Mr. Diefenbaker's

role,

... Mr. Verwoerd announced that South Africa would withdraw its application for continued membership. At the same time ... he denounced "'the spirit of hostility and even of vindictiveness" shown at the meeting, and warned that "this free association of states cannot hope to survive if ... Common- wealth Prime Ministers are going to continue the practice of interfering in each other's domestic affairs." In subsequent statements he accused Mr. Diefenbaker and certain Afro- Asian Prime Ministers of being "headstrong,"1 and their policies "'childish"1 and "Immature."5 Mr. Louw, the South African Foreign Minister, went further in charging Mr. Diefenbaker with "pandering to the anti-South African campaign" because he had been losing ground in Canada.82

Indeed, Mr. Diefenbaker had performed the Commonwealth an

unexpected service, the Economist saw his role as, "merci•

fully preventing a cleavage on the simple basis of

pigmentation."'83

The question is, why did Mr. Diefenbaker elect to play

such a role? The policies of apartheid were not new; they

had appeared as early as 1949 with the government of Dr.

Malan. Nor was Mr. Diefenbaker's personal abhorrence of

such policies new. The Commonwealth was becoming increas•

ingly multi-racial, but it was not newly multi-racial.

The record of the Diefenbaker government on the question of

apartheid to March, 1961, had been much like that of the

preceeding Liberal government, indifferent.84 The South

82. Ibid, p. 118.

83. As cited in Ibid.

84. Anglin, Douglas, "'Canada and Apartheid,"' International Journal. Vol. XV, Spring, 1960. pp. 122-137. 131

African Foreign Minister had made a telling, if cynical,

point when he suggested that Mr. Diefenbaker needed a

personal triumph for domestic political reasons; a

Canadian general election was not improbable in 1961 and

the past November had shown Mr. Diefenbaker's Gallup Poll

rating to be badly slipping.83 The fact that Canada's

rating among members of the Afro-Asian bloc would soar as

a result of such a stand also could be reasonably expected.86

While such mundane considerations can not be ignored, it

would seem reasonable to assume that it was the British

stand on Europe that caused Mr. Diefenbaker to at last

embrace Commonwealth multi-racialism as the only positive

course remaining in the preservation of the Commonwealth.

Indeed, such a course of action might have been expected to

85. In answer to the question, "'If a federal election were held today which party's candidate do you think you would favour?" the Conservative rating had slipped from a high of 57% in January, 1959, to 39% in November, 1960. - figures are cited in Saywell, John, Parliament and Polities'" Canadian Annual Review For 1960, ed. J.T. Saywell..Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962. p. 60.

86. The result was as anticipated, "'Canada is moving to a restored position of prestige, responsibility and strength at the United Nations with its overt stand against racial discrimination in South Africa.'" Creery, Tim, "'Canada Prestige Improves,'" Vancouver Province, March 23, 1961. 132

strengthen Canada's hand In opposing Britain's entry into

E.E.C.

In spite of the fact that Canada's constant opposition

to Britain's moves toward membership in the E.E.C. had

produced a certain amount of bad grace on both parts,

relations between the Diefenbaker and Macmillan governments

were not openly frigid until the third annual meeting of

the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Committee held at

Accra in September, 1961. In fact, the Diefenbaker govern• ment had generally supported British initiative in both

NATO and the UN.87 The tenor of the Accra meeting seems

to be aptly portrayed by its final communique,

Representatives of the United Kingdom reviewed the various reasons that had led them to make the application [for member• ship in E.E.C.J . All the other Commonwealth representatives expressed grave apprehension. They reaffirmed the value and importance they attach to traditional Commonwealth trading arrangements .... Most of the Commonwealth countries questioned whether the United Kingdom with its other international and domestic obligations, could possibly secure in the proposed negotiation an agreement which would protect Commonwealth interests adequately and effectively .... Because of the inseparable nature of economic and political relationship within the Commonwealth and because of the political and institutional object• ives of the European Economic Community and the terms of the Treaty of Rome, it was feared by other Commonwealth countries

87. Canada had supported the Macmillan position on the 1960 Summit Meeting and Mr. Diefenbaker's September, 1960, speech at the UN, insofar as It dealt with the question of Soviet neo-colonial- ism, was in part motivated by a desire to retaliate for repeated Soviet attacks on British colonial policy. 133

that United Kingdom membership in the European Economic Community would fundamentally alter the relationship between the United Kingdom and Common• wealth countries. Indeed, this relationship might be so imperilled as to weaken the cohesion of the Commonwealth as a whole and thus reduce its effectiveness as a world instrument for understanding, prosperity and peace.88

It is not at all difficult to Imagine that this communique

was as reported, largely of Canadian composition,®9 as it

perfectly represents the Canadian position on Britain and

E.E.C. Nor is it difficult to imagine that Messrs. Fleming

and Hees, the Canadian representatives, gave a good account

of themselves in presenting most forthrightly the views of

their government. The curious thing is that, of all the

positions articulated at the meeting, and it is reported

that the Australian and New Zealand positions were more

extreme,90 only Mr. Hees' speech was leaked to the press;

9 92 "'deliberately,"' ! an£ by hj_s own account, distortedly,

A measure of the lack of Anglo-Canadian cordiality may be

found in the assertion of a member of the Canadian govern•

ment that the responsibility for the leakage of Mr. Hees'

speech lay with Duncan Sandys, a member of the Macmillan

government. The purpose of Mr. Sandys' action was to dis-

88. as cited in Spencer, op. cit. pp. 162-163.

