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^rte u I BRITISH EMBASSY, No. 12V(101lAl/53) CAIRO. CONFIDENTIAL Hist May, 1953•

J Sir, In recent weeks opposition to the Array regime has revived and is now undoubtedly more widespread and outspoken than on the previous occasions in September and November of 1952 and in January and March of this year when counter-measures against hostile elements were taken by the Revolutionary Command (repressive in three of the four instances). The growing hostility is clearly indicated by the reactions of the people to speeches made by officers of the Revolutionary Command particularly when on tour outside Cairo. Inscriptions expressing in vulgar terms that Farouk would be preferable to Naguib have also appeared in public places in Cairo. --''^f f (Of^ '/, t> 2. After General Naguib 's tour of Upper Egypt (my despatch No. 9^ of 21st April), which is now known to have been rather less successful than at first appeared, officers of the Revolutionary Command toured the country whipping up support for the Liberation Rally (my saving telegram No. 92 of 29th April, paragraph 2). Together with officers organizing the Rally, notably Major Ibrahim al Tahawi, the Assistant Secretary-General, they covered both Upper and Lower Egypt, making their main effort at Alexandria. During this campaign, which still continues, it has become apparent that considerable sections of the people are growing tired of the Army Revolution. The speeches have followed the lines of those delivered by General Naguib in Upper Egypt* More attention has been paid to industry and commerce, in the way of actual visits to establishments; but references to social and economic development have become vaguer and denunciations of the British more violent, partly no doubt as a result of the apathy or even hostility of some of the audiences. The former have roused little interest, but the latter have provoked widely differing reactions, alarming the upper classes, causing exaltation among the hallVeduoated and whetting the appetite for loot of the dregs of the cities. It has, however, probably passed over the heads of the mass of the population, agricultural as well as industrial, who are only concerned with the struggle for existence* The mood of the rural masses at the moment appears to be one of political apathy. 3« Responsible elements and those with a stake in the country are undoubtedly alarmed by these speeches, which reached a peak of violence in the second half of April and which are now being resumed with full force* They can clearly foresee the consequences of this type of /hysteria. The Right Honourable Sir Winston S. Churchill, K.G., C.H. , etc., Foreign Office, London, S.W.I. The Governor of Alexandria, for example, has in private conversation said that he was shocked by the recklessness of Egypt's present rulers, and Squadron Leader Hassan Ibrahim (a member of the Revolutionary Command himself) thought that on occasions anti-British vehemence had been taken too far. The half-baked - those with some pretensions to education but with no great claim to intelligence - who form an appreciable fraction of the politically conscious, are probably the most fervent supporters of the new regime. These, whether they belong to the Liberation Rally, or to the Moslem Brotherhood, are the would-be martyrs who take these speeches to heart. They are the mainstay of the volunteer training camps, and send messages to Nagulb signed in blood, and telegrams to this Embassy stating that they seek 'evacuation or annihilation.1. In the event of disturbances they, together with the riffraff forming the bulk of the city mobs, would be the dangerous fanatical element. The aspirations expressed by the Revolutionary command officers pass over the heads of the riffraff, who are strongly moved only by the promises of conflict and annihilation (of other people) offering prospects of excitement and loot. They did well at the burning of Cairo last year and would enjoy a repeat performance. 4-* The reactions of the organised and articulate political (or quasl-poiltical) bodies, the Wafd and the Moslem Brotherhood are, of course, determined to a greater extent by what they conceive to be their own Interests. The former would not eeem to be unduly distressed by the possibility of the renewal of suicidal attacks on our forces and are quietly encouraging the excesses of the army leaders. They are comfortably aware that such attacks will disrupt the country and the present regime and will give them a chance to regain power. The question of their ability to retain it has probably not occurred to them. The Moslem Brotherhood, however, do not appear to be entirely happy about the situation. Their extremists, perhaps, carry xenophobia to the point where they, too, would gladly pull Egypt down and preach among the ruins; but the more moderate are worried on two counts* First, they are afraid that the Army's demagogic tactics may prove too successful. They are Jealous of even the limited progress that has been made with building up the Liberation Group, fearing that it may develop into a solid and loyal body which would relieve the Army Movement of any dependence on the Brotherhood, Secondly, they are afraid that their organisation may not survive the threatened chaos. At the moment the Moslem Brotherhood is the only reasonably well disciplined body in the country, apart from the Army itself, and it is nearer to exercising real power than was ever the case in the past. It has no \vish either to be pushed aside by the complete success of the Army Movement or to be destroyed with the Movement if it goes down fighting. Nevertheless, there is little or no doubt that, if the struggle turns from cold to hot war, the Brotherhood and its Kataibs (or paramilitary formations) will be at the disposal of the-Militery Authorities. The Brotherhood will certainly endeavour to make the regime pay their price for their support i.e. an Islamic constitution and the continued separate identity (with the right to maintain a paramilitary organisation) of the Brotherhood. But even if the regime refuse to pay this price, it is /unlikely unlikely that the Brotherhood would withhold their eventual support. 5. The Industrial workers and the fellaheen form two further categories, whose reactions to the officers' pronouncements are governed primarily by sectional considerations and who merit some separate consideration. Their feelings, particularly those of industrial workers, have become increasing^ ugly and audiences, swayed chiefly by emotional delivery, have paid less ^attention than ever to the content of the speeches. The new regime has disappointed their expectations and owing to financial stringency and for other reasons, ; which are to the credit of the regime, has not endeavoured to any great extent to whip up support by the paid "claque" and financially subsidised demonstrations which were features of previous regimes. 6» The grievances of peasants and workers are real enough. There Is rising discontent amongst the fellaheen who miss the services, both social and agricultural, formerly provided by their landlords (on^whatever extortionate terms in some cases) and which the new regime lias not as yet replaced. The plight of the landless xvorkers Is serious; they offer their labour at half or less of the legal daily wage of FT.16, but even so are often turned away by landlords unable or afraid to employ them. Industrial workers, though victims also of the high cost of living, have less grounds for complaint. They are on the other hand better placed 'to make their grievances felt. Workers at a large mill at Damanhour recently refused to turn out to hear a speech by General Nagulb, and Colonel Sadat, who visited their place of work in an effort to placate them, was received with scant courtesy. (Incidentally, Colonel Naser was similarly heckled by a group of left-wing students during his visit to Alexandria University.; Action was subsequently taken against the ringleaders which it appears was effective. Similar measures have had to be taken in other factories. In general, unemployment is increasing in both town and^ country, and the publicised labour reforms of the new regime have remained on paper for lack of resources with which to Implement them. Those affected are not particularly pleased with the New Egypt and are begin!ng to show little hesitation In saying BO. 7. It might have been expected that the Revolutionary Command would have reacted more energetically than they have towards this recrudescence of opposition. To date opposition followed by repression has occurred at almost regular two monthly intervals, and on past form some reaction on the part of the regime might have bo^n anticipated in mid-May. On this occasion, however, opposition has proved to be not only more violent but also more widespread and virtually hydra- headed. During the past few weeks the energies of the Junta have been concentrated on the Anglo-Egyptian problem. Their Inability to deal with hostile elements by more direct means may indeed be one of the reasons for their intransigence during the negotiations i.e. they may have dcliverately sought, as many of their predecessors have done, to divert attention from their short-comings at home by their zeal for the national .aspirations. It is possible that to some extent the manoeuvre has succeeded and that they will be able to forgo repressive measures until they succeed (though they are using methods calculated to make their task more difficult) An PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE Ref erence:-

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in securing the evacuation of British troops and by this triumph effectively silence criticism at least long enough to permit economic conditions to improve and internal reform to take effect. g. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office at Fayid, and to Her Majesty's Representatives in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Ankara, Washington, Paris and Amman. I have the honour to be, With the highest respect, Sir, Your most obedient, humble Servant, s*" ^r.n,^. - »OT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGWHTCAuTmHOUT

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE Sir Ralph Stevenson . *<>'—«> NO. m .^J /5 Dated: 22nd May, 1953. -~«—• Repeated to: Paris No, 221 Washington No. 17Q Meraln TFayld) No. 2Q$

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6t Al Misry of twenty-second announced that Ahmed Abul Fath had proceeds! onleave. An official communique" published on May 23rd denied that he had done so as a result of a suggestion made by the Egyptian authorities.

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(10116/19/53) BRITISH EMBASSY, RESTRICTED CAIRO. 22nd May, 1953. J Dear Department, Please refer to your letter JE 1015/66 of the 5th May, 1953. The list of members of the Council of the Revolutionary Command supplied to you by the Egyptian Embassy in London is correct except for the inclusion of Group Captain Zulflcar snd the omission of Major Khaled Mohieddin. We have never heard it suggested thet Group Captain Hussein Zulficar had been included in the Council. It would be difficult for him to combine his present Job as the Egyptian delegate on the Governor-General's Commission in the Sudan with active direction of the Revolution. *"\'\', .s-* ** *' 2. We have not much to add to the sketches of the members of the Council which were forwarded with Her Majesty's Minister's letter No. 10116A/53 of the l?th February to Allen. There are increasingly clear signs that Gamal Abdel Neser is unpopular, not only eg might be expected with the upper clashes, but also with the mass of the people. General Neguib himself, on the other hand, continues to enjoy popular respect. It has also become clear from recent pronouncements by even the obscurer members of the Jjunta, that on the subject of tne national aspirations at least, there are few if any "moderates" among them, and certainly none prepared to take in public a less extreme line than that put out by his fellows. 3* We are sending a copy of this letter to the B M.E-0. in Fayid. Yours ever, CHANCERY.

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191^43677 Comprehensive Summary j3f the interview . with. Lt.Cpl.Huaaein. al Shafei published in Al Misry on 19th May, 1933.

Q. V/hat are the main objectives of the Free Officers and what objectives have been realised so far? A. The first objective is to fight imperialism in all its fortna and to liquidate its agents whatever their positions may be. The second objective is to create a strong army. The reali- sation of the first objective will have to be carried out in several stages. The expulsion of the exiling was the first atep towards the*, objective. The subsequent laws promulgated were stages leading ultimately/that end. to Means differ according to circumstances. But we will never deviate from striving to attain our objectives. For example we held that fighting imperialism called for unity. We therefore maintained political parties. But these parties thought that this appeasement waa caused by our weakness or our need for them. Subsequently it became clear beyond doubt that these political parties werc2 damaging the movement. Some people thought that the movement of the army was nothing but a party-change such as they had seen in the past. They did not realise that it was a revolution assuming, in the eyes of the common man, a peaceful form. Some described it as "a white revolution" free from bloodshed. But they forgot that this revolution is as old as imperialism itself. Its martyrs include all those who fell fighting the imperialists since 1882 until today. Thus it transpires that the revolution is peaceful only in so far as the citizens realise their duty. It is cruel and capable of dealing blows if the safety of the State is endangered. £md 8tralchtforward. Thus, as I said, our objectives are clear/ This characteristic was illustrated by the talks which took place. These talks were clear-cut and aimed directly at the objective. Either we attain the objective, or resort to other means. Q. was it among your objectives to take power and govern the country? A. Y/e had to protect the revolution against the old interests. We, therefore, interfered only within the limits needed for the protection of the movement and for leading the country towards the objective defined before the movement began. We did not contemplate that Premier Mohamed Kaguib would assume power but it was vital to the continued success of the Revolution that he should do ao. Q. People condemned the former regimes for muzzling opinions, limiting the freedom of the Press and suspending the Constitution. You have muzzled opinions, and are still subjecting the freedom of the Press to a rigorous censorship. You have not only suspended the Constitution but abolished it completely. It is easy to say that the protection of the revolution makes these measures necessary. 3ut such a pretext can be rebutted by the fact that the main aim of the revolution waa to liberate us from these limitations and to enable us to live in a genuine democracy. A. The restoration of freedoms la the ideal of every citizen. We are among the vanguard who atrived for the realisation of this ideal. I will not use the protection of the revolution as a pretext for muzzling the freedom of opinions. But I aay that those who demand freedom should first fulfil their duties. For example, we cannot give in to the demands of the workers /for for the privileges enjoyed by the workers of more advanced countries. We must first safeguard capital and then accord rights to the workers in proportion to the work. which they have done to earn them. Undoubtedly,th$ Press enjoyed a large measure of freedom before this movement. It had great influence on those in power then. The serious defects of the men in power then made them appease the men of the Press in an unworthy manner, their aim being to remain in office. Thus the freedom of the Press was corrupted. Former regimes are condemned for the party strife that prevailed in them. liach party was in constant struggle against others. But it is said that you did the same thing, with all the other political parties. Untit/now, parties/^*** are condemned in the speeches of responsible men. Don't you see that such a policy is a sort of digging up the past and that it is fruitless. The nation knows political tfflf./ parties/ffoti thctF evilo and their Uleaainga and the only thing that would liquidate these parties is the useful work you perform. A. I agree with what you say. Talk oj£ the evils of the past might lead to their repetition. But the revolution is justified in speaking of those evils. It draws lessons from the past. But we should not indulge in this lest we should be pulled back instead of forward. The road before us is difficult and long and all forces should unite to reach the desired objective. But I asaert that the Army revolution is not ours alone, the nation is with us. Q. Do you think that the Egyptian people are firmly united at present. If not,why? A. -tfhtil the Army revolution took place, the people wero without hope. Afterwards, all the feelings of the people concentrated in a deep love for Premier Mohamed Naguib. But this fact should not be allowed to overshadow other facts. Persons whose interests were affected by the revolution are not expected to love Premier Naguib. \Ye know that an internal struggle is being carried on by these persona. We hope that we will not be compelled to resort to strength, not that we fear to use strength, but because we hope to direct it against the Imperialists. Q. Do you think that the Anglo-Egyptian talks will bo resumed? And why have you resorted to this method whereas the nation began another one in 1950. Do you think that talks will lead to the realisation of the deirands of the country? A. I do not believe in talks aa a means of freeing the country from the imperialists. He who agrees with the occupier of his country signs the bond of his slavery, unless this ia an agreement for the organisation of evacuation. Talks might only be resumed on this basis. Q. What is the attitude of Americe towards the Anglo-Egyptian dispute especially after the visit of Mr.Dulles. Do you think that we can rely on America? A. A nation- should depend, in struggling for freedom and independence, on her own determination and efforts. The Americans are the allies of the British in the world struggle. They will not offend their ally unless they find out that their support for her is not equal to the hatred of a people believing in their rights and determined to win them. OiBLH. •H i

