Fo#371/102704
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
.* a Kaference:- 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 COPYRIGHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPH! CALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION \ Registry t No. vn.*^ 0 s Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Openn. t lisf o[ Draff. ietfe. ' U/e g -fcc Ul X c z ut a*Md tt w» if v* ' uu (A x, 3l- 0 •J M M TiutOUH I (/ 1 Tto F* fcMC r AFRICAN DEPARTMENT I J ,.. ' ' / ry— 4 Last Paper. (Minutes.) "ttu ^ References. (a) a»> 011'* no Afaor (Print.) (How ditpoaed of.) |kJlw<vn • ( S*IL pa/**»*pi K- jfl Lotion (Index.) J Next Paper. fc, *fr sum FO ( PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE Reference!- COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION _u Av^rxUrv~-x A x> /T AFRICAN DEPARTMENT J 1953 EGYPT AND SUDAN FROM d.C. C*0~t*<-t' e/ r < / / ~ 7 *fe/" *~ - ^ /s S~l~*—*-* s-t-f-~^- No. Dated Received in Registry — ^ References 1L « MEVUTES % M<*- ^ 4 fe 0 i- 'V.'o \ (How disposed of) Action ""- (ladez) ttipleted) CU5&JLV i»tv*?>s! wrt ?v.t A ' ? n a 6 Reference:- t 2 P^b^,'• — ' 7(• /1 j//O 3«C Vn^/ C* ^- ^^r^;Q^/V C — 7 / C*^SC O I 1 1 1 1 \ \ 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION f , /^jLu* ^rte u I BRITISH EMBASSY, No. 12V(101lAl/53) CAIRO. CONFIDENTIAL Hist May, 1953• J Sir, In recent weeks opposition to the Array regime has revived and is now undoubtedly more widespread and outspoken than on the previous occasions in September and November of 1952 and in January and March of this year when counter-measures against hostile elements were taken by the Revolutionary Command (repressive in three of the four instances). The growing hostility is clearly indicated by the reactions of the people to speeches made by officers of the Revolutionary Command particularly when on tour outside Cairo. Inscriptions expressing in vulgar terms that Farouk would be preferable to Naguib have also appeared in public places in Cairo. --''^f f (Of^ '/, t> 2. After General Naguib 's tour of Upper Egypt (my despatch No. 9^ of 21st April), which is now known to have been rather less successful than at first appeared, officers of the Revolutionary Command toured the country whipping up support for the Liberation Rally (my saving telegram No. 92 of 29th April, paragraph 2). Together with officers organizing the Rally, notably Major Ibrahim al Tahawi, the Assistant Secretary-General, they covered both Upper and Lower Egypt, making their main effort at Alexandria. During this campaign, which still continues, it has become apparent that considerable sections of the people are growing tired of the Army Revolution. The speeches have followed the lines of those delivered by General Naguib in Upper Egypt* More attention has been paid to industry and commerce, in the way of actual visits to establishments; but references to social and economic development have become vaguer and denunciations of the British more violent, partly no doubt as a result of the apathy or even hostility of some of the audiences. The former have roused little interest, but the latter have provoked widely differing reactions, alarming the upper classes, causing exaltation among the hallVeduoated and whetting the appetite for loot of the dregs of the cities. It has, however, probably passed over the heads of the mass of the population, agricultural as well as industrial, who are only concerned with the struggle for existence* The mood of the rural masses at the moment appears to be one of political apathy. 3« Responsible elements and those with a stake in the country are undoubtedly alarmed by these speeches, which reached a peak of violence in the second half of April and which are now being resumed with full force* They can clearly foresee the consequences of this type of /hysteria. The Right Honourable Sir Winston S. Churchill, K.G., C.H. , etc., Foreign Office, London, S.W.I. The Governor of Alexandria, for example, has in private conversation said that he was shocked by the recklessness of Egypt's present rulers, and Squadron Leader Hassan Ibrahim (a member of the Revolutionary Command himself) thought that on occasions anti-British vehemence had been taken too far. The half-baked - those with some pretensions to education but with no great claim to intelligence - who form an appreciable fraction of the politically conscious, are probably the most fervent supporters of the new regime. These, whether they belong to the Liberation Rally, or to the Moslem Brotherhood, are the would-be martyrs who take these speeches to heart. They are the mainstay of the volunteer training camps, and send messages to Nagulb signed in blood, and telegrams to this Embassy stating that they seek 'evacuation or annihilation.1. In the event of disturbances they, together with the riffraff forming the bulk of the city mobs, would be the dangerous fanatical element. The aspirations expressed by the Revolutionary command officers pass over the heads of the riffraff, who are strongly moved only by the promises of conflict and annihilation (of other people) offering prospects of excitement and loot. They did well at the burning of Cairo last year and would enjoy a repeat performance. 