89. Ibid, p. 162.

90. Reliable Cabinet Source.

91. Spencer, op. cit.

92. Ibid, p. 163. 131+

credit a Canadian position that was receiving overly

favourable publicity in the United Kingdom through the

Beaverbrook press.®3 Certainly, if this was the intention

of the Macmillan government, they built better than they

knew for not only did they succeed in their intention94 but

they contributed to the general disenchantment of the

Canadian press and thus, most probably to the growing dis•

enchantment of the Canadian electorate with the Diefenbaker

government's attitude toward Britain and E.E.C. It is

hardily possible that the electorate at large could have

been much consoled when even Charles Lynch reported to them,

Mr. Donald Fleming's protestations to the contrary, the fact seems to be that Canada's reputation is low Indeed ... with London.

What accounts for Canada's present low estate in London is what the British government regards as Ottawa's stubborn and obstructionist attitude toward the proposed British membership in the European Common Market.95

It was more than probable that such confirmation of Canada's

standing in London gained double significance when Mr.

Lynch pointed out that, but for the reasons, Canada's stand•

ing in Washington was identical.®6

All in all, Canada's relations with the United States

had been better than might normally have been expected,

given the Diefenbaker government's preoccupation with

93. Reliable Cabinet Source.

94. Fraser, Blair, "'Overseas Report,": Maclean's, Vol. 75, October 6, 1962. p. 2.

95. Lynch, Charles, "'Canada's In the cold, without her reputation, "r Vancouver Province, November 6, 1961.1

96. Ibid. 135

Canadian Independence, during Fresident Eisenhower's

tenure. There had been aggravations, to be certain, and \

perhaps the groundwork for the alienation of the United

States that occured during President Kennedy's tenure was

well laid. Canadian economic and trade policies certainly

contributed to misunderstanding between the two nations.

It is inconceivable that the publicly proclaimed hostility

of the Diefenbaker government to the over-presence of

American capital, much of which had been employed as risk

capital in fields that Canadians were unwilling to invest

in had created anything less than resentment among American

business interests - even though the Diefenbaker position

turned out to be much sound and fury and little substance.

Imagined American interference in Canadian trade with Peiping

had caused a good deal of loose talk about American domin•

ation in Canadian affairs, although there seems little

evidence to support such speculation.97 The fact that the y/

Diefenbaker administration did little to dispell those

popular notions did not improve the situation. Canada's

continuing trade with Cuba did not inspire a general

confidence in the soundness of Canadian policies; in spite

of the fact that that policy was most considerate of

American.interests,

97. Lyon, op. cit. pp. 25-26. Holmes, John W., "!The Relationship in alliance and in Wbrld Affairs,'" in Dickey, op. cit. Chpt. 3. p.22. For an opposing view, see, Conant, op. cit. p. 150. 136

That policy is marked by three main features. First, Canada has not joined the United States either in its embargo or boycott against Cuba, nor imposed any embargo or boycott of its own.

Second, there has been no attempt to encourage Canadian trade with Cuba ....

The third feature of Canadian policy ... is its attempt to prevent what the Prime Minister has termed "the bootlegging of goods of United States origin." *8

Further, the public "home truth" style of Mr. Green's diplomacy (Canadian diplomatic methods had been vocal and berative prior to Mr. Green's appointment but not quite as platitudinous) led the former assistant Under Secretary of

State for External Affairs to comment,

... if we in Canada want to influence the policy of the United States the least promising way to make that attempt is by public criticism. 99

These of course, were relatively minor matters in contrast to the Canadian inability to reconcile her defence and dis• armament policies, which seemed to seriously affect her ability to function as an effective partner in NORAD and in NATO. ^~®®By the end of the Eisenhower era, almost two years had elapsed between the Canada's acceptance of a

"nuclear role" for her forces in NORAD and NATO and her actual acceptance of these weapons. It can reasonably be expected that American patience was wearing thin.

98. Earys, James, Northern Approaches, p. 161.

99. Holmes, john W., "Canada and the United States in World Politics " Foreign Affairs. Vol. J4.O, October, 1961. p. 115. 100. See pp. 118-119. 137

This is not to say that the Canadian position in the

Cold War had altered. Mr. Diefenbaker never contemplated

what James Eayrs described as '"The Nostrum of Neutralism'"101

as a cure for Canadian ills. The Prime Minister's declaration

at the convocation of Michigan State University in June,

1959, remained true throughout his government's life,

'There is no neutralism in Canada's thinking or conduct. There is no weakening of support for NATO. We believe that the member nations of NATO must remain strong in defence and economically.'102

It is however to say that there was a considerable difference

between being an ally and being an effective and dependable

ally. (It should be noted that the personal relationships

of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy with Prime Minister

Diefenbaker simply obscure the issue.103)

President Kennedy's intention during his May 16-18,1961,

visit to Ottawa may well have been to quell '"the surge of

an ti-Americanism and ...[bring] Canada safely back to the

fold,"1 as some American newspapers speculated had been the

result104 However, the response of the Canadian government 105 to his three major proposals was hardly a testimonial

101. Eayrs, op. cit. pp. 168-176.

102. Phillips, Bruce, "'Canada will play full part,'" Vancouver Province, June 8, 1959. - the Diefenbaker govern- y ment never considered that neutralist opinion in Canada ever involved more than a small, if articulate, minority of the Canadian people.

103. The personal relations of Eisenhower and Diefenbaker were generally aaVmiable; those of Kennedy and Diefenbaker were indifferent to unfriendly, see, "'In Canada, Ike mends Fences,'" Life Magazine, Vol. 45. July 21,1958. p. 21., Lyon, op. cit. p. 112., Newman, op. cit. pp. 264-267. 104. Spencer, op. cit. p. 136. 105. Canada, Debates of the Senate, 1961. pp. &85-690. to his success. President Kennedy's request for Canadian partnership in the Alliance for Progress program in Latin

America was not new and, less than a month before, had received this curious response from Mr. Green,

I do suggest to the honorable members that they give this whole question deep thought and that they discuss it with their constituents. It would be a big step in Canadian foreign policy if we were to join the Western Hemisphere organization. I think the decision should be taken only when it is fairly clear that the majority of the Canadian , people are in favour of this being done.