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Ghurchill threatened Egypt with his forces stationed in the Canal Zone. He made serious and well-publicised statements and threatened the occupation of Cairo ?und Alexandria. The British Minister of War asserted that the British troops in the Canal Zone are sufficient. What is your opinion? And what is your reply? We hope that this threat will not result in signing an agreement against the interests of the country. The talk aktf*^~ resumption of taltea ia being repeated again. Churchill and his Minister of War could not have said anything else. Is it logical that Churchill should say that his troops are not enough? But it should be noted that Mr.Churchill1a statements reflected anxiety. This increases our confidence. We know that Mr.Churchill provoked Israel against us in the hope of winning the ^favour of the United States. •—••••—— •" PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 1 2 5 * * Kejemnce:- "

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UNCLASSIFIED Following from Creswell. Chancery letter No. 1013/4/53 of 21st January. Press ninth printed the text of decree law No. 173/1953 amending the Anti-Corruption (>ibuse of Influence) Law No. 344/1952 reported in the letter under reference. 2. A revised list of penalties is given, including loss of civil rights. Persons convicted may also be - forbidden to engage in those liberal professions regulated by law or professions concerned with the educational or economic system of the country. Article 5 states that actions are to be brought before the special anti-corruption tribunal by a committee of two. Text to Foreign Office by bag. 3. It was announced on the twelfth that General Naguib had appointed the following officers to serve on the special anti-corruption tribunal* Colonal Salaheddin Hattata Colonel Farid Abdulla Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Abdel Lutfl Squadron Leader Mohammed El Shereef The Minister of Justice appointed the following civilian members : Counsellor Ibrahim Khalil Counsellor Mohammed Aly Gamal Eddin Counsellor Hassan Galal The two-man committee (paragraph 1 above) is to consist of Fathy Radwan, the Minister of State and Lieutenant Colonel Anwar El-Sadat. 4. . In a statement to the press on the 13th Pathy Radwan said that the information gathered by the purge committees was being examined by the Parquet which would 8ubmL,t,iJ.ts findings to the the" two-man committee. Those /accused r * fal

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- 2 - v accused would be tried with the utmost despatch, both in their own interests and in those of the nation. All.but two of the purge committees had completed their reports. However actions for corruption would not necessarily be confined to those persons who had been dealt with by these committees. 5. The articles of the Penal Code dealing with bribery and corruption and related offences have also recently been amended to increase their scope. The official text of the amended articles will be forwarded to the Foreign Office as soon as it is available. There would now seem to be adequate legal provision against every conceivable form of corruption. The first prosecution under the law to be announced is that of a barrow boy who offered a policeman 5 piastres to allow him to enter a closed road. According to the press the prosecution demand imprisonment with forced labour for life - the maximum punishment.

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V ' ' I A , BRITISH EMBASSY, CAIRO. 21st April, 1953.

Sir, I have the honour to submit an account of General Neguib's tour of Upper Egypt "between the 21st and 27th of March. This was the first official visit to the area made "by any member of the Revolutionary Command Council since the Army Revolution and General Neguib was evidently determined to cover as much ground and. meet as many people as possible. 2. During the six days of the tour he lived in his special train, which left Cairo on the evening of the 21st and reached Aswan at 7.30 the next morning. Prom Aswan he worked his way down the valley, making his principal stops at Esna, Luxor, Kena, Nag Hamadi, Sohag, Assiut, Minia and Beni Suef. He was accompanied "by Colonel A~bdel Naser, Squadron Leader Hassan rbrahim, Wing Commander Abdel Latif Boghdadi, (all members of the Command Revolution Council), and "by Colonel Zakharia Mohyeddin the Director of Military Intelligence, Sheikh Ahmed Hassan el Baquri, Minister of Walcfs, Dr. Nureddin Tarraf, Minister of Public Health and Maitre Hussein Abu Zeid, Minister of Communications. Two carriages on the train accommodated his escort of soldiers and another two were occupied by journalists. 3. General Neguib1 s time was fully occupied by a crowded and exhausting programme which continued with barely sufficient intervals for sleep until the afternoon of the 27th. The train halted frequently at villages along the line and visits by car were made to places more distant from the railway. As a -result of incessant speech-making the General had talked himself hoarse by the 26th and on the 27th his voice failed altogether. However, he had no doubts about the success of the tour and, despite his hoarseness and the fatigue of the journey, he was in obvious high spirits when he returned to Cairo. 4* The time-table was much the same each day. Early in the morning the General set off on a round of visits to the local government school, the hospital, the Industrial or Theological Institution and to the Red Crescent Society. He laid the foundation stones of new buildings for the latter at Aswan, Luxor and Sohag. At each place he made a brief speech to the effect that the Army Movement needed the .support of the people and called on his audiences to go forward with the slogan 'Unity, Discipline, Work1* 5. It is of interest that he also paid, particular I attention to American establishments and American visitors. .' On his arrival at Luxor he drove straight to the Winter Palace Hotel to greet American tourists there. The next day he had tea at the American Mission for Girls and at Assiut he visited both the American College and the American Orphanage. As there are no other foreign institutions of comparable standing which he might have visited, the Americans were not actually singled out for special favour. Yet/.* • The Right Honourable V/inston S. Churchill, C.H., M.P., Foreign Office, LONDON, S.lif. 1. COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

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Yet he spoke of their work with unaccustomed warmth, remarking at Luxor that he and many of the "best officers of the Army Movement had received an education in American schools, while at Assiut he praised 'the inestimable services rendered "by the Americans to Egyptian education1. The friendliness of these remarks was thrown into relief lay the nature of his comments on the British. 6. In the strongly Coptic districts of Upper Egypt, General Neguib assiduously followed up his campaign for religious tolerance "by visiting Coptic dignitaries and publicly reiterating that Copts and Muslims were fellow-countrymen. At Luxor he was no doubt gratified by shouts from his audience of "Long live the Crescent and the Cross together", and at the Sohag Theological Institute he replied to students who called for an Islamic and Koranic Government by stating that the liberation movement took its principles from the Koran and that these principles were the same in all religions. Sheikh al Baquri spoke at Kena on the solidarity of Copts and Muslims in the Liberation Group. Here, as in every other town, the Coptic dignitary thanked General Neguib for his attitude to Christianity and assured him of the loyal support of all Christians. 7. Throughout the tour General Neguib was accorded what was monotonously, but not inaccurately, described by the press as 'a rapturous welcome1. Whole villages turned out to see him and in the towns it was often difficult to clear a passage for his car. Livestock was immolated in his honour and presentations were made to him by the Beduin. The enthusiasm may have been slightly increased by the sweets and small presents which were distributed wherever he went; but it is unlikely that there would have been any appreciable difference had these gifts not been forthcoming. As well as receiving thunderous affirmatives in reply to questions such as "Are you ready to fight for your country", his speeches were frequently interrupted by gratuitous shouts of "We are with you, Neguib" and "Martyrdom is our aim". 8. In his principal speeches General Neguib dwelt on the evils of the British occupation and on his Government's new plans for internal reform at almost equal length; but although he spoke continually of social and economic progress and devoted virtually the whole of a long speech at Kena to describing Egypt's resources and calling for a sustained effort to develop them, he reserved his most forceful language for bitter denunciations of the occupation. This, he said, had been the cause of Egypt's backwardness and of her people's sufferings. The country would endure it no longer and Egyptians would lay down their lives in defence of their freedom. At Aswan he proclaimed the slogan "Evacuation or Death", at Nag Hamadi he told his audience that anything which went wrong was largely the result of 70 years of British occupation, and at Sohag and Assiut he said that freedom would indeed be won, no matter how great the cost, and called on his fellow-countrymen to prepare for the struggle. His two most violent speeches were also made at Assiut, one in the town itself and the other at the nearby Mankabad Army Training Camp. The first reached its climax with the words: "Woe to those who attempt to intimidate or humiliate us. When a Reference:- ** 4 III!

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strong wind is obstructed it becomes a raging storm, destroying all that stands in its path. Those who try to resist the will of nations would do well to bear this in mind". In the second he recalled that he had spent the two worst years of his life,'1928 and 1929, in that very camp. He had served under an arrogant Englishman who treated the men like slaves and humiliated the officers. At that time Egypt was the helpless victim of the inhabitants of that 'cold island' which had robbed the Egyptians of their liberty and taken away their livelihood. The General said that the soldiers now at Mankabad were inspired with a new spirit and he expected them to defend their freedom by destroying those who were trying to usurp it. This was his last major speech in Upper Egypt as his voice began to fail the next day. 9. Colonel Abdel Naser's position as Neguib's right- hand man became still more apparent during the tour. Thus at Beni Morr, Abdel Naser's birthplace, Neguib referred to him as the 'brain and sinew of the Army Movement' and, remarking that "Morr" meant "bitter", said that the village had produced a son bitter to Egypt's enemies. On this occasion Abdel Naser himself spoke briefly and forcefully on the subject of evacuation but otherwise he remained commendably taciturn, confining himself to laconic and comparatively colourless statements. However, he had his reward when he was able to deliver Neguib's uncono iliatory speech on the last day of the journey at Beni Suef. 10. ^The avowed object of the tour was to demonstrate the new regime's concern for Upper Egypt and to assure it that it woxild share in the development of the country as a whole. Grievances were heard and an office was set up on the train to deal with petitions* However it could no longer be claimed, as it was during his tour of the Delta last autumn, that the keynote of the tour was set by Neguib's laudable calls for social reform and disciplined effort. His tub-thumping oratory on the theme of "Evacuation or Death" was the dominant theme. 11. These speeches had evidently been prepared with full consideration, and it can only be assumed that their violence was the result of deliberate policy aime^d at regaining the initiative and strengthening the regime's position in the face of increasing difficulties. On the internal front, General Neguib was bracing himself for a trial of strength with opposition elements both inside and outside the Army, which the promulgation of the sentences against the officers involved in the Mehanna plot of mid- January made inevitable. In the field of external affairs, the prospects of the early evacuation of British troops from the Canal Zone had not improved and the members of the Military Committee, if not General Neguib himself, appeared to have lost confidence in their ability to reach a settlement by negotiation. It would seem that they decided to put up a barrage of intransigent statements which would enable them to claim that public opinion would not permit negotiations on the question of evacuation. Certainly the studied surprise with which they greeted the indignant reactions of the British press would seem to suggest that they had expected and even hoped for just such a reaction. Egyptian newspapers were delighted by the publicity that Neguib was COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY Wl THOIJTPERHISSini

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given and printed extensive extracts from the Times and the Daily Telegraph, amongst others, together with much officious comment and advice. 12. General Neguib has strengthened his position and ' that of the regime "by this tour and it is significant that immediately on his return to Cairo the sentences against ':, Colonel Mehanna and his supporters were promulgated. The wisdom of the means "by which he has done so is however open to question. He has professed views hardly less extreme than those of his junior colleagues* Indeed, if as the Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Pawzi, has said, the more violent passages of his recent speeches have been kept out of the press (my telegram 607) there can "be little to choose "between them. Neguib has sought to equal the record of his predecessors in the art of rabble-rousing and his colleagues have supported him by preaching the doctrine of unrestrained rhatred. The mystique of martyrdom has been cultivated in ] favourable soil. Whether or not Neguib had really decided that he would sooner see Egypt plunged into chaos rather than tolerate the presence of foreign troops, whether his speeches represented his own views or, as it on the whole more likely they reflected the opinions of his Military Committee which he was unable to resist, he certainly increased the difficulties of a solution of the problem by negotiation. Nevertheless Dr. Pawai has reiterated that it is the fixed and considered policy of the Egyptian Government to seek the solution by negotiation, and that General Neguib agrees with him that such a solution is possible* 13. I em sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle Bast Office and the Head of the Regional Information Office, Beirut. I have the honour to be, With the highest respect, Sir, Your most obedient, humble Servant, ft M-

SWELL) 3n Glair by ba^x.

F:

Sir Halph Stovori&on .Kg,. 87 Savin 14th April, 1953

.Repeated. Sr.vin;< to:- Paris No. 164, £Uin;rton Ko. 136, min .(Fayid) Nc. 159,

Beirut Ho, 49, .Dar.r.scus i'.c. 15, Khartoum Ko. 28, Jcdda No. 20,

UKCLASSIPIZD

Addressed to Foreign Office telegra.,: ho. 87 Saving of 14th Apiil, repaatcd for infer .nation Saving; to;- Paris, '.7'ton, Lcmin (JFayid), Amman, 13ar:u,".d, Beix-ut, Damascus, Ahc.rtoum and Jcdda. /•** • > i *? i.ay telegram I»o. 77 Saving pf.-.r-:.£iaph '/. _ - ' s j ( | :o. ;

Pollo-;/in;:: from Crc swell.

Press 13th ro?orts that Ali ilahcr, Ch-Mrman of the Constitution Committee, has outlined the method of holoin.; the plebiscite by which tha nation is to bo consulted on the new constitution.

2. Kis rr_>ort comes to the conclusion that the following principles arc those general!;- accepted in European s3rr.te:ns!

(i) The voters ore persons rc.^iatci.cd on the clcctoxrl lists for the Chamber of .Oc;;utics, Therefore a plebiscite presupposes the existence of an Ulecto^al Law defining eligibility to vote. There would have to be complete electoral lists, electoral cards would hav,' to be issued and principal and sub-committees would have to be formed, since a plebiscite requires the same moasui-cs as a general election.

(ii; A plebiscite should 'be conducted on the basis of a clear question requiring o.n answer 'yes' or 'no1. The question should be fixed by law together with tho consequences of the eventual decision, whether negative or positive.

'(iii) The opportunity may be taken to hold parliamentary elections at the same time, as the same machinery is required for each. All that is necessaiy is to provide two ballot boxes in each polling booth.