4-* The reactions of the organised and articulate political (or quasl-poiltical) bodies, the Wafd and the Moslem Brotherhood are, of course, determined to a greater extent by what they conceive to be their own Interests. The former would not eeem to be unduly distressed by the possibility of the renewal of suicidal attacks on our forces and are quietly encouraging the excesses of the army leaders. They are comfortably aware that such attacks will disrupt the country and the present regime and will give them a chance to regain power. The question of their ability to retain it has probably not occurred to them. The Moslem Brotherhood, however, do not appear to be entirely happy about the situation. Their extremists, perhaps, carry xenophobia to the point where they, too, would gladly pull Egypt down and preach among the ruins; but the more moderate are worried on two counts* First, they are afraid that the Army's demagogic tactics may prove too successful. They are Jealous of even the limited progress that has been made with building up the Liberation Group, fearing that it may develop into a solid and loyal body which would relieve the Army Movement of any dependence on the Brotherhood, Secondly, they are afraid that their organisation may not survive the threatened chaos. At the moment the Moslem Brotherhood is the only reasonably well disciplined body in the country, apart from the Army itself, and it is nearer to exercising real power than was ever the case in the past. It has no \vish either to be pushed aside by the complete success of the Army Movement or to be destroyed with the Movement if it goes down fighting. Nevertheless, there is little or no doubt that, if the struggle turns from cold to hot war, the Brotherhood and its Kataibs (or paramilitary formations) will be at the disposal of the-Militery Authorities. The Brotherhood will certainly endeavour to make the regime pay their price for their support i.e. an Islamic constitution and the continued separate identity (with the right to maintain a paramilitary organisation) of the Brotherhood. But even if the regime refuse to pay this price, it is /unlikely unlikely that the Brotherhood would withhold their eventual support. 5. The Industrial workers and the fellaheen form two further categories, whose reactions to the officers' pronouncements are governed primarily by sectional considerations and who merit some separate consideration. Their feelings, particularly those of industrial workers, have become increasing^ ugly and audiences, swayed chiefly by emotional delivery, have paid less ^attention than ever to the content of the speeches. The new regime has disappointed their expectations and owing to financial stringency and for other reasons, ; which are to the credit of the regime, has not endeavoured to any great extent to whip up support by the paid "claque" and financially subsidised demonstrations which were features of previous regimes. 6» The grievances of peasants and workers are real enough. There Is rising discontent amongst the fellaheen who miss the services, both social and agricultural, formerly provided by their landlords (on^whatever extortionate terms in some cases) and which the new regime lias not as yet replaced. The plight of the landless xvorkers Is serious; they offer their labour at half or less of the legal daily wage of FT.16, but even so are often turned away by landlords unable or afraid to employ them. Industrial workers, though victims also of the high cost of living, have less grounds for complaint. They are on the other hand better placed 'to make their grievances felt. Workers at a large mill at Damanhour recently refused to turn out to hear a speech by General Nagulb, and Colonel Sadat, who visited their place of work in an effort to placate them, was received with scant courtesy. (Incidentally, Colonel Naser was similarly heckled by a group of left-wing students during his visit to Alexandria University.; Action was subsequently taken against the ringleaders which it appears was effective. Similar measures have had to be taken in other factories. In general, unemployment is increasing in both town and^ country, and the publicised labour reforms of the new regime have remained on paper for lack of resources with which to Implement them. Those affected are not particularly pleased with the New Egypt and are begin!ng to show little hesitation In saying BO.