As it may be contended that the Canadian people are so divorced from Latin America, as a whole, as to have no interest in it; the Canadian answer to Mr. Kennedy was,

"no". Mr. Kennedy's second proposal dealt with an increase in the conventional and nuclear capacity of NATO. Mr.

Diefenbaker*s indecision on the nuclear issue was constant until he in fact decided against the American position and that of his own Minister of National Defence in February of , 107

1963. As to Mr. Kennedy's offer of a NATO nuclear navy, the Canadian position was constant (whether the force advocated was made up of Polaris-bearing submarines or, as was later brought forth, of nuclear armed surface vessels);

Canada never ceased to regard this as a device to further strengthen the American control of NATO.10®President

Kennedy's third proposal was an expanded Canadian foreign

106. Canada, House of Commons Debates. 1961. p. l4.O27-I4.O28

197. See pp. 1-2.

108. Reliable Cabinet Source. 139

aid program. In foreign aid, Mr. Diefenbaker was content

to rest on his laurels; he summarily rejected'the President's

proposed one per cent, of gross national product foreign

aid scheme as "too high and something we cannot accept.'"109

Canada, under Mr. Diefenbaker, was at best a reluctant

ally for the United States and within NATO. The Canadian

position was well illustrated by the Berlin Crisis of July,

1961. President Kennedy's reaction to this new threat to

West Berlin, and to Allied rights therein, involved the

spending of an additional $3.5 billion on defence, an

Increase in active armed forces strength of 217,000 men,

and a speed up in civil defence preparations. Canada was

informed of this decision on July 21. By July 27, the

Diefenbaker government had done no more than publicly approve

the United States position. The Canadian state of prepared•

ness was illustrated by Mr. Harkness when interviewed in

Vancouver on July, 27,

Will Canada increase its armed forces? - "No decision has been made."1

Will there be conscription? - "!No decision but it's unlikely.";

Will Canada accept nuclear weapons? - "'No decision and I don't know when one will be made."HO

In fact, there was no Canadian move to strengthen her NATO

position until September when Parliament reconvened.

109. Spencer, op. cit. p. 136.

110. "'Canada Taking No Crisis Stand,"' Vancouver Sun, July 27, 1961. 11x0

Caution and coolheadedness are admirable traits in crises

situations; however, they are only appropriate in the age

of thermonuclear warfare if the adversary is playing a

limited game. Fortunately the Soviet Union was playing a

limited game; fortunately also, an immediate American res• ponse may have stilled any thoughts the Soviets had of

extending that game; and finally, it was fortunate indeed

that the defence of the Western world had not been dependent

on a Canadian response, impaired by the fear of the Diefen• baker administration of automatically .seconding, any American

lead lest Canada appear subservient to the United States.

A rather loose parallel could be drawn between the

Diefenbaker government's stand on Berlin (and later on Cuba)

and the position of the Mackenzie King government some forty

years before on Chanak. The crises were essentially different,

but the issues were essentially the same. The issue was the

refusal of the Canadian government to automatically respond with a "Ready, aye, ready;"1 the cause was the same, Canadian

independence. The difference lay in the magnitude of the

crises Involved, and in the irony of historical development..

The Liberals had succeeded in removing the British threat

to Canada's independent development, only to draw closer

to the United States and thereby replace the British threat

with an American one. The fate of John Diefenbaker was in part a reflection of that Liberal record.

The Cuban crisis of October 23, 1962, which involved the

direct confrontation of the Soviet Union by the United States

over Cuban missile sites demonstrated the extent which,

"'Canada was less enthusiastically committed than the United 141

States to continental defense.'"111 Surely, it may be

reasonably assumed that the patience of the United States

administration with the Diefenbaker government broke here.

Canada must have appeared as an unreliable ally to American

policy makers confronted with momentous task of facing down

the Soviets over Cuba. Not only did the Canadian government

refuse to put the R.C.A.P. squadrons of NORAD on emergency

alert for '"48 fateful hours'",112 but the Canadian Prime

Minister proposed an "on-site'" Inspection in Cuba, '"to

ascertain what the facts are ....m113 The Canadian duty

as the Prime Minister saw it was,

... not to fan the flames of fear but to do our part to bring about relief from the tensions, the great tensions, of the hour.114

Two days later, on October 25, Mr. Diefenbaker cautiously

sided with the United States,

I think Canadians are In general agreement that these offensive weapons, located so contiguously to our continent are a direct and immediate menace to Canada. Furthermore, they are a serious menace to the deterrent strategic strength of the whole Western Alliance on which our security is founded. The result is that a threat is posed not only to this continent but to the NATO Alliance as a whole, and indeed to all the free world, whose security depends to such an extent upon the strategic strength of the United States. The United States Government, as I have said on an earlier occasion, informed us of the facts of the situation and of the

111. Eayrs,. '"Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues.'"' p. 8.

112. Ibid.

113. '"External Affairs in Parliament,"' External Affairs, Vol. XIV, November, 196&. p. 337. 1 II}.. Ibid. li]2

course of action proposed to be taken some few hours before President Kennedy made his announc emen t. The Government commenced immediately to consider the measures that the Canadian Government and Canadian forces should take in order to be ready to deal with whatever eventualities would arise from this action. So that the attitude of the Government will be clearly understood - and again I am asking for the support of the House as a whole in this connection - we intend to support the United States and our other allies in this situation.115

The Conservative government may have been dissatisfied with

the extent of American consultation prior to the announce•

ment of the American position on October, 23, but this was

a Canadian government out of touch with a Canadian public

that gave its support to the American position116 and that

found only further reason to be disenchanted with the 11 7

leadership, or lack thereof, provided by Mr. Diefenbaker M

during "'the most frightening East-West confrontation since

the war."'118 As to the position of the United States, the remarks of

R. J. Sutherland, cited earlier,11® bear repeating,

'. In the final analysis, a Great Power will Jit take whatever action it finds necessary to the maintenance of its security. It must do this or cease to be a Great Power, and the United States is no exception.