3. There is little doubt that Aly Laher is employing delaying tactics to resist the precipitate declaration of Egypt as a Reioubl, a aourse favoured by an influential section of the present re^B-we. FROM CAIRO TO FOR iIGN OFFICE En Clair v^''. -•—v FOREIGN OFFICE AND f d £ i*\C I e£ '\ WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION il W/ Mr. Creswell *M.««. >>**>«*^pyT>«02 a.m. 1st April, 1953 No. 595 1st April, 1953 R. 9.50 a.m. 1st April, 1953 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 595 of 1st April Repeated for information Saving to Paris Washington B.M.E.O.

My telegram No. 65 Saving. f % All papers of the 31st carry official announcement of sentences passed by the Tribunal of the Council of the Revolution on eleven officers and three civilians for inciting troops to mutiny during December 1952. ^ 2. Colonel (retired) Rashad Kehanna, ex-Regent, was sentenced to life imprisonment, nine officers were sentenced to be cashiered with terms of imprisonment varying from one to ten years. Of these seven were artillery officers, one ordnance and one cavalry. One other artillery officer who turned King's evidence, was dismissed the service and the trial of a twelfth officer, also of the artillery was postponed on account of his illness. The three civilians sentenced were Dr. Abdel Aziz el-Shal, 10 years; Maitre Sabrl el Hakim, 2 years and former deputy Mahmud Rashid 2 years. The two latter and Colonel Rashad Mehanna were among these known to have been interned in January (my telegram No. 22 Saving). 3. The Tribunal-was presided over by Colonel Qamal Abdel Naser. There was an officer prosecuting but no (repeat no) counsel for the defence was allowed. The names of all witnesses were withheld. The proceedings appear to have been conducted approximately on the lines of a court martial* * 1*. The chief evidence against Colonel I'ehanna was that he had exploited religious sentiment in his incitements to mutiny, by asserting that the Revolutionary Command Council intended to abolish Islam as the state religion and to set up a secular republic. 5. Full text to Foreign Office by bag. foreign Office please pass to Washington and Paris as my ri^ tele grams Nos. 12i. and 151. [Repeated Saving to Washington and Paris]. AFRICAN DEPARTMENT J

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M.MO.P. Davis, Colonel V.W. Street,

Major M.3, Hancock, ff.O R.C. Shawyer, Artairalty, 11. H. O'Grady, Air Min, B.H. Carson, C.R.O,

D»R» Serpell, Tsy« O.K. Loombe, B. of ^. I.^.H. ;?ore, R.J.'vV. Stacey) Miss Eyles,

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Wt. 24772/717 «7S95 »°/38 F.O.}'. 5th February, 1953. PERSONAL

Thank you for your letter of 21st January. I am very sorry I missed you on the eve of your departure - I should have liked very much to have gone over the ground with you after your very full week here. 2. Now about the "second coup". My own guess Is that the High Military Committee had decided to take action against the political parties several weeks before your arrival and that the Anti-Graft Law, to which Sadat referred, was in fact the first step. They probably also realised that further steps would be necessary. There were fairly clear signs at the time that some Clements, particularly Wafdist and Communist, were getting a bit uppish and they were certainly being carefully watched. I doubt, however, whether the action taken on January 15th was actually decided on during the first week of the month that you were here. In other words, the "second coup" was more a continuing process than a single event and at the time of your visit it was both in the past and in the future. 3. As regards the "conspiracy" which led to the arrests of January 15th, the High Military Committee admit that there was no fully worked-out plot. There seems no doubt, however, that real trouble was brewing, that the High Military Committee were seriously worried (even from the point of view of their own personal safety) and that the "conspiracy" was not merely a convenient excuse for liquidating the parties* They would not, I think, have arrested 25 officers (including ex-Regent Mehanna), thereby risking a serious split in the Army, If there was nothing seriously wrong and they had merely to deal * further blow to the old politicians. 4. I have conveyed your message to the Ambassador who thanks you for it and also, as requested, have shown your letter to Wilton. Unfortunately, Kellas, as you know, is no longer with us. 5. I hope that you have fully recovered from your 'flu attack.

(T.E.

R. H. S. Grossman, Ssq^ , M.P. House of Commons, LONDON, S.W.I. j- PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE; 2 3 4 « Keference-- *

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Glair FOREIGN OFFICE AUD WHITE HALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson D. 12.10p.m. 25th February, 1953. No. 370 25th February, 1953. R. 1.10 p. m. 25th February, 1953. jEIOlS/45. Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 370 of 25th February Repeated for information Saving to Paris Washington B. M. E. O. Press 24th reports that at the opening of the Menufia Province branch of the Liberation Group Colonel Abdel Nasr described Egypt as a free country that had fought incessantly against its many enemies without ever sacrificing its dignity or pride. Ottoman imperialism had handed Egypt over to British imperialism, which in turn had sowed the seeds of social injustice and political despotism. Injustice was evident in the division of the country into the camp of the slaves and that of the wasters. Despotism was represented by two destructive elements, the hateful British occupation and an irresponsible and libertine Crown, 2. Colonel Nasr went on to show how the British were responsible for Egypt's misfortunes and then outlined the Egyptians' struggle against tyranny from Orabi to Neguib. He said that the object of the revolution was to change the old system completely in the best interests of the people. The first target was unconditional evacuation, those who bargained for their freedom with the imperialists would be signing their own deed of slavery. The struggle for freedom gave Egypt_a giant's strength, therefore the Egyptians declared that occupation / ? grp. omitted / must pack up and go or else die fighting to preserve its existence. 3. Egypt would befriend those who helped her, but would wage relentless war in all fields against those who ignored her rights. Egypt must be liberated, the occupation forces must go. 4. All papers are speculating freely on the evacuation negotiations and considerable comment has been aroused by articles in the Times and the Daily Telegraph on the defence of the Suez Canal. Foreign Office please pass Washington and Paris as my Saving telegrams Nos. 67 and 100 respectively. /Repeated Saving to Washington and Paris /

EEE ft. What do you mean by "neutral" nations? Would you accept non-British technicians from NATO countries, say the United States? A. No, we would not accept Araerleans for this. I am thinking of Swiss or Swedish technicians, or some similar nation* ft. Would you permit the British, or NATO, to retain some of the air bases in the Canal Zone. A. Why? It does not do much good if there are a few dozen planes in the Zone in peacetime* Egyptians can maintain the air bases for use In any emergency. ft. Would you be willing to agree to permit NATO forces to move into the Canal zone in time of war? A. Why should NATO forces defend our country, rather than Egyptian forces? I don't know. The first thing that is needed is for the British to withdraw and evacuate the Canal Zone* Wnen I feel as free as other people, then I mightenter into an agrement, after making an appreciation of my means and my obligations. ft. Are you thinking of an agreement which would include several countries - such as France, Turkey, the Arab nations - or Just the United States and Britain?

A. Th%at will depend on the actual circumstances, at the time- For example, to give a hypothetical example, if the United States and Britain are fighting each other at that time, it would be a different situation then if they were allied. I cannot make such decisions in advance. Q. How much American aid do you need in Egypt? A. That is in the hands of the Ministers of Finance, Trade, etc. J- can't say off-hand. It needs study. ft. Which do you consider more Important - military or economic aid? A. Both are important. unless I have a powerful army so that I need nor fear attack, I cannot carry out an economic programme looking toward progress. ft. How much arms do you need? Enough to equip two divisions7 A. This has been discussed with the American Ambassador but I cannot go into details for publication. ft. Is Egypt ready to pay for these arms. A. This depends upon many considerations. $• How long will It take Egypt to develop the forces required to defend tne Canal Zone? A. It depends on our obligations, whether we defend locally or In the territory Just on our frontiers; but we have to start preparations at once to gain time which Is an invaluable element. Q. Some people in the United States are afraid that if military aid is given to Egypt, you will attack Israel. Would you comment on that? A. You know what war is today. A friction might lead to a world war. You can't guaranteny e what the result will be from any act of aggression• We are now doing better without war, by blockading Israel. It has the same effect as war. Why should I endanger my country endopen it to air raids by launching war? I would lose the confidence of all the big nations. They would consider me aggressive* ^11 this talk is Just Israeli propaganda. I don't think they will attack us. They know we ere 1 not thinking of attacking them. We have enough > means of pressure and do not think of foolish things like that. I have fortunately gained the confidence of nearly all the nations. Our movement Is being regarded with sympathy and we are beginning to feel the results In financial help and so on. It Is not easy to lose all this by committing a folly, the end of which cannot be known to anyone. Q. Hay I ask a personal question, General Naguib? *, If you like. Q. You are a military man. You never Intended to go into politics, £>ut now you are the ruler of a country of 20,000,000 people. How does It feel? A. I believe the art of a soldier Is a good qualification for doing anything. I believe the civilian is less prepared to take the initiative as quickly as the soldier and make Jist decisions at the proper moment. But the soldier can. He feels his responsibility and acts on his own initiative. This is a good qualification for a man to have. All our success is, In the majority of cases, due to the efforts of our officers, who do their Jobs wltn enerby and do them perfectly. When I send a civilian on a Job, he asks a lot of questions, takes up a lot of my time. The soldier today, in military staff colleges, studies history, geopolitics, economics, politics. His training Is broad. But the chief thing, for a leader, Is to have ac*: propertly, Justly, reasonably, ! V

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/ * (MISR) EGYPTIAN NEWS AGENCY

March 23, 1953

INTERVIEW WITH PREMIER LEWA MOHAMSD NAGUIB

Cairo, 23.("Misr11 Egyptian News Agency).- Premier Lewa Mohemed Nagulb gave Mr. Robert Klelman, Western European Editor of the U.S. News and World Report, an Interview which covered Egypt's political, economic, and social affairs. The Interview is at once very frank and Illuminating, and it throws light on the personality of the Prime Minister and the splendid men who form the Council of the Revolution. In this interview, ^ewa Mohamed Nagulb speaks about the reform projects for which his big heart yearned since he was a young officer in the Egyptian Army. Mr. Klelman has authorised Dr. Husni Khalifa, General ^anager of the Egyptian "ewe Agency to publish the full text of the Interview and distribute it among the newspapers of Egypt for publication at the same time as his magazine which appears on Tuesday (tomorrow)* It reads as followst- Q. General Nagulb, some observers have compared your revolution in Egypt with that of Attaturk in Turkey after the first world War. Was your movement Inspired at all by Attaturk? A. I don't think so, Mr. Klelman. I read Attaturk's biography for the first time, and the history of his revolution, many years &• go - when I was a young lieutenant. But 1 would not say that I had any inspiration from that. Naturally, there is a similarity that strikes people. There are many similarities between Egypt now and Turkey then. If two doctors in different countries find the same disease, it is not surprising that they should make the same diagnosis. Some people say they see a similarity between our revolution and that of Peron in Argentina. They say we were Inspired by Peron. Actually, none of us had read about the Argentine situation before we took power here, except for what we saw in the news- papers. At Is only recently that I've had some books and other information imported from Argentina to find out more about what has happened there. Q. And do you find similarities? A. There are some parallels in the two experiments. The emphasis on the liberty of the workman and the ordinary citizen is the same here as in Argentina. Also the idea of placing morality before everything else. Reference:- 1 1 i ': Po37///oa_vo// xcp/;a3£ 2 1 1 II 1 1 1 1 I | 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION \

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The principal ceuse of our suffering in Egypt, has been the state of our farmers and workmen, their oppression by wealthy people, the plutocrats? If we raise the standards of our farmers and workmen, everything will go alright» We must educate them, look after their health, and open work opportunities for them in agriculture and industry. $» What ere the meln reforms you are instituting? A* They are numerous. Among the most important is the agrarian reform. We are starting to break up the large estates and give land to the poor farmers. This reform, happily, is progressing very well, without the troubles we expected* We are trying, as well, to improve the conditions pf labour for farmers and workmen. We have plans for building new roads and communications, for constructing houses and new villages. We are carrying out some projects studied before, but never executed, such as irrigation projects and building small manufacturing plants - things consistent with our means. We are concentrating on projects that can easily and quickly yield their fruits, so people will not - suffer from waiting too long. We must change the conditions of life. Our people, until now, have not had enough food or health care or education or recreation. Q. Egypt's biggest problem, as I understand it, is that there are too many people and not enough arable land or water. Can this be solved? A. Before anything can be done, we must give our people a sense of responsibility. That is our main , objective now. We have to train our people to know their duties and their rights as citizens. Each individual has to do his part and not wait for someone else to do it for him. Egypt has been held back by a lack of discipline, by illiteracy, by selfishness. That is why we now are forming a new organisation, the Liberation Assoca^tlon, to give every individual a share in building up the country. It will be JustAike a Parliament, but with membership and branches everywhei Every citizen is considered responsible to work and do something for his country, according to hie means. Teachers will give their services to a drive to combat illiteracy. Economists, businessmen will help to straighten out the economic affairs of towns and villages. Soldiers will teach discipline to young people and encourage sports. COPYR.OHT - HOT TO BE ^L^Jajjj_LjV 11 i C*LLY WITHOUTPlfciisioil--1-1 4

-3 - Q. You -were speaking of land reform. As I understand It, there are almost 2,000,000 farmers who own less than one acre and 700,000 who own less thqn 10 acres. How many of them will get land? A; Not a very big proportion. We expect to distribute about 500,000 acres to 100,000 families. That means half a million persons will benefit. In addition, we plan to reclaim 357,000 acres of desert to provide land for 80,000 more families. Q. Are your economic reforms aimed mainly at improving agriculture or at Industrialising Egypt? A. Agriculture mainly. In addition to land reform, we want to wipe out epidemics that attack crops and livestock. We are trying to Improve our fowl and livestock by bringing in new breeds. At the same time we have to Improve the health of our people. We are appointing doctors to serve In the countryside. They will be required to treat a certain number of patients each year In the villages. I am planning to have competitions and a^ard prizes to those who give the best service. But that Is for the future. Q. What do you plan in the industrial field? A. We have to make a start at Industrialising Egypt. First, we must build plants that can manufacture the essential things we now have to Import from abroad. Then, or parallel to that, we will manage to exploit our mines of nearly every sort of mineral and metal. Q. What kind of goods do you have in mind? A. We have enough textile plants now. But we will start to make Iron and steel; we have plenty of iron ore in Egypt. We need electrification projects to bring electricity to the villages. We need a small ammunition industry for our Army. We should develop mining. In addition to petroleum, there is iron ore, nickel lead, copper, woodfram, tungsten, marble, precious stones, gold, and so on. There are limited quantities, but they can be exploited. We have phosphates which are very valua- ble (aj) present only a half-million tons are exploited every year), and manganese deposits. Another thing we can do Is to develop our fisheries and build a commercial fleet to carry our goods abroad. The more fish we can cath, the less meat we will have to Import from abroad. Our first objective must be to achieve a balance of trade. Then we can expand In other lines. Our trade position has been very bad, but It Is improving now. COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHTCAUjTwi THOUT PERMISSION 1