115. Ibid, p. 338.

116. Spencer, Robert, "External Affairs' and Defence"1, Canadian Annual Review For 1962. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963. p. 134.

117. Ibid, p. 133-134.

118. Ibid, p. 124.

119. See p. 23 l>+3

The Kennedy administration had, during the 1962 election,

lent the Liberals aid in the person of Lou Harris - "the

shrewd public-opinion analyst who had tested the trends so

effectively ... during the I960 presidential campaign." 120

However, the Liberal defence policy position was not much more certain than that of the Conservatives; it was not until

January 12, 1963, that Mr. Pearson came out in favour of,

"discharging thejfnuclearjcommittments ... already accepted for

Canada."121 A member of the Diefenbaker government contends

that negotiations between Canada and the United States for the

acquisition of nuclear warheads continued until Mr. Pearson's -\ op trip to New York in the first week of January, 1963. A

strange coincidence perhaps, but it seemed as if the United

States had finally found themselves a Liberal solution to

their Diefenbaker problem. Thus, the comment of Richard Starner,

Scripps Howard columnist, who asserted of the 1963 Canadian

election,12-^ Adroit statecraft by the American State Department brought down the bumbling crypto-anti-Yankee government of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, and replaced it with a regime which promises to be

120. Newman, op. cit. p. 267.

121. Spencer, Robert, "External Affairs and Defence," 1 Canadian Annual Review for 1963* Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 19614.. p. 2«7. 122. Reliable Cabinet Source.

123. For a discussion of the events leading up to the 1963 election see, pp. 1-7* Hill faithful to the concept of Canadian- American interdependence. American intervention was coldly calculated to do precisely what it -.ph did, and it was a brilliant success.

Mr. Starner's statement of the case is an obvious over• statement only insofar as it ignores the fact that the

Conservative government would probably have fallen without the State Department's help.

Mr. Diefenbaker had returned from the Nassau Conference on January 2, 1963, convinced perhaps that his procrastination in nuclear matters had been vindicated. He was however to be put on the spot by the "rather unwelcome"1^ visit of General

Lauris Norstad, the retired SupremeiuAllied Commander Europe

(SACEURO1. At a press conference Norstad confirmed the existence of a Canadian nuclear - role commitment in NATO,

Norstad: We established a NATO requirement for a certain number of strike squadrons. This includes tactical atomic strike squadrons and Canada committed some of its forces to meet this NATO established requirement. And this we depend upon.... Reporter: Does it mean, Sir, that if Canada does not accept nuclear weapons for these aeroplanes she is not actually fulfilling her NATO commitments? Norstad: I believe that's right.

12li. as cited in, Wardell, Michael, "'Renegade In Power1 Reply to Neiijman," The Fredericton Daily Gleaner, November 16, 1963. 125. See p. 6.

126. Spencer, op. cit. p. 28k., 11+5

General Norstad further commented as to Canada's inability to fulfill that commitment in her then present circumstance,

Reporter: General, would the nuclear weapons be available to the division in case of emergency? Norstad: Yes. Reporter: How long would it take to msk e the nuclear weapons available? Norstad: ... We have a stockpile, a supply system ... to meet the requirements of the NATO forces under the NATO plans, regardless of nationality or command affiliation .... There is no proliferation as far as control is concerned, because these weapons are held in the hands of the country of their source until they are actually used. But they can be made available.... Reporter: Subject to bilateral agreement.... Norstad: Yes, this is subject to bilateral agreement. Reporter: Sir, does this mean that before Canada's NATO forces could be equipped with nuclear weapons we would have to have a bilateral agreement with the United States? Norstad: That's quite correct.... Reporter: Lacking a bilateral agreement how long does it take to train crews? Norstad: You can't train them without a bilateral agreement....127

Undoubtedly, Norstad believed in the concept of a Europe - based NATO nuclear striking force and this may account for

some of his bluntness. However, SACEUR is not an office divorced from political realities or functions, It would seem improbable that this former "boy wonder" of the United States

Air Corps would be unaware of the stand taken by the

Diefenbaker government on the question of "acquiring" nuclear

127. as cited in, Ibid, pp. 28J+-285. llj.6 weapons for Canadian forces. Nor is it probable that he was unaware of the political implications of his remarks. At whose behest then were these remarks made?

Mr. Diefenbaker countered General Norstad's position when he declared on January 21, 1963,

... At Nassau before Christmas I had discussions with the President of the United States and Prime Minister Macmillan on the grave policy questions facing the Western ,„o Alliance in the political and defence fields.

The Prime Minister saw in the Nassau Conference an ex post

Facto justification for his government's stand on not giving

Canadian NATO forces other than "blank cartridges" to fight with,12^ when he said,

It was also agreed at Nassau by the two leaders in question that, in addition to having a nuclear shield, it was important to have a non-nuclear sword and to increase the effectiveness of conventional forces available to the Alliance. It has been the policy of the Canadian government to support the build-up of conventional forces in Europe. The House will recall that, on the occasion of the Berlin crisis in the autumn of 1961, Canada increased the strength of its forces in Europe. The purpose of increasing the conventional strength is to ensure that if the Western Alliance is ever faced with aggression from its enemies it will have sufficient strenth in non-nuclear forces to avoid the disastrous choice between surrender and all-out nuclear war. 130