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Q. Would you like foreign capital, private capital, to come Into Egypt? A. Yes, whynot? Q. Nationalists In some Middle Eastern countries do not favour capital from abroad. Your view Is different? A. We Insist, of course, that foreign Investors accept equality of treatment. Foreign Investments, In the past, have brought with them special rights for foreigners, special courts and other privileges- Now there Is no such thing. Times have changed. The foreign Investors themselves are more enlightened. We Intend to do everything we can to encourage foreign capital to Invest in Egypt. A new law for the protection of foreign capital has been prepared. Q. The expropriation In Iran has discouraged many Investors. How can you overcome that fear? A. We have no Intention of engaging In any such j procedures as expropriation. On the contrary, we are going to guarantee Investors that they can take their profits, or a large part of them, out of the country. If foreign capital Is taxed heavily or If It Is difficult to take profits out of the country, no one will endanger his capital by Investing abroad. We need foreign capital In Egypt because our ovm resources cannot easily cover all the great projects we intend to carryout. At present we can only do what Is possible within our own means* Q. What would you have In mind to do, If capital from abroad were available? A. There Is one big project, the Higher Dam. There Is a dam now at Aswan, on the Nile, in southern Egypt. We would like to build a second large and higher dam 4 or 5 miles up the river to the South of the present dam. The reservoir would capture a large amount of Nile water which now runs wastefully through the country and into the sea. With this water, we could make 2,000,000 more acres of desert arable. It would increase our arable land by one-third. Q. How much would the dam cost? _ COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED "PHOTOGRAPH I CALLY WITHOUT PtRHISSlON 4

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A. About IOC million pounds (£2810,000,000), including the cost of a fertiliser factory and hydro-electric plant. The hydro-electric plant would make an iron and steel industry possible for Egypt. Our iron ore deposts ere east of Aswan. The ore is of very good quality and lies near the surface. I studied that In 19^6, when I was Military Governor of the Red Sea Province, before the Palestine War. I became Interested in Egypt's mining potential), inspected various mines, gave lectures to visitors. When visitors, other officers and official delegations came to see me, Instead of passing the time chatting, I gave them a lecture on mining possibilities. All that's needed is communications to open up the area and some*risk capital. We have lots of capital, which is hoarded by rich people or used for vacation trips abroad. Labour is cheep and easy to bring down from Upper Egypt* While I was there, I constructed two Important roads into the area. One was metalled. The other, I surveyed myself and drafted a report on the sections that needed metalling. The report, as usual in those days, was neglected. I was transferred before the road could be completed. I also proposed a third road to the south, connecting the Nile Valley with the Red Sea Coast. There's a track there now. The cost is a problem. It's a distance of about 600 miles. So I made a study of road construction methods and discovered an expanse-cutting device used in South Africa* They build roads like railroads. They Just pave two strips Instead of the whole road. We could do that with the Red Sea road. Another project we are starting on now is to encourage tourism* Q,. IB that why you went out personally to welcome a shipload of American tourists at a reception recently? A* I went to get their comments or complaints. I gave strict orders that they were to be looked after carefully and gently. I wanted to see for myself if It was done. Q. Did they make any complaints about their treatment by Egyptian officials? A. No, they didn't. But maybe they were Just being nice! Tourism can be a very good source of revenue for Egypt. Our country is rich in antiquities and beautiful scenery* There is game in the desert and excellent beaches on the Red Sea Coast* - 6 - Q. How much revenue can tourism bring In? A. About 100,000 pounds a year with present facilities. But we can do much more. Oar hotels need to be Increased In number and some need Improvement. When I was Director-General of the Frontier, at Mersa Matruh, I wanted to bring in a company to build a resort town there, I like Heliopolls. We could do the same at El-Alameln. There is only one big hotel now In this town and two small ones. With good hotels, a golf course, tennis and other facilities people would flock there every year to see the old battlefields. These are the kind of things I have In mind. But we haven't the money for It all. You must think we are day- dreamers* Q. Not at all. You have to start with Ideas.•• A. But you must also carry them out. That's what we want to do. There's a wonderful beach at El-Arlsh (In Sinai) very clean white sand, not a pebble, the most beautiful scenery, palm trees In a row like soldiers on parade. It lacks only hotels and communications. If It were exploited, It would make the local people prosperous. Now they are poorly off and engage in casual labour In commerce, fishing, and seasonal agriculture to earn their living. A minority of the Inhabitants used to practice smuggling before the new regime. Q. What are your political plans for Egypt? You have suppressed all political parties for three years. In Turkey after Attaturk did the same, it took 3° years before the first free election. Will it take that long In Egypt? A. Attaturk depended on one party, the People's Party, that's true. With our people, too, I think it Is better ] not to have too many parties. The parties we have had In Egypt have always tried to serve their own Interests and their friends, only selfishness. Unless we eliminate selfishness, how can we train and develop the character of our young people? All my hopes are In the young generation, to train and educate them to be useful citizens. If this Is achieved there will be nothing to worry about. It's a question of developing a sense of justice and morality. Until lately, every party leader had an organisation among the students. They had them out shouting In the streets, ruining their llvew. Tn examinations, if students belonging to their parties didn't score 60$ to pass, the passing score was reduced to 50 or 40 or supplementary exams were given. Instead of learning discipline, the boys were trained to be feudal, backward In their thinking. Bringing up youth without discipline could only lead to grave results, like anarchy or recklessness. 2 Fo37 / //O3_VO^ XC^v/^is^ 1 I 1 1 I' 1 1 t I 1 1 \ 1 1 • ; COPYRIGHT -llOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

- 7 - Q. Is It your plan to have only one party In Egypt? A. We plan to have a number of them. But two or three are enough. Q. When will the time be ripe for that? A. At the end of three years, we will see what the situation Is* We must take It all gradually. Q. General Naguib, you seized power In a military coup, ousted a King and, since then, have been carrying out a revolution — all peacefully, without bloodshed. Hoi? did you succeed In doing this? A. Every Important step I and my Military Committee, which represents a sort of special staff, (etat major) have taken has been discussed and negotiated among us before being attempted. We studied carefully the effects of each move and the means needed to carry it out. If you make radical moves, or Jump without thinking, you can't achieve results. Secondly, the people were fed up with the evils of the past. Everyone was ready to accept any change. Thirdly, the persons carrying out this movement consecrated themselves to the public good with no personal Interests or selfish ambitions. This enabled us to win the ionfidence of our compatriots. If you begin with force and violence, you cannot get the people to back you. They will jump on you Instead. Our movement Is devoid of selfishness. This moral aspect, I believe, Is the most important factor in our success. Q. How will you preserve this high morality as time goes on? A. I keep an open eye around me. If I find someone deviating, I will give him a small notice — before, rather than after mistakes are made. Our political situation Is encouraging. The sympathy shown to us by many countries — America, first of all — helps us to carry on. At the beginning, everyone was afraid of this movement. Foreign residents in Egypt were afraid and shaken. Christians feared Moslems. Now they are reassured. We must always, of course, keep on the lookout for intrigues. When we discover an intrigue, we hand out punishment according to the crime, the motives and who Is behind It. Justice comes before everything. ft. Have most of the polifcal leaders you arrested been released? A. Yes. Q. How many are still interned? A* About one or two only. Q. How many persons (including leaders) were arrested last summer and later, after the attempted counter-coup In January? A. About SO were arrested last summer. Nearly all of them were released two months ago. Some were deceived by their co-partners. Some were Induced to think we were going the wrong way. These young people were set free with no punishment, or very little, either because they were misled by their sense of patriotism or because there was no strong evidence against them. Q. Did you talk with them yourself? A. Yes, I did with some of them. The others, the agitators, the real sources of the Intrigue, are harder to catch. They are careful about leaving evidence* Q. Is Communism a problem In Egypt. A. It Is not so Impprtant here. There are some nests here and there. We got a big one the other day - the main source of Communist pamphlets. Q. How many communists are there In Egypt? A. Very few. They are a small minority. Our religion Is against Communism, you know. Most of those who spout Communism are philosophers, talking In theory, or people who Just say they ere Communist0 because they wsnt to pretend they are leaders of a movement or because they gain some money from some Communist sources* Q,. Are you worried at all about Communist activity? A. 1 am not worried. But we must be aware of them* <%. How are decisions made In your government, General Naguib? Do you make the final decisions yourself? A* Naturally I make the final decisions but everything hes Its sources. On routine matters, members of the Military Committee who represent my staff or assistants and Cabinet Ministers make decisions In their own fields. On important matters, we all discuss it together, either In the Military Committee, or in the Cabinet, or the two bodies meet together. Everything is accorded Its proper treatment* ft. Since becoming Premier last fall, you have been a member of the Cabinet as well as of the Military Committee which carried out last July's Revolution. Are you the only individual who is a member of both bodies, the Cabinet and the Military Committee? A. Yes. ft. How are decisions made in the Military Committee' Do you vote? A. The majority has to be respected. But some things, like the Higher Dem project, ere too compli- cated for decisions to be reached by the Military Committee alone* It takes a Joint meeting of our officers group with the Cabinet Ministers to decide. Q. The Military Committee of 12 makes decisions by majority vote? A. \ On highly important matters, we must be unanimous. ^V0 For example, in giving a death sentence, on some j 3>pfr "x. P° itioel crimes, which fortunately has only (v** ^^ happened once, it is necessary that the special [J" *" Court-Martial agree unanimously subject to my confirmation or lessening the punishment. But generally, on most matters, decisions are made by majority vote* ft. Where does Egypt stand in the cold war between the Communist world led by Russia and the Western world led by the United States? A. I have always wanted peace. Human beings sometimes behave contrary to humanity and common sense of good reasong. Tney sacrifice their lives. For what? If the efforts and materials devoted to war were directed to civilised purposes, it would promote a better life for the whole world. It may sound strange for a soldier to say this. It is said that human nature leads to war. I don't believe that. It is selfishness that destroys everything. It is the basis of all evil In the world, and the cause of war* I love peace between nations. But how can people achieve it, unless they put aside selfishness? Q. As a soldier,General Nagulb, how would you propose to defend the Middle East against the threat of Soviet aggression? Actually, the question you raise, Mr. Klelman, cannot be answered at this time. We have first to know If we are going to achieve our national aspirations or not. As you know, we want British troops to leave Egyptian soil. Before deciding which policy to follow, I must be as free as you are. Two free men can make a better pact than one who Is free and one who is not. If today you ask me about a pact for defence of the Middle East, I can only say I don't know. I have twice suffered from aggression by combined Allied forces, In two World Wars and afterward. I cannot describe to you the humiliation we have felt, the arrogance of soldiers In wartime, who treat civilians badly, who don't care for the native man. We contributed a great deal In both wars -- men, animals, supplies, communications, bases. But in return all we got was that Great Britain remained in our country. We are prepared to die rather than be treated like that again. Unless these people are just toward me and give me my rights, I cannot enter into any pact. , Q. Suppose the British agree to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone. Would you be prepared to take part in a Middle Eastern defence set-up with the United States and other countries? A. When I feel as a free man, after that, I can ask: What are my objectives? What obligations must I assume? What Is the extent of your help to me? What is the price I must pay for that? During the past eight months, we. have felt the closest sympathy In our history ^8&l*h America, more than with any other Western or European country. I am not flaterring you. Your Ambassador here, Mr. Jefferson Caffery, has been very kind. Sometimes, I have asked his opinion of this case or that. His advice has always been good. He has been a very faithful man and he has Increased our confidence In America. This has paved the way for better understanding between our two nations. It could be the same with other countries. I have told the British that if they treat faithfully with us, It will pave the way to a better understanding. There are things which it Is right should happen and which, if done at once, would increase confidence and understanding. But we have Just met delay after delay. For example, our request for arms from America. The United States promised to help. We were about to gst them. But we haven't yet received any£ We have been kept waiting and waiting. This leads to suspicion. Anything done at once, any sign of sympathy, has twfcce as much affect than If delayed. As long as I am weak, I cannot enter Into any agreement with a confident heart. If the U*S. offers economic help, technicians, experts and I am weak, I must be careful. It might lead to domination. If I am strong, like Italy, France, I can accept. Q. Do you planv to Increase your forces, If Egypt tekea responsibility for defending the Suez Canal Zone, or are you just trying to equip the forces you now have? A* I must increase them, if I must prepare for such operations* It is not easy, though. It will take time* Q. How many divisions would Egypt need to defend the Canal Zone? A. Not less than five divisions, or six, and this is as peace establishment. But for war, I should need at least to double this. Q* And you have less than half your peacetime needs now? A. I sjuouia better keep that secret* 4. The British aay they are worried about the valuable repair shops, arms depots and other instal- lations in their Canal zone base. The base, they say, Is vital if a large Allied Array is to operate in the M.S. In the eveny of a Soviet attack, la this true? ' A. Presuming that the installations are very valuable, yet they are more important to Egypt tnan to Britain. The British can go to Australia via Capetown. They no longer have the need they once had for communications via Egypt or through Suez to India or elsewhere. India's positions is different now* Who can better defend our country? Our own people or strangers? The morale of people defending their own country Is better than that of any foreign soldiers. For us, It is a matter of life and death to defend that strategic point. The British soldiers In the Canal Zone don't want to stay there. They have no means of recreation. It is a very small atrip. The first requisite for defence is a faithful population behind you. You can't keep communications running when you are being boycotted. Q,. Would you be willing to accept non-Egyptian technicians to operate the Canal Zone installations? A. ' Not if they ere British. We might start from now to train Egyptians to manage them; as a last resort, we may accept some technicians from certain neutral nations. But only a limited number for a limited period, several months perhaps, during which we can study the problems, make plans and learn to operate the base. The Egyptian soldier, though Illiterate, learns easily and perfectly* CAIRO. 101 April, 1953. CONFIDENTIAL •xt Sir, With the dissolution of the political parties announced by General Neguib on the 16th January, the Wafd which for-over thirty years, whether iu office cr opposition, has boon a force to be reckoned with, disappeared from the Egyptian priitical scene, at least 'as a legally constituted and an overtly active organisation. During the months which followed the coup d'etat of July 23rd, 1952 the Wafd had fought hard by all the various moans at its disposal to maintain itself. My purpose in this despatch is to review the various stages of this unequal struggle and to attempt to assess, in the light of developments both before and since the dissolution of the political parties, the prospects of the Wafd continuing to play a part in Egyptian political life. 2. " When the Army under General Neguib seized powor en the 23rd July, 1952, both the Leader rf the Wafd, Mustapha Nahas, and the Secretary-General, Puad Sorag ed Din, were on vacation in Europe, it was therefore Ali Zaki el Orabi, the former president of the Senate, who, on the morning of the COUP d'etat, hurriedly convened the prominent Wafdists then In Cairo to a meeting at his h^use to consider the new situation, in view °f later developments it is noteworthy that Dr. Mohamed Salah-ed-Din, the farmer Minister for Foreign Affairs, stressed the need for a purge, not only in the Palace but also in the political parties, 3. Nahas and Serag ed Din returned to Cairo m the night of the 27th July and l<--st no time in calling on General Neguib and offering him the full supprrt of the Wafd, which, they let it be known, in their opinion, alone had the necessary experience and political support to form an effective Government. Though they were politely received Nahas and Serag ed Din, no doubt to their astonishment, got little or no encouragement, in the crurse of the next few days the attitude of the Military Authorities towards the political parties and to the Wafd in particular was made clear. General Neguib's message calling on the parties to emulate the Army in purging themselves and to publish their programmes was followed by an announcement of the Government's intention to strengthen the Origin of Fortunes Law and by the setting up cf purge Committees . AS might be expected, the Wafd had little confidence in Ali Maher, the new Prime Minister, and it was also extremely apprehensive of the Moslem Brotherhood and cf its influence with the Army, Hopes of Anglo-Ameriean support for a Wafdist administration were quickly disappointed.

A.

Tho Right Honourable Winston S, Churchill, C.H., M.P., Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1 . i|. The clrcumstanoes in which the Party was called upon tc fight fcr its existence were from their point cf view singularly inopportune. After its last administration, during which the country had been brought to the verge of chars~and bankruptcy by the Government's corruption and inept handling of affairs, the Wafd's prestige was generally low. It was also saddled with a sick, aged and stubborn leader who in spite of his personal prestige was generally felt to be a handicap, and the question of the succession was already giving cause for concern. Orabi, aged 71 * and Abdel Zaki Pahrny Goraaa, the former President of the Chamber of Deputies, aged 67, who were the most obvious candidates, were themselves only a few years younger than Nahas who was in his 73rd year. The influence of Serag ed Din within the Party was also not unchallenged and it was no secret that Salah-ed-Din aspired to the peat of Secretary-General. Finally, among the rank and file of the Party there was a considerable chafing at the authoritarian rule of the Wafd Executive whose members were net elected by the Party but, as in the case of the original Wafd or "delegation", were personally appointed by the Leader. 5. "It is therefore not surprising that a virtual split in the Party quickly developed. Salah-ed-Din favoured a self- imposed purge (which would include Serag ed Din and Osman Moharram, the notoriously corrupt Minister of public Works) while Serag ed Din was opposed to it ostensibly on the grounds that it was essential that, in the circumstances, the Wafd should remain united. The Military Authorities naturally supported Salah-ed-Din (in whose appointment to the post of Secretary-General they were prepared to concur) but they also wished to see Nahas replaced by Gomaa, 6. The Wafd was, however, the first Party tc answer General Neguib's call for a new political programme (which, published on August 1st, recalled the Wafd's "exceptional record cf service to the country" and promised every conceivable reform) and were also equally prompt to take his advice about purging the Party of corruption. Its purge was, however, hardly more impressive than its programme. Hamed Zaki, former Minister of National Economy* who was considered to be one of the more enlightened members of the party, paid with his expulsion from the Wafd for his disagreements with party leaders including Serag ed Din, and eleven other little known members were sacrificed with him. The President of the Party's Purge Committee was Orabi and Salah-ed-Din was a member, but the comparative respectability of these two was offset by the inclusion of Mahmoud Suleiman Ghannam, Abdel Fattah Hassan and Abdel Meguid el Rimali, which suggested that the purge was hardly likely to be directed against the most obvious targets within the Party. It was generally felt that the expulsion of the 12 was in the nature of providing scapegoats to obviate the need for further sacrifices. 7. This manoeuvre, which clearly indicated the predominant influence of Serag ed Din in the Party, deceived no one, least of all General Neguib, who shortly afterwards spoke of "taking other measures" if the parties did not heed' advice or warning, Orabi and his colleagues on the Wafd purge. Committee, however, continued to press for further re- organisation which thoy proposed would include the appointment •'' ' '"'•••. '•' : '. •- - "'. V . :/of " ;•- : of a Deputy to Nahas (orabi himself) and the replacement of . Serag ed Din by Salah-ed-Din as Secretary-General. On August 11th Orabi and Salah-ed-Din were received by General Naguib. Orabi came away from the meeting with the impressing (probably correct) that General Noguib personally had no objection to Nahas continuing as president and sc informed Nahas, unfortunately for those within the Wafd who wished for whatever reasons to make the purge a reality. The effect was instantaneous; Nahas refused to consider any further •hanges, and so strengthened Serag ed Din's position. Both Nahas and Serag ed Din evidently decided that attack was the best defence and indulged in aggressive speeches in which they placed the responsibility for the January riots on the ex-King and on the British Government. The Wafdist press took a similar line. A.I Misr1, under the influence, as the Army believed of Serag ed Din, overs lipped the mark by publishing false reports designed to embarrass the regime. The paper's premises were occupied for a short time by the military and its proprietor Mahmoud Aboul Pat'h left for Europe. The military also believed that the Wafd had had a hand in the serious labour troubles which occurred at Kafr al Dawar on August 12th/13th. 8. Nevertheless within the Wafd Executive it seems that the majority persisted in advocating radical reform of the Party and the idea of Nahas becoming Honorary president and of orabi being appointed the active President was first mooted, Orabi himself, who believed Nahas to be both honest and essential to the party, would however have none of this and certain of the Wafdist Youth who wore strong advocates of reform, went to the length of addressing a petition to General Neguib to the effect that Nahas and the old leaders were nc longer fit to direct the policy of the party. Salah-ed-Din, who agreed to be their spokesman, was received by General Neguib and informed him that, failing Orabi, Gomaa was the best candidate for the Party presidency. Gomaa was accordingly received by General Neguib on August 20th and they agreed that Serag ed Din and, to a lesser extent, Nahas were corrupt'and should be prevailed upon to retire. The General indicated that acceptance of this proposal was expected within a week. i ! '"'•"' • 9, Nahas, who firmly believed that the military in reality feared the influence of the Wafd, obstinately refused to move . He declined to recognise the verdict of the Government purge Committee which had condemned Moharram. By the end of August the Wafd response to the new regime's appeal for reform had not gone beyond announcing that in future members would have more say in the selection of the Executive Committee and that the party funds would be properly kept in a bank account. They did not, however, follow up even this small beginning and en September 5th Serag ed Din declared that, in the opinion of the Wafd, purging was the function of the duly constituted courts of law and not of the specially appointed Government Committee.. He also said that the Wafd had its own ideas on land reform. On September 6th the Prime ' Minister informed me of his intention of taking action against the political parties and alsc against Nahas for his failure to declare the origin of his fortune. * ' 10. The Army then took the matter into their own hands by including Serag ed Din and certain other Wafdista among those arrested on September ?th. The arrests were described /in in an official communique as a further step in the purge cf corruption and also as a proventative measure. General Neguib replaced Aly Maher as prime Minister and a member of . Neo-Nationalists violently anti-Wafd were included in the Cabinet . Among the Waf diets arrested were Mahmoud Suleiman Ghannam (Assistant Secretary -General of the Party) , osman Moharram, a member of the wealthy land-owning Badrawi family- related to Serag-ed-Din, members rf the Wakil (Mme. Nahas's} family, members of the Serag-ed-Din family and Serag-ed-Din' s two secretaries, on September 8th it was announced that, following a decision by General Neguib's Cabinet, the political parties were considered dissolved until reconstituted in accordance with new legislation. The law, which was promulgated shortly afterwards, provided that persons wishing to found political parties in future should so inform the Minister of the Interior beforehand, outlining the organisation and. resources cf the party and listing the founder members. After approval had been given the members should meet and elect the President of the Committee . Party funds should be kept and bank accounts and budgets submitted to full party meetings. Any persons convicted of corruption or abuse of influence were debarred from membership of a political party. •H . Serag-ed-Din, who publicly announced his resignation from the post of Secretary -General of the Wafd, remained in custody until the beginning of December and the prospects of progress appeared tc be more favourable, on September 16th The dissolution of the Wafd and the appointment cf a Committee to found a new V/afdist Party in accordance with the political Parties Law was announced. It was decided at the meeting that members rf the party who were under detention should be excluded from the party until their innocence was established. There were no indications, however, that the Wafd were prepared to jettison Nahas, and violent criticism of him in public speeches by Suleiman Hafez, the Deputy prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, and by Pathy Radwan, Minister of Propaganda, only led to a decision at a critical meeting of the Wafd Executive on September 27th not to submit any notification tothe Minister of the Interior of their intention to form a new Wafd party. Nahas decided that it was better for the Wafd to lie low and, in the event of elections, to put forward candidates under the guise of independents . In the meantime the Army Movement should be embarrassed by all possible means especially by Waf diet publicity for Egypt's claims against Her Majesty's Government. 12. This mood of hysterical defiance was not of long duration. The Military Authority decided to take the battle into the enemy territory and in the early days cf October General Neguib proceeded on a triumphal tour of the Delta, visiting Nahas's home town amongst other places. At the same time mediators were at work. Mohamed Bahieddin Barakat, a member of the temporary Regency Council and a nephew of Saad Zaghloul the founder of the Wafd, intervened with Colonel Mehanna, his colleague on the provisional Regency Councili and succeeded in securing the agreement of General Neguib and Suleiman Hafez tc a reconstituted Wafd with Nahas as Honorary President, provided that Nahas and certain others were not included in the list of founder members and that Nahas's presidency should be honorary in the full sense cf the word* This effer was .open for 2k hours only. T aha Hussein, the former Waf dist Minister of Education, urged acceptance, /particularly particularly with a view to saving the party funds, (An attempt some time previously to withdraw cash from the Bank had failed after unsuccessful recourse to the State Council, which had ruled that until parties were officially approved their funds remained blocked). The combined effect of these developments was decisive . In the course of a painful interview on October 5th, Grubi, Mohamed al Wakil, former Minister of justice, and Ahmed Hamza, former Minister of Supply, succeeded, not without difficulty, in persuading Nahas to accept the Army ultimatum, and on October ?th the press announced the Waf d's decision to submit a declaration under the political Parties Law. Gomaa, Qrabi, Tawil, Wakil, and Hamza were cited as founder members, and it was stated Nahas would be Honorary President for life and the party would "seek inspiration from his directives and find its guiding light in his loyalty, strength and devotion to principle". 13. The curtain thus fell on the first act of this drama with complete defeat for the Wafd. The party's morale was undoubtedly at its lowest ebb and his closest friends doubted whether Nahas would survive the shock. Even so further difficulties were in store for the party. The Minister of the Interior objected to the appointment of Nahas as Honorary President (ostensibly on the grounds that the law contained no prevision for such an appointment but in reality no doubt because of the party's declared intention to continue to be guided by Nahas), and also to the inclusion as a founder member of Tawil, against whom charges of nepotism and abuse of influence were being prepared. The Wafd announced its intention of contesting these objections before the State Council and a hearing was fixed for Ncvember 20th. During the remainder of October and November, however, there were few signs of Wafdist activity, though occasions for publicly calling-for a restitution of constitutional life were not missed. The absence of utilisable funds was nbvicusly a limiting factor. But both the founder members of the proposed new party and Wafdist youth leaders remained convinced of the need of an understanding with the Army, if only to counteract the influence of Suleiman Hafez and his neo-Nationalists, whom they regarded as the Wafd enemy No.1 . 1^. What appeared to be an opportunity of achieving this occurred towards the end of November and a short but dramatic second act was played before the stage was set for the final act, which was to close with the dissolution of the Wafd and all political parties and the confiscation of their funds. Increasing difficulties, particularly economic, which were outlined in my despatch No.265 <"f 17th December 1952, and the need for the maximum support during negotiations with Her Majesty's Government led the Array to modify their attitude towards the political parties, including the Wafd. The cooperation of all political leaders in an all embracing national effort was invited. Hopes of a new Government possibly under a civilian prime Minister (the Wafd were apparently prepared to accept even Ali Maher) and of a new Constitution were held out. General Neguib visited the political prisoners in their place of detention and their release in groups over a period from November 23rd to December 5th was authorised. Members of the High Military Committee were busy courting Ahmed Aboul Pat'h, who in his brother's absence in Europe was directing the policy of the Pro-Wafdist paper !Al Misri', On December 6th General Neguib paid Nahas a courtesy call which was /promptly - 6 - promtly returned* No practical result was, however, achieved in this meeting. Nahaa, who wrongly interpreted the change in the Army attitude as a sign of weakness, declined to cooperate in the roforra of the Constitution and was critical of the Army's Sudan policy. It was not therefore surprising that when Cabinet changes were announced on December 7th, General Neguib remained Prime Minister and Suleiman Hafez, the Wafd's "bitterest opponent, remained Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, The visit to Nahas was not followed up by calls "by other political leaders* Unlike Nahas, Serag-ed-Din, however, was quick to realise that the Army's gesture to the political parties was not an appeasement tut a move to gain time. 15. That the High Military Committee had every intention of keeping essential power in their own hands was made abundantly clear on December 14th when the formation of the "Liberation Rally" (the Army's own civilian organisation) was announced, and on December 21st when a new Anti-Corruption Law was issued. This law brought all the holders of public office, retrospectively to 1939, within the purview of a specially constituted Tribunal, the majority of whose members would be army officers appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and from whoso decision there would be no appeal. It represented the final abandonment of the Army's attempt to secure the Wafd's cooperation, and the findings of the Purge Committees which began to be published early in January showed an unmistakable anti-Wafd tendency. . , 16. Nahas, hewever, remained defiant. An attempt was made to vindicate Tawil by securing his election as President of the Lawyers Syndicate but this failed and the appointment of Omar Omar, although a Wafdist, was a set-back for the Wafd and for Nahas in particular. In the universities, too, the struggle was renewed and a coalition of Wafdist and left-wing students against the supporters of the Moslem Brotherhood and the Army had a minor success in one of tho elections for the Student Councils. A disturbance in Fund I University in Cairo led to the arrest of more than 100 students and to the closing of almost all the Faculties for several days. In spite of these drastic measures, efforts by the Army to induce tho students belonging to the old liberation units, which had taken part in tho disturbances in the Canal Zono in the autumn of 1951, to hand over their arms at a ceremony attended by Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasr on January 12th was foiled by the Wafd, At the renewed hearing before the State Council on the same day of the Minister of the Interior's objection to the honorary presidency of Nahas and' the inclusion of Tawil among the party's founder members the attitude of the Wafdist lawyers was almost truculent. Nevertheless prominent Wafdists were inciuded in the Committee established to rewrite the Constitution - Salah-ed- Din, Gorna'a, Orabi, Taha Hussein and Dr. Miniawy (a Copt). 17. During the first weeks of January the Wafd as well as other elements hostile to the new regime were encouraged by thu lack of confidence which the Army leaders betrayed in the face of increasing difficulties. Delay in bringing the Sudan negotiations to a successful conclusion and the continued economic stress to some extent unnerved the regime, and the Wafd rightly inter- preted as weakness the wild utterances of Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasr on the subject of the possible use of force, against British troops in the Canal Zone. Attempts were made by the Wafd to establish contact with members of my staff. It is also probable that the Wafd was in touch with their sympathisers in -the Army and also with left-wing organisations* . 18. On January 15th General Noguib and his officers decided to strike. Serag-od.-Din, together with his closest supporters, Colonel Mehanna and twenty-five officers, mostly from the Artillery, and about 100 so-called communists were arrested. The army officers wore accused of plotting to replace General Neguib's High Military Committee and it was alleged they were acting in concert both with Serag-ed-Din and his supporters and with the communists. On the following day the dissolution and the confiscation of the funds of all the political parties and the inauguration of a three year transition period during which they would not be permitte4 wore announced "by General Neguib, 19. Those drastic measures were effective in breaking tho Wafd's morale and even to some extent in splitting the party. In the two months that have elapsed since they were taken, little has boon hoard of Wafdist activities and certain Wafdist leaders, Salah-e4-Din, Taha Hussein and Gomaa, and Ahmed Aboul Fa^h, oo- propriotor of the pro-Wafdist paper Al Misri. have publicly demonstrated their support of the Army Movement and to a lesser extent for the Liberation Organisation. SO. Nevertheless, it would be,a mistake to imagine that the Wafd is dead. It is true that as long as the Army Movement maintains itself, tiie prospects of a Wafdist revival is small. The Army has clearly .shown that it can effectively deal with open defiance and it is most unlikely that the Wafd will be able to break the Army Movement by overt opposition. The time may come, however, when the Military will need a greater measure of outside support and will again make overtures to the Wafd, This would be Nahas1 opportunity and it can be safely assumed that, in the meantime, he and his supporters are missing no opportunity of hastening the day by indirect means. The circumstances in which the Wafd may be invited to play a r81e, cannot be foreseen with any degree of clarity and must remain largely a matter of conjecture and uncertainty; but any of the following eventualities, none of which is impossible, would appear likely to give them an opportunity. First, a serious rift between the Army Movement and the Moslem Brotherhood. In this case an alliance between the Army and the Wafd would be advantageous to General Neguib, It is,, of course, a moot point whether Nahas would fall into : such a trap. He might consider it bettor politics to align himself temporarily with the Brotherhood. Secondly, a split within the Army. It is again doubtful whether tho Wafd would ; In euoh circumstances bolster up General Neguib and his men. They are more likely to encourage differences with a view to the • Army Movement destroying Itself utterly. Thirdly, the Initial etages of renewed hostilities in the Canal Zone. It would clearly be difficult for Yfafdists, even if they were so inclined, to resist the appeal for volunteers for a national struggle, particularly as they are now encouraging by indirect means the excesses of the new regime, on the principle that given enough rope/ :'dpe -it will hang itself. At the outset therefore they would associate themselves with such a policy of violence, and this policy of egging on the extremists in the Army applies especially to the Canal question. But once the Army had irretrievably embarked'on a policy of violence and its failure became likely, it can safely be,assumed that the Wafd would lose no time in stabbing the regime in tho back. With the breakdown of Army rule, the Wafd's prospects would be good. The restraining influence of the Palace has gone and tho Wafd's only serious rival for power would then be the Moslem Brotherhood. 21. What then is the secret of the Wafd's vitality and where does its strength lie? The Wafd's0mystique", carefully fostered over a period of thirty years, still exists. It is the expression of tho spirit of Egyptian nationalism which is tho one force which can unite and galvanise the country - as so frequently in the Middle East. Moreover tho name of Nahas has by no means been forgotten by tho mass of the people, and tho party's countrywide organisation, which penetrates to the village level, though it has been inactive for some time, could quickly bo revived. By no means all the officers, who entered tho Army and the Police as subalterns during tho Wafdist administrations of tho past (most of whom were Wafdists or Wafdist sympathisers) were eliminated during the regime's purgo of these forces. Such support as the Wafd maintains 'in the Army and the Police is not only useful to it in present circumstances but may well prove vital, if the party is called upon in the future to four/a Government and assume responsibility for law and order. Similarly, all Wafdists have not been eliminated from the higher ranks of the civil service. In- the countryside $00, where no administrative purge has been carried out by the regime, a high proportion of the village Omdahs were appointed by the Wafd and can probably be assumed still to be capable of proving loyal Wafdists. On instructions from provincial Governors, the Omdahs, Wafdist or otherwise, are now sponsoring tho village, committees of the Army's Liberation Rally, but in changed circumstances they could equally be relied upon to make no difficulties about the revival of Wafdist committees. Membership of the Wafd has over a long period shown itself to bo profitable and in comparison the Liberation Rally with its call for service and hard work, has limited appeal for tho average Egyptian. Finally, the Wafd has in the past included in its ranks, and still probably enjoys tho general support of, a considerable proportion of the country^ leaders in finance, commerce, industry and professions, as well as in politics. 22* It is moro than likely that tho Wafd which may emerge in tho future will differ in many respects from the Wafd of the past* Tho Land Reform Law, even if it is not applied in its present form, cannot fail to *ffect the influence within the party of the land-owning class, which has been predominant to date and the so-called left-wing of the party may gain the upper hand. However this may be, one thing is clear: the Wafd is not dead. 25. I am sending copies of this despatch to tho Head of tho British Middle East Office at Payid, and to Her Majesty's representatives in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Ankara, Washington and Paris. I have the honour to be, With the highest respect, Sir, Your most obedient, humble Servant,