On the following Friday, January 25, Mr. Diefenbaker sought,

in flowing generalities, to placate not only an increasingly

restive public and Parliament but also his Defence and External

Ministers,

128. "The Nassau Meeting," External Affairs. Vol. XV, February, 1963. p. 103. 129. Newman, op. cit. p. 351+. . 130. "The Nassau Meeting, "External Affairs, p. 103. We are united in NATO. We have never and will never consent to Canada breaking any of her pledged words or undertakings. It is at ... £NAT0 Ministerial Meeting in May 3 where there will be reviewed the entire collective defence policy, that we shall secure from the other member nations their views, and on the basis of that we will be in a position to make a decision, a consistent decision, first to maintain our undertakings and secondly to execute, if that be the view, the maintenance of our collective defence. In the meantime the training of Canadian forces in the use of these weapon systems can continue. So far as NORAD is concerned I have said at the beginning of my remarks that Canada's sovereignty must be maintained. We shall continue our negoti• ations. They have been going on quite forcibly for two months or more.... There was never any concealment of the fact. We will negotiate with the United States so that, as I said earlier, in case of need nuclear war• heads will be made readily available. In other words, we will be in a position to determine finally, in the interests of Canada and our allies, the course to be followed in the light of changing circumstances in the disarmament field, which have become encouraging recently through Khrushchov's acceptance of even a minimun observation of nuclear testing. We will discuss with the nations of NATO the new concept of a nuclear force for NATO. If that concept at Nassau is carried into effect, much of our planning in the past will pass out of existence. ... It is so easy to say what should be done. Conscientiously and honestly we have tried, in the face of changing conditions, to bring about peace. We do not want to do anything at this time to rock the boat. If in the progress of disarmament it is found that we .are beginning to approach that new era that all of us look forward to, the NATO nations meeting together can make that determination in agreement that is best for each and all. If, on the other hand, there'is going to be set up a multi• lateral nuclear force, then all our planning to date, or most of it, will be-> Gf little or no con• sequence. I know they say: "Make decisions. Be concrete; be direct".... Recklessness was never evidence of decisiveness. We will, as a result of the fullest discussion and consideration, deter• mine a course which I believe now means a vast alteration in all the defensive techniques that we have accepted in the last few years, and we will come back to Parliament and place before it the considered view of this Government. 131

Washington countered with a press release issued by the

State Department which brought the tottering Diefenbaker administration to its knees. On January 29, a statement contradicting virtually the whole of the Prime Minister's position was issued; it said in part,

Shortly after the Cuban crisis in October, 1962, the Canadian government proposed confidential discussions concerning circumstances under which there might be provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces in Canada and Europe. These discussions have been exploratory in nature; the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense. The dis• cussions between the two governments have also involved possible arrangements for the provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian NATO forces in Europe, similar to the arrangements which the United States has made with many of our other NATO allies. During the debate in the House of Commons various references were made to recent di-scussions at Nassau. The agreements made at Nassau have been fully published. They raise no question of the appropriateness of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in fulfilling their NATO or NORAD obligations. Reference was also made in the debate to the need of NATO for increased conventional forces. A flexible and balanced defense requires increased conventional forces, but conventional forces are not an alternative to effective NATO or NORAD defense arrangements using nuclear-capable weapons systems. NORAD is designed to defend the North American continent against air attack. The Soviet bomber fleet will remain at least throughout this decade a significant element in the Soviet strike force. An effective continental defense against this common threat is necessary.

131. "Canada's Defence Policy." External Affairs. Vol. XV, February, 1963. p. 116. 114-9

The provisionoof nuclear weapons to Canadian forces would not involve an expansion of independent nuclear capability, or an increase in the "nuclear club." As in the case of other allies custody of U.S. nuclear weapons would remain with the U.S. Joint control!'fully consistent with national sovereignty can be worked out to cover the use of such weapons by Canadian forces. 132

Indeed, Canadian foreign policy had achieved a new mark; As

Professor Spencer was to point out,

If the foreign policy of the Diefenbaker Government has not yet resulted in disaster, it has at least led to a substantial dis• sipation of the fund of good will and prestige which the Conservatives were be• queathed in June, 1957? It is an achievement unique in Canadian annals to have alienated both London and Washington at the same time. 33

- a conservative estimate indeed.

The strange aspect of Conservative foreign policy lay In the fact they regarded their policies as reasonably successful.

Messrs. Diefenbaker and Green would never have agreed with

Professor Spencer's assertion that,

If the foreign policy of the Diefenbaker Government has not yet resulted in disaster, it has at least led to a substantial dis• sipation of the fund of good will and prestige which the Conservatives were gequeathed in June, 1957.

Yet, they would have accepted his evidence,

It is an achievement unique in Canadian annals to have alienated both London and Washington at the same time.

The chief reason for this curious Conservative reasoning perhaps lies in a vision of Canadian independence, articulated

132. as cited in, Spencer, op. cit. pp. 293-2914-.

133. Spencer, Robert in Toronto Telegram, op. cit. 150 by Mr. Green many years before, and now apparently being put into practice, however futilely, by the Diefenbaker government. This was a vision that involved more than economic

independence of the United States; it saw Canada as a great power not only through the Commonwealth but also beside the

Commonwealth and the United States. If the dichotomy between

Canada's defence and Commonwealth policies was confusing to the Canadian public, to say nothing of its effect on

Canada's friends and allies, it is not surprising that a

Conservative policy trichotomy must have seemed -totally incoherent to everyone 151 Select Bibliography

Primary Sources.

Government Documents.

1. Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, I9I41-I963.

- primarily employed were the Supply Debates on External Affairs, although other debates relating to External questions were employed. In the 191+1+-1956 period, the chief concern was the insight provided by these debates into the limitations and abilities of John Diefenbaker and Howard Green; in the 1957-1963 period, the debates are essential to a complete understanding of government policy.

2. Canada, Debates of the Senate. 1958 and 1961.

- of particular interest, the addresses of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy.

3. Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minister of Proceedings and Evidence, 1957-1962. b of particular interest, the testimonies of Sydney Smith and Howard Green.

Government Publications.

1. Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United nations (Vol. 1957 to 1962). Ottawa, Queens Printer, 1958-1963. 2. Department of External Affairs, "External Affairs " Vol. IX to XV, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1957-1963 (published monthly).

- objective and factual, and of necessity, entirely uncritical in their portrayal of Canada's external relations. They are however, of considerable value in terms of the information brought together and in their clarity of approach.

3. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada (Vol. 1957 to 1961+). Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1957-1961+.

- these volumes provide easy access to relevant statistical materials. 152

Interviews,

1. A highly placed member of the Diefenbaker administration has provided this writer with a number of Insights into the foreign policy thinking of the Diefenbaker government. Unfortunately, this writer is not at liberty to reveal the identity of his source.

2. Alvin Hamilton, Speech delivered in Vancouver, April 15, 1965, to a public meeting sponsored by the Young Conservatives of British Columbia. - Mr. Hamilton made some interesting general statements concerning economic policies formulated by the Conserv• ative administration. When pressed by this writer for clarification following his speech, Mr. Hamilton gave an impressive demonstration of the art of circumlocution.

Secondary Sources.

Books.

1. Barber, Joseph, Good Fences Make Good Neighbours. Indianapolis-New York, The Bobbs - Merrill Company, Inc., 1958. - this book is of limited value because of the space devoted to the personal experiences and other trivia. It does however, make a number of telling points with regard to problems in Canadian - American relations to 1957.

2. Conant, Melvin, The Long Polar Watch. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1962.

- an excellent study of the problems in Canadian defence policy; and of immense value in the preparation of this thesis.

3. Deener, David, R., ed., Canada - United States Treaty Relations. Durham, Duke University Press, 1963.

- Col. CP. Stacey's chapter, "Twenty-one Years, of Canadian - American Military Co-operation, 19U-0-1961," proved this collection's most valuable contribution to this thesis. k-. Dickey, John S., ed., The United States and Canada. Columbia University, The Twenty-fifth American Assembly, 196k.

- this work contains a series of stimulating chapters 153

by authors such as James Eayrs, John Holmes and Douglas La Pan. In particular, the chapter by Eayrs was of considerable value to this thesis in its analysis of the Canada-United States alliance.

5. The 25th Couchiching Confe rence, 1956: Texts of Addresses. Couchiching Conference, 1956.

- interesting not only for Maj. Gen. Macklin's charges, but also for the not too impressive showing of John Diefenbaker.

6. Dawson, R.M., The Government of Canada. Toronto. The University of Toronto Press, 195k-'

- a most impressive study of Canadian government. Professor Dawson's.discussion, quoted in this thesis, of the limitations imposed on Canadian foreign policy makers by their constitution is most valuable in its combination of clarity and brevity.

7. Eayrs, James, The Art of the Possible. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961.

- Professor Eayrs' study of the machinery of government in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy is the only one of its kind. This fact however, takes little away from the general excellence of its analysis.

8. Eayrs, James Canada in World Affairs. October 1955 to June 1957» Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959. - 'this analysis of the immediate pre-Diefenbaker period was essential in the preparation of this thesis.

9. Eayrs, James, Northern Approaches. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961. :

- a stimulating collection of Professor Eayrs' writings on external and defence questions. Of considerable value to this thesis.

10. Hogan, George, The Conservative in Canada. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963. - an attempt to articulate the principles of Canadian Sonservatism. Mr. Hogan's book was of value to this thesis, particularly in.its handling of the Common• wealth idea in Conservative thinking. Conservatives in Canada would do well to ponder Mr. Hogan's work. 151+

11. Hutchison, Bruce, The Incredible Canadian. Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., 1952. •

- of particular interest in its presentation of the events leading to Mr. St. Laurent's control of external policy formulation.

12. Hutchison, Bruce, Mr. Prime Minister. l867-1961i. Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., 1961i.

- if Mr. Hutchison's overflowing style can be ignored, his portrayal of John Diefenbaker is useful in the sense of its focus on Mr. Diefenbaker's identification with the Canadian nation and on Mr. Diefenbaker's policies as a reflection of the nation's ills - However, even this is somewhat overdone.

13. Ismay, Lord, NATO The First Five Years. 19lx9-1951u Netherlai ds, Bosch-Utrecht, 1954- - of interest because of Its portrayal of initial NATO developments.

111. Keirstead, B.S., Canada in World Affairs September 1951 to October 1953. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1555: - Of considerable value, particularly the first chapter in its consideration of domestic restrictions on Canadian foreign policy.

15. Lower, A.R.M. and Scott, F.R., Evolving Canadian Federalism. Durham, Duke University Press, 1958. - of particular value, Professor Soward's "External Affairs and Canadian Federalism," in explaining most perceptively the effect of Canada's federal structure, including and beyond the formal constitutional aspects, on the formulation of external policy.

16. Lyon, Peyton V., The Policy Question. "Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1963. - this is an interesting and provacative analysis of Canadian foreign policy in the Diefenbaker years. However, its personalized style and its criticisms of Messrs. Diefenbaker and Green to the point of malignment cause this writer to wonder as to the intentions of its author. 155

17. Mclnnis, Edgar, Canada. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959. - a general Canadian history - employed as a general reference.

18. Minmfie, James M., Peace Maker or Powder-Monkey. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, I960. - It is hard to believe that even Mr. Minifie would now support his passionate plea for Canadian neutrality or his equally passionate condemnation of the United States and its military monsters. Insofar as the pop• ularity of Minifie's book, at the time of its publication, is a testimony to a more general confusion about Canada's role in a troubled world, the book is of value.

19. NATO Information Service, The NATO Handbook: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Pari~s7 19^9. - a brief, factual account of NATO developments to the time of its publication.