(FOR HER MAJESTY'"S AMBASSADOR) EGYPT SUOA!'

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M1915 43677 .THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERS*^ OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL "'•«i8P Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

EGYPT AND SUDAN ARCHIVES COPY. June 3, 1953 JE 1015/81 NOT FOR CIRCULATION. Section 1

STATE OF FEELING IN EGYPT TOWARDS THE BRITISH Sir R< Stevenson to Sir W. Churchill. (Received June 3)

(No. 132. Confidential) Cairo, feeling, neither has it permitted others to Sir, JuJ2L do so. There have been meetings and In paragraph 2 of my despatch'" No. 121 speeches (the latter dwelling of late as much of the 21st May reference was made to the on the need for restraint as for violence) but political apathy of the mass of the Egyptian no organised demonstrations have been population and to the failure of regime permitted. Certainly the present regime orators to divert attention from their pre- has not indulged in the subsidising of occupation with the daily struggle for demonstrators as did some of its pre- existence to the problem of " national decessors, a fact which may well account aspirations." There has in fact so far been for a great deal of the indifference with a marked absence of those manifestations which it meets, particularly amongst the of anti-British feeling and acts of hostility students. Nor has the press been fully to individuals which characterised the agita- unleashed. Lastly there is the widespread tions of 1951 and previous similar occasions. feeling in the country against the regime This is observable just as much in the itself, a feeling which in so many cases (the capital and large cities as in the rural areas, dispossessed landlords, the unemployed and warrants some analysis. labourers, the shopkeepers, the dismissed 2. The regime has, of course, set its face army and police officers, the members of resolutely since the outset against that sort the former political parties, &c.) stems from of hooliganism, dear to certain elements of the fight for survival, and is in consequence the Egyptian populace, out of which the a great deal stronger than any feeling majority of such incidents have sprung in against us. the past. In addition to this discourage- 4. Nevertheless elements are not lacking ment, there is at present the pre-occupation from which an anti-British outburst could of the student body (always well to the front spring, or be conjured up. A few thousand on rowdy occasions) with their examina- well-trained and well-equipped men would tions, and the fact that they are in any case be sufficient to cause a great deal of trouble now deeply divided in their sympathies. in the Canal Zone should the regime decide The Wafd, the Moslem Brotherhood, the upon a " call to arms " and this number is so-called Communists and the Liberation not hard to find from amongst the political Rally share the students' allegiance between exaltes, the riffraff, the Wafd (ready to push them, and to a certain extent tend to cancel the army over the brink) and the Moslem each other out. The Moslem Brotherhood, Brethren (who may not participate officially who probably dispose of the most effective or as a movement, but some of whose organisation, have their own difficulties with the army and are in consequence not fanatics would probably seize the oppor- yet united in their attitude towards either tunity for an assault on the infidel). the regime or ourselves. The result has 5. Despite the absence, therefore, of any been a general lack of support for the countrywide support at present for a policy Liberation Squads and indeed for any of violence, the danger of violence remains, definite action in support of the regime. as always in a country as volatile as Egypt, 3. This lack of enthusiasm is not con- at no great depth below the surface. It fined to the student body. In the country could be touched off accidentally or inten- as a whole there are the discouraging effects tionally at very short notice and there is the of economic difficulties, which inevitably danger in the present situation that a policy loom largest in the minds of the peasantry of violence in the Canal Zone might lead, and the working classes. There is also the as it did on 26th January, 1952, to demon- fact that the regime has not itself so far set strations and disorders in the capital by the wholeheartedly about whipping up public " liberators." 175—20 Pl/PHC HtcoHp un-i tt A i y i a _ Reference' -

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6. There is little doubt, however, that the disorders in the Canal Zone spreading to Egyptian Government would spare no the Delta is very real and the consequences efforts to maintain order in the Delta, might well prove disastrous both for the particularly in Cairo and Alexandria, and it security of the foreign communities and for is also probable that they are in some ways the survival of the regime itself. If the better equipped to deal with mob violence latter therefore were deliberately to embark than were their immediate predecessors. A on a campaign of violence against the considerable number of troops have British forces it would do so, in present recently been concentrated in the capital circumstances, at the risk of finding this (the Kasr el Nil barracks have been re- weapon turn in its hand. occupied) the Cairo City police has been I am sending copies of this despatch to equipped with patrol cars in wireless com- the head of the British Middle East Office munication with headquarters, and their at Fayid, and to Her Majesty's Representa- Commandant is confident, in spite of the tives in Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, disorganisation of the force during the past Ankara, Washington and Paris. nine months, of his ability to deal with I have, &c. troublemakers. Nevertheless, the risk of RALPH SKRINE STEVENSON. AFRICAN DEPARTMENT J A«m

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.SAVING TELLGRAM

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JAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Kalph Stevenson No. 6? Saving. 17th March, 1953. Repeated Saving to:-'Paris No. 124, 'Washington No. 95, Memin (Fayid) No. 121

UNCLASSIFIED Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 67 Saving of 17th March, repeated for information Saying to:- Paris No. 124, Washington No. 95, Memin (Fayid) No. 121. My saving telegram No. Y09 of 1952, paragraph 3. In an interview with Rose el Yussef reported on the 16th Saleh Ashmawi attached Hassan al Hodeiby for the Brotherhood's present state of complete stagnation. He spoke sarcastically of the Supreme Guide's pose of far-sightedness in having saved the Brotherhood from dissolution along with the political parties and insisted that al Hodeiby had played a double game with the Brother- hood and the authorities in order to assure his own position. 2. Al Hodeiby was also castigated for having forced Sheikh al Baqpuri (paragraph 5 of my saving telegram No. 96 of 1952) to resign from the Brotherhood on the grounds that he had]accepted office without consulting the Supreme Guide and in a Glvernment not .basud on strictly Koranic principles. T/*T / 0 I 3 / 4. Al Ashmawi concluded by saying that the Brotherhood must play an active role in the reform movement and exploit their influence as the most powerful organisation in the Middle iliast in the interest of the people. This they could not do while Al Hodeiby remained Supreme Guide.

V

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Ralph Stevenson' No. 68 Saving^ 19th March, 1953. Repeated Saving to:- Paris No. 132, Washington Wo. .102, B.M,E.O. FayidNo. 128.

UNCLASSIFIED

*.ddres sea to Foreign/lffice telegram No. 68 Saving of 19th March, repeated for information Saving to:- Paris, W ton and B.M.L'.O. Fayid. My telegram NO. 6? Saving. ^Ashmawi's attack on Hodaibi./.

On 17th Al Zaman printed the following statement. "We have received a denial from al Da' awa to the effect th?.t th-3 interview published in one of yesterday's weeklies is a forgery. Maitre Saleh Ashmawi left for the Hedjaz last Thursday morning and did not communicate with anyone". PUBLJEftJECOS DOrriC E l IT— 3 it s « Rejerence-'- i_ 1 2 * — £-^ - ^> "71 I/ / D <3 V D J-4~J -^.i-^)L C— • £•*// /] CX^_jO ^2> O£ _ . II II II 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

INffARD SAVING TELEGRAM FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE By Bag FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION Sir R. Stevenson No.54 Saving 27th February, 1953. R.28th February, 1953.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.54 Savinff of 27th February Repeated far information Saving te:- Paris Washington B.M.E.O.

In an interview with the representetive of "The Voice of America" on the 25th Colonel Abdel Nasr is reported to have emphasised that there wai no military dictatorship in Egypt, in the derogatory sense of the tent. The Army Revolution was the servant of the people and its aia was to build a free and equal society. *v v 2. There were definite parallels between America's history and that of Egypt, both countries having freed themselves not only from foreign rulers but also from internal chaos and corruption. America would therefore realise that the Egyptians harboured no malice or aggressive intent. Their motto was "Good for good, and noble is he who does good first* evil for evil, and he who does evil first is the aggressor". 3. Friendly nations should not hinder the Arab desire for unity by helping out-worn Imperialism to fish in troubled waters. Egypt would befriend those who treated her as an equal and were willing to rectify the errors of the past. To such nations Egypt offered the hand of friendship, it was in their own interests to take it and not, by rejecting it, force her into irretrievable hostility.

B B B 10116/9/53 f W$jm& ] BRITISH EMBASSY, , \ '/'<0,;jVCv 'XV / - - * SECRET v£P?^gpX£v-£X;.Xy CAIRO. 2nd March, 1953. (l& . INDEXEI

Thank you for your letter of the 27th February about Hafez Afifi and Mahmoud Ghazali etc. " The short answer to your question is that these people are at liberty but under discreet, and probably fairly active, surveillance; end that no«v that special exit visas are required for any Egyptian to RO abroad, they would be unlikely to get such a visa*unless it appeared to be in the national interest that they should go. For instance, Mamdouh Riaz, a former Minister of Commerce, who was also among the people shut up in the secondary school, has recently gone on a journey to France and Western Germany in connexion with his business interests in the exploitation of iron-ore deposits in the Asswan area. 2. We paid a New Year visit to Mahmoud Ghazali and his wife, who, though very glad to see us, made it clear that they were rather alarmed about possible consequences. The trouble is that it is impossible to keep Mahmoud off dangerous political topics, and if one happens to meet him in public, as I have on one occasion since, it makes things still more tricky. 3. Hafez Afifi, on the -other hand, has been out in society from time to time, and my wife saw him recently at a charity meeting, Trefor Evans has also visited him at his house and we could certainly see him at any time we wished. 4. The only way we can really effectively help such people, particularly Mahmoud Ghazali, is by getting them jobs or directorships or otherwise helping them to solve their financial problems. Though Cumberbatch and I have tried to do this, unfortunately nothing has yet come our way. 5. I do not think that, in fact, any great harm is done to our prestige by our failing to see much of these friends of ours now that they have had this unfortunate experience. It certainly did us harm in that when they were arrested we could do nothing effective to get them out, but now that is over I think it is only tactful not to cause them any embarrassment by seeking their society, particularly if we are unsble to do any good of a financial kind. I certainly think that no good and much harm would result from any kind of press attacks on the regime here on behalf of these people.

(M. j. creswell) /* -Wfc. a/Iff. C4-4ET f I R. Allen, Esq., C. Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.I. Reference:- I

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/HP. 1014/4/53 BRITISH EMBASSY, UNCLASSIFIED CAIRO. 25th February, 1953.

Dear Department, We enclose the text, as published in Le Journal d'Sgypte, of the speech made by General Neguib at the inaugural meeting of the Constitutional Committee on 21st February. 2, General Neguib outlined the aims and achievements of the Army Revolution and said, that as the old regime had acted under the aegis of the 1983 Constitution, this had been abrogated. An interim Constitution had been proclaimed to safeguard civil rights during ths transition period. He went on to say that the history of Egypt had been distorted to show Its Inhabitants as a weak and worthless people. In fact, however, they had never abandoned their rights and In the early 19th Century had even before the nations of Europe had stabilised themselves drafted a Constitution which was now considered as a Declaration of Human Rights. Now true liberty must be assured to the people and he hoped that the Committee would draw up a Constitution upon which this liberty could be based. 3. The meeting was attended by those members of the Directing Council of the Revolution who were present in Cairo and by the Council of Ministers. 4, ALY MAKER was elected President of the Committee. Prior to his election, ALY ALLUBA, eldest member of the Committee in the absence through illness of AHMED LUTFY al SAYED, acted as chairman. In his speech in reply to General Neguib Alluba emphasised that good Deputies were more important than a good Constitution. 5. We are sending copies of this letter without enclosure to the British Middle East Office, Fayid, and tc the Information Division, British Middle East Office, Beirut. Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

AfT»1 r» AFRICAN DEPARTMENT J

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RP /S 3 7"///° ^-?° £f AH. BRITISH EMBASSY, CAIRO. No. 38 ^19611/9/53) 13th February, 1953. CONFIDENTIAL.

Sir, I have the honour to furnish an account of the Liberation Festival which as reported in my telegram No.16? of the 2?th January, was held here from January 23rd to January 26th. 2. Though the main object of the Festival was to celebrate the first six months of the Army Revolution of July 23rd, both the anniversary of the engagement between British forces and the Buluk al Nizam at Isrnailia in the Canal Zone on the 25th January and that of the Cairo riots on the 26th were included in the period of the celebrations. This inevitably caused some concern, particularly in foreign circles, who not only doubted the appropriateness of making the 25th and 26th January the occasion of public rejoicing but also feared that the festivities might be the occasion of disorders owing to the crowds which would be brought into the streets. Both my American colleague and I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs about the danger to public security from provocative and inflammatory speeches. As will be seen, the Egyptian Government made considerable efforts to reassure the feelings of foreign residents and to ensure that the celebrations were orderly. Diplomatic representatives were spared the ordeal of attending the Festivities. 3. Much publicity had been given to the Festival in the preceding weeks. A Liberation Hymn was composed for the occasion, a Liberation Badge was designed and in the streets of the capital a great deal of paintwork was carried out in the Liberation colours of red, white and black. Special arrangements for tourists were announced, including reduced fares on the railways, and delegations of foreign journalists were invited to attend the Festival as guests of the Egyptian Government. Among police precautions for the Festival may be mentioned the locking up of a number of well- known thugs and pickpockets and the decision that several of the more important factories should keep labour at work during the first days of the Festival. U. The ceremonies began early on the morning of the 23rd when General Neguib and provincial delegates together hoisted a large Egyptian flag to a flagpole specially erected on Liberty Square (formerly Ismailia Square). Pigeons were released as a token of peace and the General took his place before o row of microphones. Yifith him were the Coptic Patriarch, the Grand Rabbi and the Rector of Al Azhar. His inaugural/...

The Right Honourable Anthony Eden, M.C. , M.P. Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W. 1. inaugural speech outlined the glories of Egyptian history end the long-standing brotherhood between Egyptians and Sudanese. He dwelt on the evil caused by politicians, and on the burden of foreign occupation, and extolled the valour of the Egyptian people in resisting Turkish and French as well as British aggression. He concluded by announcing the inauguration of the Liberation Group, the civilian organisation established to support the .Army Movement, and then called upon the assembled multitude, which numbered about 100,000 persons, to repeat after him the Liberation Oath, which was done with great fervour and solemnity. 5» There followed a march past of representatives from the armed services while aircraft, including jets, flew low overhead. The rear of the parade was brought up by girl guides and boy scouts. As General Neguib prepared to leave, the crowd broke the restraining cordons and surrounded his car. It took a considerable time to clear a path for him. 6. The second day was devoted to sport. General Neguib attended a football match, and other sporting events of every description took place. The fun fair which had been set up in the gardens at the southern end of Gezira came into operation and has remained in full blast ever since. 7. On the 25th General Neguib unveiled the Police Memorial at ivbbassia to the 53 members of the Buluk al Nizam killed in Ismailia on 25th January, 1952. After General ;>bdel Ghani Barakat, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior, had denounced the British action against the Buluk al Nizam in violent terms, General Neguib made a speech in which he paid tribute to the martyrs who had fallen in Palestine and elsewhere as well as in Ismailia. 8. In the afternoon there was e procession of floats which symbolized the activities of the "regenerated" Government departments* The parade made a seven-mile circuit through the main Oairo streets and as the procession, which included a float in the form of a large black coffin to commemorate the 53 martyred Buluk al Nizam, passed before General Neguib in Liberty Square, 53 pigeons were released. 9» On the morning of the 26th wreaths were laid by General Neguib's representatives on the graves of the victims of the I riots a year ago, including those of British, Greek and Jewish I victims. In the afternoon there was another procession, this time composed of floats representing Egyptian commerce and industry. British as well as other foreign companies established in Egypt had been invited to send exhibits. It was later indicated that as a result of a comment which I had made to the Foreign Minister, and to avoid any suggestion that any pressure was exerted on them to participate, British companies need not take part. The Shell Company of Egypt (which is an Egyptian registered company) nevertheless provided a float. Before the procession started General Neguib welcomed the proprietors of those concerns which had suffered in last year's riots as guests of honour for the occasion. At the end of the parade the General made the closing speech of the Festival. In/... . *• 3 -

In it he thanked the people of Egypt for their support of the Revolution and for having proved, in the course of the Festival, that Egyptians could maintain order and discipline. He said that he could not accomplish the tasks ahead unaided and called upon every Egyptian to work whole-heartedly for the regeneration of the country and for its liberation from foreign occupation. 10. During the Festival Cairo was hung with flags and buildings were illuminated, though these decorations were not as impressive as those put up on certain occasions under the old regime. The crowds on the streets were unusually good-humoured and undemonstrative and submitted to not always gentle police control without any sign of resentment. The holiday spirit was general, business was good at places of entertainment, and the people seemed to be enjoying themselves in a generally orderly manner* 11» The keynote of the speeches made at the Festival was the slogan of the Army Revolution - Unity, Discipline, Work. The political parties and the British were castigated in official pronouncements for having weakened the country by causing dissension. In statements made during and imne diately after the Festival, General Neguib and his colleagues reiterated their determination to rebuild Egypt and to free it from foreign occupation by whatever means lay in their power. The campaign for unity and religious tolerance was furthered by the public and prominent association of the Rector of Al Azhar and the Coptic and Jewish leaders. Prayers for the success of the Revolution were offered in synagogues and churches. Of former Prime Ministers, only Aly Maher, however, was invited to attend. Mustapha el Nonas was conspicuously absent* 12. The degree of discipline was one of the striking features of the celebrations. The Army was obviously determined that there should be no hitch and not only did the ceremonies pass off with unprecedented punctuality but there was no sign of any untoward incidents having taken place. Control was almost entirely in the hands of the police though the Army, for the most part unobtrusively, remained at the ready throughout the Festival and took over the guarding of diplomatic establishments and residences. On one or two occasions Army officers intervened to break up minor souffles and to assist foreigners. 13. The successful staging of this Festival has contributed to the prestige of the Army Movement, and the striking fashion in which General Heguib was able daily to expose himself to the closest possible contact with the crowds was testimony to his continued personal popularity. Earlier in the month tension and uncertainty had increased sharply following Colonel Nasr's inflammatory statements and it was decreased by the drastic action taken on January 15th when 25 Army officers (including the ex-Regent Mehanna) and wafdist and Communist elements were arrested. By the 23rd, however, it was apparent that the High Military Committee had overcome these difficulties without sacrifice of popular support. The orderly conclusion of the celebrations increases the immediate stability of the new regime and se.es it, at least for the present, in firm control of the country. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 1" j- 3 4 5 « Rejerence:- t* j

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llj.. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Baghdad, Jeddo, Beirut, Damascus, /iimngn, Tel Aviv, Washington, Paris and .Ankara, and to the Head of British Middle Bast Office, Fayid, and the British Middle East Office, Beirut (for Merdiv). I have the honour to be, With the highest respect, Sir, Your most obedient, humble Servant, f J AFRICAN DEPARTMENT CGYPT AW) J -ll ~

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Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson No.99 Saving 30th April, 1953. Repeated Saving to :- Paris No.176 Washington No.147 Memin (Fayid) No.174 Ankara No.17 Beirut (for Merdiv.) No.53.

UNCLASSIFIED ' Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.99 Saving of 30th April, 1953, repeated for information,Saving to j Paris, Washington, Memin (Fayid), Ankara and Beirut (for J Merdiv). My Saving telegram No, 73'. j Press twenty ninth reports that the Constitution • sub-committee charged with laying down the broad lines : of the constitution approved on the 28th the recommendations of the 5-man steering Committee regarding the future system ; of government in Egypt. j 2. The following statement was issued : "The Committee considers that the most suitable regime for the country at present is a parliamentary republic and that the final word regarding the type of regime to be adopted rests with the people. The constitutional procedure for ascertaining the people's opinion is by means of a direct referendum in an atmosphere free from any restrictions imposed by martial law. The Committee therefore considers that a parliamentary republican regime should serve as the basis for the task of elaborating the new Constitution". 3. Three more committees have been formed to deal with electoral affairs, decentralised administration and the Judicial authority.

DISTRIBUTION Pile Legal Counsellor Library Information Dept. j^' T H.E. (2) Mr. St. John. w •* . . H.M.M, ^ H. of C. ' Oriental Counsellor fpfiiit ' fticorto OFFICE * 3 u & 6 Reference:- '!

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BRITISH EMBASSY, CAIRO. 1011/36/53 * 30th April, 1953- C01SIFIDMTIAL

Dear Department, We enclose herewith copies of two letters from the Consulate-General, Alexandria reporting on the visit of General Neguib and certain of his officers to Alexandria during the month of April. 2. These letters confirm other reports that we have received that these visits were not entirely successful and that the enthusiasm of the crowds no longer compares with that demonstrated during the first months of the revolutionary movement. Unfortunately doubts in the minds of the Council of the Revolutionary Command that they cannot cotnnand the undisputed loyalty of the Egyptian people tend to be reflected by increased intransigance in their dealings with the British. Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

African Department, Foreign Office, LONDON, 3.1.1. —— - - - pypL|C RECORD OFFICt i 2 •) 4 g « Reference:-

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COPY BRITISH CONSTATE GENERAL, ALEXANDRIA.