20. Newman, Peter C, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963. - this book is the only available full "study" of the Diefenbaker government. Its material is of considerable value, if employed discerningly. Mr. Newman's book does Mr. Diefenbaker and his cabinet colleagues a distinct injustice, not so much in its sensationalistic pres• entation of events and characters as it does in leading the reader to unwritten conclusions by tendentious • presentation.

21. Robertson, Terence, Crisis, The Inside Story of the Suez

Conspiracy. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, I96I4..

- A eulogy of Mr. Pearson.

22. Saywell, John T., ed., Canadian Annual Review For I960, 1961, 1962. 1963. Toronto, University of Toronto Press,19^ - literal treasurehouses of materials on Canada in the years beginning I960. The entire sweep of Canadian life, political, economic and cultural, is presented. Of particular interest and value were the chapters by Robert Spencer, "External Affairs and Defence" - written with great clarity, perception and completeness considering his closeness to the events in question. 156

23. Soward, P.H. and Mclnnis, Edgar, Canada and the United Nations. New York, Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956. - an excellent analysis of Canada's policy in the UN throughout most of the Liberal period.

2l+. Soward, F.H., Canada In World Affairs. From Normandy to Paris. 19l+il--191+6. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 19^07

- of particular interest, the section dealing with Canada at the San Francisco Conference, and for the general picture presented of Canada's position in the immediate post-war world.

25. Turner, Arthur C, Bulwark of the West. Implications and Problems of NATO. Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1953.

- of particular value in its treatment of Canada's role in the establishment of NATO.

26. Underhill, Frank, In Search of Canadian Liberalism. Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1961.

- Professor Underbill's comments on Canada, the Commonwealth and the imbalance of the North Atlantic Triangle are more than perceptive.

Periodicals.

1. The Canadian Forum. Vol 36-1+2. Toronto, 1957-1963.

- this journal of Canadian affairs was of considerable value, although its coverage varies somewhat. The Canadian Calendar idea (subsequently borrowed by the Canadian Annual Review) was a particular asset.

2. Economist. Vol. 193-200. London, 1956-1963.

- this remarkable journal's coverage of Canadian affairs is not extensive; however, what is ithere is of the highest standard.

3. Maclean's Vol. 70-77. Toronto, 1957-1961+.

- the editorial sections of this magazine were often valuable in their comments on contemporary Canadian events (for example, those written by Blair Fraser) although its overall tenor was anti-Tory. Maclean's is essential if only because of the fact tnat 1£ is Canada's major magazine. 157 k. Saturday Night, Vol. 70-79. Toronto, 195661965.

- along with Maclean1s. it is essential reading in the preparation of a thesis dealing with Canadian affairs. With the exception of the short period of Arnold Edinborough's absence as editor - when it was reduced to the level of Canada Month or below - it provided in its editorial comments (Tor example, those written by Peter Stursberg) valuable insights into Canadian political affairs. Again, like Maclean's. its general tenor appears to be pro Liberal (although it is listed as an independent).

5. Time (Canadian edition). Vol. LXXIV - LXXX. 1957-1963.

- of limited value, although it did s^rve as a means of bringing certain events to this writers attention.

Articles.

1. Aitchison, J.H., "Canadian Foreign Policy In the House And On The Hustings," International Journal. Vol. XII, Autumn, 1957. 2. Anglin, Douglas, "Canada and Apartheid," International Journal. Vol. XV, Spring, I960.

3. Anglin, Douglas G., "Lester Pearson and the Office of Secretary-General," International Journal, Vol. XVII, Spring, 1962. k.. Anglin, Douglas G., "Toward A Canadian Policy On Africa, International Journal, Vol. XV, Autumn, I960.

5. "The Atlantic Report: Canada," The Atlantic. Vol. 20k, June, 1959.

6. Atwater,' James, "Do They Really Hate Us In Canada?" The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 236, April6, 1963.

7. The Bank of Nova Scotia, "A Common Market in Europe," Monthly Review. Toronto, May. 1957.

8. Brady, Alexander, "Canada and American Policies," Que en' Quarterly. Vol. LXVI, Autumn, 1959, 9. Claxton, Brooke "The Place of Canada in Post-War Organization," The Canadian Journal of Economics and political Science. Vol. X. Toronto, 19kJj..

10. Conant, Melvin, "Canada and Continental Defence; An American View, "International Journal, Vol. XV, Summer I960. 158

11. Conway, John S., "Canadian-American Relations: Co• operation or Conflict?" International Journal. Vol. XVIII, Summer, 1958. •

12. Corbett, David, "Immigration and Foreign Policy in Australia and Canada," International Journal. Vol. XIII, Spring, 1958.

13. Deane, Philip, "Canada-US; Inevitable Allies," New Republic. Vol. 136. New York, April 29, 1957. 111. Diefenbaker, The Rt. Hon. John G-., "A Climate of Progress and Prosperity," Saturday Night. Vol. 77, May 26, 1962.

15. Duffy, Robert, "Canada's Foreign Policy in Transition," International Journal. Vol. XIV, Autumn, 1959.

16. Greening, W.E., "Great Britain, U.S.A., and Canada," Contemporary Review. Vol. 187, January, 1955*

17. Greenier, David, "Trade and an Expanding Commonwealth," International Journal. Vol. XIII, Autumn, 1958. 18. Harbron, John D., "The Conservative Party and National Unity," Queen's Quarterly. Vol. LXIV, Autumn, 1962. 19. Hodgetts, J.E., "The San Francisco Conference: Old Worlds for New?" University of Toronto Quarterly. July, I9I4.5.

20. Holmes, John W., "Canada and The United States In World Politics," Foreign Affairs. Vol. liO, October, 1961.

21. Holmes, John W., "Canadian External Policies Since I9I4.5," International Journal. Vol. XVIII, Spring, 1963. 22. Holmes, John W., "The Commonwealth and Africa," International Journal. Vol. XVII, Spring, 1962. 23. Holmes, John W., "The Commonwealth: White Man's Burden or Blind Man's Bluff?" Speech to the Empire Club of Toronto. March 11, 1965 (reprinted by C.I.I.A.).