32/1/5-2 23rd April, 1953.

Dear Chancery, Our letter Ho. 32/1/5-1 of the 20th April about the recent visits of General Kegutb and Company to Alexandria. We have since heard of other instances of rowdiness at meetings. On the afternoon of Saturday the 18th April, the officers visited the Karmuz district where live most of the workers of the Socie'tfe Egyptienne dee Industries Textiles. These workers were distinctly out of hand and the gallant officers engaged in a slanging match with , them. As an English-speaking foreman later reported to the British manager with a beaming smile: "They called us b - s". There was also trouble on the Monday at the workshops of the Ports and Lights Administration, but we know no more about this than has appeared in the press. We doubt if the Council of the Revolutionary Command can be entirely satisfied with their visit to Alexandria and we rather wonder whether the Governor may not get Into trouble over these incidents. Yours ever, Consulate General,

Chancery, British Embassy, CAIRO. COPY BRITISH CONSULATE GKNSRAL, ALEXANDRIA. 32/1/5-1 20th April, 1953. CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Chancery, During the past three weeks, Alexandria has been cursed by an intensification of the Blessed Movement. Early in the month, there was a week of joyful tree- planting out at Amria. At the inaugural ceremony, the distinguished planters were closely followed by a large crowd who trampled under foot the infant trees, much as a goose does her newly-hatched goslings. But this appears to have been of little consequence. On another &ay a prominent English resident, yielding, to pressing invitations, went out early in the morning. He was received with much enthusiasm, but when he enquired where he could plant his tree, he was told that he could not yet do so because there had not been time to dig up the trees planted the day before. He was assured that the tree-planting was at present symbolical. Later on, the real forest would be planted. General Neguib also planted a tree during his recent visit and all Alexandria was invited to attend. It was assumed that it would be I a short aad beautiful ceremony - as the convent schoolgirl described the occasion when a visiting Bishop made one of the Sisters a Mother - but this was far from being the psse. The distinguished guests were taken to a large tent, par from the scene of operations, and though the General was unusually punctual, he disappeared into the blue for nearly two hours while the guests were slowly obliterated by the drifting sand. When General Neguib eventually arrived, trailing clouds of dust and crowds of Sudanese notables, like some conquering Caesar, pandemonium broke out. Press photographers climbed over the patient guests - who were, indeed, by now mere heaps of sand - women became hysterical and. officers shrieked down several micro- phones at once. When there was at last silence, the usual speeches were made lasting mother hour. It was noticed from press photographs the next day that the General had in fact planted a tree, but none of the guests was allowed to witness this sacred rite. The rest of General Neguib's visit followed the usual pattern of inspections, receptions and speeches and he seems to have received the same ovations, though there is a story of some boos having been heard at one meeting. Hot that the poor man himself was in a mood to care. He seemed dazed and exhausted. He would stand up In his jeep, waving his cap like an automaton, whether he was in the middle of an enthusiastic crowd or in a deserted street. Par worse than tte General's visit has been the past week of Liberation Rally, attended in turn by members of the Council of the Revolutionary Command.- Every quarter has had the privilege of holding mass meetings which were addressed by one or other f these gentlemen, #ho viea with /each Chancery, British Embassy, CAIRO. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE Reference:-

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each other in the virulence of their anti-British remarks. Every shortcoming that might be noticed in the Egypt of today was laid at the door of the "imperialists". Even individual Britons formerly in Egyptian Government service were singled out for blarne. Everybody was invited to stand behind the Army in the forthcoming struggle for liberation end few can have failed to get the impression that battle, murder and sudden death were just around the corner. Even the Governor expressed hinself in a private conversation as shocked at the recklessness of the present rulers of Egypt. Perhaps as dangerous as this fanatical talk were the promises they mode to workers - more wages, better terins of work, more employment; co-operatives to be owned by the workers and, of course, the full support of the Revolutionary Command against the employers. The trouble is thpt the workers may not realise that these promises, like the tree- planting, are symbolical. Yours ever, Consulate General.

P. S. We have since heard that, in spite of this wooing of the workers, the reception of these gallant officers at one or two factories, particularly at Belda Dyers and the Presses Libres, was not at all what they expected. There was a good deal of heckling; and shouting,' so much so that they cancelled a proposed visit to the Filature Natlonale. -Y CAIRO. 1011/W53 1st June, 1953. CONFIDENTIAL

Sir, In paragraph 2 of my despatch No.121 of the 21st May reference was made to the political apathy of the mass of the Egyptian population and to the failure of regime orators to divert attention from their preoccupation with the daily struggle for existence to the problem of "national aspirations". • There has in fact so far been a marked absence of these manifestations of anti-British feeling and acts of hostility to individuals which characterised the agitations of 1951 and previous similar occasions. This is observable just as much in the capital and large cities as in the rural areas, and warrants some analysis. 2, The regime has, of course, set its face resolutely since the outset against that sort of hooliganism, dear to certain elements of the Egyptian populace, out of which the majority of such incidents have sprung in the past. In addition tc this discouragement, there is at present the pre- occupation of the student body (always well to the front on rowdy occasions) with their examinations, and the fact that they are in any caso now deeply divided in their sympathies. The Wafd, the Moslem Brotherhood, the so-called Communists and the Liberation Rally share the students' allegiance between them, and to a certain extent tend to cancel each other out. Tho Moslem Brotherhood, who probably dispose of the most effective organisation, havo their own difficulties with the army .and are in consequence not yet united in their attitude towards either the regime rr ourselves. The result has boen a general lack cf support for the Liberation Sauads and indeed for any definite action in support of the regime, 3- This lack of enthusiasm is not confined to the student body. In the country as a whole there are the discouraging effects of economic difficulties, which inevitably loom largest in the minds of the peasantry and the working classes. There is also the fact that the regime has not itself so far set wholeheartedly about whipping up public feeling, neither has it permitted others to do so. There have been meetings and speeches ( the latter dwelling rf late as much on the need for restraint as for violence) but no organised demonstrations have been permitted. Ccrtninly the present regime has not indulged in the subsidising of demonstrators as did some of its predecessors, a fact which, may well account for a great deal of the indifference with which it meets, particularly amongst the students. iJor has the press been fully unleashed. Lastly there is the widespread feeling in the country against the regime itself, a feeling which in so many cases (the dispossessed landlords, the unemployed labourers, the shopkeepers, the dismissed army and police officers,the members of the former political parties etc.) stems from the fight frr survival, and is in consequence a great deal stronger than any fooling against us, 4. /... The Right Honourable Sir Wlnatm S. Churchill, K.Q., C.H., etc., Pcreign Office, LONDON, s.w. i. 1 fUBL(L KtUIHD UM'HJt i i y 4 5 6

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U. Nevertheless elements are net lacking from which an anti-British outburst cruld spring, or be conjured up. A few thousand well-trained and well-equipped me.n would be sufficient to cause a great deal of trouble in the canal Zone should the regime decide upon a "call to arms" and th.is number is not hard to find from amongst the political exaltes the riffraff, the Wafd (ready to push the army over the brink) and the Moslem Brethren (who may not participate officially or as a movement, but some of whose fanatics would probably seize the opportunity for an assault on the infidel). 5. Despite the absence, therefore, of any countrywide support at present for a policy of violence, the danger of violence remains, as always in a country as volatile as Egypt, at no great depth below the surface. It cruld be touched off accidentally or intentionally at very short notice and there is the danger in the present situation that a policy of violence in the Canal Zone might lead, as it did on 26th January 1952, to, demonstrations and disorders in the capital by the "liberators". 6. There is little doubt, however, that the Egyptian Government would spare no efforts to maintain order in the Delta, particularly in Cairo and Alexandria, and it is also probable that they are in some ways better equipped to deal with mob violence than were their immediate predecessors. A considerable number of troops have recently been concentrated in the capital (the Kasr el Nil Barracks have been re-occupied) the Cairo City police has been equipped with patrol cars in wireless communication with Headquarters, and their Commandant is confident, in spite of the disorganisation of the Force during the past nine months, of his ability to deal with troublemakers. Nevertheless, the risk of disorders in the Canal Zone spreading to the Delta is very real and the consequences might well prove disastrous both for the security of the foreign communities and for the survival rf the regime itself. If the latter therefore were deliberately to embark on a campaign of violence against the British forces it would do so, in present circumstances, at the risk of finding this weapon turn in its hand. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head cf the British Middle East Office at Pay id, and tc Her Majesty's Representatives in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Ankara, Washington, and Paris. I have the honour to be, With the highest respect, Sir, Your most obedient, humble Servant, AFRICAN DEPARTMENT /£'

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SAVING TELEGRAM En Clelr FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson No. 73 Saving Date: 26th March, 1953- Repeated Saving to:- Prris Mo. ll|l Washington No. 112 ^cmiri (Fryid) No. 137 UNCLASSIFIED Ankara No. 11. Beirut(for l.!erdiv)Ho.U5. Addroseod to Foreign Office seving telegram lo. 73 of 26th March, 1953, reported saving to Psris No. llil, Washington No. 112 end Mernin (Feyid) ito. 137., Anlcara NO.H. Beirut (for Merdiv) No.W. Press tv/enty-fifth reports that a five-mrn sub-committee composed of Haitres Abdel Razzrk el Srnhury, nrkrfin Ebeid, Abdel Rohmrn el Rrf'ei, Osmr.n Khrlil rnd Dr. Sayed Sabri, unoniraously recommended to the Constitutional Committee thtt the future system of government in Egypt should, subject to a plebiscite, be a parliamentary republic. 2. In their editorials Al Tchrir rnd Akher Lrhza demend tjie immediete proclrmetion of"a republic. I 1 LI i rnPYB/CHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE Sir Ralph Stevenson No. 75 Saving 27th March, 1953. Repeated Saving to:- »*ashin> ton No. 115, "*'" Paris No. 146, Ankara No. 13, Memin (Fayid) Jtfo. 140, Beirut (for MJrdiv) No. 46.

UNCLASSIFIED Addressed to Foreign Offide telegram No. 75 Saving of 27th March, repeated for information Saving to;- Washington, Paris, Ankrra, Memin (Fayid) and Beirut. / My telegram No. 73'Saving. 0

* The question of republic versus monarchy has been actively debated in the editorial columns in the past few days. The pro- Wafdist Al Nidaaof the 24th suggested that neither in a republic n:,r in a monarchy v;.o.s there any inherent virtue. VtMchever system war adopted it would only work if the people insisted on having their rights respected. The Moslem Brotherhood organ Al Da1&wa was similarly non-committal and asked whether the Constitution Committee knew what type of constitution the nation wanted.

2. 1/?ith the publication of the Constitutional Sub-Committee's decision in favour of a republic on the 25th, Mohamed el label in Akher Lahza was more outspoken and demanded the proclamation of the end of the Mohamed Ali dynasty. The people were fed up with the dynasty and it was not necessary to consult them about its removal any more than it had been necessary "to consult them about the removal of Farouk. If he had been hanged the question would have been settled finally. In the case of war he would be in a position to play the trump card - King Ahmed Fuad II - which remained in his hand. Even if the people should subsequently declare for a monarchy rather than for a republic it would still be better to find someone ether than a descendant of Mohamed Ali to sit on the throne of Egypt.

3. The Army fortnightly Al '^'ahrir was even more offensive. "Why should we care if Narriman divorces King Farouk or not, if she is pregnant or not, or if the ex-King has mistresses or not? Y.'hen the people dismissed Farouk they dismissed monarchy. The infant l.ing will not be any better than his ancestors?, the idiot Said, Ismail who squandered the country's wealth on his own pleasures, Tewfik the traitor who sought British help against Orabi the Fellah, Fuad the tool in the hands of the imperialists, and Farouk whose wickedness became proverbial. 7»re have had enough of monarchy. It stinks. It is tyrannical. It is wicked. fte want a republic...... at oncel" APR cqi AFRICAN DEPARTMENT J 1953 fcv.TT A*

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V BRITISH EMBASSY ,-^Y i CAIRO. . ^ Ho. 1043/94/53. )th March, 1953. Q ..& -V HBSTRIOTEP. *\> \ llv

Dear Department, / \J /'' ,: We enclose a cppjr of, Egyptian News Agency release of S3r*d M^rch giving the interview of Rohert/Kleiuian of "United States News and World/Report™ with General Neguib. This release was keferred to in our telegrams Nos.546 and 547 of 25th March. 2. Copies of the release are also heing sent to the Political Division of the British Middle East Office, Payid, and to Chancery, Washington. Yours ever,

CHANCERY. to.

African Department, Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W. 1. G

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TOP SECRET FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE1 Cypher/OTP FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND 17HTEBHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Howe No. D. 11.00 a.m. 31st March, 1953. 31st March, 1953. R. 11.51 a.m. 31st March, 1953. TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 23-t of 31st March Repeated for information to:- Cairo A prominent member of Khatmia had an interview with Salah Salem on night of 27th March and has declared that Salem tried to get him to agree to keep Khatmia on the side of a boycott. The Khatmi refused to agree. I am also informed by a fairly reliable person that Ummft leaders protested vehemently to Major Salem Salah about Egyptian propaganda now rampant in Sudan. Foreign Office pass Cairo as my telegram No. 169. [Repeated to Cairo].

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The Egyptian Embassy have supplied the following list of the members of the Council of the Revolutionary Command: General Muhamad Ileguib Lt.-Gol. Garaal Abd al Nasr Major Salah Salem Major Abd al Hakim All Amr Major Muhamad Kamal al Din Hussain Wing Commander Ali Baghdad! Sq.-Ldr. Hassan Ibrahim Lt.-Col. Zakaria Abd al Magid Muhi al Din Wing Commander Gamal Salem Lt«-Col» Huasain Shafey Group Captain Huseain Zulficar Lt.-Col. Muhamad Anwar al Sadat

Uth May. 1953. (The above are not necessarily in order of importance).