2li. Holmes, John W., "Political Implications of the European Economic Community," Queen's Quarterly. Vol. LXIV, Spring, 1962.

25. Johnson, Harry G., "Canada's Foreign Trade Problems," International Journal. Vol. XV, Summer, I960. 26. Johnson, Harry G., "Problems of Canadian Nationalism," International Journal. Vol. XVI, Summer, 1961. 159

27. Kaliski, S.F., "Canada, the United Kingdom and the Common Market," International Journal. Vol. XVII, Winter, 1961-62. 28. Keenleyside, High L., "Canada and the United States," Current History. Vol. 29, July, 1955. 29. Lyon, Peyton V., "Problems of Canadian Independence," International Journal. Vol. XVI, Summer, 1961. 30. Mclvor, R. Craig, "Canadian Foreign Trade and the European Common Market," International Journal, Vol. XIII, Winter, 1957-5^ :

31. McNaught, K.W., "Canadian Foreign Policy and the Whig Interpretation 1936^1939," Canadian Historical Assoc• iation Annual Report. 1957.

32. McNaught, Kenneth, "What the Tories Still Don't Know About Running Canada," Saturday Night. Vol..80, April, 1965. 33. Meisel, John, "Guns and Butter: Foreign Affairs in Canada's Twenty-Third Parliament," International Journal, Vol. XIII, Summer, 1958.

3k,. Meisel, John, "The June 1962 Election: Break-up of Our Party System?" Queen's Quarterly. Vol. LXIV, Autumn, 1962. 35. Mutchmor, J.R., "The Moon's the Limit," The Christian Century. Vol. 75, March 19, 1958.

3-6. Newman, Peter C, "John Diefenbaker," Maclean's. March 23, 1963. 37. Newman, Peter C, "The U.S. And Us," Maclean's. Toronto, June 6, 196k. 38. O'Hearn, Walter, "How Me Stand With the Canadians," Reporter. Vol. 18, March 6, 1958.

39. Pearson, Lester B., "A New Kind of Peace Force,". Maclean' st Toronto, May 2, 196k,. k.0. Pearson, L.B., "Some thoughts on Canadian External Relations," The Canadian Historical Association Annual Report. 195k» k.1. Pearson, The Hon. Lester B., "Tested Principles and Policies," Saturday Night. Vol. 77, May 26, 1962. 160

1±2. Porter, John "The Economic Elite and the Social Structure in Canada," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. Vol. XXIII. August. 1957.

I4.3. Raj an, M.S., "The Indo-Canadian Entente." International Journal. Vol. XVII, Autumn, 1962.

I±!±. Ritchie, Ronald S., "Problems of a defence Policy for Canada," International Journal. Vol. XIV, Summer, 1959. ii5. Sanger, Clyde, "Minority Government in Canada," Manchester Guardian Weekly. June 21, 1962.

14.6. Soward, P.H., "On Becoming and Being A Middle Power: The Canadian Experience," Pacific Historical Review. Vol. XXXII,

14.7. Spencer, Robert A., "Let's Get Rid of Our Phony Image," Toronto Telegram. March 23, 1963.

14.8. Spencer, Robert A., "Parliament and Foreign Policy, i960." International Journal. Vol. XV, Autumn, I960. 14.9. Spencer, Robert A.. "Triangle Into Treaty: Canada and the Origins of NATO," International Journal. Vol. XIV, Spring, 1959. 50. Spicer Keith, "The Administration of Canadian Columbo Plan Aid," International Journal. Vol. XVI, Spring, 1961. 51. Sutherland, R.J., "Canada's Long Term Stategic Situation," International Journal. Vol. XVII, Summer, 1962.

52. Wardell, Michael, "'Renegade in Power' Reply to Newman,"

The Fredericton Daily Gleaner, November 16, 1963.

Newspapers.

1. The Financial Post, Toronto, June, 1957- April, 1963. - not used extensively. Of particular interest as a reflection of business attitudes, if its editorial comments on Canadian foreign policy may be taken as such.

2. Toronto Globe and Mall. June, 1957- April, 1963.

- essential in the preparation of this thesis. This writer regards the Globe and Mail as Canada's finest newspaper. Its coverage of foreign affairs and the Canadian scene are excellent (for example, the columns of Walter Gray and Robert Duffy).

3. New York Times (and weekly Magazine). June, 1957-°ctober, 1962.

- The coverage of Canadian events is not extensive; however, the reporting and editorial comments on Canadian affairs are generally perceptive when they do appear. 161

l±» Vancouver Daily Province. June, 1957- April, I963.

- generally, a somewhat saner news presentation than the Sun. Beginning in 1961, a pro Conservative paper. Of particular value to this thesis were the columns of Charles Lynch, a Canadian journalist held in the highest esteem by this writer.

5. Vancouver SUn. June, 1957- April 1963.

- of value as a source of day to day factual materials and generally, pro Liberal editorials. Its tendency to sensationalism often results in distortion of the news.

6. Vancouver Public Library (Main Branch), Clipping Service, 191+5 - present.

- this was of assistance in that it allowed this writer limited access (the clippings have tremeddous gaps) to other newspaper sources: Ottawa Journal. Montreal Star. Christian Science Monitor (Boston).

Pamphlets

1. Canadian-American Committee, The Perspective of Canadian- American Relations. National Planning Association, 1962. 2. Macadam, Pat, The Record Speaksj Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, 1962. p. 13. The - The major piece of Conservative campaign propaganda in the 1962 election.

3'. NATO publication, Vigilance the Price of Liberty. Netherlands, The Atlantic Treaty Assoc., 1959. l+. St. Laurent, Louis, The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, &91+7*

- an excellent statement of the principles of Canadian foreign policy by the then External Secretary.